

EVALUATION REPORT

SAVE THE CHILDREN GUATEMALA

Draft version, 07.10.08

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary	2
1 Introduction.....	6
1.1 Background.....	6
1.2 Save the Children Guatemala.....	6
1.3 The evaluation.....	7
2 Findings.....	11
2.1 Organizational issues	11
2.1.1 Governance	11
2.1.2 Strategic planning	14
2.1.3 Administration	16
2.1.4 Role within the Alliance	18
2.2 Programs	20
2.2.1 Background.....	20
2.2.2 Findings.....	21
2.3 Communication.....	26
2.3.1 Image building	27
2.3.2 Advocacy	29
2.3.3 Child Rights awareness-raising.....	32
2.3.4 Fundraising	32
2.4 Channeling funds to Guatemalan NGOs.....	36
2.5 Impacts of the SCN support.....	37
3 Conclusions.....	41
4 Recommendations.....	44
4.1 For SCG	44
4.2 For SCN	45
Appendices.....	47
Appendix 1 Terms of Reference	47
Appendix 2 MDPP Program and Budget Description	48
Appendix 3 People and Institutions Met.....	49
Appendix 4 Key Reference Documents.....	52

Executive Summary

Save the Children Norway (SCN) has been working in Guatemala since the 1976 earthquake, with an in-country office throughout practically the whole period. Among other partners, SCN has been cooperating with Save the Children Guatemala (SCG) since it was founded in 1983. In 2003, SCN decided to support the SCG ambition of becoming *the* Save the Children organization representing the SC Alliance in Guatemala. For SCN, this decision implied on the one hand phasing out direct support to other Guatemalan partner organizations and closing down its country office by 2009. On the other hand, it also meant strong support for the SCG process of institutional strengthening, in order to enable the organization to realize its added responsibilities in the best possible manner.

As agreed in the 2006-2008 cooperation agreement between SCN and SCG, an external evaluation of SCG should be held by the end of the cooperation period, in order to serve as the basis for discussions on future cooperation. Comprehensive Terms of Reference were developed by SCN with three main objectives:

- Assess the current organizational capacity of SCG
- Evaluate the impacts of SCN support for building organizational capacity in SCG
- Identify needs for further support and make recommendations for focus, design and scope of future support from SCN to SCG

The emphasis of the evaluation is on learning. It is a participatory evaluation in the sense that one representative of SCG has been part of the team. Fieldwork in Guatemala took place between September 2nd and 12th 2008.

FINDINGS

Organization

In terms of the SCG governance structure, there is still some way to go before the SC Alliance guidelines of best practices are adhered to. Yet, the process is moving in the right direction. The Board of Directors is increasingly involved in the strategic management of the organizations, and mechanisms to ensure proper selection and rotation of board members are gradually being improved. SCG might consider whether its current administrative structure is the optimal for promoting an efficient division of labor and use of resources.

In terms of strategic planning, the elaboration of the 2006 strategy document implied a significant step forward. It is a strategy document that is focused, rights-oriented and that is being used in practice. SCG has also exhibited a planned approach to overcome its organizational weaknesses, and to assume the responsibilities associated with being the representative of the SC Alliance in Guatemala. However, there are also clear gaps in strategic thinking. Most serious is the lack of immediate attention to the issues of long-term financial sustainability, the danger of building a too large administrative structure, the limited advances in terms of fundraising, and the growing dependence on one donor. Moreover, the evaluation team sees it as a strategic weakness that there have been no attempts at developing an overall communication strategy.

SCG has greatly strengthened its administrative capacity, not only in terms of internal management of staff, funds and other resources, but also with respect to fulfilling donor requirements for producing plans, accounts and reports on time. Today the organization appears solid and dependable – even if not exactly ‘lean and mean’.

With the help of the SC organizations of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, SCG has been able to assume many of the responsibilities of being the SC representative in Guatemala. The relation to SC USA is more complicated. While positive coordination mechanisms giving key responsibility to SCG are in place in some areas (education, emergency response), the continuing operative role of SC USA creates difficulties for the image building of SCG. Should SC USA engage in fundraising and lobbying inside Guatemala, such problems would be greatly increased. Understandably SCG views this with considerable concern.

Programs

We concur with previous assessments that this is an area of strength of SCG. Programs are based on a clear and rights-based strategy, where components complement and mutually strengthen each other, and there is considerable focus on making state institutions assume their obligations with respect to key child rights, partly through working in broad alliances with other civil society organizations. The strategy moreover emphasizes child participation and contains an exit strategy from the time of entry into an area. Furthermore, programs are implemented by staff that seem well qualified, motivated and committed, and at the local level, excellent relations have been established with local authorities.

There are still a number of areas where SCG can improve its programs. Perhaps most importantly this relates to how to work with the local development councils (COCODES). These voluntary councils are central for the program strategy, yet in practice prove to be difficult to reach with the current model of technicians working normal hours. Furthermore, in the near future, SCG will have to assess the costs and benefits of the innovative and interesting, yet challenging model of working through the municipality, which is being tried out in Chiquimula, and decide whether this model should be scrapped, modified, and/or extended to other areas. Finally, there is still a considerable distance to go before the program monitoring and evaluation system is in place and functioning.

Communication

While the program area is the strong side of SCG and the organizational side has advanced significantly, the communication area must be said to be lagging behind. There is a need for developing an overall strategy that covers and integrates the objectives, activities and targets for the four separate, but highly interrelated areas of image building, advocacy, awareness-raising and fund-raising.

In terms of image building, the SCG is well-known and has a good reputation among NGOs and state institutions working with child rights and related issues. In spite of some increase in media coverage over the last years, the organization remains relatively little

known among the general public. A serious complication for building the desired image of the organization is the continued presence and activity of SC USA. Also the fact that the name of the organization is in English is an issue which makes it more challenging to communicate what SCG is.

In advocacy and lobbying, SCG is doing a lot at the local level. At national level, efforts are weaker. Here, SCG follows the strategy of working together with other organizations, and belongs to a number of networks that are highly relevant for its objectives. However, the activity levels of SCG within these networks appear to have been fairly low over the past few years. SCG has not developed any strategic focus on key issues for concentrating lobbying and advocacy efforts.

In awareness-raising, the SCG programs have considerable effects at the local level. There is little attention to doing such work at the national level. Given the many challenges faced by SCG, this is probably a wise way of prioritizing resources.

Fundraising is an area where little has been achieved. Indeed, from one perspective developments have been negative, as the number of international donors has been reduced, while fundraising from national sources remain negligible. This is a priority area where SCG needs to dedicate efforts immediately. In the short to medium term, it is realistically only international funding that can significantly alter the current financial dependence on one donor. SCG possesses the basic skills for developing proposals, but need to do this with much greater intensity and upgrade skills at donor mapping and communication. In terms of national fundraising, there have only been limited advances in spite of the efforts made, probably largely due to factors external to SCG. The team believes that there is a potential for developing fundraising within Guatemala, but this poses a dilemma. In order to pursue this strategy, there is a need for continued and perhaps increased support for this component. Yet there is no guarantee that this strategy will be successful and that the investment will pay off.

Channeling funds to other Guatemalan organizations

This is something that SCG already has some experience with, after having had this role on behalf of the SC organizations of Denmark and Sweden. Even if this activity will be considerably expanded when also funds from SCN are transferred in this way, we do not foresee any difficulties for SCG in handling the technical side of this. The challenge will be how to develop the role as a funding partner over and above the channeling of funds and following up reports and accounts. Furthermore, SCG needs to make a strategic decision on whether this is a role that it wants to take on permanently, and follow up the implications of this decision.

Impacts of the SCN support

Over the period of SCN support for organizational strengthening, SCG has advanced significantly. Still, many of the targets for the institutional support program have not been met. We see this as primarily reflecting over-ambitious goals.

While the specific contribution of SCN support cannot be singled out, it is clear that SCN funding has been fundamental for many of the improvements that have taken place. Likewise, the ‘political’ support that SCN has given SCG within the SC Alliance has been of crucial importance for SCG to assume the role as the national representative.

However, the SCN support has also contributed to an institutional strengthening process of a form that has given too little attention to issues of long-term financial sustainability of the organization.

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

For SCG

1. The most important challenge facing SCG relates to the financial issues of very high dependence on one donor and the problem of long-term economic sustainability of a large administrative structure. SCG needs to address these issues immediately and seriously. Efforts must be made in the following areas:
 - a. International fundraising.
 - b. National fundraising.
 - c. Cost-cutting.
2. SCG should develop an overall communication strategy. This should include fundraising – both national and international – as well as image building, advocacy and awareness-raising.
3. The dialogue with SC USA should be continued and seek to establish ways of minimizing confusion and negative impacts on SCG image building and fundraising from the existence of two SC organizations in the country.
4. SCG needs to make a strategic decision on whether it wants to be a funding organization.

For SCN

1. SCN should consider carefully the implications of its co-responsibility for developing an administrative structure within SCG that may be difficult to sustain without continued Norwegian core funding. A future strategy for supporting SCG must combine acceptance of responsibility for what has been developed with efforts focused at creating sustainability.
2. SCN should support SCG in implementing the recommendations above. This means supporting the costs of developing international and national fundraising capacity, as well as costs of developing an overall communication strategy.
3. In addition to funding for these processes, SCN should seek to contribute to developing the skills needed in the areas of fundraising and general communication.
4. SCN should seek to use its position and influence within the SC Alliance to obtain agreements with SC USA that will minimize the problem of having a foreign SC organization working in a country where there is a functioning national organization.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Save the Children Norway (SCN) has been working in Guatemala since the 1976 earthquake, with an in-country office throughout practically the whole period. Among other partners, SCN has been cooperating with Save the Children Guatemala (SCG) since it was founded in 1983. The organization previously bore the name Alianza para Desarrollo Juvenil Comunitario (ADEJUC), but was identified as a member of the Save the Children Alliance and used 'Save the Children Guatemala' as an additional name on its letterhead. In 2004 the organization changed its name to the current Save the Children Guatemala. In order to avoid confusion, this report will consistently refer to the organization as SCG, even when dealing with the period before 2004 when it was known as and presented itself as ADEJUC.

In 2003, SCN decided to increase its support for the SCG ambition of strengthening its role within the international Save the Children Alliance, an ambition which included taking on the role as *the* Save the Children organization representing the Alliance in Guatemala. For SCN, this decision implied on the one hand phasing out direct support to other Guatemalan partner organizations and closing down its country office by 2009. On the other hand, it also meant strong support for the SCG process of institutional strengthening, in order to enable the organization to realize its added responsibilities in the best possible manner. Also program support has increased over the period, and SCN has expressed its commitment to maintaining levels of support for SCG also in coming years. Thus, SCN has become the by far most important donor of SCG.

1.2 Save the Children Guatemala

SCG has evolved considerably over the years, from being a community development organization with a certain focus on women and youth, into becoming an organization with a very clear rights orientation and an explicit targeting of children and youth. This has been a gradual transformation over more than a decade. For understanding the context of the present evaluation, it is important to point out that the organization went through a period of deep crisis in 2001-2003. This was a crisis of several dimensions. At the leadership level, it involved tensions between the Board and the Director, and led to the latter being replaced in 2002 by the current Director. At a staff level, it involved serious conflicts between staff members, as well as deficient lines of communication within the organization. There was also a strategic or ideological element to the crisis, related to disagreements over the appropriateness of being engaged in food distribution through the large USAID-funded PROMASA program. SCG also had difficulties in implementing this program efficiently, and progress was far behind plans. There were also significant problems in fulfilling donor requirements for this and other partnerships, particularly with respect to financial reporting. When in 2003 the PROMASA contract was terminated by the donor due to the delays in implementation, serious economic problems arose. As a consequence, SCG was forced to reduce the number of employees.

In the years since this low point, the situation has changed considerably. Since 2002, the current Director and the Board have cooperated well. The serious staff conflicts were resolved, among other things by letting some people go as part of the process of downsizing. The loss of the PROMASA project made the economic situation difficult, but it did help resolve the ideological conflict within the organization, and also aided the process of transition to a purely rights-oriented organization. Institutional support from the SC organizations of Sweden (2003-2005) and Norway alleviated the economic crisis and has led to a general strengthening of the SCG administration.

A key element of the Norwegian support to institutional strengthening is the Member Development Programme Partner (MDPP) Program. This has been designed with a view to overcoming the organizational challenges faced by SCG, as well as to the requirements for becoming a 'Strong Member' of the Save the Children Alliance. The program document sets out specific targets and milestones for achievements throughout the program period 2007 to 2009, and is enclosed to the present report as Appendix 2.

