

Mid-term Review of: The Environmental Cooperation Programme between Norway and South Africa 2005-2010

Mid-Term Review

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Tore Laugerud, Nordic Consulting Group (NCG), team leader; Matthew J. Smith, Strategy & Tactics, South Africa

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Mid-term Review of:

**The Environmental
Cooperation Programme
between
Norway and South Africa
2005-2010**

Final Report

5 June 2009

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PREFACE

The report in hand covers the Mid-term Review (“the Review”) of the:

Environmental Cooperation Programme between Norway and South Africa 2005-2010

hereafter also referred to as “the Programme”. The Mid-term Review (MTR) was undertaken in April-May 2009, by an Environmental Expert/Team Leader from Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) Norway, supported by a national consultant from South Africa (jointly referred to as the Review Team – or “the RT”).

Such a Mid-term Review (although coming towards the end of the Programme) is part of the normal project cycle in development projects supported by the Norwegian Government. The Environmental Cooperation Programme was reviewed based on desk study of written documents, interviews with the Norwegian partners in the Programme (14 - 21 April 2009) and interviews with the South African programme staff in Pretoria and in Durban during the period 23 April – 7 May 2009.

The report contains a brief introduction to the programme features and a systematic review of the most significant aspects of the Programme; together with the Review Team’s own assessment of the programme status and performance. The aim of the MTR was largely to see if the Programme was “on track” and to give recommendations for further implementation of the Programme, if required; and recommendations for continuation of the environmental cooperation efforts between the two countries. The elements reviewed, in addition to the appropriateness of the programme design (including the LFA elements) and the programme progress at large, were relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the Programme. Four of the projects under the three different programme themes were assessed in more detail.

The Draft Review Report was submitted 20 May 2009, and the final version was prepared based on constructive comments from the programme partners on both sides. All the comments to the Draft Report are shown in *Appendix 8*.

The Review Team comprised the following members:

- ◇ Tore Laugerud, Environmental Expert/Team Leader from Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) Norway
- ◇ Matthew J. Smith, Consultant from Strategy & Tactics in Cape Town, South Africa (supported mostly on the financial analysis)

The Review Team wants to thank all the involved programme partners for their open and kind contribution during the Review. In specific should be mentioned the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria and DEAT for having trust in the RT to undertake the Mid-Term Review of a relatively comprehensive and multi-faceted Programme.

A special thanks goes to the Programme Administrator of DEAT, Ms. Joey Kühn, who with never-failing positive attitude and prompt effectiveness was responsible for arranging the meetings and providing documents and required information during the RT’s work in South Africa.

5 June 2009

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The conclusions and recommendations in this report are clearly those of the Review Team, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Royal Norwegian Embassy, DEAT or any of the persons and institutions consulted, and are thus not in any way binding for the Programme.

LIST OF ACCRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AM	- Annual Meeting
AR	- Annual Report
ASAP	- As soon as possible
AQM	- Air Quality Management
AQMP	- Air Quality Management Plan
BP	- Business Plan
CB	- Capacity building
CREW	- Custodians of Rare and Endangered Wildflowers
DEAT	- Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
DN	- Directorate for Nature Management
DST	- Department of Science and Technology
EAP	- Environmental Assessment Practitioner
EC	- European Commission
ECP	- Environmental Cooperation Programme
EIA	- Environmental Impact Assessment
EIM	- Environmental Impact Management
EPA	- Environmental Protection Agency
EU	- European Union
EUR	- Euro
FY	- Financial Year (in South Africa 1.04-31.03)
GEF	- Global Environmental Facility
GenØK	- Centre for Biosafety located (in Tromsø, Norway)
GMO	- Genetically Modified Organism
HQ	- Headquarters
IC	- Institutional Cooperation
IDP	- Integrated Development Plan
IMERCSA	- Musokotwane Environment and Resource Centre for Southern Africa
IUCN	- The World Conservation Union (International Union for Conservation of Nature)
LFA	- Logical Framework Approach
LTMS	- Long Term Mitigation Scenarios
M&E	- Monitoring and Evaluation
MoE	- Ministry of Environment (in Norway)
MoU	- Memorandum of Understanding
MFA	- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MPP	- Multi-Point Plan
MTR	- Mid-term Review
NCG	- Nordic Consulting Group
NEPAD	- New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEMA	- National Environmental Management Act
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organisation
NILU	- Norwegian Institute for Air Research
NMBMM	- Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality
NOK	- Norwegian Kroner
Norad	- Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NYC	- National Youth Commission
PC	- Programme Coordinator
PD	- Programme Document
PM	- Project Manager
PMU	- Programme Management Unit
SOE	- State of Environment
PP	- Project Proposal
PSC	- Programme Steering Committee
RISDP	- Regional Indicative Strategy Development Plan
RNE	- Royal Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria, South Africa
RSA	- Republic of South Africa
RT	- Review Team
SAAQIS	- South African Air Quality Information System

SABCA	- Southern African Butterfly Conservation Assessment
SANBI	- South African National Biodiversity Institute
SANSA	- South African national Survey of Arachnida
SADC	- South African Development Community
SARDC	- South Africa research and Documentation Centre (in Harare)
SFT	- State Pollution Control Authority
SINTEF	- The Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research at the Norwegian Institute of Technology
TA	- Technical Assistance
TM	- Theme Manager
ToR	- Terms of Reference
TRAFFIC	- Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce
UNEP	- United Nations Environment Programme
USD	- US dollars
ZAR	- South African Rand
VG	- Vital Graphics
WS	- Workshop

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW MANDATE

- The cooperation between Norway and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) in the environmental sector has been ongoing since 1994, through 3 phases.
- Phase III formally started in December 2005 by the signing of the Framework Business Plan (FBP) between Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) in RSA and the Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE) in Pretoria.
- The Mid-term Review was undertaken when around 75% of the Programme period had elapsed. The purpose of the Review was to assess the progress of the Programme, including the institutional cooperation, and advise on possible programme adjustments.
- Notably, three milestones pre-Phase III had a bearing on the content of the phase: Phase II Mid-term Review (2003); a joint Planning Workshop (2004), and Pre-Appraisal of the FBP (early 2005).

2. THE PROGRAMME DESIGN

- The three phases have clearly had gradual and smooth transition periods, with (intentionally) projects continuing from one phase into the next.
- There is a logframe formulated for the Programme, distinguishing between three themes: Pollution & Waste; Environmental Governance; and Biodiversity & Conservation.
- Most projects have *not* formulated proper project design elements according to the prevalent LFA (Logical Framework Analysis) modality used by the Norwegian Government in development cooperation, with a few exceptions (notably where SFT has been involved).
- An attempt has been made to formulate monitoring indicators in most projects, but very few are quantifiable and thus not very useful for monitoring.
- Risks at programme level were identified and formulated, but possible time delays, which have prevailed in most projects, were not considered. The risk of staff turnover has materialised in the Programme, hampering the progress in some projects.
- The system of Theme Managers (TMs) in the Programme in RSA has continued from the previous programme phases, but is not seen to

be helpful to the Programme. It only creates additional administrative burden on the TMs, who have little interaction with management at the project level.

3. ASSESSMENT OF OVERALL PROGRAMME PROGRESS AND IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 Overall Activity Progress and Performance

- Theme 1 - Pollution & Waste: The project connected to Air Quality Management (AQM) and the cooperation with eThekweni Municipality (Durban) have performed satisfactorily, whereas the projects on waste management has performed poorly, and they should be partly stopped, and funds used for other purposes.
- Theme 2 - Environmental Governance: One project just started but came to a halt (2.1). The rest have performed rather satisfactorily. Sustainability of Project 2.2 might be at stake, as funds for the second stage is not yet secured.
- Theme 3 - Biodiversity and Conservation: All projects have performed satisfactorily, especially the ones under management of South Africa National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI). Project 3.5 (knowledge sharing networks) has no funding from Norway at all, and Project 3.7 (wetlands inventory) was a direct continuation of project in Phase II, with no funding in Phase III.

3.2 Standard Evaluation Elements

- On the standard evaluation elements, the RT would give the *overall* Programme the following ratings (being the "sum" of all individual projects):
 - Relevance: Highly Satisfactory. (Compliance alignments/checks undertaken for all projects).
 - Effectiveness: Marginally Satisfactory for Phase III alone, but when also including Phase II, the effectiveness has been Satisfactory.
 - Efficiency: Marginally Unsatisfactory/ Marginally Satisfactory. (Difficult to assess. Relatively high preparation costs before tangible outputs in a couple of projects, and transaction costs.).
 - Impact: Marginally Satisfactory/Satis-

factory. (Tangible impacts in AQM in eThekweni and in the SANBI projects under Theme 3. Impact must be credited to both Phase II and III).

- Sustainability: Technical - Satisfactory;
Institutional - Marginally Satisfactory;
Environmental - Satisfactory;
Economic/financial-N/A; Institutional
Cooperation - Unsatisfactory for a few
projects, and Satisfactory for a few.

3.3 Financial Management. Expenditures and Auditing

- Expenditure figures are given by the Financial Dept. of DEAT. As per March 2009, 65% of the total programme funds (being ZAR 43.3 million) have been spent, whilst 75% of the life of the Programme has elapsed.
- Theme 1 has spent 58%, Theme 2 - 82%, and Theme 3 - 60% (having the largest budget).
- The Programme Management budget item contains only part of the management costs, with no information provided on the management costs of the various projects.
- Only a small part of the Planning Reserve (a contingency item) has been spent.
- Different invoicing formats are used by the Norwegian partners, and a couple only use lump sums (with no specification of e.g. manpower input). The lack of transparency in invoicing *might* pose a potential risk as it does not comply with internationally acceptable accounting practices (nor those used typically across all government departments in South Africa). However, no evidence of any financial misappropriation has ever been found in the Programme.
- Audit reports have been submitted as agreed in the Framework BP, and the Auditor General expresses satisfaction with the Programme.
- It is observed that a few delegations from RSA to Norway get the accommodation and meals covered and at the same time receive subsistence allowance from DEAT.
- Several project staff reported that the reports from the Financial Dept. in DEAT do *not* match their own records of expenditures, which has created some confusion over which figures are the most accurate. This is partly caused by time lag from when expenses are accrued till they are debited, and mishaps with the wrong entering of codes at the project level into the DEAT accounting system. This

should be borne in mind when viewing the expenditure figures in this report.

4. ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS

4.1 Project 1.3: Further Development of the Air Quality management Plan and Action Plan for eThekweni Municipality

- The project is a continuation of the AQM efforts in Phase II, which was part of the Multi-Point Plan in eThekweni Municipality. NILU is partner in the project.
- The steering document is a proposal from NILU, with the 1-page acceptance letter from the Municipality. The contract sum has been changed later, but subsequently not formally recorded.
- Project progress seems to be satisfactory, with deliverables in time and quality, and NILU's input is gradually reduced through Phase III, being commendable. Additional training is required due to staff turnover in RSA.
- The project is very much technically oriented with tangible outputs. Norwegian input most prevalent in Phase II, though.
- NILU is invoicing on a lump sum basis only.

4.2 Project 2.5: Environmental Impact Management

- The project is a continuation of cooperation in Phase II. The Planning Dept. in the Ministry of Environment (MoE) in Norway is a partner, with DN covering a smaller part.
- The steering document is a Draft Business Plan (BP) from as late as August 2008, being merely a documentation of the activities and processes in the project rather than a *planning* document.
- The project is fully demand-driven, with more direct interaction between the partners in Phase II of the Programme than in Phase III, this being a wanted development.
- Progress reporting in the project is difficult to understand due to the changing of activities from those proposed in the original Business Plan.
- MoE staff could have been more actively used as professional "advisors", not merely being used as "consultants" arranging exchange of delegations and field visits. The reason for non-use of Norwegians is partly the busy DEAT staff, fire fighting internal EIA

processes all the time.

4.3 Project 2.7: Institutional cooperation between DEAT, GRID-Arendal, Framework AS and SFT on state of the environment reporting.

- The cooperation between GRID (being a UNEP Collaborating Centre) and DEAT started in the mid-90s, and the Phase III activities are clearly a direct continuation of the efforts on the State of Environment (SOE) reporting and Digimaker development in Phase II.
- The steering document is a "project concept paper" from 2007. SFT has not at all been a partner in the project.
- Staffing turnover in GRID has made the cooperation lose some of its momentum the last couple of years. Key executing staff are now sub-contracted GRID, e.g. Frameworks AS, also having separate contracts on software licence and consultancy with DEAT.
- GRID is invoicing on a lump sum basis, but with possibilities of specifying costs, if requested.
- Due to staff turnover in DEAT, additional Vital Graphics training is required and should be instigated without delay.

4.4 Project 3.6: Assessing the impact of commercially released GMOs on the environment.

- This cooperation started in Phase III, and Directorate for Nature Management (DN) and Centre for Biosafety (GenØK) are partners on the Norwegian side, the former also coordinating the input.
- This project was not in the initial Programme Business Plan, but taken on board after Phase III was initiated, eventually getting the largest budget of all projects. The BP and contract between the partners from January 2008 is steering the project activities.
- The planning of the project took a long time, which was needed and useful, but the 2007/08 growing season was lost. First analysis undertaken following the 2008/09 growing season.
- Scientific cooperation in the project is satisfactory, with the Norwegian side contributing with concrete outputs, appreciated by the RSA partners.

5. ASSESSMENT OF OTHER RELEVANT PROGRAMME ASPECTS

- The project staff interviewed had no feeling of being part of "a programme", as the ownership and identity only lie with the projects. The Programme is merely functioning as a financing mechanism to fund individual projects.
- The Theme Manager positions in DEAT in their present form do not assist the Programme in any meaningful manner.
- Institutional cooperation between DEAT and MoE has largely been satisfactory. MoE has several functions: partner of the MoU; advisor to the MFA/Embassy; "mother" of the project partners DN and SFT; and direct project partner (Planning Dept.). These different roles *could* lead to conflicting situations, especially regarding funding of projects..
- Cooperation between other parties has largely been satisfactory, and especially the Norwegian side speaks highly of the professionalism of the RSA staff. The payment of Norwegian experts in the project by the Norwegian Government is appreciated, as RSA could hardly have afforded such expensive experts being paid from own funds.
- In projects where the Norwegians are merely advisors, the dialogue has been strained, with some profound misunderstandings of the role of the Norwegian partner (e.g. DEAT wanting SFT to be "consultants", whereas SFT clearly sees its role as an "advisor").
- Many of the programme documents have significant shortcomings (lacking dates, proper and consistent nominations/titles of projects/activities, lacking headers and footers, etc.), which made the navigation through the documents by the RT very difficult.
- Annual progress reporting format has improved from 2007 to 2008.
- The formal decision-making process of the Annual Meetings only once per year, deciding on new projects and re-allocation of funds, has partly hampered the continued progress of some efforts. Now, the parties have agreed to a more flexible decision-making modality in-between the AMs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Some improvements could be implemented without delay during the last programme year:

- The two different sets of financial data, at project level and in the DEAT Financial Dept., must be reconciled.
- The possible double payment of subsistence allowance to RSA staff should be seized.
- The document management should be improved, with proper nominations of the documents' front pages and header/footer giving the dates, authors, name of institutions, and project/document title.
- Project 1.5 should be stopped.
- A realistic work plan must be prepared for the last year of Project 1.6.
- Project 1.7 should be stopped. Consultancy assistance to prepare a guideline for a "Blending Platform" should be looked for, preferably in SINTEF.
- Additional training in Vital Graphics should be undertaken in Project 2.7.
- The system of simple re-allocation of funds in-between 2009 and 2010 AMs, should be continued, based on direct communication between DEAT and RNE. This requires the RNE to be properly updated on programme progress and outputs.

Additionally, in the possible New Programme (post-2010 cooperation on "Climate Change"), now being discussed, the following should be considered:

- Documents in the New Programme must have proper titles, dates, and references making navigation easy. A coding system for documents should be considered.
- Proper guidance must be given during planning of the New Programme as regards format and contents of planning documents (project logframes), invoicing and reporting. Ample time for planning of activities and creation of ownership amongst the partners is as important.

- Reporting must follow the format in the "Project Documents" consistently, possibly at two levels (technical and executive).
- The DEAT Programme Management should be given the formal mandate to re-allocate funds between projects in-between the Annual Meetings, under a certain threshold.
- DEAT and RNE should discuss the broad scope and approach of the New Programme before other partners seriously enter the scene, but advice from MoE and Norad should preferably be sought.
- The position of a Programme Coordinator (PC) should be considered in RSA (supported by a Programme Administrative Officer). The position should be filled by a dedicated person (in DEAT or in another institution) with the required motivation and background, and not based on current position. In the case that the Programme will be large, several Component Coordinators could be considered.
- Depending on the number and extent of Norwegian partners in the New Programme, a similar Programme Coordinator (PC) on the Norwegian side should be considered.
- The PCs would have the updated overview of all the programme components, and be key persons in reporting, delegation exchanges, etc.
- Norwegian institutions to be included in the New Programme must be able to deliver concrete outputs really needed by the RSA side, not only be "dialogue partners" at project level, and must clearly have comparative advantages internationally, "adding value" to the development efforts.
- Norwegian funds should clearly *not* pay staff salaries in RSA.

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1. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW MANDATE

1.1 Introduction and Background

The Republic of South Africa (RSA, see map in *Figure 1.1a* in *Appendix 1*, where some new geographical/administrative names referred to in the Programme are indicated¹) represented by the National Treasury and Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria (RNE) on 13.12.2005 signed a Framework Business Plan for an Environmental Cooperation Programme between South Africa and Norway for the period 2005-2010 ("the Programme"). This Business Plan (BP) is the main *steering document* for the Programme, and all the individual project business plans produced thereafter are basically built on and are in compliance with this overall BP. The Programme has a Norwegian contribution of up to NOK 40 million, and has three main themes: Pollution & Waste; Environmental Governance; and Biodiversity & Conservation. Each of these three themes has a specified goal and purpose, and in total comprises 20 individual projects.

The environmental cooperation between Norway and South Africa in fact started back in 1994, when the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two countries was signed (1.12.1994). The second MoU in February 1996 between the Ministry of Environment (MoE) in Norway and DEAT kicked off the planning of concrete cooperation efforts, ending up with a Business Plan in December 1997. The period 1996-2000 is referred to as Phase I of the cooperation.

Already in 1999 it was clear that the successful cooperation would continue, and a Declaration of Intent was signed in March 1999, with a Business Plan for Phase II, covering the period 2000-2004, being launched in August 2000. Some projects in this phase even extended into 2005, with some being completed in 2006 (and even later), in parallel with Phase III having started.

The planning of Phase III of the Programme, which is reviewed in this report, started in October 2004 (with a Joint Workshop) and continued for almost one year, until in December 2005 when the Framework Business Plan was finalised and signed, marking the official start-up of Phase III. *Figure 1.2* in *Appendix 1* illustrates the three phases with some milestones shown for easy reference and understanding of the history and development of the Programme.

1.2 The Review Consultant's Mandate and Approach

The Framework Business Plan states: "*The parties will agree upon measures to conduct a mid-term review in order to ensure that the Programme is progressing according to plan. The Grant will finance the mid-term review.*" RNE and DEAT therefore decided to undertake such a joint review during the first half of 2009, and the team composition was mutually agreed between the parties. It was decided that the Team Leader would be an independent Norwegian consultant, and this position was finally contracted to Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) Norway, following a tender amongst four Norwegian consulting companies.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Review Team (hereafter referred to as "the Team" or "the RT") is enclosed in *Appendix 7*. The Review is named "mid-term", but in fact the Programme at the time of the Review had already exceeded the middle of the Programme by one year (when 75% of the programme period had already elapsed). Less than one year remained of the Programme Phase III (except for one project, Project 3.6, that will surely last longer). In practical terms, this Review considers activities up to the completion of the South African Financial Year (Fiscal Year – FY) 1.04.2008 – 31.03.2009.

The purpose of the Mid-term Review (MTR, "the Review") was to: assess the progress of the Programme in relation to the agreed goal, purpose and outputs; do an assessment of the institutional cooperation, including an assessment of financial flows between cooperating institutions; and advise on any adjustments that should be made to the Programme in order to better achieve the agreed goal, purpose and outputs, and to make the achievements of the Programme, including the institutional cooperation,

¹ *Figure 1.1b* shows the division in Provinces.

sustainable. The Review thus covered the whole programme, and four projects, one each under two themes and two under the third, were chosen for in-depth review. It is noted that Project 1.1 was listed as one where in-depth study should be undertaken. However, this project has no Norwegian partners, which was one criteria for selection, so it was during the field work in RSA agreed with DEAT and the Norwegian Embassy that this project should be exchanged with Project 1.3, which has a Norwegian partner and more interesting features to review.

The Team assessed the overall implementation status of the Programme so far with reference to the standard evaluation elements used by Norad in Development Cooperation Manual: effectiveness, efficiency, impact, relevance and sustainability, and assessed these dimensions in more depth for the four individual projects.

Particular emphasis was placed on the following issues:

- The institutional cooperation between DEAT and the Norwegian Ministry of Environment (MoE) and the institutional cooperation between South African and Norwegian institutions.
- To what extent has “A platform been created for long-term and sustained environmental cooperation between Norway and South Africa”, or to what extent is this likely to be achieved at the end of the Programme?
- The quality of the management, monitoring and reporting of the Programme and the selected projects under each theme.
- As Norway and South Africa foresee strengthened cooperation in the climate change area, which approaches and areas of cooperation can be identified.

The Team studied relevant reports and information prior to the joint field work in South Africa and the Team Leader had meetings with the Norwegian project partners in Norway (Norad, Ministry of Environment, Norwegian Institute for Air Research - NILU, Directorate for Nature Management - DN, Centre for Biosafety - GenØk, GRID-Arendal with its partner Frameworks AS, and the State Pollution Control Authority - SFT). In Pretoria, prior to starting the meetings with the South African programme partners, the Team Leader had a kick-off meeting with the Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE). The country visit of the Team Leader lasted during the period 23.04 – 7.05.2009. The meeting itinerary was to some degree hampered by two public holidays leading to two long weekends for the national programme staff, and even to an additional whole week off for some staff, without this influencing the main conclusions of the Review Team.

The Review Team had meetings with the three Theme Managers and all Project Managers and some other representatives for each of the 20 individual projects under the Programme, including two Project Managers residing in Durban. The Team Leader also had a brief meeting with the present and previous Programme Managers in DEAT. In all meetings the RT was received with openness and a positive attitude from the programme staff, and all pertinent and impertinent questions from the RT were answered to the best ability of the national experts. Names of the persons met with are found in *Appendix 5*. At the end of the joint fieldwork (on 7 May) the Team Leader presented the main observations and preliminary recommendations to the RNA and DEAT, who were then given an opportunity for immediate comments and input to the further reporting.

The Draft Report was submitted 20 May 2009, and all the Programme partners on the Norwegian and South African side got a chance to comments upon the Draft. The partners were first and foremost asked to focus on factual errors and misunderstandings, or analysis that were based on such errors/misunderstandings. The comments are enclosed in *Appendix 8*, and are to the most extent considered very constructive and useful. It should nevertheless be noted that the AT has disregarded a couple of the comments, as they clearly are points of view related to the AT's analysis and reporting modality.

It is again emphasised that the Review is not a “mid-term” review per se, and in practical terms it was *too late* at this time to change the *main* implementation content and modality in Phase III. Some improvements could however be implemented the last year of Phase III, but the bulk of the findings of the review are merely seen as a useful summary of lessons learned to be taken on board by the parties in the ongoing discussions and subsequent planning of the possible New Programme, having a focus on Climate Change.

1.3 Important Previous Programme Milestones

There are notably three “events” that formed the outline and content of Phase III of the Programme: the Mid-term Review of Phase II in 2003; the Joint Planning Workshop in 2004, and the Pre-appraisal of the Draft Framework Business plan in 2005. The conclusions from these three events will briefly be presented below, as they had a significant bearing on Phase III content and implementation modality, and might to some degree explain why things became as observed by the RT.

a) Phase II Mid-term Review

The review mid-2003 seems to have been the first undertaken by an external consultant² since the start-up of the cooperation between the two countries. Neither this review was “mid-term”, although named so indicates, and the Phase II content and working modality was not changed following the recommendations of this report. The findings and recommendations were merely seen as the basis for the planning of Phase III, just like the review report for Phase III gives some lessons learned to be taken on board a possible New Programme.

It is noted that Phase II contained seven themes with a number of projects under each theme (34 in total). The review found that the overall business plan was incomplete and contained several inconsistencies, which obviously were not addressed later due to several reasons, resulting in a partial lack of strategic guidance that the business plan was supposed to have provided. The programme contained two kinds of projects. a) Those that were predefined and stemmed from the previous phase of environmental cooperation (Phase I); and b) those that were designed at a later stage, mostly in collaboration with Norwegian cooperation partners who needed to be identified first, which took considerable time. Additionally, the conclusion of cooperation agreements took a long time, and also delays because of DEAT staff turnover.

The review team therefore noted a significant under-spending in the programme (60% of time spent and only 34% of the funds spent on project work). The review found that the staff of DEAT and implementing agents appointed were dedicated and did good work of a considerable professional standard. Under a number of themes, Norwegian cooperation partners played a key role as implementing agents or advisors.

Capacity building (CB), initially thought to be of major concern, turned out not to be the issue that it was thought to be. DEAT did obviously not prioritise institutional CB in any systematic way under the programme, except in the areas where project activities were defined explicitly with a purpose of capacity building. On the other hand and on an individual level, “learning-by-doing” took place and Norway provided considerable exposure and training by inviting individuals for work visits to Norway. Institutional CB was however dubious due to high staff turnover.

The review found that appropriate management of the programme and of the themes had been lacking to a certain extent, and that no leadership was available to guide the development of more profound theme objectives and monitoring instruments such as performance indicators, and no clear and overall programme purpose was developed. Norwegian cooperation partners did not have an appropriate platform within DEAT to discuss new approaches and ideas that addressed value adding dimensions and the strengthening of the focus. This resulted in non-use of additional inputs that were potentially available from the Norwegian partners; and opportunities to make *more* of the programme were perceived to have been missed.

The main recommendations of the review were to: invest considerable time and money on the institutional CB issues by evaluating suitable tools and actually introducing them; strategic development of the themes and the programme by adding value through e.g. “higher goal” articulation; to make more time available for involvement of senior competent staff to discuss with cooperation partners additional and complementary issues; constitute and engage a joint advisory programme body to guide and further develop the programme; focus on the strategic, complementary and prioritised components of the programme; consider and develop an approach of programme funding with a focus on results monitoring

² Ulrich Meier, Scanteam and Dave MacDevette, EASD, June 2003

and management. The review expected that such actions would make the expected results at programme end more substantial and the environmental cooperation would clearly contribute more to DEAT's goals.

b) Phase III Joint Planning Workshop

Another important milestone in the programme planning was the Joint Workshop (WS) that was held in Pretoria on 30 September - 1 October 2004. The WS, which had 27 participants, included eight official participants from Norway (Norwegian Embassy, SFT, Norad, MoE, and Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage) and two unofficial participants (observers) from SFT. The list of participants in the workshop is shown in *Table 1.1* in *Appendix 1..* The workshop ended up with a jointly agreed *outline* for a programme business plan in the form of a Workshop Report. The documents contained a formulation of the Programme's goal and purpose and listed some of the main programme outputs, of which one was the "*Efficient and effective institutional cooperation between South Africa and Norway*". Also the goal and purpose of each of the main themes were formulated, in addition to some indicators for the themes and list of potential beneficiaries were identified. In addition, some potential project headings and main activities were listed in the Workshop Report.

This workshop obviously was a good planning exercise for all parties, and it formed the platform for the further planning work. It is noted that before the WS, the total intended allocation from the Norwegian Government (around NOK 40 million) was known to the parties, initially intended with around 1/3 of the funds to each of the three themes. It could therefore be assumed that especially the South African participants had this financial frame in mind when setting up the priorities and indicating some projects which should get support. Not to say that the projects indicated were *not* identified out of real needs, but the composition of the participants, and the known allocation from Norway, *could* have had a say on the outputs of the workshop, as opposed to a WS where the funds and the themes were not known. At the time, the approach however seemed appropriate considering the history of the cooperation until then. Following the workshop, the parties continued the following months to work on the Framework Business Plan (BP) for the Programme, for which a draft was submitted for pre-appraisal primo 2005.

c) Phase III Pre-appraisal

This document was pre-appraised by an external consultant³ during a mission in March 2005.

The Pre-appraisal Report points out that the Environmental Cooperation Programme (ECP) is a small component in financial terms and in volume of activity compared to DEAT's overall budget and portfolio of projects (external assistance in total constituted less than 4.5% of the DEAT budget). ECP should accordingly be considered as a *facility* providing inputs to support individual components within the DEAT strategic plan rather than as a coherent programme in its own right. (It is noted that this is still valid during Phase III, see below). The Draft Business Plan should be considered as a *framework* agreement for cooperation and a commitment of total funding from Norway, *not* a programme document for appraisal and approval of projects constituting the programme. The report noted that the programme had yet to be defined through an internal project formulation, screening and prioritisation exercise.

The report urged that a decision was required on which of the two objectives was considered the primary and achievable objective of the Programme:

- to build capacity for DEAT and in areas of relevance use Norwegian partners as means of achieving it; or
- to develop sustained cooperation between RSA and Norwegian partners in areas of mutual interest.

The report pointed out that this "dilemma" should be resolved through a clearer and simpler formulation of the ECP objective that also had impact on the modality of cooperation and selection of projects. The first objective could, at one extreme, be achieved *without* any Norwegian participation, and could fully and solely define the programme as a recipient of regular development assistance common in *low-income* partner countries of Norway. The latter would exclude projects without relevance to cooperation with Norway and would be a joint formulation and decision-making process between to bilateral partners, a common procedure in *conventional* bilateral cooperation agreements. The latter had been stated in the MoU between the two countries (meaning *not* a traditional "aid relationship"), and the MoU was valid also *after* financing in the form of bilateral assistance had been phased out.

³ Jens Claussen, NCG. Report 24.05.2005.

Accordingly, the report suggested the Business Plan/framework agreement to be revised to spell out clearly the following suggested objective and roles of the different partners:

- The Programme objective should be to promote sustained cooperation between RSA and Norway, in areas where RSA have specific long-term needs and in which RSA consider Norway to have a comparative advantage.
- The “programme” should be defined in mutual consultations between DEAT and MoE. DEAT is the focal point on the RSA side while MoE should serve as the focal point on the Norwegian side, also in coordination and selection of Norwegian cooperating partners to participate in formulation and implementation of projects of mutual interest in which Norway is considered to have a comparative advantage.
- Selection of projects should be based on predefined transparent criteria such as:
 - Projects that falls within the DEAT strategic plan and contributes to its components.
 - Projects within the agreed themes (as decided upon the September 2004 workshop).
 - Projects that involve cooperation with a relevant Norwegian partner considered having a *comparative advantage* in the field of cooperation.
 - Projects that build on past successes in cooperation and may have the potential of leading to sustained cooperation between the two parties.
 - Proposals that represent larger scale and longer term projects to ensure sustained capacity is build in RSA, achieving higher economy of scale (reduced transaction costs) and be likely to generate longer term relationships between DEAT and Norwegian technical partners.
- MFA through the Embassy should continue to serve as the financial partner.

The report pointed at some unresolved issues in such a model, among others the selection of Norwegian partners, and the role of coordinators. It stated that the Framework Business Plan was intended only to serve as a *framework* under which the “programme” will be designed. The sum of projects would constitute the “programme”. It was stated that the Draft Business Plan was *too* detailed and specific when defining outputs and indicators of projects yet to be defined. It should instead be reduced to and presented as a general framework for cooperation leaving presentation of the Programme to a separate process as and when the projects have been defined. This portfolio of projects should then be subject to an appraisal of each proposal individually and their likely contribution to the overall goal and purpose of the cooperation. Eventually, the final Framework Business Plan did not fully comply with the above recommendations, but came out more as a hybrid of the “traditional” assistance model and what was proposed.

2. THE PROGRAMME DESIGN

2.1 Programme Phases

The Programme has evolved over time since the first contacts were made mid-90s, and the MoU still valid was signed on 12 December 1996. *Figure 1.2* tries to capture the development of the Programme in time with some key milestones plotted. It is noted that each phase is guided by a Business Plan, which is the main *steering document* for the work undertaken. The figure also shows other high-level agreements that have partly been the basis for the broad development of the Programme, like Declaration of Intent and Letter of Intent.

It has been difficult for the RT to find out *when* exactly one phase starts and ends and the next one is taking over. The reason for this is that the various stages have contained many projects that have developed independently at various paces. In some projects there have been delays and extensions and in some also additional tasks have been taken on board as needs have arisen. Notably, the planning of Phase III started with the joint workshop in September/October 2004, when Phase II was still running, and there was considerable overlap between the two phases in some of the activities. Most of the projects in Phase II ended towards the end of 2004 - beginning of 2005, but some continued into 2006 (e.g. the wetland inventory).

In the minutes from the 2007 Annual Meeting (AM), it is stated that: “.. the previous phase of the programme had been formally closed upon approval of the Final Financial and Narrative Reports”. This

was obviously not *one* single date but several dates, as the various projects ended successively. In the first documents produced under Phase III, the phase is defined as starting from 1 April 2005, but in all later documents the starting date is listed as 1 July 2005, being in fact the valid date. The former followed the South African Financial Year (Fiscal Year – FY), which would have been a natural staging of the Programme. However, because of the delayed planning of the phase the date was obviously changed. Formally speaking however, the start-up of Phase III was in December 2005 when the Framework Business Plan was signed. The end date still stands as 31 March 2010, and the Chief Policy Advisor in the International Governance and Relations Dept in DEAT confirms that the books are closing on that date, meaning that the funds that have not been paid or committed (accrued) will not be paid after this date, but will go back to Norway. However, some projects will still be ongoing *after* this date (as long as the funds are committed), and at least one project has a contract between the parties that ends in December 2010 (Project 3.6).

An interesting observation is that none of the project staff interviewed by the RT had any sense of *phases* in the Programme. They were merely referring to their own project as a continuous row of additional tasks and extensions, one leading to and building upon the other. One main reason for this confusion is probably that most of the project running under Phase III had their first phase under the Programme Phase II, and the project staff were also in the meetings with the RT clearly referring to Phase II as being “phase 1” and Phase III being “phase 2”. This observation also underlines that the structure of the Programme is a collection of individual projects. The intention of the DEAT management has obviously been to have a smooth transition between the various phases, and this has indeed been successful. In reality, this notion has not created any larger problems in the Programme at project level, where the activities are simply “living their own lives”. It only creates some confusion to outsiders that will look into the programme in a structured and chronological way (!).

2.2 Project Continuity under the Programme

The Programme has developed according to the needs of the South African side in the cooperation. During Phase II, which by all standards was the most hectic and assumed to be the most “important” phase of the Programme, there were 7 themes under which in total 34 projects were implemented. Following the independent mid-term review of this phase in June 2003, it was decided to narrow the number of themes and the scope of the Programme in general (amongst others the cultural heritage theme was taken out).

Figure 2.1 in Appendix 1 tries to capture the transition from Phase II to Phase III, where some of the themes, and even individual projects, were continued into the next phase. This notably goes for the Pollution and Waste (e.g. Air Quality Management component and the cooperation with eThekweni Municipality). The previous Theme of Environmental Coordination and Management led into the new theme of Environmental Governance, and the Biodiversity and Water Theme led directly into some projects under Theme 3 in Phase III.

The number of projects in Phase III is 20, a significant reduction from Phase II, but still “many”, having totally different scopes and nature. This has diluted the notion of all the projects together forming a “programme”, but this has as mentioned not influenced on the work in the projects. All efforts are demand-driven, and they all clearly build up under and support the mandated tasks of DEAT, which has been a clear intention in the Programme.

The Programme will end in March 2010, and will surely not be continued in its present form, according to both DEAT and the Norwegian Embassy, although a few project activities will continue beyond this date. A possible New Programme will be planned under a “Climate Change” heading, having new themes, new projects and most likely some new partners. The discussion on such a New Programme is ongoing at the time of submitting this report (primo June 2009), and nothing concrete has yet been decided.

2.3 Programme and Project Logframes

Goal: In a logframe context, the goal (also referred to as the “development objective” or “overall objective”) of any

Programme is defined to be the long-term objective to which the Programme will significantly contribute. The achievement of the goal will, however, also depend on other factors and Programmes beyond this particular Programme. Formulation of the goal should ideally be clearly defined and used as a main point of reference by all involved parties during Programme implementation. This means that a narrow, specific goal normally should be formulated (close to the purpose), also increasing the probability of “success” when evaluating the Programme achievements against the goal later on. The goal must represent a sufficient justification for the Programme, should be formulated as a desired state (not as an activity), it must not be too ambitious, it should preferably mention the target groups, and should ideally be expressed in verifiable terms.

Purpose: According to the logframe methodology, the purpose should be the state (or situation) that is expected to prevail as a direct consequence of the Programme, also meaning the outcome (or intended impact) of the Programme. The achievement of the purpose is clearly *outside* the Programme and cannot be guaranteed by the Programme Management. However, when the results (outputs) are delivered as planned, there is a high probability that the purpose will prevail. Any programme should have *only one* purpose, which ideally should specify the target groups, should be formulated as a desired state (not as an activity), should be precise and verifiable, and should be realistic. The purpose should be as “close” as possible to the guaranteed results.

The illustration below shows the programme objectives and the objectives of each of the three themes.

THE PROGRAMME

Goal:

To promote sustainable development through the protection and conservation of natural resources, safeguard the environment from pollution, and enhancing the quality of the environment.

Purpose:

- South African national, provincial and local governments are effectively implementing their mandates for environmental management in the following areas: Pollution and waste, and Biodiversity.
- A platform has been created for long-term and sustained environmental cooperation between Norway and South Africa.
- Sub-regional, regional and global environmental co-operation is enhanced.
- Contribution to meeting the millennium development goals and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation targets

This set-up is orderly and consistent, and the goals and purposes are relatively well formulated. Ideally, only *one* purpose should be formulated for the Programme, but as it is so comprehensive and diversified, several purposes might be accepted in this case. The theme purposes are partly capturing the *activities* that will take place under each of them (which is not according to the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) modality of formulating a purpose), but still they adequately contain the *intentions and ideas* behind the various themes.

Reference is made to *Figure 2.2* in *Appendix 1*, where the inter-relationship between the various elements in a project/programme's LFA matrix (also referred to as *logframe*) is illustrated, for easy reference to the reader.

The projects under the Programme have to various degrees formulated logframes. In most projects the formulation of goal and purpose (sometimes called "objective") are clearly *not* formulated "according to the book", and especially the *purpose* is often just a repetition of the activities in the project. This is partly appreciated by the RT, as the formulation of consistent logframes is difficult and requires a lot of experience to get it right. The exception is notably the four projects under Theme 1 where SFT is the cooperating partner. Here, SFT has obviously guided the formulations that could be used as examples for others (although the *performance* of these projects is not necessarily so, as seen below).

The lack of consistent logframes at project level does not seem to have hampered the implementation of the projects, has not created any confusion amongst project staff, or has been an issue once the implementation started. It would appear that little guidance was given to the preparation of project proposal/business plan logframes at the start-up of the Programme, even though this has been a requirement in Norwegian development assistance since the early 90s. The RT also notes that very few of the Norwegian development cooperation staff working in this field today really know how to formulate such logframes, a few staff in SFT clearly being an exception. By the start-up of the possible New Programme now being discussed, the formulation of proper project logframes should be properly guided and encouraged.

2.4 Other Relevant Programme Design Elements

a) Activities and results

Results are the direct deliverables of the Programme. The results are following from the successful implementation of the activities and these will be guaranteed by the Programme management.

