

Management of Natural Resources Programme, Tanzania TAN-0092

Final Evaluation

NORAD COLLECTED REVIEWS 1/2007

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and the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam

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The report is presented in a series, compiled by Norad to disseminate and share analyses of development cooperation. The views and interpretations are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

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Final Evaluation

**VOLUME 1: Main Report
Summary of Main Findings and Recommendations**

REVISED FINAL REPORT

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Final Report submitted to the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
and the
Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam

November 2006

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**MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAMME
(MNRP-TAN 092)
FINAL EVALUATION
Volume 1: MAIN REPORT**

Executive summary

The final evaluation of the Management of Natural Resources Programme (MNRP) consisted of site visits to the programme's eleven projects, interviews with project managers and beneficiaries, and a review of programme documents and other relevant literature.

MNRP impact on natural resources and livelihoods

The MNRP's main objective is: 'Increased benefits to rural communities based on sustainable natural resource management in Tanzania.' The evaluation team finds that MNRP has recorded positive achievements with regard to this objective. In terms of *natural resource conservation and restoration*:

- The ***Catchment Forestry Project*** has improved the quality of forests in all project regions: the number and intensity of fires have decreased significantly, woody vegetation and canopy cover have increased, and the quantity and quality of water has improved;
- The ***NCA-Katatu*** project has led to the regeneration of vegetation in degraded areas;
- Partly as a result of the ***Mangrove Management Project***, mangrove areas increased from 115,500 ha to 133,480 ha., an increase of nearly 16 percent;
- In the ***Ruvu Fuelwood Forestry project***, many trees have been planted, some of them valuable indigenous species. As well as planting trees on their forest plots, people have also started planting trees in their shambas, despite there being no culture of planting trees on shambas in this area;
- Conservation measures in the ***Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP)*** have significantly reduced the incidence of dynamite fishing;
- The establishment of bee reserves under the ***Beekeeping Project*** has had a positive impact as regards maintaining or restoring biodiversity. The project has led some farmers to abandon tobacco cultivation and has reduced the use of bark hives, which are environmentally destructive;
- Through the ***HASHI/ICRAF project***, the Shinyanga people were able to restore over 350,000 ha of degraded land by 2002, raising the afforestation rate from 1,000 to 20,000/ha per year;
- As a result of the ***Serengeti Regional Conservation Project***, there has been a significant increase in the wildlife population following a reduction in poaching.

MNRP can also claim numerous successes in terms of *increased income generation and poverty reduction* among community members in project areas, including:

- In catchment areas, households plant trees on individual plots and cut firewood and harvest grass for their zero-grazed cows. Income from the sale of honey and beeswax has enabled some families to improve nutrition, pay school fees, buy food and corrugated iron roofing sheets;
- Heifers supplied in Karatu have generated a cash income is used for food, other domestic needs, and school fees;

- The mangrove project has attained or surpassed project targets relating to accessing mangrove products and revenues, and involvement in diverse income-generating activities;
- In Ruvu, people's food security has improved because they have larger, more fertile areas on which to plant a variety of crops, and because they are able to sell poles and charcoal to cover the shortfall in food during droughts;
- The creation of MIMP has resulted in a clear increase in income within the park;
- In pilot villages, beekeepers increased honey production from an average of 175 kg/beekeeper in 1999 to of 494 kg/beekeeper in June 2005. By 2005, the average income per beekeeper was TShs 456,000;
- The HASHI Project has had a significant impact on household income through woodlot enclosures, with benefits from restoration estimated at USD 14/person/month;
- In SRCP, food security has increased for employed people, including Village Game Scouts. Income from tourism has led to increased benefits to the rural communities in the 21 villages in the project area, particularly in terms of social and welfare amenities.

At the *community level*, income earned from various project activities, including tourism royalties, meat sales, and taxes on forest products, have financed investments in social infrastructure.

These achievements reflect positively on Norwegian-Tanzanian collaboration over a range of natural resources and their management, and on the capacity of the MNRT to translate external and national resources into positive outputs.

However, projects supported through MNRP have sometimes achieved their conservation objectives at the expense of, or with unforeseen negative consequences for, local populations. For example:

- In catchment project areas, the benefits for communities involved in Joint Forest Management have generally been modest and limited to a few. Alternative income-generating activities have had limited impact, and there are many instances where income from forest products or other sources is inequitably distributed, with communities usually benefiting the least;
- Livelihoods from salt making have been largely stopped as a result of the mangrove project, but it is unlikely that income generation activities, including seaweed farming and beekeeping, have generated significant benefits for many people, the poor in particular;
- In SRCP, there has been an increase in crop destruction and danger of injury to residents, particularly by elephants, leading to food insecurity and malnutrition.

In general, *project benefits are frequently limited to a relatively small number of communities and households*. It is extremely difficult to assess the geographical spread and poverty reduction impact of these benefits.

There is also evidence that the taxes, royalties and fees collected from NRM-related activities accrue to central and local governments in that order, with insignificant amounts left for village communities.

Consequently, the team has major concerns over the *extent and distribution of environmental and socio-economic benefits* derived from the programme and therefore over the *efficiency and long-term effectiveness and sustainability* of NRMP interventions.

Natural resource management objectives have evolved rapidly in recent years. Community empowerment has replaced conservation as the major focus of NRM. Aid agencies have moved from projects to budget support. Local government reform emphasises participatory planning and fiscal decentralisation. The government and development partners now acknowledge ‘private sector development’ as a key component of efforts to increase economic growth and poverty reduction.

The evaluation team considers that it has proved difficult for the MNRP and MNRT to adjust to this rapidly evolving policy and strategic context, with the result that NR conservation has remained the main focus of programme activities, and top-down management practices have generally continued to characterise project management’s relations with local communities and the private sector. Despite enabling legislation, joint management and benefit sharing principles have not been mainstreamed. Consequently, handing over responsibility for programme activities to underfinanced and understaffed local governments is proving problematic, undermining the prospects for programme sustainability.

Conclusions

Future collaboration between the governments of Norway and Tanzania in NRM must address the following challenges:

- Governance shortcomings on both the Norwegian and Tanzanian sides that serve to undermine community empowerment and the implementation of participatory NRM policies;
- Multiple donors and weak internal and external aid coordination capacities;
- Weak policy implementation and service delivery capacity at the local level;
- Failure to integrate NRM into government and aid-supported macro-economic, fiscal, budgetary, and poverty reduction policies.

Recommendations

1. The evaluation team recommends that the evaluation results should be widely circulated and constitute an input into a *broad-based debate of development assistance for NRM in Tanzania involving development partners, the private sector, and civil society organisations from national to local levels.*
2. The long-term goal of NRM support should be *to make the GOT financially independent of donor aid by valuing and taxing natural resources effectively and enforcing NRM laws and regulations.*
3. Enhanced accountability or popular ‘voice’, the rule of law, the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, and corruption control are all critical for improved NRM. To signal the importance of these issues we propose a new objective for future Norwegian support to NRM, namely: *‘improved governance in NRM-related institutions in national and local government, communities, and the private sector.’*
4. Rather than being considered semi-autonomous ‘sectors’, marine, forest, and wildlife hunting and tourism need to be integrated into the mainstream of economic

planning, taxation and regulation, and the team recommends that *Norway take a more pro-active* role in furthering this process among development partners.

