Back to Earth: Towards Future Campaigning

WALHI-Friends of the Earth Indonesia
Joint Program Evaluation 2004-2007

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Acknowledgments

Table of Contents

Acronyms

WALHI ! *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* - The Indonesian Forum for Environment

PNLH ! *Pertemuan Nasional Lingkungan Hidup* - National Meeting on the Environment

PDLH ! *Pertemuan Daerah Lingkungan Hidup* - Regional Meeting on the Environment

EKNAS ! *Eksekutif Nasional* - National Executive Body

ED ! *Eksekutif Daerah* - Regional Executive Body

DN ! *Dewan Nasional* - National Council

DD! *Dewan Daerah* - Regional Council

KNLH ! *Konsultasi Nasional Lingkungan Hidup* - National Consultation on the Environment

KDLH ! *Konsultasi Daerah Lingkungan Hidup* - Regional Consultation on the Environment

MPR ! *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* - Peoples Consultative Assembly

DPR ! *Dewan Permusyawaratan Rakyat* - House of Representatives

NGO ! Non-Governmental Organization

GOI ! Government of Indonesia

BKSDA! *Badan Koordinasi Sumber Daya Alam* - Natural Resources Coordinating Agency!

1 Introduction

In September 2003, an independent team of evaluators produced an impact evaluation report entitled "The Sky is the Limit - Understanding WALHI, Indonesia's Major Environmental Movement" that assessed the impact of WALHI's programme over the four-year period of 2000-2003. Commissioned by Novib, the impact evaluation looked at WALHI's programme in general, with a specific focus on the programme components funded by Novib. The 2003 evaluation report presented a set of recommendations on WALHI's organizational system and campaign focus, based on a thorough analysis of the organization's activities and campaigns during the same period.

The current Evaluation takes off from the recommendations of the 2003 Evaluation and WALHI's responses to those in the course of the four-year period following the previous evaluation. The title of the current Evaluation, "Back to Earth", attempts to summarize the key theme of the recommendations from the Evaluation which drive WALHI to address concrete challenges facing the network in order to move forward.

In view of the results of the 2003 impact evaluation, and in the interest of assessing the progress WALHI has made since then, a team of external evaluators was assembled to conduct an evaluation of WALHI's work over the past four years (2003-2007). This evaluation uses the 2003 impact evaluation as a point of departure, providing a thorough independent analysis of how WALHI has worked towards the objectives set in its programs and campaigns over the past four years, and determines the relationships between and among the key components of WALHI as an organization (see Terms of Reference in Annex 1).

1.1   Main Objectives of the Evaluation

As outlined in the Terms of Reference for this assignment, the evaluation aims to[1]:
1.   Assess how far WALHI has succeeded in achieving its objectives through various programs;
2.   Identify various institutional and managerial problems that is influential for WALHI accomplishing its objectives; and
3.   Provide inputs to WALHI's organizational model, institutional and managerial development.

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[1] Terms of Reference, WALHI Evaluation 2004-2007, p.2

Moving beyond the scope of the previous evaluation that focused primarily on WALHI's programmes, this evaluation also assesses WALHI's institutional systems, the political constellation that has influenced WALHI's performance, and the direction it is moving in.

As a whole, the evaluation provides the following outputs[2]:
1. An overview of the weaknesses, strengths, challenges, and gaps in program activities and recommendations for how weaknesses can be addressed.
2. An assessment of WALHI's organizational model, its management and its capacity, including that of its members, Regional Executive Bodies (Eksekutif Daerah, or ED), Regional Boards (Dewan Daerah, or DD), National Executive Body (Eksekutif Nasional, or EKNAS), and National Board (Dewan Nasional, or DN) in carrying out their mandate; and
3. Recommendations for improvement of the next four-year program.

Using the impact evaluation of 2003 as a point of departure, the evaluation provides a thorough independent analysis of how WALHI has worked towards the objectives set in its programs and campaigns over the past four years, and determines the relationships between and among the key components of WALHI as an organization.

1.2   Report Structure

The evaluation report is divided into six chapters. Following the Executive Summary, which presents the key findings of the evaluation and the Evaluation Team's main recommendations. Chapter One gives a background to the evaluation and outlines the main objectives and outputs. A brief explanation of the approach and methodology used in the evaluation is presented in Chapter Two, followed by an overview of WALHI that includes its history, vision and mission, programme and organizational structure, in Chapter Three.

Chapter Four gives an overview of the weaknesses, strengths, challenges, and gaps in program activities, while Chapter Five presents the Evaluation Team's assessment of WALHI's organizational model, and overall management and capacity in carrying out its mandate. Finally, Chapter Six concludes the report with recommendations for WALHI to improve itself programmatically and organizationally, presented as options for WALHI to discuss further and choose from, as opposed to being singularly prescriptive.

The terms of reference, individuals and organizations interviewed, and evaluation schedule are attached as appendices to the report.

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[2] Ibid

2 Approach and Methods Used

2.1 Approach

Taking an approach similar to that used in the previous evaluation, this evaluation combined assessing the performance of WALHI as a network organization (to what extent the activities that have been carried out over the past four years have contributed to the achievement of its objectives, goals and strategies) and defining the strategies that WALHI has used to achieve its goals (to what extent its activities have advanced those strategies).

2.2 Key Questions and Issues Addressed

The key questions and issues addressed by this evaluation, as outlined in the terms of reference were as follows[3]:
1. The outputs of WALHI activities during the period of 2004 - 2007.
2. Results and impact of WALHI activities during the period of 2004 - 2007.
3. Efficiency and suitability of WALHI's current activities and strategies for achieving programme objectives.
4. Strengths and weaknesses in planning and reporting.
5. How have recommendations from previous evaluations been implemented and what are the results?
6. Knowledge management and communication of WALHI as a large organization with many regional offices, partners and peoples organization networks (organizational model, internal communication and administration)
7. How are relations to local and national government, media and other stakeholders (external communication)?
8. How are WALHI's activities, sovereignty, strengths and weaknesses seen as a member of Friends of the Earth International?
9. How is WALHI performing in relation to other international networks and donors?

The key findings related to the main questions above were then analyzed by comparing them to: (a) an understanding of contextual factors such as political, socio- economic and institutional developments in relation to WALHI's programme and activities; (b) factors related to WALHI's functioning: overall policy formulation and implementation, leadership, quality of human resources, programme management mechanisms (planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), and internal functioning of the network (including relations between headquarters and regions), and (c) WALHI's external relationships with stakeholders outside of its membership, both locally and nationally (including

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[3] Ibid

government, mass media, general public, private sector) as well as internationally (other networks, donors, etc.).

2.3 Methods Used

Taking into account issues of costs effectiveness and efficiency, the methods used in conducting this evaluation were individual interviews, Focus Group Discussions, and documentation analysis.

Interviews
The Evaluation Team conducted in-depth interviews with more than 100 individuals and/or organizations, both internal as well as external to WALHI. A list of individuals and organizations interviewed is attached as Appendix 2.

Regional Visits
To gain a better understanding of programme impact at the local level, the Evaluation Team visited 9 WALHI regions. The regions selected were: South Kalimantan, Bengkulu (Sumatera), East Java, West Java, West Kalimantan, Lampung (Sumatera), North Sulawesi, Bali and Southeast Sulawesi. In each region the evaluators visited the regional WALHI offices, active members and peoples' organizations. In most regions, they also contacted nonmembers of WALHI, including NGOs that did not join WALHI, government officials and journalists.

Debriefing
In treating the evaluation itself as a learning activity for WALHI staff and activists, the Evaluation Team held a debriefing session with WALHI to share and discuss the team's findings and opinions. Feedback and reactions from WALHI during the debriefing were then taken into consideration when the team worked on finalising the evaluation report.

2.4 Limitations and Difficulties

One notable difference between this evaluation and the previous evaluation in 2003 is that the scope of the evaluation at hand was considerably broader in scope. It is not limited to, or focused on, the activities supported by an individual donor but reviewed all programs and activities. Because also fewer days were available to the team, not all issues could be covered in as much depth as would be considered ideal. Another limitation was the final decision on the team composition was taken very shortly before the evaluation was about to commence, which left the team with very little time to prepare.

To confound the situation, WALHI was preoccupied with major national activities prior to the Evaluation, and thus had very limited time to assist the Evaluation

Team especially in identifying the respondents. While the Evaluation Team did identify major categories of respondents before the organizational meeting in Jakarta, WALHI expected the Team to arrange the appointments for interviews and was only able to set the appointments in the course of the first week of the Evaluation.

As a result, the team was not able to cover more respondents from the government of Indonesia and the targets (i.e., industry) of WALHI's advocacy and campaigns, which could have enabled it to better capture the impacts of WALHI's environmental advocacy efforts.

Furthermore, the evaluation team members were individually invited by WALHI itself. While the consultants quickly identified each others' strengths and expertise and were able to divide tasks, no team leader was appointed by WALHI. An evaluation team leader is ultimately responsible for the delivery of the final product, and by not appointing a team leader WALHI took some unnecessary risk by expecting that the team itself would identify the team leader and that the evaluators would be able to assure that a joint product would be delivered in a timely fashion.

For future evaluations, it is recommended that evaluators are given more time to form a team, prepare themselves in advance and that a team leader is appointed.

3 About WALHI[4]

3.1　History

Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia or the Indonesian Forum for Environment, more popularly known as WALHI, was established in 1980 by several NGOs concerned with the state of Indonesia's environment. WALHI's initial purpose was to promote policy change that guarantees the protection and preservation of the environment in Indonesia, through the synergy of a network of NGOs concerned about the environment and democracy.

Over 27 years WALHI has gone through three main stages of development. In the 1980s, the function of WALH was to increase public awareness of environmental issues. During the 1990s, WALHI took the role of advocating for national environmental policies. By the end of the 1990s, WALHI was promoting environmental management that takes into account human rights, community rights, and democracy. The transformation of WALHI from an environmental organization to a pro-democracy environmental organization, during the time of important political change in Indonesia, has made WALHI renown both as a hero in defending the environment and hero in promoting democracy.

At present, WALHI is a forum consisting of 445 organizations, mainly NGOs, and Regional Executive Offices in 25 provinces. As such, WALHI is the oldest, largest, and most influential environmental organisation in Indonesia. In 2002, WALHI decided to transform itself from a network organization into a stronger and more inclusive environmental movement in Indonesia. The reason for this transformation was to accelerate the realization of just and democratic social, economic and political systems in Indonesia that guarantee peoples' rights over their sources of livelihood and a healthy environment. In 2005, WALHI declared itself as a "public organization", meaning that WALHI envisaged to mobilize more and more direct public support to strengthen both its financial and human resources.

Together with like-minded groups, WALHI has succeeded in increased awareness on environmental issues and peoples' sovereign rights to manage Indonesia's environment. WALHI has also gained recognition as an advocate of Indonesia's pro-democracy movements, and is part of the international environmental movement as a member of Friends of the Earth International.

Aware of the challenges it faces in the future, WALHI is currently in the process of evolving from an organization that is NGO-based (i.e. based on a membership

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[4] This chapter is largely based on the similarly entitled section within the 2003 evaluation report, "The Sky is the Limit - Understanding WALHI, Indonesia's Major Environmental Movement."

comprising NGOs) to a public organization that provides extensive opportunities to the general public to contribute to the protection and conservation of the environment, i.e. individuals who care about, are interested in being involved in, and support the Indonesian environmental movement.

3.2   Mission and Organizational Values

According to WALHI's official website, its mission and organizational values are as follows:

- WALHI is an independent environmental advocacy network that supports the establishment of a just and democratic society and environment.
- WALHI believes that the environmental movement has to develop into a social movement that prioritizes solidarity and creative non-violent confrontational action.
- WALHI upholds gender justice, the rights of marginalized peoples, and the rights of all forms of life.
- WALHI believes that the right to a clean and suitable environment is a basic human right.
- WALHI believes that a democratic, open, responsible and professional organization will be able to protect peoples' rights and environmental sustainability.
- WALHI trusts that its experience over the past two decades in influencing policy reform that supports the people and the environment, in defending communities who are victims of development, and in building peoples' awareness constitute the principal capital for generating an inclusive environmental movement.

3.3 Main Programmes

The main programmes of WALHI are (1) promoting good environmental governance, (2) promoting bioregional planning, (3) building natural assets and (4) monitoring the impact of globalization over natural resources. The objectives of each programme are outlined as follows:

- Good Environmental Governance Programme : to promote transparency and accountability in environmental and natural resource management policies through the existing political space and multi-stakeholder processes.
- Promotion of environmental management by the 'bioregion' approach : to reform natural resources management policies from a sectoral approach to a more holistic approach through advocacy for creating natural resource legislation.
- Natural Assets and Poverty Programme : to put natural assets in the hands of the poor through the redistribution of forestlands to landless people in areas surrounding the state forests and coastal areas.

- Anti-Globalization Programme : to educate the public about the impact of globalization and the privatization of natural resources (such as water resources) through public education and campaigns.
- Moreover, WALHI is developing an internal programme of transforming itself in a social movement. This will imply, among others, further internal strengthening of WALHI, resource mobilisation among the public and the strengthening of people's and traditional organisations.