Currently SCG implements its programs in four program areas with individual field offices – Chiquimula, Livingston, Canilla and Tacaná. The programs comprise different components that are all aimed at promoting child rights and empowering local communities. They include interventions targeted at children, youth, mothers, teachers and local community development organization (COCODES). Furthermore, as part of the programs, SCG organizes civil society alliances for promoting child-oriented municipal development plans.

1.3 The evaluation

The SCN office in Guatemala will close down in March 2009. As agreed in the 2006-2008 cooperation agreement between SCN and SCG, an external evaluation of SCG should be held by the end of the cooperation period, in order to serve as the basis for discussions on future cooperation. Comprehensive Terms of Reference for the evaluation were developed by SCN (see Appendix 1). Fundamentally, three objectives were included:

- Assess the current organizational capacity of SCG
- Evaluate the impacts of SCN support for building organizational capacity in SCG
- Identify needs for further support and make recommendations for focus, design and scope of future support from SCN to SCG

The Terms of Reference lists a number of different areas to be investigated with respect to these questions. Furthermore, reference is made to the goals and indicators of the institutional development program (see Appendix 2), which specify further issues to be looked into. The following list summarizes the most important areas the team is asked to look into

- The effectiveness of internal organization and administration
- The capacity to produce plans, reports and accounts on time
- The management of Human Resources

- The systems for delegating authority to ensure smooth operations
- The relations between SCG's head office and its field offices
- The development of a more active and better institutionalized Board of Directors
- The establishment of a fundraising unit
- The capacity to implement programs
- The development of improved systems for monitoring and evaluation of programs
- The capacity to scale up activities and take on new commitments
- The capacity to create and work with alliances, and to work with other civil society and government institutions
- The capacity to do national level advocacy work
- The ability to integrate a Child Rights based approach in all aspects of its work
- The ability to address imbalances related to issues of gender and indigenous peoples in the programs
- SCG's coordination of the Alliance's international campaign for education in conflict and post-conflict countries 'Rewriting the Future'
- The impact of contextual factors for SCG and its programs
- The capacity to channel and follow up funding from SCN to other Guatemalan SCN partner organizations

Thematically, it was decided to focus on the education programs of SCG, which is the largest program area of the organization. It was also decided to include visits to the field offices of Chiquimula and Livingston. The emphasis of this evaluation is on learning: how to further strengthen the capacity of SCG and how to target future support from SCN in order to achieve this. Conversely, there is less emphasis on the evaluation aspects of control and audit. This is also reflected in the composition of the evaluation team, which consists of two external members (one Norwegian and one Guatemalan consultant), plus one internal member representing the SCG staff. Axel Borchgrevink, anthropologist and senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, has been the team leader. He has broad experience with civil society development cooperation, including some previous engagement with SCN in Guatemala. Miriam Bolaños is the other external consultant, with a wide experience of Guatemalan civil society organizations and development cooperation, among other things within the fields of indigenous peoples and intercultural and bilingual education. Rubelci Alvarado, head of SCG's program department, and with two decades of experience within the organization, completed the team with the knowledgeable insider's perspective.

Initial interviews with SCN staff in Norway were carried out by the team leader in late August 2008. Actual fieldwork in Guatemala took place between September 2nd and 12th. It included interviews with a broad range of SCG staff at the head office, with different SCN staff which have been working closely with the SCG, and with field office staff and program stakeholders. The latter include representatives of different beneficiary groups – children, youth, women, and teachers – as well as municipal employees and elected officials. An interview was also made with two representatives of the SCG Board of Directors. Furthermore, a range of different institutions with which SCG cooperates and coordinates were interviewed. This included Save the Children USA, a number of NGOs at local and national level, a number of networks and alliances where SCG participates,

as well as UNICEF and the Vice-Ministry for Intercultural and Bilingual Education within the Ministry of Education. (See Appendix 3 for a complete list of persons and institutions met.)

As always, there are methodological limitations to the evaluation that should be pointed out. As is evident from the above, the objectives of the evaluation are very broad, and the time allotted for fieldwork is relatively limited. This means that all areas cannot be covered in similar depth. In setting the priorities for where to dig deeper, we have attempted to focus on the main objectives of the evaluation. The Terms of Reference give priority to assessing organizational capacity over investigating the impact of programs, and this is the way we have prioritized our work. Of course we cannot completely ignore the effectiveness of the programs when we are assessing SCG's organizational capacity, but in terms of impacts of programs we can only offer estimates based on the opinions and statements of a limited sample of stakeholders. Furthermore, in the overall spirit of a learning evaluation, we have tended to concentrate on those areas where improvements may be made. Thus this is not necessarily a balanced presentation where strengths and weaknesses are given equal weight. Finally, the composition and competence of the team has some implications for which areas we are able to discuss in depth. As an illustration, while we are not in the position to evaluate the decision on the recent purchase of a new computer program for accounts and finances, we do feel qualified to comment on the new program monitoring and evaluation system that is being developed.

The fact that this is a participatory evaluation in the sense of having in the team a representative of the organization to be evaluated has other implications. It will inevitably affect the information collected. On the one hand, having an insider on the team means that misunderstandings can be quickly cleared up. On the other hand, it will almost certainly have affected what people we interview are willing to discuss and how they talk about it, particularly as Rubelci Alvarado is the superior of the majority of the SCG staff interviewed. This is something we cannot avoid, and we have no way of knowing whether and to what extent it has biased our findings. Anyway, the great advantage of this participatory way of working is that the findings of the evaluation will to some extent be 'internally produced', and they are therefore much more likely to be accepted. Similarly, recommendations should be more liable to be acted upon. In this respect, an important advantage that we have had is that discussions within the evaluation team have been positive and productive. The internal team member has not seen it as his role to defend SCG at all costs, and the process of arriving at joint conclusions has been quite unproblematic.

As we are asked to assess the effects of the SCN support for organizational strengthening, we face the methodological difficulties of establishing both what changes have taken place over this period, as well as the extent to which these changes are due to the Norwegian support. In terms of the first issue, we have the advantages of being able to draw upon a thorough organizational evaluation from 2003, as well as an externally facilitated organizational self-assessment from 2005/2006. These documents thus serve as a baseline reference, which, when compared to our own assessments of current organizational capacity, allows us to infer what changes have taken place. The question

of attribution – i.e. deciding whether observed changes are due to the SCN support or to other factors – is trickier. It is clear that there are a number of factors that have affected organizational development over this period – SCG’s own efforts at improving, and support from Save the Children Sweden, are obvious examples. Identifying the relative impacts of these and other factors, as well as of the SCN support, is methodologically and theoretically an impossible task. Conclusions in this respect must therefore necessarily remain fairly vague.

2 Findings

2.1 Organizational issues

2.1.1 Governance


SCG has a governance structure with a General Assembly as the maximum authority. The Assembly elects the Board of Directors, which oversees the work of the Director General and the rest of the SCG administration. The 2003 evaluation and the 2005/6 self-assessment both identify problems in making this governance structure function according to the principles of the Save the Children Alliances Best Practices. According to these assessments, the Board has been

- a) little involved and not assuming its responsibilities for overseeing the organization
- b) dominated by the staff members of the Board (according to SC Best Practices, staff members ought not to sit on the Board at all)
- c) lacking knowledge of the proper functions of a Board, as well as of specific issues such as financial management where Board control is particularly important
- d) recruited from too small a pool (the General Assembly) to ensure rotation and necessary competence

At the same time, the documents recognize the difficulties in Guatemala of finding qualified people who are willing to take on unpaid Board positions, and the consequent need to adapt the structure to local conditions.

The MDPP sets out a number of milestone targets for revising the board structure. Some of them have been carried out according to plan. Thus, a new Board was established in March 2007, with the required replacement of half its former members. Similarly, a number of training workshops have been carried out for Board and Assembly members, and the Board vice-president and president participated in the 2006 and 2007 annual meetings of the international Save the Children Alliance respectively. Moreover, the Board has become increasingly active – evidenced for instance by its engagement in dialogue with Save the Children USA, and Board members have expressed their commitment to participate in fundraising activities. What appears not to have been implemented is the elaboration of a ‘Development Plan’ for the Board of Directors (planned to be completed by 31.12.2007).

There are still some structural problems to be addressed with regards to the Board. Firstly, two staff representatives (Director and Program Director) remain full Board members with voting rights, among a total of nine members. (Up to 2003, 50% of Board members were recruited from the staff.) SCG plans to end this practice with the change of Board members in the first half of 2009, after which no staff members will have voting rights on the Board. Secondly, the SCG bylaws state that Board Members are to be elected among the members of the General Assembly. Board members are elected for two



years and can be reelected only once. As currently the General Assembly counts with only 13 members (appointed for life) – of which four are employees of SCG¹ – it is in practice impossible to have proper rotation according to the bylaws, or to ensure that the Board composition covers all the required areas of competence. SCG has started identifying new potential members for the General Assembly. However, a difficulty is reported to be the lack of people with the appropriate background who willing to accept the responsibility. *SCG needs to address this problem, to ensure adherence to its own bylaws as well as to have a system of democratic governance in accordance with the SC Best Practices.*

SCG is currently organized into a structure of four departments (*gerencias*) below the director (see Fig 1). The logic of this structure is not immediately obvious. Firstly, it is rather lop-sided, with a Department of Administration and Finance of 23 people alongside a Department of Human Resources with only two people. Secondly, it does not seem to fully reflect the internal division of functions within the organization. For instance, the Department of Institutional Strengthening apparently should follow up the development of new mechanisms for personnel management that is handled by the Dept. of Human Resources, the implementation of an ICT plan and system within the Dept. of Administration and Finance, and the development of a new Monitoring and Evaluation system within the Program Department. In sum, to an outsider, the organizational structure may seem to have developed from short-term responses to immediate needs rather than to any longer-term strategy, even though SCG disputes this. SCG has announced that it is looking at this structure and that in the near future the HR Department might be integrated with Administration and Finance. *In addition, SCG might consider giving the department currently termed Institutional Strengthening a clearer profile as a Department of Communication (in line with the logic structuring the present report).*

Another issue emerging from considering the organizational structure refers to the many levels within the organization. Having assistants of education reporting to the education advisor reporting to the assistant program director reporting to the program director who again reports to the director may create unnecessary complicated chains of command and imply a waste of available human resources. This is particularly so because SCG emphasizes the importance of communication following the direct lines of authority and because delegation of authority to lower levels does not seem to be very well developed. This issue also relates to what is mentioned in the 2003 evaluation and the 2005/2006 self-assessment; that the SCG is struggling to overcome a history of very hierarchical and authoritarian leadership. In short, a centralized and hierarchical way of working may be due to aspects of both organizational structure and organizational culture. It is difficult for the evaluation team to assess whether and to what extent this has a negative impact on the work of SCG. According to the organization, the many levels respond to a wish to minimize the number of persons directly under one leader, and thus indicate decentralization. Yet, in order to strengthen SCG's position as a flexible, rapidly responding and efficient organization, it would be *worthwhile to consider if there are*

¹ Formerly, staff made up 75% of the Assembly, so SCG has been working to address these problems.

benefits to be had from less hierarchy and more delegation of authority in both the 'cultural' and the structural dimension.

However, SCG demonstrates considerable ability and willingness to delegate when it comes to the field offices. These are given considerable autonomy to develop and implement their programs within the overall framework set by general budget and program documents. Moreover, monthly meetings at the head office, where all the field office directors take part, together with the SCG leadership and advisors, ensure mutual exchange of information. Visits by the head office advisors to the field offices to give technical backstopping are likewise appreciated. In sum, relations between field offices and head office appear to be good, and quite different from what was indicated as being the situation during the 2003 evaluation: that the central office at that time limited itself to a having controlling role towards field offices, without any additional supportive elements. *One recommendation to make in this context, however, is that the schedule of visits should be adjusted according to the different needs of the various offices.*

2.1.2 Strategic planning

An important milestone in the process of institutional strengthening which the SCG has been going through since the critical period of 2002 is the elaboration of a five year strategic plan in 2005. This plan was developed in a participatory manner, involving the whole staff, and resulted in a strategy that is coherent and concrete, and allows the organization to focus on key issues. SCG has gone through a long transformation from being principally a community development organization to its current orientation as a Child Rights organization. The strategic plan can be seen as a culmination of this process. In the strategic plan, the rights-based approach is clearly expressed in explicit principles and objectives, and corresponding indicators and activities are derived from these fundamental principles.

The ambition of becoming the organization representing the international SC Alliance in Guatemala has probably also aided SCG in developing and maintaining a strategic focus. This ambition has helped to develop the overall rights-orientation within the organization, and the Alliance has provided specific guidelines for organizational Best Practices. Thus, the Alliance and its principles have served SCG both in developing its external program and lobbying activities, as well in its internal organizational development process.