5. The importance of addressing the *aid coordination issue* and confronting the moral hazards attached to targeted aid for these sectors needs to be stressed.

6. The evaluation team *strongly recommends* that future Norwegian aid for project XI (MIMP) should be conditional on the implementation of major changes in MIMP's management as recommended in previous reviews and research, and corroborated by the evaluation.

7. GON must decide on its comparative advantage in relation to the various NR sub-sectors, in particular, wildlife management for tourism and hunting, freshwater and ocean fisheries, and forestry. *The desirability of supporting the forestry SWAP, and the modalities of such support, will emerge as a result of these processes.*

**MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAMME
(MNRP-TAN 092)
FINAL EVALUATION**

Acknowledgement

The evaluation team would like to thank all those, too numerous to list, who provided logistic and technical support, and information, explanation and opinions on the Management of Natural Resources Programme and the context in which the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism has been implementing the various components of the programme since 1994.

The team also thanks those Tanzanian and Norwegian officials in Tanzania and Norway and others who commented on earlier drafts of the report.

The team accepts full responsibility for any remaining errors and omissions in the final evaluation report.

Dar es Salaam, November 2006

Abbreviations and acronyms

BCS	Business Care Services Ltd
BHWI	Biodiversity and Human-Wildlife Interface
CAMARTEC	Centre for Agricultural Mechanization and Rural Technology (Arusha)
CAWM	College of Wildlife Management
CBFM	Community Based Forest Management
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resources Management
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCS	Community Conservation Service
DCFO	District Catchment Forest Officer
DED	District Executive Director
DGO	District Game Officer
DW	Director of Wildlife
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EU	European Union
FR	Forest Reserve
FZS	Frankfurt Zoological Society
GON	Government of Norway
HASHI	Hifadhi Ardhi Shinyanga
HIMAKA	Hifadhi Mazingira Karatu
IGA	Income Generating Activity
IUCN	The World Conservation Union (formerly International Union for the Conservation of Nature)
JFM	Joint Forest Management
JFMA	Joint Forest Management Areas
KINAPA	Kilimanjaro National Park
LGA	Local Government Authority
MKUKUTA	Mkakati Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini Tanzania (National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty)
MNRP	Management of Natural Resources Programme
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPR	Marine Parks and Reserves
NAFRAC	Natural Forest Resources Management and Agro-Forestry Centre
NASCO	National Steering Committee for Agroforestry
NCA	Ngorongoro Conservation Area
NCAA	Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority
NHFR	Northern Highland Forest Reserve
NINA	Norwegian Institute for Nature Research
NORWAY	Norwegian Agency for International Development
NRM	Natural Resource Management
RCFO	Regional Catchment Forest Officer
RNE	Royal Norwegian Embassy
SACCOS	Savings and Credit Cooperatives Societies
SENAPA	Serengeti National Park
SRCP	Serengeti Regional Conservation Project
SRCS	Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy
SUA	Sokoine University of Agriculture

SWRC	Serengeti Wildlife Research Centre
SWRI	Serengeti Wildlife Research Institute
TADREG	Tanzania Development Research Group
TAFORI	Tanzania Forestry Research Institute
TANAPA	Tanzania National Parks
TaTEDO	Tanzania Appropriate Technology Development Organisation
TAWIRI	Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute
TCMP	Tanzania Conservation Management Programme
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
VNRC	Village Natural Resources Committee
SENAPA	Serengeti National Park
VETA	Vocational Education and Training Authority
VGS	Village Game Scout
VIP	Former name of Grumeti Reserves Ltd
WD	Wildlife Division
WMA	Wildlife Management Area

MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAMME (MNRP-TAN 092) FINAL EVALUATION

Structure of the evaluation report

This report is in three volumes. **Volume 1** presents our main findings, conclusions and recommendations; **Volume 2** presents the detailed findings from field visits; and **Volume 3** contains **Annexes**. The evaluation was guided by the **Terms of Reference (Annex 3.1)** and the Response to the TOR by Business Care Services (**Annex 3.2**).

In **Volume 1**, we present our findings and recommendations. First, in **Part 1** we present a brief overview of the methodology the evaluation team employed. We describe the conceptual and practical constraints on covering the evaluation's objectives and scope of work. We then summarise our main thematic findings before presenting short summaries of the main results of the field visits in **PART 2**.

PART 1: Overview and main findings

Methodology (See Volume 3, Annex 3.2)

This report is based on field visits to MNRP project sites, interviews with officials at the Royal Norwegian Embassy and Tanzanian government officials from the national level down to the village, and discussions with villagers and private sector operators in project areas. In addition, the team reviewed programme and project-related documents, and information from academic and media sources (see **Annex 3.6: Persons met, interviews, group discussions**, and **Annex 3.3: Bibliography**).

Unlike previous evaluations and reviews, this evaluation was designed to be 'independent.' First, many of the members of past evaluation and review teams, both Norwegians and Tanzanians, have been directly or indirectly involved in MNRP implementation, some over many years. Reviewing project inputs, activities and outputs from within the boundaries of the MNRP inevitably introduces more or less subtle biases in reporting. In particular, project reviews may underestimate or ignore important issues in the wider project environment that may constitute potential constraints on successful project implementation and sustainability. For example, issues related to national, local and project-level *governance* are arguably among the most important constraints, a point that observers of NRM in Tanzania have been making with increasing frequency in recent years. A major challenge is how to integrate concerns with governance into traditional 'capacity building' and training approaches to institutional strengthening.

The issue of contextual constraints on programme impact and sustainability is elaborated in some detail in **Volume 3, Annex 3.2**. To summarise, the team set out with the view that it would be extremely difficult to assess programme and project impact in the absence of a full understanding of the overall contexts in which the programme and projects are embedded (See **Annex 3.2, Section 1.2 Understanding project contexts**), particularly on the basis of short and superficial field visits.

The response to the TOR attempted to address this problem, and a set of fieldwork instructions (not annexed) was developed to help focus on specific governance constraints to project impact and sustainability. The working hypothesis was that

governance factors in the wider project environment have major impacts on both sustainability and the distribution of costs and benefits derived from programme activities.

We elaborate on the practical ramifications of the governance concept below. As well as trying to identify and comment on key governance issues, field teams also adopted the more traditional approach to programme evaluation by examining impact, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, and sustainability, issues on which data are more readily available, and which meet the requirements of the objectives and scope of work in the TOR.

Limits to the report

The evaluation team is acutely aware of the difficulties involved in bringing a new analytical framework to bear on an existing programme and projects, and we do not claim more than partial success.

