



Technical Support to the National Institute of Statistics (INE) in Angola

Final Review

Economics and Public Administration Department

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Norad Technical Note

This note is part of the Department's ongoing work. The views and opinions expressed in this note do not necessarily correspond with those of the management of Norad.

Project: Final Review of AFO 2491: Technical Support to the National Institute of Statistics (INE) in Angola

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Foreword and acknowledgments

This report presents a final review of the cooperation programme between Norway and Angola in the field of statistics. The review was requested by the Norwegian Embassy in Kampala.

The programme was carried out between 2001 and 2008 as an institutional twinning arrangement between the National Institute of Statistics in Angola (INE) and Statistics Norway (SN).

The main purpose of this report is to draw lessons learned to enable Norad, Statistics Norway and INE's current and future partners to improve design and management of future statistical capacity building programs. The specific objectives of the review were to systematize the experiences of the project in relation to some key issues related to institutional twinning arrangements in the area of statistical development and institutional capacity building.

An additional purpose of the report is to serve as an input into Norad's knowledge base on institutional capacity building and institutional twinning arrangements conducted through Norwegian agencies.

As the INE and SN have not yet submitted final reports on the cooperation project, the consultants have not been able to take these final assessments into account. The lack of formal final reports has however been ameliorated by extensive consultations with relevant partners.

The Department of Economics and Public Administration in Norad would like to express its appreciation to the task team for important and well conducted work.

Advisers Hans Øyvind Hvidsten and Erlend Nordby have been responsible for managing the assignment in the department.

Oslo, 17th March 2009

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Summary and conclusions

This report reviews Norad support to development of statistics in Angola during 2001-2008. Assistance has been provided through institutional collaboration between Statistics Norway (SN) and the Angolan National Institute for Statistics (INE). The Norwegian contribution was NOK 24.7 million, which makes the project one of the larger Norwegian co-operation projects in Angola.

Stakeholders and beneficiaries generally report that the project is seen as valuable. To some, this was particularly important at a time when Government resources were not forthcoming to the area of statistics. In addition, a number of stakeholders note the value of a statistics support project not geared toward a specific donor's statistical needs but rather contributing to consolidating a basis for future statistics development.

Due to a lack of indicators and systematic monitoring and reporting, it is difficult to make objective assessments about project results. The review team has made an attempt based on a comparison of objectives and expected outputs versus results as reported by SN and INE in interviews, and on interviews with a number of other stakeholders. Specific results in terms of statistical surveys and analyses are limited. The project is believed to have contributed to strengthening overall capacities but with no baseline and no reported indicators it is difficult to make robust assessments. An important social survey was produced but to date has not been published. The project has contributed to the establishment of a business registry for industry surveys, and to skills development in questionnaires adapted to optical reading, among other things.

Poor project follow-up undermined project performance. On the donor side, arrangements for quality assurance, oversight and advisory support were inadequate, largely due to the limited formal role of Norad and the Norwegian embassy. The administrative model was in line with recommendations coming out of studies and evaluations in 1998 with the intention of supporting country ownership and recipient execution. As a result, the direct reporting between Norad and the supplier institution was dropped and the overall interaction between the donor and the project was limited. Annual reports and annual meetings represented the only formal interaction between INE and the donor. These arrangements, combined with the lack of monitorable indicators and milestones, undermined the project's ability to resolve key bottlenecks. A clause regarding a review after one year of operation was not acted upon and adjustments were not made that could have identified more realistic targets.

The project effectiveness was weakened by an overly narrow focus on technical capacity building. In line with earlier recommendations and literature on capacity development, a broader approach would have been beneficial. Ideally, capacity development should happen at three levels: individual, organizational, and enabling environment.

- SNs expertise is mainly relevant for individual capacity building on technical issues.
- SN provided some support toward organizational development but this came late in the project and its effect is unclear. A number of agencies specialize in technical assistance on organizational development and drawing in such resources could have been advantageous to the project.
- Addressing systemic factors relevant to the enabling environment of INE in its polity context would require higher-level policy dialogue.

The rationale for a twinning arrangement as opposed to other forms of technical assistance is unclear. Depending on what specific skills the project intends to transfer, the comparative advantages of any monopolistic supplier institution should be carefully considered. In the case of this project, SN possessed important and advanced technical skills but had only a small pool of experts and at times was not able to mobilize the most relevant expertise in a timely manner. One way to ensure the highest quality is to operate in a consortium of several supplier institutions. Another option is to contract parts or all of the planned technical assistance through international bidding processes.

The project was conceived, developed and executed on a technical level and lacked important policy linkages. The project was prepared at a time when Angola was still at war, and implementation started as the country embarked on its reconstruction. A preparatory phase of the project supported the development of a national strategy for statistics development. Consultations about the strategy among users of statistics – notably policymakers, were very limited. Policy dialogue between Norad and the Angolan Government at Ministry level on the project does not appear to have taken place. The lower than expected financial and human resources allocated to INE from Government have also reduced INE’s overall capacity to execute the strategy and the project supporting it.

The current Angolan policy context at present appears to be more prone to statistics development and use. In addition to recently increased funding for INE, a process to develop a new medium-term plan for the development of statistics (an “ENDE” in Portuguese) based on the PARIS21 methodology has been initiated. This methodology is designed to encourage Government and other stakeholder buy-in through broad consultations, although the timeline of this new medium-term plan is uncertain.

In a country emerging from conflict, support should focus on manageable targets. The project indicates that good statistics cannot create demand for good policy, but commitment to good policy can create demand for statistics. In an immediate post-conflict context, Government focus is likely to be on quick wins and physical reconstruction.

Key recommendations. Recommendations include (i) the need for closer follow-up of recipient institutions by Norad; (ii) the need for addressing broader aspects of capacity development than individual skills training; (iii) a need to reconsider the efficiency and modalities of the twinning model; and (iv) that future statistics development projects fully utilize the framework of the PARIS21 initiative both with regards to consultative strategy development and robust indicators with baseline data.

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose and objectives of the review

This report, commissioned by Norad, is the final review of the Norad project AGO-2491: Technical support to the National Institute for Statistics (INE) in Angola. The project started in 2001 and ended in 2008. The review is carried out in accordance with Article IX of the Agreement on Technical Support to INE signed on 18 December 2001.

The purpose of this final review is to draw lessons to enable Norad, SN, INE and INE's current and future partners to improve design and management of future statistical capacity-building programmes, with possible relevance for the institutional collaboration model more broadly. The specific objectives of the review are to systematize the experiences of the project with particular emphasis on:

- Institutional collaboration;
- Institutional development and capacity building;
- Country context, including dialogue and collaboration with the Angolan authorities;
- Challenges in the production and use of statistics in developing countries from a user as well as producer perspective; and
- Dissemination and use of statistics in a development context.

1.2 Scope of the review

The review covers the entire project, including the preparatory work before the signing of the agreement, until end of project activities in 2008. However, the project is not yet officially closed and Statistics Norway and INE have not yet issued their final reports.

Econ Pöyry, in collaboration with Development Workshop, was contracted by Norad to carry out the review¹. The terms of reference noted that the work 'shall comprise, but not necessarily be limited to', a list of 20 'issues and themes', which may be found in the ToR in Annex 1. Econ Pöyry and Development Workshop have done their best to address these and other relevant issues, focusing on those we felt to be most relevant to the objectives listed above.

1.3 Methodology

The review takes as a starting point the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability). It is premature at this stage to make any robust assessment of project impact, thus the review will not emphasis impact assessments beyond assessing the policy linkages that could make statistics relevant to policymaking.

The review relies on a combination of document review and interviews with key stakeholders. Documents reviewed include the inter-governmental agreement between Norway and Angola, the contracts between SN and INE, other bilateral agreements between the Norwegian and Angolan parties, minutes from meetings, notes and reports produced by the project, annual work plans and budgets, and previous evaluations of this project. The review team also took

¹ The team consisted of Sigrun Gjerløw Aasland (team lead, Econ Pöyry), Philip Swanson (Econ Pöyry), and Paul Robson (Development Workshop). Sveinung Fjose (Econ Pöyry) provided internal quality assurance and Andrea Berg (Econ Pöyry) administrative support.

into account the literature related to good practice for technical assistance in statistics and for capacity building, as well as earlier reviews of institutional collaboration in Norwegian development assistance. A list of the most important documents consulted is included in Annex 2. With the exception of the Norad appropriation document from 2000, the midterm review, and a 2006 Scanteam review on project progress and administrative arrangements, limited project documentation was provided by Norad. A number of documents relevant to the project were available at the Norwegian embassy in Luanda in hard copies². In preparing the review team's visit to Luanda, the team relied heavily on documents provided by SN. SN was also helpful in providing financial data not available from INE. However, documents provided were often undated or provided in several revisions, so that it was not always clear which were the final versions.

Interviews were conducted with INE staff, SN staff, Government authorities (Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration, Ministry of Finance, National Bank of Angola), current embassy staff and other donors providing assistance to INE, notably the World Bank, the European Commission, UNICEF, UNDP and USAID. In addition to interviews with SN in Oslo, members of the review team held meetings with stakeholders in Luanda, Angola during November 17-26, 2008. A list of persons consulted is provided in Annex 2. The report also takes into account feedback from a presentation of preliminary findings to stakeholders at the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, held at the end of the in-country mission on 25 November 2008.

² However, some important documents appeared to be lacking, including the Norad appraisal document. This document was received in February 2009 and informed the final version of the report

2 Background

2.1 Project identification and implementation

Discussions between Norway and Angola regarding co-operation in the area of statistics were initiated in 1997, based on dialogue between the INE Director and the Norwegian Ambassador to Angola at that time. In a preparatory phase, SN provided advice on the formulation of the first Five-year National Plan for the Development of Statistics. This document, in the following discussion referred to as the “strategy”, was subsequently approved by the Angolan Council of Ministers in 2002. SN’s initial support to developing the strategy was followed by technical assistance to implement some of its activities.

The Government of Angola and the Kingdom of Norway signed an Agreement on Technical Support to the National Institute for Statistics (“INE”) in 2001. INE and SN had previously already signed a Contract in 2000, which was revised in 2004. The agreed Norwegian contribution was NOK 24, 7 million for a period of three years. The project has been one of the larger Norwegian co-operation projects in Angola. By the end of 2008, most of the funds had been used. A breakdown of expenditures is provided in Annex 8.