3.4 Structure

It is important to stress that WALHI is not a single individual organisation but a network of organisations. The network is made up of a variety of components: the National Executive Office, Regional Executive Offices, the National Council, Regional Councils and members, and the Code of Ethics Committee. WALHI members are independent organizations that can either be NGOs or Peoples Organisation (POs).

Below, we shortly discuss the main components and mechanisms of the network.

3.4.1 The National Executive Office (Eksekutif Nasional, EKNAS)

This office can be considered as the headquarters of the network and is led by the Executive Director. This Executive Director is elected during the National Environmental Meeting (Pertemuan National Lingkungan Hidup, PNLH, conducted every three years), which consists of the members, the National Council (Dewan Nasional, DN, see below), the Code of Ethics Committee and the members of the WALHI. The Executive Director is responsible for managing the entire network, the EKNAS in particular, and can speak on behalf of WALHI.

Over the last years, the EKNAS has gone through various internal reorganisations. Presently, it is composed of three divisions that are directly accountable to the Executive Director: the People's Organisations Development Division (4 staff), the Campaign and Public Education Division (9 staff), and the Resource Mobilisation Division (3 staff). There are also three Supporting Units under the responsibility of the Deputy Director: the Programme Monitoring and Evaluation/Management Information System Unit (2 staff), the Institution Development Unit (13 staff, including all logistical support staff), and the Finance Unit (6 staff). In total, 39 people are presently working at the WALHI headquarters, 15 of them women; two division heads and one unit head are women.

3.4.2 The Regional Executive Office (Eksekutif Daerah, ED)

There are 25 Regional Executive Offices led by a Regional Director who is also elected by members at a Regional Environmental Meeting. These regional

Executive Offices vary much in age, size, level of activity and degree of professionalism. Some manage to include all important civil society organisations in their region, whereas others are unable (yet) to do so. Some regional offices have grown into solid networks, whereas others have been affected by internal dynamics and a few have temporarily been disbanded.

3.4.3 National Environmental Meeting

The National Environmental Meeting (Pertemuan Nasional Lingkungan Hidup, PNLH) meets every three years and is the highest governing body of WALHI. The PNLH has the following main functions:

- Evaluating the network's activities during the last phase;
- Setting the network's vision, mission and strategies;
- Determining the network's statutes;
- Confirming members of the National Council, electing members of the Code of
- Ethics Committee, and the National Executive Office for the next 3 years; and
- Accepting new members of WALHI, which could be organisations or individuals.

3.4.5 National Council

In essence, this is the small version of the PNLH, made up of elected members from each region and meeting as a full body once a year. Its main task is to monitor the work of the EKNAS. Because its members are scattered all over the country, the Council appoints a subcommittee, the Dewan Nasional Harian (National Executive Committee), which meets four times a year in Jakarta. The Director of WALHI reports quarterly to this committee. An additional task of the Council is to form the planning committee of the PNLH together with the EKNAS.

3.4.6 Code of Ethics Committee

The CEC is made up of 5-7 members tasked with investigating reports of misconduct and violations to WALHI's ethics and values. If a violation of ethics is found, the CEC is authorised to recommend actions to the PNLH.

3.4.7 Regional Environmental Meeting

The Regional Environmental Meeting is made up of regional members of WALHI and is the highest decision making body for the WALHI regional networks. It sets the vision, mission and strategies for WALHI's work in the regions including the by-laws, electing members to fill the positions in the other components of the regional structure, and chooses candidates for membership to be presented to the National Environmental Meeting.

3.4.8 Regional Council

This is the smaller version of the National Council, which oversees and monitors the work of the regional executive office. The same mechanisms and functions as at the national level exist with a regional ethics committee consisting of three members.

3.4.9 Relationship between the national and regional offices

One of the major thrusts of the structure is decentralisation - to create effective, independent regional forums, supported by an effective central forum. Clearly, the central forum, represented by EKNAS, does not manage the regional forums. In fact the structure is designed to increase the regions' influence over the centre. There are two mechanisms to achieve this purpose: the first is the PNLH which is made up of all members (NGOs/POs) from across the country; and the second is the official role assigned to EKNAS to coordinate, facilitate and support the activities of the ED to be propelled at the national level.

4   Key Findings:
Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps

This chapter provides an analysis of the strengths and weakness of WALHI as a campaign and advocacy organization. It also presents an assessment of the opportunities and threats that could influence WALHI's present and future decisions and directions.

4.1   WALHI as a Campaign and Advocacy NGO at Present

WALHI prides itself as the largest forum of non-government and community-based organizations in Indonesia with representations in 26 provinces and 436 member organizations[5]. It works across Indonesia on a wide variety of issues that include forests, mining, fresh water management, pollution, foreign debt and corporate-driven globalization, coasts and oceans, disaster management, national policy and law reform, and good governance.

To attain its vision of social transformation, peoples' sovereignty, and sustainability of life and livelihoods, WALHI works to defend Indonesia's natural assets and local communities by ensuring adequate legal representation for various community groups in their struggles to gain justice. As a key strategy to advance its goals, WALHI conducts campaigns as a national network and in alliance with other international networks that share the same concerns on environmental justice, primarily with the vast network of Friends of the Earth worldwide.

In essence, WALHI is a campaign and advocacy organization working for environmental justice, peoples' sovereignty, and sustainability of life and livelihoods. This is the image molded by WALHI for itself over the past 25 years, which is clearly embedded in the minds of its partners and allies, observers and antagonists in Indonesia. This is the current image that serves as the starting point for the analysis, assessment and recommendations put forward in this report.

Using the impact evaluation of 2003 as a point of departure, the evaluation provides a thorough independent analysis of how WALHI has worked towards the objectives set in its programs and campaigns over the past four years, and determines the relationships between and among the key components of WALHI as an organization.

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[5] As stated on WALHI's website, http://www.walhi.or.id/ttgkami/profil_wlh/

4.2 Analysis of Strengths and Weaknesses

4.2.1 Campaign Focus

The depth and breadth of WALHI's quest for environmental justice traditionally covers a broad array of issues and concerns, ranging from forests and mining to coastal and marine issues, energy and waste to food and water. That 27-year-old tradition of broad-ranging issues and involvement carries to this period.

Every three years, WALHI holds a General Assembly - hereinafter referred to as PNLH for its acronym in Bahasa Indonesia, which stands for Pertemuan Nasional Lingkungan Hidup or National Meeting on the Environment. This tri-annual meeting, attended by representatives of WALHI's more than 400 members from across the country, stands at the center stage of WALHI's democratic processes and considered as a key pillar in the organization's operations.

EKNAS, the National Executive Body, derives its mandate from the decisions of the PNLH. One of the main purposes of the PNLH is to help provide a focus on WALHI's campaigns and programs by narrowing down the key themes and issues that should be tackled by the National EKNAS for the subsequent three-year period.

The most recent PNLH held in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara in 2005, the campaign/program themes identified by the members were as follows: (1) Forests; (2) Mining and Energy); (3) Coastal and Marine; (4) Food and Water; and (5) Disaster Management. The first three themes are traditional areas that WALHI has been working in from its inception, while the other two themes are primarily new areas for WALHI. Off-hand, the focus on disaster management may be seen as more time-bound rather than a strategic advocacy and as a response to the series of disasters that struck Indonesia since the Indian Ocean Tsunami in December 2004.

Despite the discipline vested by PNLH's decision to narrow down the key themes of WALHI's three-year programs and campaigns, the very general nature of the themes does not help much in providing focus in actual operations and implementation. In other words, behind each theme are hidden a pile of issues and sectors that are worthy of individual campaigns, with each requiring human and financial resources. General headings such as the five identified at the PNLH in 2005 mentioned above do not provide adequate focus on what particular areas in forests, mining and energy, and coastal and marine issues should the programs and campaigns focus on for the next three-year period. This is evidenced by the fact that none of the Resolutions adopted at the PNLH, nor its proceedings, provide the EKNAS with clear guidance on which issues within the identified themes they should focus the programs and campaigns on.

Apart from the general discussions, the PNLH decisions and discussions do not provide adequately clear guidance on the precise positions that WALHI should take, on issues that were not identified within the mandated general themes. On the other hand, the PNLH discussions also do not cover the strategic direction of programs and campaigns, beyond responding to environmental issues and cases covered by the mandated general priority themes during the three-year period.

As mandated by the PNLH, EKNAS took on the Food and Water theme at par with the traditional themes that WALHI has been working in. However, the lack of clear guidance on what issues in to focus on, compounded with lack of clear discussion on positions to take on key issues and lack of expertise and experience in the area of food sovereignty, resulted in EKNAS grappling for the last two years on which issues to work in and what positions to take on key issues.

Campaign Managers in EKNAS have also had to struggle with the repercussions of the lack of clear guidance from the PNLH on the key issues that the EKNAS should focus WALHI's programs and campaigns on for the next three years. They have continued to work on broad concerns and issues in every theme, but some have struggled to identify a focus.

Furthermore, since WALHI's current structure only allows for a one-person Campaign Team at the EKNAS level, each Campaign Manager is spread extremely thinly over a broad array of concerns and involvement. They attend meetings in Indonesia and abroad, network, conduct research, carry out advocacy activities, occasionally visit field sites, and attend to campaign theme-related requests and requirements of the Regional Executives all within a three-year period. Not surprisingly, some Campaign Managers end up frustrated due to lack lack of strategic direction, the inability to work with a committed campaign team, and (as a result) being overwhelmed by the amount of work that has to be done.

WALHI's inability or unwillingness to choose to be more focused and strategic in its campaign themes has been raised before in the previous evaluation. While on the one hand there is a perceived urgent need for WALHI to be more clear, focused, selective, and strategic in its campaign themes, on the other hand, owing to its grassroots base, WALHI is often one of the first organizations who hear about different problems faced by different communities throughout the country.

Regional Executives, the Local Members and other stakeholders at the national and regional level expect WALHI, as a campaign/advocacy organization, to address all major environmental issues that occur as WALHI's concerns. As such, the Evaluation Team understands and respects WALHI's inability and unwillingness to limit its scope, while noting that WALHI needs to better

understand and manage the consequences of this "apparent" lack of focus. Among the consequences are that envisaged staff reductions in the EKNAS could not (and cannot) be realized and that WALHI will have to hand over cases and problem sectors to other organizations (usually NGOs) to follow up on, while itself scouts for and takes on new issues and concerns.

The ultimate consequence of wanting to address all issues and wanting to be in the forefront is that WALHI will not be able to deliver, directly, a great number of tangible successes on the ground.

4.2.2 Campaign and Advocacy Messages

WALHI's public image in Indonesia as an environmental organization is that of a radical and activist organization. This image has been nurtured by WALHI's long years of bringing a wide-array of environmental issues to national and international attention, mainly through conflict-confrontation methods such as demonstrations, pressure politics, aggressive media campaign and filing of legal cases against environmental violators, which are mainly corporations. In various interviews with different actors at the national and local levels, WALHI's radicalism and consistent activism on environmental issues in Indonesia are the main conveyor of the message of its campaigns and programs.

Derived from a political ecological analysis of environmental and social problems in Indonesia, WALHI's key message is mainly against all forms of environmental exploitation and violation of the peoples' environmental rights. This, in effect, is translated by WALHI into "*tolak* (stop)" slogans.

Confrontational and non-compromising campaigning creates enemies. This is the intended impact, as conflict is needed to create openings for change. A radical position is needed merely to force opponents or other powerful decision makers recognize that there is a problem, that practices are unsustainable or unfair.

Such a fight has its downsides. Firstly, it results in general and politically predictable campaign messages. Secondly, radicalism (or, if one likes, consistency) easily goes at the expense of the understanding and acceptance of those who seek to explore more moderate solution strategies. Thirdly, the fight can appear to have no end, or not deliver any real results. Furthermore, fourthly, once a resolute "no" position is taken, it is hard to compromise. At the same time, fifthly, being "unreasonable" is sometimes also considered easy and even cowardly: "if we stay in the comfort zone of opposition, there is no need to take responsibility for the solution". Another important risk of a non-compromising position is that the community on which a conflict case is focused may not be united in its position, or it may soften its stance.

WALHI is well aware of most of these downsides and risks. Despite internal and external critique on its approach, WALHI persists in its radical positioning, and

there is indeed a need and "market" for such positioning, be it in the undemocratic New Order era or in the presently faltering but emerging Indonesian democracy.

While consistency in its "purity" may be considered a key strength of WALHI, many respondents articulated their desire for WALHI to provide more solid technical support to complement its "political positions", in view of the changing political landscape and the real need to suffice the basic needs of the ever-growing population in Indonesia.

The general and politically predictable nature of WALHI's campaign messages may also be a consequence of the lack of guidance given by the PNLH on WALHI's campaign and program priorities. The PNLH could provide more guidance on: (1) what specific issues under each general them should the EKNAS work in for the next 3 years; (2) what is WALHI's position on these issues; (3) How does WALHI position itself vis-à-vis the other actors in these issues; and (4) What is the strategic direction of these priority programs and campaigns, and how they contribute towards attaining WALHI's vision.