In general, the paucity of basic contextual and project-level information makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions on MNRP project impacts. Project performance and sustainability depend on the socio-cultural, political, administrative, economic, development assistance and other contexts in which projects are implemented. In most cases, information on these institutional contexts is inadequate for drawing firm conclusions on project performance. Short-term evaluators cannot address these underlying contextual issues.

At the project level, brief guided tours of selected project sites usually provide no more than anecdotal information on which to pass judgements on project effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Projects routinely lack baseline and detailed monitoring information and there is a strong bias, common to development projects in general, towards reporting on project activities (such as ‘training workshops held’) and outputs (‘sensitised citizens’) rather than impacts (‘increased household income’) and outcomes (‘improved household nutrition’). Project managers usually report outputs and (sometimes) impact for pilot sites or selected localities and beneficiaries rather than for the entire project area defined in physical and human terms. In some cases, project areas are large and scattered and projects could not be expected to cover them in a comprehensive manner. Examples are the mangrove and catchment forest projects.

Other donor-funded activities also complicate the picture: there are no less than 14 donor agencies and international NGOs involved in NRM in Tanzania,¹ and a number of MNRP projects are receiving or have in the past received support from more than one donor, making the task of isolating the impact of specific interventions more difficult.

Lastly, team members did not generally have time to collect data on key governance issues, including taxation and regulation by government and parastatal bodies.

For the above reasons, it is not easy to *capture with confidence the impact* of MNRP projects on natural resources and on the people exploiting them. However, the team

¹ See URT, Public Expenditure Review, External Review 2006, Annex 1.

managed to collect much useful information during the short fieldwork exercise, using the methodology outlined above.

MNRP background

The final evaluation of the Management of Natural Resources Programme examines the impact of long-term Norwegian support to Tanzania for marine, forestry, agro-forestry, and wildlife conservation and benefit-sharing through a number of stand-alone projects and support to research and management institutions.

The MNRP is wholly funded by the Governments of Norway and Tanzania, and implemented by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). Based on a Sector Agreement between Tanzania and Norway signed in 1994, MNRP completed its third phase (July 2002-June 2006), and has entered a final 'bridging period' financial agreement for the period July-December 2006, signed in May 2006. While Norway has already signalled that the MNRT will not continue in its present form from 2007, it is using the bridging period to prepare a new five-year programme in collaboration with the MNRT and other stakeholders. While informed by past evaluations and reviews and by the present evaluation, the scope and content of the new programme are subjects for further analytical work.

The MNRP's goal, main objective and intended outputs are as follows:

Goal: 'Natural resources contributed on sustainable basis towards reduced income poverty, vulnerability amongst the poorest groups and improved quality of life and social well-being in Tanzania.'

Objective: 'Increased benefits to rural communities based on sustainable natural resource management in Tanzania.'

Outputs:

- Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) including Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) organisations strengthened and benefit sharing agreements made operational;
- Scaling up of agroforestry interventions supported;
- Income and employment generating private sector development efforts in NRM promoted;
- Strategic Programme Implementation to respond to changed policy and legal environment initiated.

Since Phase III (2002-06), the programme has been arranged into four components corresponding to the four outputs listed above. A number of projects are classified under more than one component, leading the 2005 Mid-Term Review to ask whether dividing the programme into these components was 'a very useful exercise.'²

During the period 1994-2006 the Government of Norway has contributed about US\$50 m to the programme, with the GOT providing qualified local personnel to run

² Bryceson et al. 2005:7.

the programme and its projects, and paying salaries and providing all ‘other resources that may be required.’³

Programme objectives

Natural resource conservation and management principles and practices have evolved rapidly in recent years and this has influenced the objectives of MNRP. The same is true for the principles and practices of development aid. In relation to NRM, the focus has shifted from state-managed nature conservation to community *participation* in NRM and more recently to community *ownership* and *management*. In aid, the focus has moved from donor-managed and ‘ring-fenced’ projects to general and sector-wide budget support. With regard to NRM, community empowerment is the theoretical focus; with regard to aid, the focus is national ownership and implementation of aided policies, programmes and projects, and joint monitoring of expenditures and outcomes. Budgetary transfers have funded large amounts of training and capacity building in support of both NR and aid management under these modalities.

A third factor affecting programme objectives is *local government reform*, under which local authorities are supposed to become more autonomous of the central government, more accountable to citizens, and more responsible for project implementation. One key concern here is LGA’s capacity to take over responsibility for completed MNRP projects, and to manage any future projects under a decentralised policy regime.

Lastly, the GOT and development partners now acknowledge ‘*private sector development*’ as a key component of efforts to increase economic growth and poverty reduction. The enhanced role of the private sector in sustainable NRM is acknowledged in the objective: ‘Income and employment generating private sector development efforts ... promoted.’

The evaluation team considers that it has proved difficult for the MNRP to adjust to this rapidly evolving policy and strategic context, with the result that NR conservation has remained the main focus of programme activities, and top-down management practices have generally continued to characterise project management’s relations with local communities and the private sector. Finally, ‘handing over’ programme activities to local governments is proving extremely problematic, for reasons discussed below.

Impact

What social and economic development changes have occurred among rural communities as a result of MNRP? How have project interventions influenced attitudes to conservation and helped reduce income poverty among target communities and households? How have projects affected vulnerability among the poorest groups and the overall quality of life/social well-being? Before summarising our findings on these issues we mention a number of data limitations.

³ Source: Agreed Project Summary, Annex 1, 2002.

Measuring impact and benefits

Where conservation is a major objective, it is important to know how well the project and other related interventions cover the targeted areas, for example, catchment and mangrove forests. Such information is rarely collected or used systematically, meaning that it is often difficult to assess progress in conservation efforts, especially when destructive, unsustainable activities continue in other, non-programme areas.

Second, while beneficiaries of project activities are not difficult to find, it is frequently difficult to establish with confidence the *numbers of direct and indirect project beneficiaries* in relation to *the total potential beneficiaries in project areas*, and the *nature and extent of the benefits*. This argument also applies to the efficiency with which project benefits have been delivered and the distribution of *costs* resulting from project implementation.

Using programme indicators

Phase III of MNRP introduced a set of indicators (targets) against which to measure the realisation of the project goal and objectives. Project achievements by June 2004 are summarised in **Annex 4**. Of the 28 indicators 15 (54 percent) refer to processes (for example, villagers ‘sensitised’, taking over NRM responsibilities, taking part in income generating activities) and only 13 (46 percent) refer to outputs (for example, communities have access to NR, utilising animal quotas, income from sale of forest products). Past reviews and evaluations have adopted a similar approach of recording activities and benefits (income from hunting, confiscation of timber, fires combated...). *No indicators consider wider impacts at individual, household or community levels*. This limits their value from an impact assessment point of view.

There are a number of other problems with using quantitative indicators to assess programme impact: (1) The targets are inevitably more or less arbitrary, meaning that achievements will be relative to the difficulty of meeting them; (2) projects sometimes cover huge areas so that collecting reliable monitoring data will be very costly, difficult, or impossible; (3) there is no attempt to compare the benefits derived from achieving targets with the direct and opportunity costs incurred in the process; (4) there is rarely any way of cross-checking the accuracy of the achievements claimed; (5) there is no indication of the ‘quality’ of achievements. For these reasons, the team has used project indicators sparingly in its evaluation of the impact of individual projects.