The preliminary phase of articulating the strategy took place in 2002, and project activities with the deployment of long- and short-term advisors was initiated in 2003. The original planned duration was through 2004. However, delays in project implementation resulted in the last funds being disbursed in 2008. A timeline of major events in project progress and milestones up to 2007 is provided as Annex 7.

2.2 Goals and objectives

Project goals and objectives were revised between the 2000 and 2004 legal agreements but in substance largely remained intact. Annex 5 provides a summary overview of the differences, which appear to be largely on form although they leave some room for interpretation. In the 2004 version, the grant amount was also adjusted from 30 million to 24, 7 million since the former figure in the 2000 contract was reportedly a mistake. The 2004 annual meeting agreed on contractual changes related to (i) dropping the GIS & Village Recording System based statistics from the expected outputs, and (ii) increasing the compensation for living costs for the long term advisers reflecting high living costs.

This review will use the goals, objective and outputs agreed in the 2004 contract as its point of reference. According to this agreement, the project goal was to:

“improve the quality and quantity of empirical information in Angola, by strengthening the ability of INE to identify the needs and then to produce and disseminate statistical information to users within the government, to other public organisations, to private business and non-business organizations, and to public at large”

The objectives were:

- To strengthen the ability of INE within Economic statistics, including prices, Industry statistics, Short term economic indicators, Energy (including Oil) statistics, Business tendencies and foreign trade statistics;
- To strengthen the ability of INE within Social statistics centered around the household survey program, including studies and planned surveys; and

- To assist INE in refining and developing the statistical infrastructure, including statistical training, the capacity to maintain and utilise the Business Register and statistical standards, sampling and dissemination.

2.3 Situational context

The project was prepared at a time when Angola was still at war, and implementation started as the country embarked on its reconstruction. After nineteen years of civil war, and a failed peace process in 1991, the Lusaka protocol in 1994 provided for a Unity Government and integration of UNITA (*União Nacional da Independência Total*) insurgents into government armed forces. However conflict resumed in 1998 and the country entered into one of its more violent periods up until the death of the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. A new ceasefire was signed in April the same year. This time peace prevailed and the country embarked on major reconstruction efforts. The main focus of the Government leading up to the spring of 2002 was to end the war and major military offensives were made against UNITA. Unlike many other – and much resource-poorer countries, the Angolan transition out of conflict was not accompanied by any international donor pledging. Since 2002, major reconstruction efforts and investments have been made. The country has seen double-digit growth rates several years in a row, and according to the World Bank, GDP has doubled every third year, from US\$ 19.8 billion in 2004 to US\$ 60.4 billion in 2007. In September 2008, the first parliamentary elections since 1991 were held and considered generally free and fair.

3 Relevance

This chapter discusses the extent to which the project was articulated as an appropriate response to the social, economic and political context at the time, responded adequately to needs and gaps, and to what extent it was influenced by international best practice on the topic.

3.1 Alignment with Government priorities

The project was designed as a response to technical needs rather than political priorities. Early discussions about Norwegian support to INE were initiated between the director of INE and the then Norwegian Ambassador in 1997, just before the conflict re-ignited in 1998. The main justification for the project at that time seemed to be that, “after 30 years of war the country lacks vital statistics in most areas, which makes reform work difficult” (memo from the Embassy to Norad dated August 4, 1997, AGO 0021, 99/00003). According to the Norad appropriation document³ from 2000 regarding the project, production and dissemination of social and economic statistics would constitute an important planning tool for policymakers. The document pointed out that the need for capacity strengthening at INE had been raised by the Ministry of Planning as well as by the World Bank and UNDP. The priority given to this need by the Ministry or the source of this expression is not specified. In reality project identification and preparatory dialogue appear to have mostly taken place between INE and the Norwegian embassy, and built on good relations between the Norwegian Ambassador and the INE Director.

The development of a national strategy for statistical development was not a policy priority of the Angolan Government in 2002. The drive for developing the strategy was mostly from inside INE, specifically its Director General at the time. There are a number of possible reasons for this. First, Angolan tradition for participatory policymaking was limited. Its overall governance capacity to coordinate policy across ministries and public institutions was also likely more limited than is the case today. Second, while most can agree in principle that good statistics are valuable for good policy making, Angola had little tradition for basing policy on statistics. Third, in the view of a number of interviewees, the Government even had explicit disinterest in statistics that could expose actual living conditions in the country as worse than officially endorsed figures. Finally, one might also argue that prioritising statistics development could not be expected from a Government faced with considerable immediate reconstruction needs. Whatever the reasons, according to most stakeholders interviewed, the theoretical need for statistics development did not translate into an actual prioritising by the government – despite the formal approval of the medium-term strategy by the Council of Ministers in 2002.

Assisting the Angolan Government in articulating a strategy was an important effort but the process lacked consultation and made unrealistic assumptions. In its institutional collaboration projects, SN normally starts with supporting specific technical tasks in collaboration with the recipient institution. It also often relies on more informal relationship building with different stakeholders as part of the project. In Angola, SN was required to take a different approach. At the time when the formal project preparations got started, INE leadership changed and the new director wished to base the assistance on a comprehensive national strategy for statistical development. Development of a strategy document to be

³ Bevilgningsdokument AGO 0027- Faglig bistand til Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), Norad 29.11.00

approved by the government was reportedly part of the new director's more general strategy for developing the national statistical system by first improving its legal basis. The process of articulating the strategy was based on general directions from INE and continuous dialogue between INE and SN. The strategy was mostly authored by SN staff.

As pointed out in interviews with a number of stakeholders, the strategy was not based on an initial assessment of capacities within INE. Our document search also did not identify any such assessment. Nor did the strategy development involve the providers (e.g. line ministries) and users (e.g. policymakers) of statistics in any meaningful extent. It also did not involve donors already involved in or expected to support statistics in Angola. Both SN staff and the former INE director have pointed to the lack of consultations in developing this strategy. These shortcomings appear to have reduced the strategy's ability to make realistic assumptions and articulate attainable targets.

The current Angolan policy context appears more supportive of statistics development.

According to Government officials and donors interviewed, Government commitment to statistics has increased over the last year and a half. In the opinion of some, this apparent increased priority assigned to the production and dissemination of statistics may relate to fatigue with continued quotes of statistics from 2001 and before, combined with a realization that more recent statistics likely would show considerable progress has been made. There also appears to be an increasing appreciation of the value of statistics for addressing complex development challenges. As institutions and governance improve, and as experience with consultations accumulate, the prospects for more consultative processes toward a national strategy also appear to be improving. The 2008 budget allocation indicates a higher priority to statistics than previous years. Moreover, following a seminar in 2007 organized by the association of Portuguese speaking countries in Africa (PALOP), INE and the Ministry of Planning began preliminary steps to elaborate a new medium-term plan for the development of statistics (an "ENDE" in Portuguese) based on the PARIS21 methodology.⁴ A pre-strategy diagnostic took place in mid-2007, but the Ministry of Planning notes that the results have not yet been approved within the Ministry, and so the diagnostic has not been distributed yet. Thus the timeline of this new medium-term plan remains uncertain.

3.2 Alignment with lessons and best practice

Lessons on capacity building from previous Norwegian experiences in institutional collaboration were only partly applied in project design.

In 1997, the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) conducted an evaluation of institutional development through twinning arrangements in Norwegian development assistance, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998. The CMI report distinguished between three levels of institutional development⁵: (i) Transfer of knowledge on an individual level (human resource development), (ii) changes in structures, administration, and technology in organizations (organizational development), and (iii) changes in relations between individual organizations and networks, sectors, and the overall context in which these organizations take part (systemic development) (Tvedten et al 1998, p. 2)⁶. A 2006 OECD report on capacity development echoes these terms by seeing *capacity* development as consisting of an *individual* level, an

⁴ PARIS21 stands for Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century. It is a consortium set up in 1999 by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, Eurostat, the IMF, the UN and the World Bank.

⁵ Institutional collaboration does not necessarily entail objectives about institutional development, although implicit assumption may be made about the latter being expected from the former. Literature on the topic tends to use institutional development and capacity development interchangeably.

⁶ Tvedten, Inge, S. Askvik, P. Rebelo, H. Melber, J. Helland (1998): Twinning for Development. Institutional Cooperation between Public Institutions in Norway and the South. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD Report Series no. 98:1) referred in Tvedten, I. and H. Melber 1998 NEPRU Working Paper No. 65, 1998.

organizational level, and the *enabling environment*⁷. In the CMI report, observed twinning projects mostly addressed “lower level concerns of human resource and organizational development and to a much smaller extent [the] higher level concerns of strategic management and systems development” (Tvedten et al 1998, p. 4). The evaluation also noted that “Development of organizational capacity contribute to institutional development, but only when the interventions are done with reference to their relevance for external stakeholders and society at large. Much of what is done is ‘gap-filling’ in the production of tangible outputs”. Finally, the evaluation argued that “Public institutions are not development institutions. Norad should make a closer assessment of their competence and capacity for development work”. (Tvedten et al 1998, p. 6). Similar observations can be made in this project about both the type of capacity development provided and the comparative advantages of supplier institutions. It appears therefore that the above lessons were not fully applied by Norad and SN in project design.

Recommendations from Statskonsult on project administrative arrangements were followed to the detriment of project effectiveness. The CMI evaluation was followed in 1998 by a Statskonsult report on the administrative arrangements of twinning projects (Statskonsult 1998:16)⁸. Both reports noted that the effectiveness of institutional collaboration projects was hampered with conceptual confusion about institutional *development* versus institutional *collaboration* and unclear division of roles and responsibilities between actors involved. As a result the Statskonsult report recommended a change in the administrative arrangements for such projects where Norad’s role became more limited. These arrangements were applied in the present project and appear in fact to have helped undermine project performance. This is discussed in more detail in section 0.