The strategic plan is much more than a document on paper; it is something that is being implemented in practice, thereby transforming the organization. The overall rights orientation is an approach that seems to have been disseminated throughout the organization and adopted by the staff in general. The program strategy and the content of the different program components adhere closely to the strategy. Likewise, a number of the activities of the strategic plan that relate to organizational strengthening are being implemented – such as development of administrative and financial routines, improved human resource management, consistent use of logo and name, etc. Thus the strategic plan is not just something that looks nice on paper but has no reality – most of its main elements are also being translated into practice.

Still, not all elements of the strategy have been followed up equally well. Most importantly in this respect, there have been few advances in terms of the institutional strengthening goals of ensuring financial sustainability and diversifying sources of income. In fact, and in spite of the strategic goals, the evolution in this area has actually been negative. The overall number of donors has declined, and SCG has become increasingly dependent upon one of them, SCN². In 2008 SCN is covering almost three quarters of the SCG budget. Furthermore, due to the heavy element of core funding of the MDPP program, the weight of Norwegian funding is even greater when it comes to covering salaries – between 80 and 90% of personnel costs are funded by SCN. Given SCN's strong commitment to continue its support, these figures are far from indicating any imminent economic crisis. But in the medium to long term they do constitute fundamental challenges. The challenge is not simply that of securing new donors for programs to replace the role of SCN if and when its support will eventually be reduced at some point in the future. The even more difficult challenge relates to the heavy dependence on core funding, and the corresponding question of whether SCG is building an administrative structure too large and top-heavy to be carried by its programs. The long-term sustainability of this administrative set-up may be questioned. SCG, however, considers the actual size of the administration to be necessary.

There are of course a number of reasons behind this increasing economic dependence on a single donor. To some extent it is a consequence of SCN's decision to support SCG in taking on the role as representative of the Alliance in Guatemala, which has involved substantial increases in the Norwegian funding³. Moreover, while the strategy and the MDPP program have emphasized the importance of developing fundraising within Guatemala, there are a number of external reasons why this work has developed more slowly than planned. When it comes to international funding, there have been some attempts at obtaining funding from new and former donors, in particular through the SC Alliance. However, this strategy has not been pursued with great vigor, something which SCG readily admits to. The reason for this is explicitly stated as being because there is a need 'to set one's house in order first, before one can go out and ask for new funding'. Thus, before soliciting new funds there is a need to ensure that the organization has the capacity to use these funds in a proper way, and to comply with all the requirements attached to the funding. There is of course some validity to this argument. However, it is difficult to accept that it is still being used, after more than five years of systematic institution-building since the 2002 crisis. The fact that SCG continues to argue this way, and that SCN accepts it, indicates a kind of complacency with the current state of affairs that cannot be said to demonstrate far-reaching strategic thinking.

A related area where SCG needs to improve its overall strategic approach is with respect to the wider area of communication. While this can be said to include fundraising, it also covers the fields of image building, lobbying/advocacy and general awareness-raising.

² At the same time, it should be pointed out that the budget has increased significantly over the period – from 8 million quetzals in 2003 to 15 millions in 2009.

³ Another reason for expanded Norwegian funding is the *Rewrite the Future* campaign.

SCG would benefit from an overall strategy that links these issues. This issue is discussed further in section 3.3.

2.1.3 Administration

The 2003 evaluation points to great weaknesses in SCG's administrative area. In addition to the issues related to the Board and to a vertical structure, referred to above, the report also mentions deep-set conflicts among the staff, as well as very serious weaknesses in financial control and reporting to donors. The MDPP program sets explicit goals for improvements in the areas of financial management, ICT and human resource management.

On the issue of financial control, SCG has struggled continuously to improve since 2002/2003. With support from SC Sweden, a new, computerized financial management system was introduced. Over the years, the serious deficiencies in financial reporting to donors mentioned in the 2003 evaluation have apparently been overcome. We were only able to interview one of SCG's donors; SCN. They reported significant improvements in producing financial reports on time. Still, the introduction of the financial management system has never been completely successful, largely because it was the creation of an individual consultant, and resulted in heavy dependence on the assistance of this person even for routine operations. This considerably slowed down the process of keeping accounts, and in practice constrained the possibility of getting timely overviews of the total economic situation. A consultant hired in 2007 with funding from the MDPP finally recommended the purchase of a new system. The plan was to install this in January 2008, but due to various factors it has been somewhat delayed. Now, however, the system appears to be up and running, and reportedly, it should be fully functional and having replaced the old system by October 2008. Thus, advances are continuously being made, although at a somewhat slower rate than planned.

Also in general administrative routines, there appear to have been significant advances over the last years. A number of new manuals of procedures have been developed – regulating for instance per diems, management of cash and of accounts, use of vehicles, backup system, budgeting, administration of offices and buildings, and so on. Four of eleven manuals are finalized and approved, seven still in the process of being tested out. The MDPP also specifies a program for developing and implementing a general ICT strategy. The new financial management system implies some advances in this area, but a total strategy for information technology – planned in place by the end of 2007 – has so far not materialized.

Specific goals are singled out in the MDPP for the area of Human Resources. These include developing job descriptions for all positions, a training program for new and old staff members, updated and systematized staff files, new recruitment and induction procedures, and staff development/promotion program and system for performance appraisal. Apart from the development/promotion program and the appraisal system, all of these elements have been introduced (the appraisal system has been developed, but not

yet put into practice). Thus, there have been great advances in the systematization of Human Resource Management.

The 2003 evaluation refers to deep-set conflicts between staff members. In part these conflicts were related to disagreements over whether the food security program PROMASA which was implemented at that time with funding from USAID was really within the strategic approach of SCG. The fact that the people working on this program had higher salaries than the rest of the staff, and operated in different chains of command, did nothing to alleviate the problems. This specific conflict is now past history, as SCG 'lost' this program in 2003. It is also the impression of the evaluation team that SCG has overcome this situation of deep internal conflict.

Still, the high rotation of personnel in the organization is cause for concern. According to figures from the Human Resource Department, 20 staff members (out of a total of 51) left the organization in 2006 and 22 (out of 58) left in 2007. In the first eight months of 2008, the figures look a little bit better – 12 have left out of a total of 59 (with one more having handed in his resignation). Still, the figures are very high, and the constant need for recruiting, training and inducting new people is a heavy drain on the resources of the organization and implies significant losses in terms of efficiency. Together with the fact that there has also been external recruitment for newly created positions, it is not surprising that the median period of employment in SCG among the senior and technical staff that the team interviewed appeared to be about a year. The reasons behind the high turnover are not clear. Salaries may be one important factor. Even though SCG wages appear to be in line with the norm among Guatemalan NGOs, it is possible that working requirements (such as knowledge of English) are more in line with requirements within international NGOs, where salaries are higher. It is also possible that as SCG is assuming the role of representing the Alliance in Guatemala, it is gradually acquiring a profile somewhat different from national NGOs, and that staff therefore may start comparing salary levels with international organizations. However, SCG should also be open for the possibility that there may be other reasons behind the high rate of rotation. In other contexts it has been seen that where staff feel they are able to realize themselves and their skills, they may stay on even if salaries are not particularly competitive. Thus, the SCG decision to make a *study of the work environment* in the organization is to be supported. In order to be able to reveal existing dissatisfaction, it is usually recommended that such studies be carried out by an *external consultant*, and that *guarantees of confidentiality* are clear and explicit. Furthermore, it would be useful to include in the study *interviews with a number of the people who have left the organization*, in order to probe deeper into potential factors beside the salary issue.

Within the administrative area there is also the issue of the Educational Centre; SCG's former offices, which are currently being rented out for seminars and workshops. It includes audiovisual equipment and dormitory facilities for up to 36 persons. Eight or nine persons are employed there. While the Centre previously has operated at a loss, this situation has been partially turned around, and income was slightly higher than operating costs last year. *However, it is recommended that SCG looks at the present and potential income from this centre in a dispassionate manner, factoring in future maintenance costs,*

calculating expected return on investments, and comparing with potential income from selling or simply renting out the infrastructure. As specified in the MDPP, SCG is planning to realize such a study (although somewhat behind schedule).

2.1.4 Role within the Alliance

SCG has embraced wholeheartedly the ambition to be the organization to represent the Save the Children Alliance in Guatemala. The sustained process of institutional strengthening over the last five to six years has been motivated by and geared to this ambition. In this process, SCG has received significant support from the SC organizations of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, both in the form of economic support, and in the acceptance of the principle that all funding to Guatemala should then be channeled to SCG. The relationship with SC USA has been more complicated.

SC USA has accepted that SCG should have the central role coordinating role within Guatemala with respect to the areas of education and emergency relief. Thus, the activities of the SCG, SCN and SC USA in the field of education are coordinated under the 'Rewrite the Future' umbrella, and the coordinator for this program is institutionally located within SCG. There are also monthly coordination meetings for educational issues between the three SC organizations. This appears to be a successful arrangement, allowing for common lobbying efforts as well as discussions and mutual learning from each other about forms of intervention in the sector. A positive attitude to working together is reported from this area of coordination. This appears also to be the case with the area of emergency relief and emergency preparedness, although conclusions here must be tentative as this is not an area which the team has studied closely. Still, it is a fact that in the aftermath of the hurricane Stan, it was decided within the Alliance that SCG should have the responsibility for coordinating efforts among the SC organizations within the country – a fairly large operation that involved channeling funds from international SC organizations to different local NGOs. Afterwards, SCG has continued having this responsibility. While it was seen as natural that SCG – as the national SC representative – assumed this function, it was decided that international fundraising should be the responsibility of SC USA. This division of labor ensures that the fundraising capacity of SC USA is being put to full use, while at the same allows SCG to assume national coordination responsibility and develop its skills and experience in this area. Thus, in important areas, SC USA has shown willingness to support the process of SCG assuming the role as the representative of the SC Alliance in Guatemala, and to let its own work be under the coordination of the Guatemalan organization.

Still, SC USA has not been willing to follow the examples of the SC organizations of Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and close down its own operation in Guatemala. According to the interpretation of the Scandinavian SC organizations, the Alliance's principles imply that in a country where there is a national SC organization capable of representing the Alliance, international SC organizations should not be active. This includes not having an office, not giving direct support to Guatemalan NGOs other than SCG, not doing advocacy or lobbying work, and not doing fundraising. Furthermore, in this process they have given important organizational support to SCG to allow it to

assume its new roles. SC USA, on the other hand, does not give any direct support to SCG, maintains its office, is actually operational and implements its own programs, has the new objective of intensifying efforts and doubling its coverage in Guatemala, and reportedly the new strategy contemplates building up both lobbying and fundraising activities inside Guatemala. The SC USA national representative interviewed saw no problems with this arrangement, and argued that for the sake of children in Guatemala, as well as for the reputation and impact of the SC Alliance, all activity in Guatemala by any SC member was positive. To avoid any potential competition between the organizations, SC USA only uses the name Save the Children, thus seeking to ensure that any credit for their work would go to the Alliance as such and not to the specific national organization.

The SCG, however, is deeply concerned over this situation. At bottom is the feeling that the presence of different SC organizations creates confusion among the public as to which is which. Such confusion may negatively impact the potential both for fundraising inside Guatemala and for advocacy and lobby work. The fact that SCG has adopted an English name complicates the task of communicating that SCG is a Guatemalan organization, and the presence and activity of another organization calling itself Save the Children, which is actually from the USA, makes it considerably more difficult. Being confused with an international organization with presumably a very solid funding basis in its home country is clearly detrimental to SCG's fundraising efforts inside Guatemala. Being taken for an organization of the United States may conceivably also weaken its legitimacy for seeking to influence Guatemalan public policies. Furthermore, even though the two organizations are members of the same alliance, it is not inconceivable that they might at some point in the future come to disagree on some policy or program issue. From SCG's point of view, that would make the coexistence of the two organizations even less desirable. The new SC USA strategy for Guatemala, with increased activity levels and reportedly also opening for lobbying and fundraising inside Guatemala, raises SCG concerns further. For SCG this is also a question of respect for a smaller organization of the same family. While – as mentioned above – SC USA has in some instances acknowledged SCG's right to be the coordinating SC organization in Guatemala, this is not generally the case. SCG is simply informed of the new SC USA strategy, not consulted. At times this is perceived as SC USA failing to abide with international Alliance principles on how to behave in the country of another Alliance member, and simply using its weight and economic power to pursue its own strategies and interests.

At the time of our fieldwork, the SCG board had started up a dialogue with SC USA in order to seek to resolve this issue. While no substantial advances were made during the initial contact, the SCG board was encouraged by the positive tone of the meeting. In the continuation of discussions, SCG hoped to achieve results in the form of increased mutual understanding and new forms of cooperation, where for instance joint fundraising in the US, or even SCG being allowed to fundraise on their own in the US, could be benefits obtained for the Guatemalan organization.

