

# Review of Norwegian Support to National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kenya

NORAD COLLECTED REVIEW 3/2009

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**Norad collected reviews**

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
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# Review of Norwegian support to National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kenya

## Final Report



## Review of Norwegian support to National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kenya

Project: Review of Norwegian support to National Democratic  
Institute (NDI) in Kenya

Client: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

Period: November 2008 – February 2009

### Task Team:

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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

Cllr	Councilor
CMD	Centre for Multiparty Democracy
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DP	Democratic Party
FORD ASILI	Forum for Restoration of Democracy – Asili
FORD P	Forum for Restoration of Democracy - People
FORD-K	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Kenya
IDM	Institute for Multiparty Democracy
IED	Institute for Education in Democracy
IRI	International Republican Institute
KANU	Kenya African National Union
LP	Labour Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
NAK	National Alliance Party of Kenya
NARC – Kenya	National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition - Kenya
NARC	National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (Key members DP, FORD KENYA AND NPK)
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPK	National Party of Kenya
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
ODM-K	Orange Democratic Movement –Kenya
PNU	Party of National Unity
SHIRIKISHO	Shirikisho Party of Kenya
TI	Transparency International
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## 1. Executive Summary

Norad commissioned Scanteam to conduct a review of Norwegian support to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kenya. The review was conducted in the period November – December 2007. This report presents the draft findings of the review.

The main focus of the review is to assess the results of the project “Pre-election Party Strengthening in Kenya,” which was implemented in the 2006-2008 period, but the consultants were also asked to consider the results of three smaller projects supported in the 2003-2006 period.

Additionally, the consultants were asked to consider the cost-effectiveness of NDI's organisational set-up, with overhead costs incurred by its Washington DC based headquarters, and also to provide a brief comparative analysis of alternative channels for support to political parties in Kenya.

The assignment was done in November 2008 – February 2009, and included a field trip to Kenya in the period 18 November to 2 December. In Nairobi, meetings were held with nine national level party representatives, including the Prime Minister, the Vice President, four Party Leaders (DP, LPK, ODM-K and ODM), and three party Executive Directors (DP, Ford-K and Ford-P). Meetings were also held in Nakuru and Kisumu where a total of 23 Party Branch and Inter-Party Provincial Committee members were consulted. A draft report was presented in late December and the Final Report addresses queries and comments from the Embassy, Norad and NDI.

Meetings were also held with representatives of 4 Kenyan organisations and 4 donors, in addition to representatives of the Norwegian Embassy and NDI.

The Review found that NDI has achieved its targets and objectives. The organisation has demonstrated the effectiveness of its process approach, and it has achieved an exceptionally high standing among its clients. The focus areas of the project have proved to be highly relevant. The support to coalition building did have a positive impact on the resolution of the post-election crisis; the support to party branches has made an important start in the strengthening of the foundations of political parties in Kenya; and the Inter-Party Provincial Committees have made important inroads into the challenge of supporting civic inter-party dialogue, although the actual impact of the IPPCs on the serious post-election violence, is assessed to be at best marginally positive. Still, the IPPCs now provide potentially valuable agents for peace at the local and provincial level and this contribution of the project is deemed to have achieved what was realistically possible.

NDI's approach is cost-effective and the costs incurred through overheads and due to the use of resources from NDI's headquarters in Washington is not considered excessive.

The main weakness of NDI's approach has been in documentation and learning. Reporting systems have been almost exclusively geared towards demonstrating to donors that the programmed activities have been implemented and that targets have been achieved. There has not been a systematic recording and mapping of challenges and/or set-backs. There has also been little effort to use experiences and lessons gained to inform the national debate on democratic development. Consequently, the project has been very inward looking.

Considering the overall relevance of the approach, it is argued that political party strengthening is a necessary but not sufficient condition for peace and development. Although stronger political parties will arguably make peace more likely in the Kenyan context, stronger political parties alone is by no means a guarantee of peace or democratic strengthening. The political parties operate in an exceedingly complex context, and there is surprisingly little systemic effort from donors and other actors to build a better understanding of the political economy of Kenya. The analytical lacuna is particularly marked at the local

level. An improved understanding of the political economy of Kenya is an important part of linking the support to political parties to other governance reforms.

Continued support of NDI for its political parties strengthening programme is recommended. Three sets of recommendations have been developed for the development of the next phase of NDI's programme:

*Recommendations on modalities for support*

1. NDI should be proactive in seeking core or joint funding, to minimize reporting requirements and maximize flexibility
2. Funded programme should optimally be for a 5 year programme
3. Small projects (less than \$1m) should be avoided.

*Programmatic recommendations for NDI*

4. Build on existing programme, paying special attention to:
  - Challenges faced by local party branches
  - The nomination process, and internal party democracy
  - The role of youth and women
5. Review existing reporting formats and add sections to solicit recording of experiences, challenges and lessons learned
6. Add a substantial documentation, learning and communications department to the country office. This department should be led by a senior person with experience in research and analysis of a political economy nature.
7. Provide input and support as appropriate, to fora for public debate on democratic development and party politics

*Recommendations for Norwegian Embassy*

8. Be aware of linkages to other governance programmes, eg anti-corruption, financial reform support, local government reform, support to Parliament, civil society and independent media and human rights and gender equality programmes, etc.
9. Explore possibilities for supporting ongoing process of political economy analysis and research that is linked into the national political/analytical discourse. There appears to be a lack of good quality and current political analysis. What should be considered is to kick off a process of analysis and research, preferably in partnership with other partners and organisations, wherein a set of key questions are asked, research is funded, and the findings presented and discussed in open fora. Research themes/questions could include:
  - What are the relationships between political leaders and parties and big business?
  - Descriptive research and analysis of local level politics; and
  - The role and use of ethnicity in politics.

Ideally, each of these streams of analysis and research should be ongoing processes. This would entail funding and support of consecutive research efforts, presentation of research findings and conclusions in public fora, and follow up research on issues of continued uncertainty or controversy. A key objective of this type of research would be to fuel and stimulate an informed and honest debate in the public domain.



## 2. Introduction and background

Norad commissioned Scanteam to conduct a review of Norwegian support to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kenya. The review was conducted in the period November – December 2007. This report presents the draft findings of the review.

### 2.1 The objectives of the review

According to the Terms of Reference (attached in Annex 1), the main objective of the review is to assess “the results achieved in terms of the stated goal and objectives against the plan, budget/resources and methodology laid down in the planning documents.”

The TORs specify that the review is to cover the support provided by the Norway in the 2006-08 project. Following a request by the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi at the first briefing, the review was extended to also consider the support provided by Norway in the 2004-2006 period.

The reviewers have also been asked to include:

- a) an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of NDI's organisational set-up, which includes overheads for administrative costs incurred by its Washington DC head quarters,
- b) a brief comparative analysis of alternative channels for support to political parties in Kenya and alternative models of support.

Finally, the review will provide recommendations on the possible continued support of the reviewed programme or other programmes aimed at the strengthening of political parties in Kenya.

### 2.2 The NDI project

NDI has been supporting democratic reform in Kenya since 1993. Initially, NDI's activities focused on women's political participation and capacity strengthening of non-partisan civic groups to monitor elections.<sup>1</sup> Since 2001, NDI has been working directly with political parties to strengthen their capacities.

Norway has supported this work since 2003, first through the project “Kenya. Strengthening Party Secretariat and Branch Structures,” which was divided into three phases (or three projects with the same name) over the 2003-2006 period. The total budget for the three projects comes to approximately NOK 4 million.

The bulk of Norwegian support to NDI has been provided to the project “Kenya: Pre-electoral party strengthening.” The project was planned over a 17 month period from August 2006 through December 2007. The total budget was NOK 10 million.

The project sought to strengthen democratic institutions and processes in Kenya, through the strengthening of political parties, with a particular focus on civic inter-party dialogue and coalition building. The goal of the project was “to strengthen democratic institutions and advance democratic reform in Kenya.”

The project was subsequently given a no-cost extension through August 2008.

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<sup>1</sup> See NDI's website for historical overview of activities in Kenya: <http://www.ndi.org/kenya>.

## 2.3 The Kenyan context: ethnicity, personality based politics and the violence after the 2007 elections

Kenyan politics has been characterised as being organised around ethnic lines, and with personalities, not issues, dominating the political discourse. Since the opening for multiparty competition in 1992, after many years of one party dominance under KANU, the number of political parties has proliferated and the election related violence has been an issue in every election since 1992. Voters tend to divide along ethnic lines, and election related violence also takes place along ethnic lines.

Political parties tend to be dominated by big men (or the very occasional big woman) and the steady flux of political parties and coalitions, against the backdrop of a much more stable group of big name politicians, show that parties follow politicians, and not vice versa. This is obviously not a conducive situation for building strong political parties.<sup>2</sup>

In the 1992 and 1997 multiparty elections, KANU profited from the fragmentation and infighting among the opposition parties, and managed to hang on to power and the Presidency despite not receiving a majority of the votes. In 2002, things changed, as the opposition parties managed to forge a pre-election coalition, and they unseated KANU in an election that observers characterised as free and fair.

The coalition broke up soon after the elections, however, as pre-election agreements of power sharing and constitutional reform were not honoured. In an acrimonious referendum in 2005, the Government's proposal for a new constitution was rejected in a stand-off between the coalitions of the bananas and the victorious oranges.

By the time of the 2007 elections, the oranges had split into two competing coalitions, and after a relatively peaceful campaign elections, by Kenyan standards, unprecedented levels of violence broke out in many parts of the country against what was seen as wide-spread rigging in favour of the incumbent, who won with a narrow margin. But violence also occurred as apparent reprisals against the 'protest violence.'

An end to the violence was only achieved after a political agreement was forged which saw the three top presidential candidates share power in a Grand Coalition. The fall-out from the post-election violence is still far from over. Two major reports have recently been released which findings present significant challenges. These are the Kriegler and Waki Reports.

The Kriegler report, which looked into the conduct of the elections, documented incompetence and a faulty system that is vulnerable to interference from the executive. It's recommendations include the disbanding of the electoral commission and significant constitutional and electoral reform leading up the establishment of a new Electoral Commission.

The Waki report, which investigated the post-election violence, documented a pattern of violence that was much more planned and deliberate than what many of the media reports at the time had suggested. The commission handed over a famous envelope to Kofi Annan, containing the names of senior politicians that are said to have sponsored and orchestrated many of the violent attacks. In a call for an end to impunity, the Waki Commission called for a Tribunal to be set up to try the accused for what happened, or Mr. Annan would hand the envelope with the names to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, to be tried for crimes against humanity.

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<sup>2</sup> A family tree of the political parties and coalition in Kenya has been put together for this report and is found in Annex 4. An "itinerary" of the major politicians, showing their political paths since 1992, has also been prepared and is reproduced in Annex 5.

At the moment of writing, it has just been announced that the Electoral Commission of Kenya has just been disbanded and the Tribunal asked for by Waki has been passed by the Cabinet, awaiting parliamentary approval.