The project was developed in parallel with global initiatives relevant for future statistics development projects. The project in many ways was a pioneer and should not be judged against more recent knowledge relevant to the topic. Such knowledge and practice is nonetheless useful in the articulation of recommendations for the future and will be briefly discussed. At the same time as the statistical collaboration project between SN and INE was being developed, global efforts were initiated to more systematically address statistical capacity building in developing countries. These efforts were galvanized by the adoption of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) and the subsequent need to monitor them. Specifically, the project preceded the methodology for developing medium-term plans for statistics elaborated by the PARIS21 consortium only in late 2002, i.e., shortly after the main work on INE’s strategy had been completed. Consequently, PARIS21 best practices understandably were not incorporated into INE’s medium-term Plan for 2002-2006. Among other features, the PARIS21 methodology stresses the need for Government-driven processes based on broad consultations. It also elaborates progress and performance indicators for statistical capacity.

3.3 Risks and mitigation measures

A number of realistic risks were anticipated at the design stage but not mitigated. The 2000 appropriation document from Norad noted that the initial project had overestimated initial capacities at INE. However, the adjustment made to address this appears to have been limited to extending the project duration beyond the two years initially planned. The 2000 appropriation document identified the following risks:

7 OECD/DAC Network on Governance (2006): The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice

8 Direktoratet i institusjonelt samarbeid: Forvaltningsmessige sider ved bruk av norske direktorater i institusjonelt Bistandssamarbeid, Statskonsult Rapport 1998:16

- Trained personnel could leave INE to take up better paid jobs in the private sector or international organizations
- Lack of sanctioned legal and strategic framework
- Lack of minimum working conditions at INE including offices, equipment, and qualified personnel
- The security situation limiting access in certain parts of the country
- Weak public administration reluctant to provide data and make use of produced statistics

A pre-project appraisal carried out by Norad in 1998 had noted similar concerns, stating as critical factors the following: (i) INE absorption capacities and (ii) Government ability to cover recurrent administrative costs.

With the exception of the security situation, which improved at least after 2002, all of these risks in part materialized. The appraisal or the appropriation document had not, however, specified risk mitigation measures but did build in a provision to review the project after one year. As discussed in section 0, this provision was not acted upon.

3.4 Gender and environmental issues in project design

Specific gender and environmental initiatives are not explicitly addressed in final project documents and actual activities. Norad asked the consultant to comment on the way gender and environmental issues were addressed in the project. Gender issues were mentioned in a number of early documents related to the project. At early stages, gender statistics was referred to as an area in which INE sought assistance, though no gender statistics were produced during the project. The review team did not find any references to environmental issues in early project-related documents or in the legal agreements.


4 Effectiveness

This chapter reviews the project’s achievement of stated objectives as well as major factors influencing effectiveness.

4.1 Logical consistency of project design

The program logic was not entirely consistent from goal to objectives and from objectives to expected outputs. While the goal makes reference to users of statistics, and hence implicitly to INE’s relevance of statistics for these users, the objectives – as quoted in the 2004 contract - focus exclusively on the production and dissemination of statistics. There is no specific mention in the objectives of the ‘ability to identify the needs’ referred in the goal. Hence, while the goal and the expected outputs make allusion to a role for the project in policymaking, the objectives are limited to technical skills to be transferred from SN to INE. This may have provided unclear guidance to project partners. The gap is illustrated in the right column of Figure 4.1. Moreover, while a goal of the project is to help INE better identify needs, many of these needs already seem to be pre-determined in the Objectives, e.g., “including prices, industry statistics, short-term economic indicators, energy (including oil), statistics, business tendencies and foreign trade statistics”.

Figure 4.1. Programme logic



Outputs were not translated into measurable indicators. The project did not have performance indicators in terms of particular surveys or data series to be produced at certain intervals or in terms of measurable indicators for capacity increase and skills acquired, or capacity development more broadly. The expected outputs to a certain extent mix output and outcome levels and do not propose specific targets or sources of information. This makes it difficult to point to measureable successes.

4.2 Analysis of planned and achieved objectives and outputs

The project is seen as having provided a net contribution to skills base. In the views of a number of donors interviewed, the project contributed to the skills base of INE, in turn contributing to the outputs of other donors' programmes – which only now are starting to bear fruit. One donor commented that the Norwegian project performed a valuable service by helping to keep INE's professional skills "ticking over" during a fallow period in terms of government support to statistics. Overall, despite the lack of documented results, INE, other donors and other government entities working with INE speak of the project in positive terms. Given the lack of measurable indicators and corresponding reports, it is difficult to objectively assess the specific outcomes and outputs of the project. The final reports from SN and INE respectively had not been finalized at the time of this review. All assessments of project outcome and output therefore, compared with the 2004 Agreement, are based on (i) reported results from either INE or SN that correspond to any of the expected outputs, or (ii) subjective assessments by various stakeholders among Government agencies, donors, INE and SN staff, and NORAD.

Objectives

- Objective 1: To strengthen the ability of INE within Economic statistics, including prices, Industry statistics, Short term economic indicators, Energy (including Oil) statistics, Business tendencies and foreign trade statistics.
 - **Industry statistics.** The main project focus in this area was on a harmonized enterprise survey and Index of Industrial Production (IPI). Six short-term missions were in support of the IPI and included training in SPSS, development of sampling and estimation plans, design of questionnaires, and data processing. According to the current INE Director, the annual publication of industrial statistics could be considered as almost a direct result of the project. Series of annual industrial statistics have now been produced and published covering the years 2002 through 2006. Starting with 2007, such statistics will be produced and published quarterly.
 - **Energy statistics** were not addressed by the project.
 - **Foreign trade statistics.** SN assisted INE in methodological and technical problems related to foreign trade statistics. INE notes that the project also helped improve the quality of trade statistics and the regularity of their publication. Trade statistics are now reportedly published quarterly, the most recent appearing for the second quarter of 2008.
 - **National accounts data.** The project helped improve national accounts data, although improvements in this area should primarily be attributed to assistance by the World Bank. Moreover, a number of stakeholders noted that there were still major problems with national accounts data.
 - **GDP data.** According to INE, the project helped improve the quality of GDP data.
 - **Price statistics.** Review of the Consumer Price Index was planned but this never happened.
- Objective 2: To strengthen the ability of INE within Social statistics centred around the household survey program, including studies and planned surveys.
 - **Household survey.** The first long-term adviser on social statistics initiated the work on the QUIBB, a Portuguese acronym for the World Bank-designed Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire or CWIQ. The work was put on hold as this adviser had to leave her post due to illness, but it was resumed with the arrival of the second long-

term adviser in social statistics. SN assisted in design of the questionnaire and provided training in sampling, weighting, poverty indicators, interview techniques, data processing and tabulation. The QUIBB has been produced but not yet published. According to INE it is currently being printed.⁹

- **Poverty reduction strategy and Millennium Development Goals.** SN assisted in the design of a monitoring programme for the PRSP and the MDGs to be included in the QUIBB and other survey systems. The results of this work are unclear.
- **Poverty and gender analysis.** Training in poverty analysis applying QUIBB data was planned but not carried out. Gender statistics, also applying QUIBB data, was dropped.
- **Objective 3: To assist INE in refining and developing the statistical infrastructure, including statistical training, the capacity to maintain and utilise the Business Register and statistical standards, sampling and dissemination.**
 - Outputs in this area that INE considered to be attributable to the project included revision to the nomenclature of economic activities to international norms; the creation of Business Survey Sampling Frame that supports an annual business survey; development of a library within INE, equipment and training for optical reading, and development of INE’s website (although we were not able to connect to the website at the given address www.ine.gv.ao). SN also helped organize a seminar for representatives of the media.
 - Sampling has been a problem area for INE. In addition to support provided by SN in this area, INE reported that they had contracted Oxford Policy Management through an international bidding process, also with Norwegian project funds.

Outputs

The planned Outputs listed in the 2004 Contract, like the Objectives, are also somewhat vague. Moreover, specific Outputs are not linked to specific Objectives.

- **Planned Output: Increased quality of statistical information produced by INE based upon a review, documentation and amendment of statistical methods and standards**
 - According to INE and a number of users in other government ministries and departments, the quality of statistical information produced by INE has increased somewhat in the past few years, concurrently with training as described under objectives.
- **Planned Output: User-demanded statistics, either directly as demanded by users, or needed for basic statistics on a) the national account system or b) basic social and demographic statistics**
 - According to INE and users in other government departments and donors, production of user-demanded statistics for both the national account system and basic social and demographic statistics has been inadequate. An ongoing survey called “Integrated Inquiry into People’s Well-Being” (IBEP) is anticipated with interest by a number of stakeholders.
- **Planned Output: A better trained staff through training and access to study tours and workshops**

⁹ An important constraint was reportedly objections from one or more line ministries whose own data was not consistent with survey results, particularly regarding unemployment figures.

- This vague output was addressed through 30+ technical support missions by SN staff to Angola and study tours for INE staff to counterpart institutions in Mozambique and Norway. However, the resulting level of staff training is not possible to measure, not least because no baseline assessment of staff skills was made. It should be noted that a “large” number (we were not able to ascertain a specific figure) of staff trained by the project subsequently left to work for donors or the private sector, and in fact their training probably helped open up such opportunities for them. However, this is a problem that is not unique to INE or this project.
- Planned Output: Statistical, analytical and methodological studies produced on a joint-venture basis.
 - No such studies were produced under this project.
- Planned Output: Increased awareness and utilisation of statistical information by Government, public organisations, private business, non-business organisations and the public at large.
 - Although it is difficult to measure this, according to our interviews with government departments and donors, the government is becoming increasingly aware of the importance of good statistics for policy making and is now starting to demand more comprehensive statistics from INE and other government departments. Along with this increased demand, INE also comments that there is increased government support for statistics development. However, there are no indications that this increased interest can be attributed to the project. According to INE, it has not noticed increased demand for statistics from potential *non*-government users.


4.3 Factors affecting project effectiveness

Project preparations

Assumptions in the strategy about financial and human resources from Government budgets were unrealistic. In the strategy, INE staffing was projected to more than triple from around 120 in 2001 to 374 by 2004 and 423 by 2006. In reality numbers stayed relatively stable at around 120 supplemented by approximately 60 staff on special contracts. The budget allocation from the Government was also projected to increase substantially. Although not stated directly in the strategy, the expectation of increasing funds appears to have been based on the assumption that the seven-fold budget increase to INE between 2000 and 2001 (from US\$ 400,000 to US\$ 3.2 million) was part of a trend instead of a one-off increase. In reality, the Government allocation to INE stayed significantly below the figures assumed in the strategy. Figure 4.2 illustrates the developments between 1998 and 2008. The budget allocation was just below USD 3 million in 2007 but then took another significant jump in 2008 to almost USD 4 million.

