**Evaluation of the Centre for Peace Initiatives in** Africa NORAD COLLECTED REVIEWS 23/2009 SIPU International AB, Lars Oscàr, Peter Weiderud, Godfrey Manungo, Númi Östlund

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# Norad collected reviews

The report is presented in a series, compiled by Norad to disseminate and share analyses of development cooperation. The views and interpretations are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

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# Report

# Evaluation of The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa

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#### **Abbreviations in this Report**

CIDA The Canadian International Development Agency

CIO The Central Intelligence Organisation
CPIA The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa

DED Deputy Executive Director DO Director of Operations EC The European Commission

ED Executive Director

EUR Euro

GERDC The General Emmanuel Erskine Research and Documentation Centre

HQ Head Quarters

HRM Human Resource Management

MDC The Movement for Democratic Change NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

SADC Southern Africa Development Community

SEK Swedish kronor

Sida The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

ToR Terms of reference
UN The United Nations
USD United States Dollar

ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

#### Acknowledgements

The consultants wish to thank all organisations and people met during the Evaluation for all the information, insights, experiences and kindness received. Without all of you the review would not have been what it is.

The consultants wish that the report with its recommendations will be of use to the CPIA, the GERDC, the donors and ultimately to conflict management in Africa.

Any omissions or errors are solely the fault of the consultants.

# **1 Executive Summary**

This Evaluation looks at the relevance and effectiveness of the Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa's programmes and activities, and analyses the organisation, its routines and procedures, during 2006-2008. CPIA's activities in all parts of Africa are taken into account, with a particular focus on Zimbabwe. The Evaluation also looks at the harmonisation of donor support through the most appropriate tools and mechanisms, including a possible basket funding arrangement. Three of CPIA's donors – Norway, Sida and the EC – commissioned the Evaluation, to serve as a base for decisions on continued financing of the CPIA and for CPIA to develop its activities, programmes and organisation.

CPIA's aim is to contribute to sustainable peace, stability and security, through conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa, and to "become the leader of conflict prevention, resolution and management in Zimbabwe, the SADC and Africa". CPIA's five programmes use methods such as consultations, workshops, conferences, trainings, and sports and art competitions. The main, and most effective, method is to facilitate a dialogue between the conflicting parties in Zimbabwe. The General Emmanuel Erskine Research and Documentation Centre (GERDC) is, in most respects, considered part of CPIA but is formally an organisation of its own. Its sole asset is a library and conference facility in Eastern Zimbabwe.

The CPIA/GERDC has 21 staff members, an office in Harare and a library and conference facility in Vumba. Each organisation has a Board of Trustees, originally comprised of five trustees in the CPIA Board and three in the GERDC. More members have been informally added, and a strong recommendation stemming from the Evaluation is that the organisations formalise the Board compositions and communicate this to the donors. Particularly important is that the composition of the GERDC Board is changed so that the CPIA Executive Director and his two children are not in majority on the Board in charge of the library and conference building.

The CPIA has been using a few advisory groups, e.g. the Advisory Group of Eminent Persons, the Advisory Group of Church Leaders and the Social Cohesion Committee, for guidance and as messengers and advocators. The groups have been a great advantage in the work of the CPIA.

The National Dialogue on Zimbabwe programme has been the most important, and most successful, programme. Stakeholders from all walks of life have been brought to the same table to discuss those topics considered relevant by the stakeholders. It is clear to the Team that the CPIA has been the only actor in Zimbabwe able to convene this type of meetings. Meetings have included activities of a more social nature too, such as braais, lunches and dinners. From the persons interviewed by the Team, it is difficult to substantiate or point to concrete outcomes of the programme, but the overall result of the interviews verify that the programme contributed to decreased political tensions in the country.

The failure to point to concrete outcomes does not mean that the programme has been less valued by stakeholders or should be less appreciated by donors. Outcomes from a political process are not necessarily concrete, and growing trust might be verified, but not possible to quantify. The CPIA should have been paying more attention to the need to follow up on this process and reporting on it to donors as well as all stakeholders in Zimbabwe.

The Team suggests that the CPIA continues to facilitate the dialogue in Zimbabwe, as the conflict remains despite the Unity Government having brought three of the main political parties into the same government.

Activities of the National Reconciliation, Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice programme have included consultative meetings with different stakeholders concerning what is possible to achieve, given the circumstances. Furthermore, interviews have been conducted with victims of atrocities committed since independence in 1980 until today, including the current crises. With people close to the perpetrators still in power, it has not been possible to start a full reconciliation and national healing process. The aims of the programme, to establish the sources of conflict, to raise awareness of the necessity of reconciliation, to facilitate dialogue workshops and encourage story telling and the healing of wounds, have partially been met. The agreement on a Unity Government, included in the Constitution as amendment no 19, refers extensively to the need for national healing and reconciliation, which has resulted in the appointment of three ministers of state for national healing, one from each political party, and a National Healing Organ has been created. It was not confirmed by the persons interviewed by the Team to what extent this has been a result of the CPIA lobbying Parliament is not possible to say, but it seems likely that it have had an influence on the process.

The Culture of Peace programme is not designed in such a way that it is clear how activities will contribute to the expected results. The scope of the programme is also limited, as it reaches less than a thousand youths every year. The Team recommends the programme to be revised. The CPIA should consider whether it should work at the grassroots level at all, because it is questionable whether this is compatible with the rest of CPIA programmes. A suitable level of cooperation with other organisations should be able to deliver the experience and insights necessary for CPIA to run its high level programmes.

The activities under the Regional programme were CPIA attendance at a few meetings. A SADC regional consultative meeting on ECOSOC was attended by CPIA staff in 2006, and meetings on strengthening the peace potential in Southern Africa and aid effectiveness attended in 2007, and similarly a SADC civil society forum on regional integration in 2008. These activities can not be seen as a unified programme. Neither the purposes of CPIA participation in, nor the results of, these workshops are clear to the Team. Before any more regional activities are undertaken, the CPIA needs to strategise and plan how the organisation can make a difference in another country and/or on a regional scale.

Within the Research and Documentation programme the library and conference building in Vumba has been erected. Researchers have been provided possibilities to consult the library. The visits to the library have been 10-15 per month, due to limited knowledge of its existence and its usefulness in academic circles and its remote location. The programme should therefore be deemed limited in its success until now. It is recommended that the library is co-located with a university, preferably in Harare for accessibility. The Centre's tasks, mandate and academic relevance need to be revisited before it will be able to provide added value to conflict management in Africa.

A significant shortcoming of the CPIA is its failure to set measurable success indicators at the outset of programmes, and follow up on these during implementation. The donors should not accept to fund a programme where indicators are not elaborated in the programme document. The progress should be documented in reports, which are disseminated to stakeholders and

donors. In addition, the CPIA itself should make use of experiences collected in reports to further its own development.

The analysis of the organisation, routines and procedures of the CPIA has illuminated weaknesses in some regards. The CPIA does not meet all donor expectations as of now, but the Team considers the organisation willing and able to improve. It is therefore suggested that the donors extend financing for two consultants to be contracted to work closely with the CPIA in developing the necessary competencies within the organisation. If finances are extended, the donors should communicate their requirements to the consultants as well as follow up on the developments. One of the consultants should be an expert on organisation and project management, while the other should be an expert on financial management. Furthermore, one of the consultants should be an expert on donor financing and should work with the CPIA and the donors to harmonise donor support through an appropriate mechanism – possibly a basket funding arrangement.

The Evaluation has looked into a few situations in which conflicts of interests exist. The land where the GERDC building stands is owned in the legal sense by the Executive Director's family and the GERDC itself is controlled by his family by family members being in majority on the Board of Trustees.

The other case of conflict of interests concerns the considerable amount paid by the CPIA/GERDC, for security services and board and lodging for participants, to the Brackenridge Resort, owned by the Executive Director's family. These payments have to be strictly regulated and controlled, if not terminated.

A basket fund for support to the CPIA could be advantageous for all, but it needs to be realised that it is a process to both set up and manage, and would require a different organisation of the CPIA's programming. To achieve a basket fund, the CPIA has to map the different requirements of the donors so as to establish the minimum level acceptable to all donors. An agreement would need to be reached regarding the donors' administrative and financial requirements and the requirements that would be applicable in the case of the basket fund. The CPIA should be assisted in this by an expert with experience in donor financing requirements and regulations.

The full set of recommendations made by the Team is found in chapter 6.

# 2 Introduction

The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA) has enjoyed financial support from a number of international donors since its establishment in Zimbabwe in 2001. The organisation's aim is to contribute to sustainable peace, stability and security through conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa, however most work to date has been done in connection with the conflict in Zimbabwe. The financial support during 2006 – 2008 has come from the Governments of Norway, Finland and the Netherlands, and from Sida<sup>1</sup>, CIDA<sup>2</sup> and the European Commission (EC).

The CPIA has developed its programmes and methods over the years with support from its donors. The donors financed an evaluation in 2004 to follow up their support and establish CPIA's effectiveness and relevance. That evaluation came with a number of recommendations, which CPIA responded to.

In 2008 three of the donors, Norway, Sida and the EC, decided together with the CPIA to have another evaluation carried out. This would, again, follow up on CPIA relevance and effectiveness, and also analyse the organisation, its routines and procedures, taking into consideration CPIA's organisation, programmes and activities in the last three years, 2006-2008, in all parts of Africa but with focus on its work in Zimbabwe. This is the report from the evaluation commissioned by these three donors.

The Evaluation's Terms of Reference (ToR) state the overall purpose to be to assess whether CPIA contributes towards the promotion of sustainable peace, stability and security in Africa through conflict prevention and management with a focus on the conflict in Zimbabwe, and to see how its organisational set-up could be improved. The overall purpose is broken down into three main areas; the first should take into consideration CPIA's effectiveness, impact and relevance, the second should address questions that a system-based audit usually seeks to answer, and the third should serve as a basis for harmonisation of donor support through the most appropriate tools and mechanisms, including a possible basket funding arrangement.

The Evaluation Team (hereafter "the Team") hopes that the report will be seen as a learning tool for both CPIA and the donors, and that it gives the information, analysis, answers and recommendations requested in the ToR.

# 3 Method and Approach

The ultimate aim of the Team's work has been to assess whether the CPIA contributes towards peace, stability and security in Africa through conflict prevention and management. The evaluation has focused on the CPIA's work in Zimbabwe. In addition, the Evaluation has sought to establish how the CPIA's organisational set-up could be improved and find a way forward for harmonisation of donor support.

To achieve this, the Team has conducted a thorough desk study of a vast amount of documentation from the CPIA and donors, as well as from other institutions. The desk study guided the Team in designing the interviews. Interviews were held with some 50

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A governmental agency; "The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A governmental agency; "The Canadian International Development Agency".

representatives of the CPIA, the GERDC, their partners and donors. The Team has assessed the CPIA's relevance, effectiveness and organisational set-up through interviews and visits, and by studying the documentation. The 2004 evaluation has been used as a background for the present work.

The desk study and the interviews have given a picture of the organisation and its programmes, which have been assessed against the CPIA's original goals, its partners' priorities and international best practices. The tasks given in the ToR have received particular attention.

The large amount of documentation studied and the information obtained during the interviews and visits give a picture of the CPIA and its activities that the Team finds relatively clear and unambiguous, but the CPIA's results and impacts are difficult to measure and evaluate.

The interviews with different stakeholders have been critical in the assessment of the relevance of the CPIA programme and activities and their possible effects and impacts. The primary outcome of a dialogue is trust, which is not measurable. However, by putting the results of all persons interviewed together, and critically considering why people are saying what they are saying, it has been possible to deduce both the achievements and the relevance of these achievements. The validity of the Report has been further ensured through sharing a draft version of the Report with the CPIA and the donors, inviting them to comment on its findings and conclusions. The comments received have been taken into account in a subsequent revision of the Report.

The Team consisted of four members; a team leader and two experts, and a junior consultant whose engagement is financed by Sida. One of the experts is based in Zimbabwe, while the others members are based in Sweden and visited Zimbabwe in April – June.

# 4 The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa

The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa, CPIA, was inaugurated in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, on 5 February, 2001 by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Africa, Professor Ibrahim Gambari. The vision of the CPIA was, and still is, to "become the leader of conflict prevention, resolution and management in Zimbabwe, the SADC and Africa" and the organisation saw its mission to "contribute towards the attainment of sustainable peace, stability and security through conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa".

The CPIA's "father" and main resource was, and still is, Dr. Kapungu, a professional with more than 30 years of experience from UN Peace Keeping operations in the field as well as Head Quarters. The CPIA was set up in Dr. Kapungu's native Zimbabwe and the Board of Trustees came to be parts of his network in Zimbabwe. Members from both Zimbabwe and Dr. Kapungu's professional network from the years in the UN have later been added to the Board. However, also this Board composition is "Zimbabwe heavy".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Whether this adding of Board members is made in a formal way or not, see the chapter "5.2.1.1 The Organisation's Relation to its Board and Advisory Groups" below.

The General Emmanuel Erskine Research and Documentation Centre, GERDC, was set up in 2006 to host a Research and Documentation Centre on land belonging to the Kapungu Family Trust, but in day-to-day activities the GERDC is seen as part of the CPIA.

The two organisations have developed and currently have 21 staff members, a head office in Harare and the Research and Documentation Centre in Vumba on the border to Mozambique. Ten provincial coordinators have been recruited on a voluntary basis – one in each of Zimbabwe's ten provinces. The CPIA's methods include consultations, workshops, conferences, trainings and sports and art competitions, among others. The CPIA currently has five programmes; The National Dialogue/Governance; The Culture of Peace; The National Reconciliation, Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice; The Regional; and The Research and Documentation programmes.

The most important programme during the period 2006-2008 has been the National Dialogue on Zimbabwe. The CPIA has been able to bring most of the relevant stakeholders in the political conflict in Zimbabwe to meetings and conferences where presentations have been held and the floor opened for discussions. Social activities such as braais, lunches and dinners have been provided in an informal atmosphere. Sometimes meetings have been held in remote and private locations for secrecy, as participants may not have wanted the limelight. Most organisations, among them the political parties, were represented by senior management in the first meetings although later participants seem to have been of lower ranks but officially representing their leaderships. The CPIA was the only actor in Zimbabwe at that time that was able to bring all the conflicting parties to the same table.

For support and advice, different advisory groups, e.g. the Advisory Group on Eminent Persons, the Advisory Group on Church Leaders and the Social Cohesion Committee, have been created. These groups also function as a bridge between the CPIA and key target groups.

The CPIA has managed to develop a reputation, among donors and in the political circles and civil society of Zimbabwe, of providing a space for conflicting organisation and individuals to develop a dialogue and thereby decrease tensions and establish an atmosphere closer to cooperation than violence.

Many organisations in Zimbabwean civil society are focusing on advocacy and change. This has led to a situation in which the former, non inclusive, government shunned everything labelled "civil society", as it was perceived anti government and anti ZANU-PF. Because of this and because of the need for neutrality in the dialogue, the CPIA has made neutrality a main priority. This has been an absolute necessity in being able to accomplish what has been done, without being perceived as connected to any political faction. This has, however, meant that the CPIA has not coordinated with other civil society organisations.

The CPIA has filled an important void in Zimbabwe. The CPIA has, through its meetings with important stakeholders, not only been able to complement national and provincial civil society organisations, but has also included a number of them in their activities, giving them a voice and role in the high level dialogue.

The CPIA's administrative and financial management capacities have been developed over the years. However a number of the issues recommended by the 2004 evaluation still prevail. Such issues are found in connection with flattening the organisation, institutionalisation and professionalisation, institutional development, HR management and whether the CPIA should go Pan-African in its efforts.

The funding for the CPIA activities during the period 2006-2008, totalling approximately USD 2.3 million, has come from the European Commission, Norway, Sida, CIDA, the Netherlands and Finland. The GERDC has been exclusively financed by Norway.

# **5 Findings and Evaluative Conclusions**

# 5.1 Analysis of Effectiveness, Impact and Relevance

The first part of the Evaluation addresses the relevance and effectiveness of the CPIA's programmes as related to their objectives, and establishes whether links between the programmes make these complementary. These issues as well as other questions are addressed below in five chapters – one on each of the CPIA's programmes. Overall conclusions are drawn after these, in a sixth chapter attempting to assess the effectiveness and relevance of the organisation and its total set of programmes and activities.

The Team is asked in the Terms of Reference to "to the largest extent possible, try to get 'second opinions' from other informants less at stake in the implementation of CPIA activities" or in other ways add different perspectives. A transparent discussion is required in the Evaluation report for each of the main conclusions, on the type of sources that were used, the extent to which the informant could be considered to have a stake in the issues, and the extent to which the Consultant was able to corroborate or triangulate the conclusion through other sources with different perspectives or stakes. The Team is very much aware of the problems with this type of evaluation, in which a major source of the information is the very organisation whose activities and programmes are being evaluated.

With the number of persons and organisations interviewed and the amount of documentation studied, the Team finds its assessments in general well founded. Information has not differed widely between organisations or persons, and the Team has taken into account the source's stake in the matter in its evaluation of received statements. It has been possible to establish a picture of situations and processes.

It is interesting to note that there is a slightly different message from those who have participated in the dialogue process and those who have not, the latter tending to be more critical of the relevance and impact of the work. The CPIA has, due to its focus on neutrality, been reluctant to share its achievements to a wider public, which have limited the knowledge outside those directly involved.

#### 5.1.1 The National Dialogue on Zimbabwe Programme

The politically most relevant contribution of the CPIA to the political process and peace work in Zimbabwe has been the National Dialogue on Zimbabwe programme. The objectives are "to create a situation that enables conflict prevention, resolution and management through dialogues in Zimbabwe, the sub-region and Africa, and in Zimbabwe the elimination of long standing points of conflict and the provision of a blueprint for the social, political and economic stability", and "to contribute towards the initiatives aimed at addressing the current crises in Zimbabwe to enhance peace, stability and security through sustained dialogue".

Twenty six meetings of different kinds have been held during the period 2006-2008, apart from seven meetings with only the Advisory Groups. The meetings have been held in different parts of the country while consultations have been held with non-Zimbabwean actors such as the SADC Facilitation Team and governments of SADC countries. The meetings – conferences, seminars, workshops and consultations in more personal settings – have addressed specific topics and centred on presentations by resource persons, after which they have been opened up for discussions. In the beginning, the main aim was to provide a space for the different political parties and stakeholders to meet, listen to each other and gradually overcome the inability to dialogue. According to the interviewed, reports from the meetings have been taken back to the political parties' as well as other organisations' leaderships and have thereby fed into decisions and actions.

The CPIA has been careful to use an inclusive approach and invite a wide spectrum of key individuals from different sectors of society, for example political parties, the defence forces, civil society, universities, the legal profession, churches, business and trade unions. Organisations and individuals with different views and interests have been invited. What makes the CPIA special is that more or less all the invited parties have come to the table, making the meetings unique in Zimbabwe. All persons interviewed have been clear that individuals from all different interests and organisations have been invited and participated in the meetings. Participants in CPIA activities have been from both higher and lower levels in their organisations.

The early meetings involved a lot of tension and conflict. Some people felt uncomfortable with the presence of representatives from the security forces and the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), particularly when they did not participate in the discussions, but rather gave the impression that they were there to observe. However, gradually the atmosphere improved and matured and trust began to develop. Some participants came only for one or two meetings, but a good number of people kept coming back and have been involved in the national dialogue for several years. That commitment, in particular from centrally placed representatives, is an indication of the political quality of the work of the CPIA.

Several of these meetings have also been followed and monitored by representatives from foreign countries. Embassies of SADC countries and the European donor countries have often been represented at the level of ambassadors, which shows their dedication to the process. Otherwise, the main infrastructure in support of the National Dialogue has been the Advisory Group of Eminent Persons, which has provided the CPIA with advice during the process. Its members have also served as facilitators during meetings. The Advisory Group consists of prominent individuals from different sectors of society. Some of the eminent persons are well connected in the conflicting political parties, while others have been independent in relation to the main stakeholders of the conflict in the country.

The picture that emerged during the interviews shows that the CPIA has been the only actor in Zimbabwe able to bring representatives of conflicting political parties, NGOs, security forces and senior army officials, and other organisations with different interests, agenda and motives in connection with the conflict, to the same table to conduct a constructive dialogue. This picture takes into account statements by individuals of opposite views – political and otherwise. Despite having heard different messages in different interviews, it is the Team's assessment that the process has lead to less tension and a decrease of the intensity of the conflict. Some of the interviewed admit that they themselves developed trust in their opponents during the course of the programme. It is not possible, however, to determine the

degree of such trust, or to point to additional concrete achievements stemming from it. This latter fact does not mean, however, that the results and impact as they stand are of less value to Zimbabwe or the donors. The nature of the environment and the process in which the CPIA has been active, is such that concrete results or outcomes can not necessarily be expected.

It should be noted, though, that the Kariba Communiqué, elaborated at a CPIA meeting in Kariba 27-29 June 2007, is a concrete output in the direction of the programme's objectives. It is in much the "blueprint" for the social, political and economic stability of the country which the objectives state should be provided. It is also important to note that some of its proposals are reflected in the Global Political Agreement, which was signed by the ZANU PF and the two MDCs before the formation of the Unity Government. The Kariba Communiqué provides specific language on a future Constitution, calls upon the need for a Government of National Recovery and National Reconstruction, and appeals to all actors to refrain from provocative actions and requests that the Parliament set up a National Reconciliation Commission.