Despite these limitations, the team finds that the eleven projects under the MNRP have recorded positive achievements ranging from the modest to the exceptional over the years of their implementation.⁴ In terms of natural resource conservation and restoration:

- The ***catchment forestry project*** has improved the quality of forests in all project regions: the number and intensity of fires have decreased significantly, woody vegetation and canopy cover have increased, and the quantity and quality of water has improved;

■ ⁴ See project summaries below and **Volume 2**. The results of the training and research activities are inherently difficult to measure.

- The *NCA-Katatu* project has led to the regeneration of vegetation in degraded areas around Karatu villages;
- Partly as a result of the *mangrove management project*, mangrove areas increased from 115,500 ha to 133,480 ha., an increase of nearly 16 percent;
- In the *Ruvu fuelwood forestry project*, many trees have been planted, some of them valuable indigenous trees. As well as planting trees on their forest plots, many people have also started planting trees in their shambas, despite there being no culture of planting trees on shambas in this part of the country;
- Conservation measures in the *Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP)* have significantly reduced the incidence of dynamite fishing;
- The establishment of bee reserves under the *beekeeping project* has had a positive impact as regards maintaining or restoring biodiversity. The project has led some farmers to abandon tobacco cultivation and has reduced the use of bark hives, which are environmentally destructive;
- Through the *HASHI/ICRAF project*, the Shinyanga people were able to restore over 350,000 ha of degraded land by 2002, raising the afforestation rate from 1,000 ha/year to 20,000/ha per year;
- As a result of the *Serengeti Regional Conservation Project*, there has been a significant increase in the wildlife population following a reduction in poaching.

MNRP can also claim numerous successes in terms of increased income generation and poverty reduction among community members in project areas, including:

- In catchment areas, households plant trees on individual plots and cut firewood and harvest grass for their zero-grazed cows. And income from the sale of honey and beeswax has enabled some families to improve nutrition, pay school fees, buy food and corrugated iron roofing sheets;
- Heifers supplied in Karatu have generated a cash income is used for food, other domestic needs, and school fees;
- The mangrove project has attained or surpassed project targets relating to accessing mangrove products and revenues, and involvement in diverse income-generating activities;
- In Ruvu, people's food security has improved because they have larger, more fertile areas on which to plant a variety of crops, and because they are able to sell poles and charcoal to cover the shortfall in food during droughts;
- The creation of MIMP has resulted in a clear increase in income within the park;
- In pilot villages, beekeepers increased honey production from an average of 175 kg/beekeeper in 1999 to of 494 kg/beekeeper in June 2005. By 2005, the average income per beekeeper was TShs 456,000;
- The HASHI Project has had a significant impact on household income through woodlot enclosures, with benefits from restoration estimated at USD 14/person/month;
- In SRCP, food security has increased for employed people, including Village Game Scouts. Income from tourism has led to increased benefits to the rural communities in the 21 villages in the project area, particularly in terms of social and welfare amenities.

At the community level, income earned from various project activities, including tourism royalties, meat sales, and taxes on forest products, have financed investments in social infrastructure.

These achievements reflect positively on Norwegian-Tanzanian collaboration over a range of natural resources and their management, and on the capacity of the MNRT to put external funds to good use.

However, projects supported through MNRP have sometimes achieved their conservation objectives at the expense of, or with unforeseen negative consequences for, local populations. For example:

- In catchment project areas, the benefits for communities involved in Joint Forest Management have generally been modest and limited to a few. Alternative income-generating activities have had limited impact, and there are many instances where income from forest products or other sources is inequitably distributed, with communities usually benefiting the least;
- Livelihoods from salt-making have been largely stopped as a result of the mangrove project, but it is unlikely that income generation activities, including seaweed farming and beekeeping, have generated significant benefits for many people, the poor in particular;
- In SRCP, there has been an increase in crop destruction and danger of injury to residents, particularly by elephants, leading to food insecurity and malnutrition;

In addition, project benefits are frequently limited to a relatively small number of communities and households. It is extremely difficult to assess the geographical spread and poverty reduction impact of these benefits.

There is also evidence that the taxes, royalties and fees collected from NRM-related activities benefit central and local governments in that order, with insignificant amounts left for village communities.

Consequently, the team has major concerns over the *extent and distribution of environmental and socio-economic* derived from the programme and therefore over the *efficiency* and long-term *effectiveness* and *sustainability* of NRMP interventions. The following sections elaborate on these achievements and concerns.

Project impact on livelihoods and poverty

To assess the impact of MNRP projects we need to be clear on who incurs the costs and who derives the benefits from project activities. Individuals and households are the main potential beneficiaries of 'income generating' economic activities, whereas villages and 'communities' are the focus of benefits from taxes, levies, permits fines and other potential benefits in cash or in kind, for example game-meat from commercial hunting.

If the *local community* is the NRM beneficiary, the expectation is that village governments will use income from NR sources to expand local social infrastructure. Some argue there is a limit to the benefits villagers can derive from social infrastructure when their most acute problem is lack of adequate disposable income to afford the available health services and educate their children. The lesson is that NRM

benefits should derive from both direct income-generation and collective transfers resulting from capturing NR rents.

There are numerous signs that incomes retained from different sources used by project management to promote private income generation have had mixed results. An example of good performance is the Ruvu Fuelwood Project, where individual householders, including the poor, have benefited from the allocation of plots to households, leading to additional consumption and investment.

The evaluation team confirms earlier reports that the central and local governments are the major beneficiaries of NRM taxes, levies, and so on, with villages/communities receiving at best small residual benefits. These benefits are typically used for social infrastructure projects, which may (or may not) translate into collective future benefits.

Changes in livelihoods and poverty levels are affected by the allocation of project costs and benefits. For any project we may ask: do the benefits outweigh the costs, and for whom?

It is relatively easy to identify individuals and households that have benefited materially from project activities, and in the best cases, significant numbers of households derive substantial income and subsistence benefits, as shown in the project summaries below.

Yet, in many projects, the team feels that benefits are limited to a fortunate few, often the better-off members of the community, while the poor majority do not enjoy significant individual, household or collective benefits. In the worst cases, local people derive few benefits compared to the costs they incur, while the benefits that accrue to government agents, private operators and middlemen far exceed the costs these groups incur. Examples are wildlife conservation and tourism. One study in a MNRP area points out that: 'it is important to consider the potential benefits in relation to the costs that wildlife imposes on the local people. ... While the transfer of wildlife benefits to the villages ... are small, the villages bear substantial costs related to agricultural damage.'⁵ Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) appear to allocate many of the costs of NRM to villagers, while the lion's share of the benefits accrue to tourism companies and to central and local government.⁶ These examples lead to the conclusion that there are often *winners and losers* from project initiatives. How costs and benefits are allocated is largely a governance issue.