Figure 4.2. Government expenditures on INE: Assumed and actual¹⁰

Expenditures in
(USD '000)



Source: INE (1998-2005), Angolan Ministry of Finance (2006-2008), Banco Nacional de Angola, Econ Pöyry

Project focus

The flexibility of design allowed for orientation toward INE's needs. One of the reasons why stakeholder's assessments of the project are generally positive is probably the fact that the assistance was based on training in specific subjects requested by INE. Unlike projects by some other donors, this project did not seem to be aimed at meeting the donor's own data needs. The flexible program design had the advantage of enabling project staff to adapt to changing circumstances, including provision of capacity building based on lower-than-expected baseline capacity. On the downside, this kind of flexibility without specific progress and results indicators tend to provide limited accountability. Lack of specific outputs makes it difficult to compare actual results against targets. The main measurable results of the project were the *inputs* in terms of short-term training missions by SN personnel on various subjects requested by INE. However, it is difficult to measure the outputs from such training missions except in terms of numbers of personnel trained, and for this there were no specific targets.

The narrow focus on technical capacities may have undermined the achievement of overall goals. As discussed in section 3.2, capacity development goes beyond the development of individual skills and should encompass organizational development and the enabling environment. The project objectives presented in section 2.2 however, as well as the bulk of project activities and achievements presented in section 4.2, relate to technical support to individual staff at INE in producing specific statistical products. The narrower technical focus was in part justified – at least if one considers the stated objectives in isolation. However, it seems unlikely that the stated project goal could be achieved through the type of capacity development that can be interpreted from the project objectives. A more explicit

¹⁰ Figures for 1998-2005 are quoted from Scanteam's 2006 project review, where figures are presented in USD. For 2006-2008, we have pulled information from the published annual budgets from the Ministry of Finance website, converted to US\$ using exchange rates current at the time as provided on the website of the National Bank of Angola. We are assuming that US\$ figures in the Scanteam report, provided by INE, are also based on current exchange rates, which have changed substantially over the years especially in the period prior to 2005.

broad definition of capacity development, following the recommendations from the 1998 CMI review of institutional collaboration projects, would have been beneficial.


Efforts to address organizational development had unclear effects. INE's hierarchical organization with lack of task delegation sometimes stalled activities unnecessarily. To address this, in early 2006 SN provided some technical assistance in human resource management and annual planning by way of two short-term missions by SN staff. Also of organizational relevance, SN provided support for developing the library and the website, and organized a seminar on statistics for representatives of the press. However, these efforts came late in the project and their effects are unclear.

The project does not appear to have directly impacted on INE's position in Angolan policymaking. According to the goal, the project would contribute to capacity development that could enable INE not only to produce statistics but also to identify needs of public and private sector actors including policymakers in the Government. The appropriation document from 2000 had also noted as rationale for the project that production and dissemination of social and economic statistics would constitute an important planning tool for policymakers. Interviews indicate that INE does not function optimally in its polity environment. Policy linkages are weak, and users of statistics regard INE as weak, albeit with some improvements in the last year or so. Produced statistics have occasionally been prevented from being published due to objections from line ministries whose own figures did not correspond to those of INE. SN made several efforts to promote the publication of produced statistics but had limited leverage to influence this. Some support was provided by SN to develop statistics relevant to measuring the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and informing the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). For the most part, however, the types of statistics developed seem to have been defined a priori in the medium term strategy, which in turn was based on limited consultations.

Capacity development would have benefited from broader engagement of technical assistance and policy dialogue. First, to expect the technical supplier organization in the twinning arrangement to have a comparative advantage in all aspects of organizational development seems unrealistic. To this end, it might have been advantageous to also draw in professional organizational development advisers. Second, addressing complex political issues and policy priorities is beyond the area of influence for technicians. Beyond its power of recommendation to INE, SN did not have the mandate to conduct policy discussions at a Ministry level or to ensure broad consultations with users of statistics. As noted for example by Sokol and Stiegert (2008)¹¹ the usefulness of both short and long term assistance can depend on the level and leverage of the recipient. In this case, the leverage of INE was weak and this was not something SN could adequately address. In retrospect, the project would have benefitted from a higher level policy dialogue between the embassy and the Angolan authorities on project progress, ideally also involving other donors. Figure 4.3. illustrates the three distinct levels of engagement.

¹¹ An Empirical Evaluation of Long Term Advisors and Short Term Interventions in Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, *The Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series 02/08*

Figure 4.3. Models for engagement on comprehensive capacity development



Source: Econ Pöyry

Project management

Conditions laid out in the approval document were not met. Norad’s appropriation document from 2000 stipulated a review after the first year of operation of the program. The document had built in as a caveat a possible “stopping point” for the support, which would allow necessary adjustments after the first year. This would be “to ensure that Angolan authorities prioritize the collaboration and put forward its own funds, that there is sufficient capacity and competence on the Angolan side and that other donor efforts are coordinated with the Norwegian ones” (our translation, 2000 appropriation document p. 4). This “first-year” review was only carried out in 2006, five years later than planned. It then constituted a complementary analysis to the mid-term review, with the objective to “provide recommendations on how administrative arrangements of the program can be improved, particularly with respect to donor coordination”¹². Had the review been carried out as planned in 2001, when the project was just getting started, or in 2002 after the strategy had been finalized and endorsed and the first phase effectively completed, it might have resulted in adjustments being made. Referring back to the conditions laid out the appropriation document, (i) a number of planned activities were never carried out, due in part to weak INE capacities both in terms of human resource availability and prior experience; (ii) Government funds were not forthcoming; and (iii) donor coordination was consistently weak, as elaborated on in section 0.

Administrative arrangements lacked assignment of responsibility for supervision and advisory support. In light of likely capacity constraints in a recipient institution for capacity development assistance, close follow-up and advice is necessary throughout the project. In accordance with the contractual arrangements, INE was responsible for project execution, SN was responsible for service delivery of technical assistance, and Norad was responsible for financing and overall governance, with annual meetings as its only formal interlocution with the project. This provided a very limited mandate and opportunity for Norad (and later the

¹² Terms of Reference Review of AGO-2491: Technical Support to the National Institute for Statistics (“INE”), Norad 2006

embassy) to assist INE on an overall project-management level and resolve bottlenecks as they occurred. SN did not have the mandate or capacity to take on this role, as its task in the project was service delivery of technical support based on its expertise in statistics. Consequently, a number of issues were addressed at consecutive annual meetings without being resolved, and opportunities to readjust project objectives in light of limited resources and capacities were not followed up.

The mid-term review (MTR) lacked necessary independence and project management expertise. The MTR, which could have represented an opportunity to address bottlenecks, was conducted by SN, INE and an independent statistics expert. While this team was well placed to make informed assessments on technical quality and statistical needs going forward, it lacked personnel who could identify constraints and propose revisions related to project management. The strong participation of INE and SN in the MTR team may also have affected the team's ability to come up with new observations and proposals. In accordance with the contract, the MTR would provide "Recommendations for an amended project plan for the remaining project period". The final report states the need for "sharpening some of the modalities of the project". However in its conclusions, the report recommends business as usual in 2006 and then lists preconditions for a new phase. A 2006 review of administrative arrangements replacing that planned one-year review also did not propose major amendments to project set-up.

The administrative arrangements responded to recommended approaches at the time. The project design and set-up must be seen in light of an evolving agenda in Norwegian development assistance related to institutional collaboration and twinning between Norwegian public institutions and recipient agencies in developing countries. Both the CMI and Statskonsult reports that were referred to earlier concluded that the arrangements prior to 1997 were unclear, with Norwegian directorates/ institutions having framework agreements with Norad both on general advisory work at home and on specific institutional collaboration projects abroad. They noted that Norwegian supplier institutions considered it problematic to report to Norad and felt that this created confusion with regards to the relationship with recipient organizations. The CMI report concluded that more successful institutional development projects would require "a division of responsibilities where Norad takes on a guiding rather than active role in project development" (CMI referred in Tvedten et al 1998, p. 7). The Statskonsult report echoed this in recommending a change in the management and reporting setup, whereby the recipient agency would be responsible for *execution*, the directorates for delivery of technical assistance, and Norad for *overall governance*, understood as seeing to it that expenses are aligned with budget intentions. In its report, Statskonsult noted that in this new model, Norad's responsibility should mainly relate to "governance of the development funds, and to a lesser extent to results" (our translation) (Statskonsult 1998:16, p. 22). The report also noted the challenge of recipient institutions' weak technical and managerial competence but did not propose specific measures to address this. It also did not specify any agency's supervision and advisory role related to project execution. Curiously, removing the formal linkage between Norad and the Norwegian directorate in twinning arrangements was not accompanied by a stronger connection between Norad/ the embassy and the recipient and executing institution.

5 Efficiency

This chapter discusses the cost-efficiency of selected interventions as well as of implementation arrangements.

5.1 Cost efficiency of interventions

Twinning vs. technical assistance

Twinning arrangements do not necessarily provide the best qualified assistance at the lowest price. Twinning arrangements in essence constitute a single-sourcing model for technical assistance. This means that there is no guarantee the expertise provided is the best qualified or least cost for its specific purpose, compared to expertise available in a global market. An underlying assumption to justify the approach could be that twinning provides some added value that competitive contracting arrangements would not. This could include for example the ability of the arrangement to build trust and establish personal relationships, or ambitions of a continuing partnership beyond the life of the project. Such expectations are however not clearly articulated in project documents, and as a result are difficult to assess by this review. It could be argued that a twinning arrangement, by linking whole organizations, would have greater potential to address capacity building in a broader sense including organizational development and enabling environment. However the review indicates that this project mostly addressed technical capacities in a narrower sense (see section 0). Similarly, other reports (as referred in World Bank 2004) note that the “impact of twinning is often more evident at the operational level (e.g. improving technology or technical skills) and less evident at the institutional level” (p. viii). At least two of the important challenges faced by this project could have been reduced by way of more competitive contractual arrangement or at least a broader consortium of twinning partners, namely (i) difficulties for SN in sourcing qualified and relevant staff on time and (ii) reported language barriers.