According to some of the representatives from the political parties who have been involved in the National Dialogue, this coherence can be an indication of a contribution to the political change in Zimbabwe.

The CPIA's involvement in the SADC Facilitating Team's efforts to facilitate dialogue between the conflicting parties and strike an agreement between them has also been part of the National Dialogue programme. According to representatives of the Facilitating Team, the CPIA, together with some Zimbabwean Church representatives, were the only partners worth consulting. The advice from the CPIA had some influence on the tactics of the process, but not on the substance, as the facilitator chose only to work with substance put on the table by the political parties themselves.

The recommendations and other documents that were produced and agreed upon at the CPIA meetings were rarely followed up by the CPIA or any other actor, beyond delivering them to political parties and other stakeholders. The recommendations usually concerned what the CPIA should focus on as next steps. The fact that they were not followed up decreased the CPIA's effectiveness and relevance.

When it comes to establishing facts regarding outcomes and impacts of the National Dialogue programme, the Team has noted a clear difference in the assessment of the political relevance of the programme between those who have followed the meetings over a longer period of time and those who have followed the process less intensely. The former are more positive in their assessment of the results and impact of the process.

Although this might be a natural reaction, it also indicates that the CPIA has not been able to report and verify the relevance and outcome of these meeting to the wider public. The CPIA would have received more credit and appreciation, and thus possibly had a stronger impact, if the reporting had been more comprehensive, relevant and disseminated to a wider circle. By choosing a defensive or even silent manner of reporting on its activities, the CPIA depends heavily on the individuals who have experienced the dialogue to spread its credibility and recognised political relevance.

#### Conclusions:

The methods used by the CPIA for the National Dialogue on Zimbabwe, during the political turbulence in Zimbabwe 2006-2008, were tailored and proven successful by contributing to less tension and decreased conflict. The meetings contributed to the building of trust between

the conflicting parties. Dialogue proved to be an effective and relevant way of decreasing the tensions and conflict. The assertion that topics addressed by the CPIA meetings have been considered relevant by the stakeholders is supported by their continued participation.

The contribution by the CPIA to an improved political environment seems real, but to substantiate the level of success and impact is more difficult, as the nature of the result, in particular building of trust, hardly can be measured. The level of trust created might have been possible to measure if key participants had been asked before, during and after the process, but this has not been done. The difficult political environment of Zimbabwe during 2006-2008 is of course adding to the difficulties to substantiate the specific levels of impact. Today, with the Unity Government in place, the needs that the CPIA can address are not the same as before. Reflections on how the CPIA can meet future challenges are developed below.

#### 5.1.2 The National Reconciliation, Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice Programme

The focus of this programme has been on the need for reconciliation and healing in Zimbabwe. Atrocities and human rights violations committed after 1980 are meant to be addressed under this programme. The objective of the programme is to achieve reconciliation by means of establishing the sources of conflict, raising awareness of the necessity for reconciliation, and facilitating dialogue workshops and encouraging story telling and healing of wounds.

Although not formally inaugurated until February 2007, an Advisory Group of Church Leaders was established in 2006, whose primary function it was to assist the program on National Reconciliation, in particular relating to issues of truth telling, forgiveness and reconciliation. A Committee on Social Cohesion was later formed with the task of assisting the programme on social issues. According to the CPIA Intervention summary report, the Group of Church leaders, has met six times during the last three years, while the Social Cohesion Committee has met only once.

The CPIA states in the programme document that it will advocate for a national peace building framework and a process of reconciliation, justice and peace including all political parties, civil society and other stakeholders in Zimbabwe; it will lobby Parliament to pass an Act on Reconciliation, Justice and Peace, and recommend the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The CPIA has held and organised consultations with civil society organisations, workshops, field trips to areas which have suffered atrocities in the past, and studies of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. The need for a process on healing and reconciliation has also been identified in the conclusions and outcome of other CPIA activities, e.g. the Kariba Communiqué from June 2007. In total, the CPIA has organised 15 meetings and workshops during the years 2006 – 2008, (6, 4 and 5 respectively in 2006, 2007 and 2008). All of these meetings and workshops have been of a consultative nature and have been held either with civil society organisations or internally. These activities have not yet reached all the objectives that were stated by the CPIA at the outset of the programme. Several of the activities have aimed to build capacities in the CPIA for them to be able to contribute to a future process.

The need for national healing and reconciliation is now included in the agreement on a Unity Government, incorporated in the Constitution as amendment no 19. This has resulted in the appointment of three ministers of state for national healing, one from each political party, and

a National Healing Organ, but to what extent this has been because of CPIA lobbying has not been possible to determine. The persons interviewed by the Team were not specific on this point.

It deserves to be said that it is still early days for reconciliation and healing in Zimbabwe as perpetrators or representatives linked to perpetrators are still in power.

#### Conclusions:

The relevance of this programme in today's Zimbabwe is obvious, but due to the political situation it is still too early to start implementation of concrete reconciliation.

Implemented programme activities have been of three types; Consultative meetings of more general nature and workshops on what reconciliation processes involve, and grassroots level activities comprising interviews with victims and facilitation activities of dialogue at the grassroots level.

It is not certain what the effects of this programme have been, as it is not possible to determine the CPIA's effects on the process. However, parts of the objectives of the programme have been fulfilled by the Unity Government actually appointing three ministers of state for national healing, and a National Healing Organ.

The programme document does not contain measurable indicators or was a baseline study carried out in the beginning of the programme. The fact that the activities have not been followed up and documented makes it very difficult to evaluate.

What has come out of the meetings and workshops is not clear to the Team, as no results have been documented or followed up upon. The same goes for the grassroots work. It is not clear what should constitute a success of the programme since measurable indicators were never established.

## **5.1.3** The Regional Programme

The regional work done by the CPIA during the period of this evaluation has primarily focused on the SADC region with seminars and workshops related to aid, social issues and peace in the SADC region. The work done can not be described as a programme, as activities are not linked to each other, but are mostly participation by the CPIA in conferences organised by other organisations. One SADC regional workshop was attended by CPIA staff in 2006, a couple of workshops in 2007, and another in 2008.

The persons interviewed have placed little emphasis on the few activities carried out under this programme. The effectiveness of the programme has been difficult to establish for the Team, but activities as well as results are in any case few. Results have not been documented or followed up. Measurable indicators were not established at the inception of the programme.

The original vision of the CPIA was to become the leader of conflict prevention, resolution and management in all of Africa, not only in Zimbabwe. In retrospect, some argue that it might have been a mistake to locate itself in Zimbabwe and, as a consequence of the domestic political conflict, become adsorbed in the needs there. Others argue that the location in Zimbabwe has given the CPIA the credibility to work with other conflicts in Africa.

Not only has the CPIA spent almost all its time and political energy on Zimbabwe, but the Board of Trustees is today designed primarily for the needs in Zimbabwe, and the infrastructure, with advisory groups, has been tailored to the needs in Zimbabwe. The donor representatives that the CPIA works with are almost exclusively focused on Zimbabwe. The distinction between the Local and the International Boards, together with the recent formation of a Regional Advisory Group of Eminent Persons, are efforts to deal with this. With one exception, all the CPIA's staff members are from Zimbabwe. It has, therefore, been a difficult struggle for the CPIA to design and implement activities working towards the original vision to become a centre for conflict management in Africa.

Nevertheless, a substantial number of the people interviewed by the Team expressed a wish to see the CPIA develop in a Pan-African direction. One argument was that the methodology used in Zimbabwe for the National Dialogue could be useful in other countries. The interviewed ambassadors of African countries were among those asking for the CPIA to go regional. They did that, also offering their help in identifying, proposing and promoting African personalities for the Board of Trustees and Advisory Groups should the CPIA decide to go in that direction.

The donor representatives are more reluctant to the idea of the CPIA growing regional. This can partly be explained by the responsibility that follows the party who is supposed to pay. However, it can partly also be explained by the fact that the representatives of the donor community supporting the CPIA today, are responsible for the development funding of needs in Zimbabwe. In any case, it is not possible for the CPIA to go regional or Pan-African unless the idea attracts the donors, both present and new.

#### Conclusions:

The few activities implemented under this programme are participation by the CPIA in some events in Southern Africa and can not be seen as a unified programme. Results from these events have not been followed up and it is not completely clear to the Team why the CPIA participated in them. The CPIA strategy has been to direct its efforts to the crises in Zimbabwe.

Revisiting the original vision of being a conflict management institute for Africa would require major efforts in a change of infrastructure, governance, staffing and funding. Nevertheless, there is a strong wish from many of the persons interviewed, particularly the Africans, that the CPIA moves in such a direction.

#### **5.1.4** The Culture of Peace Programme

The overall objective of the Culture of Peace programme is to promote peace among the country's youth, especially targeting those affected by the violence that has ravaged Zimbabwe. The CPIA has organised regional training workshops and activities combining sports and art with training and dialogue around the culture of peace.

The Culture of Peace programme is funded by Sida, with a comparatively small annual budget of approximately USD 50,000. The activities carried out are at low cost, with the exception of the yearly workshops, and the programme makes use of volunteers.

The grassroots activities of the programme have been organised by the CPIA's ten provincial coordinators – one for each of the country's ten provinces. The provincial coordinators also monitor the political situation in the provinces for the CPIA, reporting both during quarterly

meetings in Harare, and on an ad-hoc basis in the event of special circumstances. A Planning Committee for the Culture of Peace programme consists of representatives from various stakeholders; civil society, universities, the art world and the private sector. The Committee advises the CPIA on the activities.

The different activities, e.g. workshops, sports activities, art competitions, information gathering and house construction, are targeted at youth in the midst of violence who often lack access to basic resources, and are aimed at promoting understanding of the values of peace, while giving them opportunities to come together. This must be regarded as very relevant in the Zimbabwean context. The programme also provides the CPIA with information about the conditions in the provinces, contributing to CPIA's understanding of the situation at the grassroots level. There is, however, no clear connection between the Culture of Peace activities and other CPIA programmes, thus limiting cumulative impact or synergies. In the CPIA's portfolio of high level mediation and dialogue programmes, the Culture of Peace sticks out.

The programme is to a large extent organised by the network of ten provincial coordinators, all of them unpaid volunteers working during their spare time. They have no funds and are forced to depend on personal contacts and the media in their gathering of information. In addition, they have received only limited training in these tasks.

The information gathered by the provincial coordinator has been compiled to reports that have been presented to the ED and the DED of the CPIA. It can thus be said that the information gathering component has had an impact in that it has contributed to the CPIA's awareness of the situation in Zimbabwe. Unfortunately the information has not been gathered, processed or documented in a structured manner, which makes the collected data difficult to analyse. This is something that the CPIA is aware of, and they plan to set up some kind of database to gather and structure the collected information.

At the same time there are a number of Zimbabwean NGOs with a substantial presence in the provinces who are involved in monitoring the situation. This makes the CPIA coordinators' achievements limited in comparison. The CPIA has not been using information from other organisations active at the grassroots level, which should have been possible even with the stated CPIA strategy to stay impartial in the conflict.

Although the CPIA have contacts with civil society organisations, these have not been used in the Culture of Peace programme. The reluctance to connect closely with the rest of the civil society has, from the start, been an explicit strategy of the CPIA, since an air of "neutrality" has been perceived as paramount in their role as mediator and dialogue partner in the other programmes. But, and this is important, having a sizeable impact at the grassroots level would require a larger presence throughout Zimbabwe, something that would require either a large increase in resources, or a more active partnership with the rest of civil society. The CPIA would thus either have to shift resources from its core areas of high level mediation, or reassess its position of neutrality.

The Team has not been able to determine the extent to which participation in the programme has altered the attitudes or perceptions of the participants, or made them more able to resist violence or provocations to violence. The Team, however, questions how effective the sports activities or art competitions are, even if they are combined with one or a couple of hours of discussion around the subject of peace. Additionally, the shortage of resources has meant that

the number of participants has been as low as about five hundred youth per year in the sports events, and between one and two hundred in the art competitions.

One concrete outcome from the Culture of Peace programme is a cyber network of youths but the total number of participants in it is 8 and only about 20 posts are found. The network is found on the social networking site "Ning".

The evaluation is made more difficult because the programme document does not contain a set of objectives or indicators that are clear and measurable, and because no baseline measurements have been made with which to make comparisons. The CPIA has not followed up on the events or their possible impact.

#### Conclusions:

The Team would like to advise the CPIA to reconsider whether work at the grassroots level is compatible with the rest of its programmes and the organisation's overall strategy. This assessment can be made by considering the political change in Zimbabwe and whether the need for neutrality can be interpreted differently in the new situation.

Furthermore, despite being very relevant, the Culture of Peace programme is not designed in an optimal manner. The activities do not reach a substantial number of the target group and the impact of such isolated and scattered activities can be questioned. The provincial coordinators are not numerous enough, and do not have the resources to enable them to cover the relevant events in their provinces.

#### 5.1.5 The Research and Documentation Programme

The Research and Documentation Programme is in essence the General Emmanuel Erskine Research and Documentation Centre, GERDC, in Vumba in Eastern Zimbabwe. The GERDC has been part of the original vision of providing not only Zimbabwe but all of Africa with tools of conflict prevention. By providing documents and background material on conflicts and conflict management from all over Africa, the GERDC is supposed to assist researchers and practitioners to better address conflicts on the African continent. The main resource of the GERDC is its collection of UN documents on African conflicts and its books and periodicals on conflict prevention and political science focused on Africa, received from different institutions and individuals. A database on this conflict prevention material is under construction.

The programme's specific objectives are stated as to provide opportunities to utilise the collection of material on peace and security, to enable school pupils to visit the GERDC and dialogue around Africa's worst conflicts, conduct research and publish the findings and thereby provide an early warning data base, and provide a unique venue for training and dialogue on various peace and security agenda items. In addition, the GERDC has as a specific objective to enhance its own capacity through integration of home libraries, staff training and purchase of equipment.

The library is there and has been used by a small number of students and researchers, besides the CPIA and the GERDC themselves. The library has been made known to some universities and other institutions. School pupils from a few schools have been taken to the Centre, and some research has been conducted in the name of the GERDC.

According to the CPIA leadership, the GERDC serves a purpose for specific researchers who come for a more specific task. It has also served as a venue for some of the CPIA's seminars and meetings.

Most people interviewed by the Team, except those connected to the CPIA/GERDC, consider the location of the GERDC unfortunate. A location in Harare or on a university campus would have made the material more accessible.

The evaluation shows that, as it is at present, the value of GERDC is limited. At the same time, the building is already erected and significant investments have been made. The question is how these investments can be made to yield what they were intended to yield.

To improve the access to the library in Vumba would require more donor funds over an unforeseeable future. A shuttle service bringing visitors from Mutare or Harare at scheduled hours or instituting a scholarship fund are possibilities.

# **Conclusions:**

The GERDC is one attempt by the CPIA to meet its original vision of working on conflict management on an Africa-wide scale. However, the location is too remote to allow good access and little has been done to reach the specific objectives of the programme.

It is necessary to revisit the Centre's tasks, mandate and academic relevance, so as to make it provide added value to conflict management in Africa. The location of the library seems to have to be changed to allow for accessibility and for it to be of value for students and researchers.

# 5.1.6 Conclusions from the Analysis of Effectiveness, Impact and Relevance

From the chapters above addressing the five programmes, it should be noted that activities of any scope have been implemented in three of the CPIA's programmes during 2006-2008 - the National Dialogue, the National Reconciliation, Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice, and the Culture of Peace programmes. Some activities have been implemented under the other two, but without traceable lines of thought or consistency. The GERDC building has been erected under the Research and Documentation programme, which is a major undertaking, but is not connected in itself with any direct effects on the conflict in Zimbabwe or conflict management in a wider perspective – at least not yet. The CPIA has participated, under the Regional programme, in a few events in Zimbabwe and other Southern African countries, but possible impacts of these events have not been analysed or documented.

The picture is different when it comes to the National Dialogue programme. Under this, the biggest of the CPIA's programmes, the CPIA has been able to bring the conflicting parties to the same table, clearly contributing to a change in the political climate in Zimbabwe. The CPIA has been the only Zimbabwean actor able to achieve this. When it comes to contributing to the decrease in tension and the building of trust between the conflicting parties the programme was mostly described as successful by the Zimbabweans and some ambassadors interviewed. However, it seems difficult to substantiate the impact of CPIA's contributions, but the Team finds it safe to say that its assessment reflects reality.

Within the Reconciliation programme, activities have mainly been aiming to prepare for a future process of reconciliation and national healing. These seem like the only possible actions given that some of the perpetrators are still in power. Some interviews with victims

have been undertaken and trainings have been held aiming to build capacities in the CPIA to contribute to the reconciliation and healing process, once it begins, but the Team has not been able to identify the results.

The Culture of Peace Programme sticks out primarily because it deals with grassroots activities, while the other programs have been targeting high level actors. The programme has comprised many activities, such as sports tournaments and workshops, with the aim to inculcate a culture of peace in the youth of the country. This programme has been implemented according to plan but has a limited scope as participant numbers are limited. It is not obvious to the Team to what extent the activities, as they have been designed and implemented, can contribute to the expected results, and the CPIA has not measured possible effects of the programme. The Team advices the CPIA to seriously revisit the Culture of Peace programme, analysing whether it belongs in the CPIA portfolio.

It is clear that activities have contributed to each other in the sense that the stakeholders' trust in the CPIA has developed with every implemented activity, but otherwise activities under all programmes have been implemented as isolated events, unconnected to each other. It is often unclear to what extent activities within the same programme have had synergies. The persons interviewed did not describe activities as following onto each other, neither did CPIA staff. On the other hand it can be said that the CPIA has been able to stay flexible and adjust to the needs of the day, thereby making the programmes relevant and appreciated. It seems to the Team that CPIA's strategy has been relatively successful due to its flexibility, but that effects and relevance could have been improved if staff and stakeholders had been made aware of the relationships between activities and programmes.

Shortcomings in several aspects of monitoring, follow up and reporting hamper CPIA effectiveness, as well as the lack of a system for feeding experiences back into the organisation. The CPIA has on several occasions gone back to donors to ask for permission to postpone or change activities or change budgets. Unfortunately such changes and postponements have taken place several times without necessary approval from the financier. To some extent this is a natural consequence of working with political processes – it is impossible to fully plan activities in a dynamic context, but by acknowledging this fact and improving routines, the need to change plans can be limited.

Although less obvious when the initial decisions were made approximately ten years ago, the fact that the CPIA was placed in Zimbabwe has made it very difficult not be absorbed in the political turbulence and domestic conflict in the country. Eight years after its inauguration, the CPIA has developed primarily into a Zimbabwean organisation. This is reflected in the work carried out, in the Board of Trustees, the infrastructure and networks created, as well as the programmes for which funding is sought. The question is what the CPIA should do now after the situation in Zimbabwe has changed as much as it has over the latest six months. Two main issues stand before the organisation. One is what to do in Zimbabwe and what role to assume, and the other whether to seriously go regional or Pan-African.

Having the Unity Government of Zimbabwe in place, the needs for conflict prevention and management in the country are still considerable but different compared to the period 2006-2008. Hence, the challenges facing the CPIA have changed as well. The possible roles for the CPIA, as stated by the organisation, are contributing to the elaboration of a future Constitution, truth and reconciliation, and good governance and human rights. The question is still open as to the extent these topics would require more specific competencies on the part of

CPIA staff and advisory groups. The Team advices the CPIA to, with its considerable experience on facilitating dialogue, facilitate the necessary dialogue on some or all of these topics. Someone facilitating a continued dialogue between stakeholders in Zimbabwe will certainly be necessary, as the factions have not yet come to a sustainable agreement on the way forward. The Team's proposal is that the CPIA should stay with facilitating dialogue and not involve itself in specific topics or policies, as this is not the organisation's core competence. Such competence is to be found in many other organisations in and outside the country.

Whether the CPIA should seriously expand outside Zimbabwe depends on several issues, among them the availability of resources, the ability to establish networks, the manner in which the CPIA's competitive advantage is used and the extent to which the CPIA is welcomed in other countries. To judge from the African ambassadors interviewed, the CPIA would be welcome but needs to partner with local organisations.

Another question is what role the CPIA should assume in other countries. It can probably not be as concretely involved in the process without partnering with local personalities and organisations. To be able to only provide experiences and skills in conflict management would require less in terms of partnering, but would mean a less intense role for the CPIA. It is important that the CPIA decides what strategy to use, so as to utilize resources in the most effective and efficient way. Since the CPIA would be a more or less new actor, it is very important that the organisation has a clear profile and mandate when venturing into a new country.

The process of establishing itself as a conflict manager outside Zimbabwe would require a lot of work on a number of different fronts at the same time. Identifying partners, collecting and analysing information on the local situation in different countries, seeking funding and strategising how lessons learned from the process in Zimbabwe can be used in a Pan-African perspective. Furthermore, the composition of the Board of Trustees and the Advisory Groups would have to be changed to reflect a Pan-African approach and the organisation's competence on the part of resource persons would have to be developed, including the addition of staff from other countries.

The two organisations have received about USD 2.3 million 2006 - 2008, of which about USD 675,000 to the GERDC (the construction of the library building in Vumba and running costs). USD 2.3 million is a considerable amount of money, but in as much as the CPIA has contributed to a less tense political situation in Zimbabwe, the donors' investments have come to good use. This has to be said even with the discussion above on difficulties to determine CPIA effectiveness, considering that so many people benefit from every success.