There are also weaknesses in the mechanisms of feedback and consultation between the EKNAS on the one hand and the Regional Executive and the Local Members on the other. The formulation of (inter) national level campaign messages is primarily entrusted in the hands of the EKNAS, which could be regarded as a weakness for a constituency-based organization like WALHI which boasts itself for its genuinely democratic and participatory decision-making processes involving its local members. Ideally, a network organization must directly involve its constituency in defining, developing and formulating its positions on key issues that they decide to work as well as the messages that they convey to the national and international public. Within WALHI's decision making system, the Annual Consultations with its local members should be the ideal platform to accomplish this task, but the current format and processes do not clearly provide for it.

Some Campaign Managers regard the general program mandate from the PNLH as the sole barometer on "what the members want", while others think that it does not provide guidance on the focus and scope of the campaigns. Either way, the general nature of PNLH's mandate results to weaknesses in program implementation. Lack of clear guidance could result in too much exercise of prerogatives on the part of the EKNAS, which could be seen as a major deviation from the essence of a constituency-based network like WALHI and also from the alienation of national programs from the realities and needs of the local members. On the other hand, lack of clear guidance may also result to too broad concerns and involvements at the national level which could lead to frustrations among Campaigners as well as external stakeholders.

4.2.3 WALHI's Alternatives

Despite the common "*tolak*" message theme, WALHI does explore and promote alternatives. These are not, however, mainstream alternatives. They include, for example, support to community agro-forestry, biogas production and community-based shrimp farming. The scale of these alternatives is often (very) small and in some cases they can easily be ridiculed (biogas from cow manure is not an alternative for a nuclear plant). The main reason for decision makers to not take community based alternatives seriously is because of their views on and interests in "development" differ fundamentally with WALHI. They may have different views because they (need to) think in terms of the interests of the whole Indonesian population, and not just in the interest of "some isolated local community". They may strive for invalid interests too. When officials take kick backs from project developers, for example, then they are unlikely to consider that local communities paid land taxes for decades.

Despite the Mataram mandate to promote transparency and accountability in environmental and natural resource management policies through multi-stakeholder processes, WALHI maintains a critical position vis-à-vis mainstream "win-win" solutions, such as natural resource certification initiatives (RSPO, FSC, etc). Being critical of some of these processes is sometimes a suspected excuse for lack of courage to support other stakeholders' resolutions. When it finds evidence of poorly designed or implemented certification, WALHI would often prefer to completely dismiss the effort, but when its partners are involved in the process or because some improvements can be observed as well, WALHI ends up with ambiguous positions.

It is not so that WALHI completely backs off from mainstream "win-win" options. Regional Offices as well as EKNAS staff do not shy away from monitoring and criticizing certification efforts (like engaging in a shrimp audit in Lampung next September). Of course, it can be uncomfortable to be dragged into a process that takes the issue away from the original "stop" position. Similar ambiguity was observed by the Evaluation team in regards to WALHI's engagement in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA/AMDAL) reviews. In the case of positioning on the issue of biofuels, WALHI's international partners reported that they find it difficult to work with WALHI and other Indonesian groups because positions remain undecided, even when the international partners thought that a joint position was agreed upon.

4.2.4 Campaign and Advocacy Strategies

Consistent with its tradition and image as an activist environmental network, WALHI's campaign and advocacy strategies range from demonstrations and mobilizations to media campaigns, pressure politics and filing of legal cases against corporate environment violators. WALHI has gained national and international prominence as a leading environmental network in Indonesia

through these strategies over the years. Several high-profile conflict-confrontation engagements with government agencies and violators, as well as prominent legal battles on key environmental issues have propelled WALHI to the current level of reputation as a consistently radical network organization defending Indonesia's environment and protecting local peoples' interests and rights.

The past four years have witnessed the same traditional strategies adopted by WALHI in promoting its campaigns and advocacy as largely seen in the past 27 years. WALHI continues to mobilize communities at the local level and their supporters in the capital to bring the issues and plight of communities involved in environmental cases to the attention of policy makers and the public in general, as was shown in the Newmont case involving environmental and health damage on the Buyat community in North Sulawesi and the LAPINDO case involving the mudflow in East Java. Both cases also involved WALHI filing legal suits for environmental damage, coupled with aggressive media campaigns at different levels.

The most prominent environmental case filed by WALHI during this period is the one against PT Newmont Minahasa Raya Corporation, a US-based gold mining company operating in the island of Sulawesi. The case filed by WALHI involves the dumping of mine tailings in Buyat community in Northern Sulawesi, resulting in environmental damage in terrestrial and marine resources as well as serious health effects on the people in the community. The case actually started in 1999 and has been going on even after the community has been relocated to another site. The government of Indonesia filed a case in August 2005 for environmental damage against the company which was dismissed by the provincial court in April 2007 and has since been elevated to the appellate court in Jakarta. WALHI supported the government case, and later filed a separate case in Jakarta against the company and the government. WALHI's suit is on-going, as well as the government's appeal on the lower court's decision. The Newmont case has put WALHI in a "sleeping with the enemy" position, so to speak. It was the government that first filed a legal suit against the company for the environmental damage that its mining operations in North Sulawesi have caused to the local communities. WALHI supported the government in its legal action against Newmont, and even ended up as allies with the provincial government of North Sulawesi when the current Governor strongly challenged the continued operations of PT Mehra Suputan Mining (MSM) in Batu Putih, despite the local government's denial of its permit to re-conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA).

WALHI and its local partners strongly rooted for the Governor's final decision, despite the local government power's futility in view of the strength of a national permit obtained by MSM from the Soeharto era, which is being honored by the current national government. In the process, WALHI ended up in a schizophrenic situation vis-à-vis the government in the MSM case: supporting the provincial

government in its position not to grant permit to MSM, while fighting the national government for its recognition of the Suharto era-permit granted to the company.

While this may be a shrewd tactic on the part of WALHI to sow cracks within the government and expose the loopholes in the mining permit system, so far WALHI failed to bring the case beyond the environmental damage issues in the case. A more strategic campaign would have elevated the case to the level of environmental governance that brings into fore the conflicts between the powers of the national and local governments as well as the loopholes in the permit system.

The weaknesses in WALHI's technical and scientific capacity to support its political positions on key environment issues that it has handled in the past four years have been noted by several respondents in the Evaluation process. While its energy in bringing corporate violations of environmental rights and integrity has been well projected in the media and has been brought to the legal sphere, WALHI's position on mining in general is considered lofty by some observers. WALHI has not been coherent on its position on small-scale and traditional mining activities, for example, despite the environmentally-damaging practices used by local miners and despite the fact that small-scale mining operations continue in areas where WALHI has called for the stopping of operations of mining companies. One respondent even referred to this as selective advocacy without clear strategic position on mining in general and the different forms of mineral resource exploitation in particular.

This positioning can be explained by acknowledging that although WALHI focuses on the environment, it is ultimately a local communities' service organization, perhaps even a development organization, that aims to keep outsiders (companies and government) away from community areas to as to allow the communities to develop according to their own choice and pace. The development aspect of WALHI's work is hidden in community organization, which is definitely its main strength. Community organizing with the aim to revive, strengthen or renew the customary rules and practices that did protect the environment in most areas for a long time is an underlying goal of WALHI's mission, which presumes that revived customary traditions would also deal with unsustainable practices undertaken by communities.

In view of the predictable nature of WALHI's core message on the issues that it addresses, one of the main challenges that WALHI has to address is that it needs to get better at communicating its message to a wider audience, and creating an internal working environment that energizes its Campaign Managers specifically and all WALHI staff in general, so that they can see and acknowledge that small successes off the main target are, still, successes.

4.2.5 Sustainability of Campaigns and Advocacy

The vagueness in strategic direction of its campaigns and advocacy beyond initial tactical conflict-confrontation engagement, resulted in the observation by some of WALHI's own staff and partners that WALHI's campaigns are mainly reactive and not solution-oriented. As said above, this is the consequence of WALHI's desire to take on all relevant issues and wanting to play in the forefront.

The case-oriented nature of WALHI's campaigns and advocacy are clearly illustrated by the controversial legal cases that the organization has propelled to national attention in the past four years, such as the Newmont case described in the earlier section. Beyond corporate violations of environmental rights, the strategic position and interest of WALHI on the core issues are not clearly and explicitly presented in the campaigns.

In a case-oriented approach, the nature of methodologies is mainly reactive and any change in policies and decisions is highly dependent on the response of the targets, such as the court or the government, to the challenge brought up by WALHI and its partners. WALHI then relies on the media to generate public attention and exert pressure on the target/s with the aim of favorable decisions and responses. Without any favorable response, accomplishments and victories will be limited to media coverage and public response to the campaign.

This formula, widely adopted by WALHI in its campaigns and advocacy work, does not often yield sustainable advocacy mainly due to its reactive and one-sided nature. The formula repeats itself in subsequent campaigns, giving rise to frustrations among Campaigners and predictable political positions that advocacy targets have learned how to ignore over the years of seeing the same pattern. Once again, it is therefore crucial that WALHI improves its ability to communicate a difficult message.

The reactive and case-oriented nature of WALHI's campaign strategies sometimes result to some glaring inconsistencies in their choice of allies and targets, as well as generally vague messages. This can be gleaned from the Newmont case where WALHI ended up supporting the government at the provincial level mainly because the Governor's decision was against corporate mining activities, but not against mining in general. In the same Buyat case, WALHI later challenged the government at the national level by filing a case against it and Newmont. It is not clear how WALHI reconciled this inconsistency and whether or not it has done any analysis of the political actors and the implications of its positions on its strategic decisions in general.

So long as WALHI chooses to address all relevant issues and work on the front line, it cannot possibly sustain all issues and campaigns until real changes are delivered. WALHI is aware of this dilemma, and has in the past years begun to attempt trying to identify on focal issues that will be taken on for the longer term (e.g. the logging moratorium) but such choices must then also be consistent, and they will require a different strategy altogether. If the EKNAS revived its

campaign team structure, it could pursue selected issues towards stages beyond awareness raising and conflict creation.

4.2.6 Technical Capacity and Competence

The age profile of the staff at the National and Regional Executives is young, with an average age of mid-30s (see Annex B for the Profile of Staff at the EKNAS). Most have background as activists in the university where they came from, and many have had some experiences in working with other civil society organizations prior to working with WALHI. A good number of staff at the EKNAS had experiences in working with the Regional Offices of WALHI or as staff of Local Members.

The average number of years that the staff at the EKNAS has been working with WALHI is around five years, with the most senior staff working there for 26 years and the most junior for two months. The Campaign Managers are all new staff at the national level, with between one to two years at their current job, though some of them have worked with WALHI at the regional/local level. Notably, the hiring of Campaign Managers corresponded with the change in leadership at EKNAS following the PNLH in 2005. The Managers of the Support Units have been working with WALHI for an average of four years and have varying experiences working with the organization at the regional and local levels.

In general, the Campaign and Support staffs at the EKNAS have relevant academic and professional backgrounds to the work they are currently doing. Some of the senior staff have impressive academic and professional qualifications that make them strong assets for the organization. The Campaign Managers for Coastal and Marine and Mining and Energy, for example, have academic and professional backgrounds directly related to their respective thematic area of work. The picture is quite different at the Eksekutif Daerah (Regional Executive Body, or ED) level, where many of the staff at the ED offices are young graduates from university with science background and some involvement in the environmental movement as students.

Despite the absence of a clear Human Resources policy on recruitment and hiring of staff the matching of professional and academic background of the staff with their positions in EKNAS is good. Campaign Managers have adequate basic background in campaigning except for the Campaigner on Food and Water who is a fresh university graduate with a degree in Biology. The Managers for the Support Units all have adequate relevant professional and academic preparations, with some years of experience working with WALHI.

It is also worth noting that, along with the innovations introduced over the past 3-4 years, WALHI EKNAS has also recruited staff with no background in campaigning and activism but in other sectors (e.g. advertising) instead. The new

characters in the office mingle well with the conventional campaigners while introducing vibrant new ideas and approaches.

At the regional level, however, ED offices are struggling to maintain their better trained and experienced staff for the longer term. Firstly, experienced ED directors are (by constitutional rule) rotated away from the office after two terms of three years. Secondly, the perennial problems on lack of funds at the EDs result in a steady brain drain. Most ED staff work on a voluntary basis (such as the case of WALHI-Sulawesi Utara), while others receive a token salary and allowances depending on the availability of funds (as in the case of WALHI Bengkulu). This results to a high turn-over of staff in many ED offices, with most activities run by staff working essentially on a voluntary basis.

Although (teasingly) picking on EKNAS for its staff being paid regular salaries remains a popular area of discussion, most staff in ED offices interviewed did not necessarily have much of a problem with not being paid regular salaries. Instead, they would like to have access to a larger working budget to undertake activities, including field trips with allowances. Some ED staff noted that payment based on allowances is actually a good incentive to spend time in the field.

WALHI is essentially a huge volunteers' network with a relatively small secretariat whose staff does enjoy salaries, albeit at nominal levels. Considering this, the Evaluation Team observed that WALHI's donors are in fact getting very good value for money.

Although for the most part technically and professionally prepared for their tasks, Campaign Managers perform multiple tasks that often go beyond campaigning on their thematic scope. Apart from networking and attending numerous meetings related to their campaign themes, Campaigners also have to coordinate (and in some cases undertake) research and deal with the Regional Offices and Local Members involved in similar campaigns at their levels.