## 2.4 Methodology of review

The review is based on interviews with stakeholders conducted during a field visit to Kenya from 18 November to 2 December 2008, and a review of written documentation. In Nairobi, interviews were conducted with 9 national party leaders, including the Prime Minister, the Vice President, 4 Party Leaders (LPK, DP, ODM-K and ODM) and 3 Executive Directors (Ford-K, DP and Ford-P).

In the period 21-23 November, meetings were held in Nakuru and Kisumu where a total of 23 party branch leaders and Inter Party Provincial Committee (IPPC) members and one official of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) were consulted. Members from the following parties were represented: Narc-K, Ford-K, ODM, DP, KANU and LDP.

Meetings were also held with 4 Kenyan organisations that work in the area of party support and/or political analysis and advocacy: Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD), Transparency International – Kenya (TI-Kenya) and Centre for Governance and Development (CGD).

Lastly meetings were held with 4 other donors, Netherlands Embassy, UNDP, USAID and DfID, and with officials of the Norwegian Embassy and NDI. A full list of meetings is presented in Annex 2.

Documents collected and reviewed include project reports and material produced by NDI and political parties, relevant reports and analysis produced by other organisations, reports produced by official commissions and analytical and/or academic reports relevant to party politics and democratic development in Kenya. A complete list of documents collected and consulted is presented in Annex 3.

Some mention needs to be made of the basis for the assessments provided. The indicators were widely formulated which necessitated the application of some level of subjectivity in the assessments. Still, the evidence is fairly clear. Attribution is also a problem, as there are several actors that have been involved in related work in the area, and NDI has also conducted activities financed by other donors, that may have contributed to meeting some of the indicators.

It may also be relevant to note that the project has not provided a baseline from which progress towards agreed targets can be assessed, nor was a logframe developed to track the implementation of the project. Although it would be possible to establish an approximate baseline retroactively, it has been beyond the scope and resources of this evaluation to attempt such a challenging exercise. Finally, it has also been beyond the scope of this evaluation to control for the counterfactual, that is, considering what would have happened if the project had not been implemented. A counterfactual control would have been easier to perform had the project been purposely designed to allow for it. At the national level, this could have been achieved by providing support only to a selection of the major parties. However, a spill over effect would still have 'contaminated' the results. There would also have been serious ethical considerations connected to excluding certain parties for purely methodological reasons. At the Provincial/constituency level it would have been more feasible, although it would have upset the methodology and progress of project if it had required interfering with the selection of localities to focus on. It also would have required a fairly elaborate monitoring component to track progress and events in both localities where support was granted and where the project was not present.

Bearing the above caveats in mind, we are fairly confident of the general assessments made in the review. The observations are mutually consistent, and we have found no indication

there has been any attempt to pre-select respondents or interfere with the evidence to undermine its representativeness.

## 2.5 Structure of report

The report is organized in 6 sections. Following the Executive Summary and this Introductory section, the third section presents a Review of the Results. The fourth section presents and Analysis of the methodology and the achievements of the project. The final two sections present Conclusions and Recommendations.

## 3. Review of results

This section will review the results of the activities implemented by NDI with Norwegian support in the 2004-2008 period. The TORs direct the consultants to review the activities implemented under the "Pre-electoral Party Strengthening" project implemented from August 2006. The Norwegian Embassy also requested us to consider the activities that NDI implemented with Norwegian finances in the 2004-2006 period. The pre-2006 support is considered in the first sub-section, while each of the three objectives in the main project under review are dealt with in the following sub-sections.

### 3.1 Activities supported by Norway in the 2004-2006 period

The first NDI project, or projects (2 separate agreements plus one addendum extending support) to be supported by Norway in Kenya was "Kenya: Strengthening Party Secretariat and Branch Structures." This was spread over three phases: December 2003 – December 2004 (Phase 1, with a budget of USD 186,067; November 2004 to July 2005 (Phase 2: USD 299,049); with an addendum covering the period October 2005 to June 2006 (Phase 3: USD 321,950).<sup>3</sup> The total budget for the three phases was equivalent to NOK 4 million.

All 3 phases have the following objectives in common:

1. Strengthen the party structure down to the grassroots level, with particular focus on the party branch level; and
2. Strengthen the communication between the different levels in the party structures.

In addition, phase 1 had the objective:

3. Strengthen political party internal nomination process.

Finally, phase 3 had the following extra objective:

4. Strengthen communication and interaction between the different political parties.

It is beyond the scope of this report to make a detailed assessment of these three projects, but a quick summary will be provided of the feed-back we got from the respondents on the value of the assistance provided by NDI during this period.

The two common objectives were addressed through the convening of strategic joint forums for party secretariats and branch officials, roundtable discussions, provincial workshops and individual party trainings. The strengthening of the internal nomination process was done at a workshop in Kisumu in connection to a 2004 by-election, where training was also provided for party agents and election monitoring. A "Kenya Party Political Handbook" was prepared under phase 3 of the project.

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<sup>3</sup> The division of the report into phases is adopted for ease of reference for the purposes of this report. According to the files, what we call the three phases is treated as separate project, albeit all with the same name.

The fourth objective listed above addressed the need to establish trust between parties and to develop the understanding for what is required from party cooperation in collations such as the one attempted in NARC after the 2002 elections. This provided the foundation for the coalition work done in the main project under review.

Through our discussions with party officials that had attended these training sessions, we got a uniformly positive feed-back. At the structural level, the joint strategic forums had helped the parties establish the appropriate committees to assist policy making, management and communication within the party. On the individual level, we had feed-back from several of the participants in the first trainings who told how they had advanced in the party ranks due to the skills they had acquired through the training. Several of the respondents referred to the Party Political Handbook as a particularly useful tool.

More generally, and this was a reoccurring theme in our meetings with stakeholders, the respondents appreciated NDI's approach in providing technical assistance, which was described as genuinely facilitatory and allowing the parties themselves to remain in the driving seat. NDI themselves, described their approach as process oriented, rather than being centred on one-off activities such as workshops and trainings.

In summary, the NDI projects supported by Norway prior to the pre-election project which is the main focus of this review, put in place a solid foundation for NDI's continued work with party strengthening in Kenya. The objectives of the projects were achieved and were accomplished in a cost-effective manner.

### 3.2 The pre-election project

The "Pre-electoral Party Strengthening" project was originally set to run from August 1 2006 to December 31 2007, but was subsequently extended to 31 August 2008, following a number of no-cost extensions. The total budget of the project was NOK 10 million.

The project built on the previous work in this area supported by the Norway and other donors, but with a focus on the lead up to the 2007 elections. The emphasis was placed on coalition building and support of peaceful communication between parties. Special attention was also paid to the strengthening of local branches. This had emerged as a particularly weak point for parties in earlier work done by NDI.

As stated above, the goal of the project was "to strengthen democratic institutions and advance democratic reform in Kenya." The project had the following three objectives:

1. Strengthen the capacity of political parties to make more process oriented, participatory and strategic decisions about forthcoming coalitions.
2. Enhance capacity of branch officials to contribute to their parties' decisions and activities.
3. Enhance prospects for civil interparty dialogue at the national level and in targeted districts.

The results achieved under each of the objectives will be considered in turn and will be assessed against the indicators provided under each objective.

### 3.3 Objective 1 – National level capacities and support for coalition building

Under the objective to "*Strengthen the capacity of political parties to make more process oriented, participatory and strategic decisions about forthcoming coalitions,*" three indicators were provided. Our review of project documentation and interviews with respondents clearly indicated that all three indicators had been achieved. The results/outputs under each are summarized in turn below.

**Indicator 1.1:** *With NDI assistance, technical committees within the targeted political parties develop strategy documents that are used to inform decisions about whether or not to contest the 2007 elections in coalition.*

Eight parties – ODM, Narc-K, LDP, LPK, Shirikisho, Ford-K and Ford-People, were supported through workshops to develop strategies and tools to inform decisions about whether or not to contest the 2007 elections in coalitions.

**Indicator 1.2:** *With NDI assistance, targeted political parties that decide to form coalitions develop new or advanced skills and documents and use them in coalition-building negotiations.*

The same eight parties developed coalition technical committees to work on specific issues to facilitate their participation in coalitions.

**Indicator 1.3:** *Targeted political parties that decide to form coalitions use best practices shared during NDI-sponsored activities in establishing and sustaining coalition structures and processes*

The ODM, ODM-K and PNU coalitions used the tools developed with assistance from NDI to form their respective coalitions in the run up to the 2007 elections. Although PNU did not receive support from NDI in the short period of its existence before the elections, 5 of the 6 coalition partners had received training from NDI on coalition building and used them in the negotiations, as confirmed by our respondents.<sup>4</sup> Additional support was provided by NDI after the election to help in the forging of the Grand Coalition.

### *Discussion*

The party leaders and functionaries interviewed by the evaluators were unanimous in their verdict that NDI had played a consistently positive role and that the activities under the project (and under other projects implemented by NDI) contributed significantly to the parties' capacities to engage in a more process oriented and participative approach of coalition building.

Members of all the three coalitions, ODM-K, ODM and PNU, confirmed that the materials used that had been produced with NDI support had proved to be useful in the formation of the respective coalitions. The "12 point agenda" devised by NDI, which provides 12 steps to a successful negotiation of agreements or coalitions, was also referred by many of the respondents as having been a useful tool in the negotiation of the pre-election coalitions. The 12 point agenda was also reportedly used in the negotiations that led to the formation of the Grand Coalition after the elections.

One of the many pieces of anecdotal evidence that we collected that captures the role and influence of NDI in coalition building in Kenya, is an incident connected to the negotiation of the Grand Coalition in the troubled aftermath of the 2007 elections. We were told that as the negotiations were getting to be increasingly complicated, one of the partners sent a message to the NDI Country Director, who was in Western Kenya at the time, to come and assist in the negotiations. Despite serious transport problems due to the post election violence, the Country Director, Mr. Bjarte Tørå, quickly obliged and joined the negotiations in Nairobi three days later (finally managing to return from Kisumu by plane), providing technical back-up to compliment the far more high profile roles played by Kofi Annan and Jakaya Kikwete, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Chair of the Africa

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<sup>4</sup> The parties that received training in coalition building were DP, Shirikisho, Ford-P, Ford-K and KANU (the 6<sup>th</sup> party was Safina). Our respondents from DP, Ford-K, and Ford-P confirmed that the tools imparted in the coalition training had been useful in the negotiations and forging of the PNU coalition.

Union.<sup>5</sup> This incident is a good indication of the value accorded to NDI by the Kenyan political actors. It can also be seen as a good example of an approach that many of the respondents described as a “behind the stage” and “low profile” approach that contrasts with many other actors on the aid scene who might be more inclined to engage in flag waving to mark their involvement in key events and processes.