However, looking at if it would have been possible to run the programmes with smaller investments the assessment becomes different. The CPIA/GERDC states 85 interventions in their "Intervention Report 2006 – 2008", besides some activities in the Culture of Peace programme. About half of these are either internal staff capacity building activities, less complex consultative meetings with the Advisory Groups or meetings not organised by the CPIA. This means the CPIA has organised and led about one event of a more complex nature per month on average over the three years and utilised about USD 45,000 per month apart from GERDC construction and running costs. This amount has to be considered much but should be assessed also in the light of the difficult political context in Zimbabwe these years.

Of course some support has gone to activities which never took off or produced any results, which may have been a conscious strategy by the CPIA and the donors. When trying to achieve anything in an environment of the type the CPIA has been active in, it is wise to take risks sometimes and use several different strategies to see which are effective. However, the fact that the CPIA has not been using proper indicators and not followed up their programmes have made this need greater than necessary, have resulted in the CPIA and the donors not knowing anyway, what has been effective and what has not.

## 5.2 A Systems Audit

The second part of the evaluation addresses the CPIA's organisation, routines and systems. The ToR specifies a number of aspects that the Evaluation should take into account and instructs that the CPIA's entire organisation should be included. These aspects of the ToR are found in the sub-chapters below. Observations and analysis are in some cases repeated under more than one sub-chapter, but the Team has wanted to keep to the list of aspects mentioned in the ToR for the Evaluation, however the order of the subjects is different than how they are found in the ToR. The Team has chosen to group the subjects from the ToR under three sub-headings – Organisation, Programme Management and Financial Structures. A forth sub-heading is added addressing Conflicts of Interests which have been found by the Team and a fifth presenting a Plan of Action as requested by the ToR. Under a last sub-heading conclusions from the Systems Audit are found.

This part of the evaluation is based on documentation from the CPIA, the donors and KPMG, as well as interviews with representatives of these organisations. The information received may have been difficult to corroborate, as much of it comes from the CPIA itself, but considering the degree of openness on the part of the CPIA, the Team has no reason to doubt the correctness of most of the information. In a few cases, though, when the Team has requested documentation supporting statements given verbally by the CPIA, no such documentation has been received. The Team is highlighting this fact and urges the donors and the CPIA to look into the situation.

The Team, as requested in the ToR, presents conclusions and recommendations, found after each sub-chapter. The main recommendations are also found in chapter 6 below.

# 5.2.1 Organisation

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5.2.1.1 The Organisation's Relation to its Board and Advisory Groups

The CPIA was set up in 2001 and the GERDC in 2006. In a legal sense both organisations are Trusts, each with a Board of Trustees that has the responsibility for and the power to make decisions for the Trusts. It is claimed by the staff and Board members that the two Trusts are considered the same (the GERDC being an integral part of the CPIA) and that no distinction is made in practice between them.

Originally, the CPIA Board had three trustees of whom one was, and still is, its Executive Director and another its current Deputy Executive Director. The GERDC Board originally had five members<sup>4</sup>, of whom one is the CPIA's Executive Director and two are his children<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The GERDC Deed of Trust gives different information regarding the Trustees in different parts of the document. In the preamble of the Deed, Dr.Kapungu is included among the Trustees, but not so in article 6.1.1.

However, the CPIA and the GERDC claim to have changed the composition of their Boards. Some trustees are added while others have left. The CPIA therefore considers its current Board as having 16 trustees, of which seven are non-Zimbabweans, and the GERDC Board seven trustees, of which one represents Norwegian interests. Several of both Boards' members are prominent individuals, known to a larger audience in Zimbabwe and the world.

A problem with the changes is that, as far as the Team has been able to verify, these changes are only made in an informal manner. The Team requested from the CPIA management copies several times of Board decisions in which the compositions were changed but no such decisions or other verifications were received. Instead were the Team given other information about trustees and Board minutes which did not concern changes. The question remains if the Boards should be seen as having any other members than the original ones.

According to the Deeds of Trust, the Boards are supposed to meet at least twice per annum. However, because some members of the Boards live outside Zimbabwe, convening Board meetings has proved to be challenging. The CPIA has therefore divided its Board in two – one Local Board with the Zimbabwean members and one International, which also includes the non-Zimbabweans. CPIA staff argued that the Local Board is supposed to meet and decide more regularly and then inform the international members, who may either agree or object to their resolutions. It seems unclear what would happen if any of the international members would object, but the staff claims that it has never happened and would not be a problem if it did.

The Local Board is supposed to meet 3-4 times a year and the International twice a year. However, the International Board has not met since January 2008 and the only Local Board meetings during the past 18 months were held in June 2008 and May 2009. The International Board is planning to meet in September 2009 again. The CPIA justifies the infrequent meetings saying that the volatile situation in Zimbabwe kept management busy without possibilities to convene Board meetings. However, it can be argued that the volatility of the situation should have called for more frequent meetings of the Board, to give more guidance and support to management and staff. Also alternative ways of involving the Board could have been looked for.

The CPIA Board has created two committees and a third is planned. The Audit Committee consists of two Board members of whom one is a prominent Zimbabwean business man and auditor. The Operations Committee consists of two other Board members, one being the chairperson of the Local Board. The Finance and Remuneration Committee has not yet been constituted, but is under way.

The minutes from Board meetings, studied by the Team, give an impression that vital issues, such as strategies, programmes and new initiatives, are addressed by the Boards only to a limited degree. The Team's impression is therefore, taking into consideration also the frequency of meetings, the participation of some of the members, and the information received in interviews, that most of the real power of the two Trusts lies with the management of the professional organisation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This means that Dr. Kapungu is a powerful individual in both organisations. On the GERDC Board the Kapungu Family has decision power, which has serious implications as regards the control over the land on which the GERDC building stands.

The governance and administration of the organisations are concerns that need to be addressed. With a strong executive and a, at least relatively, weaker Board, the necessary oversight and monitoring risk not being provided. The organisations also need to address sustainability aspects, and not rely too heavily on one or a few people. Absence of necessary institutionalisation, as mentioned in the last evaluation, has been a concern among the donors, and still is. The CPIA is aware of these potential dangers, and efforts are being made to develop a succession plan, which might include the recruitment of a new Executive Director and the reassigning the current ED to a new role.

The CPIA has three advisory groups with which it consults regularly. The Advisory Group of Eminent Persons comprises 14 prominent Zimbabweans. Of the 14, two have a church background, while others are from academia, the judiciary and civil society. The Group of Eminent Persons meets infrequently as a group. It has no decision making power, but is considered influential. The influence seems to be derived from individual members of the group rather than the group as an entity.

The other two groups of advisors are the Advisory Group of Church Leaders and the Social Cohesion Committee. They are made up of 14 and 10 members respectively. The Group of Church Leaders has played an important role for CPIA and its activities and results, while the Social Cohesion Committee has not been very active yet.

Several of the members of the Boards and the advisory groups appear as members in more than one group.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA and the GERDC claim that changes have been made to the compositions of their Boards but the Team has not received supporting documents for such changes. This may lead donors to believe that other individuals are in control in the organisations than those declared trustees. In case of legal action, the stipulations in the Deeds of the Trusts will prevail, possibly to the detriment of the donors and other interests. The situation is made more serious due to the conflicts of interests existing in connection with the Brackenridge Trust, addressed below in the sub-chapter "Conflicts of Interests".

The Boards are not very active, which is particularly true for some Board members. The Team would like to recommend the CPIA to stick to the agreed frequency of Board meetings and do what it can to activate the Boards as entities, so as to build the institution and rely less on individuals. Non-active Board members should be replaced if possible.

#### 5.2.1.2 Organisation and Work at Head Office

The professional part of the CPIA<sup>6</sup> has a clear organisation with 21 members of staff<sup>7</sup> with the ED and his Deputy at the helm. The ED formally reports to the Board, but the fact that the ED and the DED are two of three Trustees in the CPIA makes this situation questionable. The Director of Operations (DO) is usually also present at the Board meetings.

The recently recruited (September 2008) DO has taken over much of the day-to-day operative responsibilities, including personnel. The DO seems in reality to run much of the office and is

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Staff members working at GERDC are employed and remunerated by CPIA.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See attached Organogram as Annex D.

in charge of the National Dialogue/Governance Programme. The ED, DED and the DO all have their own Personal Assistants; however two of the PAs have also other duties.

Three staff members deal with programmes, information and PR. Another three staff members have responsibilities concerning administration and finance<sup>8</sup>. The CPIA also has one receptionist, two drivers and one gardener. Another six staff members work at the GERDC in Vumba with documentation, research, IT and administration.

Besides the HQ in Harare and the Centre in Vumba, the CPIA has designated ten Provincial Coordinators – one in every Province in the country. Their duties are to mediate tensions at the local level, be the CPIA's eyes and ears among grass-roots and organise the sports events within the Culture of Peace programme. The Provincial Coordinators are not salaried but when they participate in different events and trainings, they receive allowances.

Despite its vision and name CPIA does not have any staff in any other African countries. A couple of years ago efforts were made to establish offices or representatives in a few countries with limited success, due to lack of funding and the CPIA being absorbed by the Zimbabwean crises.

Work is led by the ED who delegates responsibilities to and instructs staff members. The Programme Officers are responsible for the day to day running of their programmes, with appropriate support and directions from the ED, DED and DO.

The atmosphere in the CPIA office in Harare seems to be rather open and friendly, which is confirmed by the staff members, but seems unnecessarily hierarchical to the Team. More powers could be delegated to lower levels in the organisation. For example, the programme officers could be involved to a larger extent in discussions with stakeholders, which would make them able to take more responsibility for the programmes. Despite the open atmosphere in the office, several staff members seem not to consider taking up the needs of training or salary negotiations with their superiors. Nevertheless, staff members consider the CPIA a good employer that pays good salaries.

Based on the above and the number of activities that are implemented by the CPIA, the Team urges the CPIA to carry out a job evaluation exercise with the aim to make the organisation more efficient and financing the organisation and its activities easier. The amount of events<sup>9</sup> over the three years 2006 - 2008 were 22, 30 and 33 respectively, apart from the sports and art activities within the Culture of Peace programme, which are organised mostly by the Provincial Coordinators. This means the 15 staff members carry out on average about two activities per year and individual, which seems little. The Team is well aware that some of the activities may be work intensive and cumbersome, and that these are not the only tasks, but an assessment of the work load should aim at raising the efficiency of the organisation. The job evaluation should include the situation at GERDC too.

The CPIA has developed a Policy and Procedure Manual which addresses Human Resources, accounting and procurement. It seems to the Team that CPIA needs to enforce the policies and rules stated in this document. The way staff explained how recruitment and procurement procedures were carried out in reality, were cases in point. These issues are addressed further in the sub-chapter "Human Resources" below.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> One of them being also the PA to the DED.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> According to CPIA's "Intervention Report"

#### Conclusions

The CPIA (including GERDC) is a relatively centralised organisation, which should attempt to raise efficiencies by decentralising powers and responsibilities and should carry out a job evaluation exercise to determine the right staff complement.

The CPIA needs to continue elaborating the Policy and Procedure Manual and implement its stipulations.

#### 5.2.1.3 Human Resources

Human Resource Management (HRM) is the responsibility of the DO under the ED and DED. The new DO is tasked with improving systems and routines. Some improvement has already been achieved and more is underway.

The CPIA has policies and rules for HRM in its Policy and Procedure Manual. These rules and policies seem to be adequate for the CPIA's purposes and protecting the individual staff members, but the Manual needs to be developed further. Aspects such as remuneration, staff performance appraisals and capacity building are cases in point. The implementation and adherence to rules and regulations in the organisation need to be reinforced as well.

The CPIA's system for staff performance appraisals includes forms to be filled out by the staff member after which a discussion is held with the superior. However it seems this process does not lead to improvements of performance, as training needs are not identified in the process. To be effective, the process should lead to agreements between the employer and staff member on actions to improve staff – as well as the CPIA – performance and efficiency, such as training or changes in behaviour.

The focus on recruitment and selection is to get the right person in the right place at the right time. The major gap in this process within the CPIA is the obvious lack of a competitive recruitment process. The CPIA Policy and Procedure Manual says the CPIA is to recruit staff in competitive processes led by a Recruitment Panel, but none of the staff members the Team interviewed had been employed through a competitive process. Instead they had been recruited through personal contacts or other ways not including advertising or similar. This is not necessarily bad but has some pitfalls.

The lack of competitive processes when recruiting means that the CPIA risks having less competent staff than necessary because it has not ascertained whether the best available person is given the job. The CPIA argues that it can only employ reliable people as much sensitive material is handled by the organisation. The Team understands this but urges the CPIA to address this important issue so that the right and necessary competence is secured for the CPIA to be able to carry out and develop its activities and administrative routines.

The need for a competitive recruitment process is particularly important in the recruitment of a new Executive Director. The Team has understood from the interviews that the Deputy Executive Director has been identified and will be proposed to the Board for appointment. The Team does not have the mandate or the competence to have an opinion on that specific proposal, but based on what we have learned from the CPIA, its upcoming challenges and our general management experience, we would recommend that the recruitment is made through a competitive process. This ensures that the CPIA have the optimal candidate and provides legitimacy for the winning candidate once in office.

When it is not possible to attract the right competence or current staff is not able to carry out tasks, the CPIA has to provide necessary training. The CPIA has provided training, for example in financial management and reporting, but training has to be followed up and complemented when found inadequate.

The CPIA has been complaining that it is difficult for the organisation to recruit and retain staff and have argued with donors to be able to raise staff salaries. The Team has requested information on salaries in the organisation, but the information received has been contradictory. On one hand the Team was told by CPIA management that salaries are between USD 1,800 – 2,500 per month for most professional staff<sup>10</sup>, which corresponds with amounts requested for salaries from donors. However, the total cost for salaries 2008 was said to be USD 337,245 which mean an average of only USD 1,338. It has not been possible for the Team to clear this confusion, why the Team urges the donors to continue looking into this issue.

However, it can be said that salary levels of USD 1,800 - 2,500 for professional staff seems high compared to, for example the Zimbabwean private sector or comparable NGOs.

Paying high salaries is of course good from some angles but it also risks creating distortions within the CPIA. The jobs in the CPIA may become so attractive that a healthy staff turn-over is hindered and staff members do not dare to question or voice criticisms in front of superiors.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA needs to further elaborate its HR management and policies and procedures, and to adhere to the organisation's policies and procedures to a greater extent than at present.

To ensure that CPIA attracts and retains the calibre of staff it needs, the Team recommends that the CPIA carries out a comprehensive job evaluation process followed by a salary structuring exercise based on a salary survey among comparable organisations.

# 5.2.1.4 Decision Making Processes and Rules of Delegation

Formally the decision making power lies with the Boards of Trustees, but in practice it seems to lie in all material with the ED, DED<sup>11</sup> and the DO, who also make up the Management Committee together with the Accountant and the Finance Officer. The Management Committee meets twice per month to review the programmes and general operation of the office, as well as the monthly financial statements.

The ED maintains his position at the helm of the CPIA and the GERDC, based on his skills, experience and contacts. This is not to say that other members of the CPIA staff, Boards or advisory groups do not play important roles in the organisation and its activities. On the contrary, they carry out several different roles necessary for the CPIA's effectiveness and ability to attract the stakeholders to its activities. Nevertheless, the ED cannot be considered anything other than indispensable for the CPIA and the process.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Not including support staff or management.

 $<sup>^{11}</sup>$  The ED and DED are also two of three Trustees on the CPIA Board and the ED have majority on the GERDC Board together with his two daughters.

When it comes to planning and implementation of the programmes, operational decisions are formally made in the Management Committee, after consultations with the programme officer for the particular programme, the financial department, and members of the Board, advisory groups and other stakeholders. The tasks of the Programme Officers in their programmes includes organising the events, drafting conference papers and preparing other subject matter inputs to be finalised by the management. The Programme Officers seem to have limited contacts with the stakeholders of the conflict. It is primarily the management who provides analysis and insights specific to the current Zimbabwe situation.

The responsibilities for administration and staff management have been the realm of the DED, but most actual tasks have been handed over to the DO since her appointment in September 2008. However, most of the formal powers, such as responsibility for financial means and budgets, have remained with the DED who has to sign purchase orders before even smaller expenses are made.

The Team has not encountered any complaints concerning the activities that have been carried out or those that have not. This suggests that beneficiaries have had possibilities to influence the CPIA's decisions. The impression of the Team is that the CPIA is well equipped to respond in a sound way to the beneficiaries' desires and agendas.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA is a relatively centralised organisation. It would be an advantage if more tasks were divested to lower levels of the organisation. Possibilities to move budget responsibilities to the DO should be looked into.

The CPIA needs to formalise in writing the delegation that actually occurs.

**5.2.1.5** Internal Information and Communication, Feedback and Institutional Learning Distances between staff members in the CPIA office are not longer than providing for easy communication and information sharing. A system of regular internal meetings at different levels was recently introduced.

Weekly staff meetings are chaired by the DO. In these meetings the day-to-day issues are brought up, such as operational issues related to implementation of programmes, but also work schedules and feed-back to staff. The monthly meetings are chaired by the DED and quarterly meetings are chaired by the ED, covering organisational policy issues, and any other issues. All these meetings are described by staff members as open and informative, involving discussions and possibilities for all to make their voices heard.

The CPIA does not have a formalised system or routines for feed-back and institutional learning. Such a system is much needed for the CPIA to develop its methods and reach higher effectiveness and efficiency. It would also be an excellent way to professionalise the organisation and institutionalise the ED's expertise and experiences, and make the organisation less dependent on individuals.

A system for institutional learning could comprise regular<sup>12</sup> discussions between staff members and possibly invited guests (e.g. Board members, Eminent Persons) on experiences from conferences, negotiations and other actions taken by the CPIA and their results and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Monthly or bi-monthly.

impacts. The discussions should preferably lead to some conclusions that should be noted and registered in a way allowing for searching and future use. Another option would be to introduce a more inclusive way of programming, in which staff members participate to a fuller extent together with the management.

### Conclusions

The CPIA has instituted a system of weekly, monthly and quarterly staff meetings that address different issues. This is a welcome development that contributes to improved communication and greater professionalism.

The CPIA needs to develop a system for feed back and institutional learning, so as to be able to develop more effective methods, and make itself less dependable on individuals.

# **5.2.2** Programme Management

## 5.2.2.1 Planning of Activities Including Information Gathering and Analyses

The CPIA runs its activities according to multi-annual programmes, in which individual activities are identified and designed during the course of the programme. Considering the political process in which the CPIA is involved, programmes need to be kept flexible.

Programme documents are held general with high ambitions to what the CPIA will be able to achieve. The programmes are drawn up based on the CPIA's analysis of the situation and input from the Board, Eminent Persons and other stakeholders. The CPIA's planning of programmes and activities has not been standardised or described in the "CPIA Policy and Procedure Manual".

The CPIA has a continuous dialogue with major stakeholders, and is thereby able to collect information and sentiments of these. Based on its networking, the CPIA seems to be capable of assessing the situation and designing programmes successfully. The stakeholders interviewed by the Team expressed satisfaction with the CPIA activities.

At the local level, the CPIA's ten provincial coordinators are supposed to act as the organisation's eyes and ears. The coordinators report to the CPIA during quarterly meetings in Harare, and on an ad-hoc basis in case there is some especially important issue in their province. The regional coordinators do not, however, have any resources to help them survey the situation in their provinces. This means that they are limited to what they can pick up from personal contacts, friends and colleagues. The information gathering capacity of these ten individuals must thus be considered low.

Even if the programmes do not outline specified and detailed activities, the programme documents and contracts with the donors need to set success indicators. As it is, most of the CPIA's programme documents contain goals and expected outcomes that are more or less impossible to follow up and report on. They are often very ambitious and vague, such as "(e)stablishment of an environment that is conducive for a sustainable peace building process and mutual dialogue among and between people of Zimbabwe and other stakeholders, and others where impacts would be impossible to attribute to CPIA activities. An example of the latter is "(a) positive and well sustained economy."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Both examples from the Project Proposal on "National Dialogue on Zimbabwe, January – December 2009".

To be able to follow up achievements and impacts in a political process, such as the one the CPIA is engaging in, it is necessary to elaborate on success indicators from the outset, and the work should begin with a baseline study. Thereby the CPIA would have them to measure against when following up programmes. The results of the measuring should be the main message when reporting, with success measured against previously determined indicators or baselines.

It is important that success is measured at the programme level and not at the activity level. Success indicators should also be set at programme level and not at activity level, as it would be very cumbersome and difficult to measure impacts from individual activities.

#### Conclusions

Activities are developed and planned based on the management's analysis and contacts with stakeholders. The CPIA should elaborate how also other staff members and external contacts could contribute to a greater degree.

The system built to get input from the provinces does not have the capacity to supply the CPIA with sufficient information.

In the designing and planning of new programmes, clearer and more realistic goals and expected outcomes need to be set. Well designed indicators, which would preferably be measurable, should also be developed, so as to make useful follow ups and reporting possible.

### 5.2.2.2 Formulation of Goals

The CPIA's goals and objectives are formulated at staff retreats with all staff present, and some Board members and Eminent Persons. In discussions, with the facilitation by an external consultant, the needs and possibilities are openly discussed and consensus is arrived at with the help of the external consultant.