The decision of the EKNAS since 2005 to outsource some of the research under specific campaigns and programs releases to some extent the Campaign Managers of the burden to do research on top of their campaign tasks. In other instances, research is also conducted by the Campaign Manager in collaboration with Regional Offices. Outsourcing is not a preferred method in this case in view of the fact that the staff in Regional Offices greatly depend on income from field work. However, the arduous process by which the research to back up the Logging Moratorium campaign was conducted illustrates that buy in and capacity from Regional Offices into research efforts is not a given.

Most Campaigners at the ED offices come from an activist background and started out as volunteers of WALHI before they joined as full-time staff. The staffs of West Java receive full compensation because the ED is implementing two programs funded by other donors, in addition from the basic support that they

receive from the National Office. The ED staff in Bengkulu, however, only receive compensation only when funds are available, while the staff of North Sulawesi work on fully voluntary basis since these EDs are solely dependent on the support from EKNAS.

It is worth mentioning that most of the Campaigners at the ED offices have a technical or science background that are relevant to the campaigns and programs they are handling. For example, all volunteer-staff of ED North Sulawesi have backgrounds in biology, forestry fisheries or marine science. This is an asset that WALHI needs to harness and find a way to better compensate and appreciate.

4.2.7 Institutional structure and campaigns (WALHI EKNAS)

Since 2005, the new Executive Director introduced a new organizational structure in WALHI EKNAS, whereby the campaign structure was replaced by a structure based on capacities (four individual campaigners and two supporting divisions, each with a division head whereby both campaigners and division heads report to the Executive Director). Almost three years down the line, it has become clear that the new structure does not (yet) work as it relies heavily on either very smooth collaboration between division heads (ED view), or intensive guidance by the director.

The present structure results in some campaigners not being able to lead a team, resulting in redundancy because campaigners feel they have no choice but to take up tasks that fall under the responsibility of overloaded supporting divisions. Meanwhile, supporting divisions undertake activities that are not always directly linked to running campaigns or they may independently undertake activities that really would fall under the responsibility of the campaigner.

4.2.8 Information and Knowledge Resource Base and Capacity

WALHI's Information and Knowledge Resource Division provides information to the Regional Offices and Local Members, as well as the media and other actors, on various environmental issues confronting Indonesia. This information provides updates on the issues at the national and international levels, as well as shares relevant reports and researches conducted by other groups in other areas/countries. WALHI's information and updates on environmental issues are distributed regularly to the staff at the EKNAS and the Regional Offices as well as Local Members and key contacts in the media, the government and other civil society organizations. WALHI also has regular newsletters as well as occasional books and publications, nearly all of which are written in Bahasa Indonesia.

The most important updates on WALHI's campaigns and programs, as well as the most significant updates on key environmental issues, are posted in WALHI's official website. The maintenance of the website has been contracted out to

professional managers, but not all information seems to be updated regularly. The most recent annual report posted on the site, for example, is dated 2002.

The respondents generally appreciated the information provided by WALHI through various means, although some find the information presented too general in nature, mostly not generated by WALHI from its own research and investigations, and are readily available through the internet. Many respondents from within and outside WALHI aired their view that WALHI can, and needs to generate relevant information and knowledge through based on their own research and investigations rather than relying on secondary literature generated by other organizations.

While WALHI has begun to systematically document information in its internal database (on intranet), it needs tighten up the relevance, reliability and communicability of the materials it prepares for outside audiences:

Relevance: most materials are launched without having identified a strategically chosen target group and many materials do not speak to this audience directly. Press releases often primarily focus on what WALHI thinks about a situation while failing to present facts and argue from the perspective of the audience targeted.

Reliability: materials often contain mistakes, incorrect information and lack solid referencing. For example, it is common that information is posted on the website with reference to the date that the information was released.

Communicability: Reports and press releases often contain heavy duty language that is not attractive to read for a broad audience. A lot of materials are developed low cost which undermines the information's perceived credibility.

Having built its image and reputation on its 27 years of activism on environmental issues, WALHI has also raised expectations among key stakeholders and actors in Indonesia on the substance that it contributes in advancing discourses on environmental issues and more importantly in environmental governance and policy development. Thus, there is a clamor among some actors for WALHI to provide solid technical and scientific positions to complement and support its political positions. Again, you must see this from the perspective that they work from the basis of defending a community's position, not on the basis of research. Supporting facts are sought specifically to strengthen a position already taken.

4.2.9 Funding Base

For the past three years, WALHI has its funding from at least ten donors, most of which have been supporting WALHI longer term for different programs and different financial commitments. Some of these donors also directly support activities of specific ED Offices, while there are also donors that exclusively support local activities.

Since 2006, WALHI has begun to raise funds from the general public but (not surprisingly) the contribution of this effort to the total budget remains negligible, both in absolute and relative terms (Euro 1,600, or 3% in 2006-2007).

Funding support from the Indonesian public may as of yet be minimal, it must also be noted that the in-kind contribution of WALHI's volunteers in the ED offices represents significant value for the organization and its donors. If all volunteers of the EDs were paid Rp. 3,000,000 monthly on average, WALHI's annual budget would more than double by some 570,000 euro.

Financial management in WALHI has only recently been tightened up and is being steered towards more professional management. The Evaluation Team was surprised that an established and internationally-known environmental network like WALHI that it does not have substantive institutional savings to serve as financial back-up for its operations in times of delays in fund releases from donors or during transition periods or for emergency needs. Unlike many established NGOs, WALHI does not have a long term system of accumulating institutional savings from its programs and campaigns to support activities and needs that are not funded by donors. None of its current donors funds the organization's core operations and these costs must therefore be integrated into the program budgets.

As a result of its virtually complete dependence on project/programme funding, without any substantive institutional savings to serve as back-up in terms of needs and funding delays, WALHI relies on stretching spill over funds from the previous period to cover the expenses of running its operations in the current period until it receives the donor funds intended for that period. In actual terms it is the EDs, which are heavily dependent on the funds coming from EKNAS, that suffer heavily whenever there are delays. It is a common (but undesirable) practice of ED executive officers to delay staff compensation until the funds from the National Office comes.

4.2.10 Constituency Base

WALHI considers its broad based membership as its strongest asset. Rightfully so, since there is no other environmental network in Indonesia, which is as large and as well established as WALHI. However, to what extent members are active and involved in environmental issues is not clear.

There seems to have been a decline of numbers of members over the past four years. This, however, does not seem to be much of a concern to WALHI.

4.2.11 Credibility to Other Actors

In a general sense, WALHI remains widely credible among other stakeholders and actors interviewed for the Evaluation. As mentioned in earlier sections, WALHI's reputation is largely based on its image as an activist environmental organization.

While its credibility as the most prominent environment NGO in Indonesia serves as its passport in capturing media attention, the direct value of its reputation in terms of influencing government policies is questionable. WALHI staff admits that there is not always a clear indication that the government and the private sector is listening to and taking on board their positions and demands on the issues that they are campaigning on. However, it is worth noting that although WALHI would or could rarely claim it as a success, some respondents did imply during interviews that WALHI's non-comprise messages are also creating invaluable "political space" to innovative forces within government and the private sector. In conclusion, the evaluation team acknowledges that WALHI has identified and works within a particular niche. Any effort of WALHI to reconsider its current paradigm and political framework would have far-reaching implications on its campaign and advocacy strategies and methodologies.

4.2.12 National and International Networks

As a large network, WALHI has solid ground to work on its own in its advocacy and campaigns, but its strength goes beyond this in terms of networking. Despite its wide constituency and reputation, WALHI has consciously linked arms and forged partnerships with other NGOs and networks in Indonesia on various concerns ranging from thematic alliances as mining, forestry, coastal/marine issues and land rights, to broad collaborations as globalization and agrarian reform. These networks and alliances provide wider constituency base and support for WALHI's campaigns as well as ensure acceptability and credibility of WALHI within the civil society movement in Indonesia.

At the international level, WALHI's participation in the Friends of the Earth (FoE) network provides a potentially strong support mechanism for its work within Indonesia and bringing its campaigns and issues to international attention. FoE supports WALHI's media efforts abroad, facilitates access to relevant international organizations and institutions, links with relevant networks, and provides necessary information and analysis when needed. However, WALHI's decisiveness and leadership in terms of influencing the FOEI and other NGO networks abroad must be strengthened as its international partners are not infrequently confused by WALHI's unclear positions (biofuels, FSC, RSPO). In some cases, such as in palm oil, WALHI's half-hearted decision to fully transfer an issue to another NGO resulted in half-hearted commitment to the issue and unclear positions that frustrates its international network partners. Apart from its

FoE family, WALHI also joins regional and international alliances on thematic concerns and tactical engagements, such as regional networks of NGOs on coastal and marine issues.

In recent years, with the mandate from PNLH to work on Food and Water issues, EKNAS has forged alliances with non-traditional partners such as FSPI-Via Campesina on non-traditional concerns such as land rights and food sovereignty.

As a campaigning organization that faces with local problems with international dimensions and drivers, WALHI's could make more and better use its regional and global linkages, by stepping out of Indonesia to track, trace and influence major global decision makers, especially non-traditional international targets (World Bank, IMF, ADB) such as commercial banks, investment agencies and importers of commodities.

Such international work is necessary because in the increasingly globalised Indonesian economy, a great number of decisions on what happens on the ground in Indonesia are ultimately made, or influenced, by actors outside Indonesia. International outreach is especially valuable when a particular case or sector is 'stuck' in Indonesia, with no sight on progress. WALHI has many international partners who are willing to work on such cases, and working with foreign partners often also strengthens the justification of donor funding being allocated to WALHI in Indonesia.

The TMF Nature and Poverty Programme (forests, oil palm, shrimps) aimed to promote greater interaction internationally (as well as within NGO types). Although the interaction within the TMF Southeast Asia – Pacific Sub-Programme has by and large been limited to exchange of information, views and positions, Walhi has been a relatively passive player in this Programme.

A continuous challenge for WALHI – when working internationally - is that the usual response to a call for an import moratorium or boycott (which would be an extension of WALHI's domestic core message) are generally answered by alternative proposals for "win-win" options (certification under FSC, RSPO, responsible aquaculture etc.). These are options that WALHI feels uncomfortable with (often for good reason) but that can often also not be categorically dismissed (also for credible reasons). International pressure will, like in Indonesia itself, result in a demand for practical solutions to WALHI's no-compromise positions. But it is worth noting that, more than in Indonesia, international parties tend to seek win-win solutions and these may contribute to both pressure on the Indonesian opponents as well as deliver stronger bargaining positions for affected communities.

Another point of concern is that WALHI's positions are often not well communicated or streamlined with its international partners many of which leave behind WALHI in an exploration of other, often more pragmatic, strategies. Examples include Friends of the Earth's involvement in FSC promotion, and oil

palm: practically all major donors in the Netherlands now explore RSPO, with WALHI's major donor being a member of the RSPO Executive Board. Yet, WALHI's position on RSPO is either ambiguous or detrimentally opposed to RSPO and, by and large, it does not have a position because WALHI does not have a structured oil palm campaign (because it entrusted this issue to Sawit Watch).

4.3 Analysis of Opportunities and Threats

4.3.1 Changing Political Situation in Indonesia

Decentralization of governance in Indonesia presents both opportunities and threats to WALHI's current work and future direction.

The localization and strengthening of local governance provides opportunities for WALHI and its Members to establish potential working relations with progressive and responsive local government units and officials – although this will depend on the WALHI's overall paradigm and framework in engaging with government (which is, also, ambiguous).

Cases of conflicts of interest and decisions between national and local governments may provide opportunities for WALHI to advance its campaign and to raise strategic issues in environmental governance. This was demonstrated in the Newmont case described in earlier sections, as well as the experience of WALHI-Bengkulu in the sand mining case involving PT. Pelindo, a government-owned/controlled corporation operating key ports across the country.

In the case of PT Pelindo in Bengkulu, the public company's sand mining activities were stopped by the provincial government of Bengkulu after pressure from the affected community with support from WALHI.

Meanwhile, also in Bengkulu, WALHI is considered an ally of the BKSDA, the local monitoring arm of the national agency on protected areas and nature conservation. BKSDA counts on WALHI's information, support and monitoring network in its work against illegal loggers in national parks as well as in challenging the decisions of the local government that favor the economic benefits of a few political and economic interests. Interestingly, in the same province, WALHI ended up as both ally and adversary of the local government against the national government, and vice-versa, in two different cases.

From discussions with the ED in Bengkulu, the situation was not a result of strategic planning or design but as a consequence of the EDs reactions to specific environmental cases involving local communities.

4.3.2 Emergence of Thematic Focused Networks

WALHI prides itself as a key mover behind existing thematic advocacy networks in Indonesia such as JATAM (Mining Advocacy Network), Sawit Watch, Koalisi Anti-Utang (KAU), KpSHK (Community Forestry Network), among others. Some of these networks started out by holding a small office at the national office of WALHI in Jakarta, but has since moved independently after they have established their own credence and developed their own programs. As the networks become stronger, they have naturally become more independent in their work. Notably, their links with WALHI become weaker as these organizations become stronger, as the case was with JATAM and Sawit Watch.

The presence and current strength of these networks largely present an opportunity for WALHI to leave the issues that are already covered by the network and move on to other levels of engagement that are not yet covered. However, rather than doing this, WALHI has repeatedly chosen to continue working on the issues that are already well covered by the networks that it helped establish, such as mining and oil palm. As a result, there is a risk of duplication on what WALHI and the networks are doing.