- ***SN has a limited pool from which to source relevant experts in a timely manner.*** SN’s international division draws from across the SN institution on both statistical and more organizational (annual planning, library services) and support skills (internet page, scanner installation and use). As discussed in section 4.2, especially toward the end of the project organizational capacities were sought addressed through SN internal expertise, albeit with questionable impact. A large number of short-term missions foreseen in the annual work plans of the project did not occur. This is probably partly due to limited capacity in INE to absorb such training. However, it also appears to be related to difficulties SN faced in identifying appropriate persons in a timely manner. It should be noted that, almost without exception, SN sourced such experts from within SN. It does not appear to have drawn on the pool of non-Norwegian short-term experts used in the Scandinavian consortium operating at INE-Mozambique. At some point there was dialogue with the Swedish Statistical Bureau on the possibility of using some of their experts but this never materialized. Drawing from a broader pool of resources, either by way of a consortium or by INE sourcing consultants through international bidding processes might have assured more targeted and timely assistance to INE.¹³
- ***Language was consistently cited as a problem by INE.*** While the long-term advisors spoke Portuguese, almost all short-term consultants under the project could only

¹³ SN pointed out to the team that one reason it would have been difficult to draw in experts from partner institutions was that, “due to delays, the missions often would have to be postponed and then the expert would not be available when INE was ready”.

communicate with INE staff in English. A few Spanish-speaking consultants were used, easing communication considerably. Language barriers meant all training had to use interpreters, although in practice this was often done by the long-term advisor. This problem appears to be related to the small pool of SN personnel who were both technically and linguistically qualified, as well as available. On the other hand, the project financed English courses for a large number of staff, which over time helped break down the language barrier.

Twinning arrangements in Norwegian development assistance appear in part to be motivated by needs at home rather in the recipient country. According to Statskonsult (1998), the institutional collaboration or twinning approach seen in this project was consolidated in official Norad strategy in the early 1990s with the establishment of the ‘Norwegian axis’ providing a framework for the use of public and private institutions and organizations as partners in development assistance. The objectives of the ‘axis’ were articulated as (i) contributing to increased quality through more systematic contact with and use of Norwegian institutions and organizations, and (ii) stronger identification with and tolerance for Norwegian development assistance in Norwegian public opinion (Statskonsult 1998:16, p. 8).

Long-term advisers

The potential value of the LTAs was not fully utilized. The use of Long-Term Advisors (LTAs) constitutes a core part of this kind of project, and the presence beyond short-term missions is arguably important for continuous follow up of recommendations and for sustainable capacity building. The direct cost associated with the LTAs constituted just over 40 percent of the total project costs. Our findings indicate that the potential value of the LTAs was not fully utilized, due mostly to three factors.

- First, there were no systematic reporting requirements to allow the LTAs to flag difficulties, assess progress and performance, and get support from SN in Oslo. In accordance with the contract, the Resident Team Leader reported to the SN project coordinator in Oslo, however this was mostly on an informal and ad-hoc basis by email. This means that limited documentation has been available to the review team. The Long term advisers were required by their terms of reference to produce quarterly reports. The format and function of these reports was however not specified and if produced, to the knowledge of the review team these reports have not been archived or disseminated.
- Second, the LTAs had only limited opportunity for dialogue with the embassy, from which they could have benefited from more strategic support in prioritising tasks and more clearly aligning activities with project objectives, avoiding gap filling of general INE tasks.
- Third, the LTA played an important role in facilitating the short term technical support missions, but did not appear to have an established methodology for following up on agreed milestones between these technical missions, and interviews with former students taking part in some short-term courses suggested there was little if any follow up to such courses in practice.

5.2 Cost efficiency of implementation arrangements

Clarity of contractual terms

The contractual terms were insufficiently clear on accountability and reporting. In accordance with the legal agreement between SN and INE, oversight was assigned to a Project Management Group consisting of an INE project coordinator, the SN Coordinator based in Norway, the SN Team Leader based in Luanda, and a member of the INE administrative department. There was no specified leader of this group, and there is no written documentation of its activities. According to SN, the group had planned to organize regular phone meetings, but this proved technically impractical. As a result, the three Luanda based members met on an informal basis and the SN Team Lead had contact with the SN Coordinator via email.

Reports were often delayed. Based on a report from SN to INE, INE was responsible for annual reports to Norad. These were produced albeit with delays. These and the annual meetings constituted the formal supervision role of Norad. At the time of the review, the final project reports, from SN and INE respectively, were under preparation. It was hence not possible for the review team to use these reports as a basis for our assessment.

Reorganization of Norwegian development assistance

The reallocation of responsibility from Norad to the embassy in Luanda does not appear to have had a significant impact on project progress and supervision. In 2004, Norwegian development assistance was reorganized, and the responsibility for project funding and management moved from Norad to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relevant embassies. As indicated in the timeline in Annex 7, substantially more activities took place after 2004 than before. However, it is unclear whether this was due to the arrival of the long term advisors in 2003 or the shift in administrative arrangements in 2004; the former seems more likely. The fact that the project was formally launched in the second half of 2003 would also explain why the first annual meeting only took place in 2004. The fact that the review, which was to have taken place one year into the project, only (partly) happened at a much later stage, could have been related to the shift of responsibilities from Norad to the embassy. This seems unlikely however, given that the review was referred to and explicitly postponed at the 2004 annual meeting, indicating that the postponement was not a result of lack of information at the embassy. Financial transactions did change as a result of the shift, meaning that the embassy in Luanda had to make a bank transfer to INE's bank account in Norway. This could have led to inefficiencies and delays in transactions but there are no indications that this was the case. As noted in the report, the formal supervisory role of Norad and the embassy was limited, and to the extent that there was informal contact between the Embassy and SN, this could arguably have taken place in either model.

Financial management and controls

Financial management was efficient but reporting was weak. After some initial challenges in setting up the system, disbursement arrangements were sufficiently efficient to ensure timely cash flows. While the review team is not in a position to elaborate on the fiduciary aspects of the project, reporting and financial management capacity within INE appears weak. Financial reporting formats vary by year. A technical assistance in financial management was discussed at a number of occasions but never materialized. The evaluation team has only been presented with the audit for 2006, where the auditor had some qualifications regarding the lack of standardized procedures and inventory of assets. (The latter may have a negative

impact on the sustainability of this project in terms of the equipment procured with project financing.)

Monitoring and evaluation

The project did not include any indicators, milestones or procedures for monitoring progress and results. Progress against plans was documented in the annual reports, and the 2004 report noted that the project was not likely to achieve its objectives on time. There were no progress or result indicators, however, beyond the actual production of reports. Reporting was often on inputs in terms of short-term missions or study tours effectuated. Especially in light of the uncertainties regarding the project assumptions, risks, and the experimental nature of the project, a simple monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system should have been designed at entry. Moreover, given the technical nature of the project, the ability of communicating progress and results to outsiders without in-depth statistical expertise could have been facilitated by the articulation of a set of process and results indicators. Having milestones against these to assess progress on results could have made the annual reports more concise in terms of illustrating progress compared to plans and making necessary adjustments in ambitions.

Donor coordination

Donor coordination was weak and mainly driven by the donors. In contractual terms, donor coordination was implicitly the responsibility of INE, which had “overall responsibility for the planning, administration and implementation of the Project” (Art IV.1). Lack of donor coordination by INE was brought up by the Embassy as a problem at a number of annual meetings, and was noted as a problem in the 2006 administrative review. Coordination of donor efforts had been among the planned things to review after the pre-project (strategy development), though this only happened in 2006 when the project was nearing completion.

The fact that INE has a large number of donors creates specific coordination challenges. Donor coordination is not a problem unique to INE. However, it may have been a relatively greater problem at INE than it was at other Angolan government departments because a number of donors take a direct interest in the topic. Annex 6 illustrates the various donor efforts to support INE. The fact that many donors needed data from INE for their own information and monitoring needs, and that they had different priorities in this regard, appears to have placed a considerable burden on INE, but also occasionally motivated donors to initiate coordination, though only at a project level. One example is coordination by the World Bank and UNICEF in helping INE conduct the IBEP survey, which combines elements of surveys supported by both institutions. USAID also decided to support the IBEP, using it to follow up its Malaria survey instead of conducting a separate survey.

Lack of coordination in some cases caused inefficiencies in terms of scheduling and overlap. The problems created by lack of donor coordination on statistics development in practice appear to have been threefold: First, the lack of donor coordination increased managerial pressure within INE generally, lowering its already-weak capacity to plan. Second, this in turn led INE to mistakenly ask SN for some assistance that was or would be already covered by other donors, e.g., duplication with the HR needs assessment exercise under the PALOP programme. Third, it also apparently led to scheduling errors, whereby INE staff was sometimes double-booked both to receive training from SN and to work with other donors on other projects at the same time.

The Five-Year strategy did not serve as a point of reference for specific donor support in practice. In preparing and executing the project, SN took responsibility for helping INE implement the parts of the strategy it felt it had most competence in. According to INE, none of the other donors made a commitment to support specific aspects of the strategy. A practical problem inhibiting coordination cited by most donors was that the medium-term Plan 2002-2006 provided a poor platform for this, since it was not based on realistic priorities.

The Embassy made a number of efforts to improve donor coordination. This was supported also by specific proposals from the administrative review in January 2006. Coordination efforts have included donor-only meetings as well as initiatives hosted by INE. In May 2007, INE invited donors to discuss priorities, the process leading to a new medium-term Plan, and harmonisation of donor-funded activities with national statistical plans, though the outcome of this meeting is unclear.

6 Sustainability

This chapter assesses to what extent the benefits of the projects can be expected to continue after project closing. While it may be too early to judge on actual project sustainability at this stage, an assessment is made of the likelihood that activities continue to benefit INE and feed into building of the National Statistics System in Angola.