The last retreat was held in July 2008 and resulted in the CPIA Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011. The Plan states the CPIA's vision, mission and core values and contains a CPIA stock taking and a SWOT analysis. The vision of the organisation is to "become the leader in conflict prevention, resolution and management in Zimbabwe, the SADC sub-region and Africa". However, the Team considers that the vision should state the goals of the CPIA in regards to the state of African conflicts and their resolution. It must be a higher goal (vision) for the CPIA that African conflicts are kept to a minimum or at least competently managed rather than that the CPIA should achieve a prominent position.

The mission statement says that the CPIA should "contribute towards the attainment of sustainable peace, stability and security through conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa", which seems a well elaborated and suitable mission statement for the CPIA.

Lower level goals are elaborated and formulated as described in the sub-chapter "Planning of Activities Including Information Gathering and Analyses" above.

# Conclusions

The organisation's goals are formulated at retreats involving the professional staff, the Boards and the advisory groups. The organisation's vision statement should be revised to state where

the CPIA is striving in regards to African conflicts, and not, as at present, what the CPIA itself strives to become.

#### 5.2.2.3 Quality Assurance

The CPIA does not have a specific system for quality assurance, but considers that the set-up with the Board and Eminent Persons often being closely involved in decisions and activities provides necessary quality assurance.

Quality assurance in administration and finance management is worked on with upgrading of competence and routines. Particularly the DO and the Audit Committee are working on this.

### Conclusions

The CPIA should elaborate and formalise its system for quality assurance, so as to make it visible and a more prominent part of the organisation and its activities. The actions currently included could be elaborated further.

#### 5.2.2.4 Risk Assessments and Management, Including Security Issues

The CPIA faces risks in at least two regards in their activities, but seems to work actively to reduce or manage risks in only one of these.

Many factors threaten to negatively affect the programmes and their expected results and impacts. Many of these factors are outside of the CPIA's control, but nevertheless, the CPIA needs to address them and have contingency plans if conditions change. However, the CPIA states perceived risks in the programme documents, without discussing ways to minimise or manage them.

The other type of risks has to do with the physical safety of the CPIA staff and participants in activities. The CPIA is internally addressing security issues, making risk assessments and taking measures to minimise these risks.

At least one actual attack has been encountered. The Team was told about the security officer at the CPIA premises who was abducted in March last year. He was rescued after a week, severely injured. The security officer is today back on CPIA service.

Serious attacks like this must be avoided at all costs. The CPIA says it is listening to as many as possible of stakeholders in the conflict and analyses the information received. People and organisations considered risk elements are invited to the CPIA's activities so that they understand the CPIA's role in the process. It is thereby hoped that possibly violent elements understand that the CPIA is not taking side in the conflict.

The church leaders are also relied on to some extent in this regard, as they are able to calm unruly elements before, during and after the activities.

## **Conclusions**

Risk assessments and management need to be addressed by the CPIA in a more comprehensive way, and be documented.

## 5.2.2.5 Phasing out and Initiating Projects

As mentioned above<sup>14</sup>, the CPIA runs multi-annual programmes with only vaguely indicated activities in the programme documents. The programmes are based on the CPIA's analysis of the situation and where the organisation can make a difference. Needs for actual activities are identified during the course of the programme and as the Zimbabwean political process progresses.

Therefore it is relatively difficult to discern any longer term process envisioned by the CPIA of which the individual activities are parts and to which they are supposed to contribute. This is probably how it has to be, as the CPIA does not control the very fluid process in which it is active. The CPIA simply has to have a short planning horizon and great flexibility to be able to deliver activities that fit into the stakeholders' agendas and thereby stay relevant.

The nature of the programmes and activities is such that an institutionalised system for how to phase out programmes is not necessary. Apart from internal CPIA structures, which are more constant, no structures are set up that need to be dismantled, and few physical investments are made in the course of implementation.

Information gathered and the relationships established in the course of the programmes are supposed to be taken care of, documented, and used by the CPIA. This is done to some extent, but documentation needs to be made the rule.

A system for institutional learning needs to be developed, so that knowledge and experiences are fed back into the organisation and used in later activities and programmes.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA has, and must have, a short planning horizon due to the nature of what it attempts to affect – a political process. The CPIA's programmes are therefore often not coherent series of activities that feed into each other. Instead activities often address issues of the day, trying to make a contribution at that level.

The CPIA should engage in making as much use as possible of outcomes, contacts and other products of activities and programmes, and document them.

#### 5.2.2.6 Measurement of Results

The aim of the CPIA is to decrease tensions and disagreements among the stakeholders in the Zimbabwean crises, meaning that even if the organisation is successful, it risks having few results that are, in a strict sense, measurable. However, the fact that the degree of success is difficult, or even impossible, to measure does not mean that CPIA programmes are not effective. Non-tangible results can be as valuable as tangible ones.

One way in which the CPIA determines possible effects is by asking participants to fill out evaluation forms at the end of held events. Another is by gathering and analysing information from and sentiments among stakeholders, during as well as in between activities. The Team sees shortcomings with these methods.

The evaluation forms that are filled out immediately at the end of activities risk not capturing the bigger picture of the conflict but place too much focus on the event itself. The CPIA needs

<sup>14</sup> The sub-chapter "Planning of activities including information gathering and analyses".

to determine the longer term results and impacts of the activities and not only the participants' perception of the activity itself. The gathering of information and sentiments and the management's analysis are of course a way to determine effects, but as far as the Team has been able to establish, this gathering and analysis is not systematic, documented or reported.

The CPIA has to determine and verify its effectiveness, not least in front of the donors. The Team therefore strongly suggests the CPIA develops and institutionalises a system for determining results. Such a system should be aimed at measuring long-term results and impacts against pre-determined success indicators. Methods could include interviews with stakeholders before activities, which aim at establishing a baseline to measure against when the CPIA later attempts to determine the degree of success. Follow up interviews should be held after a sufficiently long time, to allow for slowly developing impacts to surface.

When activities produce something concrete, such as a communiqué or agreed recommendations, it should be followed up and documented. How have the different stakeholders used the communiqué? How has it affected stakeholders? How was the communiqué disseminated and received? Did it have an impact on the tensions and conflicts?

In general the method should be to measure results not at the activity level but the programme level, using a longer time horizon. Effects and results of a single CPIA activity may be difficult to measure, despite that the activity may be contributing to the bigger picture.

It is the opinion of the Team that the CPIA is a very forward-looking organisation spending less attention and time on follow up and reporting. This may prove to be a dangerous mistake. The CPIA should initiate a serious and comprehensive discussion on the measurement and reporting of results with the donors, so that as great a consensus as possible is achieved on these important issues.

It is important to realise that measuring results begins with the initiation phase of a programme. Without a project design that has an explicit theory of change, stating how change can be accommodated and indicators of this that are connected to a baseline, the measuring of results becomes almost impossible.

### Conclusions

The CPIA needs to develop its methods for measuring results. Necessary resources need to be allocated to this task, so as to be able to justify the organisation and its programmes, and establish what has actually been achieved. The monitoring of a programme and measuring of results are parts of an elaborate process that needs full attention and resources in order to be done properly. It needs to be seen as one of the more important and integral parts of a programme.

The degree of success needs to be stated and discussed in the reports.

### 5.2.2.7 Monitoring and Follow-up of Projects

The management of the CPIA, the Board and the Eminent Persons continually follow the political process and the conflicts in the country. Frequent meetings and discussions are held between relevant people, both among these themselves but also with external organisations and individuals. Thereby the CPIA is following up and monitoring the activities and programmes on a general plane.

However, there is a lack of systematic monitoring and follow up, and the purpose seems to be to be able to identify future needs for CPIA activities and how to design these, and not to document and report on already achieved results and impacts. The CPIA needs to address this, according to suggestions presented in the previous sub-chapter.

### Conclusions

The management follows the political developments but more needs to be done, particularly when it comes to following up effects of CPIA activities, and documenting these.

Monitoring and follow up need to be systematic and allocated necessary resources so that CPIA is able to determine and report its degree of success.

# 5.2.2.8 Reporting and Deviation, Final Reports

The CPIA's reports contain much information on the general political situation in the country and the implemented activities, but only little on what the efforts led to, or how they affected participants and participants' actions.

When reporting, it is important to report on outcomes and impacts in relation to originally stated goals and objectives. Results are supposed to be compared to the originally expected results. What the implemented activities involved needs to be reported upon, but is actually of less importance. Attribution<sup>15</sup> is important to address so that it becomes clear how the impacts and outcomes were achieved and by whom/what.

To be able to do this, goals and expected results need to be carefully set out in the programme document, and should preferably be translated into measurable success indicators. It is then possible to follow up and report on these indicators. To elaborate success indicators is admittedly very difficult, not least when success is to have affected a political process, which is what the CPIA is aiming at.

The CPIA does state goals and expected outcomes in its programme documents but these are rarely translated into measurable indicators. Therefore it is very difficult for the CPIA to follow up and report on the achieved degree of success. CPIA programme documents contain indicators but these are neither followed up nor reported on. In addition, the ways some of the indicators are designed make it very difficult to measure the extent to which they are fulfilled. Other indicators are not indicating success or failure of the programme, but stating that the CPIA should for example carry out research or organise a meeting. These do not say anything about the level of success when it comes to contribution to peace, only whether or not the CPIA has been active.

Furthermore, reporting should be done on the programme level and not the activity level, as determining effects and impact on an activity level is too difficult or even impossible.

Furthermore, the CPIA argues that much of the information it receives and produces is sensitive and that it therefore is not able to state it in reports. However, the Team believes that much of the information should be possible to write in reports and certainly possible to give the donors (Embassies), who are used to handling sensitive and secret information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Verification that outcomes and impacts are actually due to the implemented activities.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA needs to develop its reporting so as to state the degree of success of programmes. To be able to do this, the CPIA needs to develop programme documents that include indicators. With such, monitoring, follow up and reporting will be made easier.

### 5.2.3 Financial structures

#### 5.2.3.1 Financial Management and Control and Compliance with Agreements

According to donors and the CPIA's auditors there used to be serious shortcomings in the CPIA's financial management and reporting. For example, shortcomings included lack of segregation of responsibilities, incorrect verification of purchase, lack of verification of payments of invoices and lack of reconciliation of accounts. The donors are still complaining about insufficient and incorrect financial reporting and insufficient level of information in budgets. Another complaint from the donors is that the CPIA does not ask for approval before changing budgets or how funds are used. However, according to the auditors the only material shortcoming that remains is the segregation of funds.

The different responsibilities and tasks in financial management and handling of cash and bank accounts lie, in reality, on only one person, which increases the risk of corruption and fraud. With only one person involved, the risk that mistakes are either too late or never disclosed also increases.

Procurement was stated by the CPIA staff as leading to purchase of not necessarily the cheapest goods or services, despite a CPIA regulation saying this should be the rule. Instead staff told the Team that often more expensive goods were bought because the quality was considered higher. To buy better quality does not necessarily mean lower economic efficiency, but the CPIA should establish proper routines and policies for assessing quality and how the trade-off should be made between price and quality. The decision on which good or service to purchase should be documented.

The CPIA Policy and Procedure Manual includes, among other aspects, financial management issues. However, the Manual needs to be developed further, specifying in more detail routines and responsibilities. Staff members also need more training in these issues.

The different donors have brought different requirements. The CPIA has complained that it has been difficult to keep track of the requirements and that they bring an increased work load. The CPIA has recently established a calendar where all requirements are noted and followed up, ensuring these are met. The calendar is the responsibility of the DO, who works on meeting the requirements with the help of programme and financial officers.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA has improved its financial management over the years, but more still needs to be done. The Policy and Procedure Manual needs to be developed further.

The segregation of responsibilities is particularly important to address, so as to minimise the risk of mistakes and corruption.

#### 5.2.3.2 Transfer of Funds and Bank and Cash Balances

Due to the crises of the Zimbabwean dollar and the risk of withholding or confiscation by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the CPIA has set up bank accounts in Botswana to which the donors disburse their funds and from which payments are made. Bank accounts are kept in Zimbabwe but balances are kept as low as possible.

Bank accounts and petty cash are reconciled every month according to the financial management routine, but the Team has not checked if it is done in reality. The actual verifications of the transfer of funds have not been checked either, but the financial management routines contain forms for different types of transfers.

The set up of accounts in more than one country puts higher demands on the financial management capacities of the organisation. It is important that the CPIA sees to this aspect.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA has bank accounts in both Zimbabwe and Botswana, due to the situation in Zimbabwe. It is therefore very important that the financial management capacities are kept at a level corresponding to the higher complexity following on transactions between banks in different countries and in different currencies.

#### 5.2.3.3 Delegation, Authorisations

The CPIA is a centralised organisation in which little is delegated from management. Budget responsibilities are with the DED. Programme officers assist the ED and DED in organising, implementing and following up activities, but are limited when it comes to direct power over decisions.

The Management considers that the organisation is small enough for not delegating decision power. On the other hand much is de-concentrated in the sense that a lot of actual work is carried out by lower ranks on instructions from the Management Committee. Both management and lower ranking staff members claim that the cooperation is close.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA is a relatively centralised organisation where decision making power remains with management, also when it comes to minor issues. Management relies on other staff members for implementation of actions.

#### 5.2.3.4 Budget/Follow Up

The CPIA claims not to have an organisation-wide budget or an organisation-wide budget follow-up, but budget-work is kept at a programme level. Managing the whole organisation must therefore be difficult, as that should not be possible to do through the programme budgets. Many resources are used by more than one programme, but may be financed by a single programme/donor, such as staff salaries.

Programme budgets are kept at a relatively superficial level, due to the need for the CPIA to be flexible. Budgeting for individual CPIA activities is made in two steps. The Programme Officer responsible for the programme together with the DO make a rough budget based on forecasted activities. Available funds for the activity are checked by the Finance Officer, who also finalises the budget after sourcing quotations for procurement of necessary services and

goods. Quotations for conference facilities are sourced by the Programme Officer. The Accountant checks the budget before it goes to the DED for approval.

Financial reports to donors include a table with the original budget and the actual utilisation of funds per budget line, but lack an analysis of differences between budgets and the actual utilisation of funds. The CPIA needs to analyse why funds were used differently than what was originally planned and state this in its financial reports.

Audits of the CPIA are also made per donor grant, which in general means per programme. There is an inherent risk in this, as not necessarily all funds are audited at the same time. It opens for mistakes and possibilities of fraudulent behaviour.

One problem that surfaces repeatedly in audit reports and complaints from the donors, is that the CPIA "borrows" funds between different donor grants. The donor of a particular activity is sometimes late in disbursing funds, which makes the CPIA face a temporary shortage of funds. CPIA then often "borrows" from another donor grant to be able to implement an activity. However, this borrowing is not allowed according to the agreements with the donors, without a written approval in advance. The need to borrow internally would with all certainty decrease if the CPIA worked with an organisation-wide budget.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA does not have an organisation-wide budget, making management of the organisation more difficult. Budgets are made per donor/programme and audits are made per donor grant. Therefore it is difficult to have an overview of the whole organisation financially, limiting transparency. The CPIA needs to have an organisation-wide budget to assist management and contribute to transparency. It needs to be followed up regularly and shared with donors.

Audits should be made on an organisation-wide level.

#### 5.2.3.5 Calculation of Administration Costs and Programme Costs Respectively

In some programme budgets the CPIA uses so-called Administration Costs and Programme Costs, which are lump sums supposed to cover certain items and activities. These items are, says the CPIA, calculated according to instructions given by the individual donor.

This way of budgeting should be avoided as far as possible, as it hides information regarding what funds are to be used for or were used for, as the case may be.

#### Conclusions

Donors sometimes request that certain types of costs can be included in budget lines called Administration Costs or Programme Costs. These budget lines are calculated according to the donors' requirements.

#### 5.2.3.6 Audits, Quality of Auditors Certificates

Audits are made annually by the KPMG office in Harare per programme/donor grant. The audit reports from the latest years, as well as the manager<sup>16</sup> of the auditing team from KPMG, tell of an improving trend when it comes to the CPIA's ability to handle funds and the

 $<sup>^{16}</sup>$  The Team met the audit manager who has been part of the audits the last five years.

accounting of these. However, some remarks remain and these concern mainly the segregation of responsibilities. The CPIA needs to upgrade its system to cater for these remarks and handle donor funds in an adequate manner according to international standards.

Previously, remarks have been given in the audit reports regarding reconciliation of bank accounts and petty cash. KPMG seemed relatively satisfied with the improvements over the years, but are of the opinion that the CPIA can still improve. The CPIA needs to establish and document proper and detailed routines for financial management. The organisation then needs to see to it that relevant staff know these and are able to implement them.

To audit per programme/donor grant brings unnecessary work load for the CPIA and costs for the donors. The CPIA and the donors should therefore discuss how to streamline audits and requirements. To audit the whole organisation would also bring the benefit of having a more complete picture of the organisation and its activities.

As far as the Team understands, the auditor certificates are based on a reliable audit process, apart from the fact that audits are made per programme/donor, which risks leaving funds never audited. Such funds would in themselves not be coming from donors, but costs may be funded twice. The Team noted that some of the audit reports were signed "KPMG" and not with the audit manager's signature. As far as the Team understands this is according to Zimbabwean audit procedures.

#### Conclusions

Audits are made by an internationally renowned audit firm annually per programme/donor grant. The CPIA should organise with the donors to be able to have audits annually for the whole organisation. This should be in the interest of the donors as well.

5.2.3.7 Promotion of Good Administration, Transparency Regarding Finances and Management of Funds and Promotion of Measures to Counteract Corruption<sup>17</sup>
 The CPIA does not address issues of Good Administration in a comprehensive and systematic way, but the organisation is well aware of the need for improvements.

An organisation-wide effort needs to be initiated that attempts to improve all sides of good administration, transparency regarding finances and management of funds and promotion of measures to counteract corruption. This report could be used as one input in designing that effort.

#### Conclusions

The CPIA works on improving its administration and financial management but does not have a specific system or programme internally aiming for this. A more comprehensive effort is needed to seriously raise the organisation's capacities.

#### **5.2.4** Conflicts of Interests

Issues of concern are the conflicts of interests, pointed to in the 2004 evaluation. There are at least two aspects that need to be sorted out in a way acceptable to the donors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> This sub-chapter only addresses the systems and possible need for such.

The first concerns the ownership of the land itself on which the GERDC building is situated. The land was said to have been donated to the GERDC by the ED's Family Trust, but a letter from the Family Trust to the GERDC showed that the land may only be used by the GERDC as long as the GERDC is active in peace promotion, and that the day when the GERDC is not, all rights to the land will revert to the Family Trust. All developments undertaken on the land will then be sold to the Family Trust "at an agreed price with no party making any profit", according to the letter. There is therefore an obvious risk that the donor's investment may be lost if the land reverts to the Family Trust.

As it is disputable who the GERDC trustees are, it can not be ascertained that the Kapungu family would not control the GERDC and the land even if the land is properly donated to the GERDC<sup>18</sup>.

It is proposed by some members of the CPIA Board that the GERDC and the Kapungu Family Trust sign a lease agreement for the land for 49 years with a possibility for the GERDC to lease for another 49 years. This would secure the land for the foreseeable future.

The second aspect has to do with the substantial amounts of money paid from the CPIA/GERDC to the Brackenridge Resort, owned by the Kapungu Family Trust. It has not been possible for the Team to verify information and figures, but it seems over USD 75,000 were paid in 2008 from the CPIA/GERDC to the Brackenridge Resort for security services, food, drinks and accommodation for conference participants. According to the CPIA/GERDC, averages of USD 20, 25 and 30 per person per meal were paid for breakfasts, lunches and dinners, which to the Team seems an unjustified price level.

#### **Conclusions**

The conflicts of interests between the ED's private interests and donor interests need urgently to be sorted out in a way satisfactory to all involved.

#### 5.2.5 Plan of Action

The ToR requests the Team to propose a Plan of Action concerning the development of the CPIA's organisation, resources, routines and systems. Based on the above aspects, the Team likes to propose the following Plan for CPIA. The aspects that the CPIA and the donors need to engage in are of several different kinds, of which several require relatively small efforts to improve. The Team likes to put them together in two clusters.

The first cluster concerns actions that the CPIA/GERDC can sort out internally and communicate and agree on with the donors. These are:

- Board decisions need to be presented to the donors in which the compositions of the Boards are changed. The process could be led by one of the lawyers in the CPIA network, to be able to cater for all legal requirements.
- The land where the GERDC building stands needs to be controlled by the GERDC. The GERDC in turn needs to be controlled by a wider group of Trustees, to cater for the security of donor funds as well as for the governing of the Trust.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> According to the GERDC Deed of Trust three of the trustees are Dr. Kapungu and his two children, making up a majority of the Board. The Team has not received documentation supporting any changes of the composition of the GERDC Board of Trustees, which makes it disputable who are trustees and who are not.

• The transfers (e.g. regarding meals, accommodation and security) between the CPIA/GERDC and the Brackenridge Resort need to be terminated, or at least be done according to rules set in agreement with the donors.

A second cluster concerns the CPIA/GERDC professional organisation and necessary improvements of routines and procedures. As the tasks are several and require specific skills, it is the opinion of the Team that the CPIA should contract two experts to provide expertise for these tasks. Donors therefore need to provide funds for the procurement of these services. The plan of actions should then be considered as all the issues pointed to in the sub-chapters above.

One consultant should be skilled in development cooperation, administration and management. The scope of these services should include aspects such as:

- organisation;
- HR management;
- capacity and institution building;
- institutional learning;
- information and communication;
- quality assurance;
- risk assessment and management;
- project management;
- planning and programming;
- designing of indicators;
- measuring results;
- monitoring and follow up;
- reporting;
- budgeting and financial reporting;
- further elaboration of the "CPIA Policy and Procedure Manual" and implementation of its stipulations; and
- establishment of an improved funding arrangement for the CPIA/GERDC, possibly a basket fund.