All projects seem to have formulated the activities and the results (also referred to as outputs) rather well. This was also expected, as the activities are within the core professional business and tasks of the various project staff. In most cases, the description of the activities and the end products to be expected show that the staff having formulated these indeed know what they are writing about. The outputs seem to be well formulated, and is also repeated to some degree in the tabular progress reports.

b) Monitoring Indicators

In an LFA modality the indicators define the performance standard to be reached in order to achieve the objectives or outputs.

The formulation of indicators for practical use in the monitoring of a project is difficult. Most projects under the Programme have indicators formulated, but only at a *qualitative* level, meaning the indicators are *not* quantified (how much, for whom, when, etc.). In the Annual Plans and Progress Reports there is a column in the aggregated theme tables where indicators for the various projects are listed. Reporting has however not been directly on fulfilment of indicators, but rather on the progress of the activities themselves. The formulated indicators therefore seem to have little value in the monitoring of the Programme. A few projects, e.g. Project 1.4, have made more detailed elaboration of the indicators under the activities, but still not being properly quantified. In a few cases (e.g. under the Air Quality Management projects), quantifiable indicators are found.

c) Risks

In an LFA modality, risks pertain to possible impacts on the Programme from actions/happenings *outside* the control of the Programme Management. There might also be "internal risks" within the Programme itself, but these should merely be looked upon as "managerial challenges" that a competent management will be able to tackle.

The programme Framework Business Plan has a separate section on Risks ("Assessment of Assumptions"), being largely that:

- certain components in South Africa resort under another department (following which a similar agreement would be developed);
- the cordial relations between the two countries declines;
- the interest in the Programme wanes on either side;
- the managed resources suffer drastic declines for reasons unrelated to the success of environmental management;
- the level of national funding ensuring South Africa's participation in the Programme is cut substantially;
- the funding for the Programme by Norway is cut substantially as a result of changing Norwegian development funding priorities;
- high staff mobility.

The RT would have liked to see another risk listed, which really has materialised in most projects, and that is the risk of delays in implementation. In a couple of cases this delay has led to the projects not getting off the ground at all. Delays are more the rule than the exception in most projects, and this should be taken on board the planning from the beginning and lead to realistic plans and schedules being developed, with the required flexibility and time buffers to adjust and still reach the targets within the duration of the project.

All the other risks listed seem to have been relevant at the start-up of Phase III. The *likeliness* of the risks prevailing varies a lot and also the *impact* on the Programme if things had gone wrong. In most cases and in practical terms experience show that there is little the Programme Management can do to prevent detrimental effects on the projects if risks materialise as problems during implementation. This is inherent in the nature of the risk, being *outside the control* of the Programme Management. One risk (although also partly being a managerial challenge) that has lead to negative effects in several of the projects is staff

mobility/turnover, mostly in DEAT, but also to a smaller degree in Norway (e.g. GRID and SFT). This normally comes unexpected to the management as staff is tempted by “greener pastures” and leave with little warning in advance, or as staff is promoted and reallocated internally in the institution. Both these things have happened in DEAT. It is difficult to keep trained and well-experienced staff in their present positions if there is no flexibility to offer e.g. higher salaries within a category of positions, without promoting staff to higher positions.

Notably, a few *Special Scientist Posts* have been created in order to *keep* good scientists without promoting them to Directors with the unwanted (and not very attractive) administrative burden that follows. This is indeed a commendable move within DEAT. The internal re-positioning of staff is however fully in the hands of DEAT at national level (not in the various municipalities and other institutions), and this has in some cases impacted both positively and negatively on the performance of the various themes and projects. Largely however, it seems that DEAT has managed this risk to their best ability, although it will by default never be satisfactory.

The other risk that, in the RT’s opinion, has materialised, is that in a few projects there have been communication problems. Typically resulting in interest in the Programme having waned (especially the waste projects under Theme 1). This mostly because activities have been dragged out over time, or not started at all, and the momentum and enthusiasm for the project has been lost along the way.

The issue of corruption risks almost goes without saying and this is mentioned as a standard item under the section on Procurement Procedures in the Framework Business Plan. Also all the contracts between Norwegian and South African partners contain such standard clauses. The procurement in DEAT and national partners follows the governmental rules for this with no larger or lesser opportunities to play “funny games” than the procurement rules in Norway or similar countries. The RT has during the review of documents and interviews with staff *not* come across, or had any “gut feelings” of, any instances where unhealthy practices could be detected. This seems to have been handled satisfactory by DEAT and the implementing partners.

2.5 Programme Administrative/Managerial Set-up

A Programme Manager in DEAT has the overall responsibility for the Programme, with three Theme Managers being responsible for each theme and with subsequent Project Managers for each project. *Appendix 2* shows the list of staff responsible at various levels on the RSA side of the Programme. The progress reporting in the Programme follows the same line, from bottom up.

As mentioned earlier, the project staff, without exception, seems to have no comprehension for the Programme as a whole, as they are all busy with their own projects. They are of course not to be blamed for this, but the feel of a “consistent programme” where all the parties are pulling the rope in the same direction and the projects together constitute and fill the Programme 100%, does *not* exist. Most of the project staff also have other projects to pursue within their regular tasks under the various DEAT business units. *Figure 2.3* in *Appendix 1* shows the DEAT organisational chart, with the Branches and Chief Directorates and the number of Directorates under each indicated. The shaded boxes show the units that are involved in the Programme with some of their staff.

It is observed that there is a lot of frustration amongst the Theme Managers (TM) with regards to their duties in relation to the Programme. These managers (2 Chief Directors and 1 Director) are all very busy with normal line administrative functions and mandated professional tasks, and the Theme Manager obligations have added to this burden. The position as Theme Manager is seen as only a nuisance to these staff as it creates additional reporting and planning input to Annual Plans under the Programme, for which they really have no time. It is also reported that no clear directions from the Programme Management were given as to what was expected from the Theme Managers. When also realising that some of the projects’ core activities are clearly outside the professional competence of the TMs, the RT fully appreciates the frustration felt. There seems to be little enthusiasm for the work connected to this position, and the performance is indeed reflecting this.

In the few projects where the TM is also Project Manager, this work goes relatively smoothly due to this

being the core professional field of the respective TM. But the projects led by other PMs under the same theme, seems to get very little attention from these TMs. There seems to be virtually no coordination and interaction between the TM and the PMs under that theme. One PM told the RT that only once per year there is a theme meeting, and that is just before the Annual Meeting when the Annual Report and plans for next year would be compiled. This lack of proper communication indeed does not enhance the feeling amongst the staff working in *one* Programme. In a couple of cases also, PMs would really have benefited from more interaction with the TM in order to guide the work. There is notably one example of a new PM not getting the required guidance at the start-up, ending up wasting time preparing a Business Plan that had already been prepared earlier. The PMs in SANBI (Theme 3) seems to be running their “own show” in the projects, only reporting to their TM when required, but successfully so.

The question is if these administrative shortcomings could have been avoided? The RT believes probably not, as the Programme has developed through time and followed the modality in which some projects have continued into the next phase following the same working pattern as in the previous Phase. It is believed that a complete turnover of the administrative set-up in the Programme would have created even more frustration than benefited the cause in such a smooth transition period between the phases. The frustration created by this set-up at all levels therefore seems to a large extent to have been a “necessary evil” in order to continue the Programme in Phase III smoothly from Phase II. Phase III will come to an end in March 2010, and there will be no extension of new phases under this Programme. It is therefore no use of making significant changes in the managerial set-up for the remaining period of Phase III. However, in a possible New Programme between the two countries the lessons learned from this phase must be taken on board and a more effective and efficient set-up should be considered (see later sections).

On the Norwegian side the overall responsible unit is the Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE) in Pretoria under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The RNE has however just to very limited extent interfered in the running operations of the Programme (and more so in Phase II than in Phase III). Good communication has been maintained with the DEAT managers, but it is mostly in the Annual Meetings that the RNE comments on the content and format of the Programme and the individual projects (with one exception as seen below). It is also noted that the responsible officers in RNA have had different background and personal interests, and thus to various degree have communicated with the DEAT Management on substantial issues regarding programme and project matters. The last and present Programme Officer has a technical and environmental background and is thus almost by default more interested and involved in the sector development issues in the country.

The Ministry of Environment in Norway is the advisor to MFA in all aspects related to environment, when called by the MFA to support (demand-driven), and is present in all the AMs. At the same time MoE is the head ministry for some of the partners in the various projects (DN, SFT) and finally the Planning Department in the MoE is partner in one project. This means that MoE wears several hats in the Programme, and this has been discussed later in the report. There has thus seemingly been a notion amongst some of the programme staff that MoE to some degree has operated as some sort of “coordinator” on the Norwegian side because of this multi-faceted role. Such a role for MoE was also indicated in the pre-appraisal of the Framework Business Plan, where the consultant suggested that MoE should be the “focal point” on the Norwegian side. MoE on the other hand, does not perceive their role as being “coordinator”, but emphasises that due to their role as partner in the environment MoU and as “mother” to the directorates, has felt a special obligation to keep updated on the programme progress. Formally speaking it is the RNA that has the coordinating role on the Norwegian side, as opposed to the practical arrangement in Phase II, when one of the Theme Managers from Norway acted as the Coordinator for the Programme, experienced as very positive by the Norwegian partners. Norad is advisor to RNE as MoE, participating in AMs and other wise consulted as required and requested.

The Project Managers in the various institutions on the Norwegian side have run their parts of the projects in direct cooperation with their project counterparts in RSA. Neither on the Norwegian side there seems to have been some sense of “programme feeling” and a common and joint identity, as the focus has been entirely on the project activities. The lack of a formal and active coordinating body on the Norwegian side might have led to some overlapping work (and may be too high transactions costs) especially connected to delegation travels and joints workshops and meetings. Such costs is however impossible to quantify.

For comments on the reporting format and content, *Section 5.3* refers.

2.6 Programme Steering Documents

The “steering documents” are the officially signed documents that contain the main outline and scope of the Programme and its main objectives, guiding the direction in which the Programme is heading. These documents should be used as reference documents in any new project or effort that is taken onboard the Programme, and as “guiding star” for correct “navigation” at least once a year (in connection with the AMs). Seemingly, the Programme staff have never used the term “steering documents” in any reporting, and have no feel for the term as such. This has however seemingly not hampered the implementation of the Programme in any way, and neither has it created any confusion on either side. The following documents are steering the Programme:

- The Framework Business Plan signed 13.12.2005.
- Addendum No. 1 to the Framework Business Plan signed 21.11.2006.
- The Agreed Minutes from the Annual Meetings.
- Contracts between the partners at project level.
- The agreed Project Business Plans/Project Proposals being part of the Contracts.

It is noted that the Bilateral Agreement between the two countries on development cooperation (signed 2.06.2006) is ranked *above* the listed documents, but this Agreement is of very generic nature and only gives the broad guidance to such cooperation, having few direct practical implications in the projects. Also the Joint Declarations signed are only construed to be guidance for the further work and are merely signed agreements of good intentions at high political level rather than anything else. The MoU between DEAT and MoE from 12.02.1996 is the foundation for the cooperation between the two parties. The specific programme established in the Framework Business Plan is only *one* way of operationalising this cooperation, but the MoU is clearly an independent agreement establishing the cooperation between DEAT and MoE.

3. ASSESSMENT OF OVERALL PROGRAMME PROGRESS AND IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

3.1 Overall Activity Progress and Performance

3.1.1 Introduction. Rating Scale.

In this section the RT briefly assesses the Programme progress and the status related to the standard evaluation elements: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. It should be clear that some of these issues are not possible to fully assess, as this could only be undertaken once the Programme is completed, and in fact some time *after* completion. Thus, a mid-term review of some of the issues has to assess the *likeliness* of degree of success/failure at the end in addition to observing the *real* successes or failures at date. This is commented upon under each of the below main headings.

There are various options of valuating the different aspects of the Programme, and different institutions have various systems⁴. The World Bank had e.g. a system with *five* different scores. This is not fully appreciated by the RT, as it does not force the assessors to decide whether the aspect at stake is on the positive or on the negative side of “the middle line”. UNDP in their Annual Performance reporting has six ratings, which is more appreciated by the RT and will thus be used as far as relevant in the following assessment (with the RT’s refined definition of the meaning of the ratings):

- **Highly satisfactory (HS):** Programme/project has delivered (or is highly likely to deliver) all of its planned results, and has achieved or exceeded *all its major* relevant objectives.
- **Satisfactory (S):** Programme/project has delivered (or is expected to achieve) satisfactory most of its planned results with only a few shortcomings, and has achieved *most of its major* relevant objectives.

⁴ The RT has deliberately chosen a system with rating *scores*, although it might be argued that this is a bit “tabloid”. However, in the assessment of so many projects in one Programme, it should be appreciated that the *relative* “success” of the various projects is interesting to establish, and this would hopefully also be useful for the Programme Management to take onboard in their further discussions on the implementation of the projects.

- ***Marginally satisfactory (MS)***: Programme/project has achieved (or is expected to achieve) some planned results, and has achieved some of its major relevant objectives.
- ***Marginally unsatisfactory (MU)***: Programme/project has achieved (or is expected to achieve) only few of its planned results, and has achieved *only a few of its major* relevant objectives.
- ***Unsatisfactory (U)***: Programme/project has not yielded and is not expected to yield its planned results, and *failed to achieve most of its major* relevant objectives, and thus has significant shortcomings.
- ***Highly unsatisfactory (HU)***: Programme/project has not yielded (and is not expected to yield) any worthwhile development results, and has *failed to achieve any of its major* relevant objectives.

(Under the terms “planned results” and “objective” above is also understood the compliance with planned time schedules, meaning that e.g. unintended delays could be considered a shortfall. This should borne in mind when interpreting the ratings of the RT, as the programme was in most cases delayed by one year).

In order to be able to assess the overall performance of the Programme it is necessary to briefly assess the performance and status of *each of the projects in the Programme*. Without such assessment at project level, the overall programme assessment would be based on too vague speculations. In the following sections therefore, assessment of the status and performance of the projects under each theme is briefly described, as far as this has been possible in the rather short and hectic review period. It has not been possible for the RT to assess each and every activity under each project separately, and neither is this requested in this Review. The ratings given are entirely given based on the subjective overall impression by the RT, and are clearly not based on any structured and objective scientific rating and weighting process. The ratings thus only give some *indications* as to the “real”, and relative performance and progress of the projects, and should clearly *not* be read and construed as a final verdict of a project.

3.1.2 Theme 1: Pollution and Waste

According to the main Steering Document of the Programme, the Framework Business Plan, the theme objectives are:

Theme goal: “*South African national, provincial, local governments are effectively implementing their mandate for Environmental Management in pollution and waste*”.

Theme purpose⁵: “*Robust environmental management structures in place. Air Quality management (AQM), POPs and Integrated Waste Management System in place. Staff skills enhanced and well utilised by their institutions*”.

Reference is made to *Appendix 3* where a brief review and a subjective narrative assessment of all the projects by the RT is presented. The following table summarises the assessment progress and performance for Theme 1 (the one in bolded font has been assessed in more detail than the others, see later report section):

Projects under Theme 1	Assessment of progress and performance
1.1 The Air Quality Act: Air Quality Management Planning Project	HS
1.2 The Development of the South African Air Quality Information System Project (SAAQIS)	S
1.3 Further Development of the Air Quality Management Plan and Action Plan for eThekwin Municipality.	S
1.4 Institutional Cooperation between eThekwin Municipality Water and Sanitation Department and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens Forurensningstilsyn)	S-MS
1.5 Institutional cooperation between DEAT, Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, Buffalo City and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) on integrated waste management systems. 1)	Not started (HU)

⁵ Also referred to as “*objectives*” in the ARs.

1.6 Capacity building for environmental compliance monitoring inspectors (Environmental Management Inspector (EMI) Training). 2)	MU-U
1.7 Elaboration of a National Hazardous Waste Strategy 3)	Not started (U-HU)

1) The RT recommends this project to be stopped, and the funds to be spent for other projects.

2) Will not be completed as planned. The PM must without delay prepare realistic work plan for the remaining project period.

3) Different interpretations of SFT's role in the project have seriously delayed the project. A proposed new study ("Blending Platform") on hazardous waste is supported by the RT, but with SINTEF as partner.

It is very difficult and not really useful to present a final aggregated score for the theme as a whole, as the various projects have different importance and are of different sizes and complexity. It is however noted that the Air Quality Management (AQM) efforts are the most successful and the projects on waste are the least successful ones. The scientific quality of the AQM outputs seems to be of a high standard, also in an international context. At the same time it is noted that the most consistent Business Plans, according to a logframe modality, are with the projects that have achieved the least results and got the lowest scores. This suggests that it is not sufficient to have "good" logframes to avoid delays and misunderstandings between the collaborating parties, and that when designing the project document the logframe needs clearly to be based on a thorough planning process and a mutual basis agreed between the collaborating parties.

3.1.3 Theme 2: Environmental Governance

According to the main Steering Document of the Programme, the framework Business Plan, the theme objectives are:

Theme goal: "South African national, provincial and local government effectively implements their mandates for environmental management".

Theme purpose: "Enhanced institutional capacity for implementation of new and existing legislation with a focus on: Environmental planning and reporting; enforcement of environmental legislation; co-operative environmental governance; environmental impact management; delivery of regulatory services".

It is noted that in the 2008 AR, the goal is listed as "... Promoting strategic inclusion of environmental management of South Africa's natural resources, locate within the municipal space", whereas in the 2007 AR, the formulation conforms with the Framework Business Plan. The reformulation in 2008 is thus considered an unfortunate mishap only, probably having passed without anybody noticing.

Reference is made to *Appendix 3* where a brief review and a subjective narrative assessment of all the projects by the RT is presented. The following table summarises the assessment progress and performance of the RT for Theme 1 (the ones in bolded font have been assessed in more detail than the others, see later sections):

Projects under Theme 2	Assessment of progress and performance
2.1 Youth and Environment	U
2.2 Environment Management within Project Consolidate	MS
2.3 Regional State of the Environment	MS
2.4 Environment and IDP's	S
2.5 Environment Impact Management	S-MS
2.6 Indicator Strategy for Southern Africa	S
2.7 Institutional cooperation between DEAT, GRID-Arendal, Frameworks AS and the Pollution Control Authority on state of the environment reporting	MS-S

It is very difficult and not really useful to present a final aggregated score for the theme as a whole, as the various projects have different importance and are of different sizes and complexity.

3.1.4 Theme 3: Biodiversity and Conservation

According to the main Steering Document of the Programme, the Framework Business Plan, the theme objectives are:

Theme goal: “Promote the conservation and sustainable development of South Africa’s natural resources”.

Theme purpose: “A national system of managing biodiversity and conservation is being implemented. Increased participation of marginalised and local people and groups in cooperative governance, management and equitable use and benefit sharing of natural resources. Promote information sharing with all stakeholders. Contribute to capacity building of relevant departments”.

Reference is made to *Appendix 3* where a presentation from SANBI on their involvement in the projects is enclosed (presented to the RT in Pretoria). It is noted that no project Business Plans have been prepared by SANBI and submitted to DEAT. However, this lack of steering document does not seem to have hampered the project progress (with reference to the “failing” projects under Theme 1, where proper project documents with logframe were developed).

Reference is made to *Appendix 3* where a brief review and a subjective narrative assessment of all the projects by the RT is presented. The following table summarises the assessment progress and performance of the RT for Theme 1 (the one in bolded font has been assessed in more detail than the others, see later section):

Projects under Theme 3	Assessment of Progress and Performance
3.1 Development of programmes to address gaps in Red listing	HS
3.2 Development of national species monitoring strategy	S
3.3 Developing Red Lists into useful decision support products	MS-MU
3.4 Capacity development of individuals and organisations	S
3.5 Development of knowledge sharing networks *)	(S)
3.6 Assessing the impact of commercially released GMO’s on the environment	S
3.7 National Wetland Inventory **)	(S)
3.8 Local Action in Biodiversity Programme	MS

*) No financing from Norway at all.

**) Direct extension of Phase II project (being delayed), with no payments in Phase III, according to the accounts.

It is very difficult and not really useful to present a final aggregated score for the theme as a whole, as the various projects have different importance and are of different sizes and complexity. The overall picture however tells that the rather good performance reported under this theme can be largely attributed to the professionalism of SANBI. It seems the quality of their work is at a very high level, and in compliance with international standards. In general, this theme seems to have higher rate of success than the two other themes.

3.2 Review of Standard Evaluation Elements at Programme Level

Below, the RT has attempted to assess the standard evaluation elements that are normally assessed in any evaluation and review. The assessment follows largely from observations and reported progress of the activities as listed above. It is however difficult to make “weighted” aggregated assessments of the various activities, as they vary in size, characteristics and importance. Also the themes are very different in nature and complexity. An attempt has however been made based on pure subjective judgement from the information that has been made available to the RT, and the RT’s own observations and judgements.

3.2.1 Programme Relevance

Relevance is a measure of whether the original rationale behind the Programme and the objectives still are in keeping with the priorities and requirements of the national and local policy, priorities and needs, and the usefulness of the Programme in this respect. The aspect covers the direction of the Programme and its objectives as compared to possible social and political changes that have materialised since the Programme start-up.

For each project that has been included in the Programme, a so-called Project Alignment assessment has been undertaken. This is to ensure that the efforts instigated are in compliance with the mandated and agreed strategy of DEAT and meets with the Department's *Key Focus Areas* and *Strategic Objectives*. Additionally, compliance with the DEAT *Key Performance Areas and Targets* is assessed. This is indeed a very orderly exercise which forces the various Project Managers to make sure that all activities started are fully in line with the strategy and steering documents of DEAT. The RT will indeed commend DEAT for this effort, and states that this is the first time in any observed country that such alignment is being done systematically.

All the projects are in line with Norwegian development assistant policy and strategic goals, and the RT also concludes that these are in compliance with the high-level agreements signed between the two countries. (HS)

3.2.2 Programme Effectiveness

The *effectiveness* largely describes the Programme progress as compared to the work plans and budgets, and the extent to which the targets (outputs) and objectives have been achieved so far. The prospect of achievement within the remaining Programme period is also relevant in this case. Effectiveness is also used as an aggregate measure of (or judgment about) the merit or worth of an activity, i.e. the extent to which an intervention/Programme has attained, or is expected to attain, its major relevant objectives effectively in a sustainable fashion and with a positive institutional development impact.

As the Programme is the sum of many individual projects, elaborated upon elsewhere in the report, the programme effectiveness will also be the "sum" of the individual projects' effectiveness. As seen above, the effectiveness of the different projects varies a lot, as the projects also vary a lot in nature, size and complexity. Official development assistance to South Africa is typically less than 2% of South Africa's GDP per year. Although Norway is *not* one of South Africa's top ten development partners, it is one of the three main donors within DEAT (along with Denmark and funds from GEF, the latter implemented by the World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, etc.)). According to the most recent *Estimates of Expenditure* (Vote 25: Environmental Affairs and Tourism as prepared by National Treasury), the revised budget estimate for DEAT is ZAR 3,206 million for 2008/09, of which only ZAR 9 million will be provided by foreign governments and international organisations (i.e. less than 0.3% of the budget).

As the assistance from Norway is feeding into and sustaining the mandated and strategic development processes of DEAT (see *Relevance* section above) and this is a tiny input, the effectiveness is also relatively small in DEAT as a whole. However, within the individual project and with the project staff involved, the effect could be substantial and the quality of outputs rather high. A subjective assessment from the RT therefore concludes that the *overall* effectiveness of the Programme during Phase III alone in DEAT has been *Marginally Satisfactory*, with some commendable exceptions in a few projects. Part of the effectiveness is also reflecting compliance with time schedule and the degree of delays (meaning *when* a possible effect was detected). It is noted that the effect of the Norwegian input, especially on the capacity building and the development of the legislative basis for DEAT, was higher during Phase II, being a more intensive cooperation stage of the Programme. The joint effectiveness for the two phases jointly would be closer to *Satisfactory*. (For effectiveness of the partnerships, see Section 5.2 below).

3.2.3 Programme Efficiency

Efficiency is a measure of productivity, meaning comparing inputs against outputs. The term involves the assessment of achievements/results as compared to the input of resources, meaning how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.

Efficiency is difficult for the RT to assess at present, and is in general the most difficult element to assess in any programme. The various projects have various importance, size and complexity, and an aggregated assessment is largely based on the overall subjective “gut feeling” of the RT. Surely, some of the projects have by far delivered what was intended, and in a few projects surely the transaction and preparation costs connected to partnership cooperation have been too high through timely discussions on content and roles between the parties (and with expensive Norwegian time being “wasted”). In a few cases also, the Norwegian partner has not been utilised by the RSA partner to the full and expected extent, of various reasons (mostly that DEAT seems to have the competence in-house or can buy it nationally much cheaper than in Norway). The RT therefore will characterise the efficiency in the Programme to be *MU-MS*, balancing “in the middle”.

3.2.4 Programme Impact

Impact is a measure of all positive and negative consequences/effects of the Programme, whether planned for and expected, foreseen or not foreseen, direct or indirect. Such effects could be economic, political, social, technical or environmental, both on local and national level.

At the time of the Mid-term Review (April-May 2009) it is very difficult to assess the impact of the Programme, as such will mostly be seen some time *after* the completion of the Programme. Especially the capacity building efforts might show tangible impact after some time. It is also understood that the impact is closely related to the *effects* of the Programme, measured in “the effectiveness”, and as such has partly been accounted for under that heading. The AQM projects in eThekweni seem to be the ones that can really show a tangible impact today. However, this is only a *contribution* to the impact (improved air quality in the municipality) as several other factors have also played a role in the integrated efforts to improve air quality. Also the activities under Theme 3 (Biodiversity and Conservation) might clearly have led to various positive environmental impact that has not been accounted for or reported, in addition to the good high quality results delivered by the projects.

It is also clearly understood that the impact *cannot* only be credited Phase III, but also the previous Phase II, or let us for the sake of argument say the total Programme from start up till now. Looking at the Programme as a whole with emphasise on Phase III, the impact is characterised as *MS-S*.

3.2.5 Programme Sustainability

Sustainability is a measure of whether the positive effects (or assumed measurable effects) of the Programme is likely to continue after the external support is concluded, meaning: will the programme process lead to long-term benefits. This is indeed for most Programmes, may be the most important element to be assessed, so also in this case. The sustainability of a Programme is a measure of how the partner country will continue to pursue the objectives following termination of the Programme assistance, and the probability of continued long-term benefits.

Technical sustainability: This is related to the “new” technical skills that have been introduced in the Programme partly through formal training but also through capacity building efforts in general, as staff from the two countries have been working together, been on joint field excursions, and interacted in other ways. In a couple of projects the formal training provided through the Programme has obviously led to enhanced skills and knowledge that will directly benefit the work of DEAT (e.g. Projects 1.1-1.3 and Project 2.7). (*S*)

Institutional sustainability: Institutional sustainability is not directly relevant in this case, as institutional reorganisation and improvements have not been part of the Programme in this phase. However, it has been observed that some capacity building efforts might have led to (unintended) higher staff turnover in DEAT (as with increased knowledge and experience the staff are more attractive for others and they move to “greener pastures”, or are promoted within own institution). This is a problem in many development cooperation projects, as the target institution loses valuable people and experience discontinuity. However, it is realised that the human capacity stays in the country for the benefit of society as a whole. A good example is the three trained staff lost to SANBI under Theme 3, still providing useful support to the Programme and DEAT at large. (*MS*)

Environmental sustainability: The projects directly related to the sustained effects on environment are the

ones related to AQM and the SANBI-led projects on biodiversity. There is no reason why the positive development, and partly effects, should *not* be continued in these cases. It is believed that the improvement of air quality in more cities will follow the good example of Durban/eThekweni, and that the registration of endangered plants and animal species will continue and sustain a richer biodiversity at large in the long-term. (S)

Economic/financial sustainability: Surely, DEAT will continue with most of the activities, as they are part of the DEAT strategy and tasks, well mandated in legislation. The pace with which some of the individual activities are proceeding post-programme will however be reduced, simply due to less funding available. At the same time it is known that the Norwegian support to DEAT is only a very small part of the DEAT resources, so the overall effect will hardly be felt in the Department. (Not Applicable).

Cooperation sustainability: One purpose of the Programme is that “*A platform has been created for long-term and sustained environmental cooperation between Norway and South Africa*”. It is observed (as seen in a later section) that this platform was in fact largely created during Phases I and II, and that the overall cooperation in general seems to have lost some of its momentum in Phase III, with a few exceptions (Project 3.6 being one). As long as the South African side does not feel that there is value added to include Norwegian partners at the project level, they will definitely *not* be included.

The Norwegian input was clearly needed for capacity building, especially under Phase II, and partly to provide Norwegian experience in environmental governance. Now, this clearly comes to end when the South African side have got the outputs they wanted from the cooperation. DEAT will not buy *consultancy* in Norway in the future, unless in areas where Norway has a clear comparative advantage internationally, and when Norway is paying for such service provision. In some cases environmental governance issues in specific fields might be needed for a limited period of time, but again just as long as Norway is “paying the party”. There are other donors ready to chip in with such support any time.

Sustained cooperation with DN, NILU, GenØK, GRID and SFT will clearly *not* continue as long as Norway is not paying for the contribution from the Norwegian side, unless may be on a person to person basis in exceptional cases. These institutions will, similarly to private institutions and companies, *not* give priority to cooperation if there are no funds supplied to sustain it (although even at “at cost” level). This was also clearly pointed out in the pre-appraisal of the Programme in 2005. As such, the sustainability of the cooperation at project level is assumed to be poor. (U)

When it comes to strategic discussions between the two countries at high political level on climate changes, global warming, etc., it is realised that this is driven purely by the political agenda in the two countries and a common interest in fulfilling and adhering to international conventions. This is kept alive at high ministerial level and is not driven by a constrained funding for delegations to meet and talk, either bilaterally or in international forums around conventions to which both parties have committed themselves to be part of. In such cases each country meets their own costs, and not doubt that interaction will, and should, continue regardless of other interventions at project level (S).

3.3 Financial Management. Expenditures and Auditing

3.3.1 Overall Programme Expenditures per March 2009

As per March 2009, ZAR 28.1 million of the funds committed by Norway for the Environmental Cooperation Programme has been spent, i.e. 65% of total budget of ZAR 43.3 million, *Figure 3.1* refers (notably, the initial allocation from Norway was NOK 40 million). Around 75% of the time has elapsed in the Programme to this date. Of this, the largest budget has been allocated to Theme 3: Biodiversity and Conservation (notably Project 3.6 taking the biggest portion), where expenditure was at 60% of the total. However, proportionately, expenditure was highest within Theme 2: Environmental Governance (82%) and the lowest was within Theme 1: Pollution & Waste (58%). *Table 3.1* in *Appendix 1* shows a summary of the budget and expenditures for each project under the three themes.

Although the apportionments are relatively small, most of the Programme Management has been spent (79%). This item only contains the salary of the Programme Administrator (Secretary) and some planning meetings and part of field visit costs. Only ZAR 106,000 of the Planning Reserve (7%) has been spent, as

this item has simply has been a contingency item set aside at the start-up of the Programme for unexpected planning requirements at programme level, but was never used. (This Planning reserve is referred to in Item 4.2.2 of the Framework Business Plan, 15% of the grant).

Expenditure patterns within the three themes vary markedly as illustrated in *Figure 3.2*, with two of the themes failing to spend the budgets available. Expenditure within Environmental Governance has increased significantly over the three years, more or less keeping pace with the increasing available budget each year: 90% of budget spent in 2006/2007; 73% in 2007/2008; and 73% in 2008/2009. However, the same cannot be said for Pollution & Waste, which saw a significant drop-off in expenditure during 2008/2009 despite an increased budget, and only 30% of the available budget was spent in that year. While the expenditure within Biodiversity & Conservation has increased incrementally over the three years, it has also failed to keep up with the increased budget available: 79% of available budget spent in 2006/2007; 55% in 2007/2008; and 35% in 2008/2009.

3.3.2 Expenditures per Theme and Project

a) Theme 1: Pollution and Waste

Within Theme 1 project expenditure against budget varies greatly across projects (*Figure 3.3* in *Appendix I*). For instance, two projects, the development of SAAQIS (Project 1.2) and the National Hazardous Waste Strategy (Project 1.7), have seen no expenditure at all⁶. It is also noted that expenditures has exceeded budget in three projects: Air Quality Act (Project 1.1 with 200% spent); Institutional Cooperation Eastern Cape (Project 1.5 with 140% spent); and Institutional Cooperation EThekweni (Project 1.4 with 107% spent). On the remaining two projects that fall under this theme, expenditure has been less than budget in two projects: EMI Training (Project 1.6 with 18% spent); and Air Quality Management Plan for EThekweni (Project 1.3 with 81% spent). There are reasons for this situation as explained under each of the projects in *Appendix 3*.

With respect to Project 1.2 the budget covers the advisory role of one expert from NILU who has only just started and has therefore spent little time on this project and has yet to invoice the project. It is therefore likely that expenditure will increase on this project throughout 2009. With regards to Project 1.6, as noted earlier in the report (*Appendix 3*) there have been some delays as the result of a new Project Manager in DEAT having only recently come on board; an ongoing stalemate between DEAT and SFT over the role that SFT should be playing in this project; and that there is some confusion over the future direction of this project. In terms of Project 1.7, as noted in *Appendix 3*, there is an ongoing stalemate between SFT and DEAT on the role of SFT and hence why no funds have been spent on this project.

b) Theme 2: Environmental Governance

Under Theme 2 expenditure has been relatively consistent when compared with Theme 1 (*Figure 3.4* in *Appendix I*). Environmental Impact Management (Project 2.5) has received the majority (59%) of the budget allocation under this theme, and it was also one of only two projects where expenditure was less than budget (69%). Institutional Cooperation between DEAT, GRID and Frameworks AS (Project 2.7) was the other project in which expenditure lagged behind budget, in this instance only 36% of the total budget was spent. Across the other five projects (where the budgeted amounts were lower than in the above two projects), expenditure exceeded budget, particularly so in Indicator Strategy for Southern Africa (Project 2.6) where the expenditure was more than double the budgeted amount. Reference is made to *Appendix 3* for review of each of these projects.

c) Theme 3: Biodiversity and Conservation

Expenditure for a number of projects under this theme during 2008/2009 reflects nothing or little spent (*Figure 3.5*). Furthermore, two projects, National Wetland Inventory (Project 3.7) and Local Action in Biodiversity Programme (Project 3.8)⁷, have had no expenditure over the three years. With respect to Project 3.7, this started in Phase II but due to delays was carried over to Phase III. Thus there was a roll-over of funds from Phase II, and in fact the funds were paid to SANBI during Phase II. Nevertheless, the

⁶ As part of Project 1.2, technical equipment, including computer software, was installed at South African Weather Services (SAWS) in March 2009 to house SAAQIS. Expenditure for this will be reflected in the accounts in June 2009.

⁷ Also referred to as "Environmental Biosafety Capacity Building Project" in the DEAT accounting.

project was completed in 2006 by SANBI using these rollover funds and should not have been reflected as part of Phase III at all. With regards to Project 3.8, the project has been continually delayed and final approval was only given for this project in January 2009. Project 3.5 has received no funding from Norway at all, so the RT does not understand why it is included in the list at all.

Addressing the Gaps in Red Listing (Project 3.1) was the one project under this theme that has shown good expenditure against budget, in addition to the performance being very good. All of the budget was spent in the first two years with 66% spent in 2008/2009. However, expenditure on Impact of GMO's (Project 3.6) has struggled to keep pace with increasing budgets over the last two years. Over the past three years there was no budget in 2006/2007 despite expenditure; in 2007/2008 only 36% of available budget was spent; and in 2008/2009 only 46% of the available budget was spent. This is basically caused by the first growing season (2007/08) being lost due to lengthy project preparation and planning, and that the first samples for analysis is coming in from the 2008/09 growing season in April/May 2009.

3.3.3 Financial Flows. Invoicing.

Both the Norwegian partners and the South African institutional partners that are sub-consultants to DEAT invoice DEAT for the services at irregular intervals. In some contracts, regular invoicing intervals were instigated, but due to serious delays and few costs occurring for longer periods the partners are invoicing according to more practical intervals, when a significant amount has accrued in the projects. The Norwegian partners NILU and SFT are also sub-consultants to eThekweni Municipality, and submit their invoices there.

There is no standard invoicing format established under the Programme, and each partner uses the format known to him or the format that has been used in the previous phase of the Programme and to which the parties mutually agreed. It is realised that e.g. NILU and GRID only has one lump sum on the invoice without any breakdown in various cost items or specifying the manpower input during the last period (although GRID is willing to provide such breakdown on request, as their accounting system easily allows for this). The contracts are notably seen as "lump sum contracts", and the South African partner does not at all interfere with the resource input on the Norwegian side as long as the *outputs* of the project are delivered as agreed in (time and quality).

The two mentioned partners claim that there has never been any questions from the South African side on their invoices, so all parties obviously live happily with this modality. However, the invoicing is contrary to invoicing in other countries with which Norway has development cooperation, where the invoices clearly must be specified. (This modality is also understood to be the normal procedure in Governmental agencies in South Africa). With lump sum invoicing it is difficult to see how much resources of various categories have gone into the project (e.g. manpower), and it is difficult to assess the efficiency of any project, or to use the experience from previous projects to plan for new cooperation projects. Such lump sum invoicing does not enhance transparency in the projects, and *might* encourage unhealthy practices of payments between the parties, although no indications of such conduct has been traced in the Programme. Notably, SFT, DN and MoE is splitting the invoice in various categories, which is much more orderly.

In the New Programme planned for, a unified invoicing format should be instigated from the beginning, also making monitoring of the programme for outsiders more easy. Notwithstanding the shortcoming described, the invoices of all the institutions are paid within reasonable time after having been received in RSA, and no *major* complaints have been recorded from the Norwegian side.

3.3.4 Programme Auditing

The Framework Business Plan states "*Audit report for the Programme for the South African Financial Year will be provided to Norway by 30 September each year, the requirements for the audit is described in the Agreement. If South Africa can not provide the audit by 30 September, there should be a written agreement on another date. In accordance with Article 7 of the Agreement, the South African Auditor general or his delegated sub-contractor will perform the audit on Norwegian funds under the Programme and the individual projects*".

The RT has reviewed three audit reports, dated 12 October 2006, 11 July 2008 and 30 September 2008

respectively. These Audit Reports of the Auditor General stress that the financial statements analysed above has “*in all material respects, complied with the accounting and financial reporting requirements stipulated*” of the agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of South Africa. This includes assessing the internal controls, evaluating the appropriateness of the accounting policies, and ensuring compliance with contractual obligations.

Thus, in the opinion of the Auditor General the Programme has more than satisfied the necessary financial and reporting requirements. However, it should be noted that the Auditor General is primarily focused on the actual financial records and does clearly not ask questions about under- and over-expenditures, or why some projects have no expenditures at all. Neither does the Auditor General raise certain questions about overall financial management of the Programme. The Audit Reports were all conducted within the typical time frame for an audit. Projects would typically not be audited unless there was a problem detected, and there is no mention of any being audited in the reports that the RT has seen.

3.3.5 Other Financial Issues

It is noted that the Norwegian partners cover their travel expenses (international flights and subsistence allowance, being night allowance and per diem) based on the prevalent Norwegian Government rates at any time. This is orderly and used in all development cooperation projects/programmes where Norwegian manpower input is paid directly or indirectly by Norwegian funds.

The RT was also informed that when DEAT staff is travelling to Norway, a subsistence allowance is paid according to the policy provisions issued by the Department of Public Service & Administration (DPSA, “FSDCC Circular No. 4 of 2009, Revision of Subsistence and travel Allowance for Official Visits abroad: 01 March 2009”). This is also orderly and the amounts for travel to/in Norway seem reasonable and sufficient. When South African colleagues visit Norwegian institutions, the rule is that they should pay for their own accommodation and food. However, the practice is that out of friendship, hospitality and customary habits the Norwegian side hosts some meals for their South African colleagues. This is an appreciated and encouraged practice.