Technical assistance provided will be useful for current INE staff in future endeavours. INE's Director, other staff and other donors commented that Norwegian assistance on various aspects of conducting surveys was now proving valuable as INE conducts the IBEP, an ongoing household survey covering each province. (The IBEP combines a World Bank-sponsored survey on household income and expenditure with a UNICEF-sponsored Multi-indicator cluster survey/MICS.)

The sustainability potential of technical assistance to skills training on an individual level can be questioned. According to INE staff and leadership, they continue to use the skills they learned under this project, particularly in surveys. While the project undoubtedly contributed to endowing a number of INE staff with new and relevant skills, many of these no longer work at INE. Also, to the extent that long-term advisers occasionally functioned as gap-fillers for core INE functions this support ceased when the LTAs left.

The extent to which the project has contributed to the institutionalization of new procedures is unclear. The efforts to strengthen planning capacity and human resource management could have contributed to sustainability of outcomes. However, as discussed in previous chapters, this support was limited and not necessarily a comparative advantage of SN. Efforts to develop the library had sustainability potential, but according to SN the impact of this effort was reduced by a virus attack that set back much of the work.

The reported higher current commitment to statistics by the Angolan government is a positive development but cannot be clearly attributed to the project. From 2007 to 2008, Government budget allocations to INE increased by nearly 40%, and as noted in section 3.1, efforts are now underway to articulate a new strategy, led by the Government and in line with PARIS21 methodology. However, there have not been any indications in interviews or elsewhere that these developments are related to the Norwegian support.

7 Lessons learned and recommendations

This project points at some emerging lessons for capacity development of institutions that can be further explored to inform Norwegian development assistance. First, the institution accountable for specific outcomes should have the mandate and capacity to influence these outcomes. It appears that the recommendations by Statskonsult in 1998 interpreted the concept of country ownership to the detriment of quality assurance. It also failed to recognize that institutional development projects are challenged by the very issue they seek to address, namely weak institutional capacities. These projects hence require close supervision in project management. While INE was responsible for project results and SN for technical assistance, no agency was responsible for ensuring that INE, in light of its weak capacity, was able to identify and absorb the relevant needs or to assess the quality of assistance received. Also, SN was formally only responsible for responding to needs articulated by INE, although they often assisted in the articulation of these needs. SN was not mandated to address contextual challenges in the policy environment or the lack of Government resources allocated to INE. These gaps were all issues that could have been followed up by the donor. Since the donor is ultimately responsible for effective and efficient use of funds, it may need to execute this role through more active project supervision and management, especially when implementation capacity at the receiving end is weak. This includes ensuring that the project is executed according to plan, and resolving bottlenecks as they occur. However, the administrative arrangements for this project allocated little formal responsibility for progress to Norad or the embassy.

Second, while institutional development through capacity building should address the three levels discussed in chapter 3.2, it is not clear that all these can be covered by one twinning institution. Results from twinning to date (CMI 1998, World Bank 2004), indicate that impact of twinning is often more evident at the operational level (e.g. improving technology or technical skills) and less evident at the institutional level. Special attention is needed at the institutional level, perhaps provided by organizational specialists.

Third, monitoring and evaluation systems are important when outcomes are somewhat intangible or technically specialized. Such systems are most useful as project management tools when (i) they have a baseline against which to compare; (ii) they have few and measurable indicators that are SMART – specific, measurable, attributable, realistic, and time bound; and (iii) they are monitored on a regular basis of short intervals to enable necessary adjustments in project execution based on assessments of actual against expected results.

- Recommendations to Norad and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - **Norad should strengthen its supervision and advisory support to executing recipient institutions.** Norad should review the setup for institutional collaboration projects to ensure that recipient institutions receive the necessary support to address and resolve bottlenecks in a timely manner. This could include more frequent interaction between the recipient institution and Norad in-house or contracted technical experts; more standardized formats for reporting on progress; quality assurance procedures to ensure that mandated reviews are carried out as planned; and restructuring of objectives when it is clear that targets will not be reached. It would also include the embassies assisting the recipient in identifying needs and sourcing

appropriate technical assistance, especially as these may go beyond one contracted or twinning technical institution.

- **Norad should reconsider the effectiveness and efficiency of the twinning model in capacity development.** The optimal implementation model for capacity development projects depends on the capacity needs of the recipient institution. Norwegian directorates supplying technical assistance cannot be expected to have comparative advantages in transferring knowledge on organizational development and enabling environments. Moreover, depending on the specificity of technical capacities needed, limiting the supply of such technical assistance to one institution may impede on the relevance and timeliness of support. Norad should consider more frequent use of consortiums of more than one institution when sponsoring capacity development through twinning arrangements, and should consider mixing institutions with the relevant types of competence for different levels of capacity development. This could mean including a consortium member(s) that focuses specifically on institutional issues. Norad should also consider sourcing technical assistance through international bidding processes to ensure the best available expertise at the lowest price. When using long-term technical assistance, the degree of quality assurance should match the size of investment this type of intervention represents.
- **Support to statistical capacity building should include robust indicators.** Prior to embarking on capacity development projects, capacity assessment should be carried out to ensure realistic targets and workplans. The PARIS21 initiative has developed indicators that could be applied in statistical development projects, and a baseline of these would constitute a useful starting point.
- **When supporting capacity development in statistics, Norad should continue including support to the articulation of a strategy.** In particular, Norad should ensure that this process is driven from a Government policy level and is as inclusive as possible with regards to involving stakeholders in Government, civil society, private sector, and development partners. This would include support for the PARIS21 approach.
- Recommendations to INE and its partners
 - Future statistics development projects should build on the PARIS21 initiative and involve providers (e.g., line ministries) and users (e.g., policymakers) of statistics. Such consultations should continue beyond the articulation of a strategy and can be institutionalized through the National statistical Council.
 - When assessing needs for technical assistance, INE should consider (i) needs at a technical level, (ii) organizational development needs; and (iii) needs in developing its enabling environment, including relations to providers and users of statistics. Different agencies may have different comparative advantages to provide these types of support.
 - In order to help build its reputation for professional integrity and ensure the predictability of resources, INE should concentrate on providing a few but high-quality products.
 - Due to apparent increased support for statistics development in the government, the time may be right for INE to pursue better cooperation with the producers of administrative statistics, e.g., in the line ministries, including provision of advice to such bodies on how they can increase their currently fragmented coverage.

- In addition to increasing Government demand for statistics, INE is likely to continue to be under pressure from various donors with different statistical needs. INE should welcome external support but also optimize this support by coordinating inputs to avoid overlaps and ensure coherence with national policy needs.
- Recommendations to the Angolan Ministry of Planning
 - The Government can optimize policy and targeting by actively demanding and using statistics. Through the national statistical council or other governing bodies, the Government can influence what data is produced at what intervals, in accordance with policy needs.
 - The professional independence of the statistical institute is crucial for the credibility and value of statistics produced. The Government should ensure the necessary levels of independence to publish its data and reports.
 - In order to ensure the stability of regularly produced statistics, the Government should ensure predictable and stable resource allocations to the national statistics institute, allowing for long-term planning and prioritizations. This includes a long-term strategy for recruiting and retaining highly qualified personnel.

Annex 1: Terms of reference for the review

TERMS OF REFERENCE FINAL REVIEW of AGO-2491: TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS (“INE”)

1 Background

Deliberations between Norway and Angola regarding co-operation in the area of statistics were initiated in 1998.

In a preparatory phase Statistics Norway (SN) provided advice on the formulation of the first 5 year National Plan for the Development of Statistics in Angola. This plan was subsequently approved by the Angolan Council of Ministers on the 2001.

The initial support to the Statistical plan was then followed by support to its implementation. Consequently an appropriation regarding support 2001-2003 was appropriated by the embassy in Luanda and subsequently the Government of Angola and the Kingdom of Norway signed an Agreement on Technical Support to the National Institute for Statistics (“INE”) on December 18 2001. The agreed Norwegian contribution was NOK 25 million for a period of three years. The project has been one of the larger Norwegian co-operation projects in Angola.

According to the Agreement the Goal of the project was to: improve the quality and quantity of empirical information in Angola, by strengthening the ability of INE to identify the needs and then to produce and disseminate statistical information to users within the government, to other public organisations, and to the public at large.

The objectives of the project were formulated as follows:

- 1. Strengthen the ability of INE within Economic statistics, including prices,*
- 2. Industry statistics, Short term economic indicators, energy (incl. Oil) statistics,*
- 3. Business tendencies and foreign trade statistics*
- 4. Strengthen the ability of INE within Social statistics centred around the household*
- 5. Survey program, including studies and planned surveys.*
- 6. Assist INE in refining and developing the statistical infrastructure, including statistical training, the capacity to maintain and utilise a village record system (VRS) in a GIS, the Business Register and statistical standards, sampling and dissemination.*

The review is in accordance with Article IX of the above mentioned Agreement, which states that a final review may be held in order to ensure that: [sic]

The planning of the project started already at the end of the 1990ts. Due to various reasons the start up of the project only happened in 2002 with a planned duration of 2004. Delays in the project implementation have resulted in the last activities only being completed in 2008.

The causes of the delays of the implementation are several, sometimes linked and thus complex, and will be a key theme in this review.

INE and SN in 2006 carried out an internal, joint mid-term review of the co-operation. In a major recommendation the mid-term review team emphasised the need to prioritise publishing of statistical data collected by INE and its partners. In 2005 the Norwegian Embassy commissioned the initiative to an administrative review of the INE SN co-operation. The review was carried out in January 2006 by Scanteam. A major concern in the review was the challenges related to the weak co-ordination of donor support to INE.

The intention of the Embassy behind the review was to move the coordination agenda. Unfortunately this did not happen and as consequence the Embassy decided not to continue financing the program after the end of the present project.

In order to learn from the experiences the Embassy has agreed with INE to carry out a final review of the co-operation between INE and SN.

2 Purpose of the Final Review

The main purpose of the final review is to draw lessons learned to enable Norad, SN and INEs current and future partners improve design and management of future statistical capacity building programs.