The services could be provided through a contract comprising 12 man-weeks over six months. The consultant should work closely with the CPIA management on these issues.

Another consultant should be contracted for assisting with upgrading the financial management of the CPIA/GERDC. These services need to be specifically financed by the donors too. A particular task for the consultant should be to elaborate ways for the CPIA to promote good administration, transparency regarding finances and management of funds and promotion of measures to counteract corruption. Particularly important would be to institutionalise routines and procedures regarding these matters. These services should be provided through a contract comprising six man-weeks over 3 months.

#### 5.2.6 General Conclusions from the Systems Audit

This part of the evaluation has shown that the CPIA has developed considerably as an organisation over the years, but that deficiencies still remain. These deficiencies are found in relation to programmes, HR and general as well as financial administration. The most serious problem, however, is the conflicts of interests concerning the ED's roles in the CPIA/GERDC

and his Family's Trust. They need to be sorted out immediately and agreed on with the donors.

Furthermore, the organisation would benefit from establishing proper systems for institutional learning, risk assessments and management and quality assurance. The ambiguities regarding the Boards of the CPIA and the GERDC need to be sorted out and clarified. Board members need to be made active and engaged.

The CPIA/GERDC cannot currently be considered as meeting the donors' terms and conditions fully. The reporting submitted to the donors do reflect the reality as far as the Team has been able to establish, but reports have serious deficiencies as they do not report results, outcomes and impacts. Therefore they are not sufficient for the donors to make decisions regarding funding.

It is nevertheless the opinion of the Team that the donors should continue to support the CPIA/GERDC, and earmark funds for the raising of capacities according to the above in "Plan of Action". The organisation shows a serious will and determination, and has considerable advantages in relation to their core tasks, making them worth supporting. Furthermore, the CPIA has been effective in contributing to the political process of Zimbabwe since the inception in 2001, while GERDC's contribution is more difficult to determine.

#### 5.3 Requirements for Donor Support

The assignment included to "critically assess possible requirements for donor support to the CPIA, and provide recommendations as a basis for harmonisation of donor support through the most appropriate tools and mechanisms, including a possible basket funding arrangement". The Team has listened to the CPIA and the donors and how they see the relationships and what would be required for the relationships to continue and develop.

An assessment has been made based on what the donors and the CPIA told the Team, written material and the Team's experiences of relationships between donors and recipients. The Team is here presenting recommendations for how to develop the relationships and achieve higher efficiency and effectiveness.

The CPIA has been working for a number of years to improve its administration, financial management, monitoring and follow up, measuring of results and impact and its reporting<sup>19</sup>, with only partial success. For donors to continue funding the CPIA/GERDC, these aspects need to be improved.

However, the CPIA will not be able to continue to improve without continued donor funding. The donors should therefore grant earmarked support to the CPIA to cater for these improvements. Donors need to monitor the process and set conditions besides extending financial support.

It is the opinion of the Team that the CPIA and the donors should seriously contemplate contracting a consultant to extend necessary capacity building to the CPIA over an extended period of time. However, the services need to be only on a part time basis. The objective

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> For more detail see the sub-chapters above.

would be to improve the CPIA in all aspects found in the chapter above, and to develop the CPIA's relationships with the donors<sup>20</sup>.

The CPIA has for several years remarked that a lot of working time is used up for multiple reporting, auditing and similar tasks. The idea of a basket fund for the donors to put their support in, has been discussed but has not led to any concrete results, despite the agreement in principle between the parties.

A basket fund is essentially a financing arrangement between the donors and the beneficiary, in which is stipulated policies and regulations regarding the provision and the use of funds. The basket fund uses a special bank account in which the donors deposit their funds and the beneficiary can draw funds for activities that fall under the agreed policies and stipulations (the "programme" in short).

The real advantage of a basket fund is when the beneficiary can operate with only one programme<sup>21</sup> and use any funds lying in the basket for any activity. Thereby reporting and other requirements from the donors can be streamlined and the beneficiary's workload is minimised. Another advantage is that better transparency between donors, and between donors and the beneficiary, may be achieved.

For the basket fund, a number of the donors' administrative and financial requirements need to be agreed between the parties. Donors often have set requirements regarding narrative and financial reporting (e.g. frequency, format, length, focus), disbursements of funds (e.g. timing, currency, amounts relative other donors), besides goals and methods of the programme (what is supposed to be achieved and how). This means that the more financiers of a programme, the more donors there are for the beneficiary to negotiate with.

Another difficulty may be if one donor wants to earmark its funds. The basket fund will then not be as easy to manage for the beneficiary. The beneficiary would need to maintain control, so that the "earmarking" donors' funds are not used for unauthorised purposes, and special narrative and financial reports may be required. It may then be easier to lift the activities that the "earmarking" donor likes to finance, out of the basket and set up a separate financing arrangement with this donor.

The way the CPIA is organised today with five programmes is no hindrance in itself for the establishment of a basket fund, as long as the donors accept that their funds are going to any of the CPIA's programmes. If not, the CPIA would have to negotiate a solution between the donors. The day the CPIA goes regional or pan-African it is advised that that programme be kept outside the "Zimbabwean" basket fund. This, as the donor representatives dealing with Zimbabwe do not deal with regional supports.

Even if the present five CPIA programmes would be possible to finance through a basket fund, it is advised that the CPIA first updates and merges the programme documents that are to be financed through the basket fund. Only one programme document for the basket fund would provide for transparency and a better overview over activities and plans. Links and synergies between sub-programmes should also be elaborated upon in that document. A

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> This improvement is regardless of efforts to establish other forms for the support from the donors, such as a basket fund.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Under the overall programme can be sub-programmes and projects.

possible basket fund programme document should also include activities and funds sought for internal capacity building within the CPIA.

To be able to arrive at an agreement regarding the donors' administrative and financial requirements, a mapping of these would be necessary<sup>22</sup>. The mapping should be followed by an analysis and negotiation with the donors, as to which requirements would be applicable in the case of the basket fund. Hopefully all donors and the CPIA would be able to agree on a set of policies and regulations for the basket fund, but if not, a situation like the one above<sup>23</sup> may be faced, in which a donor may be a "special case" within the basket fund or have to stay outside the basket fund.

The parties to the basket fund would also need to agree on some other issues:

- How will the basket fund be managed? Probably a steering group consisting of representatives from contributing donors and the CPIA is the best alternative. The group should meet regularly and have a clearly stated mandate.
- Can there be more than one basket? Can the CPIA receive funding from other donors outside the basket fund? This should not be a problem as long as full transparency is provided.

It is the Team's opinion that a basket fund for support to the CPIA would be advantageous for all parties – donors and the CPIA alike. However, it is important that all stakeholders understand that it is a process to both set it up, and manage it. It also requires a different organisation of the CPIA's programming and someone to engage in mapping and negotiating donor requirements. All parties need to understand that they are part of a group and that agreements between all in the group are necessary too. Individual initiatives are not always possible.

#### Conclusions:

It is recommended that the CPIA and the donors jointly initiate efforts to establish a basket fund, so as to raise efficiencies and transparency.

The CPIA should engage seriously in leading the elaboration of the basket fund and start by mapping the donor requirements and revise the programme documents of the programmes that are supposed to be financed through the basket fund.

# 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

The Evaluation has shown that the CPIA has been successful in its main programme – the National Dialogue programme – by contributing to the building of trust between the conflicting parties. However, to substantiate the level of success and impact of the CPIA is more difficult, as the nature of the result, in particular building of trust, hardly can be measured. Even if there was substance to be measured, no measurable success indicators exist in the programme document making the evaluation more difficult. Measurable indicators are not set for any of the CPIA programmes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The Team has not mapped donors' different requirements as this is an assignment in itself.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> With the "earmarking" donor.

Some of the objectives of the National Reconciliation, Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice programme have been fulfilled, but to what degree this is due to CPIA's activities is difficult to determine.

The degree of success of the Culture of Peace programme has not been possible to establish. This is partly due to the CPIA not having followed up on activities and documented these. In the case of the former, activities have mostly been consultations with different stakeholders in Zimbabwe and internal capacity building, which have not been possible to measure the success of.

In the Culture of Peace programme, sports activities and art competitions have been coupled with sessions talking about conflict management and related issues. The CPIA has reached only a limited group of youth through these activities and no follow ups have been made. The Team would like to say that the effects of these activities are limited at best.

In the Research and Documentation and Regional programmes few activities have been implemented, besides the construction of the Centre's building in Vumba. Effects on conflict management in Africa of these two programmes are considered negligible until today.

The donors' investments seem small compared to the benefits that are possible to enjoy for the many Zimbabweans living in a politically more stable country, even though it is difficult to relate investments to any specific amount of results from CPIA activities.

The cost-effectiveness of the CPIA is not easy to determine, partly due to absence of follow up and efforts to measure results. If compared to the improved political climate it seems well invested funds by donors, but looking at the number of activities and the cost for these cost-effectiveness is not impressive.

The institutional audit showed that the CPIA and the GERDC need to formally deal with changes to their Boards of Trustees. The composition of members, as it is presented by the CPIA, seems well suited for the needs of the organisations as well as the donors.

It is clear that the CPIA needs to upgrade a number of aspects to answer to the demands and requirements of the donors. These aspects include organisational and management issues and several issues in relation to the running of the programmes.

The Evaluation ToR requires that the Team come with recommendations for improvements of CPIA organisation and activities. The most important recommendations the Team sees are:

- 1) Although the political context has changed with the Unity Government, there is a continuous need in Zimbabwe for the work of the CPIA. The CPIA should build on its unique role of being a civil society actor that is able to combine a dedication to peace, justice and human dignity, with diplomatic skills and political sensitivity.
- 2) The design of National Reconciliation, Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice programme should be revisited and the programme revived in the new political setting of Zimbabwe. If the programme is to continue it needs to take in the new setting and be given new objectives and measurable indicators.

- 3) If the CPIA wishes to fulfil its original vision and mission to contribute on a Pan-African scale, the CPIA should develop a realistic strategy and seek partnership among donors and African actors for this venture.
- 4) The CPIA should revisit the Culture of Peace programme and assess its relevance among its other programmes, considering the high level work the organisation is focusing on. This is especially important if/when the CPIA engages outside Zimbabwe and becomes a regional or Pan-African organisation. The programme's design needs to, in any case, be looked at, to cater for results and impact.
- 5) The Research and Documentation programme needs to be redesigned if it is to continue at all. The library should be co-located with a university and made known to academics all over Africa. If this is deemed not possible ways should be sought to make the library more accessible for students and researchers. The programme objective of conducting research needs to be made a reality.
- 6) The GERDC Centre in Vumba should be turned into a conference centre made available to a wider circle. The ownership of the land that the building stands on should be made to rest with a body outside the control of the ED's family.
- 7) Before extending further financial support, the donors should request that the CPIA revisits the designs of its programmes. The revisiting should, above all, aim to establish clear programme objectives, including success indicators, and methods for how to achieve these objectives. In the case of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation programmes, clarifications are needed as to what will be the direction and immediate objectives of them in the new situation prevailing in Zimbabwe.
- 8) The CPIA should engage seriously in following up programmes and determining and reporting on results, outcomes and impacts. Making programmes and their relevance and achievements, outside the group of participants in activities, would increase the impact and strengthen donor relations.
- 9) The CPIA and the GERDC need to submit documentation supporting changes of the compositions of the Boards. It should not be acceptable to the donors with the Kapungu family holding a majority on the GERDC Board.
- 10) The CPIA should, together with its donors, discuss and agree on how to make necessary upgrades to its organisation and management. A possible way to achieve this is to hire two consultants according to the proposal above under "Plan of Action".
- 11) The CPIA/GERDC should terminate the use of the services provided by the Brackenridge Resort or at least agree on rules for such use with the donors.

# TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A JOINT EVALUATION OF DONOR SUPPORT TO THE CENTRE FOR PEACE INITATIVES IN AFRICA (CPIA)

#### 1. BACKGROUND

The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA) was founded in Zimbabwe in 2001. The organisation mainly works with dialogue activities in Zimbabwe to achieve its overall objective of contributing towards the promotion of sustainable peace, stability and security in Africa through conflict prevention and management. The dialogue activities include consultations, consultative meetings, workshops, panel meetings, conferences, and trainings. CPIA's ongoing programmes are: National Dialogue; Zimbabwe Beyond March 2005; Governance in the Zimbabwean Context; Culture of Peace; Prevention of pre and post conflict conflicts; National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion; and the Research and Documentation Centre.

The CPIA's Strategic Plan for 2008-2011 outlines CPIA's vision and mission for the coming years, as well as its core values.

Vision - to become the leader in conflict prevention, resolution and management in Zimbabwe, the SADC sub-region and Africa.

Mission — to contribute towards the attainment of sustainable peace, stability and security through conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa.

The plan also states that "in the last seven years of its existence, CPIA has made a significant contribution to creating an environment for dialogue between various interest groups and stakeholders, primarily in Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent at sub regional and continental level". The abovementioned programmes have been supported by a range of donors over the years, namely the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), together with the Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the European Commission (EC), and the Netherlands. Finland has just entered into an agreement for support to CPIA during 2009.

Table 1. Overview of donor support to CPIA

Donor	Total EUR
European Commission (EC)	500,000
Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE)	380,000
Swedish International Development	600,000
Cooperation Agency (Sida)	
Canadian International Development	27,554
Agency (CIDA)	
Total EUR	about 1,500,000

In 2004, Sida contracted an independent consultant to undertake a review of CPIA. The objective of the study among included 'an assessment of the relevance of the institution as well as the impact and performance of project activities in relation to the objective set out in the agreements and proposals submitted to Sida'. Furthermore, the evaluation was to 'assess the effectiveness of CPIA and how the organisational structure and institutional management has contributed to the delivery of the organisation's programmes and projects'. Therefore, the proposed 2009 study

is CPIA's second evaluation process since its inception in 2001. One of the recommendations from the 2004 evaluation was the need to convey a CPIA-donor round table discussion to assist the former in the establishment of a basket fund.

Though discussions have taken place over the years about coordinating and harmonising donor support, a fresh meeting was held on 28 October 2008 to discuss the matter. In the meeting CPIA highlighted its strengths and weaknesses (the latter in regard to reporting) and the challenges of handling various donor agreements, which have different reporting and auditing timeframes. The donors therefore agreed to jointly fund an evaluation that would take stock of work that CPIA has done so far, as well as to provide recommendations on what areas CPIA need strengthening in. In addition, the evaluation would serve as a basis for harmonisation of donor support through the most appropriate tools and mechanisms, including a possible basket funding arrangement.

Sida will play the role of lead evaluation coordinator responsible for consultant contractual issues and payments. Sida, EC, Norway have agreed to co-fund this evaluation equally.

#### 2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The overall purpose of the Evaluation is to asses if CPIA contributes towards the promotion of sustainable peace, stability and security in Africa through conflict prevention and management with a focus on the conflict in Zimbabwe, and to see how its organisational set-up could be improved.

The specific objective is to firstly establish CPIA's record of achievement in relation to its objectives, the impact it has made and the relevance of its activities in relation to the conflict in Zimbabwe; and secondly to evaluate the institutional efficiency of CPIA. In addition, the evaluation should serve as a basis for harmonisation of donor support. The focus of the evaluation should be at national level, despite CPIA activities also on regional and continental level.

The first half of the evaluation should take into consideration CPIA's Effectiveness, Impact and Relevance.

#### The purpose is:

to evaluate the performance of the programmes for the last three years between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2008 in terms of outcomes (i.e. contribution to the organisation's goals),

to take account of individual programme impacts and cumulative, multiprogramme impacts at national level,

to assess to what extent the objectives of CPIA address the priorities for the stakeholders (target groups), conform relevant policies and in particular contribute to the organisational goal.

The second half of the evaluation should take in questions that a *system-based audit* usually seeks answer. Systems-based audits analyse how (instead of with what) the

organisation works by examining routines and systems in the organisation that are intended to guarantee reliability in the work of the organisation and in its reports.

#### The purpose is:

to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the systems for operational and financial management that exist in CPIA,

to assess if CPIA meets the donors' terms and conditions and how requirements from donors can be more harmonised,

to determine, on the basis of the study, whether the documentation which is received from CPIA by the donors under the current agreements reflects the actual situation and can thus be regarded as satisfactory material on which the donors can base its decisions regarding funding,

*to* contribute to CPIA's internal processes of change and system development by suggesting improvements.

The evaluation should also serve as a basis for harmonisation of donor support through the most appropriate tools and mechanisms, including a possible basket funding arrangement.

Moreover, the evaluation should be a learning tool for both CPIA and the donors. It should suggest improvements for CPIA concerning planning, implementation and monitoring of their activities, and be an instrument for the donor's overall assessment of the organisation.

#### 3. THE ASSIGNMENT

Evaluating dialogue initiatives is made difficult by the broad and loose use of the term and the nature of the activities. Dialogue is not an end in itself but a tool or method that can be applied in many contexts for many purposes, including goals related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The OECD-DAC publication "Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities" (2008) highlights special challenges regarding the evaluation of dialogue. One is that dialogue processes are often off-the-record and confidential. This is the case with many of CPIA's activities, and the evaluation should therefore take into account only those that are not confidential. During 2008, OECD-DAC has initiated work to test the guidelines in various settings. The guidelines should serve as a reference point to the assignment (please see <a href="http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en\_21571361\_34047972\_35263575\_1">http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en\_21571361\_34047972\_35263575\_1\_1\_1\_00.html</a>).

The evaluation should cover CPIA's entire organisation with a focus on activities implemented in Zimbabwe (and resource input from for example South Africa). The assignment includes studying documentation including programme descriptions, reports and audits; interviewing various stakeholders, staff at CPIA, relevant staff at the donors, as well as and with the organisation's auditor; making a survey of operational and financial management systems and routines; making analyses and

providing recommendations in general in accordance with the description given below.

The assignment should also take into account the evaluation from 2004, as well as possible prior audits and assessments that have been undertaken. After consultations with the donors, the Consultant may also include or exclude areas in order to guarantee that the study is feasible and of good quality.

#### 3.1 Analysis of Effectiveness, Impact and Relevance

The first half of the evaluation should address the following questions:

a) What is the Effectiveness of CPIA's programmes in terms of its objectives? Are there links between the programmes that are complementary? Has the dialogue achieved its stated goals? Are the goals relevant to the driving factors of the conflict? How?

This is an assessment of the effectiveness of CPIA's work is in relation its overall objective. A particular concern is to what extent the strategies, methods and goal chosen by CPIA are right. This analysis should, in turn, give an input into an assessment of the results and impact of programmes implemented by CPIA, in relation to the level of fulfilment of the CPIA's overall objectives.

b) What is the Impact of CPIA's programmes? What are the results or effects of the dialogue – going beyond the immediate programme activities, sphere and participants – that constitute broader change in the conflict?

It may be difficult to trace and measure impacts of dialogue processes as the evaluation would have to try to measure what is not quantifiable, such as personal relationships that become operative in different contexts. However, attempts should be made to focus on generating independently, verifiable evidence of outcomes and impacts, rather than measurement of them.

c) What is the Relevance of CPIA's programmes in the local context? Are there other relevant organisations that may be an alternative to CPIA? Does CPIA coordinate efficiently with other organisations? Is this dialogue with these participants to address the issues using this process relevant, or the right ones, in these circumstances? How does the dialogue plan to affect the key driving factors of the conflict?

This is an assessment of CPIA's relevance considering its activities, stakeholders and areas of operation in relation to the problems identified. Could there for instance be target groups or areas of support that are neglected and ought to be given higher priority in the programmes? What role does CPIA play in the Zimbabwean civil society and how does it coordinate its work with other actors at different levels in society? What is the added value of this specific cooperation?

In addition, the following questions should be addressed to produce recommendations for possible improvement:

- Is dialogue the appropriate option? (is there demand by key people, will it assist in getting parties to the peace table, overcoming deadlock or difficulties, reviving negotiations or implementing or increasing ownership of agreements?)

- Who is part of the dialogue? Does the dialogue include or address key people to the conflict? ("Key" are not necessarily decision makers, but people or groups that are determined to have significant influence on whether and how the conflict continues or not.) Who is left out of the dialogue? How has the dialogue planned to deal with "spoilers" and opponents to the peace process?

#### 3.2 Survey of Routines and Systems

The second half of the evaluation, survey of routines and systems (including those of financial management), should encompass the entire organisation and take the below into account (although the consultant may choose to focus on a few areas after consultations with the donors). The assignment shall cover the following agreements: Sida, EC and Norway.

#### Management and control of activities:

- the organisation's relation to its board;
- organisation and ways of work at head office;
- human resources
- decision making processes and rules of delegation, especially considering the involvement of the beneficiaries;
- the system for internal information and communication, feedback and institutional learning;
- planning of activities including information gathering and analyses;
- formulation of goals;
- quality assurance;
- risk assessments and management, including security issues;
- phasing out and initiating projects;
- measurement of results;
- monitoring and follow-up of projects;
- reporting and deviation, final reports.