However, in the invoices from the Dept. for Regional Planning in the MoE (also referred to as “Planning Dept.”, Project 2.5), it is clearly read that the Norwegian side is paying for the accommodation and all the meals of their South African colleagues, whereas at the same time the visiting South Africans are paid personal subsistence allowances, meaning double payment of allowance (but clearly not other travel costs as international flights, etc.) This seems to have been ongoing without anyone raising any questions to the practice. In fact, the two steering documents, the MoU from 1996 and the Framework Agreement, are conflicting at this point. The former states in Article V: “*Unless otherwise arranged, international travel expenses related to such exchanges and cooperative activities shall be borne by the sending Party. In-country expenses shall be borne by the receiving Party on a reciprocal basis*”, whereas the latter implies that travel costs are implicitly covered by the Programme as part of the project budgets (although this is not *explicitly* stated). Direct transport costs are definitely covered by the project budgets, but in the case mentioned, things seem to have “fallen between two chairs”, as the MoE is a partner of the MoU and at the same time the Planning Dept. is partner in the Programme. Although appreciated by all parties, such double payment practice should not be continued.

3.3.6 The Review Team’s Assessment

It is noted that the Programme Management component is a very small part (less than 2%) of the overall budget. However, this clearly only contains *part* of what might be characterised as “management costs”. Surely, managerial staff in DEAT has contributed with their own time (in-kind contribution) in the management of the Programme as a whole and in the various projects, not being accounted for. In addition, other institutions participating in the projects surely have their own management level input, but it is not possible at this stage to establish what the management costs are across these different projects, and to what extent DEAT has to absorb these costs.

Across all three themes there are a number of projects that have shown no expenditure to date. In some instances, as noted above, there are obvious reasons why this has happened, but in other instances it is not as clear. This does therefore beg the question of the link between *monitoring* of project activities and *monitoring* of expenditure. Based on the RT’s observations, this is not as strong as it could be, and that

there is a need for a closer alignment between the monitoring of activities specified in the project business plans and the expenditures. This also applies to instances in which projects have far exceeded budgets, which again raises the question as to whether there are adequate monitoring mechanisms and processes in place to keep a check on expenditure or whether the expenditure only emerges post fact. There are, as mentioned, several good and rational reasons for over- or under-expenditures, but these are not properly documented or readily available to review for e.g. outsiders like the RT. When a budget is changed during a programme period, any reporting (especially the Annual Reports) should clearly list the old and the new budget, and the reasons for the change related to changes in the list of activities.

A further point related to the financial monitoring is the issue of the roll-over of budget from year to year even if no activities have materialised. Especially so, as it places extra *pressure* on projects to spend when many are already battling to spend their budget. For example: a project is only able to spend ZAR 500,000 (out of budget of ZAR 1 million) in Year 1. In Year 2 the project gets the remaining ZAR 500,000 from the previous year plus another ZAR 1 million that had been budgeted for Year 2, and now the project has to spend ZAR 1.5 million. Because the project has a proven and clear history of slow implementation, it gets even further behind in Year 2, and so the problem gets worse over time.

Many of the project staff interviewed by the RT, both within DEAT and within outside institutions, seemed to have a limited communication with the Financial Dept. in DEAT regarding the expenditures on their own project (typically information is requested on a quarterly basis). They claimed that the expenditures recorded in the Financial Dept.'s accounts are not identical to their own records. This is clearly illustrated in the review of individual projects in *Appendix 3*.

This discrepancy between project data and the official financial data should be borne in mind when considering the figures presented above. The Programme Management admits that there are large discrepancies in the accounting at various level, and largely gives two reasons for this:

- There is a substantial time lag from the costs being accrued at project level until it is entered as expenditure in the programme accounts;
- The DEAT accounting has a coding system, where all the various costs are given a unique code when entered into the system, so it is accounted for under the correct account heading. There are reports that on several instances the wrong codes have been used, and thus the expenditure ends up under the wrong project/heading.

The RT considers the above reasons to be serious shortcomings in the programme accounting, especially so when it has created “conflict” between the project staff and the Financial Dept. of DEAT. The project staff in many cases are sceptical about the amounts listed in the official financial records. For these reasons the RT would suggest that a financial exercise be undertaken by the Programme to reconcile the two different sets of financial data (i.e. the project financial data and the programme level data) in order to better understand this discrepancy. With this in mind the RT has to conclude that this aspect of the financial reporting is at present *unsatisfactory*.

4. ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS

4.1 Project 1.3: Further development of the Air Quality Management Plan and Action Plan for eThekwin Municipality

4.1.1 Project Planning and Design

(Initially, in the ToR for the Mid-term Review, Project 1.1 was proposed for more in-depth studies. This proposal was however obviously based on a mishap, as Project 1.1 had no Norwegian partner. Project 1.3, where NILU is the Norwegian partner, was therefore chosen instead).

This project started in Southern Durban area (close to the airport), where the industrial pollution had reached unbearable proportions, especially as this is also a residential area. The Multi-Point Plan (MPP) was launched in November 2000 (beginning of Programme Phase II), and the Norwegian-supported project was part of this effort (“*Capacity building in monitoring and auditing of air quality monitoring network in Durban*”). The first contract between NILU and eThekwin was signed in 2002 as part of the interventions under the Multi-Point Plan (contract sum around ZAR 4.4 million). Extensive Technical

Assistance (TA) and planning software were provided by the Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU), and the Final Report from the project was officially submitted in October 2007.

The MPP formed a good platform for the eThekweni Municipality Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP), Project 1.3, which started at the beginning of Phase III. The project was approved in the 2006 AM, and aims at updating eThekweni Municipality's Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP) and translating the AQMP into an Air Quality Action Plan for the Municipality. Notably, also two universities are involved in the project. The main components of the project are listed to be:

- a) Documenting and identifying gaps for the priority areas, filling in gaps and updating the AEMP (8 activities defined);
- b) Ensuring data quality and improve operational sustainability of the air quality monitoring network (3 activities defined); and
- c) Link the MPP project to the AQMP (3 activities defined).

A backbone in the analysis is the use of the AirQuis model developed by NILU, purchased by the project for this purpose. The total budget approved was around ZAR 3 million over a 2-year period to begin with, but the project has been delayed and another ZAR 600,000 was approved in the 2008 AM, ending up with a total budget of ZAR 3.6 million according to the Project Manager. It is however noted that according to the table from the Financial Dept. in DEAT, the total available budget is ZAR 2,538,000. This discrepancy is not understood by the RT.

The input of NILU in the project is based on a Project Proposal (PP) from 24 November 2006, submitted directly to eThekweni Municipality. This is a comprehensive document where all activities and sub-activities are described in sufficient detail to use it as the main reference document for the implementation of the project. The main objective of the project is formulated as: "*Quantify key problems in air quality in eThekweni, quantify connection between emissions and impact, provide information in relevant form for decision making and help implement the actions pinpointed in the Master Plan*", being merely a listing of the main activities under the project, rather than what will happen *following* the delivery of the outputs. There are five "underlying objectives"/"sub-objectives" listed, but these are also a listing of *activities* to be undertaken and is *not* formally part of the objective hierarchy under a proper LFA formulation. There are eight "tasks" identified, where Task 4 (effects of particulate concentrations in SBD and the origin of the particles) would not be covered by the programme funds, but by the South African-Norwegian Research Collaboration. The PP has a time frame of 2.5 years (as compared to 2 years stated in the programme AR), with a budget of NOK 3,070,130, where NOK 231,266 is coming from the Research Collaboration.

The acceptance of the Project Proposal is in form of a letter from the Tender Section in the Municipality, one year after the PP was submitted (dated 1.10.2007). There is no other contract established for the project between NILU and the Municipality. It is however noted that the 1-page acceptance letter refers to "*this contract*", meaning the letter itself, and also refers to "*your tender*", which is obviously the PP submitted by NILU, not being part of a tender as such. The contract letter states the sum of ZAR 3,360,000, but the budget was as mentioned later changed to ZAR 3.6 million. In spite of several reminders from the Project Manager to the Tender Section, the contract sum in the formal acceptance letter has *not* been changed.

4.1.2 Project Implementation and Progress

There has been many exchange visits between the parties through the years, and *Figure 4.1* in *Appendix 1* tries to capture this. The visits from Norway are driven by demand and progress on the RSA side, and a total of 5-6 staff from NILU have been involved in this phase, with only two of them visiting RSA. Three staff from RSA were trained in 2006/07 in NILU under the project, and from November 2007 to February 2008 an additional person was trained in NILU. In average, NILU has been visiting the Municipality twice per year since 2006. It was noted that the key expert in NILU, who has been following the cooperation from the every beginning, has visited RSA around 35 times from 2000, and has visited the country 10 times during Phase III. There are also frequent contacts between the parties in-between the physical visits (email, telephone and Skype, the latter being virtually free-of-charge), and the PM in eThekweni make proper notes of each such conversation, which is very orderly.

As per March 2009, the Project Manager assessed the work to be around 50% completed, and around 50% of the funds were claimed to have been spent. He however also claimed that it is difficult to assess the progress, as the activities are to a most extent continuous. According to the Financial Dept. in DEAT however, around 81% of the total budget has been spent per March 2009, a discrepancy not understood by the RT. The completion date of the project is not known, but somewhere in 2010/11 has been indicated, with an assurance that by March 2010 all the funds would have been committed. Amongst others, NILU will do another training course because there has been staff turnover on the RSA side, and will also participate in the audit of the monitoring network and the operation of this. In general, it is observed that the NILU advisors had much frequent trips to RSA during Phase II than under Phase III, gradually being reduced.

4.1.3 Review of Standard Evaluation Elements

The RT has below tried to assess the standard evaluation elements of the project:

- a) Relevance: As mentioned in *Section 3.2.1*, all the initiatives under the Programme are very relevant to the mandate and work of DEAT, and compliance checks assure this. The efforts are in line with Norwegian development assistance policy. (HS)
- b) Effectiveness: The project is a direct continuation of the work in Phase II, comprising detailing the AQM plans. It is believed that the results will be delivered as planned, although the Project Proposal has its shortcomings. The project has undertaken 80% of the work per March 2009 (according to DEAT). (S)
- c) Efficiency: Difficult to assess. All project parties are satisfied with the cooperation, but the number of hours from NILU and the Municipality is not recorded (at least not readily available to monitor). The invoicing from NILU is on a lump sum basis only. (MS)
- d) Impact: The impact of the MPP, to which NILU contributed and the Norwegian funding was used, has improved air quality in Southern Durban area. Norwegian supported CB seems to be successful as Norwegian TA is gradually phasing out through Phase III. (S)
- e) Sustainability: Institutional and technical sustainability is reached mostly through the CB in Phase II, and partly in Phase III. AQ monitoring will continue without Norwegian funding and the environmental sustainability will also benefit. Additional training by NILU will take place the last project year. (S)

4.1.4 Overall Project Assessment

It is noted that the PP is very much directed towards technical aspects, and this really proves NILU's professional knowledge and state-of-the-art experience with the issues at stake in such planning projects (undertaken in several other places in the world). In the RT's opinion however, the PP has some shortcomings that should have been addressed in order to make the document a full-fledged Project Proposal, according to the standard normally used in development projects supported by the Norwegian Government:

- The elements in the logframe is not properly formulated.
- The various budget items should have been broken down showing the input of the various partners in the project, in order to ease monitoring and evaluation of the project, and to enhance accountability.
- The travel costs are presented in one lump sum only, and should have been specified in more detail in order to ease implementation monitoring.
- Description of the management set-up is lacking.
- A Plan of Operation is lacking, describing the implementation approach and modality to be applied.
- Description of the invoicing and payment procedures are lacking. (Regarding this point, the project partners explained that invoicing just followed the "normal" routines established in the previous phases).

The working modality seems to be completely demand-driven, which is commendable. The municipal staff is undertaking all the work at their own pace and according to own ability, and the Norwegians are advising and supporting as required. The involvement of NILU seems to have added real value to the process from the start, but more so in Phase II than in Phase III. Starting in eThekweni in 2000, the NILU input was substantial. The rate of input has however gradually been reduced as the Municipality built capacity in own ranks through on-the-job training, consultancy and workshoping. The NILU input will be more sporadic in the remaining period of Phase III and the local input comparatively more substantial. The gradual reduction in the visits from Norway really shows that the RSA counterparts are improving the capacity and are more and more independent of the Norwegian advice. This is indeed the most wanted situation and very commendable.

The impact of the Norwegian support through Phase II and III is difficult to single out as there are also other initiatives leading up to the good results seen today in Durban. It seems however that, according to the RSA project partners, the Norwegian support to the air quality management efforts has played an important role in the success. Now, the RSA professionals in eThekweni have a very operational and effective AQ monitoring system with online stations at strategic points in the city giving a continuous update of the air quality situation (briefly demonstrated to the RT). Such monitoring network was previously run by outside institutions, but now the Municipality itself is in control. In fact, the professionals from Durban are now training counterparts in Mozambique in this system, which is indeed a very positive impact.

Regarding the Letter of Acceptance from the Municipality (forming the only contractual link with NILU), the RT understands that this is a standard letter normally issued after tenders, but in this case it is somewhat confusing to outsiders. As the project accounts are not broken down on each task as presented in the PP, it is very difficult (impossible) to follow the progress and expenditures of each activity. This is a shortcoming, as normally the cost accrued should be reported on each budget item as presented in the PP in order to enable proper monitoring. The Project Manager however has an updated overview of how much has been used in total at any one point in time.

The RT appreciates that the project partners know each other from many years of good working relationships, and such partnerships are highly appreciated by everybody. There is however a danger that when projects are extended again and again over a long period of time, and there is a continuous situation with “business as usual”, the partners tend to forget to repeat some of the working modality elements in the new contracts/project documents, e.g. how project management is set-up, how invoicing and payment should be made, etc. It is therefore difficult for outsiders undertaking reviews, evaluation or audits to easily and fully understand how all parts of the cooperation works.

This is especially challenging when it comes to invoicing and getting an overview *how* the funds have been spent and not only *that* they have been spent. Invoicing from NILU to the Municipality is in form of lump sum invoices, gradually drawing down on the agreed contract sum, with no specifications as to the use of man-hours or breakdown of other costs (e.g. international travels and subsistence allowances). NILU is invoicing in Rand, whereas the other Norwegian cooperation partners in other projects are invoicing in NOK. The Project Manager in eThekweni claims that this has been the invoicing procedure for the last eight years and that this has not created any problems to anyone. The project accounts are not split on each task, as in the Project Proposal, so it is very difficult to compare the actual progress and expenditures with the planned one.

An invoice should ideally be broken down at least to a few main items, also referring to the initial budget with the remaining available budget listed. This would make monitoring of the project much easier, and would enhance integrity and a transparent accountability regarding the use of funds. Lump sum payments between “good old friends” is not necessarily the best way to show this and might in principle pave the way for “unhealthy” practices if the parties so want in a project. In this case however, the RT has no (repeat: no) indications as to any such practices.

It is understood that part of NILU’s role in the project has been to protect the RSA partners against so-called “box-pushers” (companies who want to sell “black boxes” that they claim can solve everything for the client). This is a commendable role that seems to have had positive impact in the Municipality. It is further noted that NILU also has had other engagements in RSA during this period, e.g. the preparation

of an AQM Planning Guide with Danida funds, won in competition with national companies. NILU has also been involved in various initiatives under the Research Programme (DDT/malaria, Mercury, lark project, crocodile death in Kruger), and has initiated the establishment of a local company in Durban, UMOYA-NILU (see *Box 4.1*).

Overall assessment of the project: *Satisfactory*.

Box 4.1: UMOYA-NILU

This air quality consulting company was established in 2004 by three private persons and NILU, where the latter has supported with equipment and advisory services. The company has at present seven full-time employees and with a non-white South African director on the board who holds 40% of the company's shares. The company has a full portfolio of projects, and are looking for opportunities to expand its staff and services, in a market where experts in AQM are few. The income to the company comes mainly from the public sector today, whereas the private sector income was more prevalent in the start-up period.

uMoya-NILU's mission is to provide clients with Air Quality Management Solutions that are well researched, appropriate, and sustainable. The experience residing in the company has been developed through their involvement in operational air quality management and in consulting and research projects over a collective period of more than 25 years. uMoya-NILU's diverse and experienced team offers services in the following fields relating to air quality management: Air Quality Management planning and implementation; Specialist Studies; Emission Reduction Planning; Emission Inventories; Ambient Monitoring, Calibration Services; Air Quality Analytical Services, and various Training Courses. The company is in the process of setting up a calibration facility for air quality monitoring equipment, and will apply for accreditation.

The uMoya-NILU website and info given to the RT

4.2 Project 2.5: Environment Impact Management

4.2.1 Project Planning and Design

The cooperation between the Planning Department in MoE in Norway and DEAT started already from the beginning of Phase II (around 2000) and has been maintained all through the two phases as a continuous process. The MoU from 1996 forms the basis for MoE's overall involvement in the Programme. The background was the lack of proper EIA regulations and management in RSA, as all such environmental assessments were voluntary before the Environmental Conservation Act in 1989. Regulations to this act were developed in parallel to the development of the new act through the 90s. From 2000, MoE assisted in the law reform process at large, and specifically in the development of the NEMA (National Environmental Management Act) regulations, partly with an advisor from Norway working 2 months continuously with DEAT staff during Phase II (named "Phase 1" by the project staff, and Phase III is called "Phase II"). In July 2006, the NEMA regulations finally came into force.

Phase III focused on the implementation of the system, and the parties maintained good relationship during the planning of Phase III, and this was clearly a joint effort. As part of the Theme Business Plan (BP), an *outline BP* of the project was developed in May 2006. A 2-page brief project description was attached to the 2007 AR, in which meeting the project was approved, being the basis for further detailed planning and work, and as such also being the official "steering document" to start with. On 21 August 2008 a Draft Business Plan was finally submitted by DEAT to MoE for comments. The "Final" version of the BP seems to be the *internal* Business Plan of the Theme 2 Manager, not submitted to the MoE or "officially" approved.

The project objective (in the Draft BP) is "*to contribute to improved environmental impact management in South Africa in the long-term*". The project contains the following outputs (not outlined in the initial project description from 2007, but outlined in the Draft BP):

1. To review the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental impact assessment (EIA) as a tool or environmental management in South Africa. (Norw. Funds: ZAR 1,173,687). Started January 2008.
2. To develop a fee and fines structure for EIA. (Norw. Funds: ZAR 300,000, National funds: ZAR 200,000). Started in May 2006.
3. To develop self-regulation mechanisms for registration of EIA practitioners. (Norw. Fund: ZAR 211,732, National funds: ZAR 1,696,681). Started in March 2005.
4. To develop a national Environmental Assessment System (NEAS) to be web-based electronic database that assist environmental authorities with the capturing, tracking and reporting of EIA applications. (Norw. Funds: ZAR 620,000, National funds: ZAR 1,500,000).

5. To develop a decision support tool in the form of an Environmental Management Framework (EMF) for a selected area along the Garden Route, National Lakes Area. (Norw. Fund: ZAR 800,000). Started February 2008.
6. To identify environmental attributes, geographical areas and activities in terms of Section 24(2) of the National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act. No. 107 of 1998) and the identification of environmental attributes and geographical areas for off-road recreational driving. (Norw. Fund: ZAR 800,000). Started January 2008.
7. Technical cooperation regarding environmental impact management between the Norwegian Ministry of Environment (NMOE) and DEAT's Chief Directorate: Environmental Impact Management. (No budget provided, as each party will cover own cost).

The total available budget according to the above sums should be ZAR 7,302,100, whereas the accounts in DEAT show a total available budget of ZAR 7,889,881. This discrepancy is not fully understood by the RT, but is likely to be result of exchange rate fluctuations. The Draft Business Plan is very orderly structured, with aim and outcomes listed under each output, and with the activities listed in phases with respective timelines.

4.2.2 Project Implementation and Progress

The implementation is entirely the responsibility of the RSA side and is driven by the capacity of the DEAT staff at any time. The interaction with the MoE (largely Output 7), and partly DN as sub-consultant to MoE, is merely just *one* supporting element of the activities. *Figure 4.2 in Appendix 1* tries to illustrate the intensity of direct interactions in the project by showing the various delegations that have visited the other country during the project. Most of the interactions between the partners have been concentrated around the delegation travels with some follow-up contact afterwards. The RSA side reports on the project progress prior to the visits and most of the substantial exchange of views and experience takes part *during* the meetings of the delegations.

Obviously, the frequency of interactions in-between the delegation travels was more intense during Phase II and was significantly reduced following the completion of the NEMA Regulations (July 2006). Notably however, one of the main inputs from the Norwegian side thereafter was the key speaker from MoE in the November 2008 conference marking 10 years of EIA in RSA. The DEAT staff claim that they will utilise the expertise of the MoE staff for more advice on the work on diversifying the EIA tools (simpler EIAs for simpler smaller projects, “(We will) use the Norwegian guys again, to tap their brains”). This will also include having a Norwegian member of the Advisory Panel on formulation of the New Strategy for EIA for the next five years. So far the input of MoE in the project has been around 650 hours (3.8 man-months) since 2006, and the input of DN around 150 hours (less than one man-month). It is understood that MoE is also spending time that is not invoiced DEAT on the cooperation,

The last progress update from March 2009 (a 4-page table), and the draft narrative reports from each of the activities, are difficult to comprehend for an outsider, as the nomination of the activities are *not* identical to the nominations listed in the Business Plan (meaning: the reporting has not been done directly on the Business Plan outputs). Upon special request from the RT, the PM in DEAT has given feedback on the progress directly on the outputs, summarised below (with the PM's assessment of performance also indicated):

- Output 1: The Draft Report was compiled. The Final Close-out Report is to be completed and signed off by DEAT. (Overall progress is satisfactory).
- Output 2: A Workshop with provinces and National Treasury was held in November 2008. Inputs from provinces on organizational structure were received. A draft Fee Structure is being developed. Priority given to finalisation of proposed amendments to regulations is causing delays, (but overall progress is very satisfactory).
- Output 3: The Qualification for Environmental Impact Assessment was registered with South African Qualifications Authority in November 2008. The Draft Proposal for the establishment of a Registration Authority was published for public comment. Registration of EAPs qualification by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) was an onerous process, involving complicated internal procedures within SAQA. A big challenge foreseen is the implementation cost of this initiative, (but overall progress with the EAPs project is very satisfactory).

- **Output 4:** The system is reported to be 100% error free and operational. Most of the errors currently reported are not system-based, but IT infrastructure related. Training for 2008/09 has been completed at the end of September 2008. Four provinces (KwaZulu-Natal, Free State, Mpumalanga and North West) indicated their needs in terms of IT infrastructure. The NEAS implementation and procurement plan were prepared in time in consultation with provinces, and approved. Provinces often experience high staff turnover. Some provinces have no administrative staff to capture backlog applications. All four provinces have proposed interventions to address the IT infrastructure issues. (The NEAS project is progressing well).
- **Output 5:** All maps were completed. All information catered to public involvement meeting held. Public feedback and comments were incorporated. All Draft Environmental Sensitivity maps were completed. Final documents will be completed and ready for gazetting by October/November 2009. There might be some time delay with the implementation of this due to the gazetting process (publication in RSA's Government Gazette). (Overall progress is excellent).
- **Output 6:** Sensitive environmental attributes were identified and mapped. Geographical areas based on attributes were identified and mapped. Activities linked to each geographical area were identified. Draft listing notices were prepared and are ready for gazetting for stakeholder comment. A challenge is the developing and implementation of supporting structures for distribution of map and activities. The relevant guideline has been prepared and is available. (Overall progress is excellent).
- **Output 7:** All the technical project meetings and EIA related site visits, were valuable and beneficial from DEAT's perspective to foster and further improve relationships with the Norwegian counterparts, to report back and obtain feedback and comments regarding donor funded EIM projects, to share experiences, learn and interact about international developments and views in the EIA sphere and to build capacity (during 2007 and 2008 also within the environmental departments of all nine our provinces).

According to the DEAT accounting system, around 70% of the budget has been spent per March 2009. It is understood that the project is generally progressing relatively well, although all activities have experienced significant delays. The main reason for these delays is due to national consultation processes and staff constraints.

Box 4.2: EIA backlog

The large number of construction applications that needed EIAs created a serious backlog in handling (as all projects, small and large need to have the same comprehensive EIA). By hiring consultants in the provinces (partly by Danish and own funds), and by hiring three consultants to work in DEAT centrally (from SOE Fund created by private enterprises and ESCOM to speed up their applications), the backlog has been significantly reduced. However, now (May 2009) the backlog is building up again. The implementation of the next 5-year strategy will increase the workload of the DEAT staff, but thereafter, when the tools are more diversified (simpler EIAs for smaller simpler projects), the workload is expected to reduce, as the staff will "work smarter".

The Review Team

4.2.3 Review of Standard Evaluation Elements

It is noted in general that the processes in DEAT on EIA management is continuous and also supported by own funding. It is therefore difficult to single out the results of the Norwegian funds alone. The RT has nevertheless below tried to assess the standard evaluation elements of the project. :

- a) Relevance: As mentioned in *Section 3.2.1*, all the initiatives under the Programme are very relevant to the mandate and work of DEAT, and compliance checks assure this. The efforts are in line with Norwegian development assistance policy. *(HS)*
- b) Effectiveness: All project activities have been delayed according to the BP, of various reasons (interaction with provinces, limited human resources internally in DEAT, etc.). Useful delegation exchanges. Results will probably be delivered as planned. *(S)*
- c) Efficiency: Difficult to assess. The EIA work is a continues mandated process in DEAT, where the Norwegian funds are supporting parts of the efforts. The utilisation of MoE staff seems not to have been optimal professionally.. *(MS)*
- d) Impact: Continuous process in DEAT of improving EIA management tools (see *Box*

4.2). Impact of this will come after a few years when tools are diversified and simplified. Impact from delegation exchange has led to some good ideas for RSA, but still a long way to go. (MS) (The impact during Phase II seemed to have been more satisfactory).

e) Sustainability:

The continued cooperation (Output 7) is entirely depending on funding from Norway (paying the Norwegian input). Without the support DEAT would use own sources for continuation of the key project efforts, or approaching other donors. The Norwegian part of the project is thus not sustainable (U), but the mandated processes in DEAT are sustainable and continuous, although moving slowly. (S)

4.2.4 Overall Project Assessment

The RT observes that the processes and activities in DEAT on EIA management is part of the department's mandated work, where the Norwegian funds have been boosting the process. The input of the Norwegian partners is completely dependent on the Norwegian Government paying for the input of the Norwegian partners. Without this funding, RSA would obviously *not* buy Norwegian advice. It is however observed that the Norwegian advisory services and the professional work in the project seem to be at a high scientific level.

The staff from DEAT are meeting with their Norwegian counterparts twice a year, where field visits to selected areas are included to inspect and learn from various development projects related to EIA, in addition to joint meetings on topics identified by the RSA side. Most new issues are taken up across the table when the staffs meet, and both parties seem to be satisfied as to the high professional level of the discussions and the good communication when sitting around the table. This is in principle the most appropriate working modality and it is fully demand-driven and based on equal partnership. The RT however concludes that the potential value added from the cooperation is not fully exploited in this Phase III, and not to the expectations of either of the parties, as intended at the start-up of this phase. The Norwegian side seems to have had a much more substantial input in the previous Phase II (the law reform process), and this professional part of the advisory seems to have been gradually reduced in Phase III, especially in the periods between the face-to-face meetings. This has nevertheless been an overall wanted effect from a development cooperation perspective (like in any other similar project with Norwegian advisors).

The cooperation during Phase III is however characterised as a “mutually beneficial relationship” between equal partners, and the mode of cooperation is considered good by both parties. The Norwegian side however feels that they are not fully used as professional advisors in EIA management, as too much time and resources seem to go into planning and implementation of delegation visits, especially to Norway. The RSA side also confirms that they are not utilising the Norwegian competence fully, and the RT believes this has largely to do with the fact that DEAT staff in this department are continuously fire fighting to get on top of daily tasks (in spite of hired consultants supporting the staff continuously), and have little time left to even arranging for involvement of the Norwegians. The RT also believes that the capabilities of the RSA staff are at a relatively high level and that they simply feel they do not need so much “advice” from Norway in their work, but merely national consultants to help in delivering concrete outputs. For special minor tasks however, they claim to need such advice (as long as it is free-of-charge). Obviously, the Norwegian EIA system is to a large extent based on subjective assessments from case to case, and here RSA *should* have a lot to learn in order to make the work more effective and efficient.

The partnership cooperation in this field should be considered ended with Phase III, although being at a high professional level, as it simply seems to be phasing itself out “by default”. In case it continues in any form, the expectations on either side should be clear from the beginning. The Planning Dept. in the MoE emphasises that they would like to participate in a further cooperation, as they see a potential for instance as partners to DEAT in their formulation of the new strategy for EIA in the next 5 years. They also point to the development of climate issues in environmental impact assessments (EIA), where MoE is involved in revising the Norwegian regulations on EIA, and they believe that this will probably be an issue of international interest in the coming years, also in line with the intended future cooperation between the two countries in the environmental sector.

The RSA partner also claims that it would be “*a sad loss should the cooperation on EIM be terminated at the end of Phase III*”. They claim that a natural “progression” of the EIA system opens the door for further work in SADC as well as a continuous review and improvement of the EIA system in RSA. The RSA partner also believes that they have a lot to offer in an “exchange” relationship to the Norwegian counterparts and that this could be valuable “pay-back” for the important contribution to the development of the RSA EIA system. These views are appreciated by the RT, but stresses that such cooperation must be considered with fresh eyes in view of the scope and content of the possible New Programme, now being discussed.

In case the RSA side only needs exposure and support with logistics during field excursions in Norway, which of course could be a useful input to their efforts in EIA, then the arrangement of such encounters (logistics) should *not* be the burden of highly educated professionals in MoE.

It is also noted that the project Business Plan came very late in the project, in fact too late to be a *real* steering document. It seems that the BP merely captures the details of the various activities as the project proceeds, and merely constitutes an implementation reporting need. The BP in the present draft form was obviously not a requirement from the RSA side, but is claimed by the RSA staff to come from the Norwegian side (BP of August 2008). Nevertheless, the preparation of the BP seemed to have been a useful exercise for the RSA staff, in order to clarify and document matters and processes implemented internally in the project.

The BP also clearly holds a high scientific standard and should serve as a useful reference document, also for similar efforts in the future. A question is however if this was really required (did it give significant added value), as a detailed plan for EIM is already included in the Chief Directorate’s Business Plans in DEAT, being part of the institution’s normal management and monitoring processes. Although the less-than-expected professional dialogue holds a high professional level, there is nevertheless a potential to improve reporting in this project, making it easier for external reviewers (and hopefully others) to follow the project through from the beginning. The formulation of outputs must be consistent all through the project. *Overall assessment: Satisfactory - Marginally Satisfactory* for Phase III alone. By assessing both Phase II and III jointly, the assessment would be *Satisfactory*.

4.3 Project 2.7: Institutional cooperation between DEAT, GRID-Arendal, Frameworks AS and the Pollution Control Authority on state of the environment reporting

4.3.1 Project Planning and Design

The cooperation between the partners in this project started in the mid-90s during Phase I of the Programme. GRID-Arendal came in through being a UNEP Collaborating Centre (being the first in the world with a digital SOE report in 1994), and e.g. responsible for SOE reporting in Norway. The initial intention was that RSA should build up a similar centre as GRID, but eventually this idea was abandoned. During Phase I, GRID trained DEAT staff in the use of Internet, setting up websites, etc. The sub-consultant of GRID (Framework AS, at that time part of the Ugland Group) developed software for SOE reporting for the four largest cities in RSA (2000, PublicIT). Also SFT was in as partner in the first phase. During Phase II, GRID and partners supported in capacity building and development of the provincial SOEs.

The project in Phase III is clearly a direct continuation of the efforts under Phase II. DEAT and GRID developed a project concept paper (11.05.2007), which became part of the 2007 AR and approved in that AM. This is understood to be the Steering Document for the project, as the parties have been working according to this plan. However, none of the parties obviously construed this as the sole basic document for the project. It is also noted that although SFT is mentioned in the name of the project, the institution is *not* a partner in the project and have never been included in any discussions or otherwise consulted. This is somewhat confusing, and the name of the project should have been more refined and thought-through from the beginning. (The RT believes that the inclusion of SFT might have been of “tactical” reasons to

start with). There is no contract signed between the parties on the project, and there is no logframe prepared for the project as a whole, with no goal and purpose formulated explicitly. However, objectives are attempted formulated for the main activities in the project.

The project comprises the following main activities/components:

- a) Digimaker development: with the objective of further developing and enhancing the State of Environment Internet Portal and management system, with work initially planned for June/July 2007⁸. This work was largely undertaken by the sub-consultant to GRID, Frameworks AS, located in the same offices as GRID. A document describing in detail what this activity contained was finalised by Framework in Sept. 2007, following the meeting between the parties in Arendal.

Notably, an “Update and change specification” was submitted by Frameworks on 28 April 2009, based on the specifications worked out in the WS in 10.09.2008. The aim of the upgrade is to “provide for better administrative features and a more solid and updated development platform for developing future needs”. This work is estimated to take 160 hours with a cost of ZAR 170,000, being part of the initial budget for the project. This direct contract between DEAT and Frameworks AS was suggested by DEAT in order to make the planning and management of these activities simpler and more effective and efficient, as GRID did not have any part in them. The work should start in September and end in November 2009. Although this administrative procedure was contrary to what had been agreed earlier, it was indeed a pragmatic solution, also reducing transaction costs on the Norwegian side. The arrangement again underlines the reduced project importance played by GRID in Phase III.

- b) Sharing of experiences in developing single entry Internet portal on the State of Environment: with the objectives to share experience, discuss possible solutions and identify further areas of cooperation in this area.
- c) Vital graphics on the State of Environment in South Africa for capacity Building: with the objectives of building capacity in producing “vital graphics” on South African environmental issues, in specific to increase awareness of the SOE of South Africa and to build capacity of DEAT in communicating through graphics. Proposal submitted by GRID 8 June 2007

It is noted that the project document has budgets for b) and c) (NOK 304,000 and NOK 331,486 respectively) but not for a), which must have been a mishap only. The budget for the total project in the DEAT accounts is set as ZAR 1,694,000.

Box 4.3: Vital Graphics

In order to inform environmental and development policy-making processes, UNEP keeps under review the state of the world environment. UNEP’s environmental assessments, such as the Vital Graphics series developed by UNEP/GRID-Arendal, are fundamental communication initiatives that promote the interaction between science and the various stages of the policy and decision-making cycle. They reduce complexity but add value by summarizing, synthesizing and illustrating critical environmental issues. Graphical elements form the core of the Vital Graphics series. They are supported by concise text. They also identify consensus by sorting out what is known and widely accepted from what is not known or not agreed. Vital Graphics packages are an ideal tool for mainstreaming environmental issues, in other words, for preaching to the ‘non-converted’.

Mainly from the GRID website

4.3.2 Project Implementation and Progress

Figure 4.3 in Appendix 1 tries to capture the main physical interactions between the project partners, meaning the events where delegations from the two countries have visited each other for training and meetings. Also the encounters that were “hangovers” from Phase II, but that went on during the Phase III period, are shown. The first main joint work on Vital Graphics (VG) was the workshop in Pretoria in March 2008 and the second workshop in Arendal in September 2008. In-between, there have been several consultation on this activity, and also on the Digimaker activity, although most of that component was completed under Phase II.

The Internet Portal started working in July 2007. However, a special event changed the priority of the project in an early stage: the Digimaker server crashed in July 2007 and there was no backup of the files taken in RSA. GRID had an older backup and Frameworks AS was instrumental in establishing the

⁸ Which indeed is an activity and *not* an objective, according to the LFA modality.

Digimaker again, which took 3-month efforts for the parties. At the same time the governmental website changed, and DEAT had to adapt to conform to this new set-up, taking unexpected resources. Following a period with email communication it took one more year before the solution was almost fully operational (the final document from September 2008). Some issues still remains on Activity a) and these will be completed within the Programme (see above, the additional description from April 2009).

There has been no movement at all on Activity b). DEAT claims that when the key project person in GRID (who had followed the Programme from the very beginning) was allocated other tasks in the institution, this effort stopped. The proposal for this activity also initially came from the Norwegian side, and it was in this activity that SFT could have played a role. A workshop last year decided to put it on ice, simply meaning to cancel it. Reallocation of these funds have to be taken up in the 2009 AM.

It is noted that the person responsible for the VG activity in GRID quitted and started her own company in Belgium. In order to continue the work with her, a sub-constancy contract was drawn up, and the only part of that activity remaining in GRID was the technical graphics part. Consequently, a new coordinator took over in GRID in 2008, but he is not directly involved in any of the activities, just administrating the input from Frameworks AS (which has ended) and from the VG consultant. The role of GRID itself in the project has therefore been reduced to a minimum. According to the DEAT accounts, only around 36% of the initial budget has been utilised per March 2009. This seems to be too little as compared to the statements from the DEAT PM, who claims that around 50% has been spent.

4.3.3 Review of Standard Evaluation Elements

The RT has below tried to assess the standard evaluation elements of the project:

- a) Relevance: As mentioned in *Section 3.2.1*, all the initiatives under the Programme are very relevant to the mandate and work of DEAT, and compliance checks assure this. The efforts are in line with Norwegian development assistance policy. (HS)
- b) Effectiveness: The project has been delayed, partly out of reasons beyond the control of the management (e.g. server crash). Results will be delivered as planned, except for the whole Activity b). 60% of staff trained in DEAT in VG has quitted, thus institutional CB effect is not as expected, although improved compared to previous situation. (MS)
- c) Efficiency: Difficult to assess. All project parties have done their best to utilise the funds in the most efficient way under the prevalent circumstances, even with unexpected challenges coming up. (S)
- d) Impact: Continuous process of Digimaker development from previous phase, giving good results/reports. VG training has had a good start, but not enough CB yet. Negative impact from staff leaving DEAT. (MS)
- e) Sustainability: Institutional and technical sustainability not yet reached within planned project, with too ambitious plans. Additional training in VG required for staff to boost activity and secure sustainability. (MS, provided such additional training is given.)

4.3.4 Other Project Issues

Frameworks AS has copyright on the Digimaker software, and DEAT has purchased this license directly from the company, through a contract signed 1.04.2009 with duration of 12 months, independent of and for funds *outside* the Programme (subscription fee - €4,500 per year; technical service fee - €2,000). It is also understood that DEAT in 2008 drew up contract directly with Frameworks for additional development of the Digimaker *beyond* what was agreed in the project (NOK 80,000). This was also done by practical reasons, as GRID had no part in the work.

4.3.5 Overall Project Assessment

Although the project has faced some problems and has been delayed, it is believed that the outputs will be delivered as planned during the Programme, except for Activity b) that will not be delivered at all. The cooperation in the project have seemingly been good and professional, but with some “gaps” in the communication following shifting of responsible staff in GRID, especially after around 2005 (Phase III), losing some of the institutional memory of previous phases and how things developed. At large the cooperation in the early phases has been characterised as “better” than today, and surely more extensive during Phase II than during Phase III. Having said that, the quality of the work undertaken in the Digimaker and Vital Graphics activities seems to be at a high professional international level.

The RT notes that five staff in DEAT was trained in VG; but three of them have quitted DEAT. New staff is about to be recruited, but these are inexperienced and new capacity (CB) building is required. It is also understood that the two remaining trained staff in DEAT also need more exposure in the formulation of the text in VG (“*scientist are not journalists*”), but especially on the graphics part. The two key staff in DEAT are also managers in the institution, so they have other tasks on their shoulders, and cannot dedicate too long periods of time only to the VG presentations. DEAT thus remains with too little capacity to go forward with their plans on making VG presentations for various topics, notable Climate Change and Biodiversity having priority. It is also noted that expectation in the beginning of the project was too high as to which level of capacity could be reached in DEAT during the project. The matters at stake have been more complicated to take onboard than initially anticipated by both parties.