An interesting question that was not fully explored during the evaluation is why WALHI felt it needed to continue working on issues that are already covered by the NGOs that it helped to found, especially in view of the fact that it applied for and received funding on oil palm work in 2003 (whilst WALHI helped co-found Sawit Watch in 1998), but failed to effectively spend the donor funds (which were even returned to the donor, NC-IUCN). Is it because WALHI feels that the organization it founded drifts away too far from the WALHI agenda? Is it merely because funding is available? Or is it because WALHI must remain active on all relevant environmental issues?

4.3.3 Presence of Other Networks with Stronger Public Appeal

The presence of bigger and more internationally-known environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in Indonesia could present a threat for WALHI in terms of competition for media attention, ability to influence government decisions, and get public support.

More than WWF, which is known to be more conservative in its political approach, Greenpeace, in particular, shares WALHI's reputation as an activist environmental organization but is much more sophisticated in its campaign strategies and methodologies and internationally much better organized. While Greenpeace's international reputation, label and image as an activist environmental group has recently been established in Indonesia, its attractive approach in bringing environmental issues to media attention has been well appreciated and captured the imagination of Indonesian public, especially in the urban areas. For example, WALHI's traditional activist approach in filing a legal case against Lapindo for the mudflow tragedy in East Java pales in comparison with the grand publicity earned by Greenpeace's stunt to dump mud from the site

into the Jakarta office of Lapindo. This does not, however, say anything about which strategy is more beneficial to the affected communities.

More than the media attention, the greatest threat posed by Greenpeace on WALHI is the competition for public support especially in urban areas. Greenpeace's work targeting the urban citizens, particularly the students and young urban professionals, has already gained some headway in Indonesia through its active education and fund-raising campaigns in public areas. WALHI has chosen the same path as its key strategy in raising funds from public donations, and is thus directly competing with Greenpeace. However, the international experience is that such competition is not about dividing a limited market share, but about being attractive (often to the same target group who often are members of the both organizations at the same time).

On the other hand, the presence of such groups as Greenpeace may also present an opportunity to strengthen WALHI's campaigns and programs. While both work on similar, if not the same issues, WALHI works mainly with communities and the rural areas directly affected by environmental injustices, while Greenpeace targets urban areas, student and professionals. Campaigning on the same issues with different target audience and constituencies would mean covering wider grounds, stronger public impact and better chance in influencing policies and decisions.

While collaboration is definitely an option, Greenpeace will surely choose its own paths with, or without WALHI. On the part of WALHI, which we would describe as a much more inclusive organization, consistency will be virtuous. It was noted, for example, that WALHI EKNAS has stopped WALHI Bali from working with Greenpeace, while WALHI Jatim and Greenpeace already have a fruitful collaboration.

4.3.4 Efforts to get Public Support

WALHI envisions to transform itself into a public organization in the future, where the public in Indonesia and beyond would have a stake in the organization, would support its activities, and would identify with WALHI's positions on issues. Understandably, since the vision of being a public organization was borne out of a general mandate from the 2005 PNLH, it remains vague what kind of a public organization does WALHI want to transform itself into. While WALHI has yet to clearly define this vision and direction more clearly, it has begun to put in place mechanisms that would lead the organization towards being a public organization. These current mechanisms are analyzed in this section, with corresponding recommendations on how they can be strengthened.

Media
WALHI has traditionally relied on the media as the principal platform for its campaigns and advocacy work. Through the years, WALHI has gained a

reputation as an effective media campaigner, having established good contacts in the local and national media as well as having mastered the skills of using the media to advance its campaigns in promoting the environmental rights of communities in Indonesia. WALHI has effectively used the media in projecting cases of violations by corporations of community environmental rights, such as the Newmont case in North Sulawesi and the Lapindo case in East Java. Through active media campaign and mainly highlighting the conflict between corporate interests and community rights, WALHI was able to bring those cases to public attention and put pressure on the government to address the problems, albeit not always favorably.

At varying degrees, national and local media practitioners are very familiar about WALHI as a constituency-based NGO and as a source of information on developments, trends and issues in the environment. In general, WALHI is regarded as an NGO "authority" on the environment in Indonesia, as one editor of a national daily puts it. That position, however, is being threatened by the presence of strong environmental NGOs that have equally adopted media advocacy as a strategy, such as Greenpeace which resort to more daring and controversial approaches in attracting media and public attention.

At the regional level, WALHI's relationship is more sublime when compared with its links at the national level. A key reason for this is the fact that local media seems to be more vulnerable to political influences and economic interests than their bigger national counterparts who are more exposed to public scrutiny. While the WALHI Regional Offices in Bengkulu, West Java and North Sulawesi maintain good relationships with key journalists and media outfits that have created their own niches in environmental reporting, they have not gone "mainstream" since the largest media outfits either do not consider environmental issues as a priority or they are largely controlled by local political interests.

WALHI-Jabar attempts to go around this obstacle by engaging the local journalists' forum which is very active in providing platforms for different actors to convey their messages to the media, as well as by utilizing non-traditional forms of engagement with the media such as Open Nights in local bars focusing on specific themes. In provinces where organized journalists' forum are not present, such as in Bengkulu and North Sulawesi, WALHI Regional Offices depend on key contacts in the local media as channels for their campaigns and advocacy work.

The contacts of EKNAS in national media are also useful in providing media channels for the EDs in projecting cases of environmental injustices such as in the PT Pelindo sand mining case in Sepang, Bengkulu. WALHI's assistance in projecting the case in national media was highly appreciated by the community. EKNAS also played a very active role in projecting the Newmont case in national media, in coordination with the Local Members, especially during the time when the ED was inactive due to organizational dynamics.

In some cases, the EDs depend on the local partners of national media outfits to pick up local issues that may have national significance, such as the case of the waste-energy incineration plant in Bandung where WALHI-Jabar did not have to tap the assistance of EKNAS in projecting the issue at the national level.

While the media practitioners interviewed generally acknowledged WALHI's role as NGO source of information on environmental issues and as a channel in bringing community issues to public attention, all noted that WALHI needs to strengthen its media work to cope with the changing times. The editor of a national daily and the president of the journalists' forum in Bandung shared that WALHI needs to strengthen its capacity to generate technically-solid information on the environmental issues that it is working in order to obtain support from the public and influence the decisions of government on the issues.

All journalists interviewed noted that WALHI, especially the EDs, need to improve its capacity to write press releases and provide regular information and updates to the local media. The journalists interviewed in Bengkulu and Manado stressed the importance of investing on media work at the local level in order to make the EDs more effective in utilizing the media as a channel to bring environmental issues to public attention and generate public support to its campaigns.

The journalists interviewed for the Evaluation noted that WALHI's reputation to the public is an activist environmental NGO working to defend community rights against corporate interests. While they acknowledged that WALHI is the most consistent and most visible among Indonesian environmental NGOs, this strength could pose a challenge in encouraging the public to support WALHI's activities by donating money. One journalist said that while the public may support WALHI's advocacy work politically, it is a different game to ask them to donate money for WALHI largely because it is more known as a political organization

In order to utilize the media as vehicle to make it acceptable to the public and encourage the public to support its activities, WALHI would need to define clearly what kind of public organization it really wants to transform itself into. A clearer vision of what does it mean by a "public organization" will provide the parameters in the formulation of campaign and advocacy messages that it wants to convey to the public in a manner that would encourage the general public to support WALHI's work politically and financially.

It is worth noting here WALHI's attempt to go beyond its traditional media work by engaging a major multinational advertising company in coming out with advertising posters on environmental issues. WALHI took advantage of the offer of McCann-Erickson in 2005 to collaborate on an advertising campaign on the environmental impacts of urban wastes, which yielded very good advertising images that even won some international and national awards in advertising. The

collaboration may not have been an ideal one since the advertising company already has already completed the formulation of campaign messages and concepts before they approached WALHI, but it was a good vehicle to project WALHI's messages on urban environmental issues to the general public without any costs on the part of the organization.

The Green Students Movement (GSM)

As part of its effort to generate public support, WALHI has created the Green Students Movement (GSM) as its platform to reach out to the youth and students' sectors. A key strategy creating and sustaining the GSM is through outreach in high schools and universities through forums on environmental issues and mobilizing students on how they can take practical actions in addressing concrete environmental problems, such as pollution, wastes and flooding.

WALHI has launched the initiative of GSM in six provinces such as Lampung, Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Yogyakarta and Banjarmasin since 2006. This initiative aims to reach 5,000 students who have interest in handling local environmental issues such as urban waste management, eco-village network development, etc. WALHI has planned to expand this program to others provinces in the end of 2007. Eight provinces have showed their interests in adopting this approach.

Since the GSM is a new strategy of WALHI to generate public support, not all EDs have managed to translate it to the local level. Among the most active EDs with regards to organizing GSM are Jakarta and West Java, both considered as intellectual centers in Indonesia. Bengkulu and North Sulawesi have yet to organize GSM in their respective areas, although North Sulawesi is working closely with youth and students' organizations in Manado on local environmental concerns.

WALHI-Jabar has already mobilized 190 volunteers from 14 universities in West Java for the GSM, primarily as facilitators of student trainings on environmental issues in various high schools. This number is quite impressive, considering that the Regional Office's GSM organizing started only in December 2006. Communications among the volunteers are maintained through electronic list serve, with plans to create a regular bulletin soon. Jabar works closely with the National Office in putting together materials and references for the environmental trainings in various schools, which the GSM focal person in the ED translates into more popular materials appropriate for students.

In the case of WALHI-Jakarta, organizing of the GSM has yielded student volunteers who took part in the ED's disaster response efforts in the wake of the massive flooding that hit Jakarta in January 2007. The volunteers also active take part in the ED's campaign on urban waste and on the reclamation of Jakarta Bay which is strongly endorsed by the Governor of Jakarta but rejected by the

Minister of Environment. The ED has laid out plans in establishing "eco-villages" around Jakarta, comprised of communities engaged in environmental protection and conservation such as waste recycling and composting.

GSM has a very promising potential of generating wider public support for WALHI's campaigns and activities, especially as it taps the youth and student sector which represent the future corps of professionals and decision-makers in Indonesia. It is also a good platform to package WALHI's messages on key environmental issues into practical and less political terms, such as the focus on waste recycling and reuse as an effective solid waste management approach. This area requires a totally different set of competence on the part of WALHI EDs, many of whom have been honed to undertake media and political campaigns on environmental issues. This could be done by tapping competent volunteers and partners who have appropriate experiences in public mobilization and education, such as the case in WALHIJabar whose focal person on GSM has substantial experiences in running corporate marketing campaigns.

At present, GSM is largely adopted by WALHI in urban areas, such as in provinces with large university centers as Jakarta and West Java. The challenge for other EDs is how to transform WALHI's campaign messages into practical terms to mobilize the students and youth sector around environmental issues beyond political mobilization.

The role of the EDs in organizing the GSM is fundamental in ensuring the success of WALHI's efforts in reaching out to the public. As envisioned by the EKNAS, the Regional Offices are intended to serve as a "hub" for the GSM and the general public to discus environmental concerns and practical actions. Thus, there is a conscious effort on the part of the EKNAS and some Regional Executives to make their respective offices attractive and welcoming to the public. However, there are some Regional Offices that have yet to put this vision into action.

Friends of WALHI (Sahabat WALHI)

Friends of WALHI or "Sahabat WALHI" is a more general platform to generate public support for WALHI's campaigns and activities. Unlike the GSM which is targeted at the students sector, Sahabat WALHI's target is much less defined. At the level of EKNAS, it is even loosely defined as anybody who supports WALHI through donations or volunteer work. In WALHI-Jabar, on the other hand, GSM alumni could become Sahabat WALHI if they opt to be and pay the required membership fee. Bengkulu attempted to organize its own Friends of WALHI two years ago, but has since become inactive when the volunteer-staff in charge left to finish his studies.

Overall, organizing the Friends of WALHI, as well as the GSM, are left in the hands of the Regional Offices. The Public Support Division (PSD) at the EKNAS,

consists of two personnel, oversees activities that generate public donations to WALHI and works closely with WALHI-Jakarta in organizing public support campaigns and developing fund-raising materials. The activities of Friends of WALHI in Jakarta, which includes those people who have made financial donations or have done volunteer work of WALHI, are the responsibilities of the Regional Office. The PSD also supervises the publication and distribution of BUMI, the semi-annual bulletin of Friends of WALHI whose members contribute articles to the publication.

The efforts of EKNAS in mobilizing public donations to support WALHI's activities and increase the membership of Sahabat WALHI in the process, are quite commendable. Mobilizing local resources, particularly public donation, is a strategy identified by the 2005 PNLH to reduce WALHI's dependence on foreign funding and to generate public support to the organization's campaigns and activities.

The Direct Dialogue with the public, conducted in malls and other public places, is the key strategy employed by the PSD to generate public attention and seek donations. These public dialogues serve as venue to raise public awareness on environmental issues, gauge the level of public consciousness on the environment, and raise funds from the public through Donation Boxes. As of February 2007, WALHI has generated more than Rp 81,400,000 from these donation drives (See Annex E), still a very modest amount compared to the amount required by WALHI to sustain its activities but good enough start for its attempt to mobilize public donations. A portion of the public donations raised from previous periods, amounting to RP 40 million, have been earlier allocated for the construction of local shelters for the Buyat community affected by Newmont's mining activities.