#### Financial Management and Control

- compliance with agreements;
- transfer of funds and bank and cash balances;
- delegation, authorisations;
- budget/follow up (including the calculation of administration costs and programme costs respectively);
- audits, quality of auditors certificates;
- promotion of good administration, transparency regarding finances and management of funds and promotion of measures to counteract corruption

The assignment shall result in recommendations and propose a plan of action concerning the above-mentioned points. The consultant should also include other possible recommendations that are considered to be of relevance for the donors and CPIA.

#### 3.3 Requirements for Donor Support

The assignment should also critically assess possible requirements for donor support to CPIA, and provide recommendations as a basis for harmonisation of donor support through the most appropriate tools and mechanisms, including a possible basket funding arrangement.

#### 4. METHODOLOGY, EVALUATION TEAM AND TIME SCHEDULE

The evaluation has been commissioned by Sida on behalf of the following donors: Sida, EC, and Norway. A Steering Group consisting of one representative from each donor will approve the inception report as well as the draft report together with CPIA. The Steering Group consists of Frederique Hanotier (EC), Tor Kubberud (RNE), and Kerstin Lundgren (Sida) A Reference Group with representatives from the donors as well as the CPIA will be of access to the Consultant throughout the evaluation process. The programme officer at the Embassy of Sweden/Sida responsible for the evaluation is Kerstin Lundgren.

#### 4.1 Evaluation Process

The selected Consultant is asked to begin the assignment by preparing an *inception report* not exceeding 3 pages elaborating on the basic design and plan for the evaluation. The inception report shall be approved by the Steering Group and CPIA within ten working days.

The Consultant shall evaluate relevant background documentation that will be provided by CPIA or the donors, as well as examine all programmes. A *draft report* will be submitted to Kerstin Lundgren (Embassy of Sweden/Sida) by mail. Sida will disseminate the draft to the Steering Group and the Reference Group in order for them to be given the opportunity to comment and correct any factual errors.

#### 4.2 Method

The evaluation should be carried out in adherence Sida's Evaluation Manual 2<sup>nd</sup> revised edition 2007 and to DAC's Evaluation Quality Standards. The analysis is expected to include a study of relevant documentation, e.g. applications and assessment memos and descriptions of the organisation. Interviews will be done with staff of CPIA, CPIA Board of Trustees, CPIA Advisory Group, CPIA Group of Eminent Persons, and CPIA beneficiaries, as well as the donors.

The donors consider that the evaluation team focus on lessons learnt and to the degree possible reaching the conclusions and recommendation in close dialogue with the CPIA to emphasise the participatory learning process.

The evaluation requires an overview of the objectives, purpose, plans and priorities of CPIA. It also involves an overview of the implemented programmes and the organisational set-up. The assessment of the value added of CPIA should include an overview on the implemented activities.

An obvious problem with any evaluation of this type is that a major source of information comes from the partner organisation itself. Hence, the consultants should, to the largest extent possible, try to get "second opinions" from other informants less at stake in the implementation of CPIA activities, or in other ways can add a different perspective. These informants might include other NGOs (including those based in South Africa via telephone communication), community leaders, journalists, researchers, or whomever most suitable.

Furthermore, the Consultant is required to have a transparent discussion, *for each* of their main conclusion, on the type of sources that were used, the extent by which the informant could be considered to have a stake in the issues, the extent by which the

Consultant was able to corroborate or triangulate the conclusion by other sources with a different perspective or stake, or if the Consultant has any alternative explanation of the observations.

#### 4.3 The Consultant and Composition of the Team

The Consultants assigned to carry out the evaluation are called off from the "Framework agreement for Consulting Services in relation to Civil Society" with the regard to services of evaluations/developments of methods, March 2007.

The Consultant should seek to use a participatory approach and if possible to have a gender balanced team. The Team Leader should have thorough experience of development cooperation in Zimbabwe, including civil society issues as well as documented experience of conducting evaluations. The team should include a local consultant.

The team should include:

- appropriate knowledge about the conflict in Zimbabwe,
- knowledge and experience of conflict prevention and peacebuilding (preferably with a focus on dialogue activities),
- financial management and organisational analysis skills,
- documented experience of conducting systems-based audits.

#### 4.4 Time Schedule

The time needed for the assignment is estimated to a maximum of 12 person weeks between 5 March 2009 and 30 June 2009, including the time required to prepare the inception report and including time for completing the report and a presentation of the draft report at a seminar.

#### 5. REPORTING AND TIMING

The evaluation shall be initiated no later than **5 March 2009**. An inception report shall be presented no later than 13 March 2009, which the Steering Group and CPIA should approve within ten days. A *draft* of the full report shall be presented to the donors and CPIA for consideration, not later than the 27 May 2009. The donors and CPIA will comment on the draft report within fifteen working days, after which the Consultant shall prepare the *final report* within ten working days.

When the draft report has been submitted the consultants will present the report at a seminar in Harare, Zimbabwe.

The report must include a presentation of the process in drawing up the evaluation design and choosing methodology. It shall also list all contributors to the evaluation (excepting those that have opted for anonymity).

The report should also include:

List of acronyms, tables and figures

**Executive Summary** 

Evaluation purpose and scope

Methodology

Findings, lessons learned conclusions and recommendations

The final report should be delivered by the Consultant to Embassy of Sweden/Sida with a copy to the Reference Group within two weeks after received comments. The final report shall not exceed 50 pages excluding Annexes and be submitted electronically and in 10 (ten) hardcopies. Sida is responsible for the distribution of the report. The report shall be written in English. The final report must be professionally proofread and presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

#### 6. SPECIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS

Sida will, after evaluating the call-off proposals with the Steering group using the criteria specified below, decide upon which call-off proposal is most suited for the assignment. Sida will then make a decision and sign the call-off order under the "Framework agreement for Consulting Services in Relation to Civil Society" with the regard to services of evaluations/developments of methods, March 2007.

The tenders shall offer services as described under section 3 above and the call-off proposal shall include the following information:

- how and when the assignment is to be done;
- the methods employed in order to complete the assignment and secure the quality of the completed work, use a participatory approach and if possible a gender based team;
- state the total cost of the assignment, specified in the following way (in accordance with call-off order): for the assignment in Sweden specify the hourly fee for each personnel category and reimbursable costs; for the assignment abroad specify the fee per week for each personnel category and reimbursable costs, any other costs and possible discounts. All costs shall be given in Swedish kronor, excluding VAT;
- a proposal for time and working schedules according to the Assignment;
- state knowledge and experience as described under section 4.3, by including qualifications of each of the persons/sub-consultants they make available for the assignment and attach a CV for each of them.

The following criteria will be used to evaluate the competing proposals:

- > the overall suitability of the proposed personnel in relation to the terms of reference;
- > the suitability of the proposed personnel's specialist competence;
- > the suitability of the proposed personnel's experience;
- > the suitability of the firm's method for doing the assignment in relation to the terms of reference;
- > the firm's ability to perform the assignment at the appropriate time;
- > the cost of the assignment.

The consultant should be able to sign the call-off order no later than 5 March 2009.



# ANNEX B

# **SIPU Call-Off Proposal**

#### **SIPU International – background**

SIPU International is a Swedish consultancy organisation which has been working in Africa since 1982. One of our first consultancy assignments commissioned by Sida was support to the Training Management Bureau of Zimbabwe's Public Service Commission followed by a number of other consultancies in Zimbabwe during the 1980's and 1990's. SIPU International's experiences comprise of consultancy assignments in some 20 African countries, some where we still maintain a network of contacts. Recent assignments encompass consultancies in Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Egypt and Kenya. SIPU International has carried out a large number of evaluations and assessments of projects, programmes, sectors and organisations/institutions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe and the Middle East. SIPU International's consultancy assignments have been commissioned and financed by bilateral donors such as Sida, Danida, Norad, SwissAid and DFiD, regional donors such as Nordic Development Fund and Multilateral Banks and Donors i.e. the World Bank, the European Commission, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter American Development Bank and UN agencies.

#### 1. THE ASSIGNMENT

The CPIA endeavours to promote peace, stability and security in Africa through conflict prevention and peace maintenance. The organisation also strives to promote a culture of peace continent wide and promote dialogue among all major stakeholders, leading to political stability and economic development. In addition, CPIA also attempts to foster capacity building in Africa.

At the website, CPIA is outlining the major issues analysed;

- Potential conflicts and identifying potential trouble spots with a view to developing early warning systems, preventing conflicts in Africa and setting up peace support operations.
- o The issues of HIV/AIDS as a threat to security and stability in Africa
- o The issue of demining (land mine removal) and the control of small arms
- The potency of the issue of land ownership patterns as a major cause of instability in Africa
- The issues of poverty, the economy and unemployment as causative factors of conflict and political instability
- o The marginalization of ethnic minorities as human security threats in Africa.

o The creation of child soldiers; an analysis of the implications of the use of the youth to commit acts of violence in Africa.

The Vision, mission statement, endeavours and issues analysed are all ambitious and noble and should together, and even as single issues, justify financial support to CPIA. However, the documents attached to the invitation to tender do not fully reflect the activities, outputs or outcomes of CPIA's operations. SIPU International is however well aware of the sensitivity of the political dialogue in Zimbabwe and the complexity of the tasks of CPIA. Nevertheless, we will, should our team be selected for the joint evaluation, strive to identify achievements in relation to the objectives, the possible impact and relevance of CPIA's activities. We will also assess the institutional efficiency and resource allocations of the Centre.

Quality control of the assignment will be performed by SIPU International, Mr Bo Synnerholm.

Should SIPU International be selected for the Joint Evaluation, we are prepared to start working on the 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2009 and submit a draft Interim Report March 13, 2009, a draft final report by the end of May 2009 and a Final Report June 15, 2009.

#### 2. THE EVALUATION – APPROACH AND METHOD

#### 2.1 SIPU International's General Approach to the In-Depth Review

As a core principle, SIPU's evaluation approach is based on an independent and objective stance for which SIPU assumes full responsibility of the contents of its reports. SIPU will at all times strive to achieve full consent with stakeholders around factual situations.

The points of departure of SIPU's work are:

- The OECD-DAC "Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities (2008)
- DAC's Evaluation Quality Standards
- Do not harm; How aid can support peace, Mary B. Anderson
- Sida's Evaluation Manual "Looking Back Moving Forward" and "Sida at Work";
- Sida's cooperation agreements with CPIA, including budget and project work plan;
- Agreements between CPIA and other donors and cooperation partners;
- Sida's decision on the support of CPIA.
- The Review report of CPIA 2004
- Relevant CPIA documents

This list will be further detailed in the Inception Report.

In the Terms of Reference for the Evaluation it is stated that:

#### The purpose is:

to evaluate the performance of the programmes for the last three years between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2008 in terms of outcomes (i.e. contribution to the organisation's goals),

to take account of individual programme impacts and cumulative, multi-programme impacts at national level,

to assess to what extent the objectives of CPIA address the priorities for the stakeholders (target groups), conform relevant policies and in particular contribute to the organisational goal.

Our comments to the purpose statements are that the evaluation must rely on documents provided by CPIA, interviews with immediate stakeholders and organisations with an overview of policy development. The evaluation is dependent access to important stakeholders and their expressed policies. When evaluating cumulative multi-programme impact the consultants can only evaluate cumulative multi-programme impact if these programmes are well documented verified and possible to follow up.

#### APPROACH AND METHODS OF THE CPIA EVALUATION

From the Terms of Reference it is made clear by Sida and the other donors to CPIA that the evaluation shall be concentrating on CPIA's work in Zimbabwe and on organisational, managerial, administrative and financial issues concerning CPIA as an organisation. From the information available at the time of preparing the tender, these priorities are apparent as CPIA's operations have been devoted mainly to Zimbabwe. The Joint Evaluation will focus on CPIA's achievement, the impact of its initiatives and activities as perceived by cooperation partners, civil society, institutions and other stakeholders. The evaluation team will also strive to establish the relevance of the activities of CPIA, especially in relation to other, similar organisations in Zimbabwe. The baseline for the evaluation will be the 2004 Review of CPIA, its conclusions and recommendations. CPIA's organisational development and resource allocation as well as its strategies and programming will be reviewed. The second part of the evaluation, the Systems-based audit of CPIA will be performed in close cooperation with the CPIA staff members. This approach will enhance organisational learning and improve skills among the staff.

The Joint Evaluation will provide a set of recommendations aimed for use in connection both with Sida's and other donors' continued support as well as for CPIA's further strengthening of organisational development, administrative and financial development and learning. The recommendations will include key issues for such improvement from both implementation and support perspectives.

In and for the process of analysis and formulating recommendations, a participatory approach will be applied. We would like CPIA to comment and suggest on our approach and methods, include the CPIA leadership and staff in the detailed planning of the evaluation and do an inclusive Systems-based audit of CPIA. This will help to avoid misunderstanding of systems, procedures and routines by the consultants, assist the staff in their own analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation and its administration and provide a learning

opportunity for the organisation. We are likewise suggesting a workshop for CPIA leadership and staff as a final opportunity for clarification and dialogue on the findings and conclusions of the evaluation before the team start working on the draft final report.

We would like to invite CPIA to advice and recommend on the final list of interviewes and the proposed issues for the interviews. The interviews will be held I a way inviting initiatives and comments, not only on the exact question, so as to capture all relevant aspects on CPIA and its activities and initiatives.

The Joint Evaluation will, among others, examine the following;

- To what extent has the recommendations from the 2004 Review (and other reviews, audits e.t.c.) been followed? If not, why?
- What are the main achievements in CPIA's programmes 2006-2008?
- What impact can be identified as a result of CPIA's interventions?
- What is the relationship between CPIA's organisational goals and activities?
- How are the major issues for peace found on CPIA's website reflected in the programmes and activities of the Centre?
- What are the effects on women and children in relation to the programmes?
- What is the relationship between CPIA and GRDC?
- Which are the challenges and opportunities for organisational development?
- What possible changes and improvements can be made in reporting?
- How is CPIA working with different donors and how can synergies be made?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current organisational set up of CPIA?

# n.b. Additional questions to be put are well defined in the Terms of Reference and do not need to be repeated.

After reading the documents attached to the invitation to tender and other information and documents available to us, we would like to propose a slightly different approach to the evaluation dividing the work in three phases;

#### Phase 1 – in Sweden

The first phase is obviously desk studies of relevant documents for the evaluation and the formulation of an inception report where the details of the evaluation are outlined and a time schedule for the evaluation suggested. Other details of the inception report would be practical and logistical issues for the evaluation team's visit in Zimbabwe. The Terms of Reference has made it clear that more written material on CPIA will be made available to the consultant selected for the assignment, thus forming the basis for the Inception Report and subsequently for the evaluation. SIPU International will be able to develop a draft Inception Report to be ready by March 13, 2009.

#### Phase 2 in Zimbabwe

The Second phase is suggested to be performed in Zimbabwe where the Evaluation team will first meet with and interview the donor organisations which are contributing to CPIA in order to establish the donor community's expectations, relationship, and commitment to CPIA. Following the meetings with the donor community, the team will meet with CPIA where initial interviews will be made with the Chairperson and staff members. The systems based audit of CPIA will be initiated at the same time but the bulk of the audit will be performed later.

The Provincial Co-ordinators of CPIA are playing a significant role in assessing the situation in the local communities of Zimbabwe. Hence it is suggested that the Evaluation team visits a few Provincial Co-ordinators for interviews. It is further suggested that the Evaluation team together or individually do interviews with representatives of the Law Society and Lawyers for Human Rights in Zimbabwe to assess CPIA's impact on constitutional issues.

An important partner for CPIA is ZIMCET and it is further suggested that the Evaluation team meets with ZIMCET to look into the issues of capacity building for conflict resolution, community mobilisation and peace building. Other institutions/organisations which the Evaluation team need to interview are the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference, Zimbabwe Council of Churches and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe. All three are important players in the peace initiatives in Zimbabwe.

SIPU International is also suggesting that the Evaluation team meet with the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists, the United Nations Information Centre and other organisations to get a thorough and un-biased view of the results of CPIAs initiatives and activities on the Zimbabwean society.

It is further suggested that one of the team members shall visit Gaborone, Botswana for interviews with SADC staff on their impressions and views of CPIA's achievements in relation to the SADC interventions in Zimbabwe. Telephonic interviews with stakeholders in South Africa and elsewhere will be carried out.

After assessing and analysing the results of the interviews mentioned above, the team will meet with CPIA staff members again for in-depth interviews about the findings and opinions expressed by the interviewees. Interviews will also be made with members of CPIA Board of Trustees, CPIA Advisory Board and CPIA Group of Eminent Persons. This is also when the systems based audit of CPIA will be performed and finalised. In connection with the systems based audit, a meeting with CPIA's auditors will be organised.

Finally, we are proposing that preliminary findings and conclusions as well as recommendations to CPIA are communicated to CPIA and validated in a one day workshop for leadership and staff.

The Joint Evaluation team will remain in Zimbabwe to produce the draft Final Report. The Draft final report will be presented at a Seminar in Harare for Sida and the other donor organisations.

#### Phase 3 in Sweden

Drafting of the final report. Presentation to Sida and other donors(?) in a workshop. Final report.

#### 3. PROPOSED TEAM INCLUDING KEY QUALIFICATIONS

The requirements in the Terms of Reference are high on the consultants, and so with good reasons as it will be a complex and demanding task to carry out the Evaluation of CPIA. We therefore propose three experts with a proven track record from similar assignments as well as other tasks. The team leader will be Mr Lars Oscar with the support from Messrs Peter Weiderud and Godfrey Manungo.

The Team Leader Mr. Lars Oscar is a specialist in international development cooperation, holding two Master's Degrees (development economics/political science) and with long work experience as Head of Sida office, project manager, analyst, area manager, programme officer, and evaluator from his many years working from a donor's perspective and as a consultant. He has acquired substantial knowledge and experience in development cooperation and its different mechanisms, not least concerning evaluations, capacity building, organisational and institutional development and management. Mr. Oscar has considerable experience from support and cooperation with many different stakeholders. As an analyst he has dealt particularly with evaluations and other project/programme aspects, budget issues, donor coordination, aid effectiveness and poverty aspects. He is also proficient in working with Systems-based audits.

Mr. Oscar has experience from Southern and Eastern Africa as well as other regions (the Balkans, EU candidate countries). African affairs are one of his interests professionally as well as privately. Mr. Oscar is well familiar with Sida procedures and routines including the Policy on Global Development and related policies, partly from his time as an employee but also from consultancy assignments.

On most of the positions Mr. Oscar has held, evaluations have been a major part of the work. In the position as area manager for Sida (1997 – 1999) he handled the phasing out of the Swedish support to seven of the central European states, in which an important part was to evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the given cooperation and support. Mr. Oscar carried out many evaluations himself but also contracted consultants for these tasks. The positions as Sida's economist in Zimbabwe (1999 – 2002) and as Head of the Swedish Embassy office in Albania (2002 – 2004) as well brought experiences in evaluations, as part of the handling of Swedish supports as well as daily interactions with politicians and high level officials. As a consultant (from 2005) Mr. Oscar has carried out and been involved in a number of evaluations and systems audits.

Before joining the international development cooperation field Mr.Oscar was active within airplane piloting, teaching, sales and marketing.

The Conflict Expert, Mr Peter Weiderud is working as General Secretary of the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the only global organisation of parliamentarians specifically working to prevent the proliferation of small arms through legislative work, awareness raising and by advocating for peace and improved international cooperation. The Parliamentary Forum is particularly active in Sub-Saharan Africa. He is also working as private consultant, offering strategic advice to top management of business, public sector and civil society on corporate social responsibility and how to strengthen fulfilments of goals through improved cooperation with other sectors of society.

During his term as Director for International Affairs of the World Council of Churches Mr Weiderud interacted and cooperated with many Peace Organisations and Institutes.

Peter Weiderud is a trained journalist with degrees also in Peace and Conflict studies and management, and started his career as a journalist. He has a long experience of working with international affairs in a political context, as speech writer and political advisor to two Foreign Ministers (Lena Hjelm Wallén and Anna Lindh 1994 - 99) and the Minister for Development Co-operation (Carin Jämtin 2006). He is President of the Christian Social Democrats of Sweden since 2005, and in that capacity also member of the Executive Committee and Board of the Social Democratic Party. He is appointed as alternate member of the Swedish Parliament for the county of Västmanland. Four four years (2004 - 2006) he served as Director for International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, based in Geneva. Immediately before that he was Director General for the international work of development and mission for Church of Sweden (1999 - 2002). Earlier he was general secretary of the Christian Peace movement in Sweden (1983 -89) and personal assistant to the Bishop of Västerås, Claes-Bertil Ytterberg (1989 - 94).

He has held numerous voluntary posts as elected representative, e.g. President of the Christian Peace Movement and the Swedish Peace Council, Chairman of the government delegation on indigenous issues, board member of the Swedish Institute in Alexandria, the Olof Palme International Centre, Church of Sweden Mission, the Arena group, and member of the Thematic Committee on Social Science and Humanities of the Swedish Research Council.

Mr Godfrey Manungo is a Zimbabwean senior Human Resource Management consultant with considerable experience from large Zimbabwean companies such as Delta Corporation, A.A: Mines and African Banking Corporation; He has also been working with the public sector as consultant to e.g. The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor, Ministry of Health and Harare City Council. Mr Malungo's experience from the non-governmental sector comprise e.g. of assignments for the Red Cross Society of Zimbabwe, Help Age Zimbabwe, Catholic Relief Services and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. Godfrey Manungo has been working as consultant in several African countries; Namibia, Mocambique, Malawi, Zambia and South Africa where he worked for SIPU International and Sida in the Eastern Cape Provincial Administration as HR consultant.