The Executive Director of Ford-K recalled the time before the 2002 election as a time when there was overt hostility between the different political parties. At the time, he said, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) “was the only agent that could bring the parties together to talk in the same room.” After NDI started working with the parties in 2001, he said that, they became only “the second agent” that could facilitate peaceful party interaction.<sup>6</sup> Many of the respondents also credited NDI with having played a significant part in the run-up to the 2002 elections by making the NARC coalition possible.

One of the methods that NDI has used in supporting coalition building, according to both NDI and respondents from political parties, has been to attempt shifting the focus from personalities to issues. Although we saw some evidence that the emphasis of issues rather than personalities had taken hold among the politicians interviewed, it is not clear to the consultants whether this indicated a shift in terminology or substance. Through some of the more candid discussions with the more senior politicians, the message clearly came across that the main purpose of coalition building was more to gain access to power for personal enrichment than to gain acceptance for key policies. It may also be relevant to note in this context that one of the results of the negotiation that led to the formation of a Government of National Unity, encompassing the three main candidates for the presidency, was the unprecedented appointment of 40 Ministers and 52 Assistant Ministers, which means that close to half of the elected MPs are members of the cabinet.

What this indicates, is that the focus of the negotiations seems to have been on personalities and the allocation of power, rather than on policy negotiations and forging of policy compromises. It may also be indicative that the announcement of the Grand Coalition was not accompanied by a joint policy statement, which is what one in a Northern context would have expected to have been one of the main outputs of the negotiation of a coalition government. If the main objective of coalition building is to get access to power and the perks it provides, rather than to forge viable policy compromises, it is not immediately clear how beneficial this on its own is to the long-term prospects of peace and development. There is a need for further reflection and research on these important questions and issues.

### 3.4 Objective 2 - Support to capacity building at branch level

Under the second objective: “To enhance the capacity of party branch officials to contribute to their parties’ decisions and activities in the lead up to the 2007 elections,” there are three indicators. Our review indicates that all the indicators have been met. The outputs/results under each of the indicators are summarized below:

**Indicator 2.1:** *With NDI assistance, party branch officials provide input to their parties’ pre-electoral decisions and/or processes such as whether to form coalitions and platform developments*

More than 1200 party branch officials from 8 parties were provided with training in necessary skills, with different sessions focusing on communication and input to decision making within

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with Kalonzo Musyoka, Vice President and Party Leader ODM-K, and Mutula Kilonzo, Minister of Metropolitan Nairobi and General Secretary ODM-K, 28 November 2008, Nairobi. The story has been confirmed with Mr. Tørå.

<sup>6</sup> Interview Stephen Namsyule, 19 November 2008, Nairobi.

the party, party branch management, conflict resolution, electoral laws and procedures, awareness raising and discussion on party policies, and the promotion of participation from youth and women.

The 23 respondents from Party Branches that we met with were unanimous that the training had had a positive impact on their ability to participate effectively in their parties' policy processes, including providing input to policy discussions for platform development. Several of the respondents, at least three, had been promoted within their respective parties to positions in the national executives. So it is probably fair to assume that some of them would also have taken part in some of the decision making processes concerned with forming of coalitions before the elections. The three branch officials that told of their promotion within their parties, all gave credit to the training provided by NDI as having helped them advance their political careers.<sup>7</sup> It also seems probable that the increased competencies gained by the party branch officials have gone some way towards strengthening the voice and influence of the branches at the national level.

**Indicator 2.2:** *With NDI assistance, party branch officials develop and use new skills to conduct pre-electoral activities such as voter outreach.*

The Party Branch representatives consulted emphasized the outreach activities conducted primarily through the Inter Party Provincial Committees (IPPCs, see below), as one of the most valuable activities supported by NDI. Particular emphasis was placed on outreach programmes for youth that sought to raise awareness of the need for peaceful inter-party dialogue. Support for the empowerment of women and for encouraging women to stand for office were also mentioned. It seems appropriate, given the circumstances of local politics in Kenya, that the training on pre-electoral voter outreach has been so focused on conveying messages of peace and reconciliation. Although it cannot be ruled out that the respondents told the consultants what they thought we wanted to hear, the discussions around these issues did produce consistent answers, and we did not leave with a sense that we had been provided with a rehearsed message.

**Indicator 2.3:** *Party branch officials displayed improved understanding of their roles and responsibilities and/or take steps to improve communications with headquarters officials.*

The respondents told of a much improved understanding of what it takes to run party branch offices and of their responsibilities as party officials. Many, but not all, of the party branch representatives confirmed that they now had up to date membership registries at the branch offices. None of them had this before the training.

Many of the representatives also confirmed that they now have improved systems and practices for communicating with headquarters. Two of the parties, Ford-K and LDP, have formalized communication systems to improve communication between branches and headquarters. In the words of one of the respondents: "The party branch training has helped us a great deal to formalize. It has helped us to ask questions to headquarters."<sup>8</sup>

### *Discussion*

As can be seen, there was agreement among all respondents that NDI's support to party branches has had a positive impact. The fact that the party branch representatives welcomed this support is, of course, not surprising. It should also be mentioned, however, that several of the national level politicians and functionaries highlighted support to party branches as a priority area.

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<sup>7</sup> Interviews in Nakuru, 21 December, and Kisumu, 22 and 23 December 2008.

<sup>8</sup> William Atingi, ODM and chair of Nakuru IPPC. 21 November, Kisumu.



It appears to be almost universally held among both local and national politicians that the key to developing stronger political parties in Kenya, parties that transcend the personalities of popular leaders, is to ground them more solidly in their constituent bases. In order for this to be achieved, it is obvious that there is a need for strong and viable party branches.

Of the organisations that have been most active in supporting capacity building of political parties in Kenya, NDI, Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IDM), Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), NDI is the only one to have developed programmes for support to party branches.

It would be difficult to overestimate the challenges presented by the quest to put in place strong party branch offices. We were told that most local offices only open in the run-up to elections, and close down soon after. This is primarily a question of limited resources (for rent, salaries or any compensation and running costs) and capacities (the necessary know how for running a party office). But it is also a reflection of how party politics is so much about running for elections. There seems to be little focus on the parties' role in supporting and guiding party representatives in local councils, for example. Party politics seems to be much more about winning office than about running office.

One issue here that may benefit from further investigation, is the question of what are the skills required to run a branch office in between elections. It is quite possible that these could be substantially different from the skills required to contribute to party policies and manifestoes, nominate candidates and negotiate coalitions. Skills that could be considered would include routine media dealings, interaction with local authorities, lobbying and/or dealing with special interest groups, and legislative and budget work at both the local and national levels. It would also be interesting to document what the different parties see as their main capacity constraints.

There is also the problem of the ever changing landscape of political parties in Kenya. Parties come and go so quickly that this on its own makes it very difficult for parties to establish structures, particularly at the local level. The political trajectory of the chair of the IPPC in Nakuru is a good illustration of the inconsistencies of parties and party affiliations in Kenya. After first joining the opposition before the 1992 elections, party splits, coalitions and new parties led him through the following string of party affiliations: Ford → Ford-K → NDP → KANU → LDP → NARC → ODM-K → ODM. A total of 8 party affiliations in the span of 16 years. This coming and going of political parties compounds the problem referred to above, of my most party branch offices virtually or totally closing down between elections. This has not negated the usefulness of the training provided by NDI, however. All respondents, while recognising the problem of often weak party affiliations, stressed that the skills they had acquired were portable, so to speak, so that they stayed with them, even if they changed parties.

To summarise, the strengthening of political party branches is an important part of democratic development in Kenya. They are a crucial link between the top politicians and their constituents. The challenges in assisting parties to establish viable and active branch offices, on the other hand, are formidable:

- a serious shortage of resources and knowledge;
- the political culture mitigates against the establishment of professional, non-personal bureaucracies;
- attentions within parties tend to be geared towards winning rather than running office; and
- weak party loyalties

These are all factors that vastly complicate the task of strengthening party branches and the institutional and democratic structures within parties.

NDI should be commended for recognising the importance of party branches. They were the first to address this challenge, and the work they have done so far has been important both in terms of what they have achieved and because of the valuable lessons and experiences gained. This brings us to what is arguably the weakest point of the project under review. The documentation has been very weak, and there has been little systematic effort to capture and analyse the challenges that have been encountered. There is no monitoring system in place and no attempt to establish a baseline against which to measure progress. Neither was any logframe developed at the outset. Consequently, valuable opportunities have been lost for learning. This issue will be explored in more detail in section 4 of this report.

### 3.5 Objective 3 – Support to peaceful party relations at national level and in targeted districts

Under the third objective: “To enhance prospects for civil interparty dialogue at the national level and in targeted districts in the lead up to the 2007 elections,” there are four indicators. Our review finds that all the indicators have been achieved. The outputs/results under each of the indicators are summarized and discussed below:

**Indicator 3.1:** *NDI-sponsored multi-party roundtables assist political actors in identifying and reaching agreement on steps to enhance the legitimacy and integrity of the electoral process.*

A large number of meetings were held with political actors, at least two of which would qualify as multi-party roundtables. This was one multiparty round-table with party leaders and senior executives, and one session on coalition politics between a previous Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, and party leaders. These national level events helped in bringing parties together and provided a good basis for constructive interparty dialogue.

**Indicator 3.2:** *With NDI assistance, IPPCs are established in 13 targeted districts in the lead up to the elections.*

13 IPPCs were established in Nakuru, Kisii, Kisumu, Machakos, Thika, Kakamega, Eldoret, Mombasa, Voi, Embu, Bungoma, Nairobi and Garissa.

**Indicator 3.3:** *IPPCs conduct activities in their respective areas to raise awareness about the need for peaceful elections and political tolerance*

The IPPCs conducted a wide range of activities, including inter-party dialogue and community outreach activities advocating peaceful inter-party dialogue and competition. This included activities specifically targeting women and youth.

**Indicator 3.4:** *IPPCs take steps to reduce interparty tension in their respective areas.*

The by NDI established IPPCs (not to be mixed up with the ECK/Government initiated Peace Committees) registered significant successes in initiating peaceful interparty dialogue. The IPPC meetings were an unprecedented effort of bringing the party leaders from different parties together at the district level. We were given graphic accounts of how the first meetings started with intense hostility and fear, but how the atmosphere quickly turned to one of mutual trust and cordiality.

#### *Discussion*

NDI has succeeded in assuming a role as facilitator of inter-party dialogue at the national level. NDI has emerged as the agent of choice among the lead parties and coalitions to provide technical assistance and facilitation for preparations for negotiations and in the process of negotiation itself. This is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the incident referred to earlier, when one of main actors requested the NDI Director to come from Norway to assist in putting the necessary agreements in place that lead to the formation of a grand coalition government in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. This agreement led to a

resolution of the serious post-election political crisis and was instrumental in ending the post-election violence.