3 Scope of work

The work shall comprise, but not necessarily be limited to, the following issues and themes:

Preparation and start up

1. Describe and discuss the situational context and its influence on the project at the time of the preparation and start up of the project;
2. Describe and assess the actual preparation process of the project and the Five year National Statistical Plan on which the project was based with reference to best practice and including the roles of key stakeholders, particularly INE, Ministry of Planning SN and Norad;
3. Analyse the relevance, the logical consistency and realism of the project design;
4. Describe and analyse how external and internal risks were identified, how they were planned to be mitigated, and how were they met in practice;
5. Assess how gender issues were considered in the project design and in the appraisal of the project;
6. Assess how environmental issues were considered in the project design and appraisal.

II Project implementation

7. Compare results and achievements results produced by the project and compare these with the ones planned;

8. Assess the of the various and sometimes interlinked, main causes to the delay of the implementation of the project;
9. Assess the contribution of funds and staff by the government to INE and the project compared to needs and stated in the five year Statistical plan
10. Assess the performance of SN in terms of timeliness, quality and appropriateness of the services delivered to INE;
11. Analyse to what extent the contractual terms and procedures and administrative arrangements of the project were appropriate;
12. Assess how donor co-ordination and co-operation was handled by INE, Ministry of Planning, SN, the Norwegian Embassy and other partners to INE as World Bank, UNDP, EC and US-AID;
13. Assess how gender issues have been considered in implementation in the project;
14. Assess how environmental issues have been considered in the implementation of the project;
15. Analyse the goal effectiveness of the project;
16. Summarize the main reasons behind the achieved goal effectiveness;
17. Draw key lessons learned on how goal effectiveness can be increased in similar statistical development projects;
18. Assess the efficiency of project, including identification of the main reasons behind the performance of the project in terms of efficiency;
19. Draw key lessons learned on how efficiency can be higher in similar statistical development projects;
20. Provide to the extent possible specific recommendations to INE and the Ministry of Planning regarding how to proceed with the building of the National Statistical System in Angola.

4 Reporting and Implementation of the review

While in Angola the team will report to Norad. All contractual matters will be managed and followed up by Norad.

The Review Team will be given copies of all available documentation like Project Document, Memos, Agreement, reports and financial statements. The co-operating partners will be encouraged to share with the Review Team other documents relevant to the study.

The review will be carried out by a team of three external consultants contracted by NORAD. At least one of the consultants shall preferably be living in Angola. NORAD will consult with the Embassy and INE regarding the selection of the consultant and the composition of the team.

At the end of the work in Angola the Consultant shall present a short debrief note outlining preliminary findings and indicative conclusion. The Embassy will convene a debrief meeting with INE Angola and its partners and the Ministry of Planning, to provide a first feed back on the debrief note.

A draft report shall be submitted not later than two weeks after departure from Angola. The main parties concerned, INE, SN, Norad and the Embassy, shall be given two weeks to comment before the draft report. The consultant shall submit the final report not later than two weeks after reception of the comments.

The leader of the Review Team will be given 5 working days for preparatory work in Norway, including meetings with SN, 10 working days of field work in Angola and 11 working days for preparation, finalisation and presentation in Oslo of the report. Total time allocated to the Team leader will thus be 26 days plus 2 travel days.

The other two team members shall be given 2 working days for preparations, 10 working days in Angola and 3 days for report writing, in total 15 days, plus up to 2 travel days, if required. It would be preferable to have in the team at least one person resident in Angola.

The planned time for the review is October-November 2008,

The report's format shall consist of a Summary for Busy People, Methodology used; Major findings and assessments, Conclusions and Recommendations plus annexes as considered useful by the Consultant. The main text shall not exceed 20 pages excluding annexes.

The draft and the final report shall be in English and Portuguese and will be published by Norad. The debriefing note shall be in Portuguese.

The final draft of the report shall be submitted electronically in Word format.

The final report shall be presented in 4 bounded copies and one unbounded master copy and one copy submitted electronically in Adobe Acrobat Reader format.

5 The Consultants

A team of two to three consultants shall be assigned to the task.

Combined the team shall have profound knowledge about:

- Evaluation methodology
- Institutional development and capacity building;
- Project design and management
- Statistics in developing countries both from point of user and producer of statistics
- Management of development co-operation including aid co-ordination
- Angolan political, economical and social modern history and current situation.
- Portuguese language

Annex 2: List of persons interviewed

Ministry of Planning

Pedro Luis da Fonseca, Vice Minister

Joaquim Flavio De Sousa Couto, Director, National Directorate for Studies and Planning

National Bank of Angola

Manuel Antonio Tiago Dias, Sub-Director/Deputy Manager, Departamento de Estudos e Estatisticas

Carlo Sousa, Sub-Director

Artemisia Lemos

Ministry of Finance

Manuel da Costa, Director, Cabinet of Studies and International Economic Relations

Arlete Sousa, Statistics Department GEREI

Ministry of Social Affairs/ MINARS

Paulo dos Santos Junior, manager, Planning, Study and Statistics (GEPE)

Dr Conceicot, Tecnica de Estatistica

Leonel Lima, OK-Audit Consult, Consultant to MINARS

INE

Maria Ferreira Dos Santos Oliveira, Director General

Domingos Constantino

Maria Madalena Machado

Zetando Mbela

Ezequiel Lues

Domingos Lassi

Inocencia do P.T dos Santo

Donors

Ricardo Gazerl, World Bank

Francois Thiollier, Counsellor, European Commission

Juan Jose Almagro Herrador, European Commission

Jorge Andrade da Silva, Economist, UNDP

Geoff Wiffin, Deputy Representative, UNICEF

Margaret Brown, Chief Social Policy, UNICEF

Victoria Mantovu, UNICEF

Susan K. Brems, Director, USAID

Vic Duarte, Head of Development Programs, USAID

Lars Ekman, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy

SN

Stein Opdahl, SN, Coordinator for Angola, SN

Bjørn K. Getz Wold, Director International Cooperation, SN

Others

Ann Kristin, Johnsen, NORAD (former long-term advisor within INE for SN)

Annex 3: List of main documents consulted

The review team received over 200 unsorted electronic documents from SN and NORAD and was invited to review the paper archives in the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda. The most pertinent documents viewed by the team were the following:

- Letter from Mario Alberto Adata de Sousa, General Director, INE, to Bjor S. Leite, Charge d’Affaires, Norwegian Embassy, Subject: Proposal for a technical assistance program with the royal Norwegian Institute of Statistics (RNIS), 28/05/1997
- INE: Statistical Co-operation Instituto Nacional de Estatistica – Statistics Norway: A Program for Technical Co-operation in Economic, Social and Area Statistics between Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Angola, and Statistics Norway, Luanda, 11/02/1998
- Contract for co-operation partnership between STATISTICS NORWAY (SN) and INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTATISTICA (INE) in term of NORWEGIAN ASSISTANCE IN SUBJECTS AS AGREED UPON, signed 23/10/2000 and 31/10/2000
- Bevilgningsdokument AGO 0027- Faglig bistand til Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE), Norad 29.11.00
- INE: Statistical Capacity Building in Angola [...] Submitted by Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Angola to NORAD/Luanda applying for financial support in March 2000 and amended according to budget allocation in March 2001
- Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of Angola regarding the Technical support to the National Institute for Statistics (INE), signed 18/12/2001
- INE/SN: Strategic Five Year Plan for the Statistical System in Angola, 2001-2005, draft 07/06/2001
- INE: Plano Estatistico Nacional de Medio Prazo 2002-2006 (Medium-Term National Statistical Plan), approved by the Permanent Commission of the Council of Ministers in Session of 13/11/2002
- MinPlan: Estrategia de Combate a Pobreza, Versao Sumaria [PRSP summary version] “aprovado pelo Governo a 11 de Fevereiro de 2004”
- Contract for co-operation [...Amendment], signed 15/12/2003 and 08/01/2004
- Contract between Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Angola (INE) and Statistics Norway (SN) regarding “Statistical Capacity Building in Angola”, signed 22/09/2004 and 29/10/2004
- Contract for co-operation [...Amendment], signed 14/07/2005 and 22/08/2005
- INE: Statistical Capacity Building in Angola [...] Adaptation to the INE 5-year plan 2002-2006, Tentative time schedule leading up to first annual meeting in July 2003, November 2002
- Minutes (Projecto de Acta) of annual meetings for the project prepared by INE, for annual meetings held on 05/08/2003, 16/02/2004, 2005 (date?), 26/06/2006
- Mandates for annual meetings prepared by the Norwegian Embassy, for meetings held in 2003, 2004, 2006
- Annual Reports (Relatorio Anual) for the project for 2003, 2004, 2005

- Work plans and draft budgets for the project for 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006
- Draft meeting note from donor meeting on poverty monitoring statistics, held Luanda, 14/03/2007
- Flavio Couto e-mail to various partners, Re: Reuniao com Parceiros de Cooperacao Internacional, INE, 15 de Maio de 2007, 10:00 horas, 08/05/2007
- Mid-term Review of the Institutional Cooperation Project between Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE), Angola and Statistics Norway (SN), Final draft, Luanda 30/01/2006
- Scanteam: Review, Norwegian Cooperation with the National Institute for Statistics, Angola, Final Report, Oslo, March 2006
- Terms of Reference Review of AGO-2491: Technical Support to the National Institute for Statistics (“INE”), Norad 2006
- Tvedten, Inge, S. Askvik, P. Rebelo, H. Melber, J. Helland (1998): Twinning for Development. Institutional Cooperation between Public Institutions in Norway and the South. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD Report Series no. 98:1) referred in Tvedten, I. and H. Melber 1998 NEPRU Working Paper No. 65, 1998.
- OECD/DAC Network on Governance: The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice
- Direktoratet i institusjonelt samarbeid: Forvaltningsmessige sider ved bruk av norske direktorater i institusjonelt Bistandssamarbeid, Statskonsult Rapport 1998:16
- Norad appraisal document: Vurdering av prosjektsøknad om institusjonelt samarbeid mellom Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB) og Instituto Nacional de Estatisticas (INE), May 1998

Annex 4: List of short-term consultancies

The following is based on a list of short-term consultancies noted as “completed” by the Joint Mid-Term Review of 30 January 2006. It is supplemented by a list of missions that took place after the Mid-Term Review, based on copies of mission reports that the team reviewed from this period. Since the team apparently did not have a complete set of mission reports, there may have been additional short-term missions. Each course was usually 1 – 2 weeks.