Godfrey Manungo is a well known HR expert who has extensive experience of working in a politically sensitive environment and with diverse assignments. He has been project manager for large performance management projects in various Civil Service Departments and Municipalities where he assessed performance and administrative systems, identified key results areas and productivity measures. He has reviewed and evaluated HR functions, routines and methods and been Stream leader for Business Process Mapping for Delta Corporation. Godfrey has performed manpower audits, skills audits and other systems and institutional efficiency audits for various organisations.

Mr Manungo holds a Masters Degree (MSc) in Human Resource Development from University of Manchester, UK and a Bachelor of Arts Degree from University of Zimbabwe. His professional career started in Ministry of Health where he was a Senior Administrative Officer. He was promoted to Senior Personnel Officer in the Post and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) from where he was recruited to Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration as Senior Consultant. He proceeded to PriceWaterhouseCoopers, an audit firm

where he was employed as Senior Consultant and Manager. He is now Managing Consultant and owner of Best Practices (Pvt)Ltd, Zimbabwe since 2003.

# 3. **TENTATIVE WORK PLAN** (to be detailed in the Inception report)

The chart below shows a tentative work/time plan. The coloured bars do not reflect weeks but periods.

ID	Task name	Durati	March		Ap	oril		May		Ju	ne		
		on	Inly										
		(man-	Start 5 <sup>th</sup>	Start 5 <sup>th</sup> of March						End 30 <sup>th</sup> June			
		days)											
1	Desk review	2											
2	Draft inception report	1											
3	Approval by Steering group and CPIA	(10)											
4	Establishing contacts and finalization of interview preparations	2											
5	Visit to Zimbabwe Meetings and interviews with CPIA and other	20											
6	Visit to SADC	1											
7	In-depth interviews with CPIA, Board and Groups	13											
8	Systems based audit performed	4											
9	Analysis and drafting report, including developing recommendation s	5											
10	Workshop for CPIA leadership and staff	3											
11	Finalisation and submission of draft Final Report,	3											
12	Presentation of draft Final Report in a seminar in Harare	3											
13	Comments from CPIA and donors	(15)											
14	Finalizing and submitting of report	3										Final Rep	

# 4. BUDGET

A budget for the assignment is included below

Fees	Cost per Unit	Numbers	<b>Total cost in SEK</b>
a. for work in Sweden			
Lars Oscar	990	32	31.680
Peter Weiderud	990	32	31.680
b. for work abroad			
Lars Oscar	39 600	3	118.800
Peter Weiderud	39 600	3	118 800
Godfrey Manungo	24. 500	3	73 500
Fees total;			374.460
Reimbursables			
Airtickets Sthlm-Hre	15.000	2	30.000
Airticket Hre-Gab	3.000	1	3.000
Accommodation	1.500	38	57.000
Per Diem	593	38	22.534
Local trpt * incl airport transfers and fuel	6.800	1	6.800
Communications	2000	1	2.000
Miscellaneous			3.666
Total Reimbursables			125.000
Grand Total			499.460

<sup>\*</sup> Local transport cost is based upon Avis Harare airport rates and approximate fuel costs

Attached annexes:

CV's for Messrs Oscar, Weiderud and Manungo

# Curriculum Vitae

# Lars Oscar

#### **Personal**

Surname, first (middle) names: Oscar, Lars (Martin)

Address: Hardvallsgatan 7C, 417 18 Gothenburg, Sweden

Date of birth: 9 November, 1963

Civil status: Divorced
Gender: Male
Nationality: Swedish

**Contact:** 

Phone (mobile): +46 - 702 - 527352E-mail: lars@oscarconsulting.se

Skype: larsoscar

#### **Key qualifications:**

Lars Oscar is a development cooperation specialist with extensive knowledge and experience from both HQ and the field. He has long work experience as Head of office, project manager, advisor, analyst, area manager, programme officer, and evaluator from his many years working from a donor's perspective and as a consultant. Thereby he has acquired substantial knowledge and experience in development cooperation and its different mechanisms, not least donor coordination and effectiveness. Further Mr. Oscar has considerable experience from capacity development, institutional development and management. As an analyst he has dealt particularly with project/programme aspects, Government budgets, and poverty aspects. Academically he holds two Master's Degrees in development economics and political science. He has experience from difficult and conflict-filled environments and has proven able to achieve and deliver also in such conditions.

#### Work experience (selected)

April 2005 – currently

#### Senior consultant

Lars Oscar Consulting AB

(Own consultancy firm)

Hardvallsgatan 7C, 417 18 Gothenburg, Sweden

Ph: +46 – 702 – 52 73 52

Contact person: N.a.

- Self-employed consultant;
- Achieved to establish and run successfully his consultancy firm;
- Sectors/subjects worked with: Donor coordination, aid effectiveness, project management, strategic design of projects and programmes, resource management, evaluations, and more;
- Selected assignments according to list below.

August 2004 - April 2005

#### Senior program officer

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) (Governmental agency) Valhallavägen 199, 105 25 Stockholm, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 8 - 6985000Contact person: Elsa Håstad

- Swedish National Contact Point (NCP) within the framework of the EU's PHARE and TACIS twinning programmes;
- Responsible for Swedish development cooperation with the former Soviet Union within the security sector;
- Monitoring of projects and supports;
- Commissioning of studies, evaluations and audits;
- Developed new methods for security sector support;
- Developed the NCP function's relations with stakeholders.

June 2002 - August 2004

#### Head of Tirana office/Counsellor

The Embassy of Sweden/Sida

(Embassy)

Rruga Budi 76, Tirana, Albania

Ph: +355 – 4 – 34 34 86

Contact person: Björn Mossberg

- Heading the Embassy's "Section for Cooperation with Albania", based in Tirana with 10 staff and support to Albania amounting to EUR 6 million per year;
- Developed both the development cooperation programme and the office;
- Overall planning of extensive support to Albanian development, incl extensive negotiations with Albanian Government, other donors, Albanian civil society and international organizations;
- Development of cooperation modalities and methods;
- Leading operations, finance and administration, including developing routines and recruiting and laying off staff;
- Considerable experience of donor coordination with other donors and Government, incl the development of the donor coordination architecture in Albania, in line with Rome and Paris agendas;
- Analysing and evaluating project proposals and Albanian politics, economy and poverty aspects, in both qualitative and quantitative terms;
- Commissioning of evaluations, audits and studies;
- Monitoring of the Swedish support and evaluating project results against policy and strategy documents:
- From the field lead the elaboration of the Swedish strategy for cooperation with Albania.

September 1999 - June 2002

#### Economist/2nd secretary

The Embassy of Sweden/Sida

(Embassy)

32 Aberdeen Rd, Avondale, Harare, Zimbabwe

Ph:  $+263 - 4 - 30 \ 26 \ 36$ 

Contact person: Abdi Foum

- Overall planning of development co-operation;
- Donor coordination and effectiveness;
- Analysing in qualitative and quantitative terms the Zimbabwean economy/poverty/politics and state budget and reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida;
- Widened the scope of the Economic Reports from the Embassy;

- Handling support to development during the very difficult Zimbabwean crises, and participated in changing the Swedish strategy for the support;
- Job included leading Sida support to the education, civil society, public financial management (support to all of Sub Saharan Africa), water resource management and (involved in) hiv/aids, democracy and human rights sectors in the conflict-filled situationin Zimbabwe at the time;
- Monitoring of projects and supports;
- Considerable experience of donor coordination with other stakeholders;
- Being the Embassy's contact point for Swedish NGOs working in Zimbabwe and succeeded in developing relations with these;
- Commissioning of several evaluations, audits and studies.

September 1997 – September 1999

#### Area manager

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) (Governmental agency) Valhallavägen 199, 105 25 Stockholm, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 8 - 6985000

- Responsible for Swedish development cooperation with 7 countries (Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria), of which the largest portfolio was Poland comprising more than EUR 13 million a year;
- Handling support for development;
- Negotiating contracts and conditions for Swedish support;
- Developing support methods;
- Monitoring, follow-up of projects and supports;
- Commissioning of a huge number of evaluations, audits and studies.

February 1997 – September 1997

#### Macro economist

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) (Governmental agency) Valhallavägen 199, 105 25 Stockholm, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 8 - 6985000

- Analyst of structural adjustment and balance of payments issues;
- Analysing international capital flows to developing countries and writing report "From Courting the State to Courting the Market", published by Sida 1997;
- Analysing distribution of Sida's budget.

August 1996 – February 1997

#### Author/editor/desk officer

The Swedish Institute of Foreign Affairs

(Governmental institute)

Drottning Kristinas Väg 37, 102 51 Stockholm, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 8 - 51 17 68 00

- Wrote and edited works published by the Institute;
- The institute's desk officer for African affairs;
- Wrote a volume on Kenya's political and economical development in the Institute's series on world politics.

April – August 1989

#### Flight instructor/airplane pilot

Garrett Flight Center

(Flight school)

Allair Airport, Farmingdale, NJ 07727, USA

Ph: N.a.

• Trained student pilots to learn to fly and take licences;

• Held ground and flight training.

February 1987 – May 1988

#### Project assistant (sales)

Expo Media AB (Exhibition-organisers)

Mässans Gata/Korsvägen, Gothenburg, Sweden

Ph: N.a.

- Selling/renting out stands at leading industrial maintenance trade exhibition "Maintenance 1988";
- Achieved record sales.

June 1984 – June 1985

#### Military service

Swedish Army

(Defence forces)

Regiment A1, Linköping, Sweden

Ph: N.a.

- Military service (compulsory) in artillery forces as vehicle officer;
- Rank of sergeant when honorably discharged.

#### A selection of assignments as consultant:

January 2009 – currently

# Team leader (evaluator)

SIPU International AB

(Consultancy firm)

Dalagatan 7, 111 23 Stockholm, Sweden

Ph: +46 – 8 – 698 06 00

Contact person: Pontus Förberg

- Team leader for a team of two experts carrying out an In-Deth Review of the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, AWEPA;
- Reviewing of the organisation from institutional, administrative, methodological point of views with the intention to come with recommendations for AWEPA's continued elaborations and implementation of the reforms;
- AWEPA implementing several reform processes simultaneously and Review particularly follows up on them.

November 2008 – January 2009

#### Consultant (evaluator)

SALA IDA AB

(Consultancy firm)

Hornsgatan 20, 118 82 Stockholm, Sweden

Ph: +46 – 8 – 452 70 00

Contact person: Ryan Knox

- Carried out a Mid Term Review of the "Turkish Swedish Municipal Partnership Networks" (tusenet). Project contained seven sub-projects/partnerships between the Turkish and Swedish associations of local authorities and municipalities in the two countries, aiming to promote democracy, human rights and effectiveness and efficiency of municipalities in view of the Turkish local administrative reform and EU accession;
- Recommended ways for the project to fulfill as much as possible of goals and expected results. Aspects addressed: relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of project design, implementation of activities, management etc.

July 2008

#### Consultant (evaluator)

The Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA) (Governmental agency)

601 78 Norrköping, Sweden

Ph: +46 – 11 – 19 10 00

Contact person: Willand Ringholm

- Designed a battery of questions/aspects for evaluating the cooperation agreement 2005-2008 between SMA and Sida;
- Recommended ways for the evaluation to yield as valuable insights as possible.

June - July 2008

#### **Evaluator**

UNICEF

Ali Pashe Tepelena 1, 38000 Prishtina

(UN agency)

Ph: +381 - 38 - 249230

Contact person: Robert Fuderich

- Carried out a mid term review of UNICEF's 5-year Kosovo programme 2005 2009;
- Recommended possible options to increase goal fulfillment;
- Work done in close cooperation with UNICEF/Kosovo team, Government of Kosova and other stakeholders.

February - May 2008

#### Aid management advisor

COWI A/S

(Consultancy firm)

Parallelvej 2, 2800 Lyngby, Denmark

Ph: +45 - 45 - 97 22 11

Contact person: Thomas Juel Thomsen

- Aid management advisor to the Prime Minister's Office in Prishtina, Kosovo;
- Position financed by Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs/DANIDA;
- Advised and engaged in making aid (all sectors) more effective in Kosovo, according to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles;
- Looked strategically and evaluating at different stakeholders' interests for and commitments to donor coordination and aid effectiveness (according to the Paris Declaration), to reach best possible results;
- Managed the Kosova reporting to the 2008 Survey on Monitoring of the Paris Declaration;
- Held capacity building in Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in management of donor financed project and donor coordination towards a SWAp;
- Produced a number of papers with advice on different aspects of donor coordination and aid effectiveness, of which some had strong impact on Government's actions;
- Elaborating a Government of Kosova strategy for aid effectiveness;
- Wrote speeches for the Prime Minister.

October 2006 – December 2007

#### Team leader

SIPU International AB

(Consultancy firm)

Dalagatan 7, 111 23 Stockholm, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 8 - 698 06 00

Contact person: Pontus Förberg

- Work location: Tirana, Albania and Stockholm, Sweden;
- Leading the EUR 2 million project financed by Sida;
- The project delivered advice and capacity building to the Albanian Ministry of Interior, involving 15 experts;

- Was hired after problems had been encountered in the project, and succeeded in putting the project back on track;
- Managed to improve routines and quality of results;
- Reached consensus with Ministry and Sida after negotiations on set-up and activities;
- Being the project's head expert on donor coordination and carried out substantial coordination with other donors and Government;
- Evaluated the experts' contributions against ToR and other stipulations;
- Work involved implementation, reporting, human resource management.

February – October 2006

#### **Expert**

The Swedish National Courts Administration (NCA) (G

(Governmental agency)

Kyrkogatan 34, 551 81 Jönköping, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 36 - 15 53 00

Contact person: Annika Sehlstedt

- Call-off contract with NCA;
- Advised NCA how to improve cooperation with Sida, incl all aspects of international development cooperation;
- Elaborating the NCA system for accounting and reporting on the international development cooperation activities;
- The proposed administrative/financial system implemented (by NCA) which led to strong improvements in possibilities to manage activities and relations with Sida;
- Advised on setting of NCA's fee levels in development cooperation, which made NCA have improved control of finances and activities.

December 2005 – August 2006

#### Project manager

SALA IDA AB

(Consultancy firm)

Hornsgatan 20, 118 82 Stockholm, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 8 - 452 70 00

Contact person: Anna Backmann

- Work location: Kigali, Rwanda and Stockholm, Sweden
- Leading the closing phase of the project, delivering advice and capacity building to the Rwandan Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs;
- Organised and implemented an orderly phasing out of the project;
- Managed after evaluation of situation, to improve sustainability of results and project routines;
- Work also involved implementation, reporting, human resource management, administration;
- Wrote final report from the whole project which was praised.

January - April 2006

#### Team leader

The Swedish Rescue Services Agency, (SRSA)

(Governmental agency)

Norra Klaragatan 18, 651 80 Karlstad, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 54 - 135000

Karlstad, Sweden

- Developed an institutional cooperation programme between SRSA and their Ukrainian counterpart;
- Simultaneously built SRSA's capacity in development cooperation, project design, institution building, and feasibility studies.

October - November 2005

#### Strategist

SNV Netherlands Development Organisation (Int:l organisation) Rruga Ismail Qemali nr 32 / 1, Tirana, Albania

Ph: +355 - 4 - 25 58 03

• Dutch civil society organisation "SNV" was expanding into Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in this process needed guidance in coordination, strategizing and programming;

- Identified possibilities for complementarities with and avoiding overlaps with Sida's programmes in these three countries;
- Contributed to building of SNV's capacities in institutional cooperation.

October - November 2005

#### Strategist

UNICEF (UN agency)

Rruga Skenderbeg, Tirana, Albania

Ph: +355 - 4 - 27 33 35

- Providing strategic directions for UNICEF's work in Albania during 2006 2010 within the area of Governance;
- Evaluated UNICEF's previous experiences and using own expertise concerning development cooperation in Albania to assist UNICEF in positioning itself so as to achieve most impact and use its comparative advantages;
- The strategic directions were used in the agreement "Government of Albania UNICEF Programme of Cooperation, 2006 2010".

May - September 2005

# Head of development cooperation/Counsellor

The Embassy of Sweden/Sida (Embassy)

Rruga Budi 76, Tirana, Albania

Ph: +355 - 4 - 343486

- Contracted to fill in as Head of the development cooperation section of the Embassy (basically same position as the one held 2002 2004, see above "Work experience") with support to Albania amounting to EUR 6 million per year;
- Deputy Head of office;
- Analysing Albanian politics and economy and project proposals;
- Overall planning of development co-operation and donor coordination;
- Handling extensive support for Albanian development, incl extensive negotiations on projects and methods development;
- Monitoring of the Swedish support and evaluating project results;
- Representing and negotiating Swedish development cooperation with Albanian Government, other donors, Albanian civil society and international organizations.

#### **Education and training**

September 1993 - August 1999

Master of Science in Political Science

Gothenburg University

Karl Gustavsgatan 29, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 31 - 786 18 60

September 1993 – June 1996

#### Master of Science in Economics

Gothenburg University

Karl Gustavsgatan 29, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden

Ph:  $+46 - 31 - 786 \ 18 \ 60$ 

June 1988 - March 1989

# Commercial Pilot/Flight Instructor

North American Institute of Aviation

Las Cruces Airport, Las Cruces, NM 88004, USA

Ph: N.a.

August 1992 – June 1993

#### Diploma in Business administration

Vasa Vuxengymnasium (secondary school for adults)

Molinsgatan 23, 400 12 Göteborg, Sweden

Ph: +46 - 31 - 367 31 80

Several trainings and courses in LFA, evaluation, rhetoric, negotiations, sales and marketing, etc.

#### Languages:

	Reading	Speakin	Writing	
English	Fluent	Fluent	Fluent	
German		Basic	Basic	Basic
French	Basic	Basic	Basic	
Albanian		Basic	Basic	Basic
Spanish		Basic	Basic	Basic
Swedish		Mother	tongue	

#### Social skills and competences

- Team work: Substantive experience from various types of teams, as member and as team leader, able to take charge when appropriate,

while at other times assuming more of a team

member's position.

- Negotiation skills: Extensive experience from mediating and negotiating in conflicts, as

manager and from sales in previous positions.

- Intercultural skills: 7 years of living/working in different positions in very different

countries (USA, Zimbabwe, Albania, Kosova besides

native Sweden) and many shorter missions and

travelling in over 50 countries.

# Organisational skills and competences

Foremost experience and achievements are from heading the Embassy office in Albania which gave experience in developing a development cooperation program and setting up the office administration and routines successfully, which was appreciated by the Ambassador and colleagues in Tirana and Sida/HQ. Another valuable experience was being the Team Leader for the Decentralization and Regional Development Project which gave valuable experience in managing and implementing a complex activity in a very difficult environment.

#### Technical skills and competences

A true development cooperation expert, with a Master's Degree on the subject and over 12 years of very relevant and varied work experience. Experiences are from a HQ perspective as well as "the field".

#### Computer skills and competences

A proficient user of the common programmes, such as MS Office.

#### **Driver's licence**

Holding a Swedish driver's licence category AB\*\*\*.

#### **Publications**

- The volume 11/97 of the Swedish Institute of Foreign Affairs' periodical "Världspolitikens Dagsfrågor" ("Today in World Politics"), on Kenya's political and economical development
- Study published by Sida 1997 "From Courting the State to Courting the Market" on international capital flows to developing countries

#### References

References are given on request

#### **CURRICULUM VITAE**

#### Peter Weiderud

Idungatan 1B 11345 Stockholm -Sweden

### **Professional Experience**

- Consultant, President and Partner, Samhällsnytta AB, Stockholm, Sweden. Group of management consultants, established in November 2006, working with the business community, the public sector and civil society. Samhällsnytta (For the Common Good in English) identifies, develops and promotes projects and programmes where two or more of the three sectors of society would cooperate in order to improve their results. Particular focus has been given to i. Improving the performance and services of municipalities in Sweden by working creatively with the civil society and business community ii. Improving corporate social responsibility iii. Offering strategic advice and management support to national and international organizations based on stakeholder assessment and dialogue and iv. Citizen empowerment, community development and capacity building. Reviews and evaluations.
- General Secretary, The Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Stockholm, Sweden, since March 2007(part-time). International member organization of parliamentarians working to prevent the proliferation of small arms.