Gender impact

Concerns with inequitable control by men and women over resources have not been central to MNRP or its component projects. Yet poverty, discussed above, can take intra- as well as inter-household forms. There is little information from project reports or reviews on how the implementation of the MNRP has been influenced by and in turn influenced gender control of resources and the engendered division of labour. An

■ ⁵ Tomas Holmern et al. 2004, 'Human-Wildlife Conflicts and Hunting in the Western Serengeti, Tanzania,' NINA Research Report No. 26, Trondheim, May. See project VII (SRCP) for details.

■ ⁶ Corruption in the allocation of permits and licenses, and in revenue collection and transfer, means that officials accrue *private* benefits that should go into government coffers. Examples are deep-sea fishing, hunting block allocation and logging. See DPG (2005) policy briefs on forestry, tourism and fisheries.

exception is the Ruvu Fuelwood project, where some married women have eventually managed to obtain forest plots in their own name. This is fine, but it underlines the difficulty of men and women in the same household working together for the common good. Along with governance issues, the lack of a gender perspective throughout the implementation of the MNRP is one of its major weaknesses.

Efficiency: use of programme funds and human resources

Efficiency is a measure of the outputs of the project in relation to total resource inputs. It measures how economically project inputs are converted into outputs. Projects may be effective but overly expensive in terms of human and financial costs.

MNRP defines 'efficiency' in terms of timely spending of funds allocated to projects. Delays in transferring funds from the MOF to the MNRT and to projects can cause frustrating delays in project implementation. Although the transfer of funds is a complex and lengthy process, neither the Norwegian nor the Tanzanian side saw delays in the transfer of funds as a major constraint on programme implementation. Overall, delays of this sort do not seem to have seriously undermined project implementation, though there are exceptions.

The above definition of efficiency is very limited. In theory, project efficiency should be measured in terms of social and economic rates of return. In practice, this is very difficult, for reasons discussed above and in more detail in our Response to the Terms of Reference (**Annex 3**). We could find no evidence that the Norwegian funders or Tanzanian implementers of MNRT *were in any way constrained by concerns with the economic or social dimensions of efficiency as defined here*.

National level efficiency

In the national budget, there are frequent movements of money between various votes and sub-votes, which impedes budget efficiency and effectiveness.⁷ Donor general budget support is vulnerable to these movements through aid fungibility. However, we have no evidence that MNRP funds have been diverted to non-MNRP purposes. This is a significant achievement.

Use of funds at the programme and project level

The transparency of MNRP finances is one important aspect of programme governance. The MNRP is audited annually by the National Audit Office, formerly the office of the Controller and Auditor General (CAG).⁸ In auditing MNRP accounts, the NAO is guided by generally accepted accounting policies and practices, and the provisions of the agreement between Norway and the MNRT. Accounting procedures may help improve programme and project governance if they are designed with this objective in mind. However, normal audit and accounting procedures do not allow for an assessment of value for money, which ultimately depends on project outputs and impact. Nevertheless, accounts can be more or less informative, and it appears that throughout most of the programme, MNRT provided a minimal amount of information on expenditures.

⁷ Tanzania Public Expenditure Review Annual Consultative Meeting 2006, 'Review of Fiscal Developments and Public Expenditure Management Issues 2004/05 and First Half of 2005/06', Joint Evaluation Report, Dar es Salaam, May 12-13, pages 8-9.

■ ⁸ Accounting issues are dealt with in greater detail in **Annex 3.5**.

During the initial years of the programme, compliance with some of the relevant clauses of the specific Sector Agreement between NORAD and MNRT, as well as the standard of book-keeping, were low. For example, in 1994-96, the Auditor General raised queries with regard to the following areas:⁹

- Non-compliance with the Programme Agreement Document (failure to submit programme accounts within the time stipulated in the agreement);
- Non-preparation of bank reconciliation statements;
- Discrepancies between store ledger balances and physical balances;
- Inaccurate recording of transactions; and
- Some payments for which no supporting documents were made available.

Close follow-up by NORAD on these queries resulted in MNRT taking corrective action to the satisfaction of the Auditor General. Similarly, the Auditor General raised queries on other matters in subsequent Annual Financial Statements which again were followed up by all parties concerned and in this way the standard of accounting for and reporting on the Programme activities evolved and improved to the satisfaction of Norway.¹⁰

Over the years, projects have received qualified opinions because substantial sums have not been properly accounted for or have been used for unintended purposes. To its credit, MNRP management has been diligent in following up on the Auditor General's queries, generally resulting in their satisfactory resolution.¹¹

Currently, MNRP produces expenditure reports in a number of formats. Below we summarise programme spending for FY2004-05 by activities, expense type and costing categories. **Table 1** summarises disbursements on programme activities during FY2004-05 by main activities.¹²

Table 1: Utilization by project main activities 2004-05

Project	Amount	%
Coordination and Capacity Building	1,353,988,941	34
Natural Forestry Resources Management and Agro-forestry Project	584,392,436	15
Catchments Forestry Project	539,168,170	14
Biodiversity and Human – Wildlife Interface Project	357,071,444	9
Serengeti Regional Conservation Project	325,091,613	8
Mangrove Management Project	280,486,652	7
Beekeeping Development Project	149,505,180	4
Ruvu Fuel Wood Project	141,672,704	4
Mafia Island Marine Park Development and Conservation Project	83,391,530	2
Ngorongoro Conservation Area	77,703,722	2
Capacity Building and Infrastructure Development – Mweka	38,226,201	1
Total	3,930,698,593	100

⁹ Management Audit: letter of The Auditor General on the Programme's Financial Statements for the Fiscal Years 1994/1995 and 1995/1996.

¹⁰ For example, the NORAD delegation expressed appreciation for improved report when adopting the MNRP 2000/2001 Progress report at the 4th Annual Meeting of Programme development partners of Phase II.

¹¹ For example, in the 2004/05 the Auditor General queried CAWM, Ruvu fuelwood, DOF, TAWIRI and NAFRAC over unaccounted for expenditures worth TShs 546 million (MNRP 2006:6).

¹² MNRP, Report for the Financial Year 2004-05. The SRCP is reported to have spent TShs 2.5 billion on 'Support [for] villages to establish non-traditional income generating activities.' This is clearly an error, and we have assumed a figure of TShs 25m.

During this period, one third of MNRP funds were spent on Component 4 of the programme, which consists largely of coordination and capacity building activities. The HASHI (Shinyanga) and Catchment Forestry projects accounted for 29% of spending, and a further eight projects for the remaining 36%.