NDI's work to promote peaceful party relations at the provincial and constituency level also appears to have had some impact. The consultants met with members of 4 of the 13 Inter-Party Provincial Committees (Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu and Kisii). The stories told by the members of each of the IPPCs were remarkably similar. The first time they met, it was in an atmosphere of intense distrust and fear. Soon, however, mutual trust and remarkably cordial working relations were established. The IPPCs met by the consultants all appeared to be working together as closely knit teams with common perceptions of the challenges they faced, and their objectives for working together.

IPPCs were established in areas where there was a history of election related violence, so it is not surprising that the post-election violence hit many of the areas where IPPCs were established particularly severely, i.e. Eldoret, Nakuru, Kisumu, Kisii, Nairobi and Mombasa. It was not possible for us to establish whether the violence would have been worse still without the IPPCs.

In Mombasa, NDI supported the IPPC to conduct a 'post-mortem' in February, before the post-election conflict was resolved, to assess the situation and the continued threat of violence. They succeeded in forging a partnership with the newly elected MP that also involved religious institutions and the provincial administration. Similar initiatives were attempted in Kisii, Kisumu and Machakos districts. According to NDI and the consulted IPPC members, these initiatives had a good impact that contributed to reducing violence after the elections.

It may be worth noting that while many of the senior party administrators interviewed by the consultants knew of the work of the IPPCs, the national politicians appeared not to be aware of them. Also, we did not come across references to the work conducted by the IPPC in media or any other reports on the election and the post-election violence (e.g. the Waki report). We have therefore not been able to assess firmly what impact the IPPC have had.

Our educated guess is that the impact has been at most marginal. There are at least a couple of factors that suggest this conclusion:

Firstly, although the post-election media reports seemed to suggest that much of the violence occurred spontaneously in an angry reaction to reports of rigging, the findings of the Waki Report paint a picture of a much more sinister, planned build-up to the violence. There is substantial evidence that much of the violence was pre-planned and prepared, and that many of the youth gangs functioned as militias paid by national leaders. It is difficult to see how the local IPPCs could have been expected to deal with this type of covert activities. It is certainly not the type of animosity you would expect to tackle *in the short run* with outreach activities.

Secondly, the IPPC seem to function first and foremost as a group unto itself. It is a group of like-minded local politicians, who although coming from different parties, appear to agree on a common agenda of peaceful development and civic political engagement. In our discussions with the representatives of the four IPPCs (Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu and Kisii), we tried to get a sense of how the IPPCs interacted with the parties. The responses we got indicated that by and large, the IPPCs were not used as a tool to communicate concerns raised by members to their respective parties. The IPPC functioned more as its own club, which conducted outreach activities and tried to interact with constituents and groups on the ground, including the unemployed youth. This reinforces the point made above, that the IPPCs were not well placed to deal with the type of violence that took place after the elections.

Through some of the more candid discussions, the case of a local politician delivering "hate speeches" in Kisumu was given. Although known by the IPPC members, no direct action was taken, such as lodging a formal complaint to the party of the candidate in question.

Following one of the points raised in the earlier section, part of the problem here is also possibly that there is often no strong feeling of a cohesive party. There tends to be no strong common interest in parties that bind members together and give them a common purpose. Therefore, the one Parliamentary candidate in question, was not seen to be the responsibility, so to speak, of the local party branch. He had anyway most likely gained nomination by foul means.

The point being made here is that the problem of post election violence was much bigger than the IPPCs, and that it would not be realistic to have expected them to have managed to forestall or control the violence when it broke out. This does not mean, however, that the support that NDI has provided for establishing the IPPC has not been a strategically sound one. But there is a need to be realistic about what the IPPCs can be expected to achieve.

What is clear, is that the IPPCs present a valuable and unique resource in the political and civic landscape of Kenya. NDI has managed to forge some quite extraordinary partnerships of committed individuals. In Kisumu, we were handed the file of the South Nyanza IPPCs (Kisumu and Kisii) with the minutes of their monthly meetings since their establishment. They had not received financial support from NDI or anyone else for any of these meetings, and they had also conducted outreach activities on a voluntary basis, often using own resources.

It was also clear from our discussions with the IPPCs that they had good insights into the potential sources of violence in their areas. They described the local factions and named the militias consisting of unemployed youth or young adults active in their areas, including the the Taliban, Mungiki, Kayabongo, Angola and Msumbiji. The usefulness of this type of local knowledge is obvious.

The message from all the IPPC members consulted was also very clear. The present time in Kenya is not a good time to stop support of the IPPCs. They see their mandates and capacities as critical resources at this particular point in time, when the threat of politically motivated violence is ever present. We therefore don't hesitate to recommend continued support of the IPPCs.

The start of a new phase of support for the IPPCs might be a good time to think more carefully about the role and identity of the Committees. At the moment they do not have any work description, terms of reference, articles of association or memorandum of understanding. Issues to address is whether they should be 'owned' by the parties, or if they should be 'owned' by its members. Presently, there is no formal link with the parties, either at local or national level. If they formalise their association more as a CSO, would that further *weaken their link and influence with their respective parties?* There is also the old adage to consider, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Would an attempt to formalise the identity of IPPCs jeopardize their achievements to date?

Finally, the IPPCs present an invaluable source of knowledge and experience on issues relating to political and civic processes at the local level in Kenya. There is at present no system in place to capture their experiences, and no effort to systematize and analyse the challenges they are dealing with. This is something which should receive much closer attention in future.

### 3.6 Concluding comments

As can be seen from the foregoing review of the results and outputs of the NDI supported activities, the objectives of the project, including the pre-2006 projects, have been achieved and the indicators provided have been met. For ease of reference, the findings have been summarised in Annex 6.

The goal of the project was to "strengthen democratic institutions and advance democratic reform in Kenya." *There is little doubt that the project has contributed to this.* Political parties play an important role in democratic reform and the recent events in Kenya have only underlined the need for continued support to these important democratic institutions.

Stronger political parties are a necessary countervailing force to the most powerful politicians. The positive contribution of the project remains vulnerable to serious set-backs in the context of the continuing fragility of existing structures and the weakness of political institutions, including political parties. Kenyan politics continues to be dominated by personal power structures and captured by converging political and economic interests. This means that the parties, albeit to a slightly lesser extent than before, often function as the personal property of its leader. A further strengthening of the party structures, therefore, will be necessary in order to enable the rank and file of party members to exert stronger ownership of the parties.

NDI has demonstrated a good strategic sense of how to best engage with the political parties, and have established themselves as the foremost organization working on political party support in Kenya. Their chosen focus on coalition building has been percipient, as shown by the way the post-election conflicts were resolved. The added focus on the local level is equally well placed, as it is becoming increasingly obvious that the continued strengthening of democratic reform in Kenya will to a large part depend on the strengthening of internal party structures and democracy, and on the establishment of a firmer sense of party identity and ownership down to the local level, as observed above.

As discussed, there are weaknesses in the NDI approach, particularly in terms of monitoring, documentation and systemic analysis. More could also be done to communicate the lessons and challenges identified to a wider audience and to fuel a more informed debate on democratization in Kenya. These issues will be elaborated in further detail in the following section.

## 4. Analysis

This section will take a closer look at the wider context and at the approach adopted by NDI. The first part will take a closer look at the current political context and ask if support to political parties should be a priority. The second part takes a closer look at NDI's approach, exploring its strengths and weaknesses. The third part considers the cost-effectiveness of NDI, paying special attention to the cost-implications of the overheads incurred by its Washington DC based headquarters. The fourth and final part considers alternative models of support.

### 4.1 Context/relevance

The still recent post-election violence in Kenya has focused attention on the importance of peaceful, democratic development. The danger presented by the continued threat of violence would be hard to overemphasise. Ethnic animosities and resentment are being manipulated by politicians, including the political leadership, and one should not take for granted that the state has the necessary capacity to control the violence should it get out of hand again.

Political party structures are important instruments for maintaining discipline on the behaviour of political leaders and contestants. The political big-man-ism that characterises so much of Kenyan politics is a large part of the current problem, and one prerequisite for overcoming it and improving the prospects for peace is the strengthening of political parties, to transcend the position and popularity of their leaders. In the words of the Vice President: "you cannot build peace without political parties."<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with Hon. Kalonzo Musyoka, 28 November 2008, Nairobi.

Building stronger political parties will beyond all require much better democratic structures within parties. Some progress have been made, particularly within ODM and ODM-K, which both for the first time and with NDI support, nominated their presidential candidates in the last elections through voting among delegates.

However, even in these contexts, are there signs that personality based politics persists. One example we noted is the aftermath of the nomination process in ODM. After the nomination of Raila Odinga, he moved to forestall a "political fall-out" by setting up a new executive group in the party dubbed "the Pentagon," consisting of all the five nominees in the leadership contest.<sup>10</sup> This is a clear indication that personalities, and their internal following, matter more than policies in internal party dialogue. This type of personality driven politics is likely to remain an obstacle for issues driven politics in Kenya for the foreseeable future. It does not necessarily mean that coalition building and reaching compromises will be more difficult, but it does mean that it is less likely that such coalitions and compromises will be forged with the interests of the Kenyan public at heart.

The new Political Parties Act provides incentives for improved party management, as it requires stricter conditions for the maintenance of records and for permanently maintaining local branches. The provision of public funding through the Political Parties Fund will also improve the financial wherewithal of political parties. It also makes it harder for a politician to hop between parties, as it ties elected seats to the party for which the candidate contested. This means that if an MP, for example, leaves a party, his or her seat will become vacant, triggering a bye-election. This will also make it easier for parties to enforce party discipline.

A stricter regulatory framework, as provided by the Political Parties Act, will not automatically turn parties into democratic institutions, however. There still remains a large scope for malpractice in the nomination process, and there is still a long way to go before many Kenyans identify with parties, rather than persons, and before a local party functionary feels that she or he have a part in running the party.

Therefore, the strengthening of local branches and the strengthening of internal structures of democracy and communication will remain key challenges in the years to come. Only when local constituents feel ownership of their parties, and when people start to have more trust in rules and procedures, is it likely that a more ordered and peaceful democratic culture can take root. A point made by NDI in one of our discussions was that "competition is less risky within an environment of rules and procedures."

All the above factors point to the continued relevance of the support that NDI has been providing to political parties in Kenya. Particularly the support to local branches, and the support to inter-party mediation at this level remains important.

But it is also clear that the issue of democratic reform and building a more peaceful democratic culture depends on more than strong parties. It is also important to keep in mind other aspects of the context in which political parties operate. One issue in particular which we would like to flag, is the connection between business and politics. According to Transparency International Kenya, 80% of grand corruption in Kenya is connected to elections and political finance.<sup>11</sup> Business, particularly finance and construction, bankroll parties and campaigns in expectations of rewards if and when their people win office.

In this context of high stakes politics, issues such as ethnicity and/or party affiliation, is often used as mere rallying points to gain public support. They are issues of manipulation, rather than real points of contention. It has been suggested by many that ethnicity in Kenya is not

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<sup>10</sup> Interview with Hon. Raila Odinga, 25 November 2008, Nairobi.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Job Ogonda, Executive Director TI Kenya, 27 November 2008, Nairobi.

necessarily the main cause of conflict and violence in Kenya, and that self-interest and profit seeking are the real drivers of much of the displayed ethnic rivalry. The issue of grand corruption also raises the problem raised by i.a. the Waki report, regarding the culture of impunity and lack of accountability by Kenyan leaders.