#### Previous Positions

- Political Advisor to the Minister, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden, (May 2006 October 2006). Advisor to the Minister for Development Cooperation and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mrs Carin Jämtin, Position ended as result of general election.
- Director, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, (CCIA/WCC) Geneva, Switzerland, (September 2002 July 2006). Responsibilities included: Advising the General Secretary and governing bodies of the WCC on international affairs policy and their response to conflicts and wars. Provided opportunities for the WCC membership and partner civil society organizations to promote social and policy change and strengthened their capacity to engage in post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and reconciliation. Other responsibilities included the following: Serving as spokesperson for the WCC on international political affairs. Preparing analytical reports on international political trends and root causes of conflicts, violence and human rights violations for WCC member churches and partner organizations. Representing the WCC to governments and intergovernmental organizations. Managing and supervising the international affairs staff team of the WCC in Geneva, New York and field projects.
- Director General for International Mission and Diaconia (Utrikeschef), Church of Sweden,
  Uppsala, Sweden, (1999-2002). Responsibilities included, developing policy for the Church of
  Sweden on international affairs as well as managing the overall international emergency, relief
  and development work of Church of Sweden Mission and Church of Sweden Aid. Monitoring,
  Evaluation and follow up of projects and programmes.
- Political Advisor to the Minister, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden, (1994-99). Speechwriter and advisor to the Foreign Ministers Lena Hjelm Wallén and Anna Lindh.
- Director of Justice, Peace and Creation (Unit IV), Christian Council of Sweden, Stockholm, Sweden, (1994).
- Personal Assistant to the Bishop, Diocese of Västerås, Church of Sweden. Västeras, Sweden, (1989-94). Advisor to Bishop Claes-Bertil Ytterberg with a focus to analyze and address the role of church in a changing society.
- General Secretary of the Christian Peace Movement of Sweden (Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation), Uppsala, Sweden, (1983-1989). Second largest Swedish peace organization.
- **Journalist**, News Editor, Foreign Affairs desk, National News (Aktuellt) of the Swedish Television, summer 1988.
- Journalist, Editor, Arbetet, daily paper in Malmö, Sweden, (three months) 1982.
- **Journalist**, TV reporter, Regional News for South Sweden, (five months) 1982.
- **Journalist**, Reporter and Editor, Bärgslagsbladet, local paper in Köping and Arboga, Sweden,1981-83 (during and immediately after university education).
- **Community Service** (alternative to military service for Conscientious Objection), social worker at a centre for homeless and drug addicts in Stockholm, Sweden, 1980.
- **Teacher**, senior level in comprehensive school in Arboga, Sweden (Swedish, religion, history and civics), 1979.
- Youth Leader, Parish of Arboga 1977-79.
- Youth Leader, Parish of Eskilstuna Fors, 1976-77.

#### Elected/Appointed Representative (a selection)

- **President** of the Christian Social Democrats in Sweden (one of four official branches of the Social Democratic Party) since 2005. In this capacity also member of the Executive Committee and Board of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden.
- **Board member** of the Swedish Institute in Alexandria, Egypt. Appointed by the Swedish Government since the inception of the Institute in 1999. The Institute promotes dialogue with countries in Northern Africa and Middle East in areas of culture and religion, peace and security, environment and development.
- **Board member** of the Olof Palme International Centre, since 2006. An international development agency and think-tank on foreign affairs, focusing on peace, democracy and human rights, created by the labour movement in Sweden.

#### **Previous positions**

• Chairperson of the Christian Peace Movement of Sweden, 1989-94.

- **Board member** of the Church of Sweden Mission, 1995-99.
- Chairperson of the Swedish Government Delegation on Indigenous People, 1995-2005. Appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. A delegation with Sami majority, set up as advisory committee to the Minister, with the task to propose long term improvements on national and international indigenous policies, during the UN Decade on Indigenous People.
- **Member** of the Thematic Committee on Social Science and Humanities of the Swedish Research Council. Appointed by the Minister of Education 2001-2002.
- **Member** of the Council for Peace- and Security Promoting Measures at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Dialogue forum on current foreign affairs between the Ministry, academics and NGO representatives, lead by the State Secretary. 1999-2002.
- **Member** of the Advisory Group to the Government on funding Swedish NGO's work on peace and security. Appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1997-2002.
- **Board member** of the Arena group. An independent Swedish political/cultural magazine and think tank. Since its foundation in 1993-2003.
- **Member** of the Executive Committee of the Aprodev Association of European church based development agencies for advocacy to the EU, 2000-2002.
- **Moderator**, Working Group for Peace Building and Security to the Commission for Church in Society, Conference of European Churches, Brussels. 1999-2003.
- **Board member and treasurer** of the Magazine En Värld (One world Swedish ecumenical magazine to cover issues on justice, peace and environment, 1992-94.
- **Coordinator** for Sweden in the Kairos Europe process, 1991-94. Initiative to organize and empower socially and politically marginalized group in the European countries.
- Participant for the Conference of European Churches in the Churches Human Rights Programme to the CSCE (today OSCE) Meetings in Moscow, September 1991, Helsinki, April/May 1992, Stockholm, December 1992 and Budapest, October 1994.
- **Board member**, the Swedish Peoples Parliament for Disarmament, 1986-91.
- President of the Swedish Peace Council, umbrella for the Swedish peace organizations, 1987-88.
- Advisor to the Swedish Delegation to the UN General Assembly 1987 (First Committee).
- Member of the NGO Group of Reference to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the UN Special Session on Disarmament III in 1988.
- Member of the Working Committee of the Development Forum of the Swedish Churches, 1984-89.
- **Member** of the Peace Committee of the Swedish Ecumenical Council 1985-93.
- **Member** of the International Committee of the Church of Sweden Youth, 1981-88.
- Member of the Västerås Diocesan Board of the Church of Sweden Youth, 1977-83.
- Member of the Parish Synod Parish of Arboga 1979-83.
- Chairperson of the local group of Church of Sweden Youth, Parish of Arboga, 1973-76.

#### Education

- Certificate in Management and Leadership, a joint programme between the IPF Management Training
  Institute at the University of Uppsala and the School of Management of Cranfield University, UK, 20002001
- Intensive training in English writing, The London School of English, 1993.
- Certificate in Peace and Conflict Studies, Department for Peace and Conflict-Research at the University of Uppsala, 1987.
- First Certificate in English, University of Cambridge, 1985.
- B.A. in Journalism, University of Stockholm, 1982.

#### Personal 1

- Birthplace & date: Karlstad, Sweden. October 16, 1957
- Family: Married. Four children
- Languages: Swedish mother tongue; fluent in English; working knowledge of German; basic knowledge in French
- Tel: +46-8-41020078 (office), +46-8-42055955 (home), +46-733540074 (mobile)
- Email: <u>peter.weiderud@samnytta.se</u>, <u>peter.weiderud@yahoo.com</u> (private)

## **CURRICULUM VITAE OF GODFREY PAISON MANUNGO**

Name: Godfrey Paison MANUNGO

Name of Firm: Best Practices (Pvt) Ltd

**Profession:** Strategy Development and HR Management Consultant

Year of Birth: 16 April 1965

Marital Status: Married

Nationality: Zimbabwean

**Address:** P.O. Box 4384, Harare, Zimbabwe

**Telephone:** 263-4-309781 (Home) 263-792287 (Business)

**Cellphone:** 011 401 460

#### **EDUCATION**

1992 – 1993 Masters Degree (MSc) in Human Resource Development,

University of Manchester (U.K)

1986 – 1988 Bachelor of Arts Degree, University of Zimbabwe

1990 Diploma in Personnel Management, Institute of Personnel

Management of Zimbabwe

# **KEY QUALIFICATIONS:**

Godfrey is a Human Resource Consultant with core competencies in Strategy Development, Organisation Development, Management Training and Development, Organisation Design, Job Evaluation, Performance Management, and Human Resource Planning. Godfrey holds a Masters Degree (MSC) in Human Resource Development from the University of Manchester as well as a Diploma in Personnel Management. He has been involved in carrying out Strategy Development, Management Training, Performance Management, Job Evaluation and Organisation Design assignments for both private and public sector organisations. Recently he has been involved in the implementation of an Organisation Design project for a large Public Sector organisation.

Organisations Godfrey has assisted in developing strategies are the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council (ZNFPC), Cernol Chemicals, Victoria Foods, General Beltings Limited, BMA Fasteners, Turnal Fiber Zimbabwe, Hasst Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation, Jena Mine, Elvington Mine, Victoria Falls Council, Harare Polytechnic, Central Statistical Office (C.S.O), the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, Zimbabwe Community Newspapers Group, Zimpapers Group, Zimpapers Commercial Division (Natprint, Bold Ads and Typocrafters), Centre for applied Social Studies (UZ) and DMH Commercial Law Chambers, Help Age Zimbabwe, and NovAfrica. Godfrey has just completed a Human Resource Strategy for the Ministry of Health and a Marketing Strategy for a large International Organisation.

Godfrey has designed and implemented in-house management development programmes for such organisations like Fidelity Printers (a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe) African Banking Corporation, Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor, Interfresh ,Zimre Group of Companies, Tube and Pipe Industries, Nicoz Diamond Insurance, Econet Wireless, General Beltings, BMA Fasteners, A.A Mines, the Red Cross Society of Zimbabwe, Posts and of Telecommunications, Kwekwe City Council, Harare City Council and Masvingo Municipality. Godfrey has particular experience in running Leadership Development, Team building and Change Management workshops.

Godfrey also has in depth experience in manpower and succession planning, executive appointments, review and implementation of Human Resource Policies, systems and procedures, manpower audits and training and development.

### REGIONAL CONSULTANCY EXPERIENCE

Godfrey has strong regional consulting experience having carried out assignments in South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland and Mozambique.

## **EMPLOYMENT RECORD:**

October 2003 to Present: Managing Consultant, Best Practices (Pvt) Ltd, to

Harare, Zimbabwe.

November 1999 to Manager/Senior Consultant,

September 2003: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Harare, Zimbabwe

April 1996-October 1999: Senior Consultant (Management Training and

Development)

Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration and

Management (ZIPAM)

March 1995 – April 1996 Senior Personnel Officer, Post and

**Telecommunications Corporation (PTC)** 

January 1989 - February 1995 Senior Administrative Officer (Human Resources),

**Ministry of Health** 

# SPECIALISED EXPERIENCE

## **Business Development**

Drafted a variety of project proposals and project plans in strategy development and HRM process Improvement (e.g. job evaluation, salary structuring, organisational review, and performance management) incorporating knowledge of the appropriate Best Practice methodologies, deliverables and resources.

Also responsible for maintaining positive working relationships with clients (involving understanding of client needs, consistently meeting client expectations and responding promptly to client requests/inquiries to ensure successful completion of projects.

### **Local Government Capacity Building**

Part of a team put together by IDAZIM to carry out induction training of newly elected councilors and mayors for Urban Local Authorities in Zimbabwe. Facilitated training for councilors from Harare City Council, Redcliff Municipality, Kariba Town Council, Norton Town Council among others.

Assisted the Rural District Council Capacity Building Programme to design and implement a performance management system for its members

**Fa**cilitated strategic plans for a variety of municipalities which include Kwekwe City Council, Rusape Town Council, Kariba Municipality and Kadoma Town Council.

## **Project Evaluation and Institutional Assessments**

Conducted an evaluation of the Partner Support Coordination Unit in terms of its performance relevance to the work of the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Zimbabwe. (Team Leader)

Member of a work team put together by the Swedish International Development Agency (the official donor agency for the Kingdom of Sweden) with the purpose of doing a baseline study of the Institutional Development of Statistics South Africa. The institutional assessment was carried out using the Stair Case Model of diagnosis institutional Development. The team was lead by Dr Winai

Conducted an assessment study for the Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administrator and Management using the Stair Case Model of Diagnosing institutional development. The study was conducted as a situational analysis to guide strategic planning.

#### **Strategy Development (Project Manager/Team members)**

Member of project teams that provided strategy formulation support to the Zimbabwe National Family Council (ZNFPC), Cernol Chemicals, Victoria Foods, General Beltings Limited, BMA Fasteners, Turnal Fiber Cement, Hasst Zimbabwe, MidSec, Zimbabwe Development Corporation, Jena and Elvington Mines, Victoria Falls Town Council, Harare Polytechnic, Central Statistical Office (C.S.O), the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, Zimbabwe Community Newspapers Group, Natprint BoldAds and Typocraters and other organisations.

Godfrey's role in these projects included organising and co-facilitating strategy development workshops, development/review of mission and vision statements as well as writing strategic plans.

#### **Performance Management (Project Manager/Team Member)**

Part of project teams that designed and implemented performance management systems for the Kwekwe City Council, Interfresh, Redcliff Municipality, Zimtrade, Ministry of Local Government and National Housing, Rural District Council's Capacity Building Programme and Comptroller and Auditor General's Office and various Civil Service Ministries and Departments. Godfrey was responsible for training middle, senior and top management teams in performance management techniques. He was also involved in establishing balanced business scorecards, key result areas, setting performance objectives and standards, producing activity (work) plans and assisting departments in their transformational process of cascading performance management to all levels. He was also part of a work team that designed and presented a trainers package for the cascading of performance management throughout the Civil service.

### Job Evaluation and Remuneration (Project Manager/Team Member)

Has been involved in the introduction and implementation of job evaluation assignments for the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, SMM Holdings, FSI Trading, General Beltings Ltd, Turnal Holdings, Africa Logistics Services, Victoria Falls Town Council, the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, Lancashire Steel, Founders Building Society, Food and Industrial Processors, Phillips Zimbabwe, National Railways of Zimbabwe, Eagle Insurance, Lion Match Zimbabwe, A.A. Mines and Kwekwe City Council.

Godfrey's role in these projects involved conducting training of groups of client staff to be members of project team, and managing the on-going work and client project teams throughout each implementation and the on-going maintenance of the systems. In the majority of clients, the job evaluation implementation was followed by developing suitable alternative remuneration structures.

#### **Organisation Design (Project Manager)**

Part of a work team involved in the redesign of the organisation structures of the Ministry of Information, Post and Telecommunications, Zesa, Interfin Merchant Bank, Urban Development Corporation (Udicomp), Kwekwe City Council and the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society.

### **Business Process Mapping (Stream Leader)**

Part of a work team responsible for Business Process Mapping for Delta Corporation. The process involved the unification of the "best of as is" business process, systems and procedures for United Bottlers, National Breweries and Chikubu Breweries as well as mapping the to-be business processes for the new Delta.

#### **HR Review (Team Member)**

Part of an International Consulting Team put together by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) to review the HR function in the Provincial Government of the Eastern Cape in the Republic of South Africa.

The review, which consisted of both a functional analysis and an efficiency analysis of the HR function, was meant to propose improvements with a view of professionalising the function.

#### Manpower Audit and Skills Audit (Project Manager)

Godfrey has just completed an extensive manpower and skills audit exercise for the City of Kwekwe. The exercise was meant to rationalise the manning levels of the City by analysing areas of undermanning, over manning and recommending the optimum staffing levels. Also carried an extensive Human Resource Audit for CFI group of companies which include Ross Breeders, Suncrest, Agrifoods, Victoria Foods, Farm and City, Town and Country, Dore and Pitt.

## **Management Training and Development**

Wide practical experience in the design, development, presentation and evaluation of management training and development programmes to meet the business needs of both public and private sector organisations. Godfrey has among others designed and implemented inhouse management development programmes for such organisations like A.A Mines, Turnall Holdings, Cernol Chemicals, BMA Fasters, General Beltings Ltd, Fidelity Printers, Export Credit Guarantee Company, Econet Wireless, Zimre Holdings, Nicoz Diamond, Fidelity Life Medical Aid Society, the office of the Auditor and Controller General's Office, the Registrar General's Office, the Red Cross Society of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade

Unions, Immigration, Posts and Telecommunications, Kwekwe City Council, Harare City Council and Masvingo Municipality and the Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries.

Godfrey has developed and facilitated many open management development programmes in Change Management, Performance Management, Human Resource Management, Negotiating Skills, Leadership Development, Team Building and Organisational Development.

## **Manpower Planning and Development**

Was responsible for planning, designing, implementing and evaluating manpower plans for a diverse workforce of 10 000 workers – forecasting requirements, developing their training needs and recommending strategies for development. Also responsible for implementing and maintaining a job evaluation system (the Paterson Method) for 10 000 employees. The job also entailed job analysis, Human Resource planning, recruitment and selection. This was with the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC).

Developed a manpower planning strategy for the Ministry of Health, which formed a basis for the Ministry's first manpower plan.

#### **Change Management**

Designed and implemented a series of change management programmes for the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management. This was to prepare the Department from being a Civil service entity into an Independent Fund. The process also included the development of the Department's Strategic Plan.

Co-facilitated stakeholder consultative meeting on the situational and core-business analysis for the Tsetse control and Trypanomiasis Branch of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Part of a work team (team leader) involved with institutional reform of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in Mozambique. The job involved conducting training in institutional assessment, functional analysis and organisational design and Human resource rationalisation.

### **Membership of Professional Organisations**

- > Full member Institute of Personnel Management of Zimbabwe
- ➤ Part-time Lecturer MBA programme Zimbabwe Open University
- ➤ Lecturer/Presenter Post Graduate Diploma in Public Management run jointly by the National University of Science and Technology and the Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration

#### **Papers Presented**

- ➤ Leadership and Productivity the missing link paper presented at a National Productivity Seminar Organised by the Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration and Management.
- ➤ Human Resources Development and Productivity improvement and enhancement in small and medium enterprises paper presented at the African Regional Labour Administration Centre (ARLAC) Seminar on Labour Administration and Small and Medium Enterprises: Going beyond the traditional arrangements.
- ➤ Re-engineering the public sector through reform in Africa paper presented on a seminar on Managing Civil Service Reform in Africa organised by ARLAC.
- ➤ Labour Relations in Transition: Targeting contemporary challenges (new forms of work, organisation process, new actors, new Human Resource Management\_ paper presented on a seminar on strengthening and integrating dispute settlement machinery and conflict resolution: A systems approach organised by ARLAC.

#### **LANGUAGES**

	Speaking	Writing	Reading
English	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Shona	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent

# **Annex C**

# **Persons interviewed**

-	Runo Bergström	Ex-UN official	CPIA	Board Member	16/4 (phone)
-	Leonard Kapungu	Executive Director	CPIA	Executive Director	21-25/4
-	Max Chigwida	Deputy Executive Director	CPIA	Deputy Executive Director	
-	Cecilia Nedziwe	Director Operations	CPIA		21/4-8/5
-	Göran Engstrand	Country Director	Sida/Swedish Embassy		22-29/4
_	Kerstin Lundgren	Second Secretary	Sida/Swedish Embassy		22/4-8/5
	Sten Rylander	Ambassdor	Swedish Embassy		22-28/4
_	Hans Petter Hergum	First secretary	Norwegian Embassy	P	22/4
	Adadi Rajabu		Tanzanian Embassy		23/4
	Isaac E Mwakiluma		Tanzanian Embassy		23/4
_	Leonard Tsumba	Chairman	CABS	•	23/4
	Guardiner Manikai	Consultant	Best Practices		23/4
-	John Deary	Ex CZI President	CPIA		23/4
-	Sebastian Bakare	Bishop	Anglican Church		23/4
-	Wonder Jekemu	Programme Officer	Sida/Swedish Embassy		24/4
-	Mlungisi Makalima	Ambassador	South African Embassy		24/4
-	<u> </u>		The state of the s	•	24/4
-	Edwin Mushoriwa T. Zimuto	Representative	MDC-M MDC-M	•	24/4
		Representative			24-29/4
-	Frederique Hanotier	HR & Governance Attaché	•		
-	Louis Leimgruber	Contract Manager	European Commission	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	24/4
-	Fidelis Mukonori	Jesuit Priest	Roman Catholic Church	Eminent Person	24/4
-	Shirley DeWolf	Professor	Africa University		25/4
-	T. Tshabalaba		Zimbabwe Teachers Association		27/4
-	Washington Sansole	Judge	Sansole & Senda		27/4
-	Phenias Makhurane	Professor	Nat University of Science and Technology		27/4
-	Goodwill Shana	Professor	Word of Life Ministries		27/4
-	Erich Bloch	Chartered Acoountant	H. and E. Bloch and Company		27/4
-	Sikumbuzo B. Dube	Representative	ZAPU FP		27/4
-	Arthur Mpuli	Teacher	CPIA		28/4
-	Owen Gagare		The Chronicle and Sunday News	Media	28/4
-	Tor Kubberud	Counsellor	Norwegian Embassy		28/4
-	Stephen Chidavanyika	Representative	ZANU PF	,	29/4
-	Willias Madzimure	Representative	MDC-T	Political Party	29/4
-	Michael Mataure	Executive Director	PAPST	Civil Society	30/4
-	John Chitekuteku	Chairman	NANGO	Civil Society	30/4-19/5
-	Judith Kamutepfa	Accountant	CPIA	Staff	30/4
-	Yemurayi Mutama		CPIA	Staff	30/4
-	Mantombi Chikuni	Administrative officer	CPIA	Staff	30/4
-	Sheunesu Hove	Programme Officer	CPIA		4/5
-	Pension Makutu	Senior Manager	KPMG		4/5
-	Petronella Mapfiro	Programme Officer	CPIA		6/5
-	Xavier Marchal	Head of Delegation	European Commission's Delegation in Harare	Donor representative	8/5
-	Simon Muchesa	Reverend	CPIA	Provincial Coordinator	9/5
-	D. Chimhini	Executive Director	Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust	Civil society	11/5
-	Elling Tjönneland	Representative	Chr Michelsen Institute	GERDC Board Member	11/5
-	Sithengisiwe Dube	Auditor	CPIA	Provincial Coordinator	13/5
-	Masimba Chidzomba	Captain	CPIA	Provincial Coordinator	13/5
-	James Chifamba	Teacher	CPIA	Provincial oordinator	13/5
-	Brian Penduka	Legal Practitioner	Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum	Civil society	14/5
-	L. Kadenge	Chairman	Christian Alliance	Civil society	19/5
-	Useni Sibanda	National Co-ordinator	Christian Alliance	Civil society	19/5
-	Lois Machonga	Chairperson Local Board	CPIA	Board Member	19/5
-	Merwyn De Mello	Representative	Counselling Services Unit	Civil society	20/5
-	Irene Petras	Representative	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights	Civil society	20/5
-	Frank Chikane	Director General	Presidents Office, South Africa	SADC/Fac Team	21/5 (phone)

Additionally, the Team attended a sports activity within the Culture of Peace programme in Marondera, Mashonaland East on Saturday 9/5.