The evaluation team concurs that the attitude of SC USA is a problem and a challenge for SCG in its ambition to position itself and clarify its role within Guatemalan society, and

furthermore, that this again has serious consequences for the potential for developing local (national) fundraising. From a worst-case perspective, one might also fear that the withdrawal of SCN from Guatemala may shift the balance of power among the SC organizations in the country, in SCG's disfavor. This is really an internal Alliance issue, which is an arena of which the team only has superficial knowledge. It is therefore difficult for us to come with recommendations in this respect. But *continuing the dialogue with SC USA* must surely be a good thing. In addition, it might help if *SCN and other SC 'allies' of SCG lobbied for understanding and acceptance of the SCG position within the decision-making bodies of the Alliance.*

2.2 Programs

2.2.1 Background

The evaluation from 2003 contains a number of positive as well as negative observations on the programs and projects of SCG. Among the weaknesses, the evaluators mention that there is a mismatch between project ambitions and scope of coverage on the one hand and available resources on the other, that there is a need for a better system of monitoring and its systematic use, that field offices are left too much alone with little support from the SCG leadership and advisors, that the strategic plan lacks clarity and is insufficiently anchored among staff, and that the local organizations created show considerable dependence on SCG and do not appear to be sustainable after the five year project period. Among the most important elements on the positive side were the good relationship between field staff and communities, and the general positive evaluation SCG's work received from beneficiaries and stakeholders.

The 2006 self-assessment was, as we have seen, quite critical of a number of organizational issues. It was more self-congratulatory when analyzing its program work:

SCG's programme is one of its core strengths, recognized among other Guatemalan NGOs as being based on child rights approach and with a strong methodology that has delivered results in an increasing number of municipalities and over 30 years. SCG ... is recognized as the lead Guatemalan agency working in this field.

It should be noted that between the two reviews referred to above, and partly explaining the differences, the SCG involvement in the PROMASA program (plagued by slow implementation and creating internal staff conflicts and disagreements over strategies) had been terminated and a new and much more focused strategic plan had been developed.

The MDPP has one set of indicators relating to the program area, namely the introduction of a Monitoring and Evaluation System. This contemplates the recruitment of a person responsible for this area, developing a quantitative data base system, training staff in its use, and implementing the system from mid-2008.

2.2.2 Findings

It should be emphasized that the evaluation team has not had the time and resources required for making a real study of program impacts. Still we have visited a number of project areas and sites, and discussed programs intensely with SCG staff of different levels, beneficiaries, local authorities and other stakeholders. Thus, we are able to offer fairly well-founded opinions on the SCG programs and their implementation, while we are not really in a position to say too much about the key question of their long-term impacts.

We find a number of strengths with the SCG programs. It is directly based on an explicit, clear and focused strategy. From the basic principles underlying this strategy – primarily its rights-based approach and child rights orientation – a limited number of sets of interventions (or program components) are derived. These components have different target groups: children (early stimulation/pre-school); youth (promoters of rights-related issues and youth organization at different levels up to the national); women (women’s groups), teachers and local organizations (COCODES). Yet, as all the interventions derive from the same principles and orientation, they mutually support each other, and where programs are implemented with sufficient intensity, strong synergies should arise. This strategy is being followed consistently in all program areas, although of course with adaptations to local conditions. The rights orientation shows itself in the strong focus on organization and participation (including the rights of children and youth to participate), as well as in the direct efforts to work with and influence local state institutions. The latter is demonstrated both by the efforts to develop and lobby for local child-oriented development plans and municipal policies, and by the willingness to try out innovative ways of directly involving state institutions, such as in Chiquimula, where instead of SCG hiring its own fieldworkers, new positions at the municipal Office of Women, Children and Youth are funded. In lobbying for child-oriented development plans and greater community involvement in and influence over municipal affairs, SCG uses and organizes broad alliances of civil society organizations. And finally, SCG enters a new program area with a five year horizon and an exit strategy already in place, and an approach that seeks to avoid clientilistic relations by minimizing provisions of materials and infrastructure⁴. Thus the strategy is geared at avoiding dependency and laying the foundation for sustainability.

Moreover, the impression of the evaluation team was that staff was well-qualified and committed to the organization and the child-rights-based approach. This includes both technicians and senior staff at field offices as well as advisors and other representatives

⁴ One informant (external to SCG) was of the opinion that SCG still had some distance to go to ensure a full rights-based approach free of clientilistic relations based on the distribution of material benefits. The example given was that SCG has not completely relinquished the practice of supporting schools with materials and certain improvements of infrastructure, ‘which could lead to expectations of further such support among target groups’. In our opinion, we saw very little of such expectations, and were quite impressed with SCG’s ability to convey that the main benefits they were able to provide were immaterial ones of training and organization. Thus, our conclusion is quite different from that of our informant.

from the central office. The relative autonomy of the field offices to develop specific program interventions in accordance with the conditions and opportunities of the areas where they work, complemented with the support and backstopping received from the head office, appear to have been successful in stimulating efficient use of resources. Given that the evaluation should focus specifically on the area of education, we are happy to be able to report the extremely high level of satisfaction among teachers having received training. SCG advisors in education were rated very highly, as were the concrete and easily applicable pedagogic techniques they taught. Impacts in terms of adoption of an active pedagogy were easily discernable in the schools visited (and echo what the team leader experienced during a visit to another SCG field office – Canilla – in 2007).

Still, there are of course a number of challenges and dilemmas that SCG face in their program work. Some of these are illustrated by the differences between Chiquimula and Livingston. Even from the brief visits made, it was evident that the Livingston program had progressed more in its year and a half of existence than had the Chiquimula program in the same period. There are different reasons for this. One is that whereas there has been considerable turnover among all types of staff in the Chiquimula office, the Livingston office has been spared such rotation. Indeed, the majority of the staff there worked in the office of El Estor before the establishment of the Livingston office. Continuity and experience is therefore much greater in Livingston. However, there are also important differences in SCG's manner of working in these two areas. In Livingston, the technicians who work directly with the communities are employed by SCG, whereas in Chiquimula they are employed by the municipal Office for Women, Children and Youth. This latter way of working implies a number of difficulties. Since the technicians are municipal employees, they may at times be ordered to work in specific tasks outside the SCG program, thereby reducing time spent on the project components. Furthermore, salary levels are adjusted to the level normally paid by the municipality, which is considerably lower than what is paid to the technicians directly employed by SCG in other areas. Thus, in Chiquimula it is difficult to expect technicians to work outside normal office hours, something which in other areas is to some extent expected when circumstances require it. Moreover, the lower salary level directly leads to the higher rotation of staff. The Chiquimula model also leads to greater turnover in another way: when there is a change of mayor after elections, it is not uncommon to change staff associated with the predecessor, even if these are persons funded through the SCG program. Thus, the way of working in Chiquimula is clearly less efficient in a number of ways, at least in the short term.

Still, however, the evaluation team does not feel in a position to say that one model is better than the other. Probably it is too early to make a judgment in this respect. The reason for this reticence is related to the potential benefits of working through municipal authorities. If successful, SCG will directly influence the way that state institutions work, and stimulate increased consideration of child rights in the policies and practices of the municipality. From a rights-oriented perspective of placing the responsibility with the institutions of the state, this must obviously be a correct strategy, if it yields positive results. And the model contains very interesting elements, such as the agreement entered with the municipality at the start of the program, specifying that the municipality shall

gradually assume responsibility for the costs of the technicians. Thus, whereas in the first year SCG is to cover the full salary costs, the municipality will assume 20% of the costs in the second year, and annually increasing responsibility for the costs until covering all of it after five years. According to the agreement, the municipality will continue funding the positions also after the five program years. In this way, a new form of sustainability is built into the program. Whether in practice the municipality will follow up this obligation is of course impossible to say now, but at least the municipalities of Chiquimula are all paying the 20% in the second year. This is the case even where there has been a change of mayor and some doubts as to whether the new political administration would feel bound by the agreement. Believing that it is too early to judge, the team therefore abstains from evaluating which model is best, and recommends that *SCG should monitor closely the effects of the Chiquimula model, and make a decision on which model to use generally as soon as this is deemed possible on the basis of the experiences gained.*

However, one thing that is evident at the moment, is that the Chiquimula office – with more recently integrated staff, a more complicated and challenging model to implement, and a larger area to cover (four municipalities, compared to only one in Livingston) – has a greater need for support from the head office than does the Livingston office. *Thus, it is recommended that in the near future SCG should allocate greater head office resources to the Chiquimula office – which appears to be in line with what has already been discussed.*

Another issue that turned up in different interviews was the question of whether SCG is spreading its efforts too thinly. Several people were of the opinion that visits by technicians to communities were not frequent enough to ensure impacts. In practice there is some variation in this respect between program areas. In Chiquimula, each technician covers ten communities, while in Livingston the number is eight. Given the additional differences in the technicians' available time for the project between the two areas, this may easily translate into visits to each community twice a month in Livingston and only once a month in Chiquimula (yet another reason for Livingston having achieved more). In each community, the technician is supposed to give follow-up to all project components and target groups – children, youth, women, teachers and members of the local development council. It is difficult for the evaluation team to specify what would be an ideal frequency of visits that balanced having sufficient impact with the wish to extend coverage as widely as possible. Yet given the challenges of organizing different community groups from a rights oriented perspective, it seems clear that once a month, with so many target groups to cover, is very little. *SCG should seek to establish a required frequency of community visits, and allocate technicians to communities on the basis of this, avoiding great differences between program areas.*

This issue is related to another question, namely the required time SCG needs to work in an area before they can pull out and continue somewhere else. The SCG strategy is working in an area for five years, and thereafter having a follow-up period of two years with less intensive presence. Having only visited two project areas in the early phase of the program period, the evaluation team is not in a position to assess whether five plus two years will be sufficient to build organizations strong enough to be able to continue on

their own after the SCG withdrawal. We can only point to the fact that the 2003 evaluation states that the five plus two years were not sufficient for creating sustainable organizations at that time. However, this was at a time when the SCG programs were different, with more emphasis on material support which the evaluation claimed led to dependencies, so this problem might have been overcome today. It might also be questioned the extent to which SCG actually follows its own exit strategy. In Guatemala City we visited a school where program work started 12 years ago, and which still was in the follow-up phase. The reasons for this were not completely clear, but might indicate the recognition of a need for support over a longer period. Also the youth activists of SCG we met with in Guatemala City stated that the withdrawal of SCG support in their area led to the collapse of the youth organization. While the evaluation team cannot say definitively what the correct time horizon is, it seems reasonably clear that the answer will vary according to what kind of project component/target group one is discussing, as well as with the frequency of follow up in the communities by technicians. *SCG ought to systematize experiences from previous program areas, including information on what happens after withdrawal, in order to establish required time frames for different project components in different contexts.*

The above issues of coverage and time frame should be considered in conjunction with other discussions on project strategy that SCG are preparing to hold; on whether division of labor between technicians should be on the basis of geography or technical specialty, and on whether the model of working through state institutions should be extended by supporting pedagogic staff employed by the municipal delegation of the Ministry of Education.

From the project visits and from interviews with technicians, the evaluation team has the clear impression that work with teachers is extremely successful, and that also the project components targeting youth and children seem to work well. The project component seeking to strengthen the COCODES (local development councils), however, is much more difficult. The main reason for this has to do with the fact that the majority of COCODES members are at their places of work at the time when project staff visit the communities. Meeting the COCODES members normally requires being present in the communities at night or in the weekends, and work hours of the technicians prevent this happening except in special instances. Thus, the impression gathered is that this component is quite far from achieving its stated objectives. The evaluation team sees this as very regrettable, as the COCODES is the obvious institution to work with in a community oriented, rights based program. *SCG should urgently rethink its strategy and seek ways of overcoming the difficulties in reaching the COCODES.*

While in general the team is very impressed with the teacher training component, it seems that it could still be improved in one respect. As we have observed, and as was likewise suggested by the representatives of the Ministry of Education in Livingston/Rio Dulce, teachers would benefit from concrete and practical advice on how to manage class situations where all or some students have another language than Spanish as their mother tongue. The fact that SCG has recently hired an advisor on bilingual and intercultural education shows that the organization recognizes the potential for improvement in this

area. *SCG should follow this up with developing teacher training components on practical ways of handling the challenges of education in multilingual contexts.*

Trying to characterize the form of rights orientation in the SCG programs, we could say that SCG is very strong in terms of a general rights orientation with a focus on making state institutions assume their responsibilities as duty bearers, and in a universalistic approach seeking to ensure that benefits are for all. There is also a clear emphasis on the specific rights of children, including the rights of children to participate. Furthermore, attention to gender issues and to equal rights for girls and boys, men and women, seems to be generalized throughout the organization and its program work. Thus, where a rights orientation could be further strengthened seems mainly to be in terms of increased attention to issues of indigenous rights – no insignificant issue in a country like Guatemala.