The PSD is planning for a more aggressive public campaign using more attractive and innovative tools to encourage people to donate. Marketing tools such as key chains, colorful brochures, posters and education materials have been employed for this purpose. The division targets to raise public donations that would at least allow WALHI to recoup ("break even") its investments in public resource mobilization such as the production of information and marketing materials.

4.4 Analysis of Institutional Capacity and Support System

4.4.1 Decision-Making Mechanisms

PNLH
More thorough preparations for the PNLH as explained in an earlier section to make it a more meaningful and genuinely democratic process where decisions made are based on informed choices. Substantive preparations, particularly on the decision to be made on the mandate of EKNAS for the following period, is

very crucial in view of the competing items in the usual agenda of the PNLH whose highlight is often centered on the elections of the National Coordinator and the National Council.

As it is, the political items in the PNLH's agenda overshadow the discussions on substantive issues, resulting to very general discussions on the mandate of the EKNAS as discussed in earlier sections. As many participants in past PNLH have described it, the triennial PNLH is no different from the traditional political processes that the general public see during national elections, with candidates for key posts at WALHI campaigning for votes from the delegates. The best way to ensure informed discussion on substantive matters, shielded from the political excitement over the other items in the PNLH agenda, is to have thorough preparations long before the actual assembly.

National Council (Dewan Nasional, DN)
The members of WALHI's National Council or Board are elected by the PNLH in its triennial meeting. The Council meets quarterly to receive updates from the National Secretariat on the activities, campaigns as well as the financial standing of the programs. The body is also appraised by the EKNAS of the plans for the next quarter during their regular meetings. It also exercises oversight functions over the activities of the EKNAS. The members also hold substantive discussions on issues arising from the mandate given by the PNLH for the current three-year period.

Members of the National Council also take part in thematic working groups with representatives of the EKNAS and the Regional Executives on strategic issues that have bearing on WALHI's future. For example, some members of the National Council are part of the on-going Task Forces on Economic Wing, Political Wing and the Revision of the WALHI Statute.

Some Local Members interviewed during the Evaluation stated that the National Council is quite detached from the local realities of WALHI's members. A member in Bengkulu and two members in North Sulawesi noted that there is hardly any interface between the National Council and the Regional Councils, thus the decisions at the national level do not address the needs and realities on the ground. There were suggestions for closer interface between the councils at the national and regional levels, as well as more active role for the members of the National Council in connecting with the Local Members.

Program Evaluations
External program evaluations, such as this one, should be consistent with the cycle of the leadership changes at WALHI, to ensure that Recommendations resulting from the Evaluation will be followed through.

For example, if the General Assembly (PNLH) decides to extend the term of the EKNAS to 5 years from the current 3 years, Program Evaluations should be done

not later than the second year of the current term. At present, external program evaluations are held every four years, which does not correspond to the three-year leadership term at the EKNAS.

4.4.2 Thematic Campaign Structure

The organizational structure of the EKNAS is divided into two key complementary components: Campaigns and Support Units (see Annex F). The Deputy Director for Campaigns oversees the work of the campaign staff working on priority themes mandated by the PNLH, namely Forests, Mining and Energy, Coastal and Marine, Food and Water, and Disaster Management. The supporting units, comprised of Education, Capacity Building, Networking and Public Support, fall under the supervision of the Deputy Director for Community Organizing, Legal Services and Education. The Finance, Administrative and Knowledge Management units also fall under the supervision of the Deputy Director for Campaigns who took over the functions of the Deputy Director for Institutional Building who resigned in 2006. The National Coordinator, who is elected by the PNLH every 3 years, leads the day-to-day operations of the EKNAS.

Each of the thematic campaigns is comprised of a one-person team performing multiple tasks. The Campaign Manager coordinates all the campaigns and advocacy work of WALHI related to the specific theme assigned to him/her, including networking and alliance work, research and media relations, and working with the Regional Offices involved in the same theme. He/she works with the Support Units in specific tasks such as the Knowledge Management Division for media relations, the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Division (PME) for proposals and reports, and the Finance Division for budgetary and financial requirements of campaigns. Working relations with other Support Units though are quite weak. The Campaign Manager for Mining and Energy simultaneously heads the Knowledge Management Division.

Updates on the campaigns and activities are provided in the weekly staff meetings attended by the Managers of the Campaigns and the Support Units. Collaborations between campaigns and the support requirements of each are also laid down in the weekly meetings. Annual planning with the full participation of the staff of the EKNAS ensures coherence among the campaigns as well as the activities of the Support Units.

The multiple tasking nature of the responsibilities of the Campaign Managers result to their being "spread too thinly" in their respective thematic areas, even frustrations to some. One Campaign Manager shared his frustration about starting campaigns without knowing the strategic targets and without seeing them end. There are also expectations on the part of the Regional Executives for the Campaign Managers to be more visible in terms of providing guidance to the local campaigns and for them to be exposed to the local realities in order to make the national campaigns more grounded.

The one-person-team nature of the campaigns is also echoed in many Regional Offices, which is more understandable since the scope of work and geographic coverage is much more limited. West Java and North Sulawesi follows the same organizational structure in their respective campaigns, while Bengkulu only has one Campaigner to cover all the issues addressed by the Regional Office.

4.4.3 Institutional Support Units

Mandate and scope of some divisions
PME is a good addition in the organizational structure to ensure the quality and standards in program planning, monitoring and evaluation within the National Office as well as Regional Offices. It also extends assistance and provides guidance to the program staff and the Regional Executives in the preparation of proposals, budgeting and reporting. PME also ensures good relations between WALHI and its donors as well as international networks.

There seems to be a certain degree of confusion on the mandate and scope of some divisions. Interviews with the Managers of the Division on Education, Capacity Building and Networking, and the Division on Community Organizing and Alliance Building, in particular, revealed that there is no clear delineation on the scope of their responsibilities. Feedback from the Regional Offices do not help in providing clearer guidance in understanding their distinct roles. The tasks and responsibilities, as well as the relationship between these divisions may have to be clearly defined.

Another good addition in the institutional support structure of EKNAS is the Knowledge Management Division which covers the internal resource base, the WALHI website, publications as well as media relations. The Division is comprised of vibrant and dynamic young staff who have brought in appropriate academic and professional backgrounds into their work at WALHI. Each staff has distinct but complementary responsibilities, such as media work, library/database, publications, etc. The maintenance of the WALHI website as well as the internal database available through intranet have been outsourced to focus the energy of the staff to more substantive matters.

Administrative and Finance Support
From the interviews and observations during the Evaluation period, the National Office has competent administrative and finance support system. The personnel in the Finance Division have appropriate academic and professional background pertaining to their respective functions. The Finance Manager has worked with WALHI for a number of years and has very good grasp of the financial status and systems at the National Office.

A key challenge for the finance staff is the management of institutional finances among the 26 Regional Offices and the National Office. It is the Finance Division that allocates limited resources to the different units at the National Office and

the Regional Offices especially when funding from the donors have yet to be released. It is also the division that receives the financial reports from the Regional Offices, and ensures soundness and accuracy of those reports.

The Finance Division shared that WALHI has no institutional savings that can be used as bridge fund in times when funds from the donors are delayed, or to cover for important unbudgeted expenses. The organization has no tradition of charging institutional fees on funded programs that they implement, neither do they receive core funding from any of their long-time donors. As a result, the Finance Division always end up with a big headache in allocating the limited resources available at the end of the year coming from the unspent portion of the previous funds received, to meet the requests of the Regional Offices and the different units at the National Office.

One glaring gap at the EKNAS is the absence of a clear policy on Human Resources management. There is actually no staff that takes care of human resources development, except under the Institutional Building responsibility of one division. There is no human resource development plan that exists to guide the strategic interests of WALHI in developing the capacity of its staff as an indispensable element in reaching institutional goals.

The lack of human resource development program was made very evident in cases of new staff who has no professional background, as was the case of the Campaigner for Food and Water who joined WALHI less than a year ago. While the Campaigner has good technical/science background to prepare her for her work at WALHI, she was left mostly confused by the lack of clear guidance on her work beyond the occasional coaching that she received from senior Campaigners. Since the nature of Campaigns is largely political, she was virtually left on her own in getting to know the political landscape within the civil society movement and in the overall political milieu of the issues that she was tasked to handle. Despite her confusion and wish that WALHI should have a clearer human resource guidance for new staff, the Campaigner remains interested in her work largely due to her environmental involvement in university.

In some EDs, such as in West Java, for example, the EKNAS structure is being mimicked despite the lack of staff and existing capacities to match with the positions in the structure, resulting to one-person support units. The staff of six people in WALHI-West Java includes a Human Resource Manager who doubles as a Program Coordinator and an Information Manager who doubles as a Campaigner.

The organizational structure of other Regional Offices visited may not be as complex as the EKNAS, but largely demands multiple functions on most staff. The Finance Office of WALHI-North Sulawesi who is working as a volunteer just like the rest of the staff, for example, doubles as the Campaign Coordinator for Coastal and Marine issues. In West Java, virtually each and everyone of the 6 staff has dual-functions, doing programs/campaigns and heading a support unit.

That is on top of the multiple tasks involved in their respective programs and campaigns.

Some staff at the Regional Offices performing finance functions do not have the relevant background for the position. In Bali, for example, the Financial Officer did not fully understand the PWC recommendations yet (after training of no less than a week). Fortunately, there is a have a network of finance officers.

While it may not take rocket science for any personnel to manage the recording or bookkeeping of the amount of funds received by most Regional Offices, it would take an effective system of check-and-balance to ensure that a sound financial management, no matter how small the amount involved is. In most cases, the effectiveness of any financial check-and-balance system is dependent on the capacity of the personnel who handles finances. This can be gleaned from the case of North Sulawesi where the volunteer Campaigner on Coastal and Marine issues also functions as the Finance Manager. Since she handles the finances and makes financial decisions together with the Regional Coordinator, her decisions bear implications on the campaign that she is handling vis-à-vis other Campaigns.

The financial system put in place by WALHI-Bengkulu is worth acknowledging. On the initiative of the Regional Coordinator, the Regional Office tapped a friend who is a certified accountant to design a financial system for the office, complete with appropriate forms to track fund receipts, expenses and reimbursements. While the amount of funds received by Bengkulu is considerably small, the presence of a good financial system helps in increasing its readiness to manage bigger funds later and increasing its potential to gain the confidence of future donors.

The effort of the Finance Division of the EKNAS to train members of the Regional Councils on internal auditing in 2006/2007 is also commendable, to help ensure check-and-balance within the Regional Offices with the active involvement of the Regional Councils. The members of the Regional Councils in Bengkulu, West Java and North Sulawesi were eagerly applying the knowledge and skills that they gained from the training on the financial management systems of their respective Regional Executives. In the case of West Java, the training allowed the member of the Regional Council responsible for Finance to impose rigid standards that check and curb the irregular practices on financial management in the Regional Executive.

A major perennial problem at the Regional Offices is the lack of funds to support their campaigns and programs at the local level. Most Regional Offices are heavily dependent on the financial support from the National Office every year. A few, like West Java, have managed to raise funds from other sources by implementing programs within the province.

4.4.4 Institutional Innovations

WALHI Institute
WALHI has come to recognize that there is a need to tap the opportunities and potential coming from its alumni in government, media, and other sectors. For many environmental activists in Indonesia, becoming part of WALHI at some stage of their professional life is part of a "rite of passage".

As with Sahabat Walhi, the Green Student Movement, and Eco-village Initiative, the WALHI Institute is a promising institutional innovation for building new partnerships, bringing back institutional memory and introducing new knowledge into the WALHI network.

The initiative of WALHI INSTITUTE will focus on how knowledge's activists can support and effectively scale up the environmental movement in Indonesia. The idea is to mobilize 100 experts as a think tank group to regularly provide valid analysis on current issues and will enrich the WALHI's advocacy work.

Political Wing
There has been serious debate on the whether or not WALHI is ready to have its political wing to more systematically propel its political agenda. Not surprisingly, this new development that followed from the Mataram mandate is least developed up to date. If not handled carefully by the WALHI leadership, this debate could potentially cause serious rifts within the network.

The mandate to develop a political wing has been responded by WALHI with establishing a working group namely BP3OPK (Badan Pekerja Persiapan Organisasi Politik Kerakyatan or Working Group for Preparation of People's Political Organization Development). This working group has carry out serial workhops at provincial and national level to introduce a green political agendan beyond WALHI. Finally, BP3OPK has conducted National Congress to establish a new mass organization, Sarikat Hijau (Green Union) in August 2007.

Economic Wing
The establishment of an economic wing of WALHI was intended to reduce WALHI's financial dependence on donor funding. However, with the exception of a notable few Regional Offices, the current efforts in establishing WALHI's economic wing are largely superficial and are not designed to generate serious income for the organization even at the local level. Economic initiatives at present are limited to the operation of restaurants and small shops that sell activist publications, t-shirts and souvenir items. WALHI lacks the experience and expertise to venture seriously into potentially profitable (or loss generating) economic activities. Building this requires a business spirit, serious attention and investments. Some Regional Offices, such as West and East Java, have innovated into partnership with a private individual in operating a small café/eatery in Bandung which is yet to become profitable to be judged as a viable model.