These latter points are included here as a reminder to Norad that there is a need to see the challenges of democratic reform and political party strengthening in the wider context of governance.

## 4.2 NDI's approach – strengths and weaknesses

In the process of conducting this review, it became very clear that NDI enjoys an exceptionally good reputation among its clients. It is universally respected as a capable, professional and trusted partner. Many respondents referred to the "NDI approach." The NDI Country Director describes this as a process approach, through which they approach assistance to the parties as an ongoing process, rather than a series of isolated activities.

NDI starts this process by discussing the issues at hand and presenting various tools for solving problems and building capacities and structures. In the words of more than one of the respondents: "NDI walked us to the intended objectives ...". referring to activities such as the development of party strategic plans, designing of party manifestos, building coalitions, etc.

The advantage of this approach is manifold:

- It allows the parties to be in the driving seat by deciding the speed of the process, who to involve, where to concentrate geographically and what to prioritise;
- It is flexible, allowing to continuously adjust to the changing circumstances and challenges of supporting political parties in Kenya;
- It focuses on substance and technical advice and enables continuous follow up, all of which helps to keep the process on track and to focus on learning and practising what is being learnt.

NDI is helped in this by its corporate expertise, as the organisation can draw on a comparatively long experience of working with political parties, and has a solid network of experts to call on, both in the region and outside. The organisation has also developed a very capable cadre of national staff who was evidently respected and appreciated by the clients. Finally, the Country Director enjoys a unique standing among Kenyan politicians and he has a better insight than most into the party political landscape of Kenya. NDI's standing among the Kenyan political elite was demonstrated to us by the fact that NDI successfully arranged for us to see the Prime Minister, the Vice President, the Minister for Metropolitan Nairobi and a total of four party leaders. NDI's low profile style is also worth a mention. The organisation's preference for "flying under the radar," as one of the respondents described it, is much better suited to this type of endeavour than the flag waving and chest thumping more traditionally associated with development contractors.

The above factors combine to make NDI a strong candidate for further financial support to continue its political party strengthening programme.

It may be a concern that the Country Director has now left the organisation. He leaves a large legacy that it will difficult to live up to for his successor. Having said that, it was clear throughout our discussions with the project partners that they associated the project with NDI as an organisation, rather than with the Country Director. In our liaison with many of the most senior politicians in the country, we also observed how other senior NDI staff had good relations established with the supported political parties and their leaderships. Our interviews with NDI staff also demonstrated a high level of technical competence that bode well for the continuation of NDI's activities under new leadership. Still, it will be important for NDI to

identify and hire a top quality successor to the position of Country Director. The continued back-up of NDI HQ in the transition phase will be an important asset.

The strengths of the NDI approach notwithstanding, there is also a number of observed, systemic weakness in the NDI programme that should be addressed in the organisation's future programme. These relate to the documentation/reporting, monitoring, learning and communication parts of their programme.

The documentation is by and large restricted to the monthly progress reports which describes what activities have been implemented and mid-term and final project reports, which reports against the stated targets/indicators and objectives of the project. These do not include any reflections on the problems encountered, any attempt to systematise and analyse the challenges and weaknesses to be addressed by the project. The documentation is produced in order to report to the donor what has been achieved and what activities have been implemented. None of this appears to be meant for consumption and/or reflection by NDI itself, or its clients, the political party members.

A consequence of this is that there is little systematic learning. Since reporting is geared towards capturing what is being done and achieved, there is no systemic recording of the problems faced. This is the case throughout the project cycle. Consequently, there was no baseline analysis at the beginning of the programme, no recorded assessment for the duration of the programme of whether the problems had changed, or what impact the programme had had on the issues addressed, and no discussion at the end of the programme of what worked and what did not.

This weakness is of particular concern in connection with the local branch support. As seen from some of the limited discussion in this review, the challenges connected to supporting the building of viable party branches at the constituency and district level are formidable. The established partnerships with local branches and the regular contact with them provides a valuable opportunity to learn more about what are the problems and constraints experienced by the branches what impact the support from NDI is having. Institutionalising learning would enable NDI to add adopt a more systematic approach to its monitoring and evaluation and continuous improvements of its approach. This would also be of benefit beyond the confines of the project. There is very little research and analysis available on local party politics, and not using the project to contribute to this is a regrettable missed opportunity.

Likewise, there has been little effort to use the projects activities and experiences to inform and sustain a wider public debate on the challenges presented by democratic reform in Kenya. Although it could be seen as problematic for NDI to be hosting debates on the problems faced by their clients, more efforts could have been made to partner imaginatively with other actors in ways that would provide NDI with opportunities to contribute to debates on democratisation in Kenya.

One reason why the weaknesses presented above matter so much, is that there is a limit to how much can be achieved by a project that operates in relative isolation. The challenges experienced by, in particular, the local branches are of a scale far larger than what can be comprehensively assisted by NDI or other similar actors and projects. One of the most important contributions that NDI can do, therefore, is arguably to assist in generating a better understanding of the problems of building stronger structures for democracy at the local level, which would help to bring these issues out into the open and to engage the public in a more effective and efficient way.

#### 4.3 Cost-effectiveness and considerations of funding modalities

The Terms of Reference express concern over the cost implications of NDI using its headquarters (HQ) based in Washington DC for parts of its administration and by the use of services from its HQ based experts.

The following cost implications of using HQ have been identified.



One of the project officers charged directly to the project is based in HQ. The total, at 20% of full time, is at USD 4,735 (including benefits) for the duration of the project. This is 2,1% of the total staff cost, or 0,4% of the total budget.

The cost implications of having HQ experts travel to Nairobi on monitoring and consultations, inclusive of airfare and per diem are: USD 4,104 (monitoring) and USD 5,712 (consultations). This is a total of USD 9,816, which is 0,8% of the budget.

Assuming that the above contributed substantial value to the projects, the costs cannot be said to be excessive. It is doubtful whether any substantial saving could have been made on these budget posts, had comparable services been procured from outside the NDI's HQ.

In addition to the earmarked costs detailed above, there is also the more substantial 13,5% for "Program Support", which is according to the Budget Notes of the project is the sum allocated to maintain and develop NDI's in-house pool of technical expertise.<sup>12</sup> This pool of in-house technical expertise provided guidance and support throughout the implementation of the project(s). The use of permanent staff is well suited to NDI's approach, as explained by a senior HQ staff:

Please note that the nature of NDI's democracy programming involves intensive, hands-on support to and maintenance of long-term working relationships with political leaders. As a result, the Institute's programs generally require a high level of both headquarters and field office staff support. This may be in contrast to other organizations, which can rely more heavily on short-term consultants.<sup>13</sup>

Program Support has assisted the development of functional teams within NDI, and each team has an extensive library of resource materials. One example of the type of support enabled by this resource base is the Political Parties Handbook (NDI 2007), that was developed under the first project supported by Norway (see page 6).

Finally, project overhead is at 8,5% (net of the 13,5% allocated to Program Support). This covers office and administrative costs of NDI's headquarters.

In the opinion of the consultants, the 13,5% charged for Program Support and 8,5% charged for overhead are not excessive, although it is recognised that cost-efficiency always needs to be a criteria when selecting organisations to support. As a ways of ensuring that the overhead costs benefit any future programme, it is recommended that an agreement is sought upfront and documented, that NDI will use part of the resources secured through Programme Support to strengthen the weaknesses identified in this evaluation, concerning weak routines and practices of learning and documentation.

It is our opinion that NDI demonstrates cost-effectiveness compared to competing organisations. The organisation has succeeded in implementing a remarkable range of activities within the relatively modest budget of USD 1,5 million, as detailed in the previous section. The activities are very much advice oriented, with no cash grants or support for production of large volumes of material or any other procurement on behalf of clients. This means that NDI's work is labour, rather than capital intensive. NDI's approach is centred on the transfer of technical resources and knowledge. This is done through close cooperation with partners, and a tailoring of the support provided to fit the clients needs. There are no

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<sup>12</sup> The charging of a set rate for Programme Support is mandatory for NDI, under US regulations, as detailed in the Budget notes "As a recipient of a significant amount of U.S. federal funding, NDI has been required to develop a cost allocation rate to spread certain expenses among its programs. Federal regulations obligate NDI to apply this allocation rate equally to all funders, including both U.S. government agencies and non-U.S. government donors." (NDI 2006a, 10).

<sup>13</sup> Email from Ms. Lisa Klimas, 30 January, 2009. Other information in this section also draws on the same email.

large costs associated with production of material, hardware (such as computers or cars provided to clients) or sub-grants for projects to be implemented by the clients themselves. The reliance on the technical expertise delivered by NDI would go some way towards justifying the overheads. It is also clear from our interviews with the NDI's target group, that this approach has been effective, as documented throughout this report.

It should also be noted in this connection, that we doubt whether a Kenyan organisation would be able to play the role that NDI has in providing technical support to political parties and in bringing parties together in an atmosphere of trust. Many of the respondents put forth the opinion that it would be very difficult for a Kenyan organisation to be viewed with equal trust by all parties, as something as basic as the tribal affiliation of the Director would be enough for some to suspect their motives and impartiality.

Issues on cost effectiveness that could be noted, however, is concerning the fragmentation of financial and reporting arrangements. It is our view that cost efficiency would be improved through pooling of resources and the adoption of common reporting.

#### 4.4 Alternative modalities of democracy support

The Terms of Reference ask us to consider alternative channels of support for political parties and alternative models of support. These are discussed in turn.

Two issues are considered regarding alternative channels of support for political parties. These are the choice between technical assistance vs. cash support, and the choice of working with international and national organisations.

##### *Technical Assistance vs. Cash support*

Two models of support that was often cited by the respondents were the NDI approach of technical assistance and the "CMD approach" of providing financing to parties for them to implement their own activities.

As discussed earlier, the NDI approach of providing continuous and flexible technical assistance has the advantage of ensuring that resources are efficiently used and increases the likelihood that the focus is on the more relevant issues at stake. It is also particularly appropriate for the interparty and civic dialogue activities, as it affords NDI the role of a mediator and facilitator.

According to CMD, the advantage of their approach is that it allows the parties to assume full ownership. The parties develop the project proposals themselves, and take the full responsibility for implementing them. This approach does, however, carry substantial risks, as CMD has had problems with ensuring that the funds are properly accounted for, and it is also much harder to combine the cash-based support with the type of flexible, demand-based advice that NDI provides.

A more recent obstacle to the cash-support approach is that the Political Parties Act forbids parties to receive funding from international organisations. There is still not complete clarity about whether this will put a stop to the cash funding from CMD, who receive most of their funding from IMD and the Dutch Government.