Overall, we were also impressed with SCG's ability to coordinate and cooperate with a wide range of other actors in the program areas. This was particularly evident in the establishment of municipal 'Childhood Commissions' working to develop child oriented municipal development plans and policies. Yet, somewhat to our surprise given the otherwise positive relations between the organizations, we did discover that in Livingston, both FUNDAECO and SCG are working to support the COCODES, partly in the same communities, without any coordination or apparently much awareness of each other. *Thus, there are particular instances where SCG ought to improve coordination with other actors operating in the same area.*

SCG still does not have its improved monitoring and evaluation system up and working, but has put considerable efforts into developing such a system. SCG has started this process in a more comprehensive way than what was foreseen in the MDPP program, which appeared to envision an M&E system as simply consisting of a database system. SCG has developed a proposal which starts by setting out thoughts on objectives of the M&E system, information requirements at different levels, and different types of users of the system. From this starting point, a system of instruments, procedures and indicators is sketched out for the different program areas. The aim is to make the system participatory, in the sense that the basic level of monitoring and evaluation is done within the different community level organizations supported by SCG, and should serve the purpose of orienting and strengthening their activities. We strongly support this comprehensive approach to developing an M&E system, as well as its participatory orientation. However, it should be pointed out that there is a considerable distance still to go before this system is up and functioning, and that there are significant challenges to be overcome in this process. Here we can only briefly point out some of these challenges. Firstly, a great difficulty faced by any comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system is that it may be seen by the people on the ground and the field staff as a bureaucratic requirement of no use to themselves, only increasing their workload and taking up more of their time. This inevitably leads to foot dragging, halfhearted attempts at going through the motions, and a system that in practice does not fulfill its objectives in terms of providing useful knowledge for assessing progress and improving approaches. The intention of a participatory system such as proposed here is to overcome this kind of a resistance. Still,

there remains the challenge of convincing people at the ground that this is actually something that benefits them. Furthermore, a second difficulty is that if this is to be successful, it implies that indicators must be set according to the objectives that people on the ground have with their organizations and activities. It is by no means certain that these correspond to the objectives and aims of higher levels of organization (field office, head office of SCG), or that the locally developed indicators correspond between geographical areas and thereby allow aggregation at higher levels. There is simply a tension between a participatory M&E system developed from below to correspond to needs on the ground, and an M&E system created from above in order to allow integration of information from many different areas and program components at the central level of a complex organization such as SCG. This tension is not something that is impossible to overcome, but remains yet another challenge for developing the M&E system. And finally, when speaking of the needs of the system as seen from above, i.e. the information required by the Program Department of SCG in order to assess progress, impacts and refine strategies, there is still some way to go in developing relevant indicators. The proposal does not yet contain specific sets of indicators that have this internal relationship to information needs. In sum, while SCG has started the process of developing a new M&E system, and done so in the right direction, *there is still the need to dedicate considerable efforts to designing the system and getting it understood, accepted and used at all levels.*

2.3 Communication

In structuring this report, we have chosen to dedicate a section to the wider area of 'communication'. With this we refer to a set of interlinked topics that include a) image building or 'branding' of SCG (what in Guatemala is often referred to as *posicionamiento*), b) advocacy or lobbying, c) awareness-raising and d) fundraising. Discussing these issues together has the advantage of bringing out how they are articulated and may mutually support each other. Image building is for instance a process that when successful will increase the capacity for having an impact with lobbying and advocacy, as well as for fundraising. It may also provide a platform for improved outreach for awareness-raising. At the same time, there may be similar effects going the other way. Lobbying and advocacy campaigns on key child rights issues may have great impact in terms of raising the profile and building the image of SCG. Thus, in some cases, one specific activity, such as lobbying or advocacy efforts related to core SCG areas, may help attain objectives within several fields. For this reason it is important to have a joint strategy for the whole communication area that may take into account such possible synergies. This strategy would also need to relate to the program area, as communicating about the projects implemented here are important not only for fundraising purposes, but also for building the organizations' image and for gaining legitimacy and acceptance for its lobbying and advocacy work. As previously mentioned, a weakness of SCG is that it lacks this kind of global strategic approach to the communication that enables the linking of activities and objectives within and between these areas.

The 2003 evaluation discusses SCG's capacity for lobbying and advocacy. It concludes that on the basis of its programs, the organization is active in seeking to influence policies in the municipalities, but that there is a lack of a strategy to raise these efforts to lobbying at the national level. The 2006 self-assessment states that SCG has a solid reputation among institutions working with children and child rights, and a network of contacts in the municipalities where they have been working, but that there is a need to continue working to strengthen and make wider known SCG's profile as the Guatemalan organization working for child rights and as the Guatemalan representative of the Save Children Alliance. The self-assessment likewise emphasizes the need for a stronger and more coherent effort in terms of fundraising, both nationally (where little had been done up then) and internationally (where it was stated that relations to donors and potential donors needed to be built and that skills for dealing with this arena should be developed and diffused within the SCG leadership). The MDPP sets out a number of targets in terms of developing fundraising within Guatemala. For 2007 these included hiring new staff and establishing a 'marketing and fundraising unit'; developing a communication plan and strategy; initiate contacts with private sectors companies that might become sponsors; and carrying out a first fundraising campaign that should bring an income in the range of USD 75,000. For 2008, goals include developing a marketing and fundraising plan; receiving support from the first private companies and increasing the number of companies contacted; and carrying out a second fundraising campaign.

2.3.1 Image building

Image building or branding includes at least two elements – becoming better known in wider circles, and being associated with the 'correct' or desired qualities and issues. Image building may be less of a goal in itself than a means for achieving other goals. Achieving that all Guatemalans know of and have confidence in SCG is of interest principally because it places SCG in a better position to achieve its vision – that the rights of children are respected. This would facilitate both lobbying/advocacy and raising funds for programs.

The SCG strategy is not very clear on the objectives in this area. From discussions with leadership and staff it is clear that there is an overall objective of becoming *the* organization of reference when it comes to children's rights. This would seem to imply being recognized as the Guatemalan organization working in this area that is most serious, trustworthy, knowledgeable, able to come up with sound policy recommendations, and having the most extensive impacts through quality work in local programs. In the SCG strategy, under the wider objective of institutional strengthening, there is a goal formulated in the following manner: 'SCG positioned as institution which promotes and realizes children rights'. Linked to this are sets of indicators and activities that partly relate to the issue under discussion here:⁵ Consistent use of name and logo, media coverage, being consulted by persons and institutions requiring information on the situation of children. The recent proposal for a fundraising strategy also contains some

⁵ Other indicators and activities relate to SCG's role within the Alliance, the role of the Board of Directors, and lobbying and advocacy activities.

elements of relevance here – for instance the emphasis on the need to establish linkages between project activities and campaign issues, and the proposal of establishing a group of communications experts to give advice on campaign strategies, media issues, etc. Nevertheless, in sum, this is an area that SCG so far has not attempted to tackle through an overall strategic approach.

There is little systematic knowledge of how well known SCG is and of what kinds of characteristics people associate with the organization. In the self-assessment of 2006 it is stated that SCG is recognized by other Guatemalan NGOs as being the lead Guatemalan agency working in the field of child rights. While a strong statement, it may be quite close to the truth: SCG and its programs do have a very good reputation among institutions engaged in children's issues, including not only NGOs but also state entities. Furthermore, SCG reports that there is considerable interest from media when it comes to covering their arrangements, and that the degree of media coverage surpasses the goal of being in the press once a month by a very wide margin. Moreover, through its programs, SCG has established good working relations with the authorities of the municipalities where they work. Thus, at an institutional level, it seems that SCG has gained considerable respect and acknowledgement. Among the wider public, though, knowledge of SCG is probably much rarer and more diffuse.

One obstacle faced by SCG in this field relates to the name in English, which for many Guatemalans is difficult to pronounce and carries unclear connotations. It may give the impression of an international organization, and does not communicate to everyone that it is an organization working with and for children. The fact that the organization until recently was known as ADEJUC makes more difficult the challenge of communicating the desired SCG profile, as does the history of a number of SC organizations from other countries having been active in Guatemala, and the continued presence of SC USA. Even if a new change of name just five years after the last is far from ideal, it might be a solution to use a translation of Save the Children into Spanish in its communication inside Guatemala. This is apparently allowed within the alliance, and might lessen confusion over what the organization is, including creating a clearer distinction between it and SC USA. However, before making such a decision, the potential costs and benefits need to be considered. SCG has discussed the option and decided that as long as SC USA is active within Guatemala the costs of changing name would outweigh the benefits.

Furthermore, there is a need to continue the dialogue with SC USA over division of labor, roles and responsibilities. While it may be unrealistic – and probably not desirable – to expect SC USA to stop its programs, it would seem to be crucial for the image building of SCG to *establish an accord with SC USA which squarely places the responsibility for communication activities (such as lobbying/advocacy and in-country fundraising) with SCG.* (While responsibility should be with SCG, this does not preclude the possibility that in certain situations it might be advantageous to let the non-Guatemalan organization be the one raising the voice, for instance if protection of the one who speaks out is an issue.)

While it was stated above that SCG is well-known and respected among organizations working in the same field, this does not imply that there are no remaining communication challenges. Representatives of several organizations close to SCG – organizations working in alliance with SCG as well as ones about to receive funds from SCN channeled through SCG – expressed confusion and uncertainty as to what kind of new roles SCG was about to assume. Filling the gap of the SC organizations leaving Guatemala, does that mean SCG transforming itself into an international organization? Will SCG become a donor organization? Will that change relations with other Guatemalan organizations and network partners? Will SCG continue its program work? *SCG should ensure that proper information is disseminated to partner institutions and other organizations active in the field, so that confusion and misunderstandings are dispelled.*

Most importantly, however, in conjunction with a new overall communication strategy, SCG needs *to develop a strategy for image building*, that both develops goals of knowledge and perceptions among different target groups (state institutions, general public, donors, etc.), as well as outlining ways of reaching these objectives. (Such a strategy needs to understand and build on the already existing knowledge and perceptions of SCG. It might therefore be a good idea to commission a small study of SCG name recognition and associated perceptions and impressions. This need not be very scientific or expensive. Just having a few students make brief interviews with a limited sample of random respondents from a few different settings, and then analyze and systematize the results should yield useful pointers.)

2.3.2 Advocacy

As a key element of SCG's rights-based approach, there is a significant emphasis on local level lobbying and advocacy within its programs. Most clearly, this is expressed in the work of developing municipal child-oriented development plans in cooperation with a broad range of civil society actors. Similarly, the focus on local organizations, on youth promoters of different issues, and on supporting local development councils, are all aimed at strengthening the abilities of children and their parents to influence and lobby their local authorities. In sum, this engagement adds up to a significant engagement with local level advocacy.

So far, SCG has not really built upon and elevated these experiences to the departmental and national level. The municipal processes include the mapping of needs at local level. Aggregating this data for national level needs assessments would be a useful instrument for higher level advocacy work. The new and improved monitoring and evaluation system could potentially aid the process of aggregation and systematization of information relevant to a scaling up of advocacy work.

NETWORKS THAT SCG BELONGS TO:

1. COINDE (Consejo de Instituciones de Desarrollo)
2. CIPRODENI (Coordinadora de Instituciones de Promoción de los Derechos de la Niñez)
3. Movimiento Social por los Derechos de la Niñez
4. CONACMI (Coordinadora nacional contra el maltrato infantil)
5. Gran Campana Nacional por la Educación
6. Red Inter-Agencial de Educación
7. Circulo Centroamericano de Niñez, Municipios y Poder Local
8. Grupo de Calidad del Aprendizaje

At the national level, SCG recognizes that on its own, the organization's lobbying will only have a limited impact. The strategy is therefore to work in alliances for lobbying and advocacy purposes. SCG is therefore member of a number of networks and coordinating bodies, in many cases even a founding member. A list of these networks is given in Textbox 1. These are partially overlapping networks that have focused on different issues that generally are of high relevance to the objectives of SCG. *CIPRODENI* has been working at the local, departmental and recently national levels with the elaboration of the public policy in favor of children and adolescents. They promoted the law of integral protection of children in 2003, as well as other successful child-related initiatives. The *Movimiento Social* was very much involved in the Adoption Law approved last year seeking to stop illegal adoptions in the country and in the Guatemala's ratification of the Hague Convention. They were also a reference point for the National Council of Adoptions confirmed last year. The *Gran Campaña para la Educación* has been working for increased budgets for the educational sector for many years. It may have been somewhat less active recently. The *Mesa de Municipalización* is simply a meeting place for organizations working on issues related to decentralization and local democracy, established for coordination purposes, with no organizational life of its own. SCG has withdrawn from this space in order to avoid being associated with one of the members – the Spanish NGO *Intervida* – which has been subjected to serious allegations of corruption. *COINDE* is an umbrella organization of 12 development NGOs working in the areas of participation, health, education and children/adolescents, indigenous rights and productive projects. In addition to information sharing and coordination among members, *COINDE* has been active in various lobbying efforts geared at ensuring increased popular participation, such as the process of decentralization.