The RT also notes that a proportionately small part of the budget has been spent. In order not to “lose” the funds when there is a clear need for more capacity building (expressed both the Norwegian and South African side), the RT strongly recommends that DEAT without delay contacts GRID and the sub-consultant on VG and explores the possibilities of having another training programme in VG with the DEAT staff within the programme period. This training should preferably use the urgently needed Climate Change and Biodiversity presentations as case studies during the training, in order to “feed two birds with one seed”.

It should be fully possible to undertake this additional and repeated training before the Programme closes. Seemingly, also other national institutions (consultant could implement such training, and DEAT is of course free to choose purchasing these services locally. It is however believed that as DEAT and the Norwegian partners already has a good working relationship and as time is a critical factor here, that present cooperation should continue also in this additional training within the Programme. The option of contracting the preparation of presentation material to outside consultants (which is indeed possible in theory) is thus not recommended, because then the DEAT CB, which initially has been the driving force behind the project, would be largely lost. The training workshops should preferably take place in RSA to get the most of the funds available.

Like in Project 1.3, GRID is invoicing DEAT with a lump sum invoice only, but claims that if requested, more detailed invoices might easily be produced, as their accounting system has this modality. DEAT has however never asked for such detailed invoices. It is interesting to note that, as with NILU and eThekweni, the cooperation between DEAT and GRID has a long history. Especially during Phase I and Phase II, the partners (also individuals) came to know each other well, and cooperation modality developed at this stage has been carried into the last phase without this having been concluded in any written agreement/contract. The lump sum invoicing, where DEAT does not ask for a breakdown of the costs, is between “old friends” who trust each other. Although this is working to both parties satisfaction, it is *not* very orderly from a formal point of view.

DEAT should therefore following consultations with GRID and partners prepare a proposal for this extended CB activity and present this to the AM in June for approval. *Overall assessment: Marginally Satisfactory - Satisfactory.*

4.4 Project 3.6: Assessing the impact of commercially released GMOs on the environment

4.4.1 Project Planning and Design

The Directorate for Nature Management (DN) and Centre for Biosafety (GenØk) notably did not play a part in Phase II of the Programme, but DN gave some smaller input to the MoE as being part of the Norwegian “Directorate Group” (under Theme 5 at that time). This project was *not* included in the initial list of projects when Phase III started, although the subject had been discussed during the 2004 workshop as a relevant topic to be taken onboard the Programme (“*SA/Norway cooperation on the Biosafety Protocol has improved knowledge and information sharing*”). Also, one Deputy Director from DEAT attended the GenØk Biosafety Course in Tromsø during July/August 2004 and the issue of possible cooperation under the Phase III environmental programme was raised at that time. The next direct contact between the parties was during a presentation held at DN in Trondheim on biosafety in September 2006 during the South African delegation’s visit. This delegation also visited GenØk in Tromsø and received information on their operations (but this was notably not the persons involved in the project later on, as they did not have this particular background).

The starting point for discussions of possible cooperation was that biosafety is a relatively new science in RSA.. The interest for cooperation was strengthened during the 2006 encounter and obviously there were leftover funds from Phase II of the Programme to start activities. The Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria invited DEAT to prepare a project outline and consequently a one-year project (“*GMO Impact Study Project*”) with a budget of around ZAR 1 million was started as part of Phase II (actually the *extension* of the phase). This project was undertaken by the Biosafety Unit in DEAT alone, a unit established in 2005, supported by three universities in RSA.

The Norwegian Embassy also encouraged DEAT to formulate a project under Phase III, within the frame of ZAR 6 million, which was not utilised or committed by other projects during the first year of Phase III. The project staff in DEAT however claimed that they misunderstood this and thought the mentioned sum *only* should cover the South African participation and that a similar sum would cover the Norwegian input in the Project. Thus the project proposal that was prepared had a budget of around ZAR 14 million, despite the fact that there was no initial budget allocation. It should also be noted that an interest had been expressed by the MoE in a statement that mentioned “*SA National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan being a good basis for cooperation on implementation of legislation. MD is particularly interested in co-operation on Access and Benefit Sharing and Biosafety/Cartagena protocol*”. This is the project with by far the highest budget in the Programme at present, and the project in principle will be nurtured on the funds not spent by other projects. The project was approved for funding in the 2007 AM, where also the results from the previously funded GMO Impact Study Project was presented.

The contract between DN and DEAT was signed on 17.01.2008 (ending in December 2010) and the Business Plan is dated the same day, being an annexure to the contract. The Goal of the project is formulated as: “*A system established for assessment of the impact of GMOs released into the environment*”. The project purpose is split in two: “*a) Improved tools to conduct research, monitoring and assessments on environmental impact of GMOs used in agriculture are available; b) Improved Biosafety management and research capacity in South Africa*”.

The project would study the Bt (*Bacillus thuringiensis*) Maize in regions where it is grown in South Africa. Additionally, the project would cover South Africa as a whole regarding capacity building (CB) and in the mapping of existing monitoring programmes. There were four outputs formulated in the BP:

- Output 1: An assessment is conducted of the impact of GMOs released into the environment, with specific reference to Bt Maize using a scientifically sound approach.
- Output 2: Mapping and evaluation of existing monitoring programmes and proposals for further action is conducted.
- Output 3: Terms of Reference for centre of excellence for environment Biosafety is prepared.
- Output 4: Biosafety workshop (GenØk Model) in South Africa is organised.

Notably, the BP only contains an overall description of the various outputs, and the intention was for the scientists jointly to develop the detailed technical work plans, with processes and procedures for sampling, laboratory analysis, etc. at a later stage.

On the Norwegian side, DN included the Centre for Biosafety (GenØk, established in its present form and

status in 2007), which is responsible for the scientific work in the project. GenØk's scientific counterparts on the RSA side are the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI, an agency under DEAT, which in fact got a new mandate in 2004 to monitor GMOs in the environment), and three Universities: University of Free State; North-West Potchefstroom University and University of Free Hare. Also Department of Science and Technology (DST) is involved in minor parts of the project. All administrative communication and dealing are between DN and DEAT, who also are the partners that will undertake Output 2 in specific, bringing into the project the legislative element and the state management issues at large. In the DEAT accounts, the project has a budget of ZAR 7,063,750, but more funds are expected as activities are developing.

4.4.2 Project Implementation and Progress

Figure 4.4 in Appendix 1 shows the physical interaction between the project parties through delegations to RSA and Norway. The substance of the project was, according to the RSA partner, discussed during the Norwegian delegation's visit to RSA in February/March 2007 (partly paid for by DN and partly from the a cooperation agreement with Norad, outside the project), where the scientists were brought together with some high-level officers in DEAT, which created the interest and consent all through the Department. The detailed substance of the project was then developed in the May 2007 workshop in Pretoria, the project was given a go-head from the 2007 AM, and the content was finally concluded at the project preparation workshop in Pretoria in November 2007. In-between those two events, draft versions of the Business Plan were discussed (using e-mail) between DEAT and DN with input from the relevant partners on both sides. In the latter workshop, representatives from both RSA Government and research institutions on both sides participated. The planning took quiet some time as it was obviously quite a lengthy procedure to establish the testing fields that were provided at Free State University land (whereas the field in N-W University comprises exiting farmers' fields). The testing of field samples in the project is undertaken in the Free State University laboratory, and thereafter selected samples (e.g. seeds) are sent to GenØK in Tromsø for specialised analysis.

Output 1: This is by far the largest activity in the project, where now around 40% of the work is estimated undertaken by the time of the Review. The thorough and lengthy planning made it impossible to start the growing of maize in the test fields in the first growing season 2007-08. It seems however that the in-depth and lengthy discussion and clarification were indeed required in order for the various project partners to start on the right, and on the same, footing. This has benefited the project so far once it started in the field. The first growing season was thus 2008-09, with planting late 2008, and where the samples have just recently (May 2009) been collected and the analyses are ongoing in the laboratories. Analysis will be undertaken on the maize, on soil, on insects, small mammals. etc., and aim at e.g. identification of species; fight against certain harmful insects, the effect on useful insects, the effects on predators, etc. The change in proteins and the inter-connection between proteins and genes will be studied in detail. Most analysis will be undertaken in Bloemfontein (Free State University), which is the national laboratory for DNA analysis.

The detailed work plans of the scientists for the various outputs are in the process of being compiled. In fact, input from three RSA partners was discussed in the workshop in Pretoria in November 2008 and is now compiled in document form, but the RSA staff claim that the input from Norway is still outstanding. (Notably, in the comments to the Draft Review Report, DN commented that they understood that the input from the RSA scientists were still outstanding, and claimed that the work plans of DN/GenØk for 2008 were submitted in April 2008. The AT believes this discrepancy is based on the parties referring to different documents). The aggregated and consolidated document will be a highly scientific document containing all kinds of details on procedures and processes, e.g. sampling, packing, sending, storage, analysis, etc. in the project.

Output 2: This has not been started yet and is the responsibility of DN and DEAT. It will be done once the scientists have completed part of their work, and the end product will be a report regarding monitoring systems. The parties will also present something on the cooperation outcomes in the next meeting on the Cartagena Protocol in November 2010.

Output 3: A draft ToR is close to completion, and DEAT has been in contact with the National Research Foundation who will finance the establishment of the centre and be responsible for the operations. This

centre will clearly be established well before the project activities end, so it can take these onboard in the next stage and secure continuity of the monitoring efforts post-project.

Output 4: Will be undertaken in June/July 2009, with project staff admitted on the Regional Course that GenØk is running under another project and funding. Notably, GenØK has had 2-week courses in Tromsø every year for students for developing countries, supported by Norad. Now, the institute has also started Regional Courses in Indonesia, Peru, and the one mentioned in RSA. In this course, the project will sponsor around 15 participants.

Expenditure so far has been around ZAR 4 million (55% of the total budget so far). The project staff claim to have around ZAR 10 million outstanding, related to the initial promised total budget of ZAR 14 million. It is also understood that GENØK is sponsoring the project with own funds and time in parts of the activities, as they have a keen own interest in the project results and the cooperation, especially in view of the international project they are running in several countries, comparing results. The next important interaction between the parties will be in connection with the Regional Course on Biosafety held by GenØk in RSA in June/July 2009. The reporting in the project will be quarterly on the scientific level, whereas just aggregated overall information will be reported to the AM.

Box 4.4: GenØK

The Centre for Biosafety was founded in 1998 and is a non-commercial foundation located in the research environment at the University of Tromsø. GenØk is the national centre for biosafety and works closely with Norwegian authorities on issues related to biosafety, is engaged in research and teaching in the professional field of Gene Ecology. GenØk's mission is to do research based on worse-case scenarios. At the moment we are the only independent research institute in the world with biosafety research as the main objective. The Foundation focuses in particular on the environmental and health related consequences of the application of gene technology and gene modification. GenØk is also engaged in the broad dissemination of information and offers advisory and consulting services in its field of expertise.

The Centre has 42 employees, including staff members located at Third World Network HQ, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand; University of California at Berkeley, USA; Nanjing Institute of Environmental Sciences (NIES), China; National Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research (NISIR), Lusaka, Zambia; EMBRAPA and University of Sancta Catarina, Brazil)

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the convention on Biological Diversity entered into force in 2003. The Protocol seeks to protect biological diversity from the potential hazards and risks of modern biotechnology. The Protocol also regulates trade, import and export, and it also focuses on capacity building in developing countries. The Protocol also refers to the principle of precautionary approach. Norway is one of the 143 countries that have signed the protocol (and RSA being another). A major issue in connection with the Cartagena Protocol is appropriate capacity building and technology transfer that enables developing countries to fulfil their obligations under the Protocol. This is a challenge that requires cooperation at international level, including a high standard of teaching, training and methodology transfer from countries with institutions experienced in handling safety in relation to modern biotechnology.

Excerpts from the GenØk website

4.4.3 Review of Standard Evaluation Elements

The RT has below tried to assess the standard evaluation elements of the project:

- a) Relevance: As mentioned in *Section 3.2.1*, all the initiatives under the Programme are very relevant to the mandate and work of DEAT, and compliance checks assure this. The efforts are in line with Norwegian development assistance policy. (HS)
- b) Effectiveness: The start-up of the project has been delayed due to lengthy, but necessary planning. Analyses have just started (May 2009), but results will surely be delivered as planned before December 2010. Important political effect from project is expected. (S)
- c) Efficiency: Difficult to assess. Seemingly high initiation and preparation costs (18 man-months Nov07-Mar09), although required in this phase based on *how* the project came to life, especially compared to project outputs so far. This will improve when funds are spent for scientific activities/analysis. High quality level of scientific work. (MS-S)
- d) Impact: Impact on enhanced dialogue between the two countries on the issues, and

RSA's participation in the international discourse on GMO and biosafety. (S)

- e) Sustainability: The participation of Norwegian partners not sustainable without Norwegian funding, as RSA will buy experts from elsewhere. Capacity building on biosafety will make the RSA staff self-supplied with knowledge to an acceptable degree. The new centre will ensure continued activities in monitoring. (S)

4.4.4 Overall Project Assessment

This is a “strange” project, as it was born without money and became the largest in the Programme. The timing of the start of such project seemed however right on both sides and the passion and enthusiasm of the team drove the planning forward and formed a good basis for cooperation. It seems to have been a good opportunity for the two countries to bring their different opinions together in the field of biosafety. Also the slow progress and under-spending in other projects obviously assisted with the birth of the project, and not least the encouragement from the Embassy to get the spending rate up in the Programme. Prior to the project, there had only been pockets of researchers doing their work in this field, but the project was the first opportunity to do something nationally and jointly under the same umbrella. The starting point of the cooperation seems to have been appropriate: neither of the parties would use the project to prove a certain viewpoint, but both went into it with open scientific eyes. Before this point in time, all the research on GMO has been connected to certain products in RSA; where the producers have maintained the obligation to undertake such research and monitoring. Very little focus has been given to biosafety in RSA before this project. RSA also wants to extend the cooperation in the region in this field, amongst other with the GenØK supported centre in Zambia.

No doubt, GenØK has a reputation of being a centre of excellent in the world in the field of GMO and biosafety, and is well-reputed for high quality professional work. The unique features of this centre is not necessarily the well equipped laboratory and the magnitude of analysis that can be undertaken (being matched by several labs in the world), but merely the overall *approach* to the challenges, with an open mind, in a country where the principle of “think before you act” (“føre vår prinsippet”) is prevalent in the field of GMO (see *Box 4.4*) and the consequences of GMO on the overall environment. GenØk is in the forefront internationally through lobbying this *whole concept* and is already involved in an international project for testing GMO in maize in various countries under various conditions (China, USA, Brazil) with RSA as the fourth country.

The planning of the project took a long time, but this was required, and it will benefit the project in the long run. The RT has no doubt as to the partners being able to undertake the analysis and properly compile the results within the deadline of December 2010. However, the funds must clearly be committed before 31.03.2010 (the official end date of Phase III), and the partners are surely aware of this, so advance payments at that point in time will prevail. The rest of the project work plan will be presented to the 2009 AM for approval, with the funds to be paid in two portions to the DEAT account before the deadline. The only risk of not reaching there in time, must be that there are less funds available from the other projects to cater for the needs in the project. However, the budget has been approved and the fairly comprehensive project progress has started, so funds will *have to* be made available by Norway and RSA to complete this project. There is notably a high political prestige connected to completion of the project.

The cooperation between the parties has seemingly been good, although the DEAT PM admits that not much attention has been given to the Norwegian partners the last half year as she has had too much to do internally in DEAT (partly a double function following staff turnover). The Norwegian partners have expressed high regard of the professionalism of the RSA partners, and the RSA staff claim that the Norwegian input is very valuable. It is obviously the feeling at both sides that they are cooperating with scientists at the same professional level, and mutual trust has developed. The professional quality of the work is undoubtedly at a top international level. It was also mentioned that the DN representative has played a role of mediation when the various scientists have had conflicting views on professional topics, which is commendable. The Norwegians are not so pushy as e.g. the Americans, although the Norwegian have reminded the RSA partners of outstanding issues when things are delayed. Especially, there was an unclear stage from the 2008 AM (when the budget was not approved) until around September that year, when finally the funding was confirmed. Communications sometimes take the form of telephone

conferences, where a summary from the dialogue is distributed on email afterwards. The RT believes this is a suitable mode of communication.

As the project developed, it has been the right setup with DEAT and DN being the coordinators on each side. The communication between the two countries went through this channel in the planning stage of the project, which seemed appropriate at the time. The project has been a “diplomatic” project in Phase III, as one RSA staff expressed it. These partners have now encouraged the scientists to directly communicate with each other, and this working modality has caught up.

The invoicing and resource recording in the project has been an issue of special attention for DEAT. SANBI has submitted detailed budget up-front for each output in the project, and this is considered a lump sum contract, and consequently SANBI is not recording hours. DN and GenØk has around 51.5% of the entire budget, from which they are drawing down when invoicing the number of hours spent at any time (Annexure III in the contract between DN and DEAT is specifying the total Norwegian input of the total budget for the entire project, ZAR 14,834,939). The RSA side believes that the Norwegians input per output unit is very high, due to the high salary level in Norway. GenØk has so far registered around 2,200 hours on the project (13 man-months), whereas DN has registered around 150 hours from the start-up.

If the cooperation should continue in one form or another between the two countries under the possible New Programme (largely with a Climate Change focus), it could in principle be directly between GenØk and SANBI, unless the legislative component also is such that it requires the involvement of both DN and DEAT. This “shortcut” would cut transaction and administrative costs (and time) of DN and DEAT, both being involved mostly at the administrative level. However, it is important to have DEAT in e.g. the Steering Committee of such possible new project in order to ensure that the policy element is properly taken onboard. DN, being the main environmental directorate in Norway with responsibility for GMO-regulation, has however expressed interest in contributing as a resource partner for DEAT also in a possible continued cooperation (in a possible New Programme, if relevant thematically).

5. ASSESSMENT OF OTHER RELEVANT PROGRAMME ASPECTS

5.1 *The Programme Set-up*

a) The Notion of “a Programme”

The Programme has developed through three phases, with most of the substantial development activities undoubtedly taking place in Phase II, when also most of the capacity building and bilateral cooperation efforts took place. The number of individual projects was reduced from 34 in Phase II to 20 in Phase III, and the number of themes was reduced from seven to three. This reduction in the scope of the Programme largely followed the recommendation in the 2003 Mid-term Review of Phase II. The RT nevertheless observed that the projects in Phase III, although having been categorised under one of the three themes, are very different in nature and size, and have various implementing agencies involved, although DEAT is the coordinating body for all of them.

Without exception, the project people interviewed by the RT had no feeling of being part of “a Programme” per se. Everybody was more than preoccupied with his/her daily work in the individual projects, and the loyalty and ownership was with the project. Some of the projects were carried over from the previous phase, and these are seen by the staff only as *continuation* or *extension* of the previous phase. Or rather, there is very little feel about programme *phases* per se, but more a notion of the projects being extended. The reporting from the project to the Programme level is merely seen as a “necessary evil”, adding extra burden to the project staff, as this comes to some degree in addition to the normal internal reporting in DEAT and in the respective institutions. Thus, the ownership and identity are with the projects and not with the Programme.

The Programme has thus just developed in the direction pointed out in the Pre-Appraisal Report from 2005: “... *the Framework Business Plan was intended only to serve as a framework under which the “programme” will be designed. The sum of projects will constitute the “programme”*. The RT also concludes that the Programme is merely an umbrella and in reality a financing mechanism to fund individual projects. This has obviously not hampered the progress of individual projects, but merely have

confused the RT, and possibly other outsiders, believing that a programme constitutes projects which together form a complete entity being “the Programme”, meaning the projects constitute the various *components* of the Programme.

b) The Programme Management Hierarchy on the RSA side

The overall responsibility of the Programme rests with DEAT, and a Programme Manager has been appointed to follow it through. Notably, this Programme Manager has many other programmes and projects in her portfolio, and the donor funding of DEAT operations is very small in comparison with the total budget of DEAT, the Norwegian part simply disappearing in that (see *Section 3.3.7*). A full time Programme Administrator is employed to help coordinating the Programme, especially the reporting and logistics.

One Theme Manager (TM) has been appointed to coordinate the work of the various projects under each theme. This position has been defined at a Chief Director level, which puts serious limitations as to *whom* could be the TM. The tasks of the TMs are to be the link in-between the Programme Management and the Project Managements, both ways. The TMs would give guidance from the DEAT management to the projects on reporting, planning, etc. and compile project progress reports into theme reports once a year, aggregating into the programme reports.

The RT observed that nobody was very happy being TM, as elaborated in *Section 2.5*. The reason is that this task comes in addition to all the other in-line functions put on a Chief Director, and as such the position only meant more work. The TMs, unless they are Project Managers in any of the projects within their theme, had no specific ownership of the projects, and would not at all be able, or have time (and may be interest), to acquaint themselves with all the various topics at stake in the projects. There is obvious very little guidance on the project performance from the TMs and there is very little direct interaction with the PMs through the year, except before the AMs, where there is a rush to ensure reporting is up-to-date.

The RT therefore concludes that the TM positions are not functioning effectively, although it is appreciated *why* it has developed that way through the Programme and the DEAT management’s need to have this administrative level is also understood.

Assessment and recommendation: It is believed that this could be done differently in a possible New Programme now being discussed, where one person (or persons) should be given time and mandate to undertake coordinating functions. A *Programme Coordinator* (PC), a dedicated person from DEAT, or one of the other participating key institutions, could take the role of coordinating the overall guidance, reporting, the logistics, delegation travels, etc. Such person should at any one time be updated on the progress of the project through frequent and/or continuous contact with the PMs. The extent of time allocated for such work would of course vary with the number of projects, the size of the programme, the number of institutional partners, etc. The main point is that *sufficient* time should be allocated for this person really to operate as a focal point on the RSA side in the implementation of the Programme, not to be mixed with the role of the overall responsible person in DEAT (the Programme Manager, or similar positions in the main cooperating partners). The PC will clearly *not* manage the daily work in the institutions, but coordinate the input and outputs of the projects. This Programme Coordinator should not be selected out of *formal* position requirements, but out of merit, experience with coordination of programmes/projects, personal motivation and interest. A *Programme Administrative Officer* (or Programme Administrator, similar to the position existing today) must support such PC full time or part time depending on the scope and extent of the Programme.

Another option, depending on the layout of the new Programme, could be to appoint *Component Coordinators* (CC, or Theme Coordinators) from DEAT, or the most prominent participating institutions depending on input in the Programme, and give these CCs partly free from normal duties to undertake an effective coordination within the theme. Neither should such position be linked to a formal position of being Chief Director in DEAT, but being a person with special interest, dedication and experience, having a real ownership to the issues at stake.

These CCs, or the PC, whatever model is chosen, must be given a clear mandate of coordinating, especially connected to the reporting (compiling reports) and delegation travels, arranging workshops,

seminars, invoicing formats, etc. The person(s) must clearly be experienced in project and programme management work, well enough to give *guidance* to the implementation to, but not interfere directly in, the various projects' scientific work. The person should have regular meetings and interaction with the various Project Managers and Programme Management and at any time have hands-on and updated knowledge of what was going on in the Programme. There must be a good communication between these CCs/PC and the responsible officers in the implementing institutions, having frequent meetings to sort out the work plans and use of resources under each project.

c) Coordination on the Norwegian side

On the Norwegian side there is no coordinating body during Phase III. During Phase II, the Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage was appointed the coordinating institution on the Norwegian side, and funds for this function was allocated on a separate budget line in the programme budget. The appointed Coordinator (Ms. Inger Heldal) made frequent follow-up visits to RSA at least twice per year. This arrangement has been spoken of very positively from a couple of the Norwegian partners. It is also understood that the follow-up of the Programme from the Norwegian Embassy was closer in Phase II than it became in Phase III, with one main reason being the frequent shift of responsible officers at the Embassy in the first part of Phase III (until mid-2008). Today, as mentioned earlier, MoE is probably the institution with the best overview of the Programme on the Norwegian side, although not considering themselves in any "coordinating role", as they are sitting on every side of the table and simply needs to have a certain overview of things and need to be informed of the whereabouts of at least some the Norwegian partners in any case.

Assessment and recommendation: In case there will be several different partners from Norway also in the possible New Programme, with many different activities in various fields, the RT would advise the partners to consider also employing a *Programme Coordinator* (PC) on the Norwegian side, with a similar function as the one on the RSA side. The PC must be a dedicated and experienced project/programme person, coming from one of the most prominent and active institutions on the Norwegian side. In case the role of the MoE in the new Programme will be as many-faceted as in Phase III, it is recommended that in order not to mix roles, or being *accused* of mixing roles, such PC should preferably (but not necessarily so) come from an institution *outside* the MoE system. However, the PC must clearly maintain a close cooperation with the MoE system, Norad and all the other project partners. Sufficient time must also be set aside for this Norwegian PC to coach the programme implementation, give guidance to reporting, invoicing, other document formats, etc. The person should compile reports, assist in the preparation for delegation travels and seminars as appropriate, etc. The PC must be supported by a *Programme Administrative Officer* who can assist in the practical work and logistics (part time possibly sufficient).

It is obvious that this person will not be part of the Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria, or the MFA in Norway for that matter. The role and responsibility of the Environment/Energy Advisor at the Embassy will be as partner in the Annual Meetings and custodian of the Agreement/Framework Business Plan from the Norwegian side. This person will be frequently informed by the PCs on each side on the development of the Programme (progress and outputs) and consulted as required when special problems arise. The Embassy will not interfere in the daily implementation of the Programme unless specifically required to do so at an overall level. The Embassy will give overall guidance as to the direction in which the Programme is moving, mostly through the AMs.

As the reporting requirement from the Norwegian Embassy has changed with the persons being there, the reporting should be at two levels: one technical progress reporting from the various projects going to the PCs on either side according to a pre-agreed format (see below), and an aggregated tabular, brief to-the-point progress reporting to the AM, compiled by the PCs.

5.2 Institutional Cooperation

Figure 5.1 in Appendix 1 tries to illustrate the partnerships in the Programme, where the partners on the Norwegian and South African sides are shown and in which projects they are cooperating. The figure does not claim to fully capture *all* the connections and especially not all the smaller partners from RSA, but should provide useful and quick reference as to who are the *main* partners.

5.2.1 The Cooperation DEAT - Ministry of Environment

The cooperation between the Ministry of Environment (MoE) in Norway and DEAT started in the mid-90s with the signing of the MoU 12.02.1996. This MoU is still the overall and valid document for the cooperation and dialogue in the environmental sector between the two countries.

It is noted that MoE has many roles in the bilateral environmental cooperation:

- Being the partner of the MoU (represented by the International Dept.).
- Being the professional advisory ministry to MFA in some international questions pertaining to the environmental sector. In the Programme, MoE amongst others is participating in Annual Meetings on the side of the MFA, being the lead Norwegian ministry in the Programme⁹. (In principle, it is understood that MoE is “called upon” by the lead ministry,, being demand-driven). This activity is coordinated by the International Dept. but other departments might be involved as required according to the topics at stake.
- Participating in Project 2.5 as the main project partners from the Norwegian side (with DN as the second partner). Represented by the Planning Dept..
- Being the mother ministry of DN and SFT, thus giving guidance every year to the preferably and allowable input of time resources in various international environmental cooperation programmes and projects all around the world (where DN and SFT themselves will have to secure funding for such involvement from other sources than through MoE.) Represented by the International Dept..

This means that the MoE is an institution that might sit on “all sides” of the table in meetings where the Programme and projects are discussed, notably in the AMs, altogether being an unclear role. The representatives from MoE, sitting on the same side of the table as DEAT, might in principle have to critically “review” the performance of its own Planning Dept, and its two institutions DN and SFT. (MoE rightly claims that such review of performance must be the responsibility of the Embassy. However, the MoE being the sector advisor to MFA/RNE and having the most updated knowledge of the development in the sector internationally might be asked for advice from RNE on performance). This *might* lead to a biased assessment of their performance as they are coming from the “same family”. At the same time the MoE *might* be met with their own guidance/directions to the department/institutions, *if* such directions were *not* appropriate or led to mis-performance and failures on the other part.

In principle, this is *not* orderly and if a private or para-statal institution had played the same roles simultaneously as MoE today, it would have been pointed out immediately that this was a serious mixing of roles and the modality would have been changed. In fact, such set-up would never have been allowed in the first place. However, as the MoE is part of the Government, no concerns seem to have been raised regarding this issue so far, and the MoE has lived happily with this multi-role appearance for a long time. The RT understood in the meeting with MoE staff, that this “hat trick” has not posed any worry, as they believed they handled it well. The RT has no reason to say that it has *not* been handled well, but the principle is unsound and might lead to confusion or some unsound interrelations. The RSA side has not been fully aware of, and not been bothered with, the set-up on the Norwegian side.

The most disorderly point regarding this set-up is connected to the funding and partnership issues. As the MoE is advisor to MFA/the Embassy (driven by demand, like the role of Norad), who sits on the financing of development assistance, there *might* be a risk of MoE advising funding to its own departments or institutions in order to create interesting (income-generating) activities. May be these institutions are not the most appropriate to be involved in the said project/activity, objectively seen? It is known that the funding of such activities to own MoE departments are steadily shrinking and also that the institutions DN and SFT face an increasingly tougher demand to create own income from other sources.

The Planning Department in the MOE is, as mentioned above, partner in Project 2.5 - Environmental Impact Management. This project is assessed under a separate heading (*Section 4.2*). The cooperation and communication with the RSA partner has however been good, as far as the partners have expressed. Both parties have however raised the concern that the professional advisory role of MoE has not been fully utilised. The reason for this could be a combination of the RSA staff not having time to look over the fence as they are doing fire-fighting due to understaffing, and also the fact that the level of competence

⁹ Norad informs that in international (=global) questions related to the environment sometimes MFA is the lead ministry and sometimes MoE. In general, the cooperation between MFA and MoE has been rather good in Phase III.

has reached a level where they satisfactorily can drive the project along with own forces. The staff of the MoE Planning Dept. are spending a lot of time arranging visits for delegations. These field trips and connected meetings are useful for both parties, but someone else than highly educated scholars in MoE should spend time on planning logistics. This could be a role of the PC on both sides, assisted by their respective Programme Administrative Officers, in a possible New Programme.

5.2.2 Cooperation Between Other Partners

There are, as mentioned, two defined objectives with the institutional cooperation (IC) between the two countries: to have a mutual professional beneficial exchange of views; and to assist RSA in capacity building (CB) where needed in order for the RSA side to manage themselves effectively and efficiently without support in the future.

As regards the CB, this was mostly prevalent during Phase II, and is being gradually reduced in Phase III. This is the case with NILU's engagement in eThekwin Municipality and DEAT (Projects 1.2 and 1.3); SFT's involvement in eThekwin (Project 1.4); GRID & partners' involvement in Project 2.7, and MoE's assistance in Project 2.5. The gradual phasing out of Norwegian support shows that the CB support has been successful. The RSA institutions will from now on largely manage alone in the fields comprised in the Programme. The Norwegian partners have added value to the projects (mostly in Phase II), but now this added value is declining, and it is in most cases time to end the cooperation.

In the Projects 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 where SFT is partner, the developments have been different. In the first case, the project has come to a standstill due to the municipalities' lack of taking responsibility, in principle being out of the hands of the project management and the partners. In the second project, lack of internal communication in DEAT has led to serious delays and misunderstandings regards the BP and the required actions to be taken. As SFT's input is demand-driven, the SFT involvement in these two has halted, a situation being out of their hand. In Project 1.7 however, the communication between the parties has been lengthy, the processes delayed and in the RT's opinion both parties must share the responsibility for this. The RSA side believed SFT were *consultants* ("service providers") and SFT see themselves as *advisors* only, a significant mismatch indeed.

In Project 3.6 where DN and GenØk are partners, the latter is playing the main role during the scientific work together with SANBI and the Universities, and with a smaller professional input by DN in one of the activities related to overall biosafety management, together with DEAT. In addition, DN is playing a coordinating role on the Norwegian side, very much appreciated by GenØK, which is a company comprising scientists and not project administrators. The communication in the project has been orderly and DN is undertaking the coordination well on the Norwegian side. The RSA would like to continue the scientific research work with GenØK and visa versa. DN's role however seems to be less needed in any continuation of similar activities in a possible New Programme, as DEAT seemingly feels that they could handle the overall Biosafety Management issues themselves.

Overall assessment and recommendation: In all the projects, the Norwegians speak very highly of their South African counterparts, characterising them as "*very professional, hard working, easy to get along with, etc.*". The RSA side gives a similar description of their Norwegian counterparts, although with a more modest use of superlatives (which might, to the RT's observation, be part of the somewhat "softer" RSA cultural behaviour). The parties on both sides in general believe that they are equal partners cooperating, although in the beginning of the Programme (Phases I and II), the Norwegian partner added some of their own and international experience and knowledge to the RSA, more than the other way around.

The value added by the Norwegians has thus varied, with most value in Phase II and the beginning of Phase III, when most of the capacity building activities took place, now declining towards the end of the Programme. The added value however has its price, and it is clear that if RSA had the money and could spend it freely, they would *not* buy services from Norway, as the hourly rates of professionals are typically far higher when compared with national experts. In a couple of cases, the Norwegian assistance is more appreciated than in others, notably the one from GenØk in Project 3.6 (direct scientific work) and NILU in Project 1.2 (as a mentor to DEAT), but even here the services are appreciated because Norway is paying for them.

A general observation is that DEAT to a large extent in their daily work is using “service providers”/consultants to undertake the various activities in this Programme and many other internal projects. To some extent the RSA partners have believed that the Norwegian side would also be doing consultancy work with concrete results/reports delivered, whereas the Norwegian side, clearly following Norwegian development assistance modality through the last 20 years, see themselves as advisors that will guide the RSA partners in doing the work themselves. The direct delivery of practical results, as with NILU in Phase II and GenØk in Phase III, is therefore highly appreciated by the RSA side, and not so much as having the Norwegians as “dialogue partners”, at a very high price.

The effectiveness of Institutional Cooperation (IC) and Capacity Building CB in any programme/project will be influenced by several factors. *Box 5.1* below presents some highlights from a review on lessons learned from IC and CB in Norwegian development assistance, undertaken by NCG for Norad in 2007 (Final Report March 2008). Most of the recommendations are relevant also in the case of cooperation Norway-South Africa, although RSA is clearly *not* like any developing country, but at a much higher professional development level.

Box 5.1: Lessons Learned from Institutional Cooperation (IC) and Capacity Building (CB)

The review, where around 50 review and evaluation reports from the last 10 years were studied and several institutions and companies interviewed, served as an important input to the operationalisation of the Norwegian Government’s Action Plan for Development Cooperation in the Environmental Sector (2006). Some highlights from the report:

- ❖ For IC and CB to succeed and result in lasting improvements, there has to be well-established ownership of and commitment to the content of the IC and CB development cooperation components.
- ❖ The experts assigned to conduct IC&CB tasks need to be well-versed in both the sector specific aspects as such, and have a good knowledge of the local cultural dimensions that often turn up as barriers to successful and timely implementation.
- ❖ Rather than first selecting the Norwegian institution to participate, the challenges and topics to be covered should have defined which institution and what experts on the Norwegian side should participate in the “twinning”.

Other relevant conclusions and recommendations were:

- Norad should critically assess which institution is the most suitable for managing the IC and CB efforts, and undertake a tendering for this if in doubt.
- With limited capacity and capability on the local institution, a postponement of the project should be considered, with a pre-project phase of staff capacity building only.
- The Norwegian institution must critically assess own human resources to undertake the institutional cooperation.
- Although the public institutions have gained experience from development cooperation projects the last 10 years, some still do not in all aspects have the same competence as the private consulting companies, notably in project management, and are not fully organised to undertake such duties.
- However good the public or private institution, the success of any project depends almost completely on the motivation, capabilities and capacities of the individual staff working in the projects. Competent people must be put on the projects (not idling ones).
- The skills of preparing consistent planning documents following LFA still has a potential for improvement, especially with the public institutions.
- Project planning is the most critical activity, so it is important not to rush the planning, but take the required time.
- Project planning is often too ambitious, and must be scaled down to meet the capacity and capability of the institutions.
- It is important to limit the success criteria and outputs to a few realistically achievable ones.
- The risks and success factors must be properly analysed before project start-up.
- Roles and responsibilities of all the project partners on both sides must be clearly identified.
- Norad must accept a long-term approach in institutional development, without re-directing the main course underway just because of shifts in political agendas in Norway.
- The preferred cooperation modality in most cases is based on short-term follow-up visits by Norwegian advisors, who have a long-term commitment throughout the project duration, securing continuity. Long-term resident advisors should, if required, be used with great caution.
- Critical assessment of the value and modality of the arrangement as a projects proceeds, and round it off in time, is important, before it gets pathetic.
- The institutional cooperation process must be clearly demand-driven, and the Norwegian institution should “hold their horses”, however frustrating this might feel.
- The managerial level of the institutions must be involved in the process from the start, and this will facilitate the processes during implementation.
- Norad must never allow topping-up of salaries, but should be realistic as to payment of travel accommodation costs, and “sitting allowances” commonly used in the country.
- Individual training does not always lead to institutional building. Transparency and openness must be enhanced through the project in the local institutions.

Highlights compiled by the Review Team from the report “Review and synthesis of lessons learned from institutional cooperation and capacity building in the

As seen from the Box, the review was aimed at IC at the *operational* and *professional* level, and not directly dealing with IC at a high political level, where the dialogue and contacts/alliances in international forums are the most important. Such dialogue between the two countries is founded on the mentioned MoU from December 1996, and is at present still ongoing between DEAT and MoE at Minister and Director General levels, regardless of what other interactions at project level are taking place. This dialogue is also expected to be continued undisturbed in the future.

From the above, the RT wants to highlight a couple of issues that have proved to be very important in the cooperation between Norway and RSA (especially also during a possible New Programme under a Climate Change heading):

The *modality* and *contents* of IC and CB projects must be carefully considered at the start-up with regards to: project complexity; Norwegian comparative advantage; institutional capacity and capability; and institutional motivation and ownership. Hereunder, the success of any project depends almost completely on the motivation, capabilities and capacities of individual staff members at various levels working in the projects, whether these are from public institutions or private companies.

As the IC projects under the Programme are largely aiming at developing the human resources in DEAT/other institutions, and improving the processes and procedures for these institutions to more effectively and efficiently undertake their mandated tasks, the *competence* level on both sides is important. Especially the educational/experience level in the recipient institution, and the ability to *absorb* the newly required knowledge, will be main elements (no. of available staff to train, staff's time to participate in the CB activities, etc.), in addition to the institutional *willingness* to incorporate the new knowledge in the operations/daily work (management allowing the staff to utilise it).

On the other hand, the competence and abilities of the Norwegian institution is also important, as this must be able to identify and appreciate the real needs of the recipient institution. The Norwegian institution must be "the best", meaning having comparative professional advantages internationally, so the RSA partner really wants to cooperate with them. Also the Norwegian institution must be *motivated* and really wanting to obtain tangible results in a joint cooperation. The CB must clearly meet "felt needs" at the recipient side. The cooperation must be driven by genuine wishes to cooperate on professional basis and not only because Norway is giving money to such cooperation. In fact, the RSA side in the Programme has so far been very conscious on this issue, and has, intentionally or unintentionally, reduced the communication and input from the Norwegian side when there is no longer a need for it. This is a commendable development.

The expectations and motivations on both sides are very important to *reveal at the start-up* of any IC/CB activity, as they are likely to be different with the different partners. The roles of the parties, the working modality and the expected outputs must be properly discussed and defined. The observations of the RT show that in the case of SFT/DEAT, such different expectations have made at least one project come to a standstill. It is clear that SFT in this case could not deliver what DEAT wanted (consultancy services), whereas SFT on their side claimed to have been clear on their role as advisors only, not properly appreciated by the RSA partner. It also seems to the RT that, although the motivation for cooperation might have been genuine at the start-up, the motivation with both parties has faded as the dialogue has loped and very little has happened in the projects. Not so in the project where DN/GenØk is involved, and where the motivation seems to be very good, and the progress is clearly catching up following the first growing season, resulting in tangible results. It is nevertheless fair to state that the projects supported by Norwegian partners in the Programme are very different in nature and working modality, and are not readily easy to compare in all aspects.