Table 2 summarise the utilisation of programme funds by the Coordination and Capacity-building project by ‘expense type’.¹³

Table 2: Summary of spending by Coordination and Capacity-building project by expense type, 2004-2005

Activity	Amount	Percent
Fixed Properties & Renovation	484,799,290	42
Conferences and workshops	187,334,726	16
Consultancy	150,999,341	13
In-service training	114,957,920	10
Travel	85,565,833	8
Financial costs and technical services	58,708,568	5
Motor vehicle maintenance	28,975,814	3
Personnel expenditure	17,694,475	2
Office expenses	14,735,973	1
Total	1,143,771,940	100

Table 2 shows that more than two-fifths of coordination and capacity-building activities consist of ‘fixed properties and renovation’, and a similar proportion for conferences, workshops, consultancy and in-service training. **Table 5.2** in **Annex 5** shows that MNRP Motor Vehicles & Equipment account for 98 percent of the fixed properties and renovation expenditure category.

Table 3 summarises utilisation of programme funds by the Coordination and Capacity-building project by ‘main activities.’

Table 3: Summary of spending by Coordination and Capacity-building project by main activities, FY04-05

Main activities	Amount	Percent
Backlog activities – 2003/2004	726,755,605	54
Develop guidelines and facilitate implementation of monitoring and evaluation program	173,976,309	15
Develop mechanisms for enhancing institutional collaboration and sustainability for Natural Resources	126,000,000	9
Facilitate MNRT institutions in developing effective management information system	87,159,952	6
Support national level agro-forestry initiatives through the National Agro Forestry Steering Committee	60,000,000	4
Support capacity building at local government-level in collaboration with PORALG	56,375,000	4
Support development of ecotourism guidelines based on national policies and international best practice	29,610,772	2

¹³ Full expenditure breakdowns are in Table 5.2 in **Annex 5**. There is a discrepancy of TShs 210m between the total spend for Coordination and Capacity-building by expense type and Utilisation by Main Activities (Table 1).

Promote cultural heritage and eco-museum activities	24,217,000	2
Support development of guidelines for benefit and cost sharing	16,770,800	1
Facilitate information sharing and lessons learned from best practices	11,350,000	1
Support measures for HIV/AIDS prevention	11,230,000	1
Total	1,353,988,941	99

Table 3 shows that over half the 2004-05 spend is for unspecified ‘backlog activities’. The items ‘Develop guidelines and facilitate implementation of monitoring and evaluation program’ and ‘Develop mechanisms for enhancing institutional collaboration and sustainability for Natural Resources’ account for a further quarter of spending by the Coordination and Capacity-building project.

Finally, **Table 5.3** in **Annex 5** presents spending by activity. The largest spending items are subventions (16 percent of all spending), per diems (16 percent), and diesel (6 percent). Combining diesel and petrol, service and repair, maintenance and ‘transport’ gives a total of TShs 283m, or 13 percent of all costs incurred.

What should we conclude from the above figures? First, direct spending to benefit local communities appears to have very low priority compared to spending on programme overheads benefiting the central ministry and project management, in that order.¹⁴ Expenditures on vehicles, fuel, travel and per diems are no doubt legitimate, but it is not evident that such expenditures are proportionate to the requirements of the overall programme or justified in terms of benefits derived by intended programme beneficiaries.

Second, related to the above, coordination and capacity-building are arguably over-financed by the programme, with some of the activities of apparently little relevance or priority. For example, developing ‘guidelines and facilitate implementation of [the] monitoring and evaluation program’ and ‘mechanisms for enhancing institutional collaboration and sustainability for natural resources’ are essentially modest desk studies and it is extraordinary that these activities should carry a TShs 300 million price tag.¹⁵

Lastly, even with the more transparent financial reporting system that the MNRP has introduced in recent years, we still cannot assess with any confidence the benefits that target populations or ‘the environment’ derive from programme expenditures. For example, no less than six projects invested in beehives during 2004-05, spending nearly TShs 73 million.¹⁶ Yet we know from the evaluation fieldwork (**Volume II**, project IV) that the benefits to beekeepers have been very patchy, and in many instances negligible.

¹⁴ See Marine Parks and Reserves expenditure in Part II below for project-level evidence that direct spending for intended project beneficiaries is a residual category.

¹⁵ Though the Programme’s auditors have challenged the apparent misuse of Programme funds, they are not required to query ‘value for money.’

¹⁶ See Annex 5, Table 5.3. Expenditure on beehives is the sixth largest programme spending item for FY04-05.

Programme and project effectiveness

Effectiveness is the extent to which projects' have achieved their objectives. Assessing effectiveness presupposes that the project objectives have been unambiguously and operationally defined with clear and appropriate outputs and indicators to make verification possible. In practice, these conditions are rarely met, for reasons discussed above. Given the huge geographical areas generally covered by NR-based projects, it is normal for project managers to launch pilot projects or to focus project activities on easily accessible areas. This is a logical strategy: spreading project inputs too thinly would probably result in no benefits reaching anyone.

Project support is intended to reduce the usual outreach constraints on effectiveness faced by government agencies, lack of transport¹⁷ and fuel in particular. (The programme has 60 vehicles, more than half of which (31) are with the catchment forestry project and NAFRAC, leaving only 29 vehicles for the remaining nine projects). Yet the large number of projects in the MNRP portfolio and the huge areas they cover make it unlikely that most projects will achieve high levels of effectiveness, even with long-term commitments. For example, although it is considered a model project, HASHI/NAFRAC has only managed to reforest *eleven percent* of the total area of degraded land in Shinyanga Region. As the HASHI project goes 'going to scale' under NAFRAC, and with the involvement of LGAs, this problem of extending coverage will become increasingly acute.

- A final general constraint on effectiveness is the personnel available to the Programme. The 11 MNRP projects have 426 staff, excluding drivers and office attendants, or less than 40 staff per project. Of these, 43 percent are support staff, 35 percent are diploma and certificate holders, and 20 percent have degrees. The Document for the 2006 Annual Review claims that 'the number of qualified staff in natural resources and tourism ... remains the main challenge to the government' at both national and district level.¹⁸

Relevance

Relevance is the coherence of project goals and objectives in relation to international, national and local policies and priorities. Project relevance may change over time as policies and priorities change. Relevance concerns how well the programme/project has succeeded in reaching the target groups and whether it is directed towards areas to which the involved partners have given high priority, for example, poverty reduction.

The Mid-Term Review sums up the relevance of the MNRP to Tanzania's international obligations and broad policy options, while also justifying MNRP's relevance in the context of Norwegian development policy.¹⁹ There is little doubt that MNRP is extremely relevant in terms of Tanzania's overall policy options and international commitments in regard to protecting bio-diversity and assuring sustainable development.

Yet these relationships have to be *specified and justified empirically*. For example, MNRP reporting procedures were inadequate for Norway to understand if or how the

▪ ¹⁷ The programme has 60 vehicles, more than half of which (31) are with the catchment forestry project and NAFRAC, leaving only 29 vehicles for the remaining nine projects.

▪ ¹⁸ MNRT 2006: 6.