At the local level, there is also some confusion in the development of economic activities for WALHI and economic activities for the local community.

While small-scale, WALHI's efforts to explore economic activity are to be appreciated as a creative effort that also can deliver a great deal of lessons about – if one can appreciate the expression – the "real" world.

At the national level, there is Working Group comprised of some members of the National Council and the EKNAS that is looking into potential economic projects. Among the most feasible candidate project being considered is the establishment of a Travel Agency that could take advantage of the numerous domestic and international travels of WALHI's staff and partners, as well as provide services such as eco-tourism. Debates on this business option due to its implications on WALHI's advocacy on global warming and oil exploration which is at the core of the critique on the environmental impacts of the airline industry.

4.5 Analysis of WALHI's Regional and Local Bases

4.5.1 Bio-Regional Approach

The Bio-Regional Approach is currently not useful because it does not conform nor complement the current organizations structure at EKNAS and the Regional Offices. At present, the relationship of the bio-regional approach on on-going campaigns and programs of the Regional Offices is very vague. The status of implementation of the bio-regional approach highly varies across the regions. While some bio-regions such as Java have already defined their focus and is already implementing its "Java Collapse" project, others are still debating on the definition of what should constitute their bio-regions such as in the case of West Sumatra.

There is definitely value added for this approach, however, such as an area based model for intra/inter cooperation on local issues. An example from Save our Borneo (SoB) shows that in a situation where West Kalimantan was unable to get data on a particular issue, Central Kalimantan joined efforts and succeeded in getting the required data.

On the other hand, SoB is unclear about what its relation to Walhi is, although EKNAS claims that SoB is its bio-regional network. Indeed, SoB received funding to set up the mini network, but that is also where it stopped.

4.5.2 Relationship of the National and Regional Executives

MOU

A mechanism of setting up Memorandum of Understandings between EKNAS and ED offices was introduced in 2005 when Chalid Muhammad assumed as the National Coordinator. The MOU is intended as a tool for EKNAS to make sure that the ED Offices comply with the agreed activities and projects during the year.

The MOU Serves as a "quality control" mechanism for the National Office and provides a systematic order in ensuring fair allocation of resources among the Regional Offices. However, its value is not well-communicated even within EKNAS and among the EDs. Some staffs at the national and regional levels, for example, regard the MOU as a "political tool". In addition, the MOU does not generally allow for flexibility in accommodating local needs/activities.

Financial Dependence of the Regional Offices
WALHI touts the Regional Offices as autonomous and independent from the EKNAS. The reality, however, challenges this claim. Most of the Regional Offices are heavily dependent on the financial support from the National Office to run their campaigns, implement their programs and even maintain their physical presence in the provinces. In seeking funding some Regional Offices compete wtih EKNAS for funds from the same donors.

The Regional Offices, such as North Sulawesi and Bengkulu, that are heavily dependent on the financial support of the National Office have to resort to drastic resource conservation measures to make do with their very limited funding. Bengkulu barely gives regular salary to its staff who often receive only transportation allowances that enable them to come to the office everyday. North Sulawesi relies on an all-volunteer-staff and even adopts ridiculous measures such as locking the office telephone in a wooden box to make sure that no one uses it for out-going calls and ensure that the office will only pay for the basic charges for incoming calls. The volunteer-staff has to use their own money to pay for official calls to local partners and communities that they are working with. To Regional Offices that only receive Rp15 million annually for their overhead costs, such measures are necessary for the office's survival.

While Regional Offices are allowed to raise funds from other sources, largely by submitting proposals to donors, very few manage to attain that kind of independence. Various staff of Regional Offices raise the concern that they have very limited capacity to write and package proposals, even with the assistance and guidance provided by the PME at the National Office. The Regional Coordinator of Bengkulu expressed his frustrations over wasted time and energy in preparing proposals that were repeatedly rejected by donors. He felt that the EKNAS needs to exert more active efforts in pressuring donors to accept the proposals of the Regional Offices.

More important than the issue of capacity to prepare good proposals, a number of staff at the regional level noted that the Regional Offices end up competing

with the National Office for funding opportunities made available by donors, especially in view of decreasing funds intended for Indonesia.

In the final analysis, the Regional Offices are largely dependent on the National Office in their operations, both financially and substantially.

Legal Personality of the Regional Offices
A key issue on the MOU is the lack of legal personality of the Regional Offices, most of whom do not have their own legal personality under Indonesian law. Without legal personality, the MOUs are essentially signed by the National Coordinator with the Regional Coordinators who are individuals acting on behalf of the team that implements WALHI's program.

The lack of legal personality also limits the potentials of the Regional Offices to submit proposal to funding donors. This is remedied by the extension of WALHI's legal personality as the legal project holder to those Regional Offices that submit proposals for funding. While this may be generally acceptable to some donors, this may pose legal and institutional complications in cases when the Regional Offices renege in the delivery of commitments under the project. In such cases, it is the National Office of WALHI that bears the responsibility and legal repercussions.

Paradoxically, since most Regional Offices have no legal personality of their own, they are essentially staff of WALHI which has a clear legal standing under Indonesian laws. However, this fact is not clearly acknowledged in the operations of WALHI as can be gleaned from the fact that the Regional Executives are not covered by the same compensation package and basic privileges enjoyed by the EKNAS.

Relationship of the Regional Executives and Local Members
Some RO campaigners do not work with members (there is no SOP on dealing with members). In some cases, some members want WALHI to set up sub-regional offices, such as in Malang, East Java, so that they have someone closer by to work with.

5   Towards Future Campaigning:
Recommended Options for Moving Forward

This chapter presents the Evaluation Teams recommendations, some of which are presented as options for further discussion.

5.1 WALHI as a Campaign and Advocacy Organization

5.1.2 Campaign Focus

There is a dichotomy between WALHI needing to be more focused and strategic in its campaigns and programs, and the desire and self- as well as externally-imposed expectation to be at the forefront of all environmental problems and issues. The Evaluation Team's recommendations are presented as options from which WALHI needs to choose from and commit to follow through.

Recommendations:
Option 1: Choose Specific Campaign Themes
WALHI could choose fewer campaign themes. These campaign themes need to be strategic, well-focused, and supported throughout the organization as mandated by the PNLH.

The implications of this option is that WALHI then has to commit to seeing each campaign theme through, from seeking data to support the campaign (either done by WALHI itself, which has further implications of increasing the research capacity of WALHI or by working in collaboration with qualified organizations or by encouraging WALHI Institute to take on this research role) to doing whatever it takes for the campaign to reach its goal.

Option 2: Keep Campaign Focus Broad and Grassroots-driven
The other option is to acknowledge that WALHI chooses to be at that forefront of all problems and issues. As a grassroots-based organization, each and every case that is brought to WALHI's attention is taken into consideration as a campaign issue because each and every case involves people, different people with immediate needs.
The implications of this option are that WALHI:
1. has to be prepared that it may not achieve a lot of tangible successes;
2. be prepared not to to follow up all the way in each and every case;
3. does not enter the arena of solution seeking; and furthermore
4. it should not expect to be understood or be taken seriously by everyone; and lastly
5. will have less access to funds.

If this option is chosen, WALHI also has to ensure that its team is well trained and prepared to be maximally responsive, carry out emergency responses and then quickly guide cases to other organizations (often those it helped create), and then let go. This may prove to be a challenge to WALHI, but it is one that it has to learn to tackle.

WALHI also has to accept its limitations, and make best use of its network. Cases may not be resolved in the way it envisioned them to be. But once WALHI hands over a case, although it may continue to monitor and guide its handling it still has to entrust others to carry it through.

This is an important niche for WALHI, but it is also just a niche. So once WALHI has chosen this niche, it needs to focus on getting better at what it does, and that is a major area of improvement for WALHI.

Regardless of which option WALHI chooses to follow through, it should continue deriving its key mandate from the PNLH which is regarded as a democratic platform for local members to directly participate in decision-making in the network. However, in order for genuine democracy to truly operate in the PNLH, mechanisms need to be adopted to ensure that decision-making in the general assembly is based on solid information and would provide strategic guidance for the organization.

Some of the mechanisms recommended by the Evaluation are as follows:
1. Preparation for the PNLH should not just start in the lead up to the assembly itself, but should begin at least one (1) year before the actual schedule. Preparations may include the following:
   (a) Drafting by the EKNAS of Status Report on each program and campaign, and circulation among the Regional Executives and Local Members;
   (b) Drafting by the EKNAS of Working or Issue Papers to present a comprehensive background on key environmental issues in Indonesia including the international context. The Working/Issue Papers should include a mapping of the key actors at work in every issue/theme, and must provide key points/questions that the PNLH needs to discuss and decide on;
   (c) Circulation of the Working/Issue Papers to all the Regional Executives and Local Members for comments (written or oral conveyed to the EKNAS) within a reasonable period of time; and
   (d) Consolidation of all Comments and Inputs from the Regional Executives and Local Members on the Working/Issue Papers, to be presented at the PNLH as initial starting point of discussions on the Mandate on programs.
2. The PNLH discussions of the Mandate on the campaign and program themes must be guided by the Key Questions outlined in the Working/Issue Papers, taking off from the Consolidated Comments and Inputs gathered earlier by the EKNAS from the regional and local constituency.

3. The decisions of the PNLH on the Mandate regarding program and campaign focus must provide clear guidance on the key issues under general themes that the EKNAS should work in for the next period, as well as clearly present the strategic direction of those programs and campaigns.
4. The PNLH may consider extending the period of coverage of programs from the current 3 years to 5 years, in order to make it more reasonable.

5.1.3 Campaign and Advocacy Strategies

Recommendations:
1. EKNAS needs to conduct a thorough mapping of actors and stakeholders in key issues that they choose to engage in within the broad thematic mandate given by the PNLH. Solid stakeholder analysis can provide guidance to the Campaigners at the national and local levels on the conflicting and complementary interests of the different actors, as well as the implications of WALHI's political and technical positions on issues.
2. The current strategies and methodologies used by WALHI in its campaign may have to be reviewed in view of its vision to transform itself into a public organization in the future.
3. A real tension exists between WALHI's desire to become a "public organization" and its non-compromising positions that at present represent a political and public minority. The Evaluation team is convinced that within its current positioning WALHI could generate significantly increase public support for its cause through more professional marketing. But for the coming decade or beyond, its positioning simply does not provide a basis for it to become an ORMAS (mass organization).
4. Taking present trends into the future, WALHI should expect its rural constituency to decline due to de facto modernization in remote areas and the relative growth of urban centers. The Evaluation team forecasts that WALHI will in the future increasingly deal with environmental problems faced by urban communities. Judging by the way people in Java's mega-cities live with environmental havoc with apparent ease or ignorance, a focus on urban issues is also unlikely to win WALHI an ORMAS status on the short and medium term.
5. The concept "WALHI goes public" represents a change of course that the organization should vigilantly continue to explore, in the service of transparency, public support, public donations and the opportunity to learn about the "real world".
6. Instead of overhauling the essence of the organization by wanting to become an ORMAS itself, WALHI could benefit from expanding on and making optimal use of (opportunistic) partnerships with mass organizations (mostly religiously oriented groups).
7. EKNAS may consider creating a Technical/Scientific Advisory Committee outside of the WALHI organizational structure, to provide experts' advice and opinion on the scientific and technical aspects of cases and issues that

WALHI decide to tackle. The Advisory Committee should have a good balance of expertise from various disciplines, including social sciences, economics, political science and development studies. The body may be organized into specific Working Groups tackling specific issues, such as mudflow, small-scale mining, commercial fishing, etc. In recognition of the political implications and concerns of academics and experts being associated with an activist group like WALHI, the members of the Advisory Committee may be kept confidentially within WALHI as may be requested by the individuals concerned.

8. Alternatively, the WALHI Institute can take on this role (mentioned in point 7 above) with relative ease, without having to create a separate entity. In addition to focusing on conducting solid and relevant research, it should also be able to advise WALHI on how to communicate key information and market a difficult message more effectively, more clearly, and more cleverly.

5.1.4 Sustainability of Campaigns and Advocacy

Recommendations:
1. See recommendations made on the need for PNLH decisions need to provide clearer guidance on key issues to work in and positions to take, as well as on Campaign Strategies and Methodologies.
2. WALHI needs to chose if it wants to be a forerunner, i.e. the organization that cracks new issues and makes them come alive, after which it hands the issue to a specialized other group. This option implies more coverage and public recognition for being observant and responsive, creating more space for WALHI to be radical, but also implies access to fewer funds.
3. Alternatively, does WALHI want to be more selective and focused in its campaign strategies and programs, choosing fewer issues but also committing to take those issues "all the way." The implications of this option are opposite to what is stated above, and also demands that WALHI have access to solid and relevant data to support the issues it focuses on - either through conducting the research itself or by collaborating with other organizations (e.g., having the WALHI Institute take on this role).

It is important to note that whichever option WALHI chooses, it is highly likely that the other option will always be tempting to take on as well.

5.1.5 Technical Capacity and Competence

Recommendation
The Evaluation Team recommends that WALHI appoints a responsible person at the management level to shape a more explicit human resources policy for EKNAS and the ED offices.