The difference in interpretation of the cooperation and the roles of the parties ("advisors" and "consultants") must clearly be taken on board in the planning in the possible New Programme, where the roles of the Norwegians to be involved should have concrete deliverables connected to them, and not only be "partners in talking". Notwithstanding this, it is clear that the institutions offering CB in the possible New Programme must have a comparative professional advantage nationally and internationally within the core issues at stake (the needs of the RSA partner), in order for any future CB activities to be

5.3 Programme Document Management and Reporting

a) Document layouts and formats

The RT has been given a large number of documentation in connection with the Mid-term Review (*Appendix 6* refers), and had indeed great difficulties in navigating through these. This is largely due to the following reasons:

- Many documents were lacking a nomination/title on the front page as to the nature and status of the document, meaning whether it was a draft or a final version, or whether only a working document as part of the normal development process;
- most documents were lacking date of submission on the front page (or elsewhere in the report);
- most documents were lacking the name of the institution and department that produced the document on the front page (or elsewhere in the report);
- most documents, with a few good examples, the 2008 AR main part being one, are lacking footers and headers on every page (except front page). Copies of selected pages (e.g. tables) taken from larger documents have thus no indications showing *from which document* the copies are coming, *when* it has been produced, *who* prepared it, etc.;
- the nomination of some projects (name/title of the project) has changed from one document to another, making following-through of the project unnecessarily confusing and difficult;
- some projects are listed in one report but are missing in another, without telling the reasons for these being left out;
- in a few reports, there is an unmotivated mix of landscape and portrait format on tables.

The RT believes this “sloppy” format of documents is a fairly serious shortcoming in the Programme, which has to be remedied without delay and which indeed should be relatively easy to improve. *Figure 5.2 in Appendix 1* show in principle the required information that should go into the header and footer in any document in any project/programme.

Assessment and Recommendation: At the start-up of a possible New Programme, document layouts and formats should be largely agreed to, with flexibility of minor adjustments and changes along the way, if required. The Programme Management should consider introducing a simple coding/reference system comprising numbers and/or letters to include on the front page and in the header/footer of each document to identify under which component the document is produced, whether it is a draft or a final document, the date of submission, from which project the document is coming, from which institution and department, and the initials (or name) of the persons responsible for preparing the document. Such system will ease filing and retrieval of documents for various needs, e.g. review and evaluations by outsiders, audits, etc.

b) Technical Work Plans and Progress Reporting

As mentioned above, some projects and activities are difficult to follow through as the names have changed. It is important that the nomination/title of a project or activity does *not* change during the Programme. A well-thought-of name should be established at the start-up and this must follow the project throughout. It is important that the business plans, the annual work plans, and the progress reports have exactly the same nomination all through. Projects where no progress is reported, or which are completed, should still be in the progress report table with a comment on the status. It is also important that the nomination of the project and individual activities are the same in the programme reporting as it is in the internal normal DEAT reporting, including the same nomination in the financial reports.

The annual progress reporting has changed through the Programme. The 2007 AR had several formats and layouts in one document with no aggregated reporting at programme level included, and as such a very difficult document to navigate through. The 2008 AR was much better, with a mix of narrative reporting and tabular overview of individual project progress and expenditures (notably Theme 2 only had a tabular progress overview and no narratives). The 2008 AR also had more detailed project progress reports as attachments, which was useful. It is also understood that for the 2009 AR, an even more simplified format will be used, as this was discussed between the parties in the 2008 AM, where the high-level representatives believed that last year’s reporting in the AM was too detailed.

Assessment and Recommendation: The interest of the parties in the Annual Meetings will inevitably vary with the education, position, working background and personal preferences of the individuals, although in principle this should not prevail, as the persons present are representatives for their respective institutions. From mid last year, an Energy and Environment Councillor has been employed at the Norwegian Embassy, having (for the first time during Phase III) a much more keen interest also in the professional sector topics at stake. The dilemma still remains however, to which level of detail should the programme reports be? They should in principle not be changed each year according to the sentiment and taste of the individuals present in the AM, although it is appreciated that too many detail are *not* wanted in this meeting. On the other hand, when the details disappear, there is no way the responsible parties can really monitor and follow-up the projects, and interfere if needed.

There is definitely a need for reporting at two levels: one overall AM reporting for the high-level officers and one technical reporting in more detail. This is where the Project Coordinators in the possible New Programme comes in, as they should review the detailed progress reports and communicate with the project partners on possible shortcomings, additions needed or clarifications. The PCs will review the reporting on behalf of the bilateral partners and bring any discrepancies or shortcomings in the progress reporting to the attention of the AM, as required. In general, the reporting format agreed to should be as close as possible to the internal DEAT reporting format, as to avoid double and unnecessary work.

It should also be noted that in case the RNE should be involved in a meaningful dialogue and make decisions during the last year of the Programme, information on progress and outputs would need to be received. As a minimum an overview of outputs (reports) produced in the different projects should be made available at regular intervals. How this should be done without adding administrative burden to DEAT and programme staff could be discussed at the 2009 AM.

c) Steering documents. Project Business Plans

The main steering document of the Programme is the Framework Business Plan (of 13.12.2005), leave alone the other higher-level documents (Bilateral Agreement for Development Cooperation, the MoUs and the Letters and Declarations of Intent). This Framework Business Plan presumes that under each project, a more detailed Business Plan would be prepared, being the main reference document at project level and the basis for approval under the Programme.

The RT noted that in some projects *Business Plans* (BPs) have been prepared, whereas in others *Project Proposals* (PP) have been submitted and approved. In other projects again, no such BP or PP have been prepared, but the work is steered by the *Annual Work Plans*, and in a couple of cases, notably the AQM project, the description of the project is detailed in the *Terms of Reference* for the consultants that will undertake the project¹⁰. It is also understood that DEAT, as part of their normal routines, is preparing Business Plans for new initiatives taken onboard, and these have a different format from the ones having been prepared with the assistance from the Norwegian partner in the Programme (e.g. SFT, who is following the Norwegian development cooperation standard, being much more comprehensive).

This variety of project documents does not seem to have posed any problems to the project staff during implementation of the individual projects. For outsiders, like the RT, this variety of steering documents could however in some cases be confusing. The RT nevertheless appreciates that the format and content of the project documents have developed into their present forms due to the history and background of the various project partners (e.g. institutions and departments of DEAT and SANBI). The Project Document/Business Plan is “the Document” that forms the basis for any project review or evaluation. The progress is measured against what was planned in the BP, so this document should contain all the design elements of the project in an orderly way. Ideally also, the Project Document should be the basis for internal project monitoring during implementation, where the project management should refer to document particulars being the guiding star of whatever is being done. The Project Document would easily lose its usefulness and “power” in case it is not utilised properly.

Assessment and recommendation: At the start-up of the New Programme, a common format for the

¹⁰ As mentioned somewhere else in the report, being some of the most thorough, elaborate and comprehensive ToRs the RT has seen anywhere in the world.

project documents should be agreed to, meeting both the RSA and the Norwegian sides' requirements of what such document should contain in order to be useful. It is noted that the Norwegian Government in all their development cooperation projects use the LFA planning modality, which very orderly captures all elements that the planners should think thoroughly through during the planning stage, before embarking on any implementation. However, a well prepared Project Document according to the LFA modality is indeed no guarantee for success, although being a good starting point. This is illustrated by the three hazardous waste projects where SFT has guided the development of such well-formulated documents. These projects have largely halted due to misunderstandings and miscommunications between the parties. This clearly indicates that it is *not* sufficient to have "good" logframes to secure success between the collaborating parties, and that when designing the project and formulating the project document, the logframe needs to be based on a more comprehensive planning process between the collaborating parties. Time must be allowed for creating proper ownership to the project challenges, and the various roles of the partners.

As the term "Business Plan" is used both at programme and project levels, and that DEAT internally are also using this term for own projects, it is recommended to consider *using another term* for the steering documents at project level in a possible New Programme. It is recommended that the nomination "Project Document" is used for the basic document steering the individual projects, a in order to avoid misunderstandings.

5.4 The Decision-Making Process

The Framework Business Plan lists some initiatives that would be included in the Programme, and the final approval of such projects is done in the Annual Meetings every year, following the end of the South African Fiscal Year (31 March), normally held in May (exceptionally in June like in 2009, because of this Mid-term Review). Formally, no project is thus approved in-between the AMs, and no major re-allocation of funds between projects are approved either. However, a more flexible mode of project approvals was discussed and agreed to in the 2008 AM, based on direct agreements between RNE and DEAT. Project 3.8 (Local Action in Biodiversity Programme) is the only one that so far has been approved by communication between the parties *in-between* the AMs.

Assessment and recommendation: The initial procedures meant that if a need for a new project, or for reallocation of funds between projects to keep activities running, materialised in-between two AMs, the decision should in principle wait till the next AM, in theory up to a maximum of one year of waiting. This was not a very practical approval procedure, and it is indeed suggested that a more simplified and pragmatic solution is formally chosen in the possible New Programme, similar to what has been practiced for Project 3.8 (and agreed in the 2008 AM). It is simply also recommended that below a certain budget limit, the Programme Management should have the authority to reallocate funds in-between two AMs. The procedure for this must be carefully established by the start-up of a possible new cooperation programme, where consultations with the Project Coordinators on both sides is an integral part of the procedures at the operational and professional level, and that informing the Embassy, giving the Programme Officer there a chance to comment, is also a necessary part. Above this certain threshold, new projects and reallocations should as a general rule be taken to the AM for discussion and approval. However, in case of special circumstances, where e.g. time is critical factor, re-allocation and starting of new projects could be agreed between the parties any time during the year, based on proper communication.. The Norwegian Embassy has, as mentioned, already welcomed this principle (as expressed in the 2008 AM) and has declared an "open door policy" regarding such working modality. In such cases however, it is imperative that the RNE is properly informed of the progress and outputs of the Programme on a continuous basis (much more than has been during Phase III), and that any agreement is properly documented in writing, easy to trace and review.

5.5 A Possible New Cooperation Programme

a) The Backdrop

South Africa and Norway have agreed to continue the 15-year successful cooperation, and it is envisaged that future cooperation shall be characterised by a new and transformed relationship and mode of cooperation. The "donor to recipient" relationship, characterising major parts of bilateral cooperation till

today, will fully be replaced by *partnership relationships*, on equal terms, expressed in two recently signed “declarations” between the two governments, the “*Joint Declaration on Climate Change and Energy Issues*”, signed in April, 2008, and the “*Declaration of Intent on Partnerships in Africa*”, signed between South Africa and the Nordic countries.

Bilateral cooperation for the period 2010-2014 is envisaged to broadly focus on the following main priority areas (based on preliminary signals from the Norwegian side, and thus clearly *not* being the final list of interventions as nothing has been formally agreed per date):

- **Climate change:** Being a common global concern and the most important challenge in international cooperation. Climate change is expected to negatively affect future prospects to combat poverty, and Norway and RSA have common interests and matching priorities, being the foundation for cooperation in efforts to limit and adapt to climate change. With reference to the above-mentioned Joint Declaration, the two countries confirm to consult on policies and issues of climate change, in preparing for international meetings and conferences to further promote global cooperation and commitments. The most relevant areas of cooperation on climate change are expected to be: mitigation; adaptation/environment; and energy efficiency/renewable energy.
- **Good governance:** hereunder civil, economic and social human rights; conflict resolution; and peace building, with reference to the above-mentioned “*Declaration of Intent on Partnerships in Africa*” guiding this development.
- **Regional integration:** meeting South Africa’s vision for higher degree of involvement in economic co-operation, mutual assistance, and joint planning, consistent with socio-economic, environmental and political realities, supported by Norway. The two countries will increase efforts to consult and inform on regional initiatives, policy development and programme support, to optimize efficiency and the achievement of results. Norway *might* support this initiative in: climate change/adaptation and mitigation; natural resource management, including marine resources; and good governance/human rights.
- **University- and research cooperation:** basically building on previous initiatives, e.g. the “*Norwegian Programme for Development Research and Education (NUFU)*”, which has included South African and Norwegian university partnerships to promote research and academic development, and which will continue. “*The Norad Master Programme (NOMA)*”, might also be a channel for continued and increased partnerships between Norwegian universities, universities in the SADC region and South African universities in tripartite partnerships. The ongoing “*Research Cooperation Programme*”, sponsored jointly by the Norwegian and South African Governments, managed by the National Research Councils, will be considered for continuation, with a possible focus on climate change and renewable energy issues.

Cooperation based on longstanding relationships between institutions in the two countries may be of high value when developing institutional systems, strategies and policies, and there are preliminary considerations on establishing a limited funding scheme to catalyse such relationships. Additionally, the future cooperation might comprise elements such as: tripartite partnerships; research cooperation; and skills development programmes, clearly based on *shared* funding, common interests and mutual benefits. It is also understood that such partnership should focus on *developmental impact*.

A larger Technical Mission from RSA (including six staff from DEAT and some staff from DST), accompanied by the Environmental and Energy Counsellor at the Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria, will go on a fact finding mission to Norway in May 2009, to meet various potential partners who might have a potential to play a role in such a New Programme.

b) Programme Planning

It is remembered that the planning of the Phase III framework under the present Programme took place in a joint workshop where also partners from Norwegian institutions participated (including MoE, Norad and SFT, the latter being a partner in four of the present projects). Whereas this was very useful for the partners and created good ownership to the broad scope of the Programme, the RT believes that a slightly modified planning modality could preferably prevail in the possible New Programme. Such possible New Programme is clearly *not a continuation* of the previous partnerships (may be with a few exception?) as the new thematic areas will be biased against climate change, renewable energy, and natural resources management (with focus on marine resources). As the New Programme is in its initial planning stage at present (only a “dialogue stage”), it is considered too early to call potential partners together for such

workshopping, which could lead to a situation of “sharing the cake” between partners and themes, as it partly was last time, rather than thinking in strategic and innovative terms at a broader scale.

As the MFA is in charge of the possible New Programme on the Norwegian side, it is important that the Norwegian Embassy (possibly supported by Norad) firstly boosts the dialogue with DEAT (and other potential partners in RSA), in order to properly identify *what are the needs on the South African side*, and the regional side, and where does RSA want Norway to assist with human resources, technical expertise and limited funding. The Embassy, now having the required expertise in-house, together with DEAT, should from there develop the overall scope and framework of the New Programme. Only after such needs are revealed and the scope outline being in place, the dialogue with other potential Norwegian partners should start on the scope of their possible participation. It is however clearly expressed that MFA/RNE will draw on the appropriate resources of e.g. both MoE and Norad in the discussion about the possible New Programme at an early stage.

It is understood that the Norwegian institutions participating in Phase III would have liked to be involved in the planning from the very first moment, as they then would have the chance of influencing on the format and content of the cooperation, and could allocate the required resources at an early stage. The RT fully appreciated this need, but at the same time believes that some overall consultations will have to set the playing field of a possible New Programme before the partners, who eventually have a vested interest in the projects that will materialise, are detailing their own role and subsequently the content of the projects. The RNE obviously should be given the chance now to “play out the first cards” in the game before the partners are taken on board. At a later point in time, joint workshops under the separate programme components should be conducted to plan the interventions in more detail, forming the basis for the detailed Project Documents eventually to be prepared.

c) Possible Areas of Cooperation

As the planning of a possible New Programme has not properly started, and as the RT has not been part of the bilateral dialogue so far, it seems *premature* and not very useful for the RT to make firm recommendations as to possible partners on the Norwegian side or fields of cooperation. Obviously, some thinking has already been undertaken as the DEAT/DST delegation to Norway in May 2009 has identified several institutions they would like to visit, notably several of them in Bergen connected to the marine environment. The institutions to be visited cover a broad thematic range and have all previous contacts in RSA. The RT would therefore clearly *not* list any names of companies or institutions at this stage. It is also appreciated that under the possible New Programme, a variety of various cooperation projects in different sectors could be initiated (environment/water, renewable energy, marine, agriculture, forestry to mention some possibilities). In fact, almost *any* kind of development project could be captured under the broad scope of cooperation indicated above, especially so when it comes to climate change adaptation and mitigation, and natural resources management.

However, bearing in mind the experience from some of the Phase III projects, where the RSA side broadly wanted *consultancy* work done by Norway and the Norwegian side wanted to be *advisors*, is it important to take onboard the New Programme those Norwegian partners that can deliver concrete outputs to the RSA development process, especially when the Programme has to pay for the partners’ input, and when knowing such manpower costs are comparatively high in Norway. The notion of “advisory staff” from Norway just giving guidance and inputs in meetings and workshops, including commenting on reports, is clearly not appreciated by the RSA side. This should thus be avoided, unless explicitly wanted by the South Africans.

The input from Norway must also be through institutions and companies that have a clear comparative advantage internationally, and nationally in RSA. This also includes transfer of technology. Otherwise, the cooperation will not work according to intentions, like we have seen in Phase III. The Embassy also confirms that Norway and South Africa are presently discussing future cooperation where climate change is clearly a stated mutual priority. Future cooperation will be based on mutually agreed priorities where both parties see tangible benefits and where the competence of Norwegian institutions can provide “*value for money*”

In other words, the era of delegations “just meeting and talking” at the operational level just for the benefit of keeping up a certain contact, seems to have passed. At a high political level however, such

dialogue would continue through direct interaction of political delegations and in connection with international conferences on various declarations and conventions the two countries have committed themselves to. Such interactions are in any case not covered by any Programme funding.

The RT had the opportunity to review a report prepared by the consulting company Econ Pöyry from Norway, being an input to the MoE in their preliminary preparations for the New Programme (“*Climate Mitigation Strategy Support to South Africa*”), not being public at the time of preparing this Mid-Term Review Report. It has been emphasised that the report is just *one* amongst many inputs from different parties to the ongoing planning process, so the RT will *not* go into any detail on the report. However, the RT only wants to comment on one aspect: that the possible subsidizing of staff salaries in the recipient country is contrary to the Norwegian development cooperation policy, and has not been practiced since the late 80s. The recipient country must clearly pay for such salaries themselves, and adjust the pace of the development activities to the staff available locally. In some cases capacity building is required before any activity is started or cooperation initiated.

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Review Team appreciates that the Programme started in the mid-90s and has developed through three phases with Phase III ending on 31.03.2010, although some activities will continue beyond this date. There has been a smooth transition between the various phases, allowing the projects to develop gradually over time. The Programme as such is merely an overarching financing mechanism under which the individual projects each have a specific focus. The various projects constitute the Programme, but the Programme does not appear as a complete unit where all the projects together (and *only* these) are required to fill the entity. The projects however fall naturally under the mandated tasks of DEAT, and an orderly compliance check has been undertaken for all projects. Also local governments and outside central and regional institutions (e.g. SANBI and SARDC) are amongst the successful implementing partners.

There is relatively consistent set of goals and purposes developed for the Programme and the three main themes thereunder: 1-Pollution & Waste; 2-Environmental Governance; and 3-Biodiversity and Conservation. The individual projects have, to a very limited degree, developed logframes following the LFA method, with the waste projects under Theme 1 where SFT is involved the notable exception. This lack of consistent logframes has however not restricted or hampered the project implementation, although the lack of quantifiable indicators make outside monitoring difficult, as progress is measured against activities only. Properly planned projects according to the LFA modality is neither a guarantee of success for the project, as clearly seen with the waste projects. Allowing sufficient time for planning the project and for the partners to develop proper ownership to the efforts, is even more important.

The implementation of the Programme might be characterised as fairly satisfactory, with some projects doing really well (the ones in eThekwin, within AQM, and within Red Listing/biodiversity and biosafety), and some having not performed at all (notably the ones on waste management, and to a large extent Youth & Environment). It is noted that a couple of the projects in the Programme has not received any funding from Norway at all during Phase III, even though they are still on the project list (Knowledge Sharing Networks and Wetlands Inventory under Theme 3). Almost all the projects have experienced delays in the implementation, a risk that was not elaborated from the start. It is also realised that the activity level and the extent of bilateral cooperation between Norwegian and South African partners has gradually decreased during Phase III, after having experienced the most intensive period of cooperation during Phase II. This is also the desired scenario in terms of the Norwegian development cooperation perspective, which will end in its present form naturally at the end of Phase III.

The list of positive effects from the Programme must be attributed both to Phase II and III, with the most tangible results being in Phase II, especially with regards to the capacity building of South African staff. The staff at DEAT and in eThekwin Municipality especially have to a large degree reached a competence level making them independent of foreign personnel cooperation assistance, although they might have challenges in staff turnover, as educated staff are seeking greener pastures or are promoted. It is also observed that the South African staff to a large degree are *not* using their Norwegian counterparts as

advisors and partners in dialogue any more, but merely want the Norwegian side to be “services providers” (consultants) delivering concrete outputs. This will have a clear bearing on the cooperation under a possible New Programme. In general, the scientific results delivered in the Programme (*when delivered*) have a very high quality, and the project partners to a large extent construe each other to be on similar professional level internationally. The cooperation between the partners, however limited, has been satisfactory seen from both parties, with very few exceptions. It is realised that Ministry of Environment has several roles in the Programme, which should be critically reviewed when the possible New Programme is designed.

Some shortcomings are observed in the Programme, especially connected to the functions of Theme Managers, who have little interaction with the projects. The document management in the Programme (notably DEAT) is not satisfactory with too many activities being changed and documents being poorly marked/nominated. There is a discrepancy between the amounts reflected in the financial management system of DEAT and those records kept at the project level, mainly due to the time lag when amounts are recorded in the books and the coding being wrongly entered. Expenditure in the Programme has been lower than planned, mainly due to project delays in implementation. Institutional cooperation between the two countries is clearly not sustainable without Norwegian funds to cover the Norwegian part.

As less than one year remains of the Programme, very little can and should be changed during this period. However, a few issues are recommended taken onboard without delay, and also of course improved and refined in a possible New Programme being planned:

- A financial exercise should be undertaken by the Programme to reconcile the two different sets of financial data at project level and in the DEAT Financial Dept.
- The possible double payment of subsistence allowance to RSA staff should cease.
- The document management should be improved, with proper nominations of the documents’ front pages and header/footer giving the dates, authors, name of institutions, and project/document title.
- Project 1.5 should be stopped and the funds reallocated to other projects in need.
- The DEAT Project Manager of Project 1.6 must prepare a realistic work plan for the remaining year in consultation with SFT.
- Project 1.7 should be stopped as initially planned, as the dialogue between the partners has come into backwaters. Support should be sought from SINTEF to prepare a guideline for a “Blending Platform”, and funds re-allocated accordingly.
- Additional training of DEAT staff in Vital Graphics should be undertaken in Project 2.7.
- The system of non-bureaucratic re-allocation of funds in-between two annual meetings should be actively continued during the last programme year, by simple communication between DEAT and the Norwegian Embassy (as was agreed in the 2008 AM). This requires DEAT to keep the RNE continuously updated of programme progress and outputs in order to take part in the dialogue and decisions.

In addition to the improved procedures listed above, which must be carried over to any possible New Programme, the following should be considered:

- Proper guidance and assistance must be given during planning of the New Programme, so the format of planning documents (project logframes), invoicing and reporting are consistent throughout. Ample time should be allowed during planning of projects to create ownership amongst the partners and properly identify the roles of each party.
- A system of document coding/references should be considered. Reporting format should be as close as possible to the DEAT format, but a two level reporting could be introduced (technical and executive level).
- Under a certain threshold the DG in DEAT should be given the mandate to re-allocate funds between projects in-between the Annual Meetings, to enhance implementation flexibility. A continuous dialogue with the Norwegian Embassy must be maintained.
- Partnership between institutions in the two countries should only be encouraged where the Norwegian institution has a comparative international advantage professionally, and where it can deliver the concrete outputs the South African side needs. Dialogue (“talking”) alone between equal partners at technical/scientific level should not be encouraged at project level, if it does not lead to tangible results useful for the RSA side. Dialogue should however continue at a high political level. .
- The Norwegian Embassy and DEAT should be given the opportunity to discuss the broad scope and


approach of the New Programme before all other potential partners are involved in the detailed planning. MoE could be involved in such scoping exercise in order to see the New Programme properly influenced by environment and climate policy, but clearly driven by demand from MFA/RNE.

- The present system of Theme Mangers should be discontinued on the South African side. A Programme Coordinator (PC) position, with a person chosen out of professional merits and interest, should be considered as the daily link between the projects and the overall Programme Management.
- A similar position on the Norwegian side should be considered, if there would be many Norwegian partners involved in the New Programme. The PCs should give guidance on implementation processes, but not interfere in the daily project activities.
- Norway should clearly not subsidise South African governmental salaries.

Appendix 1:

Maps, figures and tables








Figure 1.2: Phases of the environmental cooperation


PHASE II (2000-2004)**PHASE III (2005-2010)**

Figure 2.1: Themes and project in Phase II and Phase III




Figure 2.2: The logical framework (LFA) elements. The matrix is valid for both projects (as shown) and programmes




Figure 2.3: DEAT organisational chart with its branches (in beige) and Chief Directorates (CD). Directorates (Dirs) are not shown. The departments from where the programme staff is coming, are shaded.




Figure 3.1: Summary of total expenditures per theme per March 2009. (2006/07-2008/09 Financial Years)




Figure 3.2: Summary of annual expenditures per theme




Figure 3.3: Project expenditures Theme 1: Pollution and Waste




Figure 3.4: Project expenditures Theme 2: Environmental Governance




Figure 3.5: Project expenditures Theme 3: Biodiversity and Conservation




Figure 4.1: Exchanges of delegations, joint meetings under **Project 1.3** in Phase III, and some important project milestones

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


Figure 4.2: Exchanges of delegations, joint meetings under **Project 2.5** in Phase III, and some important project milestones




Figure 4.3: Exchanges of delegations, joint meetings under **Project 2.7** in Phase III, and important milestones




Figure 4.4: Exchanges of delegations, joint meetings under **Project 3.6** in Phase III




Figure 5.1: Programme partnership

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<i>Date/prepared by institution/editor's name or initials</i>	<i>(Alt. page no.)</i>

Figure 5.2: Principle possible content of the header and footer on any programme document

**TABLE 1.1: PARTICIPANTS IN THE JOINT PLANNING WORKSHOP (20.09-1.10.2004)
AT THE CSIR INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION CENTRE**

Name & Surname	Organisation	TEL AND CELL NO	FAX	EMAIL
Inger K.Stoll	Royal Norwegian Embassy	082 901 8113		ingerstoll@mfa.no
Kjersti Hasfjord	Royal Norwegian Embassy	082 901 8133	012-342 6099	kjeh@mfa.no
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Pam Yako	DEAT	012-310 3955 082 550 5225		pyako@deat.gov.za
Judy Beaumont	DEAT	012-310 3532 082 653 0625	012-322 1421	jbeaumont@deat.gov.za
Peter Lukey	DEAT: Regulatory Services	012-310 3710 083 415 2963	012-322 1320	plukey@deat.gov.za
Vinny Pillay	DEAT	012-310 3745 082 375 3541	012-322 5890	pillayv@deat.gov.za
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Ike Ndlovu	DEAT	012-310	012-320 1639	indlovu@deat.gov.za

Name & Surname	Organisation	TEL AND CELL NO	FAX	EMAIL
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Sylvester Mokoena	DEAT	083 642 1453	012-320 1639	
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Brita Slettemark	Min of Environment	+47 2224 6035	+47 2224 2755	Brs@md.dep.no
Pumla Nhleko	DEAT	012-310 3804	012-310 3541	pnhleko@deat.gov.za
Zaheer Fakir	DEAT: International Liaison & Coordination	012-310 3828	012-310 3541	zfakir@deat.gov.za
Joey Kühn	DEAT	012-310 3444	012-310 3541	jkuhn@deat.gov.za
Godfrey Mvuma	DEAT	012-310 3480		gmvuma@deat.gov.za
Itumuleng Mabalane	DEAT	012-310 3480		imabalane@deat.gov.za

Table 3.1: Summary of Programme expenditures (source: DEAT Financial Depot)

PROJECT NUMBER	THEME/PROJECT DESCRIPTION	Budget 2006/2007	Budget 2007/2008	Budget 2008/2009
1	2	3	4	5
1	THEME: POLLUTION AND WASTE	0.00	3,509,637.50	6,122.28
1.1	The Air Quality Act: Air Quality Management Planning Project	0.00	400,000.00	
1.2	The Development of the South African Air Quality Information System (SAAQIS)	0.00	300,000.00	1,370.00
1.3	Further Development of the Air Quality Management Plan and Plan for Ethekwini Municipality	0.00	1,188,000.00	1,350.00
1.4	Cleaner Production Strategy Implementation (taken out early in Phase III)	0.00	0.00	
1.4	Institutional Cooperation between Ethekwini Municipality water and Sanitation Department and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority	0.00	471,637.50	390.00
1.5	Institutional Cooperation between DEAT, Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, Buffalo City and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority	0.00	400,000.00	562.28
1.6	Environmental Management Inspector (EMI) Training	0.00	500,000.00	1,950.00
1.7	Elaboration of a National Hazardous Waste Strategy	0.00	250,000.00	500.00
2	THEME: ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE	334,462.24	5,710,000.00	7,406.58
2.1	Youth and the Environment	130,000.00	130,000.00	
2.2	Environmental management within Project Consolidate	0.00	750,000.00	500.00
2.3	Regional State of the Environment	0.00	425,000.00	49.61
2.4	Environment and IDP's	0.00	600,000.00	585.35
2.5	Environmental impact Management	104,462.24	3,080,000.00	4,705.41
2.6	Indicator Strategy for Southern Africa	0.00	421,000.00	276.20
2.7	Institutional cooperation between DEAT, GRID-Arendal, Frameworks AS and the Pollution Control Authority on state of the environment reporting	100,000.00	304,000.00	1,290.00
3	THEME: BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION	4,101,203.00	5,603,033.00	8,303.51
3.1	Development of programmes to adress gaps in Red listing	1,689,500.00	1,544,676.00	2,024.87
3.2	Development of national species monitoring strategy	700,460.00	548,607.00	743.13
3.3	Developing Red Lists into useful decision support products	170,000.00	141,000.00	321.00
3.4	Capacity development of individuals and organisations	396,000.00	305,000.00	714.50
3.5	Development of knowledge sharing networks	0.00	0.00	
3.6	Assessing the impact of commercially released GMO's on the environment	0.00	3,063,750.00	4,000.00
3.7	National Wetland Inventory	1,145,243.00	0.00	
3.8	Environmental Biosafety capacity Building Project	0.00	0.00	500.00
4	PLANNING RESERVE	750,000.00	750,000.00	
5	PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (OVERALL PROGRAMME)	250,000.00	250,000.00	250.00
	Total: New Environmental Cooperation Programme: 2005 - 2010	5,435,665.24	15,822,670.50	22,082.38

Table 3.1: Summary of Programme expenditures (source: DEAT Financial Depot), continued

PROJECT NUMBER	Expenditure 2006/2007	Expenditure 2007/2008	Expenditure 2008/2009	Total Expenditure	Total Funds Available
1	7	8	9	10	11
1	300,000.00	3,473,695.00	1,779,081.95	5,552,776.95	4,079,140.55
1.1	0.00	800,000.00	0.00	800,000.00	(400,000.00)
1.2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,670,000.00
1.3	300,000.00	1,750,000.00	0.00	2,050,000.00	488,000.00
1.4	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1.4	0.00	923,695.00	0.00	923,695.00	(62,057.50)
1.5	0.00	0.00	1,346,118.49	1,346,118.49	(383,838.49)
1.6	0.00	0.00	432,963.46	432,963.46	2,017,036.54
1.7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	750,000.00
2	300,000.00	4,219,400.17	6,553,445.15	11,072,845.32	2,378,205.76
2.1	300,000.00	0.00	0.00	300,000.00	(40,000.00)
2.2	0.00	1,454,750.00	0.00	1,454,750.00	(204,750.00)
2.3	0.00	400,387.00	192,613.12	593,000.12	(118,387.12)
2.4	0.00	662,708.86	660,302.31	1,323,011.17	(137,654.33)
2.5	0.00	890,080.49	4,556,554.15	5,446,634.64	2,443,246.60
2.6	0.00	639,618.80	714,111.74	1,353,730.54	(656,530.54)
2.7	0.00	171,855.02	429,863.83	601,718.85	1,092,281.15
3	3,259,517.55	3,534,746.31	3,971,915.78	10,766,179.64	7,241,569.36
3.1	1,686,040.00	1,544,676.00	1,340,758.00	4,571,474.00	687,580.00
3.2	700,460.00	548,607.00	0.00	1,249,067.00	743,135.00
3.3	170,000.00	141,000.00	0.00	311,000.00	321,000.00
3.4	396,000.00	305,000.00	0.00	701,000.00	714,500.00
3.5	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3.6	307,017.55	995,463.31	2,631,157.78	3,933,638.64	3,130,111.36
3.7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,145,243.00
3.8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	500,000.00
4	0.00	106,321.83	0.00	106,321.83	1,393,678.17
5	54,407.15	179,892.02	357,832.09	592,131.26	157,868.74
	3,913,924.70	11,514,055.33	12,662,274.97	28,090,255.00	15,250,462.58

Appendix 2:

List of DEAT Theme and Project Managers

NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME CONTACT PERSONS

Zaheer Fakir (DEAT) zfakir@deat.gov.za	Former NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME MANAGER TEL. 012-310 3828 / 3027
Merlyn van Voore (DEAT) mvvoore@deat.gov.za	Present NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME MANAGER TEL. 012-310 3865
Joey Kühn (DEAT) jkuhn@deat.gov.za	NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME ADMINISTRATOR TEL. 012-310 3444
Veronica Steyn (DEAT) vsteyn@deat.gov.za	NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME: FINANCIAL PERSON TEL. 012-310 3880

THEME 1: POLLUTION AND WASTE (012- 310 3931 / 3835 / 3710)

Peter Lukey (DEAT) (Theme Manager)

PROJECTS	
Peter Lukey (DEAT) plukey@deat.gov.za Project Manager: Margot Richardson (DEAT)	1.1 The Air Quality Act: Air Quality Management Planning Project 1.2 The Development Of The South African Air Quality Information System (SAAQIS) Project – NILU Involvement
Project Manager: Siva Chetty chettysiva@durban.gov.za (Ethekwini Municipality) Tel: 031-3113690	1.3 - Further development of the Air Quality Mgt Plan for Ethekwini Municipality
Project Manager: Chris Fennemore ChristFe@dmws.durban.gov.za (Ethekwini Municipality) Tel. 031-311 8734 (Previously Ms. Sandra Redelinghuys and Mr. Dale Braun were project managers 2007-2008)	1.4 - Institutional cooperation between eThekweni Municipality Water and Sanitation Department and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens Forurensningstilsyn)
Project Manager: Rantsadi Moatshe rmoatshe@deat.gov.za (DEAT)	1.5 - Institutional co-operation between DEAT, Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, Buffalo City and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) on integrated waste management systems
Dept. Manager: Sonnyboy Bapela sbapela@deat.gov.za (DEAT) Project Manager: Mark Jardine	1.6 - Environmental Management Inspector Training
Project Manager: Dee Fischer dfischer@deat.gov.za (DEAT) Dept. Manager: Daniel Nomphele dnomphele@deat.gov.za (DEAT)	1.7 - Elaboration of a National Hazardous Waste Strategy

THEME 2: ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (012-310 3972 / 3713 / 3670)

Lize McCourt (DEAT) lmccourt@deat.gov.za (Theme Manager)

(Previously Mr. Blessing Manale was Theme Manager)

		PROJECTS
Project Manager: Rudi Pretorius rpretorius@deat.gov.za (DEAT)		2.1 – Youth and the Environment 2.2 - Environmental management within Project Consolidate 2.3 - Regional State of the Environment Report 2.6 - Indicator strategy for Southern Africa 2.7 - Institutional cooperation between DEAT, GRID-Arendal, AS Frameworks and Pollution Control Authority on state of the environment reporting
Project Manager: Keleabetswe Tlouane ktlouane@deat.gov.za (DEAT)		2.4 – Environment and IDP's
Project Manager: Johan jbenade@deat.gov.za (DEAT) Sen. Project Officer: Wynand Fourie		2.5 - Environmental Impact Management

THEME 3: BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION (012-310 3694 / 3930)

SANBI CONTACT TEL. 012 843 5283 / 073 311 7093 / 012-843 5293

Wilma Lutch (DEAT) wlutch@deat.gov.za (Theme Manager)

(Previously Ms Leseho Sello was Theme Manager)

		PROJECTS
Project Manager: Solly nkoanas@sanbi.org (SANBI)		3.1 - Development of Programmes to address gaps in Red Listing
Project Manager: Domitilla Raimondo (SANBI) raimondo@sanbi.org		3.2 - Development of a national species monitoring strategy
Project Manager: Solly Nkoana (SANBI)		3.3 - Developing Red Lists into useful decision-support products
Project Manager: Solly Nkoana (SANBI)		3.4 - Capacity development of individuals and organizations
Project Manager: Solly Nkoana (SANBI)		3.5 - Development of knowledge sharing networks - Biodiversity Information Management
Project Manager: Lukeshni Chetty (SANBI) chetty@sanbi.org Sen Officer/Project Manager: Wadzi Mandivenyi (DEAT) wmandivenyi@deat.gov.za (Previous PM: Pamela Kershaw (DEAT) pkershaw@deat.gov.za)		3.6 - Impact of commercially-released GMOs on the environment (Biosafety Project)
Project Manager: John Dini (SANBI) mukhoro@sanbi.org		3.7 - National Wetland Inventory
Project Manager: Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, Cape Town Sen. Officer/Project Manager: Kiruben Naicker (DEAT) (012-310 3088)		3.8 Local Action in Biodiversity Programme

Appendix 3:

Assessment of individual projects (by the Review Team)

THEME 1: POLLUTION AND WASTE

Project 1.1: The Air Quality Act: Air Quality Management Planning Project

Air Quality Management (AQM) has been an important issue all through the Programme, properly starting in the beginning of Phase II, during mid-2000. Before that time the old law prevailed in RSA, basically ending up in negotiations on emissions between the authority and the polluters. The project initiative started in Southern Durban area, where the industrial pollution in the area close to the airport had reached unbearable proportions, especially so as the area is also a residential one. The Multi-Point Plan (MPP) was launched in November 2000, and the Norwegian-supported project was part of this effort. Extensive TA and planning software were provided by the Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU), and the Final Report from this stage was submitted in October 2007. The MPP formed a good platform for the eThekweni Municipality Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP), being Project 1.3 (described elsewhere in the report), which started at the initiation of Phase III.

The aim of Project 1.1 was to take the good lessons learned at the eThekweni municipal level up to the national level. In the 2007 AR, the ToR for the consultant to undertake the project was presented and approved (version dated 7.08.2006). This is in fact the *steering document* for the project, as no other Business Plan has been prepared. The document draws clear lines to the work previously undertaken in eThekweni. It should also be noted that in December 2005, the Air Quality Management Section in DEAT had its administrative structure ready and was thereafter in charge of managing the project. The Project Manager is leading this section and he also is the Theme Manager of Theme 1. The “Manual for Air Quality Management Planning in South Africa” was published in September 2008, and this was the end product of the project. Just a tiny input has seemingly been given by NILU in this development process (not even recorded). The total budget for the project was ZAR 1.5 million, with a Norwegian contribution of ZAR 400,000. According to the DEAT accounts, however, this was overspent with another ZAR 400,000. This is not fully appreciated by the RT but is assumed to be an “accounting grip” to balance the accounts only.

RT’s assessment: This project was initially in the ToR for the Mid-term Review proposed with a more detailed assessment. The proposal was however obviously based on a “mishap”, and Project 1.3, where NILU is the Norwegian partner, was chosen instead.