Another issue related to the PPA, is that it provides for state funding of political parties. This will provide an important impetus for the parties to professionalise and institutionalise. The provision of state funding, would also tip the scale more towards selecting technical assistance rather than cash support. There are a range of ethical and political dilemmas in the way of providing official development assistance in the form of cash to political parties, and it is our opinion that it would be difficult to justify in a context where there is also state funding available.

When considering the need for improved party funding, some consideration should be made of the parties' *considerable* ability to raise party campaign funds in the time of elections. As

documented by the Coalition of Accountable Political Financing (CAPF 2008),<sup>14</sup> in their study of campaign financing during the last elections, it is probable that the parties spent at least Kenya Shillings 5,6 billion, or about USD 87,5 million. It is obvious that this level of financing dwarves anything that can ever be made available through development assistance programmes to political parties. An argument could be made that if parties are able to raise this level of funds for campaigns, then there should also be scope for improving their financial independence between elections.

Moreover, it became apparent in interviews with party leaderships that parties continue to use state resources for party administrative purposes between elections. It is doubtful whether this would abate if additional finances were made available to them in the absence of viable monitoring of these issues between elections.

### *Supporting international vs. national organisations*

Another set of alternatives to be considered briefly are the pros and cons of providing support through an international or a national organisation. As a rule, national organisations are considered to be more cost-effective, as they are less likely to deploy more costly expatriates. More importantly, support to national organisations also has the advantage of contributing directly to the building of national capacities for a longer lasting and sustained impact.

Support to international organisations, therefore, should only be chosen when there is not a viable national alternative. In this case, as argued above, we do not think there are any national organisations that can take on the role that NDI has built for itself. It will be very difficult, if not impossible, for a national organisation to lift itself above suspicion that it is party politically neutral.

There is an argument, however, for employing a more conscious effort to involve Kenyan civil society in discussions of issues relating to party political support. To a certain degree this is already happening, through initiatives as CAPF, for example, cited above. We believe, however, that more can still be done to input into a national debate on democratic development.

### *Alternative models of support*

This brings us on to the question of alternative models of supporting democratic development in a way that strengthens the political process.

Support of Parliament is one of the more recognised ways of strengthening the influence of political representatives. There are already programmes in place for Parliamentary strengthening in Nairobi. Moreover, with the political credibility of MPs seriously eroded by the current public outrage over the MPs' refusal to pay taxes on their allowances, it is not clear that this is the area in most urgent need of support. This is not to say that support programmes to Parliament, such as capacity development for committees, research facilities and support to the opposition on how to organise their work in Parliament, is not important. The point is rather that this is already a recognised and fairly well subscribed area of democratic strengthening.

A stronger argument could be made for strengthening the role played by elected councillors in local authorities. This is an arena of democratic development that has lagged behind both in Kenya and in comparable countries. This is also likely to be increasingly relevant as all

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<sup>14</sup> The Coalition consists of the Centre for Governance and Development (CGD), Centre of Multi-Party Democracy in Kenya, Transparency International – Kenya, the Editors Guild, the League of Kenya Women Voters and the Kenya Women's Political Caucus.

major parties agree that there is a need to devolve more authority to local authorities, which would make the role of the elected councils potentially more important.

Strengthening of the role of local councils could be even more effective, if combined with support of locally based interest and rights groups. A good starting point would be to support local interest groups to lobby and perform oversight over the budget process. The budget provides a concrete focal point that ensures that lobbying and advocacy is anchored in actual processes, avoiding the oft observed tendency of support to advocacy groups to produce little more than workshops and reports.

The budget process, of course, also provides a useful window of entry at the national level. It could be interesting to explore possibilities of linking up with initiatives such as the International Budget Partnership's Open Budget Index, to involve MPs and Parliament in the discussions around the transparency of the budget process that are also supported by Kenyan partners of IBP and other organisations working on budget monitoring.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, as argued repeatedly above, there is much to be gained by developing better programmes for research and analysis. Programmes such as DFID's Drivers of Change, have provided some valuable input into the debate and analysis of Kenyan political economy (Ng'ethe et. al. 2004). The Afrobarometer and several of the surveys done by TI Kenya and other national organisations also provide useful information, but they are less ambitious in analysing the underlying political economy of the trends that are observed and documented.

Moreover, there is not much material readily available on the political dynamics of at the local level. This is of particular concern, as the donors often have problems conceptualising the challenges experienced outside the 'Nairobi bubble.'<sup>16</sup> What could be a worthwhile initiative, is an attempt to instigate a more continuous and open process of political economy analysis, with more substantial funding and a much more deliberate effort at opening the analytic process and involving CSOs, media and political parties, academia and trade unions, business organisations and religious bodies.

## 5. Conclusions and recommendations

This final section presents a few, brief concluding comments, as well as detailed recommendations for continued support of NDI's programme of political party strengthening.

In summary, we would like to highlight three overall conclusions of this review.

**First, NDI has achieved its targets and objectives.** The organisation has demonstrated the effectiveness of its process approach, and it has achieved an exceptionally high standing among its clients. The focus areas of the project have proved to be highly relevant. The support to coalition building did have a positive impact on the resolution of the post-election crisis; the support to party branches has made an important start in the strengthening of the foundations of political parties in Kenya; and the Inter-Party Provincial Committees have made important inroads into the challenge supporting civic inter-party dialogue, and now provide valuable agents for peace at the provincial level.

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<sup>15</sup> In the recently released (1 February 2009) 2008 Open Budget Index, Kenya scores relatively highly at 57 out of 100 in budget transparency, which compares well to Uganda (51) and Tanzania (35). For full ranking, see <http://www.openbudgetindex.org/index.cfm?fa=rankings>. Kenyan IBP partners include the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Social Development Network and Kenya Institute for Public Research and Analysis (see <http://www.internationalbudget.org/groups/kenya.htm>).

<sup>16</sup> This point came up during our de-briefing session at the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi.

**Second, the main weakness of NDI's approach has been in documentation and learning.** Reporting systems have been almost exclusively geared towards demonstrating to donors that the programmed activities have been implemented and that targets have been achieved. There has not been a systematic recording and mapping of challenges and/or set-backs. There has also been little effort to use experiences and experiences gained to inform the national debate on democratic development. Consequently, the project has been very inward looking.

**Third, political party strengthening is a necessary but not sufficient condition for peace and development.** Although stronger political parties will arguably make peace more likely in the Kenyan context, stronger political parties alone is by no guarantee of peace or democratic strengthening. The political parties operate in an exceedingly complex context, and there is surprisingly little systemic effort from donors and other actors to build a better understanding of the political economy of Kenya. The analytical lacuna is particularly marked at the local level. An improved understanding of the political economy of Kenya is an important part of linking the support to political parties to other governance reforms.

Continued support of NDI for its political parties strengthening programme is recommended. Three sets of recommendations have been developed for the development of the next phase of NDI's programme (we refer to this as a programme, rather than a project, in line with our recommendation to avoid small, stand-alone projects): First, some observations are made on what would be the optimal modalities for support; then recommendations are made for NDI on issues to address in their programme; finally, recommendations have been made to the Norwegian Embassy that relate to the positioning of political party support relative to other parts of its governance portfolio.

#### *Recommendations on modalities for support*

10. NDI should be proactive in seeking core or joint funding, to minimize reporting requirements and maximize flexibility
11. Funded programme should optimally be for a 5 year programme.
12. Small projects (less than \$1m) should be avoided.

#### *Programmatic recommendations for NDI*

13. Build on existing programme, paying special attention to:
  - Challenges faced by local party branches
  - The nomination process, and internal party democracy
  - Promoting participation in party politics by youth and women
14. Review existing reporting formats and add sections to solicit recording of experiences, challenges and lessons learned. This should not just be a standard logframe, as such are often too rigid to cater for the needs of the type of flexible programmes that would best serve party strengthening. Flexibility in programming has been one of the strengths of the NDI approach, and also in the modalities for Norwegian support. It would be regrettable if this flexibility was sacrificed in the interest of adopting a more rigid logframe approach. Rather, what would be useful would be to develop a purpose-built framework systematically to record data on capacities, practices and experience of parties at the various levels. This could include factors such as:
  - Systems (existence of membership register, maintenance of archives, including minutes of meetings and results of nominations, financial records, etc.)
  - Parties' continuous assessments of what are the key challenges and opportunities at each level.

- Records of party activities between elections.
- 15. Add a substantial documentation, learning and communications department to the country office. This department should be led by a senior person with experience in research and analysis of a political economy nature. It is our opinion that this would provide an important value added not only to the programme but also to the organization, as there is a significant unmet need for learning in the complicated area of party strengthening and democratization.<sup>17</sup> This would be additional to other research work recommended below (see rec. 14). It should also be noted that we are of the opinion that some of the costs charged for Programme Support should go towards the strengthening of NDI's learning and documentation capacities and routines.
- 16. Provide input and support as appropriate, to fora for public debate on democratic development and party politics

### *Recommendations for Norwegian Embassy*

- 17. Be aware of linkages to other governance programmes, e.g. anti-corruption, financial reform support, local government reform, support to Parliament, civil society and independent media and human rights and gender equality programmes, etc.
- 18. Explore possibilities for supporting ongoing process of political economy analysis and research that is linked into the national political/analytical discourse. There appears to be a lack of good quality and current political analysis. What should be considered is to kick off a process of analysis and research, preferably in partnership with other partners and organisations, wherein a set of key questions are asked, research is funded, and the findings presented and discussed in open fora. Research themes/questions could include:
  - What are the relationships between political leaders and parties and big business? This would explore issues such as grand corruption cases, and possible linkages with party/campaign funding. The issue of political financing should be explored at both the national and the constituency level, and could also cover the internal party nomination process;
  - Descriptive research and analysis of local level politics. This would look at political competition at the local level. What are the issues that win or lose elections? Relationship and interaction between local authorities and elected councillors. What does political life at the local level look like?
  - The role and use of ethnicity in politics. Mapping of use of ethnicity in the political conflicts that culminated in the 2007/08 post-election violence. Mapping the grievances that lay to ground for the ethnic tension and analysis of the political solution proposed by various parties and politicians to redress real and perceived injustices (e.g., the various proposals for majimbo and land reform).<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> It may be noted that one of the world's foremost experts on democratisation aid, Thomas Carothers, has also observed that one of the key weaknesses of many of the organisations that have specialised in implementing democratisation programmes, is a failure to institutionalise learning and record experiences. Carothers speculates that one of the reasons for this particular failure in this area of development, is that the "missionary zeal" for spreading the goods of democracy comes in the way of stopping to reflect on the actual processes encountered (Carothers 2006).

<sup>18</sup> A good example of an analysis of ethnicity and democratisation is Juma Okuku Anthony's study of "Ethnicity, state power and the democratisation process in Uganda." One of his observations is that "the

Ideally, each of these streams of analysis and research should be ongoing processes. This would entail funding and support of consecutive research efforts, presentation of research findings and conclusions in public fora, and follow up research on issues of continued uncertainty or controversy. A key objective of this type of research would be to fuel and stimulate an informed and honest debate in the public domain.