▪ ¹⁹ Bryceson et. al. 2005 op. cit., pp 24-27.

programme was contributing to the realisation of broad policies, including MKUKUTA, Vision 2025 and the Millennium Development Goals.²⁰ Norway wanted to know whether Programme activities lead to efficient and cost effective service delivery by the MNRT and districts, and to socio-economic benefits and poverty reduction for local communities. Operationalising these cross-cutting policy connections is difficult when NRM is not fully integrated into the poverty reduction and growth promoting concerns of policy-makers. Our concern is reinforced by the apparent failure of past policies to have a significant impact on levels of rural poverty.²¹

Ownership of programme operations

The MNRT has the mandate and the resources to own and manage the MNRP as a public initiative. Ownership of land and natural resources lies with the state. These are the key components of local ownership of programme operations. At the local level, district councils may pass by-laws concerning NR management and benefit-sharing. Although the law allows for joint management and benefit-sharing arrangements in wildlife and forestry, district councils have been reluctant to enter into agreements with villages to allow this to take place. With some exceptions, MNRP does not seem to have used its influence to advance the cause of community ownership of programme operations.

Institutional collaboration

The MNRP management and accounting structures were critiqued and consequently improved in 2004. Problems included the complex relationships between the programme and government structures regarding recruitment, employment conditions, and reporting arrangements.²² Below we comment on institutional responsibilities and relations between Norway and Tanzania, and between the programme, local government, and other development partners.

Norwegian-Tanzanian programme governance

The 1999 evaluation of Tanzania-Norway development cooperation argued that Norway was too passive and ‘reluctant to assume responsibilities’ as a long-term and respected development partner.²³ An important though *unstated* objective of the GON concerning programme governance is to assure that Norwegian taxpayers’ money is well spent.²⁴ Arguably, Norway could have been more pro-active in defending

▪ ²⁰ United Nations Department of Public Information (no date). MDG 7 is to ‘ensure environmental sustainability by integrating ‘the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources.’ Other environmental objectives mentioned are access to safe water and improved lives for slum dwellers.

▪ ²¹ See for example, Research and Analysis Working Group 2005, *Poverty and Human Development Report 2005*, Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Dar es Salaam, This source cites a World Bank estimate that rural poverty declined by only 2.1 percent between 1991 and 2001.

▪ ²² Pricewaterhousecoopers 2004, ‘MNRP Systems Audit Report, Dar es Salaam, September, summary, pages 4-7.

²³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999, ‘Evaluation of the Tanzanian-Norway Development Cooperation 1994-97’, Evaluation Report 4.99, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, page 63.

▪ ²⁴ In recent years, Norwegian aid management has undergone major changes, including the delegation of responsibility for development aid programmes to local embassies, the consequent rise in the relative status of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ‘demotion’ of NORAD, Norway’s aid agency, to a technical and advisory status. NORAD is responsible *inter alia* ‘for ensuring that development cooperation is evaluated by independent consultants.’ (NORAD 2003:3). These organisational changes constitute perhaps another ‘moving target’, though not one on which the team feels competent to comment.

taxpayers' interests by requiring more detailed accounting procedures throughout the programme. Yet in the penultimate (2005) Annual Meeting, reported in the Annual Meeting, April 2006, the Norwegian Embassy was still asking the Ministry for a breakdown of capital and recurrent expenditures in their budget presentation.²⁵

Norway has consistently stressed national ownership and responsibility for programme implementation. This implies that programme implementers should be accountable to those in whose interests projects under MNRP are implemented. Yet neither the Norwegian nor the Tanzanian authorities appear to have raised the issue of downward accountability for programme funding and activities. Despite an increasing programme concern with stakeholder participation, most projects have been implemented in a traditional top-down 'service delivery' rather than participatory mode.²⁶

It is also noteworthy that the principle of local ownership should be so widely endorsed while the issue of accountability for Norwegian tax-payers money is not considered particularly important. Why, for example, should there be no Norwegian representative on the MIMP (**project XI**) board of directors, given the important Norwegian contribution to MIMP's budget? The answer given is that the RNE does not have *the capacity* to be involved in this detailed level of project implementation. As a result, Norway's financial support does not afford effective leverage, or at least the opportunity for dialogue and argument that the concept of *development partnership* implies. In the team's view, this constitutes a missed opportunity for deepening the partnership between donor and recipient governments.

Collaboration with Norwegian institutions

The evaluation deals with the issue of collaboration between Norwegian and Tanzanian institutions in the review of the relevant projects. The mid-term review examined relations between MNRT and the Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management, TAWIRI and the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA) and between NAFRAC and Toten Ecomuseum.

In relation to the first collaborative effort, the mid-term review found that the 'ideas behind this cooperation seem plausible, but the results are still at an early stage for assessment.' With no insights into this cooperation, the team reserves its judgement, though we would have expected some concrete results by now.

As regards TAWIRI-NINA collaboration, the main criticism to date has concerned the research bias towards 'natural science' approaches to NRM. The team feels that it is not easy for research institutes to change their disciplinary orientation. A rapid review of research topics and reports produced found that, while both institutions had a strong natural science bias, the studies undertaken under the collaborative research programme have combined both natural science and 'socio-economic' issues. However, the review suggests that the mix of natural science and socio-economics has

■ ²⁵ MNRT, Report of the Annual Meeting 2006, page (iii).

■ ²⁶ See Brian Cooksey and Idris Kikula 2005, 'When bottom-up meets top-down: The Limits of Local Participation in Local Government Planning in Tanzania' REPOA Special Paper No. 17, Tables 5.3 and 5.4. In a survey of 55 district planners, two-thirds ranked NR project planning as the least successful in a list of six sectors. Planning was more successful when it was supported by donor and government funds, and when it was participatory.

been relatively constant over time rather than there being a trend away from the first towards the second.

The evaluation findings summarised above suggest that a systematic rethinking of the nature of the Norwegian-Tanzanian aid interface concerning achieving sustainable NRM and improved livelihoods is in order. These are spelled out below.

Collaboration with local government

Projects under MNRP vary in the degree to which LGAs are involved in their activities. In the Ruvu fuelwood project relations with LG and regional officials have been good, whereas in catchment forestry areas district forestry officers often feel marginalised. The prospect of handing over responsibility for project activities on completion of the programme at the end of 2006 has led to efforts by programme managers to build LG capacity, but these efforts often appear to be ‘too little, too late’. LGAs will not have the finances or qualified personnel to support project activities, and with few exceptions, benefit-sharing arrangements are unlikely to provide adequate incentives to local communities to continue participating in project activities.

The project phasing-out process is frequently fraught with problems. Well-funded projects routinely fail the sustainability test when they are handed over to under-funded, understaffed, and poorly motivated LGAs. The handing-over process may be perfunctory or rushed.

Under the LGRP, local authorities are supposed to become more autonomous of the central government, more accountable to citizens, and more responsible for project implementation. A key concern is LGA’s capacity to take over responsibility for completed MNRP projects. This concern is expressed with particular force in the case of the HASHI/ICRAF project, as narrated in **Volume 2**.