Another coordinating instance that also serves as a base for advocacy is the *Rewrite the Future* program, which the three SC organizations of Guatemala, USA and Norway have used to coordinate joint efforts at engaging politicians for discussions on educational policies. It should be pointed out that lobbying need not necessarily be confrontational. The *Rewriting the Future* program is an example of this through the agreement on technical cooperation signed with the Ministry of Education. While on the one hand this

document sets out the framework of the support that the Save the Children Alliance will offer to the Ministry, it also spells out certain obligations of the Ministry, such as ensuring the sufficient number of bilingual teachers for the schools of the municipalities where the program is being implemented. Thus, it can be seen as a way of having an impact on government policies based on the carrot rather than on mobilization, campaigns and confrontations.

These networks are in general strategically important spaces of participation, as they focus on key issues for SCG, and are significant actors in their relevant arenas. A possible exception to this is COINDE, which is not particularly focused on child issues (even if it focus on citizens' participation, a key area of SCG), nor does it appear to be particularly important within the set of networks, alliances and campaigns of Guatemalan civil society. Thus, one might question the wisdom of prioritizing this network, which actually does require a certain level of active participation from the SCG leadership.

While the strategy of working through networks in order to have impacts seems reasonable, it is possible to question the effort that SCG puts into this work. Several of the representatives of networks interviewed expressed that the SCG had not been very active in the networks over the last years or had to some extent withdrawn from the lobbying and advocacy work. Similarly, when referring to the advocacy of the Rewriting the Future campaign, the national director of SC USA stated that so much more could have been done. The President of the Board of SCG referred to his organization's lobbying efforts as 'advocacy light (*incidencia* light)'. And the decision to withdraw from the Mesa de Municipalización could be interpreted as expressing a great reluctance to exposing oneself through playing an active role in lobbying and advocacy. In sum, there is feeling that SCG is not throwing itself wholeheartedly into national level lobbying.

Of course, how much effort to put into lobbying and advocacy is a question of resources. Doing a serious job in this field requires the dedication of significant amounts of manpower, and given the different challenges faced by SCG, it may be wise not to give the advocacy field top priority. However, unless one should wish to leave the issue of advocacy completely aside, this brings up the issue of prioritization. When asked about advocacy issues to prioritize in the future, the SCG director mentioned the *pacto fiscal*, the proposed tax agreement that might substantially increase government revenue and consequently its capacity to address social issues. While this is undoubtedly an issue that might benefit Guatemala (and indirectly Guatemala's children), it is difficult to understand the strategic thinking behind this. The evaluation team suggests that *SCG ought to develop an advocacy strategy that should single out a limited number of issues upon which efforts should concentrate*. These should be selected firstly on the basis that they are among the core areas of SCG's mission. Thus, they should directly involve key child rights. These are the issues where SCG has a special responsibility, and should be among those actively fronting the issue. At the same time, being a key spokesman on these issues supports the image building efforts of the organization. Secondly, issues should be selected according to whether the SCG lobbying may have an impact. That is, there should be expectations of succeeding in influencing policies in the right direction, and the SCG's participation in lobbying should make a difference in this respect. SCG

should not simply be one more among a large number of organizations. In our opinion, selecting the *pacto fiscal* as the key advocacy cause fails both these requirements.⁶ This is does of course not mean that SCG should refrain from expressing support to the organizations working for this, sign petitions and so on. But when it comes dedicating its own resources, manpower and resources to an advocacy issue, this should be selected on the basis of stringent strategic thinking. This should be linked up to – and indeed be a key part of – the overall communication strategy. This means that a third element also needs to be considered – whether a focus on a specific issue may hurt SCG in other contexts, such as in fundraising, or in the ability to work with and influence state institutions.

2.3.3 Child Rights awareness-raising

With this term of awareness-raising, we refer to dissemination of general knowledge of children's rights and of the actual situation of children in Guatemala and elsewhere and the degree to which their rights are fulfilled. Clearly, this is a task that falls within the mandate of SCG. In actual fact, there is a considerable amount of such awareness-raising being carried out at the local level through the SCG programs. Children, youth, teachers, parents, COCODES members and local authorities are in different ways being made aware of different aspects of children's rights. To some extent these efforts also reach a somewhat higher level, for instance through the child rights festivals and radio programs arranged by SCG and its local partners, and through the exposure of SCG activity in media reports. At the national level, an important contribution of SCG is the mapping of the situation of child rights in Guatemala, which has been disseminated through the networks the organization belongs to, as well as to mass media. Apart from this, however, there has relatively little systematic work done by SCG at the national level. Given the many challenges faced by SCG in other areas, this probably reflects a wise decision on how to prioritize resources. Still, it should be maintained as part of SCG's area of responsibility. Thus, while currently it seems reasonable to maintain this area on the backburner, we would still recommend dedicating a section of the overall communication strategy to awareness-raising. One reason for insisting on this is because there may be indirect effects and spin-offs in terms of awareness-raising from other SCG communication activities, and such benefits should be considered and made explicit within the overall strategy.

2.3.4 Fundraising

Fundraising may easily be considered as different from the other communication areas, as its purpose is different: to secure resources necessary to implement the programs and keep the organization going. Yet it is important to realize that fundraising is fundamentally a communication activity – sending messages and establishing

⁶ SCG argues that lobbying for the *pacto fiscal* is highly relevant for a rights-based strategy, as increased income is a precondition for the state to assume greater responsibilities. While we agree with this, we would still maintain that SCG should select its advocacy causes so that they serve to profile the organization as a *Child-rights* organization, not simply as a rights-oriented one.

relationships with donors and funders – and that it is intimately linked to the other communication areas. For instance, having an updated webpage with relevant information about SCG and its programs might be considered primarily part of the image-building area, yet may be crucial for fundraising purposes, both in-country and internationally. For this reason, fundraising is dealt with as part of the communication challenge in this report, and for the same reason we recommend a joint strategy covering all these four areas.

The above holds for both international fundraising and for fundraising inside Guatemala. However, these two forms of fundraising are fundamentally different along a number of dimensions, including the types of potential donors and the requirements and challenges they pose. Therefore, in the following, they are dealt with individually. As was argued in section 3.1.2, fundraising is a crucial area where SCG urgently needs to develop its capacity. While fundraising within Guatemala is important for a number of reasons and should not be neglected, it should nevertheless be recognized that in the short to medium term, SCG's great dependence on a single donor cannot realistically be alleviated without expanded international fundraising. In order to reach the SC Alliance target of no single donor accounting for more than 30% of funding, such large new sources of funding are needed that it will take a number of years before one might reasonably expect national fundraising to be most important. The implication of this, then, is that seeking new international donors is not something that should be put off for the future, or given lower priority than raising funds within Guatemala.

2.3.4.1 Fundraising within Guatemala

SCG has expended considerable efforts in this area, but are nevertheless far short of the milestones set out in the MDPP program document. The main reason for this relates to the difficulty of securing and retaining qualified staff for this specialized area. Civil society fundraising is an underdeveloped field in Guatemala, and very few people possess the required skills and experiences. Furthermore, the salary levels of the NGO sector may be too low to attract people with the relevant qualifications. One person was hired in 2007, but she left the organization after a few months, too early to have developed any basis within SCG for future fundraising. Her replacement only started working in January this year, and had to start from scratch. In the period since then he has developed a proposal for a strategy. The strategy proposes working on a number of fronts simultaneously: seeking funding from private companies; establishing a net of individual (well-off) donors; recruiting individuals (less well-off) as volunteers for different kinds of arrangements and campaigns; seeking funding from government institutions; arranging campaigns for specific fundraising issues; drawing on Board members and their networks for establishing contact groups of influential people; and so on. Furthermore, the fundraising coordinator has initiated contacts with a number of companies seen as potential future donors to SCG. Unfortunately, he has also handed in his resignation, effective by the end of September. While this time there is at least a document outlining an approach left behind, it still means that SCG will have to start pretty much from the beginning again.

The evaluation team finds the proposed strategy to be useful and full of good ideas. It might be over-ambitious, and in need of prioritizing between different proposed activities. After all, it is important to have the capacity to follow initiatives through in a proper manner, rather than doing too many things in half-hearted manner. On the other hand, being motivated, positive, creative and (over-)ambitious are perhaps the most important qualities required of a good fundraiser, and an ambitious strategy may thus be a sign of the right approach. Anyway, the strategy is still in need of further refinements in terms of specifying communication strategies, campaign themes and specific approaches for different target groups. *We recommend that the further development of the national fundraising strategy be done in conjunction with the overall communication strategy, which for instance will allow integration between fundraising and image building activities.*

While fundraising in Guatemala is an underdeveloped field, the team is of the opinion that there is a significant potential for an organization such as SCG – competent in its programs; with a long trajectory; working with an issue such as children’s rights which may easily move and mobilize people; and in a position to be able to attain broad recognition as the leading Guatemalan organization within the field. We therefore hold it to be correct for SCG to continue to pursue this objective. We further believe that in the short term, it is the target group of private companies that holds the greatest promise. However, it is important to work strategically for forms of support that contribute to SCG covering its administrative and overhead costs. Donations of school materials for SCG programs are of course positive in themselves, but really do not contribute at all to resolving the organization’s underlying financial challenge. In other countries, one experience that fundraising NGOs have with support from private companies is that these donors are more willing than others to include overhead costs in their support. On the one hand, businessmen understand that running a program or an organization implies overhead and administrative costs that need to be covered, and on the other hand, they are often just as interested in the positive image the funding may give their company as in the way their support is actually being used. Hopefully it will also be the case for SCG that it will be able to secure corporate funding also for core administrative costs. Anyway, in national fundraising as well as in international fundraising, SCG has the challenge of *presenting programs for support where a wide range of staff and head office costs are included as project costs in ways that appear reasonable and acceptable.*

Now, while the team believes there is a potential for developing in-country fundraising, this nevertheless poses a dilemma: In order to pursue this strategy, there is a need for further support to SCG in building its fundraising capacity. And it is not possible to give any money-back guarantee in this case. Even though the purpose is increased income for SCG, there is always the risk that investing money in this area might not be successful. Nevertheless, with some hesitation, we conclude that *SCG ought to continue its national fundraising efforts.*

2.3.4.2 International fundraising

As mentioned in section 3.1.2, the number of international donors supporting SCG has been gradually going down. While there have been attempts at securing new donors, principally through the SC Alliance, these have not been pursued with great intensity, principally because SCG has prioritized ‘setting its house in order’ and ensuring the capacity to be able to live up to donor requirements is in place before new partnerships are entered into.

The evaluation team has been able to examine the eight proposals for new projects that SCG has presented to donors in the last year. Most of these have been to European SC organization, or to back donors such as the European Union in cooperation with a European SC member. The initial impression is that these proposals are well done, convincingly presented in the right formats and what appears to be the correct terminology. Even if most have failed, this only what one must expect given the competitiveness of the funding system. It does not indicate any weakness of the applications. The fact that one (fairly small) project has been accepted and two more are pending the decision of the donor actually indicates a high approval rate of the applications.

However, there is a *need to intensify efforts, including seeking contact with new donors*. The interview with the SC USA country director was interesting in suggesting ways of doing this. On the one hand she emphasized the importance of going for greater numbers. Her staff had produced and submitted 35 applications in the eight months since January - and should five be accepted that would be considered highly successful. On the other hand she pointed out the need for understanding donors thoroughly. This means spending time investigating their web pages, learning what kinds of projects they have supported, the language they use in their strategy documents and their objectives and guidelines for support. Where possible, learning what kinds of items are accepted in project budgets is very useful. And of course information on procedures for submitting applications, formats and deadlines should be collected. Thus, it is not sufficient to learn the general rules and language of development cooperation – each individual donor must be ‘read’, and proposals adjusted and packaged accordingly.

SCG already has a set of programs with different components that are being implemented in different areas, which can be scaled up with the availability of new funds (even if scaling down again after the end of short-term funding is more difficult). This means that SCG is in a position to package and tailor different proposals in accordance with the guidelines and preferences of individual donors, without breaking with the overall project strategy. Thus, SCG is in an excellent position to develop its fundraising capacity in the way proposed by the SC USA country director. However, obviously this requires some *reorganization within SCG, dedicating one or more staff members to this task and giving them the required training*. Perhaps it would be possible to approach SC USA for such training. Of course the person cannot develop proposals in isolation from the program department – it will be necessary to find a way of integrating inputs from the program staff into the process. But overall responsibility for initiating and putting together proposals and tailoring them to the particular requirements of the different donors should

be the responsibility of a person with special training in fundraising from international donors.