The ToR for the consultant presented in the 2007 AR indeed is a very comprehensive document, and in fact the most comprehensive and detailed ToR the RT has ever seen (anywhere in the world). It serves well as a steering document for the project (like any Business Plan or Project Proposal). The preparation of the Manual was a direct follow-on from Durban, maintaining that momentum in the national AQM planning sector, and the Manual was delivered without significant delays, by a consultant. The RSA side did this without any partners from Norway, which is commendable.

It is also clear that DEAT has no interest in buying the NILU AQM software “AirQuis” at national level because of the high costs involved. The USA EPA “CALPUFF” programme, which is free to download from Internet, will be used. In spite of this, the work of the PM in NILU is highly praised by DEAT for having done a tremendous job through the last nine years in the various AQM projects, amongst other through introducing the idea of a National Reference Laboratory for monitoring (QA, calibration and services). *Overall rating: HS.*

Project 1.2: The Development of the South African Air Quality Information System Project (SAAQIS) (- NILU Involvement)

It is noted that the part of the title in brackets are found in the 2007 AR Concept Paper, and in the 2008 AR, but in some other documents, notably in the ToR for this Mid-term Review, it has fallen out. This is a pity, because it better explains the real contents of the project.

This project is a continuation of the air quality management efforts in Phase II and is continued into Phase

III under various headings. The project was approved in the 2006 AM and builds on the previous project “Capacity building in monitoring and auditing of air quality monitoring network in Durban” listed the first time in the Concept Paper in the 2007 AR, where it states: “A *project that in essence constitutes the NORAD supported involvement of NILU in the South Durban Multi-point Plan project into the development of the national system*”. This project establishing SAAQIS (being a software system) experienced delays in getting off the ground. One reason for the delay was that NILU established a local company (uMoya-NILU) in Durban. This local company then wanted to tender (put out by DEAT) to provide services (installation of specialized equipment) to the SAAQIS, however there was a potential conflict of interest as NILU was involved in designing and scoping the ToR for the tender. NILU then withdrew and this potential conflict of interest resulted in delays in getting the project off the ground.

The 2007 AR also stated that due to this possible conflict of interest, the project involvement of NILU had to wait until the tender for the project had been concluded in April 2007. Eventually, uMoya/NILU/CSIR did *not* win the contract (their tender was the double price of the winning competitor), so Project 1.2 could continue with NILU as advisor instead. In reality, the project covers the advisory services of one person in NILU only, who has been with the project and supported DEAT and eThekweni Municipality since the start-up of the air quality projects early in Phase II.

There are three so-called *Special Scientist Posts* at Director level established in the Chief Directorate “Air Quality Management and Climate Change” in DEAT. These posts were established in order to encourage good scientists to follow the professional carrier route and not be tempted to move to administrative positions because of higher status and payment. Such an approach is very much appreciated by the RT. One of the positions, on “Air Quality Modeling”, has not been filled until now, and here the NILU Expert would step in as part-time advisor in the process of filling this post. The first visit by the NILU Advisor was late last year, when the job description for the position was developed. The applications for the position is expected in the near future, and the NILU Advisor will scrutinize them in Norway and give recommendations on which candidates seem to be the best suited. DEAT will eventually decide upon a shortlist of candidates and the NILU Advisor will then come to RSA to take part in the interviews. After the new person has been employed, the NILU Advisor will be his mentor in the beginning, continuous in the first 2-3 months. It is noted that the NILU Advisor has proposed to include a *larger* group of DEAT staff under his mentoring/training, not only concentrated to one person, which would enhance sustainability of the efforts and not make it so vulnerable in case of staff turnover.

The project was initially approved with a total budget of ZAR 300,000 over two years. In the 2008 AM however, a request to increase the budget was approved. Total budget of the project ended up at ZAR 1,670,000, and per March 2009 nothing is reported spent. (It is not understood why the PM informed the RT that the budget was ZAR 5 million, which is assumed to be a mix-up). Later, a study tour to Norway was proposed as part of the project (March 2009) and this will be proposed to the 2009 AM, having a cost of ZAR 720,000 for a total of 10 people. If approved, the total budget for this project will end up at ZAR 2,390,000. The RT has been informed that the previous contract between DEAT and NILU also will prevail in this Phase, so no new contract has been signed.

RT's assessment: This project has thus just started, but it is expected to be completed within the programme period. The RT has observed that the cooperation in the air quality management field is very much appreciated by all parties and it has in general produced very useful outputs, having a good impact amongst others on the Durban air quality in Phase II (together with other measures outside the Programme building up under the same objective). It is also appreciated that good personal working relationships have been developed and that the present cooperation builds on mutual trust between the parties.

On the other hand, it is always a danger that such long-term cooperation, where one side is “following” the donor’s funds, may be too easily will lead to strong recommendations on budget increase and extension of the scope of work. It is appreciated that a study tour to Norway might be useful for the RSA partners, however ZAR 720,000 spent on one study tour seems to be on the high side. Especially so when knowing that DEAT has so many other unsolved challenges under other programme projects, or even in general terms. The cost-benefit of this study trip should be carefully assessed by the Annual Meeting as

compared to other pressing and important issues that need funding. The RT is in general however not in doubt that the project will be successful in the end, as the partners seem very competent, with or without the study tour. *Overall rating: S.*

Project 1.3: Further Development of the Air Quality Management Plan and Action Plan for eThekweni Municipality.

(Initially in the ToR for the Mid-term Review, Project 1.1 was proposed for more detailed assessment, but that project did not have any Norwegian partner. Project 1.3, where NILU is the Norwegian partner, was therefore chosen instead). See *Section 4.1. Overall rating: S.*

(Project 1.4: Cleaner Production Strategy Implementation

This project initially had number 1.4, but it was taken out early in Phase III, and consequently the other following projects were re-numbered).

Project 1.4: Institutional Cooperation between eThekweni Municipality Water and Sanitation Department and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens Forurensningstilsyn)

The cooperation between the municipality and SFT already started in 2003 under Phase II with the “Permit Project”, having an overall goal of reduced industrial pollution, and a purpose of improved regulatory system (contract signed January 2003). This project has been significantly delayed and will be completed in 2009 (!), and a person from SFT will then probably come to Durban to participate in the project closing.

Project 1.4 was approved in the 2007 AM for continued funding under Phase III, and has SFT as partner on the Norwegian side. In the 2007 AR is stated: “A project aimed at the formulation and implementation of an improved regulatory and monitoring system in the eThekweni Municipality for package plants (small scale domestic sewage treatment works)”. The “package plants” have capacity of less than 2,000 m³ per day, and in Durban there are 68 of these in operation. These are often run by housing condominiums and other private entities, and the operations are not up to the required standard and neither the quality of the discharged effluent meets the requirements. There is a need to improve the legal framework in order to be able to monitor and effectively control such smaller treatment facilities. The main outputs of the project are in the Business Plan listed to be:

- 1) Project inception meetings and overview of the project.
- 2) Examine firsthand the system in place in South Africa.
- 3) Examine the low volume treatment plant system in Norway.
- 4) Workshop held for all the relevant and interested parties (South Africa).
- 5) Compile and implement a policy for the approval and regulation of low volume treatment plants and a monitoring programme (South Africa).
- 6) Review of Policy Document.
- 7) Finalization of Policy Document, training and Public Reporting.

The timeframe of the project was estimated to be almost four years. The total Norwegian contribution to the budget was initially set to ZAR 680,000. However, due some confusion with the Business Plan formulation (see below), the budget was found to be too small. The 2008 AM approved an additional funding, the project thus ended up with a total budget of ZAR 1,787,100. By the time of this approved addition to the budget, the project had already an over-expenditure compared to the initial budget (with around ZAR 450,000).

The first Business Plan was prepared jointly by the RSA staff and one person from SFT in Durban in December 2005. (*RT's comment:* that SFT person was very well known with the Norwegian format for such project documents in development cooperation). This BP, having a budget of ZAR 809,850, was submitted to DEAT and was approved for support in the 2006 AM¹¹. In July 2007, another meeting between the Durban staff and the SFT coordinator took place, and the BP was further developed by the two parties, ending up with a new budget of ZAR 2,850,850. This new budget was seemingly *not* communicated to DEAT, who still operated with the initial budget in their books (or rather a budget of

¹¹ The project staff in eThekweni told the RT about this BP, but could not retrieve the version from their files.

ZAR 861,637, the difference assumed to be due to the exchange rate fluctuations). This miscommunication created a lot of confusion and a lot of time spent to sort out, especially in DEAT. Finally, some additional funds were allocated in the 2008 AM (not captured by the DEAT accounts). A contract was drawn up and signed with SFT on 28.08.07, with a funding limit from Norway of ZAR 1.8 million. It is clear that the mentioned confusion of BPs has had no influence on the cooperation between the two main project partners, but indeed created headache for DEAT, and is not at all properly understood by the RT.

The project started with a study tour to Norway 20-28 September 2007, where 7 staff from the municipality participated. Thereafter, 2 persons from SFT came to Durban 5-10 November 2007. In the period 2-5 June 2008, 2 persons from the municipality went to Norway to study the Norwegian small treatment plants operation related to the regulations. In-between these delegations there has been very little communication between the parties, as this has been no felt need from the RSA side. The RSA side claims that the advice from Norway in the first stage of the project (during Phase II of the Programme) was sufficient for them to be able to proceed with the work alone. The Norwegian budgetary support has mainly covered delegations to Norway and the RSA. The next delegation will be from SFT to RSA where the final documentation will be compiled. That will in principle be the end of the joint project activities. The RSA side has just *one* outstanding need, being to get the Norwegian regulation on testing and certification of the small WWTPs translated into English. There should be ample budgetary cover for such a work, although the DEAT accounts do show an over-expenditure of around 7%.

Based on the drafting of regulations in eThekweni in the project, similar regulations are now being drafted at national level, where the municipal staff is on the Steering Committee.

RT's assessment: The accounting in this project seems to be a mess, where nobody uses the same budget figures in their respective accounts. The RT concludes that the Business Plan under this project has a very structured format (in spite of the confusion around which version is the valid one). It contains all the elements that such a document should contain, and could serve as a good example and template for other projects!

The contract for the project is drawn up using the same template as in Phase II, but the RT would like to stress that the front page of these contracts (and the one for Project 1.6) look exactly the same, with no indication as to which project the contract refers to. In the first text page it is possible to distinguish the contract by reading the goal. This is a smaller shortcoming that could easily have been rectified.

Obviously, the parties had different expectations to the cooperation from the beginning than it turned out to be. The South African side claimed that they found out that conditions in the two countries were very different, as Norway has a lot of much smaller treatment plants than RSA. The input from the Norwegian side was thus not so useful as hoped for. Nevertheless, the first stage of the cooperation gave some useful input, and it was realised that Norway has good regulations and guidelines. After that, the RSA side did not need any more support from Norway. In this way, they have considered the Norwegian input as only being useful as long as it improved their understanding of the matters at stake and answered directly their queries. This is more like a client-consultant relationship. SFT, on the other hand, has expected much more requests for advice from the RSA side on the managerial and regulatory side.

The development in the project is nevertheless encouraging, as the RSA side have made themselves independent of the Norwegian side and can proceed alone. As regards the idea of institutional cooperation and partnerships, which is useful for both countries, this had not been achieved as expected. As long as the Norwegian institution has no value to add for the RSA side, such partnership will not work in the long run. *Overall rating: S-MS.*

Project 1.5: Institutional cooperation between DEAT, Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, Buffalo City and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) on integrated waste management systems.

The partners in this project are listed in the heading of the project. The project was approved for support in the 2007 AM (but it is not reported in the 2007 AR under this theme!). The project is aimed at improving the integrated waste management system in South Africa, addressing both solid and hazardous

waste, and has the following goal: “*Recyclable waste disposed in landfills is substantially reduced*” and a purpose: “*Substantial amount of waste is sorted*”. The Draft Business Plan from August 2007, based on LFA workshops in both municipalities, lists the following outputs:

- 1) Instruments to promote recycling and development (7 activities).
- 2) Good quality compost is available and marketed in Buffalo City and Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (NMBMM) (7 activities).
- 3) Appropriate policies and/or legislation to support recycling at local level are developed (4 activities).

The background for the selection of the two participating municipalities was a survey undertaken by DEAT and SFT, where 10 municipalities were visited. The municipalities were assessed based on a set of criteria (needs of assistance, had projects in their IDPs already¹², and had sufficient experienced staff to take part in the project, etc.), and thus the two were selected.

A draft contract between the four parties was drafted and submitted to the parties second half of 2007, but it was never signed. The budget for the project is given as ZAR 962,280 in the DEAT accounts, whereas the PM informed the RT that the Norwegian contribution was approved to ZAR 4.6 million over three years. By March 2009, the DEAT account shows an over-expenditure of 40%, whereas the PM reported that only 8% of the funds have been spent!

The project has come to a standstill as per March 2009. The initial idea was that the municipalities should take a leading role in the implementation of the activities, which modality is also outlined in the draft contract, with SFT being advisors and DEAT only overseeing the project, giving guidance and making sure that the policies are carried out (taking 20% of the total budget). The municipalities finally refused to take the full responsibility of the implementation and wanted DEAT to have this role of day-to-day management of the activities. The reason given was that they did not have the human resources to undertake it (although this was clarified with them in the initial survey, where they confirmed this ability), and they had no funds to employ a PM to manage the activities, and this is not foreseen in the project budget either. A key point seems to be the issue of the Municipal Councils not really giving priority to the projects by allocating the sufficient funds in the IDPs. The discussion went to and fro and in a meeting 21.08.2008, DEAT made it clear that the municipalities will have to take up the project management, but nothing has happened since then.

Various options to solve this deadlock situation have been discussed in DEAT, with one option being transferring the funds to the municipalities under certain conditions (that they take the leading role and clear out the capacity issues, meaning pointing out a PM each).

RT's assessment: The Business Plan for this project has an orderly format, like all BPs where SFT has contributed to the preparation, notwithstanding the fact that the progress is non-existent. The process of selecting the municipalities to participate in the project seemed to have been an appropriate starting approach. The budgeting and accounting seems to be in a mess and is not at all understood by the RT.

Although the PM in DEAT believes that the municipalities can manage this project, he admits that they “*have taken a bigger bite than they can chew*”. The RT agrees with this assessment, and would add that there seems to be a big risk of this project not coming to life at all. The municipalities have to be by the steering wheel here, as this is the only way to create *ownership* and secure *sustainability*. The lack of action from the municipalities simply shows that they do not give enough priority to this project, and thus do not want to allocate local finances to it. Such prioritisation has to be respected, although it is a pity that it did not surface earlier in the identification process. Even if DEAT transfers the funds to the municipalities, the condition of them managing the project still prevails, and there is a big risk of the activities agreed to not being completed in time and quality.

The RT will therefore strongly advice the Annual Meeting 2009 to stop this project and reallocate the outstanding funds to other more needing and dedicated projects. This is in line with the proposal of the

¹² Integrated Development Plans, which is Municipal Council approved document required by law, where all development efforts must be included/approved.

Project Manager and the Theme Manager concluded in Feb/March 2009, and which will be presented to the AM. *Overall rating: HU.*

Project 1.6: Capacity building for environmental compliance monitoring inspectors (Environmental Management Inspector (EMI) Training)

The project was approved by the 2007 AM (but it is not reported in the 2007 AR under this theme, although the Draft Business Plan is attached to the AR). Also here SFT is a partner. The project will identify the skills needed for the inspectors, design a training programme and undertake the training. The goal of the project is formulated as: “*Ensure adequate specialised skills in compliance monitoring and enforcement*”. The total budget is according to the DEAT accounts ZAR 2,450,000, whereas the PM informed the RT that the Norwegian contribution was ZAR 3.5 million over 3 years! The expenditure according to the DEAT account is around 17% as per March 2009.

A Draft Business Plan was developed in a join workshop in Pretoria in June 2007 having the following outputs:

- 1) Develop a competency framework (2 activities).
- 2) Develop a specialised skills development programme (3 activities).
- 3) Implementation of skills development programme (2 activities).

Obviously, this Draft BP was further developed by DEAT and a revised version of the Business Plan (not *draft* any more, so it is considered the *final* version), with no date on it, followed with the following outputs:

- 1) Develop a competency framework: understanding of competence for inspectors (5 activities).
- 2) Develop a specialised skills development programme (2 activities).
- 3) Implementation of skills development programme (2 activities).

A contract was signed between SFT and DEAT on 28.08.2007.

There were significant delays in 2007/08, mostly due to staff turnover in DEAT (Compliance Monitoring Dept. and Enforcement Dept.). A study tour was undertaken to Norway by DEAT 31.05-9.06.2008, and the 2008 AR states under the Work Plan heading that the detailed work plan for 2008/09 “*to be established following study tour*”.

It is somewhat difficult for the RT to comprehend what happened thereafter. However, it seems that after the study tour, where the Final BP was discussed, a new DEAT Project Manager was assigned to the project (he had *not* been to Norway). He claims not to have been shown or given the agreed (Final) Business Plan, and not the signed contract with SFT (did not know whether the contract was signed at all), but he was asked to give input to a more detailed internal DEAT work plan for 2008/09 (version dated 28.08.2008 was given to the RT, but obviously the input was given *before* the AM although not being in the AR).

This input from the new PM was given *without* reference to the agreed BP. The input was nevertheless on par with the mandated activities of DEAT in this Chief Directorate, and could be construed as a detailed planning of Output 2 in the BP, Activity 2.2:

- a) EMI operation manual, being consultancy work.
- b) Grade 5 environmental management Inspectorate Basic Training, training DVDs in 7 languages and facilitators guide.
- c) 2-day EMI specialised training Course in Information, Communication and the Media (later cancelled).
- d) Course material for EMI specialised training (later cancelled as more basic training is needed).
- e) Study tour to Norway.

The new PM wanted to extent the scope of the Project and during second half of 2008/first quarter 2009 prepared a new Draft BP being very different from the previously agreed one in format and content (notably, SFT received a copy of the new version as late as 2 April 2009) This was discussed in a telephone conference with the SFT staff (the first verbal interaction between the new PM and SFT) on 20

April 2009, and the Norwegian side obviously was very confused by the new BP. (On the question on *why* he had not contacted SFT earlier, the PM answered that he was in doubt as to *who* was in charge on the Norwegian side).

The bottom line is that the PM wants to take out the specialised training and reallocate funds to basic training, as he claims it is too early to embark on specialised training. This will be proposed to the 2009 AM.

RT's assessment: There has obviously been some mis-communication and lack of appropriate guidance internally in DEAT on the process of previous staff leaving and the new PM coming in, as he was neither shown the Business Plan nor the contract with SFT. This mishap also might indicate the lack of understanding of (and respect for) steering documents in DEAT. This shortfall seems to have led to a lot of unnecessary work and confusion. The RT does appreciate that there will be changes in priorities during the implementation of any project, and the idea of shifting from specialised training to more basic training seems to be reasonable as long as this is based on the prevalent situation on the ground. However, such changes in the work plans must be done with both parties involved and with a clear reference to the already agreed BP, where some activities are taken out and some new are taken in. It is also noted that the accounting under this project seems to be in a mess.

It is therefore recommended that the PM, in consultation with the SFT staff and with clear reference to the agreed BP, prepares a realistic work plan for the coming year with an adjacent budget, and have this approved in the 2009 AM. It will mean that most of what was initially planned will not come to life, but at least some sensible activities might come out of the Norwegian Funds at the end of the Programme. The PM also confirms that a workable schedule of activities with SFT will be developed, but he emphasises that this will only be done once the relevant training needs analysis have been completed by DEAT in-house (Output 1: Competency Framework). In the meantime, the PM proposes to carry on those activities that would *not* require technical input from SFT, which seems like an appropriate approach under the prevalent circumstances. *Overall rating: MU-U.*

Project 1.7: Elaboration of a National Hazardous Waste Strategy

The project was approved by the 2007 AM (but it is not reported in the 2007 AR under this theme), and also here SFT is partner. The project is aimed at ensuring the efficient and effective implementation of Section 7 and 14(1)(a) of the Waste Management Bill regarding the establishment of a National Waste Management Strategy. According to the Business Plan, the overall goal of the proposed project is therefore formulated as: *"to implement the waste hierarchy in waste management in South Africa and move from disposal to treatment of waste"*, with the purpose formulated as: *"A national hazardous waste prioritisation matrix has been developed and used to identify two priority hazardous waste streams"*.

The following outputs have been specified:

- 1) To develop a detailed Project Plan for the activities to be undertaken in order to develop a national prioritisation strategy for hazardous waste (2 activities).
- 2) To update the hazardous waste baseline studies to support the identification of two prioritised waste streams (4 activities).
- 3) To develop a hazardous waste prioritisation matrix for identifying hazardous waste streams (2 activities).
- 4) To apply the hazardous waste prioritisation matrix to identify two priority hazardous waste streams (2 activities).
- 5) To develop a Hazardous Waste management Plan for the two prioritised hazardous waste streams identified.

The DEAT account shows a budget of ZAR 750,000 (see below). According to the PM, the initial Norwegian contribution to the project was NOK 1,736,780, with a DEAT contribution of NOK 346,708 over three years! As per March 2009, nothing has been spent.

The project staff was interacting with SFT during a visit to Norway in November 2006. The project however was for the first time discussed in a workshop in Pretoria in June 2007, where various

possibilities were explored, and 3 persons from SFT participated. The output from the WS was a Draft Business Plan, merely an outline of possibilities, which was refined and detailed during the following months. However, clearly the process was delayed due to awaiting the finalization of the legislation in the Parliament as the project needed to be in line with the final version of the Bill.

In June 2008, the Project Coordinator from SFT came to Pretoria, and together with the DEAT PM finalized the BP and costed the various elements (doubling the budget), although there were clearly some discussion and misunderstandings on the human resources input from the Norwegian side. Following the meeting, SFT drafted a contract that was sent to DEAT. The content of this was discussed further between the parties, and the final version with the ToR for the services to be provided incorporated (notably the content of the BP), was agreed to. The contract was finally approved by the Legal Services in DEAT (partly to the surprise of the project staff in DEAT), but has never reached the Director General. However, nothing else happened in the project, as it became apparent that the two parties obviously have different version of the Business Plan and different understanding of the roles of the two parties.

In order to clarify the hanging issues, a telephone conference was held in December 2008, and it then became clear that the parties had totally different conception of the their roles in the project (in the conference DEAT asked for a prequalified *consultant* from SFT). DEAT had from the very beginning considered SFT to be consultant that would provide Technical Assistance (TA) to the project, being an executing part of some of the activities, preparing reports and submitting documents that were tangible outputs in the project. SFT has however from the very beginning of the project defined their role only to be advisors. An “advisor” in this respect would mean a dialogue partner; a reviewer of reports and plans in the project; a partner who could give professional guidance to concrete project issues and the implementation process at large and as required; etc. Such advisory role would however not include direct line functions in the project implementation of the activities, as such have been considered to be DEAT’s responsibility. (In other words: SFT would guide the DEAT on how to implement the project, but would not directly involve in the implementation). SFT however accepted that consultants could be used for certain activities (baseline studies), but saw this as DEATs responsibility to arrange nationally, as the budget would not allow for an international consultant.

The project had at this stage experienced significant delays, and it is clear to DEAT that there was not enough time to complete the project as planned. In order not to fail the objectives completely, the PM raised the issue of reallocation of the funds to another project that would last for one year, with a budget of ZAR 750,000 (the figure in the DEAT account). This project concerns the co-processing of hazardous waste in cements kilns, where DEAT would like to have guidelines for a “Blending Platform” (pre-treating industrial waste to produce a consistent quality and specification of the fuel which can be used as a source of energy in the production of cement, with solid, liquid and sludge waste from various sources, and blend them with suitable impregnation medium into a dry and homogeneous waste-derived fuel).

A concept paper in this respect has recently been sent to SFT, where DEAT states that there is a need for a consultant. Notably, Norway was one of the first countries in the world to develop the treatment of hazardous waste through cement kiln technology. The response mail from SFT on 29.04.09 still raises a question about SFT’s role in such project, whereas the draft proposal clearly states that: “*the requirement would be that SFT would be able to either produce or to manage a Norwegian Consultant to undertake the work and to provide input as required*”.

RT’s assessment: The confusions and delays seem to have been caused by both parties: DEAT in the preparation of the ToR and SFT in the preparation of the BP. The main issue here is however the different interpretation of the parties’ roles. The RT do not properly comprehend that this misunderstanding has lasted for so long time after so many interactions and extensive communication! The staff turnover in SFT involved in the project can only explain parts of this. The parties have simply not been clear enough in their statements. Especially when the parties sat together in June 2008 and costed the various budget items, a bell should have been ringing aloud at that time. The budget had a significant time input from the SFT side, according to DEAT, and this was construed as being *consultancy* input. The RT appreciates that the high cost of SFT in the project as compared to the value for money in RSA when consultants are hired, backed up such interpretation. SFT is probably used to such relatively significant manpower input

in similar consultations and processes as advisors, probably resulting from experience elsewhere.

The last mail answer from SFT, where they still reflect on their role in the project, is not fully appreciated, as the concept paper from DEAT clearly states that *consultants* are needed for this concrete piece of work. The dialogue seems to be looping still, and SFT is still not interested in being consultants!

The above-mentioned confusion with the two versions of the BP is not understood by the RT.

Obviously SFT cannot and will not be able to prepare the requested guidelines (“Blending Platform”). This is the specialty of another Norwegian institution - SINTEF, which is known to the DEAT as one expert from there¹³ has been working with co-processing policy for DEAT with DANIDA funding through a Danish consulting company (completed in November 2008). It is believed that only SINTEF can deliver what DEAT needs during the time left of the Programme.

The RT would therefore recommend that the discussions and cooperation between SFT and DEAT is terminated and the parties agree to close the project in its initial form, which should be approved in the 2009 AM. This is also in line with the recommendation of the DEAT PM. DEAT should however explore the possibilities of preparing the requested guidelines directly with SINTEF, and if they can do it within the required time and budget, this should be started ASAP. If this is not possible, the funds should be reallocated to other needed activities in the Programme, otherwise they will be lost. *Overall rating: U-HU.*

THEME 2: ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

Project 2.1: Youth and Environment

This project is a continuation from Phase II of the Programme, when the National State of Environment (SOE) Report was prepared and submitted and a special version for youth was also prepared, the Youth SOE Report, in cooperation with the National Youth Commission (NYC) of South Africa being in charge of the implementation. The idea of the project was two-fold: first of all to expose selected youth from RSA to international seminars and conferences and some events were identified at a preliminary stage (e.g. in Germany), and secondly to reprint the Youth SOE Report. A project proposal was submitted and approved in the 2007 AM, having a 2-year duration, but it is noted that the Youth SOE Report was printed in 2006 (reported in the 2007 AR).

The PM in the NYC left the organisation and the momentum of planning the main activities in the project was thereby lost. The efforts of coming to a joint understanding regarding the project with the new PM failed, a detailed work plan was never produced by NYC and the project came to a standstill. Thus, the well-intended exposure internationally of the youth did not materialize at all. However, the project accounts from the Financial Dept of DEAT shows a small over-expenditure (ZAR 300,000 against a budget of ZAR 260,000). This expenditure was the mentioned reprinting of the Youth SOE report, as only 1,000 copies were printed in the Phase II and the demand for the report was much higher. Another 6,000 copies were thus printed, and the invoice paid in August 2006. The project was stopped by the 2008 AM upon recommendation by the PM.

RT's assessment: This shows how vulnerable a project might be when it is hinged on the enthusiasm of one person. Although the decision of re-printing of the report indeed was a wise one, the initial intent of the project completely failed. *Overall rating: U.*

Project 2.2: Environment Management within Project Consolidate

This somewhat “strange” project title refers to a large governmental programme “Project Consolidate”, under which the project fits in. Notably, in the contract between DEAT and SANBI under this project the project is called “Municipal Biodiversity Profiles”, which is a better title indeed. The project was initiated

¹³ Kåre Karstensen, who has gained respect in DEAT for his professionalism internationally.

based on the obvious limited capacity in the municipalities to develop the environmental component in the spatial planning, mainly through municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDP, compulsory according to new legislation). Part of this was the lack of detailed unambiguous spatial environmental information at local level (e.g. Bioregional Plans). SANBI, taking the initiative, and DEAT, therefore developed the Project Proposal¹⁴, and a concept version of this was attached to the 2007 AR, constituting the project's steering document. A contract was signed with SANBI (31.07.2007), being the implementing institution.

The project plan contains Phase 1 with *three steps* to be financed under the Programme:

- 1) Establish municipal biodiversity maps.
- 2) Develop municipal biodiversity profiles in two pilot provinces.
- 3) Distribute profiles to municipalities.

and *two steps* under a Phase 2 for which other finances must be found:

- 4) Provide support to municipalities to use profiles in planning and decision-making.
- 5) Capture lessons to inform roll out to other provinces).

The project (Phase 1) had a timeframe from January 2007 to June 2008, with a budget in the DEAT account of ZAR 1,250,000, whereas the SANBI PM informed that the approved budget was ZAR 1,454,750, which is in fact the accounted for expenditures as per March 2009. The start-up of the project was significantly delayed (almost one year), as there was staff turnover in SANBI. Additionally, SANBI and DEAT could not agree on the contract, and subsequently a Project Manager was not in place. Also, there were some uncertainties as to how the project should relate to the published bioregional plans as provided for in terms of the Biodiversity Act, which was developed while the project was developed.

SANBI insisted on having the funding up-front in order to be able to employ and secure payment for a PM, and this was done. Finally, the person was employed in August 2008 (Municipal Biodiversity Advisor), and things started to move with a joint workshop in September 2008 on biodiversity profiles, sectors plan, etc. The template for the profiles, including maps for some district municipalities, has been drafted. The project will feed into the recently established National Municipal Biodiversity Programme. Expenditures are shown as ZAR 1,454,750.1, which was the contract sum paid up-front by DEAT. SANBI reports that only ZAR 44,047 has been spent by them (only 3%), partly due to the delay and the fact that the project has not hired the anticipated consultants yet, but used own staff so far.

RT's assessment: According to the last progress update, this project is moving along relatively well, and the project is now into the stage of mapping in the municipalities. It is believed that in spite of the serious delays, the project will deliver most of the results as planned within the closing of the Programme, and this is confirmed by SANBI ("*most of the funds will be spent this year, following production*"). The RT also notes that the project does not really belong under Theme 2, as it has very little to do with the traditional understanding of the concept of environmental governance. The project is not reaching a final stage as Phase 2 will lead to the end results and funds are not found for this so far. The sustainability of the project therefore might seem *unsatisfactory*, but the RT believes that required funds will eventually be found to end the efforts as intended, especially with own staff in-house. The project should, of both practical and administrative reasons, have been moved to Theme 3 at the time it was approved by the AM in the final form. *Overall rating: MS.*

Project 2.3: Regional State of the Environment (SOE)

The idea of this intervention was born already towards the end of Phase I of the Programme, when amongst others GRID-Arendal was a dedicated advocate for regional projects in this sector, discussed and developed further during Phase II through the SOE project. The project in Phase III is closely connected to Project 2.6 below (in fact, that project is feeding into Project 2.3), the two being developed and submitted for approval under the Programme at the same time. DEAT submitted the proposals/Business Plan on behalf of SARDC (South Africa research and Documentation Centre), who had developed it. The implementing partner is the SARDC IMERCSA (Musokotwane Environment and Resource Centre for

¹⁴ Notably not named *Business Plan*.

Southern Africa). A contract (“Memorandum of Agreement”) was finally signed between DEAT and SARDC on 26.07.2007 with the Business Plan attached with a time-span of 1 year (1.08.07-31.07.08). It is also noted that the term SOE has internationally gradually been replaced with the term *Environmental Outlook*, and these two are often mixed in the various project documents, still meaning the same (notably, the latter heading is used in the 2007 AR).

The project seeks to promote the Southern African Environment Outlook 2005 and start preparing for the next Environment Outlook Report in 2011. The project has three outputs:

- 1) A comprehensive outreach programme for the Southern Africa Environment Outlook 2005 is implemented.
- 2) Key achievements and environmental issues assessed and publicized through an electronic annual environment outlook for Southern Africa.
- 3) Initiation of a discussion towards a strategy for environmental assessment and reporting mainstreaming into SADC programme as part of the RISDP¹⁵).

The last progress update tells that only the online version of the Outlook is outstanding and some other smaller issues.

The initial budget was said to be ZAR 400,387, although the contract says ZAR 400,000. According to the project staff, and the DEAT accounts, the budget has been ZAR 474,613, and all funds were disbursed to SARDC IMECSA. (The various figures are assumed to be due to varying exchange rates). So far, the DEAT account shows an over-expenditure of 25%. The funds has been paid out to printers for bulk distribution to the project's partners (SADC, IUCN, UNEP and SARDC), and for further distribution to their constituencies (without any additional costs).

SARDC has however realized that they need to have a more pro-active and focused distribution strategy, and this might take some additional ZAR 72,000 to support the work. The major outstanding activity for this project is reported to be the launch of the book for which the bulk of the costs will be met by SARDC as they are the main organizers of the event. SARDC had a budget for the launch, but due to delays in producing the book and exchange losses, an additional contingency of ZAR 50,000 will be required to cover travel and other logistics for the launch. Thus, for the successful conclusion of the current phase a supplementary budget of ZAR 122,000 is required, to be taken up at the 2009 AM. This is assumed to be the over-expenditure in the DEAT account already. The project proposal for the initiation of the funding for the next cycle of SOE Report as outlined under Output 3, has been development and will be discussed for funding.

RT's assessment: In this project, DEAT is only a financing instrument with no influence on the project implementation, as all the work is done in SARDC in Harare. The project has obviously taken much longer than expected initially (time schedule on 2007 AR shows completion in May 2008), but will surely be completed during the Programme. The RT appreciates that the implementation took much longer than planned, as the SADC initiatives must interact with 14 countries at different development levels, having different capacities and capabilities to respond as expected, both in quality and time. As such, the planning seemed to have been somewhat unrealistic. On the other hand, the efforts in the project support a continuous process in SADC. The project will have a larger, although not significantly, over-expenditure by project completion. Fund to complete the 2011 Environmental Outlook production is now being sought from SARDC. *Overall rating: MS.*

Project 2.4: Environment and IDP's

This project was planned at the tail end of Phase II, and is already mentioned in the 2006 AM, having no Norwegian partners. The budget for the project was said to be covered by the interest earned on funds in Phase II, being ZAR 1,185,356, being the figure in the DEAT account. The budget was split with around one half each in 2006/07 and 2007/08. The PM claimed that more funding was expected from Phase III, but such add-on never materialized. As per March 2008, there is an over-expenditure of 12%.

¹⁵ Regional Indicative Strategy Development Plan

The overall aim of the project is to enhance and strengthen planning capacity at local government level. There is obviously no Business Plan prepared for this project, but it comprises five outputs:

- 1) Review of Gauteng, Free State and Western Cape provincial Environmental IDP Toolkits.
- 2) Printing of provincial Environmental IDP Toolkits.
- 3) Development of Legislation Handbook.
- 4) Capacity building workshops in Northern Cape.
- 5) Integrated Development Planning (IDP) Training.

An important component in the project was the transfer of skills from the consultants to the provinces, who now are able to undertake the planning themselves.

The project planning took a long time as different consultants (“service providers”) were procured for all the five outputs. The project therefore started in 2007/08 and by the end of that FY around 80% of the work had been undertaken and a proportionate part of the budget spent. Output 2, being the Legislative Guidelines had eventually to wait for the new NEMA amendments to be in place (this process had started while the project was ongoing) in order for these new amendments to be incorporated into the Guidebook. The Guidebook interprets the clauses of the legislation that have a direct impact on the local Government environmental planning. The completion of the project will materialise before the 2009 AM, and no more fund allocations are required.

RT’s assessment: DEAT has seemingly got very positive feedback on the Environmental IDP Toolkits from the municipalities in the annual IDP consultations/info sharing on IDP Toolkits, and these are said to really be used in the planning (also containing case studies, best practices, methodology, etc.). The PM also reports that there has been a significant improvement of the ID Plans at local level the last couple of years. *Overall rating: S.*

Project 2.5: Environment Impact Management

See Section 4.2. Overall assessment: S-MS.

Project 2.6: Indicator Strategy for Southern Africa

This project was submitted by SARDC/IMERCSA through DEAT at the same time and by the same persons as Project 2.3, and the results of Project 2.6 is directly feeding into Project 2.3. A Business Plan was presented in the 2007 AR and approved in that AM. The project builds directly on the efforts in Phase II of the Programme, and comprises updating and strengthening of the indicators and meta-databases developed and harmonising methodology for calculating and measure the indicators. A contract has been signed between DEAT and SARDC on 11.09.2007 (with the Business Plan attached), with a sum of ZAR 1,407,000. The budget is according to the project staff and the DEAT accounts only listed as ZAR 697,200, with total expenditures so far noted as ZAR 1,353,731. The DEAT accounts therefore show 94% over-expenditure. This discrepancy is not understood by the RT and has not been properly explained by the project staff.

The goal of the project is: *“To improve and sustain the capacity of SADC countries to produce and publish comprehensive, reliable, timely and relevant statistics that met international standards for different sectors and for different users of environment outlooks and the Southern Africa Environment Outlook”*. The project has four outputs:

- 1) A firm data and institutional infrastructure for integrated environmental assessment and reporting is developed.
- 2) Enhanced national capacities in integrated environmental assessment and reporting.
- 3) Science-based environmental assessments and reports to support Southern Africa meet its targets under the RISDP and NEPAD¹⁶.
- 4) A data portal that can easily feed into and out of other portals.

The project has a time frame of 3 years (1.08.07-31.12.09), and the PM told that the “remaining” funds will be spent during the 2009/10 FY. After the BP was adopted, the need for capacity building in some of

¹⁶ New Partnership for Africa’s Development

the other SADC countries on harmonising datasets and storage was identified, having a cost label of ZAR 551,000, being a training programme for 1 year for 22 people. This could however be done in 3 months if funds were available. It is understood that this need will be addressed during the 2009 AM. The plan of the SARDC IMECSA is to merge this indicator project with the outlook project (Project 2.3) after March 2010 into one undertaking to be continued by other funding.

RT's assessment: It is known that GRID-Arendal is working directly with SARDC on the website development, which at present seems to be very slow. It is noted that also this project should preferably be under Theme 3, but is under Theme 2 of historic reasons. It is expected that SARDC will complete the project in time and within budget (except for the additional training identified). *Overall rating: S.*

Project 2.7: Institutional cooperation between DEAT, GRID-Arendal, Frameworks AS and the Pollution Control Authority on state of the environment reporting

Se Section 4.3. Overall assessment: MS-S.

THEME 3: BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION

Project 3.1: Development of programmes to address gaps in Red Listing

SANBI has the Project Manager for this project, but working and reporting through DEAT (DEAT sits in the board of SANBI). SANBI is reporting on the state of biodiversity nationally (part of SANBI's mandate) and internationally (Convention on Biological Diversity), and during Phase II of the Programme was a Botanical Institute.

Project activities started in Phase II (in 2005 worked on mammals and birds), and due to the requirements in the new Biodiversity Act, similar activities continued in Phase III. The project was listed in the Concept Paper in the 2007 AR. The activities largely include assessment of *new species*, starting from scratch, with the following components:

- 1) SA butterfly assessment (Southern African Butterfly Conservation Assessment – SABCA).
- 2) South African national Survey of Arachnida (SANSA).
- 3) Marine threat assessment and Red Listing.
- 4) Western Leopard Toad Biodiversity Management Plan.

Total budget in the DEAT account is given as ZAR 5,259,054, whereas the project management in SANBI gave a figure of ZAR 6,244,930 (discrepancy due to exchange rate fluctuations?). As per March 2009, the DEAT accounts report 87% expenditure, whereas the SANBI management told the RT that 67% was spent.