5.1.6 Institutional structure and campaigns (WALHI EKNAS)
Recommendations:

1. There is an evident need for WALHI to reconsider the current organizational structure of the Campaigns which are essentially operating in one-person-team basis. WALHI may consider re-organizing the Campaigns based on the following options:

   (a) Organize Campaigns into functional Teams headed by a Campaign Manager at the EKNAS and comprised of representatives from relevant Regional Offices with interest and experience on the specific campaign themes/issues mandated by the PNLH.

   (b) Expand the number of campaign staff to form a team of at least three within each theme/program, with back up from Supporting Divisions that cannot be split over the campaign teams (e.g. legal support). The Team shall be headed by the Campaign Manager, working collectively with the other members who shall be assigned specific thematic or functional tasks.

2. The Campaign Teams (either based on Option (a) or (b) described above) can then work closely with the proposed Technical and Scientific Advisory Committee (see Recommendation in earlier section) or with a Working Group dealing with specific strategic issue related to their respective thematic scope, or the WALHI Institute (if it is chosen to be the research arm of WALHI). It is the task of the Campaign Teams to define the strategic issues and questions that will be tackled by the Working Group.

5.1.7 Information and Knowledge Resource Base and Capacity

Recommendations:
1. WALHI needs to improve its research capacity. The current practice of outsourcing can help to lessen the burden of Campaigners and staff at the EKNAS but outsourcing can be costly and engagement of Regional Offices in research should have priority when local research is to be conducted. Research capacity at this level, however, needs strengthening. See earlier recommendations on this issue.
2. If WALHI will seriously pursue its vision to transform itself into a public organization, it needs to improve its communication abilities. The media outreach staff within the Knowledge Management Division are aware of this and have begun efforts to clean up and improve external communication.
3. Each research assignment needs to be based on clear Terms of Reference.
4. Strengthening of WALHI's research capacity should be closely linked with the earlier recommendation to establish a Technical/Scientific Advisory Committee (with specific Working Groups tackling strategic issues and questions) that will work closely with the Campaign Teams.
5. Another option is to encourage the WALHI Institute to take on the role of conducting research to support the campaign and advocacy efforts of WALHI.
6. Research, management of (internal) information (such as the library, intranet) and outreach to the media do not necessarily form a logical single unit

(division). Research capacity would better be linked directly to campaigns for a lot of issues require intimate knowledge of a sector.

7. If WALHI is to strengthen its support base among the general public, it needs to give a stronger mandate to the staff responsible for media outreach. Within limits and assuming professional judgment of the media staff, it would be good if campaigners feel that they lose some control over their issue and the way WALHI communicates about it.

8. Some short-term recommendations for the Knowledge Management Division:
    (a) Expand the reach of regular information/updates especially to contacts in the media, government and other civil society organizations at the regional and local levels.
    (b) Improve and update the English page of the WALHI website, in track with the Bahasa Indonesia version, but provided that the information has relevance to an international audience.

5.1.8 Funding Base

Recommendations:
1. WALHI should have a policy to charge institutional savings in the form of management or institutional fees on programs funded by foreign donors. The EKNAS may come up with proposals on the rate of management/ institutional fees to be charged on funded programs, based on a survey of the current practice among other NGOs in Indonesia and other countries. Alternatively, a donor may be interested in granting a basic reserve, e.g. when end of year budgets are unspent and unallocated.

2. There should be a clear set of policies on how the proposed institutional savings based on the principle of transparency that must be strictly observed in managing the funds. The guidelines should cover the purpose of such funds, for what particular uses it can be tapped, etc. The institutional savings shall primarily cover the expenses for donor approved programs and activities at the national and regional levels, pending the release of funds from the donors.

3. Although still minimal in volume at present, WALHI should develop a policy for how it will allocate funds raised from the general public. It is good practice to save such funds for expenses that donors are unlikely to support.

5.1.9 Constituency Base

Recommendations:
1. As a constituency-based organization, WALHI should periodically keep track of the status and level of involvement of its members. The commitment of Local Members on WALHI and its activities should also be affirmed at the PNLH. EDs, in coordination with the EKNAS, need to update its Directory of Local Members, as well as the status and level of their involvement in environmental issues.

2. EKNAS may consider establishing a specific unit within its organizational structure that will be mainly responsible for Membership Affairs, monitoring the status and level of involvement of Local Members in WALHI's programs and activities, developing a Capacity Development Plan for Local Members, and ensuring the direct involvement of Local Members in decision-making and formulation of positions and messages on campaigns and programs. The responsibilities of the current Division for Capacity Building, Education and Networking and the Division for Community Organizing and Development do not clearly lay down which one has direct responsibility for the affairs concerning the Local Members.
3. There has apparently been a decline of members over the past four years. WALHI should look into why this is the case, and whether it is due to issues that WALHI needs to address. WALHI might consider developing a tool for monitoring the level of satisfaction among members toward WALHI as a network organization.

5.1.10 Relationship of the National and Regional Executives

Recommendations
1. The MOU should allow adequate flexibilities for the Regional Executives to tap the funds made available by EKNAS to support local campaigns and activities based on the annual plans and the urgency of local situations. The MOU should not serve as "straight jacket" that ties the Regional Executives to implement activities that are not relevant to the local situation and needs. Such flexibility, however, should be guided by the annual plans prepared by Regional Executives and submitted to EKNAS, or based on a written request to respond to an urgent local situation.
2. EKNAS, with a mandate from the PNLH, should set minimum standards for the administrative and financial operations of the Regional Offices, such as minimum allowances/salaries to be received by the regional staff. This is in view of the fact that the Regional Executives are in essence staff of WALHI since most Regional Offices have no legal personality. A basic standard of fairness and equity should apply among personnel at the national and regional levels. While this recommendation may indeed substantively increase the overhead expenses of WALHI, it the principle of justice behind it should serve as strong justification to convince donors on its merits.

5.1.11 Changing Political Situation in Indonesia

Recommendations:
1. WALHI should institutionalize the practice of doing an analysis of political and corporate actors and the dynamics among them, including opportunities and threats for WALHI and the potential implications of its actions and positions.

2. WALHI should lay down clearly its overall position on engagement with the government, both at the national and local levels, to guide its campaign strategies and positions. This can be a challenge, however, as in reality, WALHI can only count (often temporarily) on good individuals in the right position. It is virtually impossible for WALHI to count on the institutions.

5.1.12 Emergence of Thematic-based Networks

Recommendations:
1. Once again, WALHI needs to be clear on its chosen position and approach when it comes to campaigning on issues (see earlier recommendations on this point), i.e., does it want to be a forerunner on issues, which means tackling issues as they arise and then handing them over to specialized groups (such as Sawit Watch, JATAM, etc.), or
2. Focus on a selected few, strategic issues and then commit to taking those issues "all the way", not excluding the possibility of collaborating with the specialized groups working on those issues.

5.2 WALHI as a Public Organization

5.2.1.Media
Recommendations:
1. The National Office should update its Media Directory to include regional and local media contacts in its regular information updates on environmental issues. Two out three regional journalists interviewed do not receive the WALHI info updates.
2. Regional Executives should be trained in writing press releases, organizing press briefings and conferences, and media campaigning in general. Media practitioners may be tapped in these trainings to guide the staff on the current practices, dynamics and realities in the local/regional media.
3. WALHI should be bold enough to resort to non-traditional media campaigns to deliver its messages to the public, without sacrificing its political positions. Non-traditional collaboration with other media forms, such as advertising, should continue to be explored.

5.2.2 Green Students Movement

Recommendations:
1. Current efforts in organizing GSM should be sustained and supported, but with clearer strategic guidance on its direction and synergy with the other campaigns and activities of WALHI. The plan of WALHI-Jakarta to establish "eco-city initiative" from the activities of GSM and the practical models set by Sahabat WALHI is a good example for other Regional Offices.

2. The GSM is a good attempt to systematize WALHI's outreach to the youth sector, and should also be seen as a potential source for future human resources at the National and Regional Executives. The GSM could also potentially play a role as a pool for future human resources that could provide technical and scientific advice for WALHI on its campaigns and advocacy work, either through the WALHI Institute or a technical advisory body.

5.2.3 Friends of WALHI (Sahabat WALHI)

Recommendations:
1. WALHI should have clearer operational guidelines in utilizing the potentials of the Sahabat WALHI as the organization's link to the un-organized public in Indonesia. The complementation between the activities of the Sahabat WALHI with the campaigns of WALHI and its work with its Local Members should be clearer. At present, the synergy between these constituency bases is quite disjointed which is quite understandable at this stage in the development of the GSM.
2. EKNAS should consider increasing the number of personnel in the PSD from the current two staff. This is especially if WALHI puts more serious and aggressive efforts in raising funds from public donation. An alternative option would be to strategically tap Sahabat WALHI in augmenting the personnel requirement of PSD in putting together public education and marketing materials, engaging the public through Direct Dialogues, and other public engagements. This option would require more thorough guidance on the part of PSD in terms of the form and substance of involvement of non-personnel in these activities.
3. WALHI should request its institutional donors to increase their support to the organization's local resource mobilization activities, in view of the long-term benefits in terms of reduced dependence on donor support.

5.3 Institutional Capacity and Support System

5.3.1 Decision-Making Mechanisms

Recommendations:
1. Substantive preparations for the PNLH on the issues and mandate to be decided on. The dissemination of Issue/Working Papers should commence at least a few months prior to the date of the next general assembly, to allow adequate time for the Regional Offices and the Local Members to consider the issues and the political landscape. (See recommendations in previous sections for more detail.)
2. External program evaluations should correspond with the term of the National Coordinator to ensure that the results and recommendations will be useful for

the incoming leadership in terms of guidance in designing programs and campaigns.

3. The National Council may be transformed into a "working Board" with more active role in ensuring interface between the national campaigns and the regional/local needs. This may be done by providing a formal mechanism for interaction between the National Council and the Regional Councils, beyond the informal interactions initiated by members of the National Council coming from the regions.

5.3.2 Thematic Campaign Structure

Recommendations:
1. WALHI should consider increasing the staff of each Campaign Team to two to three staff, led by a Campaign Manager. Each staff in the team should have complementary functions that contribute in attaining the objectives of the campaign.
2. Another option that WALHI may consider is to retain the one-man-team nature of the Campaigns, BUT create a mechanism where Regional Offices working on similar campaign themes or issues will work together as part of one Campaign Team. The task of the Campaign Manager lodged at the EKNAS is to coordinate the campaign activities of the Regional Offices within the team, how they can synergize their activities towards a national campaign, supervise the delegation of responsibilities to each Regional Office in the team such as research, and ensure support from the National Office to the different activities of the team.
3. Still another option would be for WALHI to use the bio-regional approach as the basis for the work of the Campaign Managers/Teams at the national level. Instead of having thematic Campaign Managers, the EKNAS may appoint focal person/s to be responsible for a particular bio-region (i.e., Java, Sulawesi) who will cover the different thematic concerns of the Regional Offices within that bio-region. This scope may sound even broader than the current thematic Campaigns, but a more defined mandate from the PNLH can effectively provide focus on the substantive coverage of each Bio-Region Manager/Focal Person at the national level.

5.3.3 Institutional Support Units

Recommendations:
1. The standard operating procedures (SOP) needs to clarify the specific tasks of the Support Units and how they relate to each other, as well as the Campaigns.
2. WALHI needs to adopt a human resource development program/plan to systematically develop the capacity of its present and future staff. The HRD

program/plan should provide clear guidance and responsibilities in assisting new staff, especially those coming directly from university.

3. A standard financial system should be adopted and required from all Regional Offices. At present, each Regional Office adopts a different financial system, some of which does not necessarily confirm with standard check-and-balance principles required in financial management. The training on internal auditing attended by some members of Regional Councils is a good initiative towards harmonizing the standards in financial management. WALHI can make a follow up by presenting "best practices" in financial management from selected Regional Offices.

5.3.4 Institutional Innovations

Recommendations:
1. WALHI needs to establish clearer guidance on the value of the WALHI Institute in the future direction of WALHI. This is crucial for leveling off on understanding and appreciation of it among the EDs and members, while at the same time allowing space for experiments and innovations.
2. WALHI Institute has the potential to become the research wing of WALHI, this option should be explored as an alternative to setting up an external panel of researchers to strengthen WALHI's research capacity.
3. WALHI should assure it has access to someone with undisputed entrepreneurial skills and who is willing to review the investments involved and analyzing the feasibility of potential economic projects aimed at making the organization financial less dependent from donors. Services of professional consultants specializing in the conduct of business feasibility studies could be tapped (possibly against non-profit rates, e.g. in the framework of the consultancies' CSR obligations/commitments).
4. WALHI should take into serious account the implications of its business venture on its political positions and strategies, even if it decides to establish a separate entity for its economic wing.
5. For the next three years, it is recommended that WALHI minimizes risk, e.g. by not endorsing investments beyond a specified financial reserve. It needs to keep close check on the size of investment, the types of agreements made between entrepreneurs and WALHI ROs, as well as progress made by these initiatives. WALHI should probably create a reserve insure itself against business risk (i.e. initial profits are not used for activities but for creating a reserve with a bottom ceiling).
6. There should be no mingling of economic activity and political agendas (as may happen in East Java with WALHI Jatim).