The type of research would be very much in line with the new innovations presented by DFID's Drivers of Change and SIDA's Power Analysis. The difference would be in the ongoing, long-term character of the research. A weakness of the aforementioned power analysis type studies is that donors have been uncertain what to do with them once they have been completed.<sup>19</sup> By purposely approaching the research as a way of contributing to a national dialogue, it is hoped that the research will be both more useful and more relevant to the continued process of policy analysis and lobbying.

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persistence of the ethnic problem in Uganda is linked to the failure of democratic practice, not vice versa" (Anthony 2002).

<sup>19</sup> This is also discussed in Scanteam's recent analysis of Anti-Corruption Approaches (Disch et al 2008, pages 44-45)

## **Annex 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE**

for

A review of Norwegian support to National Democratic Institute (NDI): Pre-election Party Strengthening in Kenya (hereafter called the “study”)

### **1. Background**

The bilateral development cooperation between Norway and Kenya is centred around issues of good governance and strengthening of democracy, including human rights and rights of women.

Support for democratic development through civil society has many forms in Kenya. NGOs have directly or indirectly received support by donors in connection with the general elections in 2002 and 2007 and the constitutional referendum in 2005 . Indirectly political parties receive donor support through international parliamentary organisations such as AWEPA (European Parliamentarians for Africa), the Canadian Parliamentary Centre and APNAC (African Parliamentarian Network Against Corruption) and through NGOs involved in party building like CMD (Centre for Multiparty Democracy) and NDI (National Democratic Institute).

These various civil society organisations somehow active in capacity building of political parties receive funding from both bilateral donors as well as International non-governmental organisations (INGO) and UN organisations.

Multiparty politics in Kenya is of a young age (1991), and party structures are likewise not firm and fixed structures compared to Western Europe. Therefore, a formalisation and a strengthening of these structures has been regarded as important in the overall aid given to the Kenyan democracy.

Illustrating of this lack of formalised and fixed structures is that people with political ambitions have been using for example civil society organisations as well as political parties to gather political support in the population. In this regard, it may be difficult for aspiring politicians in Kenya to distinguish between the functions of a political party and a civil society organisation. In other words, in Kenya civil society organisations are more important for political mobilisation than in most European countries, for example. This trait is a challenge for any programme directed at enhancing democratic representation through the strengthening of political parties.



## **NDI**

NDI established itself in Kenya in 1993. Programmes in Kenya initially provided skills training to enhance women's political participation and to strengthen the capacity of non-partisan civic groups to monitor elections. Since 2001, NDI has worked with political parties with support from a variety of donors including the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNDP Election basket 2007 and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

NDI is currently working with parties at the national level to help them better articulate and refine their positions on key issues, efficiently participate in coalition-building, strengthen their rules and procedures, and refine their internal nomination procedures. The Norwegian Embassy has supported these activities in 2006-2007. The programme builds on previous programmes but is adapted to the pre-2007-election situation and has a strong focus on inter-party peace dialogue. The need of such a focus is based on electoral tension and violence in recent history, in particular tensions surrounding the November 2005 constitutional referendum. At the local level NDI provides skills training to party branch officials on improving communication with party headquarters and their role in such processes and activities as coalition-building and platform development.

Currently, NDI has directed its Norwegian funded efforts to strengthening the functioning of the Grand Coalition government.

This review will cover the Norwegian-supported programme from 2006. The programme should be assessed in the wider political, social, cultural context as outlined above.

## **2. Programme description**

An initial agreement with NDI was signed on 27.07.2006 for a total grant of NOK 10 million to be disbursed in 2006 and 2007.

Target groups are all political parties and party officials in Kenya.

The main goal of the programme is to:

0) Strengthen democratic institutions and advance political reforms in Kenya.

The objectives of the programme are to:

1) Strengthen the capacity of political parties to make more process oriented, participatory and strategic decisions about forming coalitions.

- 2) Enhance the capacity of branch officials to contribute to their parties' decisions and activities.
- 3) Enhance the prospects for inter-party-dialogue at the national level and in targeted districts.

### **3. Main purpose of the study**

The main purpose of the study is to carry out a review of the results achieved in terms of the stated goal and objectives against the plan, budget / resources and methodology laid down in the planning documents. Assessing goal achievement may be difficult given the formulation of the goal and could be limited to stakeholders' assessment of its relevance. The programme objectives are also listed with a set of indicators (ref. proposal of 2006 p. 14). These indicators focus on parties' activities that relate to the above referred objectives. Most of these indicators are easily quantifiable and are reported on, but some require qualitative assessment from various stakeholders.

Although the results of the programme as described above are most important the review shall include an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the administrative and organisational set-up of the headquarters in Washington, including the relevance of the selected methodology.

Although of secondary importance, the study shall also provide the embassy with a brief comparative analysis of alternative channels for support of political parties in Kenya and alternative models of support.

The study shall provide recommendations for possible continued support of this programme or other programmes aimed at the development of political parties.

### **4. Scope of work**

The work shall be guided by the Development Cooperation Manual of Norad and comprise, but not necessarily be limited to, the following tasks:

- a) Assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the methodology, the administration and the organisation, and the resources against the planned goal and objectives of the programme. The study should in particular look at the cost-efficiency and impact of the programme in view of organisational set-up whereby much of the administrative tasks are done at the headquarters in Washington DC and guidance and advice are given by the HQ's governance- and democracy experts to the office in Nairobi. Could the funds

have been spent more efficiently and more effectively through another, locally based, organisation operating in the same area?

b) Assessment of the relevance of the programme as expressed in the goal and the objectives. The assessment of the relevance should also include comparisons with alternative ways of reaching the overall goal of strengthening democratic institutions and advance political reforms in Kenya. It should consider whether the objectives of the programme are relevant in view of the existing challenges of the wider setting of the political system and power structures, political cleavages, and political culture in Kenya. Further, do the goal and objectives allow special attention to the gender and human rights dimensions?

c) The study should take into consideration the political system and power structures, political cleavages, and political culture in Kenya and how these factors have developed during the time-span of the programme. These factors represent opportunities or obstacles for people to affect the development of democratic institutions and democratic reforms including the development of political parties - at the national and district levels. As such, the factors represent the framework of the programme; they obviously have an impact on any programme addressing these issues.

## **5. Implementation of the study**

### **5.1 The team**

The study should be carried out by a team with good general knowledge of the political history and political culture as well as current politics in Kenya. The team will consist of a Norwegian consultant and a local/regional consultant with theoretical and Kenya-related relevant knowledge. It may be considered whether to hire a Ugandan or a Tanzanian consultant instead of a Kenyan in order to avoid a partisan approach. The Norwegian will be the teamleader.

The consultants should familiarise themselves with the Embassy's guidelines and strategic approach to development co-operation in Kenya.

The local consultant will be hired by the Embassy.

### **5.2 Sources of Documentation, respondents and methodology**

The study will be based on secondary data including written information from NDI and the Embassy and relevant research and studies. In addition, qualitative data should be

collected through interviews in the target groups (with people who have benefited and not benefited from the programme), with key persons involved in the planning and implementation of the programme, if relevant, including telephone interviews at the NDI HQ, with people in similar organisations as NDI and with other resource persons. Interviews could be undertaken with the Embassy and other donors, NDIs, MPs and political parties, district politicians, civil society organisations, media, government, and academia, as relevant. Interviews may be undertaken one-on-one or in groups.

NDI will assist in setting up some of the interviews.

### 5.3 Time frame and financing

Most of the interviewing will take place in Nairobi, although some travelling is required to party branches and representatives drawn from a sample of the regional Inter-Party Peace Committees.

The time frame of the study for the local consultant is estimated to be about 3 weeks of which 2 weeks in the field. The review, including the field work is expected to take place in November 2008.

The Embassy and NDI will assist the team in making arrangements for their visit to selected districts.

## 6. Reporting

A draft report shall be presented in electronic form no later than December 15th for feedback from the Embassy, NDI and Norad. These shall be given 4 weeks to comment on the draft report. The final report shall reflect these comments and acknowledge any substantive disagreements. The final report shall be ready by end of 1 February 2008.

The report shall be written in English and should not exceed 20 pages (excluding the annexes). The report shall consist of an executive summary, methodology used, major findings, conclusions and recommendations. TOR shall be attached.

END

## **Annex 2 LIST OF INTERVIEWS**

### **18 November**

#### **Norwegian Embassy:**

- H.E. Ambassador Elisabeth Jacobsen
- Jan Arne Munkeby, Counsellor
- Vegard Holmelid, First Secretary (Political Affairs)
- Johan Roko, Intern

#### **NDI**

- Bjarte Tora, Country Director
- Felix Odhiambo, Senior Programme Officer

### **19 November**

#### **Ford Kenya Offices**

- Stephen Namsyule, Executive Director Ford-K

#### **DP Offices**

- Ramadhan Juma, Executive Director, DP

#### **Netherlands Embassy**

- Kees van Baar, Minister Councillor

#### **ODM House**

- Joshua Kawino, Finance Director, ODM

#### **Ford-P Offices**

- John Imoite, Director, Ford-P

### **20 November**

#### **Nairobi Metropolitan Ministry**

- Hon. Mutula Kilonzo, Minister Nairobi Metropolitan and Secretary General ODM-K

#### **NDI**

- Julia Ojiambo, LPK Party Leader

#### **Jakaranda Hotel**

- Hon. Joseph Munyao, DP Party Leader

### **21 November**

#### **Waterbuck Hotel, Nakuru. Meeting with IPPC members from Nakuru and Eldoret**

- Samuel Chimweno, Kanu, Eldoret IPPC
- Pamela Ruhungu, Ford-K, Eldoret IPPC
- J.K. Weere, ODM, Eldoret IPPC
- Cllr. John Bett, ODM, Nakuru IPPC
- Cllr. Jepter Maniga, DP, Nakuru IPPC
- Joseph Juma, Forde-P, Nakuru IPPC
- Beatrice Onsongo, Narc-K, Nakuru IPPC
- Constance Njoroge, Narc-K, Nakuru IPPC
- Mwange Muraye, ECK, Nakuru
- Jonathan Mbulua, Ford-K, Nakuru IPPC
- Samuel Kaman, Narc-K, Nakuru IPPC
- Niver Oluchivi, ODM, Nakuru IPPC
- William Atingi, ODM, Chair Nakuru IPPC

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### 22 November

#### Sunset Hotel, Kisumu

- Enock Olonde, DP Dep. National Org. Secretary, Chair Kisumu West Constituency, Secretary Kisumu IPPC
- Peter Kochiel, DP Regional Coordinator Nyanza, Chair Karachonyo Constituency, member Kisumu IPPC
- Samuel Nyabinda, ODM Kisumu Branch Secretary, Kisumu IPPC