The progress in this project is reported to be:

- 1) New version of Virtual Museum launched in January, and has received about 5,600 photographic records from the public; most museum data has been digitized; SABCA database now contains 29,076 digitised records (Transvaal Museum-7,700; Iziko South African Museum-10,652; Durban Natural Science Museum-31,093; Natal Museum-7,027; Albany Museum-6,999; East London Museum-1,540; National History Museum (London)-17,300; Private Collections-43,571; Skukuza Biological Reference Collection-1,000; and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife-31,000); 4 SABCA e-newsletters distributed to 605 members, available on the project website; two large field surveys, SACBA database now contains 29,076 records.
- 2) 6,280 records of spiders (12,000 specimens) identified, geo-referenced and databased; 12,800 record entries in the database; 882 entries (of 1,700 photographs) in the Virtual Museum; SANSA is training the next generation of arachnologists; and is notably a finalist in the National Science and Technology Forum awards for teams.
- 3) A WS held to initiate the process of listing threatened marine species; distribution of 80 fish species was mapped (incl. 42 species of conservation concern).
- 4) ToR submitted to consultants in March 2009 for conducting surveys for presence of Western Leopard Toads east of False Bay.

RT's assessment: It is noted that consultants making EIAs are in need of the data collected by SANBI, and these will be released to them in their work if they provide new data back to SANBI from their work (the ATLAS project, see *Appendix 4*). The work in this project is indeed a continues process. The RT also notes that the reporting from this activity is very well structured, and the project seems to be very well on track under SANBI leadership. The scientific work in this project seemed to be of very high quality, and it is anticipated that the results will be delivered as planned and even beyond, in time and quality, as additional SANBI funding will be applied for certain activities. *Overall rating: HS.*

Project 3.2: Development of national species monitoring strategy

SANBI has the Project Manager for this project, but working and reporting through DEAT (DEAT sits in the board of SANBI). These activities started under Phase II and are continued into Phase III, and the project was listed in the Concept Paper in the 2007 AR. The aim of the project is continued monitoring, where ordinary people are asked to look after the plants in their local vicinity. This especially goes for the Cape Province, which has one of the richest biodiversity in the world on such a small geographic area, and where 100 species are already extinct. The budget for the project is ZAR 1,992,202 in the DEAT accounts, and the expenditure per March 2009 is 63%. SANBI reports that the total project budget is ZAR 2,709,070 of which 60% is spent per March 2009.

The project contains the following components:

- 1) Conduct national plant monitoring via the Custodians of Rare and Endangered Wildflowers (CREW) Programme.
- 2) EIA Data Collection System.

The progress in this project is reported to be:

- 1) CREW volunteers submitted monitoring data for 412 species of conservation concern (representing 8% of plant species of conservation concern in RSA); 26 volunteer groups involved, new field work started in Limpopo Province in October 2008; CREW volunteers have rediscovered 7 species that were listed under the IUCN 3.1 Red List criteria as possibly extinct. Working with low-income groups with takes longer than expected (Cape Town), and Black universities will be involved to increase black volunteers.
- 2) An inception workshop held February 2009 to formulate the implementation with Provincial Conservation Authorities. This will be a priority project for this year. The EIA project is behind schedule due to poor response form EIA officials in the Provincial Conservation Agencies.

RT's assessment: The RT notes that the reporting from this activity is very well structured, and the first activity of the project seems to well on track, whereas the second is lagging behind. The scientific work on this project seemed to be of very high quality, and it is anticipated that the project progress will take up and that results will be delivered as planned and even beyond, in time and quality. *Overall rating: S.*

Project 3.3: Developing Red Lists into useful decision support products

SANBI has the Project Manager for this project, but working and reporting through DEAT (DEAT sits in the board of SANBI). These activities started under Phase II and are continued into Phase III, and the project was listed in the Concept Paper in the 2007 AR. The project will address the problem with smuggling of threatened and protected species, and the difficulty in identifying the species in order to take quick actions. The project has one key element: Law Enforcers Decision Support System. The total budget is according to the DEAT account ZAR 632,000, but according to the SANBI project management: ZAR 331,000. Per March 2009 around 49% has been spent according to the DEAT accounts, whereas according to the SANBI management, less than 1% has been spent. This discrepancy is not understood by the RT.

Progress reported: MoU with TRAFFIC¹⁷ in place (as TRAFFIC will drive the project); workshop held in August 2008 with key law enforcers to determine the detailed requirements of the decision support

system; a Steering Committee (SC) has been established; an IT developer has been identified to develop the software for this decision support system.

RT's assessment: The RT notes that the reporting from this activity is very well structured. Obviously, this project is lagging behind schedule and the funds for this activity seems to be too little, so the SC will try to raise funds to sustain the services of the IT Developer. This is not fully understood by the RT, as so little of the budget has been spent, but then the difference in accounting between DEAR and SANBI is not understood either. There is then a new risk introduced on the project as it is uncertain whether such additional funds can be found in time to complete the project during the Programme. *Overall rating: MS-MU.*

Project 3.4 Capacity development of individuals and organisations

SANBI has the Project Manager for this project, but working and reporting through DEAT (DEAT sits in the board of SANBI). These activities started under Phase II and are continued into Phase III, and the project was listed in the Concept Paper in the 2007 AR. The project aims at stimulating the development of the human capacity to deal with the conservation issues in the future, through scholarships and internships in SANBI. The key elements of the project are:

- 1) Sponsorship to students.
- 2) IUCN Red List training Workshop.

The total budget of the project is ZAR 1,415,500 according to the DEAT account, but ZAR 1,215,000 according to the SANBI project management. This is not understood by the RT, but might have to do with exchange rate fluctuations. 49% of the funds have been spent per March 2009 according to DEAT, whereas 57% has been spent according to the SANBI project management.

The following progress of the project has been reported:

- 1) A call for proposals was circulated in March 2008 to relevant universities and the scientists, and over 40 research proposals were received. 7 proposals were selected and got support from April 2008-April 2009, with student progress reported to be very satisfactory. There were too few applications from black students. This will be encouraged in the next round of applications.
- 2) A successful IUCN Red List training workshop facilitated in July 2008 (even with a few officials from Zimbabwe); 1-day Red List workshop conducted for the scientists working on the South African Butterfly Red list Assessment in August 2008; 1-day two day Red List training workshop conducted for scientists working on threatened Marine Species in September 2008; a 3-day IUCN 3.1 Red List training workshop was conducting in October 2008 (University of Limpopo).

RT's assessment: The RT notes that the reporting from this activity is very well structured, and the activities seem to be well on track. It is anticipated that the results will be delivered as planned and even beyond, in time and quality. *Overall rating: S.*

Project 3.5: Development of knowledge sharing networks

SANBI has the Project Manager for this project, but working and reporting through DEAT (DEAT sits in the board of SANBI). These activities started under Phase II and are continued into Phase III, and the project was listed in the Concept Paper in the 2007 AR. The project aims at establishing an integrated inclusive approach to biodiversity information management by bringing together information from various sectors and groups, and making it available over Internet. The database includes NEMBA¹⁸ listed species and Red Listed Species. This project has not received funding from Norway, and appears in the DEAT accounts with ZAR 0. This project is completed and the database and a platform where knowledge is shared, is established. It is noted that the data from Project 3.1 is feeding into this database.

RT's assessment: This is very small and concrete project, and in spite of some delay and miscommunications the first year, this has been delivered as expected. It is not fully understood why this project was taken onboard the Programme at all in the first place. *Overall rating: S.*

¹⁸ National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act

Project 3.6: Assessing the impact of commercially released GMO's on the environment

See Section 4.4. Overall assessment: S.

Project 3.7: National Wetland Inventory

This project started under Phase II in DEAT (2000), and when the Project Manager moved to SANBI in 2004 (SANBI getting its new extended mandate), the project followed him. The project directly meets the requirements in the RAMSAR Convention on wetlands regarding surveying and mapping of the resources. At the time of the project start-up, land cover mapping took place in RSA, and the project enhanced the wetland component of this mapping.

The process took longer than expected and was not completed under Phase II. The project was therefore approved for an extension into Phase III, but with not additional funding, and the project was listed in the Concept Paper in the 2007 AR. In fact, all the funds for the project were transferred to SANBI during Phase II, and the expenditures were reported back to DEAT during Phase III. However, no funds were paid through the Phase III programme allocation. In reality, the Norwegian funds lasted longer than expected, as the project was piggybacked by other institutions, and also the land cover mapping was dragging out. The key components of the project were:

- 1) Production of National Wetland Inventory coverage in 1:50 000, in digital format.
- 2) Establishment of a web-enables database of the National Wetland Inventory.
- 3) Publication of various reports.
- 4) Publication of various related manuals, standards and technical documents.

The mapping was completed in 2006, with more than 200,000 wetlands mapped. The validation/accuracy assessment and so-called “ground-truthing” of some of the wetlands are continued with other funding. The project is completed and the budget spent (ZAR 1,145,243 listed in the DEAT accounts, but with no expenditures, as the funds were transferred already during Phase II.)

RT's assessment: The project is a direct part of Phase II, and all the funds were transferred to SANBI before Phase III and no payments were received during this phase. The RT therefore does not understand why the project was included in the Phased III list of projects at all, as this is only confusing! The work seems to have been going well though, although delayed, but integrated with other institutions and the land mapping, which seems like the right approach here. *Overall rating: S.*

Project 3.8: Local Action in Biodiversity Programme

(Notably, this project is called “Environmental Biosafety Capacity Building Project” in the DEAT accounts). DEAT is the Project Manager for this project but the *Council for Local Environmental Initiatives* in the City of Cape Town is the implementing agency. The Council approached DEAT with a proposal for funding some two years back under the Environmental Governance heading (Theme 2), getting a negative answer at that time. Then DEAT approached the Programme later again in 2007/primo 2008. The approval took a very long time, partly due to the leaving of the PM from DEAT, and finally the project was approved under Theme 3 with a budget of ZAR 500,000 according to the DEAT account (although the initial request was ZAR 900,000). The Deputy Director General (DDG) for Biodiversity and Conservation in DEAT “signed it off” in March 2009. The funds are at present *not* transferred to the project (promised by 31.03.2009, but did not come), but are still with DEAT. No expenditures so far.

The aim of the project is to promote biodiversity at local government level. The work to produce the LAB (Local Action for Biodiversity) Guidebook (the only end product) has started, and a draft outline is already produced, being in fact on the Table of Content and a description of the contents (given to the RT). This guidebook will contain the following modules:

- 1) Biodiversity, climate change and sustainability.
- 2) Mainstreaming biodiversity throughout local government sectors.
- 3) Partnerships.
- 4) Biodiversity assessment.
- 5) Planning and biodiversity.
- 6) Biodiversity management.
- 7) An overview of the international legislation framework and governance of biodiversity.

- 8) Mechanisms for implementing biodiversity conservation and sustainable management at local level.
- 9) Communication and participation in biodiversity.

The PM claims that the project will be completed before the Programme ends and within the said budget.

RT's assessment: It is noted that the project never appeared in the 2007 AR or in the 2008 AR, and it is only shown in the financial overview with a budget of ZAR 0. The project has been approved in-between two annual meetings, contrary to the formal procedures, but mutually agree between DEAT and the Norwegian Embassy. This seems to have been a pragmatic solution, and in the RT's opinion the right one under the prevailing circumstances. The project has different names in the accounts and in the project list, which is very confusing. The City of Cape Town will undertake the project in-house with own resources, but with input from a number of stakeholders, also at national level. As the preparation of the Guidebook is a fairly straight-forward exercise, it is believed that the work will be completed in time. The distribution of the book will be done post-project by DEAT. *Overall rating: MS.*

Appendix 4:

Project update from SANBI
(ultimo April 2009) from
PowerPoint presentation



Threatened Species Programme

Solly Nkoana & Domitilla Raimondo



THEME 3: BIODIVERSITY AND CONSERVATION

SANBI's Areas of Responsibility:

- **3.1 Development of programmes to address gaps in Red Listing**
- **3.2 Development of National Species Monitoring Strategy**
- **3.3 Developing Red Lists into useful Decision Support Products**
- **3.4 Capacity Development of individuals and organizations**
- **3.5 Developing of Knowledge sharing networks**



The model for work on Threatened Species

Choose taxonomic group that previously had little work done on it

Work with relevant agency who have expertise on group

Involve the public in collecting data via atlasing projects

Webased interface - virtual museums

Use detailed distribution data to update Red List statuses



Webased interface - virtual museums

Southern African Butterfly Conservation Assessment

Click on record number or image to display full details.

Records 1-10 of 1234 found.

[Next page](#)



SABCA No. : 5435

Observer: Willis C.K.; date: 2009-03-14. North West. 2527CD

There is 1 photo and 1 comment

Species: 2660 -- *Anthene amarah amarah*
Black striped hairtail -- Swartstreep-kortstertjie (LYCAENIDAE)



SABCA No. : 5434

Observer: Willis C.K.; date: 2009-03-14. North West. 2527CD

There is 1 photo and 1 comment

Species: 8480 -- *Papilio demodocus demodocus*
Citrus swallowtail -- Lemoenskoenlapper (PAPILIONIDAE)



SABCA No. : 5433


Observer: Willis C.K.; date: 2009-03-14. North West. 2527CD

There is 1 photo and 1 comment

Species: 4050 -- *Hypolycaena philippus philippus*
Purplebrown hairstreak -- Persbruin-stertbloutjie (LYCAENIDAE)




Use detailed distribution data to update Red List statuses




Produce Red List Assessments

World first 6% of worlds flora assessed only 4 % previously assessed





What do we do with data from Atlas projects




Reporting on the state of biodiversity **nationally** (SANBI's mandate) and **internationally** (Convention on Biological Diversity)

Meeting one of the Millenium development goals



What do we do with data from Atlas projects


Fine scale conservation planning





What do we do with data from Atlas projects

Draft list of threatened terrestrial ecosystems:
original extent



Informing and guiding environmental legislation

e.g. high numbers of threatened species used as a criterion for listing threatened ecosystems under the Biodiversity Act



What do we do with data from Atlas projects

Environmental Impact Assessments



EIA practitioners are required to report the presence of species of conservation concern

Records of decision will aim to mitigate loss of habitat/individuals of threatened species

What do we do with data from Atlas projects




Circandra serrata CR

Influencing where protected areas are expanded to e.g. via stewardship



SANBI works in collaboration with other agencies on animal work



Threatened Animal Co-ordination Unit



University of Cape Town: ADU

Agricultural Research Council





South African Butterfly Conservation Assessment (SABCA)

- New version of Virtual Museum was launched in February 2009
- Virtual Museum has received 5 600 photographic records
- Four quarterly e-newsletters distributed
- Two large field surveys conducted
- The SABCA database currently contains 29 076 records

RECORDS OF MUSEUM COLLECTIONS

Transvaal Museum	77 000
South African Museum	10 652
Durban Natural Science Museum	31 093
Natal Museum	7 027
National History Museum (London)	17 300
Private Collections	43 571
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife	31 000





South African National Survey of Arachnida (SANSA)

- Finalist in the National Science and Technology Forum awards for teams
- Virtual Museum received about 882 entries (from about 1 700 photographs)
- Total of 6 280 records of spiders representing 12 000 specimens were identified
- The SANSA database currently contains 12 800 records



South African National Survey of Arachnida (SANSA)

- Dr Russel-Smith (UK) helped identify the Lycosidae and Linyphidae
- Dr Prendini (AMNH) helped identify more than 4000 scorpion specimens. Large sample sets still need to be identified and incorporated into the database
- SANSA plays a major role in the training of arachnologists





3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAMMES TO ADDRESS GAPS IN RED LISTING

Biodiversity Management Plans for Specie New tool under Biodiversity Act

- Pilot study on Western Leopard Toad (*Amietophrynus pantherinus*)
- Collaboration with Cape Nature and City of Cape Town
- 2 Students research projects
- Radio-tracking of toads
- The Terms of Reference : conduct surveys for presence of Western Leopard Toads east of False Bay.



CapeNature



Marine Threatened Species

Threatened species workshop:

- Marine stakeholders met to explicitly discuss threatened marine species and scope the development of a strategy for assessing marine species status in South Africa
- Achieved consensus on the use of IUCN criteria
- Linefish redlist project developed





Marine Threatened Species

Linefish distribution work



- Distribution of 80 fish species mapped (42 species of conservation concern)
- Spatial component of important life cycle phases for threatened species mapped
- All maps included into a provincial systematic conservation plan to pilot the approach for national application



3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL SPECIES MONITORING STRATEGY

Civil society volunteer programme that monitors threatened plants CREW




- Involves local civil society groups in monitoring and conserving threatened plants and habitats
- Focuses on the highly threatened ecosystems
- Prioritise DD and CR PE species. 4 CR PE species of our 108 refound in past 6 months



Priority areas for threatened plant conservation

 Albany Thicket
 Bronberg
 Cape Floristic Region
 Maputaland-Pondoland
 North Eastern Escarpment
 Sekukhuneland
 South Eastern Escarpment
 Succulent Karoo



A vertical collage of six images showing various animals: two fish (one red, one silver), a butterfly, a frog, a bird with a large crest, a spider, and several red flowers.

OBSERVER & LOCALITY
Collector: W. C. Mackay, Columbia River, 25 July 1904

COLLECTOR AND LOCALITY
 Collector: W. W. W. W. W. W. Date: 25/10/04

Grid Ref: 2419 BC Lat: 24 26 52
 Long: 19 44 25

Description of locality
Rocky outcrop near quarry to left of
highest point of sandy Glen Rd., Napier

Species: Lachenalia surgeantii

Specimen type
☒ Picture ☐ Herbarium Specimen Spec. No.: _____

HABITAT
 Landform:
☒ Mountain peak
☐ Mountain slope
☐ Hilltop
☐ Hill slope
☐ Cliff face
☐ Kloof/hollow
☐ Plain
☐ Riverine
☐ Wetland/marsh
☐ Other: _____

Soil type:
☐ Sand
☐ Clay
☒ Peat
☐ Gravel
☐ Rock
 Slope:
☐ Gentle
☒ Steep
☐ Flat
☐ Variable

Geology:
☐ Conglomerate
☒ Sandstone
☐ Shale
☐ Limestone
☐ Dolomite
☐ Granite
☐ Quartzite
☐ Siltstone
☐ Other: _____

Aspect: N

Ownership:
☐ Private
☒ Commercial
☐ State
☐ Other: _____

POPULATION INFORMATION
 No. individuals Estimated No. of individuals
☐ 1-10 ☐ 100-500
☐ 10-50 ☐ 500-1000
☐ 50-100 ☐ >1000

Distr. of plants:
☐ Even ☐ X ☐ m ☐ km
☒ Variable
☐ Clumped

Population composition:
☒ Adults ☒ Juveniles ☐ Seedlings ☐ Dead individuals

Plant features:
☒ Resecder ☐ Specialist ☐ General
☐ Resprouter ☐ Clonal spread

Dispersal:

THREATS & DISTURBANCES
 Code Past Future
 T A B
 R 14
 A
 T
 I
 N
 G
☒ Present

Aliens:
☒ Acacias
☐ Grasses
☐ Grasses
☐ Other: _____


Alien density:
☐ Scattered
☐ Substant
☐ Dense
☐ Impenetrable

Notes:
This pop. severely threatened by a burrow
pit. Rocky outcrop is undamaged or being bur-
rowed. Urgent action needed to protect
this species

Notes & Sketches


THREATS & DISTURBANCES:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1 Habitat loss/degradation | 3 Harvesting |
| A Agriculture | A Food |
| B Plantations | B Medicine |
| C Livestock | C Fuel |
| D Abandonment | D Materials |
| E Mining | E Horticulture |
| F Timber harvesting | F Cultural/Lesure |
| G Groundwater extraction | 4 Pollution |
| H Urbanization | A Agricultural |
| I Roads/Railways | B Commercial |
| J Power lines | C Water pollution |
| K Change in native species dynamics | 5 Damage in native species dynamics |
| L Telecommunications | A Pollinators |
| M Tourism/Recreation | B Dispersing agents |
| N Alien | 6 Climate change |
| O Too frequent fires | A Evidence of drought - related death |
| P Too irregular fires | |
| Q Wrong season fires | |
| 2 Aliens (affect to species) | |



CREW Progress 2008-2009

- CREW volunteers submitted data for 412 species of conservation concern
- 8% of the 4953 plant species of conservation concern that occur in South Africa.
- Project on track, 26 volunteer groups involved.
- New field work started in the Northern Parts of the Country in Limpopo Province.
- CREW volunteers have rediscovered 7 species that were listed under the IUCN 3.1 Red List criteria as possibly extinct.



3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL SPECIES MONITORING STRATEGY

EIA DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM

- On-line interactive database that is easily accessible, user-friendly, free
- Consultants supplied with free list of potential species occurring in the broad geographic region of interest
- The consultants will in exchange, give feedback on species that occur on the proposed site
- Conservation community will have access to continually updated species locality records
- Initial workshop with key stakeholders held February 2009





3.3 DEVELOPING RED LISTIS INTO USEFUL DECISION SUPPORT PRODUCTS

SPECIMEN INDENTIFICATION TOOL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL

- Problem: Smuggling of threatened and protected species
- Species identification (whole +parts) difficult
- Important to identify species to make immediate action i.e. arrest or fine.



TRAFFIC
the wildlife trade monitoring network



3.3 DEVELOPING RED LISTIS INTO USEFUL DECISION SUPPORT PRODUCTS

SPECIMEN INDENTIFICATION TOOL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL

- Secured the services of TRAFFIC to drive the project
- A workshop was held in August 2008 with key law enforcers to determine the detailed requirements of the decision support system
- A Steering Committee for this project has been established
- An IT developer has been identified to develop the software for this decision support system

TRAFFIC
the wildlife trade monitoring network

3.4 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS

- Received over 40 research proposals
- Selected 7 projects
- IUCN Red list training in July -attended by 31 provincial and 2 Zimbabwean conservation practitioners

Anisha Dayarem 2008-09 Student

Pethole Manyama
2006 Student
2007 SANBI intern
2008 SANBI employee



3.5 DEVELOPING KNOWLEDGE AND SHARING NETWORKS

environment & tourism
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Species Status Database

- NEMBA listed species
- Red data listed species (plant, reptile, butterfly, arachnid, mammal, etc.)

Home
Background
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Encephalartos cerinus Lavranos & D.L.Goode - Waxen Cycad

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THREATENED STATUS	
NEMBA Status:	Critically endangered More info
Current Global IUCN Listing:	Not Set Date: Criteria: More info
Rationale:	
Current National IUCN Listing:	Not Set Date: Criteria: More info
CITES listing:	Appendix I
Other legislation:	

TAXON DETAILS	
Common Name:	W
Scientific Name:	E. c.
Scientific Synonym:	
Family:	Z
Order:	C
Class:	F
Endemic species:	<input type="checkbox"/>
Common synonym: Waxen Cycad (English)	

Appendix 5:

List of persons met and consulted.

List of persons met and consulted by the Review Team:

(listed in the approximate order of appearance)

Name	Position	Institution
Persons met with in Norway:		
Ms. Helle Biseth	Senior Advisor (former Programme Officer, Royal Norw, Embassy, Pretoria)	Dept. for Private Sector Development and the Environment, Norad
Ms. Brita Slettemark	Senior Advisor	Previously International Dept., Ministry of Environment
Ms. Vedis Vik	Senior Advisor	International Dept, MoE
Mr. Gard Lindseth	Advisor	---“---, (new employee)
Mr. Harald Noreik	Senior Advisor	Dept. for Regional Planning, Ministry of Environment (MoE), Project 2.5
Mr. Terje Lind	Deputy Director General	---“---
Mr. Svein Knudsen	Senior Advisor	Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU, Project 1.2 and 1.3
Mr. Frank Eklo	Project Coordinator	Directorate for Nature Management (DN). Project 2.5 & 3.6
Ms. Trine Hay Setsaas	Advisor (new Project Coordinator)	---“---
Ms. Nina I. Vik	Senior Advisor	---“---, Project 3.6
Mr. Terje Traavik	Scientific Director, Professor of Gene Ecology	GenØK, University of Tromsø, Project 3.6
Mr. Geir Arntzen Andrew	Manager	Frameworks AS, Project 2.7
Mr. Frank Turyatunga	Manager, Project Coordinator	Regional Field Programme, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Project 2.7
Mr. Morten Sørensen	Head of Dept., (Phase II Project Coordinator)	Marine Programme, UNEP/GRID-Arendal
Ms. Barbro Thomsen	Advisor	International Dept., Pollution Control Authority (SFT), Projects 1.4; 1.5; 1.6 and 1.7
Mr. Tor Skudal	Senior Advisor	---“---
Persons met with in South Africa:		
Mr. Helge Stange	Counsellor, Development Cooperation	Royal Norwegian Embassy, Pretoria
Mr. Tim Lund	Counsellor, Environment and Energy Sector	---“---
Mr. Zaheer Fakir	Chief Policy Advisor (former Programme Manager)	International Governance and Relations, Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT)
Mr. Merlyn van Voor	Senior Policy Advisor, Programme Manager	---“---
Ms. Jowy Khün	Programme Administrator	---“---
Mr. Peter Lukey	Chief Director	Air Quality Management & Climate Change, Theme Manager (1)
Ms. Liza McCourt	Chief Director	Environmental Impact Management, DEAT, Theme Manager (2)
Ms. Wilma Lutsch	Director	Biodiversity Conservation, DEAT, Theme Manager (3), Project Manager (PM) for Project 3.8
Mr. Kiruben Naicker	Ass. Director	Biodiversity Planning, ---“---
Mr. Rudi Pretorius	Director, Information	Office of Chief Operating Officer, DEAT, PM

	Management	for Projects 2.1; 2.2, 2.3; 2.6 and 2.7
Ms. Wadzi Mandivenyi	Director	Biosafety, DEAT, PM for Project 3.6 (partly acting Theme Manager)
Mr. Johan Benade	Assistant Director	Environmental Monitoring Standards and Regulations, DEAT, PM for Project 2.5
Mr. Wynand Fourie	Director	Environment Impact Management, DEAT, Project 2.5
Mr. Rantsadi Moatshe	Director	General Waste Management, DEAT, PM for Project 1.5
Mr. Mark Jardine	Project Manager	Pollution and Waste Management Support, DEAT, PM for Project 1.6
Ms. Keleabetswe Tiouane	Director	Planning and Coordination, DEAT, PM for Project 2.4
Ms. Dee Fisher	Director	Waste Stream Management, DEAT, PM for Project 5 1.7
Mr. Daniel Nomphele	Ass. Director	---“---
Ms. Domitilla Raimondo	Project Manager	South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI), Threatened Species Programme, PM for Project 3.2
Mr. Solly Nkoana	Project Manager	---“---, PM for 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5
Mr. John Dini	Director	Freshwater Programme, SANBI, PM for Project 3.7
Mr. Lukeshni Chetty	Deputy Director	GMO Monitoring and Research, SANBI, PM for Project 3.6
Mr. Mark Zunckel	Managing Director	uMoya-NILU (pty) Ltd, Durban
Mr. Benton Pillay	Director	---“---
Mr.		
Mr. Siwa Chetty	Deputy Head	Pollution Control and Risk Management, Health and Social Services Cluster, uThekwini Municipality, PM for Project 1.3
Mr. Christopher Fennemore	Manager	Pollution and Environment Branch, Water and Sanitation Dept., eThekweni Municipality PM for Project 1.4
Ms. Claudia Botha	Project Officer	---“---

Appendix 6:

List of key documents reviewed

List of main documents reviewed:

No.	Title	Author/ Institution	Date
Overall and general documents			
1.	MoU related to co-operation on the protection of the environment	South Africa and Norway	12.02.1996
2.	Agreed Minutes for a meeting regarding an environmental programme between South Africa and Norway	South Africa and Norway	11.02.1997
3.	Referat fra Miljøvernministerens besøk til Sør-Afrika 8-11 februar 1997	MoE	7.03.1997
4.	Rammenotat for miljør Samarbeidet (MoU) med Sør Afrika	MoE	28.05.1998
5.	Final Report. Mid-Term Review of the Norwegian Environmental Cooperation Programme with South Africa. 2000-2004	Scanteam, Ulrich Meier	June 2003
6.	Referat fra møte mellom Sør-Afrikas Miljøvernminister Mohammed Valli Moosa og Miljøvernminister Børge Brende	MoE	21.11.2003
7.	RSA-3002 Miljør Samarbeid – påanlegging av nytt program (2005-2009)	MoE	27.02.2004
8.	Til orientering – referat fra møte om nytt miljøprogram for Sør-Afrika	MoE	5.10.2004
9.	Outcomes of joint workshop in Pretoria 30.09-1.10.2004	MoE	2004 ??
10.	Pre-appraisal of the Environmental Cooperation Programme between the Republic of South Africa and Norway. Final Report	NCG, Jens Claussen	28 April 2005
11.	Framework Business Plan for the Environment CO-Operation Programme Between Norway and South Africa (enclosed to ToR)	DEAT, Embassy and National Treasury	13.12.2005
12.	Rapportering 2005. Institusjonelt samarbeid om konsekvensutredninger mellom Department for Environment and Tourism (DEAT) og Miljøverndepartementet v. Planavdelingen	MoE	2005
13.	Agreement between Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of South Africa regarding development cooperation	Norway and RSA	3.07.2006
14.	Agreed Minutes from the Annual Meeting, 14 June 2006	DEAT and Embassy	16.08.2006
15.	Report on factual findings of the Auditor General of South Africa	Auditor General	12. 10.2006
16.	Addendum 1 to Framework Business Plan	DEAT and Embassy	21.11.2006
17.	Working Together for Environmental co-operation programme between South Africa and Norway	SANBI and others (MFA, MoE, ...)	April 2007
18.	Consolidated Theme Concept Paper. 2007-2008. Information Management Input only.	DEAT	11.05.2007
19.	Agreed Minutes from the Annual Meeting, 22 May 2007	DEAT and Embassy	May 2007
20.	Environmental ... Consolidated Theme Concept Paper 2007-8. Information Management Input Only	??	11.05.2007
21.	Rapporter fra møter i Pretoria og Cape Town 28.5-	MoE	2007 ??

	1.6.2007		
22.	Revised Annual Report (for Annual Meeting 22-05.2007)	DEAT and MoE?	14.09.2007
23.	The 2007 National Framework for Air Quality Management in republic of South Africa. Series C. Book 12.	DEAT	Sept. 2007
24.	Travel Report from RSA Delegation to Norway 14-20 October 2007	DEAT	Oct. 2007
25.	Report on outcome of the study tour to Norway. Joint study tour with representatives from 5 provinces, undertaken from 14 to 20 October 2007	DEAT	Oct 2007?
26.	South Durban Basin Multi-Point Plan Case Study Report. Air Quality Act Implementation: Air Quality Management Planning. Series C. Book 12	DEAT	Oct. 2007
27.	Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway and the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa on Climate Change and Energy Issues	South Africa and Norway	17.04.2008
28.	Notat fra samtaler mellom Erik Solheim og Sør-Adfrikas miljøvernminister van Schalkwyk, 18. Des 2008 i Bonn	MoE	??2008
29.	Rapport geografisk rettede miljøarbeid. Årsrapport 2008. Vedlegg 5	SFT	??2008
30.	Review and synthesis of lessons learned from Institutional Cooperation and Capacity Building in the Environmental Sector in Norwegian Development Cooperation. Final Report.	NCG/Norad	March 2008
31.	Agreed Minutes from the Annual Meeting, 28 May 2008	DEAT and Embassy	May 2008
32.	Audit Report of the Auditor General to the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on the Norwegian Environmental Co-operation Programme	Auditor General	11.07.2008
33.	Audit Report of the Auditor General of South Africa to the Government of the Kingdom of Norway	Auditor General	30.09.2008
34.	Annual Report 01.04 – 31.3.2008	DEAT and MoE?	27.05.2008
35.	4E Rapport om geografisk rettet miljøsamarbeid 2008	DN	31.12.2008?
36.	Travel Report from RSA Delegation to Norway 1-5 Sept. 2008	DEAT	Sept. 2008
37.	Manual for Air Quality Management Planning in South Africa. Series C. Book 3.	DEAT	Sept. 2008
38.	Strategiske konsultasjoner mellom departementsrådene Rensvik og Ngcaba og møte i UD og Norad september 2008. MDs interne oppsummering	MoE	17.12.2008
39.	Strategic Plan for the Environmental Sector 2008-2013	DEAT	???
40.	FSDCC Circular No. 4 of 2009. Revision of Subsistence Allowance: 01 March 2009	DEAT	15.04.2009
41.	Organisation chart of DEAT	DEAT	May 2009
42.	Organisation chart of SANBI	SANBI	May 2009
43.	Climate Mitigation Strategy Support to South Africa. Final Report. Memo 2009-002	Econ Pöry AS,	Jan. 2009
44.	Various emails from project partners	Various	March-May 2009
Documents related to the individual projects			
45.	Development of the South African Air Quality Information Systems (SAAQUIS) – Phase one. (Project 1.2)	SAWS and DEAT	29.01.2007

46.	Project Proposal. Air Quality in SBD-AQMS (Project 1.3)	NILU	24.11.2006
47.	Kostnadsspesifikasjon og Reiseoversikt, (Project 1.3)	NILU	4.05.2009
48.	Contract between eThekweni Municipality and SFT regarding Environmental Cooperation (Project 1.4)	SFT and eThekweni Municipality	28.08.2007
49.	Business Plan. Institutional co-operation between eThekweni Municipality Water and Sanitation Unit and SFT (Project 1.4)	SFT and eThekweni Municipality	July 2006
50.	Business Plan. Waste Minimisation. Institutional cooperation between DEAT and, Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, Buffalo City Municipality and SFT. Draft. (Project 1.5)	DEAT and SFT?	August 2007
51.	Contract between DEAT and SFT regarding Environmental Cooperation (Project 1.6)	SFT and DEAT	28.08.2007
52.	Business Plan. Compliance Monitoring. Institutional cooperation between DEAT and SFT (Project 1.6)	DEAT and SFT	???
53.	Business Plan: Compliance Monitoring (Project 1.6)	??	None
54.	Business Plan. Development of the DEAT Hazardous Waste Prioritisation Matrix and Application to two Hazardous Waste Streams. 2008-2009 (Project 1.7)	DEAT and SFT	???
55.	Business Plan: Development of DEAT, Hazardous Waste Prioritisation Matrix and Application to two Hazardous Waste Streams 2008-2009 (Project 1.7 ??)	??	??
56.	Memorandum of Agreement between DEAT and SANBI for Municipal Biodiversity Profiles (Project 2.2)	DEAT and SANBI	31.07.2007
57.	South African Environment Outlook - Interim update report for Dr. Rudolf Pretoria (Project 2.3)	SARDC	28.04.2009
58.	Supplementary Activities (June-December 2009). Budget (Project 2.3)	SARDC	??
59.	Memorandum of Agreement between DEAT and SARDC for Southern Africa State of the Environment Report (Project 2.3)	DEAT and SARDC	26.07.2007
60.	Brief Information Note (Project 2.5)	??	??
61.	Theme: Environmental Governance. Project: Environmental Impact Management. Progress report? (Project 2.5)	DEAT	??
62.	EIM budget 2006-2010 (Project 2.5)	MoE	??
63.	RSA 3002: Theme 2: Environmental Governance. Project 5: Environmental Impact Management. Progress March 2009 (Project 2.5)	DEAT	April 2009?
64.	Formal contacts between NMoE and DEAT regarding EIM since 2006 (list of delegations. (Project 2.5)	DEAT	May 2009
65.	Environmental Impact Management. Brief Description. (Project 2.5)	??	15.08.2006
66.	Draft Business Plan. Environmental Impact Management. Project and Action Plans (Project 2.5)	DEAT	21.08.2008
67.	Progress Report on the Environmental Authorisation System (NEAS) fro the MoE, Norway. Visit Note (?) (Project 2.5)	DEAT??	April 2009
68.	Report EAGAA (Project 2.5)	DEAT	April 2009?
69.	Report on Environmental Assessment Practitioners (EAPS), Section 24H of the National Environmental Management Act, 107 of 1998 (NEMA) (Project 2.5)	DEAT	May 2009?
70.	Report on the development of a decision support tool in	DEAT	April 2009?

	the form of an environmental management framework /WMF) for a selected area along the Garden Route, in the National Lakes Area (Project 2.5)		
71.	Report on the development of fees for environmental impact assessments (EIA) regulations Promulgated in terms of the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) (Project 2.5)	DEAT	May 2009?
72.	Report on the law reform process for environmental impact assessment: the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) and environmental impact assessment (EIA) regulations promulgated in terms thereof (Project 2.5)	DEAT	May 2009?
73.	Report on the strategy towards co-regulation of the off-road industry of South Africa by the National Off-Road Work Group (NOW) (Project 2.5)	DEAT	May 2009?
74.	Report on the review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the EIS System in South Africa (Project 2.5)	DEAT	May 2009?
75.	Indicator Strategy for Environmental Assessment and Reporting Project – Interim update report for Dr. Rudolf Pretoria (Project 2.6)	SARDC	24.04.2009
76.	Memorandum of Agreement between DEAT and SARDC for Indicator Strategy for State of the Environment Assessment and reporting Phase II (Project 2.6)	DEAT and SARDC	11.09.2007
77.	Update and change specification for Digimaker web solution for the National State of Environment in South Africa (Project 2.7)	Frameworks	10.09.2008
78.	Mission Report. Workshop on vital graphics and visual communication, Pretoria (DEAT) March 17-19 2008 (Project 2.7)	GRID	??
79.	Agreement between DEAT and Frameworks AS on Digimaker Development (Project 2.7)	Frameworks and DEAT	1.04.2009
80.	Progress update on email on Vital Graphics development (Project 2.7)	Marianne Fernagut	5.03.2009?
81.	Vital Graphics of State of Environment in South Africa. Proposal for Capacity Building (Project 2.7)	GRID	8.06.2007
82.	Consultant Contract between Envalue and GRID – Arendal (Project 2.7)	Envalue and GRID	20.01.2009
83.	Various vital graphics maps and presentations (Project 2.7)	GRID and DEAT?	??
84.	Theme: Biodiversity and Conservation. Progress Report (Projects 3.1; 3.2; 3.3; and 3.5)	SANBI	23.04.2009?
85.	Threatened Species Programme. PowerPoint presentation (Projects 3.1; 3.2; 3.3; 3.4; and 3.5)	SANBI	23.04.2009
86.	Contract Between DEAT and Directorate for Nature Management (Project 3.6)	DEAT and DN	17.01.2008
87.	Annex II (to the Contract): Environmental Biosafety Cooperation Project between South Africa and Norway: Business Plan (Project 3.6)		
88.	Addendum. Proposed framework for Biosafety cooperation between South Africa and Norway: Phase II (Project 3.6)	??	??
89.	Invoice from DN to DEAT (Project 3.6)	DN	Nov. 2008
90.	Environmental Biosafety Cooperation Project between South Africa and Norway. Minutes from Project Implementation Committee Meeting (28.02.2008).	DN	28.02.2008

	(Project 3.6)		
91.	Environmental Biosafety Cooperation Project between South Africa and Norway. Minutes of Project Implementation Committee Meeting, SANBI, Pretoria (4.11.2008). (Project 3.6)	DN and DEAT	28.02.2008
92.	Project info in Norwegian (Project 3.6)	DN	??
93.	Agreement between DN and GenØK (Project 3.6)	DN and GenØK	12.03.2008
94.	Programme for RSA Delegation visit to Tromsø and Trondheim, 25-29 February 2008 (Project 3.6)	DN	??
95.	Answer to in Norwegian Review Team Questions re. man-hours spent on the project (Project 3.6)	GenØk	April 2009?