In terms of seeking out new donors, SCG concludes from its experiences over the last few years that Europe is becoming increasingly difficult due to a new concentration on Africa, and that USA and Canada are therefore the priority areas in the near future. *While expanding to North America may be a good idea, SCG should not for that reason stop soliciting funds from Europe.* Having applications rejected – also good applications – is the norm. Therefore SCG should not be discouraged. A further area to explore consists of the *UN agencies and multilaterals present in Guatemala* that have funding windows for civil society organizations. The great advantage of this set of donors is that direct personal contact with the representatives may be established without incurring great travel expenses.

2.4 Channeling funds to Guatemalan NGOs

This is a new function that SCG is taking on as the SC organizations from Sweden, Denmark and Norway are leaving Guatemala. With funds from Denmark there is already four years of experience in having this role. However, from 2009, when three of SCN's partners will receive their funding through SCG, there will be a significant expansion in amounts and scope. According to the 2009 budget, almost 2.3 million quetzals will be channeled this way – about 15% of SCG's total budget.

This means that SCG is assuming a new role, close to the donor or funding partner role of an international NGO. There are a number of challenges in this. How will it affect the relationship between SCG and the organizations it is channeling funds to – in many cases organizations with which SCG already is cooperating. Will it unbalance the relationships within a network when one of the organizations is channeling funds to another member, and has the responsibility to give follow-up and control that the other organization is using the support properly?

There is also the uncertainty among the receiving organizations as to what kind of funding partner SCG will be. It will automatically be compared to SCN, which has been described by Guatemalan partners as an almost perfect donor; close to the projects, understanding, flexible, supportive. This can be a tough act to follow, and SCG will probably have (or feel that they have) less freedom to make decisions on reallocations or future funding than has been the case with SCN. Thus, there may be inevitable strains in these relationships.

Some of them also involve very complex relationships. SCG will channel funds to Pennat and to the Quality Group (a network of present and former SCN partners working with education), which is coordinated by Pennat. At the same time SCG is member of the Quality Group, and part of the funding for this group will eventually be channeled back to SCG (as is the case for all the group members). For this amount, the Quality Group (or

Pennat, as its coordinator) will have the role of controlling and ensuring that SCG is using the funds properly. Thus, we get an extremely long aid chain:

Norad -> SCN -> SC Nicaragua⁷ -> SCG -> Quality Group/Pennat -> SCG

The evaluation team feels fairly confident that SCG will handle the ‘technical aspect’ of this role satisfactorily, and that transfer of funds, financial management, control and reporting routines will be carried out according to the procedures required by the back donor. How SCG will develop the other dimensions of the partnership relation – being a dialogue partner, offering technical backstopping where needed, discussing changes in plans and reallocations of budgets, participating in planning processes, making field visits, discussing future funding possibilities, facilitating links to other relevant institutions, etc. – is a more open question. In this area SCG will need to develop its own role, in dialogue with both the international funding organization and the Guatemalan partner. The challenge for SCG will be to develop this role in a way that ensures the best use of the available resources.

How this role should be fashioned, and how crucial this process is, will to a large extent be determined by the time perspective involved. If this is just a temporary function that SCG assumes in a transition period of one or a couple of years, then the way that the partner role is developed is not all that important. However, it is possible for SCG to decide that this is a role that the organization ought to take on permanently. This would not entail an end to implementing its own programs, but would be based on the recognition that one organization cannot do everything and that at times there are other actors better suited to certain tasks. Here, then, lies one of the fundamental strategic decisions that SCG needs to take in the near future. As of now, SCG appears not to have concluded on the issue, and it is probably wise to gather more experience with the role of being a funding partner before a decision is made. However, it is one that should not be postponed too long. And in making this decision, SCG should consider very carefully what the implications are for its roles as a Guatemalan organization, and as member of an international alliance and its representative in the country.

2.5 Impacts of the SCN support

The material presented in sections 3.1 to 3.3 shows that SCG has gone through a considerable process of organizational strengthening over the last four to five years. This is seen in a number of ways: Reduced conflicts and improved relations among staff, and between head office and field offices; better capacity to produce project documents and narrative and financial reports on time; improved systems of managing human resources; greater involvement of Board of Directors; a new strategic plan that is used in practice to focus efforts in a rights-based approach; assuming greater responsibilities as the national representative of the SC Alliance; advances in developing plans for national fundraising and for program monitoring and evaluation, etc. SCG today is a much stronger organization than it was just a few years ago.

⁷ With the closing down of the SCN office in Guatemala, it will be the SC office in Nicaragua which will have the responsibility for following up support from SCN to SCG.

At the same time, it is clear that advances have not been as great as hoped for. In a number of areas, improvements are at the planning or ‘paper stage’, still waiting to be implemented. This applies for instance to the Monitoring and Evaluation System, the national fundraising, to seven of the eleven manuals of administrative procedures that are being developed, to the new financial management system, and to human resource management systems such as manual of procedures, functions and responsibilities and performance assessment system. Table 1 gives an overview of the extent to which MDPP milestones up to July 2008 have been met.

**TABLE 1
TARGETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MDPP PROGRAM**

	Achieved	Pending
Fundraising	Recruited fundraising coordinator (but unable to retain) Private companies contacted First proposal for strategy	Develop communication strategy Carry out fundraising campaign Develop fundraising plan
Financial Management	Consultancy carried out New financial management system is being installed Monthly financial statements are produced	Study on educational centre income Finalizing the installation of the new financial management system
Information and Communication Technology	Half-time IT assistant hired	Develop ICT plan 2008-2011
Human Resources	HR assistant hired Staff trainings initiated Manual with responsibilities and functions of all positions created Staff files completed / updated Recruitment evaluation tests for different positions developed	Develop HR training plan Implement functions manual and performance appraisal system Develop staff development and promotion plan
Program Measurement and Evaluation	Program sub-manager recruited Strengths/weaknesses of existing practice of M&E mapped Proposal for new M&E system outlined	Complete development of M&E system Train staff in its use Implement the new system Produce quarterly monitoring reports
Board of Directors	Change of Board members in accordance with bylaws Training and greater involvement of Board members Strengthened Board participation within Alliance Board review of strategic plan	Elaborate Board development plan

Thus, progress is considerably behind what was planned. This can be interpreted in two ways: Either implementation has been slow, or plans were over-optimistic. Undoubtedly there are elements of both, but the evaluation team prefers to put the emphasis on the latter explanation. After all, the MDPP program document is dated March 19 2007, just 18 months before the evaluation took place. Thus, we prefer to emphasize that a lot has been achieved in this period.

The SCN–SCG partnership has been a particular one. Fundamentally it has been a positive relationship, evidenced by the strong economic and ‘political’ support from SCN. Yet it has been a fairly distant relationship. This is somewhat surprising as the two organizations have their offices in the same building, and as SCN is generally acknowledged as having very close relationships with its partner organizations, including for instance frequent project and field visits. However, this has not been the case with the sister organization on the floor above, at least not until the period of closer working relations made necessary by the handing-over process⁸. It might be that this more distant relationship has had implications for how SCN has perceived SCG. Possibly, there has been a time lag in appreciating the changes that SCG has been going through, in terms of an increased rights-based approach and perhaps also in general institutional strengthening. If this has been the case, the problem has to a considerable extent been overcome through the closer working relations over the past year or two.

To what extent are improvements in SCG’s organizational capacity the result of SCN support? As argued in the introduction, this is an impossible question to answer with any precision. Changes and improvements are due to a range of different factors, and Norwegian support is only one of them. Attempting to specify what amount is due to SCN, and what to SCG’s own dedicated efforts at improving, or to the support from SC Sweden is a meaningless exercise. However, what can be said is that for a number of these improvements – in management and administration, in program M&E and in developing the fundraising strategy, the Norwegian support has been a necessary condition, without which the improvements would not have happened. In that sense, the Norwegian financial support has been fundamental.

However, in discussing the role of SCN, the Director of SCG gives equal weight to what can be called the political support within the SC Alliance. The Norwegian support for SCG’s ambition of becoming the organization representing the Alliance in Guatemala has been crucial for SCG to assume this greater role. This includes the decisions to close down the SCN Guatemala office and phase out support to other Guatemalan partners, and to be a partner in for the organizational strengthening process of SCG. Furthermore, SCN has strongly supported the idea that it was SCG which should be the entity to coordinate

⁸ In their comments, SCN mention some exceptions to the generalization: Contact at director level has always been close; in the issue of communication there was close cooperation between the SCN and SCG coordinators between 2003 and 2007; one SCN program coordinator was involved in the SCG participation in the *La Iniciativa* process in 2004-2005. These cases notwithstanding, SCN does dispute the general characterization of the relationship.

both the Rewriting the Future program in Guatemala as well as the emergency response after Stan and the subsequent process of developing of emergency preparedness.

Finally, it should be mentioned that alongside the financial and political support, there has also been technical support. This has really only been ongoing over the last year and a half, when SCN and SCG staff has been working more closely together. This has been appreciated by SCG staff. In sum of overall impacts, however, this form of support has been clearly less important than the other two.

To some extent it can thus be said that SCN should have a significant part of the credit for the advances that have been made, while the delays should largely be blamed on external factors, over-ambitious targets, and perhaps also SCG slowness in implementing some of the components. This is one advantage of being a donor; that one gets credit for what is achieved while avoiding the blame for what is not.

However, there is a reverse side to this argument: If it is the case that through the support to the organizational strengthening, what has been achieved is the construction of an administrative structure too large and top-heavy to be financially sustainable⁹, then a substantial part of the responsibility for this must lie with the donor. It could be argued that the ready availability of SCN funds has led to a tendency to resolve administrative and organizational shortcomings by hiring new people and opening new units and departments within the SCG structure, rather than seeking to make more efficient use of the already existing resources. Likewise, SCN has accepted the argument that SCG should put its house in order before seeking new donors, even supported it through the policy of covering the necessary costs of SCG's administration. This SCN stance has allowed the number of donors to dwindle and directly led to an increased dependence on SCN. In this perspective, the primary blame for the lack of attention to issues of financial sustainability should actually be apportioned to the donor that is supplying the incentives for addressing problems in this way.

⁹ As previously noted, it is the opinion of SCG that it is necessary to have the current administrative structure.

3 Conclusions

Organization

In terms of governance structure, there is still some way to go before the SC Alliance guidelines of best practices are adhered to. Yet, the process is moving in the right direction. The Board of Directors is increasingly being involved in the strategic management of the organizations, and mechanisms to ensure proper selection and rotation of board members are gradually being improved. SCG might consider whether its current administrative structure is the optimal for promoting an efficient division of labor and use of resources.

In terms of strategic planning, the elaboration of the 2006 strategy document implied a significant step forward. It is a strategy document that is focused, rights-oriented and that is being used in practice. SCG has also exhibited a planned approach to overcome its organizational weaknesses, and to assume the responsibilities associated with being the representative of the SC Alliance in Guatemala. However, there are also clear gaps in strategic thinking. Most serious is the lack of immediate attention to the issues of long-term financial sustainability, the danger of building a too large administrative structure, the limited advances in terms of fundraising, and the growing dependence on one donor. Moreover, the evaluation team sees it as a strategic weakness that there have been no attempts at developing an overall communication strategy.

SCG has greatly strengthened its administrative capacity, not only in terms of internal management of staff, funds and other resources, but also with respect to fulfilling donor requirements for producing plans, accounts and reports on time. Today the organization appears solid and dependable – even if not exactly ‘lean and mean’.

With the help of the SC organizations of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, SCG has been able to assume many of the responsibilities of being the SC representative in Guatemala. The relation to SC USA is more complicated. While positive coordination mechanisms giving key responsibility to SCG are in place in some areas (education, emergency response), the continuing operative role of SC USA creates difficulties for the image building of SCG. Should SC USA engage in fundraising and lobbying inside Guatemala, such problems would be greatly increased. Understandably SCG views this with considerable concern.

Programs

We concur with previous assessments that this is an area of strength of SCG. Programs are based on a clear and rights-based strategy, where components complement and mutually strengthen each other, and there is considerable focus on making state institutions assume their obligations with respect to key child rights, partly through working in broad alliances with other civil society organizations. The strategy moreover emphasizes child participation and contains an exit strategy from the time of entry into an area. Furthermore, programs are implemented by staff that seem well qualified, motivated and committed, and at the local level, excellent relations have been established with local authorities.