### 23 November

#### Sunset Hotel, Kisumu

- Enock Olonde, DP Dep. National Org. Secretary, Chair Kisumu West Constituency, Secretary Kisumu IPPC
- George O. Oulo, KANU, member IPPC Kisumu
- Dave Okwach, ODM, Chair Kusumu IPPC
- Shem Onyango, KANU, member NEC, Kisumu IPPC
- Audi Ogada, Ford-K, Kisumu IPPC
- Antipas Okoth, ODM, Kisumu IPPC
- Faston O. Okech, Ford-K, Kisumu IPPC
- Charles Nyachieo, Secretary Nyanza South (Kisii) IPPC
- Samuel Nyabinda, ODM, Kisumu IPPC
- Cllr. Caroline Owen, LDP, Kisumu IPPC

### 24 November

#### UNDP, Nairobi

- Sheila Ngatia, ARR, Empowerment Unit
- Jane Likimani-Gachanja, Programme Officer, Democratic Governance

### 25 November

#### Prime Minister's Office

- Hon. Raila Odinga, Prime Minister

#### IED

- Peter Okoth Aling'o, IED Executive Director

### 26 November

#### NDI, meeting by telephone

- Sheila Karani, USAID
- Ann Mvumbi, USAID

#### NDI

- Bjarte Tora, NDI Country Director

#### Norwegian Embassy

- Vegard Holmelid, First Secretary (Political Affairs)
- Johan Roko, Intern

### 27 November

#### Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD)

- Njeri Kabeberi, Chairperson of CMD
- Omweri Angima, Programme Officer, CMD

#### NDI

- Baraza Nyukuri, Consultant, NDI

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### **Transparency International**

- Job Ogonda, Executive Director, TI
- Mwangi Kibathi, Programme Officer, TI

### **28 November**

#### **Centre for Governance and Development**

- Kennedy Masime, Executive Director, CGD

#### **Office of the Vice President**

- Hon. Kalonzo Musyoka, Vice President and Party Leader ODM-K
- Hon. Mutula Kilonzo, Minister of Metropolitan Nairobi and Secretary General ODM-K

### **1 December**

#### **NDI**

- Bjarte Tora,

#### **Norwegian Embassy**

- Sheryl Stumbras, USAID
- Paul Simkim, DIFD

### **2 December**

#### **Norwegian Embassy, presentation of findings of mission**

- Elisabeth Jakobsen
- Vegard Holmelid
- Johan Roko

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
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**Annex 4 - THE TREE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN KENYA UP TO THE ELECTIONS IN 2007**



## Review of Norwegian support to National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kenya

### ACRONYMS

#### I. POLITICAL PARTIES

DP	Democratic Party
FORD ASILI	Forum for Restoration of Democracy – Asili
FORD-KENYA ( FK)	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Kenya
FORD PEOPLE (FP)	Forum for Restoration of Democracy - People
KANU	Kenya African National Union
LP	Labour Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
NAK	National Alliance Party of Kenya ( DP + 13 Small Parties)
NARC	National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (Key members DP, FORD KENYA AND NPK)
NPK	National Party of Kenya
NARC – Kenya	National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition - Kenya
NDP	National Democratic Party
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
ODM-K	Orange Democratic Movement –Kenya
PNU	Party of National Unity
SABA SABA ASILI	
SAFINA ( <i>Ark</i> in Kiswahili)	
SHIRIKISHO ( Federal )	Shirikisho Party of Kenya

#### II. MOVEMENTS

BANANA ( In Support of the Government Constitution Bill )
ORANGE ( Against the Government Constitution Bill)

**Annex 5 – Itinerary of key politicians**

**ITINERARY OF MAJOR POLITICIANS IN KENYA:  
Which Party, at What Date and Event, and Which Associates**

S/N	NAME AND POSITION	1991 Inception of Multipartism	1992 Founding Elections	1997 Elections	2002 Elections	2005 Referendum	2007 Elections
1.	President Kibaki	Democratic Party (founding member)	Democratic Party	Democratic Party	NARC (Democratic Party)	NARC (Democratic Party)	PNU
2.	V. President Musyoka	KANU	KANU	KANU	NARC (Rainbow) (LDP)	NARC (LDP)	ODM-Kenya
3.	PM. Raila	FORD	FORD-Kenya	National Development Party (NDP)	NARC (Rainbow) (LDP)	LDP	ODM
4.	Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU (PNU)
5.	Ho. Paul Muite	FORD	Ford-Kenya	Safina	Safina	Safina	Safina (PNU)
6.	Ho. Martha Karua	Democratic Party	DP	DP	NARC (DP)	NARC (DP)	PNU (NARC-Kenya)
7.	Hon. Simon Nyachai	KANU	KANU	KANU	Ford-People	Ford-People	PNU (Ford-People)
8.	Hon. Musikari	FORD	Ford-Kenya	Ford-Kenya	NARC	NARC	PNU

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S/N	NAME AND POSITION	1991 Inception of Multipartism	1992 Founding Elections	1997 Elections	2002 Elections	2005 Referendum	2007 Elections
	Kombo				(Ford-Kenya)	(Ford-Kenya)	(Ford-Kenya)
9.	Hon. Jirongo	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU	UDM
10.	Hon. Charity Ngiro			Social Democratic Party (SDP)	NARC (National Party of Kenya – NPK)	NARC	NARC Affiliated with ODM
11.	Hon. Joseph Munyao	Democratic Party	DP	NARC (DP)	NARC (DP)	NARC (DP)	PNU (DP)
12.	Hon. James Orengo	FORD	Ford-Kenya	Ford-Kenya	SDP	SDP	ODM
13.	Hon. Prof. Anyang Nyongo	FORD	Ford-Kenya	SDP	NARC (SDP)	NARC (SDP)	ODM
14.	Hon. Musalia Mudavadi	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU	ODM
15.	Hon. William Ruto	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU	KANU	ODM

**Annex 6 - Summary presentation of the achievement of agreed indicators**

Indicators	Status	Comments
<b>Objective 1. Strengthen the capacity of political parties to make process oriented, participatory and strategic decisions about forming coalitions in the lead up to the 2007 elections</b>		
1.1 With NDI assistance, technical committees within the targeted political parties develop strategy documents that are used to inform decisions about whether or not to contest the 2007 elections in coalition.	<b>Achieved.</b> 8 parties - ODM, NARC, LDP, LPK, Shirikisho, DP, Ford-K and Ford-P - supported to develop strategies and tools to inform decisions about whether or not to contest the 2007 elections in coalitions.	While the parties no doubt have gained significant skills in coalition building, it is still obvious the primary gain of coalitions is to gain power for personal enrichment, not to gain acceptance of policies.  The formation of the Grand Coalition led to what can be seen as an excessively large cabinet where almost half of MPs are of Minister or Assistant Minister rank. This is an indication that coalition building is benefiting the political elite more than the electorate. This is perhaps inevitable in the political context of current Kenya, but there is a need to reflect on the limitations of coalition building as a method of deepening democracy in the country.
1.2 With NDI assistance, targeted political parties that decide to form coalitions develop new or advanced skills and documents and use them in coalition-building negotiations.	<b>Achieved.</b> The same 8 parties (see above) developed coalition technical committees that to work on specific issues to facilitate their participation in coalitions.	
1.3, Targeted political parties that decide to form coalitions use best practices shared during NDI-sponsored activities in establishing and sustaining coalition structures and processes	<b>Achieved.</b> The ODM and ODM-K coalitions and the individual members of the PNU coalition use the tools developed with assistance from NDI to negotiate and form the respective coalitions in the run up to the 2007 elections. The tools and additional technical assistance from NDI also assisted in forging the Grand Coalition that was formed after the elections and which forms the basis for the present government of national unity.	
<b>Objective 2. To enhance the capacity of party branch officials to contribute to their parties' decisions and activities in the lead up to the 2007 elections</b>		
2.1 With NDI assistance, party branch officials provide input to their parties pre-electoral decisions and/or processes such as whether to form coalitions and platform developments	<b>Achieved.</b> Party branch officials provided with necessary skills and enabled to participate in party decision processes, including on whether to form coalitions and platform developments.	The strengthening of party branches remain a key challenge. There is also a need to develop a better understanding of the challenges faced by party politics at the local level.
2.2 With NDI assistance, party branch officials develop and use new skills to conduct pre-electoral activities such as voter outreach.	<b>Achieved.</b> Party branch officials provided with skills and supported to conduct pre-electoral activities such as voter outreach, with particular emphasis on need for peaceful co-existence and the role of youth and women. This appears to have primarily been conducted under the auspices of the IPPCs.	
2.3 Party branch officials displayed improved understanding of their roles and responsibilities and/or take steps to improve communications with	<b>Achieved.</b> Strengthened capacities and confidence of local branch party officials enabled them to assert more influence with national party leaderships, and also elevated a number of local officials to assume positions in the party national structures. Additionally, Ford-K and LDP established	

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Indicators	Status	Comments
headquarters officials.	standardized communications systems that improved communication between the parties' national headquarters and branch offices.	
<b>Objective 3. To enhance prospects for civil interparty dialogue at the national level and in targeted districts in the lead up to the 2007 elections</b>		
3.1 NDI-sponsored multi-party roundtables assist political actors in identifying and reaching agreement on steps to enhance the legitimacy and integrity of the electoral process.	<b>Achieved.</b> Political roundtables sponsored, including one major session with party leaders and one between previous Prime Minister of Norway, Kjell Magne Bondevik, and party leaders.	
3.2 With NDI assistance, IPPCs are established in 13 targeted districts in the lead up to the elections.	<b>Achieved.</b> IPPCs have been set up in Nakuru, Kisii, Kisumu, Machakos, Thika, Kakamega, Eldoret, Mombasa, Voi, Embu, Bungoma, Nairobi and Garissa.	
3.3 IPPCs conduct activities in their respective areas to raise awareness about the need for peaceful elections and political tolerance.	<b>Achieved.</b> IPPCs conduct a wide range of activities, including inter-party dialogue and community outreach activities advocating peaceful inter-party dialogue and competition, including activities targeting youth and women.	
3.4 IPPCs take steps to reduce interparty tension in their respective areas.	<b>Achieved.</b> The IPPCs record significant success in initiating peaceful interparty dialogue, as the meetings of the IPPC is an unprecedented effort of bringing the local party leaders around one table to exchange concerns and experiences.	Significant challenges remain in enabling IPPC members and committed branch party leaders to instill appropriate discipline to control cases of candidates indulging in practices inimical to peace.
<b>Goal:</b> <b>Strengthen democratic institutions and advance democratic reform in Kenya.</b>	<b>Achieved.</b> It is the opinion of the evaluators that the project has contributed significantly towards its stated goal of strengthening democratic institutions and advancing democratic reform in Kenya.	The positive contribution of the project, however, remains vulnerable to serious set-backs in the context of the continuing fragility of existing structures and the weakness of political institutions, including political parties. Kenyan politics continues to be dominated by personal power structures and capture by converging political and economic interests.