From 2004 Annual meeting report

- Identification of poverty indicators (11-12/2003)
- Indicators for monitoring PRS & MDGs (12/2003)
- Questionnaire design – Household survey system (11/2003)

In addition to the 3 completed missions, there was 1 mission listed as “cancelled” and 4 missions listed as “postponed” (some of which ended up being cancelled)

From 2005 Annual meeting report

- Enterprise surveys – sampling mission (03/2004)
- Integrated Household Survey system – course in sampling (12/2004)
- Industry, Energy Construction – review, amendment of production indices (03/2005)
- Integrated Household Survey system – Review of IDR 1999/2000 (04/2004)
- Integrated Household Survey system – Interview/supervisor training (04/2004)
- Foreign trade – mission on bottleneck issues (04/2005 - had been postponed from earlier period)

In addition to the 6 completed missions, there were 1 cancelled and 9 postponed

From 2006 Annual meeting report

- Integrated Household Survey system – Training course in use of optical reading – by INE Mozambique (07-08/2005)
- Integrated Household Survey system – Course on tabulation analysis (08-09/2005)
- Integrated Household Survey system – Configuration of optical reading software for network and follow-up training (02/2006)
- Indicators on economic fluctuations and prices: Follow-up mission on review and improvement of methodologies for Production Index (04/2005)
- IT: Improve publication and dissemination: Library (10/2005)
- Controlling the QUIBB pilot data and giving advice on how to report survey data (09-10/2005 – this was not listed in Mid-Term review, although we have mission report)
- Indirect costs on the production of statistics – Establish annual planning and follow-up system (01/2006)

In addition to the 7 completed missions, 3 were cancelled, 10 postponed, 2 “likely to be postponed”, 2 “pending”, 1 to be integrated into another sub-project.

Missions since the Mid-Term review (likely incomplete)

- Contribution to development of website (03/2006)
- Development of plan for human resources of INE (03/2006)
- Development of a new system for the Production Index (04/2006)
- Controlling the QUIBB data and giving advice on how to make tables for a preliminary report (09/2006)
- Statistical writing techniques and cooperation with the press (09-10/2006)
- Industrial Production statistics (10/2006)
- Developing the Library (05/2006)
- Developing the Library follow-up (05/2007)
- Establishment and control computer system routines to produce the IPI (Industrial Price Index) in Angola (10-11/2007)
- Set up and use of scanner and scanner software (04/2008)

Additional missions reported by SN

- Calculations of weights to IPI and Quibb (05/2006)
- Conversion of IPI-programs to SPSS (05/2006)
- Estimation issues of QUIBB (10/2006)
- Preparation of website (10/2006)
- Publication of the new Production Index and update the sample of the survey (04/2007)
- Industrial Production Index, final issues (05/2008)

Annex 5: Comparison of 2000 and 2004 legal agreements between SN and INE


2000 Contract	2004 Contract
<i>Goal</i>	
The ‘overall objective’ of the project is presented as to “contribute to the strengthening of the ability of INE to identify specific statistical needs of, and then to produce and disseminate corresponding statistical information to, users within the Angolan Government, the economy and the public at large”.	The “goal of the project” is articulated as “improve the quality and quantity of empirical information in Angola, by strengthening the ability of INE to identify the needs and then to produce and disseminate statistical information to users within the government, to other public organisations, to private business and non-business organizations, and to public at large”.
<i>Objectives</i>	
<p>“to strengthen the ability of INE within statistical subject matter issues as listed</p> <p>to enhance the likelihood of INE achieving the overall objective by providing professional training to increase technical skills, the ability to promote and ensure the user-producer dialogue, and professional development”.</p>	<p>“To strengthen the ability of INE within Economic statistics, including prices, Industry statistics, Short term economic indicators, Energy (including Oil) statistics, Business tendencies and foreign trade statistics;</p> <p>To strengthen the ability of INE within Social statistics centered around the household survey program, including studies and planned surveys.</p> <p>To assist INE in refining and developing the statistical infrastructure, including statistical training, the capacity to maintain and utilise the Business Register and statistical standards, sampling and dissemination.”</p>
<i>Expected outputs</i>	
<p>Establish or further improve the statistical production in quality and/or quantity terms of the following subject matter statistics: Price statistics, Industry statistics (incl. energy), Business Tendency, Foreign Trade, Time Use Survey, Informal & Non-Registered Sector Survey, GIS & Village Recording System based statistics</p> <p>Establish and/or increase the capacity of INE to produce high quality statistics according to national needs and adapted international standards within these statistical subject matter areas.</p> <p>Further strengthen statistical infrastructure and institutional capacity including: Business Register & Classifications, Survey Management, and Sampling & Stat. Methods.</p> <p>Enhance the ability of INE for an active user-producer dialogue and a targeted dissemination strategy towards the policy planning units in the Government, the economy and the public at large.</p> <p>Furthering professional and management support training for INE staff through training on the job, (including short courses and seminars), the production of material and other suitable means.</p> <p>Improve management capacity at all levels, incl. systematic annual activity planning</p> <p>Making available to the national research community aggregated data and micro data.</p> <p>Planning, implementation and reporting from Gender and Living Conditions Studies.</p>	<p>Increased quality of statistical information produced by INE, based upon a review, documentation and amendment of statistical methods and systems</p> <p>User demanded statistics, either as directly demanded by user, or need for basic statistics on a) National accounts system or b) basic social and demographic statistics</p> <p>A better trained staff through training and access to study tours and workshops</p> <p>Statistical, analytical and methodological studies produced on a joint venture basis.</p> <p>Increased awareness and utilisation of statistical information by Government, public organisations, private business, non-business organisations and the public at large.</p>

Annex 6: Partner Support to INE as of March 2007

Partner	Activities	Results	\$US
World Bank	<p>EMTA project (2003 – 2009)</p> <p>Strengthen INE capacity specifically focused on improving</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IT systems GIS and mapping Sampling techniques 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IDR1: Finalisation and dissemination of the first Household Income and Expenditure Survey (2000/1) IDR2: Support to second survey – to be finalised at end of 2008 National accounts data – GDP and trade stats (2005 by end 2007) 	\$5 m (credit)
EC	<p>1. Institutional Support to INE (2002-2005)</p> <p>Strengthen capacity of INE to produce stats (esp. on CPI and employment) to contribute to the definition and implementation of the poverty alleviation strategy</p> <p>2. PALOP Regional Programme – Support to development of statistics</p> <p>(Phase I: 2002-2007; Phase II – 2008-2010)</p> <p>Reinforce institutional capacity of INE through strengthening technical skills of staff, and through adoption of common methodologies and working tools for the production and dissemination of statistics</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> QUIBB 2005/06 to be published in 2007 Consumer price index, labour force survey, enterprise census Internalisation of national accounts system Definition of common enterprise statistics Implementation of international nomenclature system 	<p>EUR 1.9 m (only EURO 8 m used)</p> <p>Phase I: EUR 2.8m (regional)</p> <p>Phase II: EUR 2m</p>
UNICEF	<p>Child Survival and Best Estimates</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review an adjustment of past survey data to make them representative Possible follow up capacity building activities to be considered with INE 	Best Estimates report to be released soon (UNICEF and INE discussing)	
UNFPA	Census planned for 2010. UNFPA ready to respond to GoA request for support		
UNDP	<p>MDG NEPAD project</p> <p>MDG Monitoring Group set up w/ MinPlan. Produced 2005 MDG report last year. Still expects the institutionalisation of MDG Plan by the government</p> <p>MDG campaign planned in 2007</p> <p>INE will be a focus</p>	2005 MDG Report	
UNRCO	<p>DEVINFO</p> <p>INE will role out Devinfo at national and provincial levels. Advanced training course on Devinfo database took place Feb 2007. Devinfo Angola launching is proposed at the end of this year</p>	Devinfo official launch at end of 2007	

Source: “Partner Support to GoA on Poverty Monitoring Statistics”, prepared by donors for a meeting in March 2007.

Annex 7: Project timeline 2000-2007



Annex 8: Total project expenditures

	2001/02	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
Preliminary phase								674
Planning missions	674						674	
Economic statistics								2215
Censuses and Surveys								133
Sampling			133				133	
Industry, Energy And Production								1877
Production Index System			144	106	141	301	161	853
Calculation of weights for IPI					159			159
Production Index programming				68	158	155	180	561
Industrial Production Statistics Report					147			147
Study visit to Norway					157			157
External trade				205				205
Social statistics								3019
Household survey program								
Questionnaire design		99						99
Poverty indicators		270						270
PRSP and MDG Indicators		136						136
Review of IDR			126					126
QUIBB planning			76					76
Sampling course			119					119
Interviewer training				118				118
Optical reading				124	141		159	424
Data processing and tabulation				123	141			264
Calculation of weights for QUIBB					159			159
Study trip to Mozambique			29	37				66
Pilot survey				232				232
Skanner, printer software			90					90
QUIBB survey field costs					840			840
Statistical infrastructure								1542
Information Technology								1249
Publication and dissemination				137				137
Development of website					422			422
Library					141	134		275
Writing techniques and cooperation with media					142			142
Study visit to Norway, library						54		54
Study visit to Norway, website						110		110
Internal network							109	109
Indirect costs of the production of statistics								293
Annual planning system					155			155
Human Resources Development Plan					138			138
Twinning arrangement								16522
LTA Social statistics		798	423	1018	1492	1365		5096
LTA Economic statistics		119	1270	1375	1434	1440		5638
Extra housing costs		144	252	224	305	285		1210
Coordination		177	260	238	238	175	44	1132
Launch meeting		163						163
Annual meeting			64	58				122
Language training				252				252
Mid-term evaluation					275			275
INE Language training				52	126			178

Cars purchase/insurance			746	952	260				1958	
INE Printing costs			67						67	
INE PCs			431						431	
Other costs										728
Books, software, translation etc				2	493	182	15		692	
Interests		-9	2	2					-5	
Audit			21	20					41	
Total	674	1897	4253	5343	7664	4201	668	24700	24700	

Source: SSB

Note: Figures in black are SSB invoices while red and blue are direct INE expenditures and not controlled against cumulative financial reports which were not available to the evaluation team