There are still a number of areas where SCG can improve its programs. Perhaps most importantly this relates to how to work with the local development councils (COCODES). These voluntary councils are central for the program strategy, yet in practice prove to be difficult to reach with the current model of technicians working normal hours. Furthermore, in the near future, SCG will have to assess the costs and benefits of the innovative and interesting, yet challenging model of working through the municipality, which is being tried out in Chiquimula, and decide whether this model should be scrapped, modified, and/or extended to other areas. Finally, there is still a considerable distance to go before the program monitoring and evaluation system is in place and functioning.

Communication

While the program area is the strong side of SCG and the organizational side has advanced significantly, the communication area must be said to be lagging behind. There is a need for developing an overall strategy that covers and integrates the objectives, activities and targets for the four separate, but highly interrelated areas of image building, advocacy, awareness-raising and fund-raising.

In terms of image building, the SCG is well-known and has a good reputation among NGOs and state institutions working with child rights and related issues. In spite of some increase in media coverage over the last years, the organization remains relatively little known among the general public. A serious complication for building the desired image of the organization is the continued presence and activity of SC USA. Also the fact that the name of the organization is in English is an issue which makes it more challenging to communicate what SCG is.

In advocacy and lobbying, SCG is doing a lot at the local level. At national level, efforts are weaker. Here, SCG follows the strategy of working through networks, and belongs to a number that are highly relevant. However, the activity levels of SCG within these networks appear to have been fairly low over the past few years. SCG has not developed any strategic focus on key issues for concentrating lobbying and advocacy efforts.

In awareness-raising, the SCG programs have considerable effects at the local level. There is little attention to doing such work at the national level. Given the different challenges faced by SCG, this is probably a wise way of prioritizing resources.

Fundraising is an area where little has been achieved. Indeed, from one perspective developments have been negative, as the number of international donors has been reduced, while fundraising from national sources remain negligible. This is a priority area where SCG needs to dedicate efforts immediately. In the short to medium term, it is realistically only international funding that can significantly alter the current financial dependence on one donor. SCG possesses the basic skills for developing proposals, but need to do this with much greater intensity and upgrade skills at donor mapping and communication. In terms of national fundraising, there have only been limited advances in spite of the efforts made, probably largely due to factors external to SCG. The team

believes that there is a potential for developing fundraising within Guatemala, but this poses a dilemma. In order to pursue this strategy, there is a need for continued and perhaps increased support for this component. Yet there is no guarantee that this strategy will be successful and that the investment will pay off.

Channeling funds to other Guatemalan organizations

This is something that SCG already has some experience of, after having had this role on behalf of the SC organizations of Denmark and Sweden. Even if this activity will be considerably expanded when also funds from SCN are transferred in this way, we do not foresee any difficulties for SCG in handling the technical side of this. The challenge will be how to develop the role as a funding partner over and above the channeling of funds and following up reports and accounts. Furthermore, SCG needs to make a strategic decision on whether this is a role that it wants to take on permanently, and follow up the implications of this decision.

Impacts of the SCN support

Over the period of SCN support for organizational strengthening, SCG has advanced significantly. Still, many of the targets for the institutional support program have not been met. We see this as primarily reflecting over-ambitious goals.

While the specific contribution of SCN support cannot be singled out, it is clear that SCN funding has been fundamental for many of the improvements that have taken place. Likewise, the 'political' support that SCN has given SCG within the SC Alliance has been of crucial importance for SCG to assume the role as the national representative.

However, the SCN support has also contributed to an institutional strengthening process of a form that has implied too little attention to issues of long-term financial sustainability of the organization.

4 Recommendations

In Chapter 2 of this report (Findings) a number of recommendations are mentioned in the context of the relevant descriptions or discussions. They have all been put in italics, so they are easily found when skimming through the pages. In order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, and to allow the focus in this section to be on the most important recommendations, most of these earlier points will not be mentioned again in this section.

4.1 For SCG

1.

The most important challenge facing SCG relates to the financial issues of very high dependence on one donor and the problem of long-term economic sustainability of a large administrative structure. SCG needs to address these issues immediately and seriously. This means that action must be taken in a number of areas.

- d. International fundraising. Much greater efforts need to be put into this area. More proposals need to be developed and presented to donors. New sets of donors need to be identified, analyzed, and contacted. The ability to package and tailor proposals to the individual requirements and guidelines of different donors must be further developed. Budgets should be developed so that relevant costs incurred at head office are included as project costs. The overall responsibility for this ‘donor contact and project developing’ should be with one or more designated persons, who will need specialized training.
- e. National fundraising. The efforts initiated in this area must be followed up. The proposed fundraising strategy must be further refined and developed, including priority-setting among proposed activities. It is recommended to give priority in a first phase to the private business sector. Companies already contacted must be followed up. Priority should be given to securing funding arrangements that can also cover overhead costs.
- f. Cost-cutting. There is also a need to search for opportunities for cost-cutting and more efficient use of resources. Potential areas could be through restructuring the organization, for instance with fewer levels and increased delegation of authority, or a different division of labor between departments. Income and costs of the educational centre needs to be compared to the options of renting out or selling the building.

2.

Related to some of the points above, there is a need to develop an overall communication strategy. This should include fundraising – both national and international – as well as image building, advocacy and awareness-raising. Care should be taken to develop the strategy so that maximum synergies are achieved between these components. Where possible, activities should be selected so as to serve objectives in more than one area.

3.

A crucial point in connection with the organization's image building is the relation to SC USA. Dialogue should be continued and seek to establish ways of minimizing confusion and negative impacts on SCG image building and fundraising from the existence of two SC organizations in the country. In parallel, it seems important to lobby through the structures of the Alliance in order to influence SC USA to minimize its 'footprint'.

4.

SCG needs to make a strategic decision on whether it wants to be a funding organization. This is an important strategic decision which will affect its relations to other organizations of Guatemalan civil society. It will also have an important effect in defining what it means for SCG to be the representative of the SC Alliance in Guatemala, and it will have an important impact on the image building process.

4.2 For SCN

1.

SCN should consider carefully the implications of its co-responsibility for developing an administrative structure within SCG that may be difficult to sustain without continued Norwegian core funding. A future strategy for supporting SCG must combine acceptance of responsibility for what has been developed with efforts focused at creating sustainability.

2.

As the most fundamental challenges for SCG are mentioned in the recommendations above, the logical recommendations for SCN are to support these processes. In terms of funding, this would involve supporting the costs of developing international and national fundraising capacity, as well as costs of developing an overall communication strategy. The two first are forms of support that should be able to generate income fairly rapidly, and should therefore be sustainable. The last point is in many ways a precondition for the other two. Developing the strategy should not in itself be very costly.

3.

In addition to funding for these processes, SCN should seek to contribute to developing the skills needed in the areas of fundraising and general communication. As these are areas where SCN possesses considerable expertise, one might consider internships and exchange arrangements between SCG and the SCN office in Norway. Alternatively, one could hire Latin American consultants for shorter periods (with the purpose of transferring knowledge, not of doing some specific task). In terms of international fundraising and donor contact, SCN is not an expert, but might consider whether it is possible to recruit trainers through its extensive network.

4.

SCN should seek to use its position and influence within the SC Alliance to obtain agreements with SC USA that will minimize the problem of having a foreign SC organization working in a country where there is a functioning national organization.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

***Appendix 2 Save the Children Guatemala Organisational
Development Plan to Promote Children's Rights at a Country
Level: MDPP Program and Budget Description***

Appendix 3 People and Institutions Met

Date	Institution	Person
21.08.	SCN, Oslo	Annette Giertsen
26.08.	SCN, Oslo	Anne Ma Grøslund
02.09.	SCG, Guatemala	Amilcar Ordoñez, Director
02.09.	SCN, Guatemala	Kari Thomassen, National Representative
03.09.	SCG, Guatemala	Lisette Minerea, Head Institutional Strengthening Armando Secaira, Fundraising Coordinator
03.09.	SCG, Guatemala	Edna Mejicano, Head Administration and Finance Josue Campos, Accountant Aura Hernandez, Administrator
03.09.	SCG, Guatemala	Mónica Cabrera, Head Human Resources Brenda Donado, Assistant
03.09.	SCG, Guatemala	Miriam Enríquez de Serech, Education Advisor Tania Santiesteban Yanira Batres Emeterio Cua
03.09.	SCG, Guatemala	Nelson Oliva, Youth Advisor Julisa de Paz
04.09.	SCN, Guatemala	Heliodoro Cumes Ingrid de Soto
04.09.	SCG, Guatemala	Candida Rabanales, RTF Coordinator
04.09.	SCN, Guatemala	Jorge Peck Saira Arévalo Julieta Senteno
04.09.	SC USA, Guatemala	Patricia O'Connor, Country Office Director
04.09.	Médicos para el Mundo, Jocotán	Isabel Saens
05.09.	SCG, Chiquimula	Evelia Fagioli, Head Field Office Hugo Elías, Program coordinator municipal Luis Ramos, Secretario Contador

05.09.	MINEDUC, Camotán	Jorge Monroy, CTA Rosario Rivas, CTA
05.09.	School Los Encuentros	“Chepe” Portillo, teacher
05.09.	Mayor’s office, Camotán	Manuel Suchini, Advisor to mayor
05.09.	Office of Women, Children and Youth, Camotán	Mari Karol Rivera, Marta Avalos Technicians
05.09.	MINEDUC, San Juan la Ermita	Blanca Rosa Morales, CTA
05.09.	Municipality, San Juan la Ermita	Rolando Martínez, Mayor
05.09.	Office of Women, Children and Youth, San Juan la Ermita	Ana Isabel de Martinez, Coordinator Claudia Mateo, Evanelia Gonzales, Lourdes Durán Technicians
06.09.	Rio Dulce	Youth communicators
06.09.	SCG Rio Dulce, Livingston	Alfredo Morales, Head Field Office
06.09.	Community ‘Tierra y Libertad’, Livingston	Youth Promoters Early Stimulation Volunteers
07.09.	Girls School, Livingston	Teachers
07.09.	Livingston	Youth promoters
07.09.	Community Radio, Livingston	Radio transmission, youth program
08.09.	SCG Rio Dulce, Livingston	Karina García, Eliceo Chub, Anibal Chuc, Yesenia Ramirez.. Technical team
08.09.	MINEDUC, Rio Dulce	Rubén Alfredo Mazariegos and Hector Arturo Carpio, Education Supervisors
08.09.	Rayito de Amor, Livingston Conalfa, Livingston FUNDAECO, Livingston	Mirella Santiago Teq Matilde Chocoj
09.09.	PENNAT, Guatemala Quality Group, Guatemala	Jairo Gonzales Carlos Sanchez
09.09.	UNICEF, Guatemala	Jorge Mejía, Sub-Director Ana María Sánchez, Head of Education
09.09.	Secretaría del Bienestar Social (previously Movimiento Social), Guatemala	Alejandra Vásquez
09.09.	PAMI CIPRODENI	Mirella Saadeh Mariana del Aguila
10.09.	Canalitos School, Guatemala	Elisabeth Gudiel, Director

		Celita, Lorena, Ramiro López, teachers
10.09.	COINDE, Guatemala ASEDE, Guatemala	Demetrio Pérez Guido Calderón
10.09.	MINEDUC, Guatemala	Virgina Tacam, Vice Minister Bilingual and Intercultural Education
10.09.	Board of Directors SCG, Guatemala	Álvaro Pop, President Felipe de Jesús Ortega, Vice President
10.09.	SCG Guatemala	Youth Coordinators (Rydy Renato Chic, Shadia García, Edwin Maquín)
10.09.	SCG Guatemala	Williams Mazariegos, Deputy Head of Programs
10.09.	COMUNICARES, Guatemala	Oneida Rodas, Director
10.09.	SCG Guatemala	Amilcar Ordoñez, Director
11.09.	Feedback and validation workshop	SCG SCN

Appendix 4 Key Reference Documents

(In chronological order)

Alianza Para Desarrollo Juvenil Comunitario – Save the Children Guatemala. Diagnóstico Global Programático y Administrativo (Informe General de Consultoría). Servitec-Consultores, Guatemala febrero 2003. (In text referred to as the ‘2003 evaluation’)

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Save the Children Guatemala Organisational Development Plan to Promote Children’s Rights at a Country Level: MDPP Program and Budget Description. Save the Children Guatemala and Save the Children Norway, Guatemala March 19 2007.

Terms of Reference: Organizational Evaluation of Save the Children Guatemala. Save the Children Norway, Oslo, May 2008.

Sistema de Información, Monitoreo y Evaluación del Programa. Save the Children Guatemala, Sub-gerencia de programas. (Powerpoint presentation) No date, probably mid-2008.

Propuesta de Estrategia de Recaudación Nacional: Save the Children Guatemala: Período 2008-2012. No date, probably August or September 2008.