Appendix 7:

The Review Team's Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference

Mid-term Review of the Environmental Cooperation Programme between Norway and South Africa 2005-2010

1. Background

The Republic of South Africa (National Treasury and Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism – DEAT) and The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria (RNE) signed 13.12.2005 a Business Plan for an Environmental Cooperation Programme between South Africa and Norway for the period 2005-2010. The Programme has a Norwegian contribution of up to NOK 40 million. The programme was a continuation of previous cooperation programmes in the environmental area, specifically the 2000-2004 Environmental Cooperation programme.

The Programme Goal

To promote sustainable development through the protection and conservation of natural resources, safeguard the environment from pollution, and enhancing the quality of the environment.

Purpose

- South African national, provincial and local governments are effectively implementing their mandates for environmental management in the following areas: Pollution and waste, and Biodiversity;
- A platform has been created for long-term and sustained environmental cooperation between Norway and South Africa;
- Sub-regional, regional and global environmental co-operation is enhanced;
- Contribution to meeting the millennium development goals and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation targets.

The Programme is covering key aspects within the following themes:

- Pollution and Waste;
- Biodiversity and Conservation;
- Environmental Governance.

Each of these three themes has a specified goal and purpose. Under each theme individual projects have been financed. Project Business plans have been signed between DEAT and the various implementing institutions. The project Business Plans are submitted to RNE for information and possible comments before approval by DEAT. The list of approved projects under each theme is attached to this ToR.

The Business Plan states that “The parties will agree upon measures to conduct a mid-term review in order to ensure that the Programme is progressing according to plan. The Grant will finance the mid-term review.” RNE and DEAT have therefore decided to undertake such a review early in 2009. The review is a joint review and the ToR and the team composition is agreed between the parties. The team leader will be an independent Norwegian consultant.

2. Purpose and intended use

The main purpose of the review is:

- To assess the progress of the programme in relation to the agreed goal, purpose and outputs. The review will cover the whole programme, but one project under each theme will be chosen for an in-depth review.
- To do an assessment of the institutional cooperation, including an assessment of financial flows between cooperating institutions, within the programme.
- Advise on any adjustments that should be made to the programme in order to better achieve the agreed goal, purpose and outputs, and to make the achievements of the programme, including the institutional cooperation, sustainable.
- Identify possible areas and approaches for new cooperation.

3. Scope of work

The review shall briefly assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact (ref. Norad's Development Cooperation Manual) of the programme so far and assess these dimensions in depth for one project under each theme.

The institutional cooperation between DEAT and the Norwegian Ministry of Environment (MD) and the institutional cooperation between South African and Norwegian institutions to assess to what extent the Norwegian partners give "value for money" compared to other possible technical partners, the usefulness of Norwegian advice and support, the efficiency of cooperation, communication and coordination between the partners.

One purpose of the programme is that "*A platform has been created for long-term and sustained environmental cooperation between Norway and South Africa*". To what extent has this been achieved or to what extent is this likely to be achieved at the end of the programme? What are the prerequisites for the cooperation to be sustained after the programme period with regard to (i) active cooperation between South African and Norwegian institutions and (ii) strategic discussion between Norway (Ministry of Environment) and DEAT on global challenges?

The quality of the management, monitoring and reporting of the programme and the selected projects under each theme. How are risks managed compared to planned arrangements and what adjustments have been made because of risk factors with possible adverse effects on the programme? How are/have corruption risks been identified and dealt with in DEAT and at implementing partners? How are Audit reports developed and used?

As Norway and South Africa foresee strengthened cooperation in the climate change area, what approaches and areas of cooperation can be identified, taking into account recent Norwegian and South African policies and initiatives in these areas and the ongoing transformation of the cooperation between the two countries including recent proposals for post 2010 climate change cooperation.

4. Implementation of the review

4.1. The Review Team

The team shall consist of a team leader and one or two other consultants.

The team leader should be an experienced leader of international consultancy teams, have experience in the field of institutional cooperation and from at least one of the themes under the programme. The consultant must be familiar with the Norwegian resource base in the field of environment. The consultant should preferably have working experience from South Africa.

The other team member(s), where at least one should be South African, should (between them) have the following experience:

- South African Government administration and systems;
- Environmental Policies and challenges facing South-Africa;
- Knowledge of the Themes (i) Pollution and Waste, (ii) Biodiversity and Conservation and (iii) Environmental Governance;
- Knowledge of Climate Change issues and South African policies and priorities;
- Financial- and project management.

4.2. The Mission

The review team shall carry out the review as a combination of literature studies, personal interviews and interviews by phone/e-mail. The Norwegian participant(s) in the team will interview the Norwegian based partners and stakeholders.

One or two projects under each theme shall be assessed in detail. The 3 projects should be agreed between the parties and preferably be projects that are large, presently relevant, involving both Norwegian and South African institutions and have been operative since the start of the programme.

The team will have a briefing with RNE/Norad at the start of the mission. A debriefing with the RNE and DEAT should be done at the end of the mission. At the debriefing, the main findings and recommendations should be presented to the Embassy and DEAT.

4.3 Budget

Team leader: 4 weeks including approx. 8 days field work and 2 travel days.
Team member(s): approx. 2-3 weeks including approx. 8 days of field work.

A detailed budget will be attached to these ToR.

4.4 Contact Information

Main contact person, DEAT: Merlyn Van Voore, mvvoore@deat.gov.za
Main contact person, RNE: Counsellor Tim Lund; tilu@mfa.no
Main contact person, Norad: Senior Adviser Helle Biseth; helle.biseth@norad.no

5. Time and Reporting

The mission should be carried out in April/May, 2009.

A draft report should be finalised by 24 May. The report should be circulated to Norad, RNE and DEAT for comments. Comments from Norad, RNE and DEAT should be given to the consultant before June 3.

The final report shall be finalised within 1 week thereafter. The report shall be in English and include a summary with main conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations. The report should be both in electronic form and on paper (3 copies).

Pretoria, 15.04, 2009

(sign)

Tor Christian Hildan

Norwegian Ambassador to RSA

Annexes:

- I: List of approved projects under each theme
- II: List of Relevant Documents

Annex 1: List of approved projects under each theme:

THEME 1 : Pollution and Waste

Sub-Projects:

1. The Air Quality Act: Air Quality Management Planning Project
2. The Development of the South African Air Quality Information System Project (SAAQIS)
3. Further Development of the Air Quality Management Plan and Action Plan for eThekweni Municipality.
4. Institutional Cooperation between eThekweni Municipality Water and Sanitation Department and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens Forurensningstilsyn)
5. Institutional cooperation between DEAT, Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, Buffalo City and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) on integrated waste management systems.
6. Capacity building for environmental compliance monitoring inspectors (Environmental Management Inspector (EMI) Training)
7. Elaboration of a National Hazardous Waste Strategy

One project under the above theme was cancelled; see consolidated implementation progress report 2006-2007

THEME 2: Environmental Governance

Sub-Projects:

1. Youth and Environment
2. Environment Management within Project Consolidate
3. Regional State of the Environment
4. Environment and IDP's
5. Environment impact Management
6. Indicator Strategy for Southern Africa
7. Institutional cooperation between DEAT, GRID-Arendal, Frameworks AS and the Pollution Control Authority on state of the environment reporting

THEME 3: Biodiversity and Conservation

Sub-Projects:

1. Development of programmes to address gaps in Red listing
2. Development of national species monitoring strategy
3. Developing Red Lists into useful decision support products
4. Capacity development of individuals and organisations
5. Development of knowledge sharing networks
6. Assessing the impact of commercially released GMO's on the environment
7. National Wetland Inventory
8. Local Action in Biodiversity Programme

Annex 2: List of relevant documents:

- Business Plan 2005-2010
- Addendum to Business Plan
- Annual Report 2007
- Minutes of Annual Meeting 2007
- Annual Report 2008
- Minutes of Annual Meeting 2008
- Project Business Plans for the 3 selected projects

Various other reports, publications and other material produced under the programme.

Appendix 8:

Comments to the Draft Report

This appendix contains comments to the Draft Report dated 20 May 2009, from the various partners in the Programme. The comments are *not* in any way altered or edited by the Review Team, but taken in as they were submitted.

Dear

Tore,

I have reviewed only the " **4.3 Project 2.7: Institutional cooperation between DEAT, GRID-Arendal, Frameworks AS and the Pollution Control Authority on state of the environment reporting**" and I think this seem to be captured nicely as far as our involvement and my knowledge of it stretches.

Kind Regards, Geir Andrew, Frameworks AS

Dear

all,

First of all: the RT should be highly commended for an excellent evaluation process and report!

I have very few, and rather modest, comments and amendments to offer. Here we go:
Page 37, first paragraph (Output 4), last sentence: "Indonesia" should replace "India!"
Page 37, Box 4.3, second paragraph, first sentence, NB! Our own lack of homepage updating is to blame!. The whole sentence should be overhauled, and should now read: "The Centre has 42 employees, including staff members located at Third World Network HQ, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand; University of California at Berkeley, USA; Nanjing Institute of Environmental Sciences (NIES), China; National Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research (NISIR), Lusaka, Zambia; EMBRAPA and University of Sancta Catarina, Brazil)."
Page 43, paragraph 4, first sentence: Project 3.6 should replace 3.8.
Page 46, Section 5.4, last sentences in paragraph 1 and also in paragraph 2: It is unclear whether the descriptions apply to projects 3.8 or 3.6 . Maybe both?

Best regards to all of you from a sunny, green-blue-white Tromsø, i.e. Spring!
Terje

*Dr. Terje Traavik, PhD; Scientific Director, GenØk-Centre for Biosafety, Norway
Professor of Gene Ecology, Institute of Pharmacy, Faculty of Medicine, University of Tromsø
Mail address: Science Park, PB 6418, 9294 Tromsø, Norway
Office phone: +47 776 44379, Mobile phone: +47 45 50 74 71, Fax: +47 776 46100
E-mail: terje.traavik@genok.org, www.genok.org*

Dear

Tore,

Tank you for sharing with us the preliminary findings and recommendations of the evaluation. My colleagues and I have had an opportunity to read through the Draft Report of the Mid-term Review dated 20 may 2009. We all agree that GRID has no key concerns to raise with the report.

One simple point of correction: GRID is a officially referred to as a **UNEP Collaborating Centre** and not a *UNEP Centre*. On a cheeky note, as environmental managers, we like to stay away from the phrase "*kill two birds with one stone*"; actually, we prefer not to kill any birds at all – so to say!!

Thank

you

and

best

regards,

Frank

Frank Turyatunga, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Postboks 183, N-4802, Arendal, Norway
Tel: +47 907 34432, Fax: +47 3703 5050, www.grida.no



Norad

Direktoratet for utviklingssamarbeid
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

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Telefon/ Telephone: +47 22 24 20 30 Faks/ Fax: +47 22 24 20 31
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Arkivkode/ File no:	Vår ref./ Our ref.:
842.0	0900122-13
Deres/Dykkar ref./ Your ref.:	Vår saksbeh./ Enquiries:
	Helle Biseth
Dato/ Date:	
28.5.2009	

Mid-term Review of Environmental Cooperation Norway-RSA.

Comments from Norad on Draft Report

The Draft Mid-term report has followed the ToR and is fully satisfactory. Some minor comments:

1. List of Acronyms: Pls see through this list; both MoE and ME is used for Ministry of Environment and both RSA and SA is used for South Africa. GMO = Genetically Modified Organism.

2. para 1.3 b (page s 5-6): The planning workshop. The “outcomes” of the workshop including list of participants has been sent to Laugerud in a separate e-mail.

3. para 2.1 page 8: I would expect the main reason for the confusion about phases is that most of today’s projects had their “phase 1” in the second phase of the programme.

4. para 3.3.2 c (page 20) Pls check if sub-projects have been mixed up; Biosafety capacity Building is not project 3.8

5. para 4.4.1 (page 35): It is said that the GMO-project was not initially in the programme. This is not correct. Please refer to the outcome from the planning workshop (sent Laugerud); under “Biodiversity” one of the outputs were : *SA/Norway cooperation on the Biosafety Protocol has improved knowledge and information sharing*. Also, one Deputy Director from DEAT attended the GenØk Biosafety Course in Tromsø during July/August 2004 and the issue of possible cooperation under the phase III environmental programme was raised at that time.

6. para 5.1 c (page 41). During phase II, Riksantikvaren (Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage) was the appointed coordinating institution on the Norwegian side, and funds for this function was allocated on a separate budget line in the programme budget. The appointed coordinator (Ms Inger Heldal) did not live in South Africa, but made follow-up visits at least twice a year.

7. Para 5.1 c (page 41). Background information, can be included if the RT finds it relevant: The follow up from the Norwegian Embassy during phase II was much closer than the later follow of phase III. During the planning and implementation of phase III there were also several changes in responsible officer at the embassy.

8. para 5.2.1 (page 42): The sentence “*The professional advisory ministry to MFA in all international questions pertaining to the environmental sector (amongst others participating in*

Annual Meetings, in principle called upon by MFA as required). This is coordinated by the International Dept. but other departments might be involved as required according to the topics at stake)." is unclear. In international (=global) questions related to the environment sometimes MFA is the lead ministry and sometimes MoE. But the issue in relation to the RSA-NOR Environmental programme is the somewhat unclear role of MoE as an advisor to the embassy in programme planning and implementation matters.

9. App 1, the map. If possible, please include a map showing the new names (eThekweni, Nelson Mandela Bay) of the municipalities.

Yours sincerely,

Helle
Senior Adviser
Norad/NUMI

Biseth

Comments from the Norwegian Embassy in Pretoria

Dear

Tore,

Please find attached the Embassy comments to the Review Team's draft report:

General remarks:

The draft report is comprehensive, well structured and analyses the programme well. The report addresses all the points stated in the "terms of reference". The report is quite long. The team of consultants has done an impressive job in a fairly short amount of time.

The Embassy is encouraged by the overall findings of the RT that the Programme is still very relevant and addresses important needs in South Africa. Most projects are also rated to perform satisfactory. Where weaknesses are found, recommendations are put forward, either for immediate rectification or as advice for future cooperation. Most of the concrete recommendations follow logically from the analysis and are well reasoned. RNE would expect DEAT to ensure that the pertinent recommendations are tabled for decisions at the upcoming Annual Meeting next month. Many places in the report DEAT would need to clarify issues that the RT has not been able to figure out.

The effectiveness of institutional cooperation as a tool for capacity building could be better addressed. The consultants should elaborate on this in general and based on the RT's observations of "deliverables/consultancy" versus "advice", reflect on the specific conditions for successful cooperation between Norwegian institutions and South African counterparts including preferred modalities for such cooperation.

Some specific suggestions:

p. iii, p. 46 and p.50 on decisions between AM

It is correct that the Business Plan limits the possibility of adjusting workplans and budgets between Annual meetings. However, it was expressed in the 2008 AM that this may now be done on recommendation by DEAT to the RNE, a procedure that has been followed in one instance. The RNE would always be responsive to suggestions from DEAT for making decisions to optimise the results of the programme. Such decisions would however require that the RNE is better informed on outputs and progress of the programme.

p. 44 and p. 45 on reporting

For the RNE to be able to have a meaningful dialogue and make decisions in the last year of the programme, information on progress and outputs would need to be received. As a minimum an overview of outputs produced (reports) in the different projects should be made available at

regular intervals. How this is done without adding administrative burden to DEAT and Programme staff could be discussed at the upcoming AM. (This point is also related to the RT's description of the Role of TMs and Document control).

p. iii and p. 42 on roles

The consultants discuss well roles and possible conflict of interest situations. It should be noted that the RNA, on behalf of the MFA is responsible for the programme on the Norwegian side. The advice from MOE to the RNA is demand driven. Similarly, NORAD, whose role is not mentioned, also provides advice to the RNA upon request. The cooperation arrangements between the RNE and MOE and NORAD respectively, has worked quite well in this programme. In the discussions between RNE and DEAT on future cooperation, RNE will draw on the resources and advice of both MOE and NORAD.

p.8 and p. 46-49 on expected future cooperation

There are some inconsistencies in the report regarding future cooperation. The report correctly states that the programme will end on March 31, 2010. The report should not describe a possible "Phase IV" or "The new cooperation programme". Norway and South Africa are presently discussing future cooperation where climate change is clearly a stated mutual priority. Future cooperation will be based on mutually agreed priorities where both parties sees tangible benefit and where the competence of Norwegian institutions can provide "value for money". Overall, we find the RT's discussions on these issues to be good and the general recommendations about the process of agreeing the contents and modalities of a future cooperation programme useful. We would however suggest that the 4 paragraphs dealing with the Econ report is taken out.

The use of colours in the main report does not come out well when printed on a b/w printer. It would be better to use font type (**bold**, underline or similar) for this.

Best

Mr. Tim I. B. Lund, Counsellor, Environment, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Pretoria
Tel: 012 342 6100, Mobile: 082 884 3232

regards,

Comments from Directorate for Nature Management (DN):

Dear Tore,

Thanks for the draft report with some obvious useful observations and recommendations. We look forward to discussing the analysis and recommendations at a later stage.

Below you'll find comments and questions to the Draft Report from the Directorate for Nature Management in accordance with your request.

DN comments and questions:

List of ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS: GMO = Genetically **Modified** Organism

Executive summary: 5. ASSESSMENT OF OTHER RELEVANT PROGRAMME ASPECTS, page iii, third bullet:

· Institutional cooperation between DEAT and MoE has largely been satisfactory. MoE has several functions: partner of the MoU; advisor to the MFA/Embassy; "mother" of the project partners DN and SFT; and direct project partner (Planning Dept.). These different roles could lead to conflicting situations, especially regarding funding of projects, where the MoE agencies and departments have a gradually increasing demand for income-generating activities.

The review team also comments on the “need for income generation” in section 3.2.5, p 19, paragraph 5 and in section 5.2.1, p 42, paragraph 5.

DN comment:

Based on the agreement with Norad and on agreements related to institutional co-operation, Norwegian environmental agencies (SFT and DN) include in their annual plans budget lines for income and costs related to participation in development co-operation programs and projects. However, this participation is undertaken based on an agreement between MoE/the agencies and MFA/Norad to use the agencies’ experience and competence, **and not for generating income**. It should also be noted that the (hourly) rates according to the agreement with Norad are set on an at cost (selvkost) basis, i.e. that agencies will recover actual staff and direct costs but will not create any profit. We therefore find the text “where the MoE agencies and departments have a gradually increasing demand for income-generating activities” to be misleading, and propose that it is deleted from the report.

Section 4.4.1, p 35, Project planning and design:

Second paragraph, last sentence;

DN comment: the final report was not presented. The workshop focused on activities of biotechnology in SA and the need (from the scientists views) for monitoring. Results from phase II were (in part) presented at the workshop in Pretoria in November 2007.

Third paragraph, 2nd sentence “*only* should cover”

Section 4.4.2, p 36, Project implementation and progress:

First paragraph:

DN comment: The substance of the project was actually developed following DN’s participation in the End WS GMO ISP in Pretoria 10-11.05.2007, and was concluded at the project preparation workshop in Pretoria 12-16.11.2007. In between those two events, draft versions of the business plan were discussed (using e-mail) between DEAT and DN with input from the relevant partners on both sides. In the latter workshop, representatives from both Government and Research institutions on both sides participated.

Second paragraph: Output 1, 2nd sentence: “the first growing season 2008-2009” (or perhaps you mean that it was not possible to start the field trials in 2007-2008?)

Third paragraph:

DN comment: The partners discussed the detailed work plans in the workshop in **Pretoria (not Norway)** in November 2008. It is our understanding that **it is the input from the SA scientists that is outstanding. The Norwegian partners (DN and GenØk) submitted their work plans for 2008 in April 2008.**

Section 4.4.3 Review of Standard Evaluation Elements

c) Efficiency:

Difficult to assess. Transaction costs seemingly on the high side (especially Norwegian administrative coordination), but required in this phase based on *how* the project came to life. Preparatory costs high as compared to outputs so far, but this will improve when funds are spent for scientific activities. High quality level of scientific work. (MS-S)

DN comment: What is used as a benchmark for assessing the level of transaction costs / administrative coordination?

Section 4.4.4 Overall Project Assessment, p 39:

Second paragraph: *DN and GenØk has a certain total allocation of the entire budget, from which they are drawing down when invoicing the number of hours spent at any time (the contract between DN and DEAT is not specifying the total Norwegian input, only the total budget for the entire project, ZAR 14,834,939).*

DN comment: The Contract (clause 4) refers to Annexure III where the budget allocations for the Norwegian partners are shown.

Last paragraph/Last sentence: DN has expressed a wish to be a sparing partner for DEAT on a possible continuation.....

DN comment: It may or may not have been phrased this way by us, but in this context we feel that the following would be more representative for what we wanted to express: "DN, (as the main environmental directorate in Norway with responsibility for GMO-regulation), showed interest in contributing as a resource partner for DEAT in the possible continuation".

*With best regards
Frank Eklo*

Comments from SFT:

Dear

all

SFT would like to thank the RT for an interesting and useful report.

We have the following comments and reflections.

- SFT is of the opinion that the ranking system presented in the tables on pgs in the report 15-16 is flawed. Does it make sense to rank projects that have not started - no activities have been implemented and no contract signed - as e.g. "Highly Unsuccessful?" We suggest that the term "not started" be used for such projects in the tables on pgs 15-16.
- We note that in project 1.5 there are conflicting records of expenditures, varying from 8% to 140% of the budget. We note that expenditure has occurred in the project despite the fact that no contract has been signed between SFT and the counterpart in South Africa.
- In annex 3 pg. 7 it is stated that the Competency Framework has been completed (output 1). Based on our communication with DEAT it is our understanding that this framework has not been completed.
- In annex 3 pg. 7 (last para) it is also stated that a new BP was drafted in second half of 2008. It is our understanding that this BP was developed first half of 2009. SFT received a copy of the BP on 2. April 2009.
- SFT are commended in the report for guiding the design of proper LFAs in the projects. At the same time these projects have seemingly experienced the biggest problems in terms of implementation. This suggests that it is not sufficient to have "good" logframes to avoid delays and misunderstandings between the collaborating parties, and that when designing the project document the log-frame needs to be part of larger planning process between the collaborating parties.
- The role of advisor vs. consultant is raised in the report. The report suggests that the advisor role is problematic. SFT has consistently defined its role vis-a-vis South African counterparts as that of an advisor. SFT has perceived this as the role most compatible with projects geared towards institutional collaboration and capacity building. It is difficult to grasp exactly what the RT puts into the advisor role, but the discussion in the report seems

to imply that it is limited to being a dialogue partner; someone whom participates in workshops and comments on reports. SFT's understanding of the advisor role is broader than this.

With
Tor Skudal, Senior Adviser, Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT), Section for International Affairs, PO.Box 8100 Dep, N-0032 Oslo, Norway, tel.: +47 22573400, Direct Line 22573671
best regards,

Comments from Ministry of Environment:

Dear

Tore,

The MoE would like to thank the Review Team for the report. The MoE's comments are in particular related to how the Review Team has assessed the role of the Ministry of Environment:

Comments from Ministry of the Environment, Department for International Cooperation to the "Mid-term review of The Environmental Cooperation Programme between Norway and South Africa 2005-2010 (Draft report 20 May 2009)"

Page 8, section 2.2, last §

The RT writes that "The Programme will end in March 2010, and will surely not be continued. A new cooperation programme will eventually be designed under a Climate Change and Energy heading.."

MoE comment:

Has a formal decision been taken on this? If so, a reference should be included.

Page 13, section 2.5, 2nd § on page and Page 41, section 5.1c

The RT states that the "MoE has to some degree considered itself as some sort of 'coordinator' on the Norwegian side".

MoE comment:

It is our understanding that the coordinator on the Norwegian side is the Embassy in Pretoria as partner to the Framework Business Plan. It is thus not the perception of the MoE that it has taken on a "coordinating role". We have tried to be well informed about the environmental projects since they are of relevance to the MoU with DEAT. Furthermore, the MoE has a specific role towards our directorates in terms of resource use and work priorities, also in the field of environmental cooperation.

Page 13, section 2.6

MoE comment:

An important steering document for the cooperation that is not listed here is *DEATs strategic Plan for 1 April 2004 – 31 March 2007*. The document lays out key priorities for the department which also has consequences for the bilateral cooperation between South Africa and Norway.

Page 13, section 2.6, last §

The RT writes that "...the MoU [...] is steering the overall scope of the cooperation and formally have preference before the Framework Business Plan".

MoE comment:

It is correct that the MoU is the foundation for the cooperation. However, the specific programme established in the Framework Business Plan is only one way of operationalising this cooperation, with projects funded by the ODA. The MoU is an independent agreement establishing the cooperation between DEAT and MoE.

Page 16 ff. Section 3.2

MoE comment:

The analysis and evaluation in section 3.2 is not transparent, i.e. it is a bit difficult to assess how the RT has reached its conclusions in this section. Furthermore the review in section 3.2 does to a very little degree rely on the evaluation done in section 3.1 – although this section is a detailed evaluation of the different projects.

Page 42, section 5.2.1, § 3

The RT writes: “the MoE will have to critically review the performance of its own Planning Dept, and its own two institutions DN and SFT”

MoE comment:

It is the understanding of the MoE that the task of reviewing the performance in the concrete projects lies with the Embassy.

Page 47, section 5.5.a, last §

The RT writes that “a technical team from DEAT (compromising two persons)[..] will go on a fact finding mission to Norway starting 7 May”.

MoE comment:

The delegation was broader than this, and included 6 representatives from DST.

Page 48, section 5.5.c, 1st §

The RT writes that “Obviously, some thinking had already been undertaken at DEAT as the delegation going to Norway had identified several institutions they would like to visit”.

MoE comment:

The delegation that went to Norway was a joint DEAT/DST team – thus it is not correct that it was DEAT alone that had planned and identified possible partners. Furthermore, the institutions visited represented a broad range, and were institutions with previous contacts with South Africa.

Page 49, section 5.5.c Second last §

The RT writes that “The other issue is regarding the MoE and DEAT continuing the discussions on cooperation”.

MoE comment:

MoE and DEAT are not in discussions on their MoU. Cooperation and contact between MoE and DEAT are not dependent on ODA projects alone.

Page 49, Chapter 6, Bullet point 4

The RT writes “Only dialogue between equal partners at technical/scientific level should be avoided”.

MoE comment:

Dialogue between equal partners should generally be recommended. If avoided in a new programme supported by ODA it should be part of other activities under the MoU between DEAT and MoE.

Page 49, Chapter 6, Bullet point 5

The RT writes that "The Norwegian Embassy and DEAT should be given the opportunity to discuss the broad scope and approach of the new programme before all other partners are involved in the detailed planning".

MoE comment:

The MoE is not primarily involved as a potential project partner. We would however like to see the new programme influenced by environment and climate policy and wish to be part of such a scoping exercise.

Appendix 1

MoE comment:

It would have been helpful if the graphic also was readable and understandable in a black and white print out of the document. It is suggested that the different graphs and tables are adjusted accordingly.

*Comments are written by adviser Gard Lindseth Adviser, dr.polit., Department for International Cooperation. Phone: + 47 22245807, Mobile: + 47 92456432
Approved by Deputy Director General Mari A. Sæther
Oslo 29 May 2009*

Comments from the Ministry of Environment, Planning Dept:

Hello

Tore,

The Planning department of the Norwegian Ministry of Environment (NMoE) would like to comment on Project 2.5, The EIM cooperation as we are active partners in this cooperation. Comments on other aspects of the programme will be submitted by the Department for International cooperation at NMoE.

1. p30, c) Efficiency. We ask to have the last part of the sentence deleted (more used as "travel agents")

The Planning department does not feel that we act as travel agents. We work actively to prepare interesting field visits in Norway, but these are always related to topics of mutual professional interest. We find that this expression is unjust, that it might be hurtful and that it might damage the good cooperation.

2. p.31, the third paragraph. The sentence starting with "In case the RSA side only "travel agency"

The same applies here. Please delete this sentence.

3. We question the use of the rating scale in the report. To label a project with a simple rating, for instance marginally satisfactory, does not necessarily promote an open discussion, it rather closes it. You might say such ratings tend to become a bit tabloid! One should rather stick to elaborating on the achievements made in a broader and more comprehensive way.

4. We would like to stress our interest in further cooperation. We see a potential for further work, for instance as partners to DEAT on their formulation of the new strategy for EIA in the next 5 years. We will also point to the development of climate issues in environmental impact assessments (EIA). This is an issue we are involved in when revising the Norwegian regulations on EIA, and it will probably be an issue of international interest in the coming years. It should also be in line with the intended future cooperation between the two countries.

Regards,

Harald Noreik, Unit for Environmental Impact Assessment, Department for Regional Planning
The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, P.O.Box 8013 Dep, 0030 Oslo, Tel +47 2224 6012,
Fax +47 2224 2759, www.regjeringen.no/md



environment & tourism

Department:
Environmental Affairs and Tourism
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Mid-Term Review of the Environmental Cooperation Programme between Norway and South Africa 2005-2010

Comments from DEAT Managers

May 2009

1. INTRODUCTION

This memo provides comments from relevant DEAT managers on the findings of the mid-term review of the SA- Norway Environmental Programme, conducted in May 2009.

2.

BACKGROUND

Norway and South Africa have been engaged in environmental cooperation since 1997. A new five-year programme on environmental cooperation between Norway and South Africa was signed in Pretoria on 13 December 2005, making available up to NOK40 million for the period 2005-2010. In terms of the programme three thematic areas are being funded namely:

- Pollution and Waste
- Environmental Governance
- Biodiversity and Conservation

In April 2009, a mid-term review of the environmental programme was conducted. DEAT managers have reviewed the report and comments are provided below.

3. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to the review team for their efforts. We believe that the report contains some useful findings and recommendations that will enable us to improve performance of Norwegian-supported projects to meet our national environmental priorities.

4. COMMENTS ON PROGRAMME DESIGN

We note the comments made with respect to the various phases that the SA-Norwegian Environmental cooperation has evolved. We also note the comments regarding the use of the logical framework approach, and the gaps and weaknesses as it has been used in designing the current programme elements. We also note the reviewers' comments that "the lack of consistent logframes at project level does not seem to have hampered the implementation of the projects" (page 10).

We also note the need for better defined management arrangements.

5. COMMENTS - ASSESSMENT OF OVERALL ACTIVITY PROGRESS AND PERFORMANCE

Rating system

The RT notes that - "the ratings given are entirely given based on the subjective overall impression by the RT, and are clearly not based on any structured and objective scientific rating and weighting process" (page 14).

We note the following statement -- "**unintended delays will be considered a shortfall**" (page – 14). Given that implementation of the programme was delayed in most cases by a year, this will no doubt influence the "rating" provided by the RT.

Pollution and Waste Theme

1.2 Development of the South African Air Quality Information System Project (SAAQIS)

The RT notes (page 20) – "*the development of SAAQIS (Project 1.2) have seen no expenditure at all.*"

DEAT's comment on this project --- This project establishing SAAQIS (which is a software system) experienced delays in getting off the ground. One reason for the delay was that NILU established a local company (umayo-NILU) in South Africa. This local company then wanted to tender to provide services/ installation of specialized equipment to the SAAQIS (DEAT put out the tender), however there was a potential conflict of interest as NILU was involved in designing and scoping the terms of reference for the tender. NILU then withdrew. This potential conflict of interest resulted in delays in getting

the project off the ground. As part of the SAAQIS initiative, technical equipment and including computer software was installed at South African Weather Services (SAWS) in March 2009 to house SAAQIS, this year. Expenditure for this will be reflected in June 2009.

Institutional cooperation between DEAT, Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, Buffalo City and the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) on integrated waste management systems

RT's comment – *“this project should be stopped, and the funds spent for other projects”*

DEAT's response - The relevant project managers together with the Theme Manager made a decision in Feb/March 2009, to “bring this project to an early close”. This decision, with full reasons, will be presented to the Annual General meeting on 30 June 2009.

1.6 Capacity building for environmental compliance monitoring inspectors-Environmental Management Inspector (EMI) Training

Reviewer's comment – *“this project will not be completed as planned. The PM must without delay prepare realistic work plan for the remaining project period.*

The **DEAT** project manager notes that - a workable schedule of activities with SFT will be developed, but this will only be done once the relevant training needs analysis have been completed by DEAT in-house. In the meantime the project manager proposes to carry on those activities that would not require technical input from SFT.

1.7 Elaboration of a National Hazardous Waste Strategy

- **Reviewer's comments** – *“Different interpretations of SFT's role in the project have seriously delayed the project. A new study (“Blending Platform”) on hazardous waste is supported by the RT, but with SINTEF as partner.*
- **DEAT** project managers state that - it was difficult to get agreement on the scope of work for SFT, and to date no agreement could be reached. DEAT project managers wanted SFT to work as consultants, but SFT were not able to do so. DEAT project managers have recommended that this project be cancelled – this recommendation will be tabled at the Annual Meeting on 30 June 2009 that this project be cancelled.

Environmental Governance Theme

2.1 Youth and Environment Project

The reviewer notes that the **Youth and Environment** project has “not performed at all” (p. 50).

DEAT wishes to point out that this project had two objectives – one objective was to reprint the “*Youth state of the Environment Report*” which was done – the Report was officially released by the Deputy Minister. The second objective was to expose South African youth representatives to attend international youth events where environmental issues are debated. At the Annual Meeting in May 2008, the DEAT project manager

reported that no plan for this second objective was forthcoming (from a local SA partner organisation) and the DEAT project manager then proposed at the Annual Meeting that this project be stopped. The Annual Meeting in 2008 accepted the recommendation.

2.5 *Environment Impact Management (EIM)*

DEAT notes the overall rating for the EIM project given by the RT is “Marginally Satisfactory to Satisfactory”. DEAT does not want to interfere with the reviewers’ findings, and respect their views. However we wish to note that this assessment rating does not concur with the assessment of individual aspects of the project nor does it reflect the experience of both partners (NMOE and DEAT) who on many occasions expressed their high level of satisfaction with the cooperation and the products thereof. Furthermore, the evolution of the cooperation on EIM between DEAT and the NMOE started with **law reform** (setting the EIA system in place) in phases 1 and 2. These two phases involved far more time of the NMOE in an advisory capacity and progressed to **implementation of the system** in phase 3. Phase 3 evolved into a **mutually beneficial relationship** between the NMOE and DEAT (learning and sharing for both partners) and only to a limited extent an “advisory - beneficiary” relationship - this however does not make the cooperation less efficient, effective or satisfactory.

Page . 30 - para 4.2.3 - the following statement appears in the “efficiency” category - *“The utilisation of MoE staff ha not been optimal professionally, more used a **“travel agents”**”*. DEAT would like to state that even though it is not the intention this phrase can cause offence. It is our view that the technical visits both in South African and in Norway have been organised around the areas where learning could be facilitated (e.g. around integration of planning and environmental management (Norway visit); environmental impact assessment of renewable energy (Norway visit); environmental management in sensitive areas (both Norway and South Africa), etc. The detail and in depth discussion and engagements during these visits have been of tremendous value and have influenced policies, legislation and approaches of both partners.

About **“partnership”**- DEAT holds the view that a “partnership should be mutually beneficial, in contrast to an “Advisor - Beneficiary” relationship. Where possible we will continue to use the wisdom and experience of our Norwegian partners to advise on policy direction, etc. However, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to EIA is not relevant to the context of SA.

p. 31 the RT recommends that *“the partnership cooperation in this field should be considered ended after Phase III”*. It is our view that it would be a sad loss should the cooperation on EIM be terminated at the end of Phase III. It is our view that a natural

"progression" of the EIA system opens the door for further work in SADC as well as a continuous review and improvement of our EIA system. We also believe that we have lots to offer in an "exchange" relationship to our Norwegian counterparts and that this could be valuable "pay-back" for their tremendous contribution to our EIA system

On the issue of **planning and reporting in the EIM** project - DEAT wishes to point out that there is a detailed plan for EIM which is included in the Chief Directorate's Business Plans and Reports (a copy of the CD BP for 2009-2010 was made available to the RT).

XX. Overall Programme Expenditure

RT's extensive comments are noted. DEAT Finance is currently busy with an extensive financial review and reconciliation exercise of the SA- Norway programme, and the final results of this reconciliation exercise will be available by 8 June 2009.

Biodiversity and Conservation Theme

Page 34

The RT writes -

"The Norwegian Embassy also encouraged DEAT to formulate a project under Phase III, within the frame of NOK 6 million, which was not utilised or committed by other projects during the first year of Phase III. The project staff in DEAT however misunderstood this and thought the mentioned sum only should cover the South African participation and that a similar sum would cover the Norwegian input in the Project. Thus the project proposal that was prepared had a budget of around ZAR 14 million, **without even having been allocated one Rand from the beginning of the Programme ("the Child born without a any money".)**

DEAT project manager suggests replacing the UNDERLINED part with this statement -- *"despite the fact there was no initial budget allocation, although an interest had been expressed by the Norwegian Environment Ministry in a statement which mentioned "SA National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan good basis for cooperation on implementation of legislation. MD particularly interested in co-operation on Access and Benefit Sharing and Biosafety/Cartagena protocol".*

pg 35—is the amount NOK 1 million?? Is it not ZAR

Pg 36- Spelling of "Potchefstroom" needs to be corrected

6. PROGRAMME EFFECTIVENESS

RT's comment -- *Although Norway is not one of South Africa's top ten development partners, it is one of the three main donors within DEAT (along with Denmark and the World Bank) (p.17).*

DEAT's Response - A small correction - it is not the World Bank that is a donor, the funds

come from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The World Bank together with the UNDP, UNEP etc, implement these GEF-funded projects. So in the context of DEAT the World Bank is an implementing agency not a donor.

7. INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION

One purpose of the review was to - *“To do an assessment of the institutional cooperation, including an assessment of financial flows between cooperating institutions, within the programme”*. DEAT requested that institutional cooperation should be included in the review based on its understanding that institutional cooperation will be one of the modalities used under a post-2010 SA- Norway “Climate Change and Energy” programme.

DEAT’s understanding of institutional cooperation is that the purpose of institutional cooperation is typically to support capacity building and to allow two institutions/ organizations to cooperate on a service or technology that is not readily available in the market.

We note the RT’s comments on the need for institutional cooperation to be “demand-driven”, and we note also the need for good working and personal relationships between institutional partners. The biosafety project (3.6), for example, illustrates both the successes as well as potential challenges of “institutional cooperation”. For example the working modalities between the SA and the main Norwegian partner on the biosafety are good, and there is a shared vision and understanding of objectives and goals. However, there appears to be tension between the Norwegian ‘sub-party’ contracted by the main Norwegian partner with regard to finding common ground on core objectives.

From DEAT’s side we would have welcomed more detailed recommendations that point out the success factors and potential downsides/ pitfalls of institutional cooperation – eg ownership issues; roles and responsibilities; funding flows/ expense sharing; and value-add. If we understand the challenges and benefits more clearly we can ensure that the benefits of “institutional cooperation” are maximized in the future.

8. OTHER - Programme’s Planning and Reporting

We note the RT’s constructive comments regarding weaknesses and gaps in the Programme’s reporting.

It should be pointed out that one weakness in the **Programme’s planning and reporting** mechanisms is that DEAT staff use internal DEAT reporting guidelines, and use a different reporting template for the SA-Norwegian programme. So for example DEAT staff have to complete detailed trip reports; full details are also contained in Departmental quarterly and

annual reports; detailed feedback is provided directly to partners in Norway during reciprocal technical visits. Also at the Annual Meeting detailed presentations on selected projects are provided. Often this same level of detailed reporting is not evident in the reporting for the SA-Norway Environmental Programme. This is a gap that needs to be addressed. This gap in reporting may have contributed to a lack the full and complete picture of the SA- Norway Environmental Cooperation.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

DEAT has enjoyed a positive bilateral relationship with its Norwegian partners under the SA-Norway Environment programme. DEAT wishes once again to express its appreciation to the RT in producing such a comprehensive report. Where feasible we will act upon and will use the inputs to guide decision-making at various management levels, as well as to support the ongoing implementation of projects under the SA- Norway Environmental Cooperation.

Sincerely
Merlyn van Voore