Collaboration with other development partners

A number of projects have a degree of overlap with other development agencies, including international NGOs and research organisations. Interviews suggest that cooperation between development agency projects targeting the same or partly the same groups is less common than mutual distrust, competition or simply ignoring each other. Without further investigation it would be unfair to characterise the relationships between MNRP projects and other externally-funded activities either positively or negatively, but if the question is ‘has there been synergy in such relationships?’ the answer is probably ‘no’.²⁷

Sustainability

The above discussion leads us to question the sustainability of programme interventions. Sustainability is the extent to which positive changes achieved are maintained after the programme has been terminated. Sustainability is the ultimate test of the programme’s success. The MNRT implements the MNRP directly, with Norwegian funds transferred via the Treasury. A frequent criticism of donor-funded

■ ²⁷ In the forestry sector, Jorgensen and Svarstad (2006:3) identify ‘limited commitment to coordination among development partners’ as a constraint on the proposed Forestry SWAP (see ‘Recommendations’ below). Also ‘[t]here may be some parties gaining from the continuation of a rather uncoordinated situation.’ (ibid).

projects is their non-sustainability: projects typically collapse when donor funding and TA personnel withdraw. Projects under the MNRP do not employ Norwegian personnel, so the issue of the withdrawal of TA does not apply in this case. Yet there are major concerns with the effects that project termination will have on both conservation and livelihoods.

Private sector promotion

One of the four outputs of MNRP is the promotion of ‘income and employment generating private sector development efforts in NRM.’ The role of the state in facilitating and regulating private investment and enterprise is a contested policy area, both in general and in relation to MNR.

Fieldworkers noted numerous instances where project managers take charge of promoting ‘income-generating’ activities *directly* rather than facilitating the development of product and service markets through efficient regulation and taxation. The GOT is struggling to find the right balance of roles and responsibilities between the state and the private sector. This is a long-term process that has only recently been initiated.

What is lacking, the team believes, is the will, on the part of both government and development partners, to involve ‘the private sector’ *as an equal, trusted and respected partner* in the discussion of NRM ownership, management and regulatory responsibilities.

The evaluation team noted a widespread reluctance among government officials (and previous evaluations) to acknowledge the vital role of the private sector in conservation, investment, risk-taking and employment creation. Many government officials suspect the motives and criticise the practices of both national and external private investors and traders.

There are indeed both foreign and local businesses whose activities are on balance probably detrimental to the long-run interests of the country and of the poor majority of Tanzanians. At the same time, the operations of many opportunistic businesses, local and external, would not be possible without the active collaboration of government officials at all levels. Too often, the GOT endorses private sector NR initiatives in the absence of transparent stakeholder consultation, leading to accusations of abuse of power, depriving the treasury of large revenue streams, and undermining the principle of community ownership and resource management (marine fisheries, timber exports; projects VII and XI);

Much potentially useful private sector investment is foregone or undermined through overly bureaucratic procedures and poor relations between the government and private sector operators (project VII, XI).

There is insufficient analysis in project documents of the linkages between conservation and ‘income-generating’ opportunities for individuals, households and communities created by MNRP project interventions. As well as production, ‘income generation’ involves product promotion, quality control, and marketing. Foreign and local investments in NR determine many of the opportunities for individual and collective income generation, and also many of the threats to current income

generation. NR conservation-investment-income linkages need to be investigated much more thoroughly than heretofore. A notable exception is Norwegian interest in the inland and coastal fishing industries that are the subject of past and on-going research initiatives.

Understanding these linkages will allow for greater clarity in policy formulation and development assistance on the costs and benefits of market liberalisation and private sector development.

Governance: the missing link between NRM and development outcomes

Degraded and over-exploited marine and terrestrial resources can only be protected and restored when their custodians are legally empowered to protect them and derive significant cultural, symbolic, social and material benefits from their custodianship. Governance provides the link between the resources and the stakeholders responsible for their protection and development.

Governance includes corruption control, performance in service delivery, the rule of law, public accountability, and regulation. Governance influences both the effectiveness of government and the effectiveness of aid. Transparent and accountable governance practices are increasingly proposed as keys to successful NRM, poverty reduction, and effective donor support. This constitutes a huge challenge for both governments and aid agencies, for ‘governance’ takes us out of technical and managerial areas that may be ‘strengthened’ by training and capacity building into the highly complex field of *how institutions work or fail to work*. Yet facing this challenge is a prerequisite for sustainable resource use and poverty reduction. The alternative is further rapid deforestation, depletion of marine and wildlife stocks and consequent loss of biodiversity.

The evaluation team tried to review some of the key dimensions of governance listed above, though the time available only allowed for very partial coverage. Some of the main issues are listed in **Figure 1**. Examples of poor governance in the main NR sectors, some of which impact directly or indirectly on MNRP, are in the right-hand column.

Figure 1: Governance shortcomings in the MNRP and NRM in general

Governance dimension	Examples from MNRP	Other NRM examples
Corruption control	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Illegal logging. - Fishing and tourist hunting licensing. - Unaccounted use of sector development funds. - Official export figures underreported.
Voice and accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Most revenue is collected by or on behalf of the central government with many rural people benefiting little from their NR conservation efforts. - Programme accounts non-transparent throughout most of the programme. - Interests of Norwegian tax-payers not adequately represented. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Patronage-based rather than democratic political relationships. - Non-representative boards of directors. - Political actors in the state, regional and district bureaucracy. - LGAs collect NR rents and consume most of them in unproductive activities. - Projects are non-transparent. - Foreign investments are non-transparent.
	- Dynamite fishermen are taken to	- Inadequate protection and enforcement of

Rule of law	court but not punished. - Joint NR management legislation is not implemented.	property rights. - Overlapping jurisdictions.
Regulation	- Direct project involvement in income-generating and commercial activities ineffective and inefficient.	- Non-conducive regulatory environment for private investors.
Service delivery	-	- LGAs have weak service delivery capacity. - Insufficient or zero sanctioning of official waste and inefficiency.

Source: Volume 2, literature review.

The evaluation team raises *serious concerns with governance*, both within the MNRP and in the wider environment influencing programme impact and sustainability. This concern is not new. The last Mid-Term Review (January 2005) cautioned ‘against taking governance, transparency and accountability issues lightly in relation to development assistance in general and as regards the MNRP in particular.’²⁸ This source stresses the free flow of information and ‘forums for communication’ and discussion between stakeholders, and the monitoring of the private sector.

Major gaps in our understanding of the broader institutional framework in which officials implement NRMP-funded projects concern the role of central and local government in regulation and taxation. In general, fieldworkers did not have time to collect much information on these issues, taxation in particular.

The team’s review of programme documentation over the years suggests that governance weaknesses may have contributed in fundamental ways to some of the problems we note in this evaluation. More transparency and accountability could have improved performance by allowing the principal actors to deal with problems as they emerged. There is little to suggest that project implementers were ‘learning by doing’ or changing course when problems occurred. Nor were external reviews used as opportunities to identify and probe emerging problem areas. Instead, review missions have generally been satisfied with guided tours of show-case project activities rather than looking for wider impacts and constraints or evidence that innovations had taken root. The main area where the GON requested major procedural changes from the GOT during the MNRP concerned financial reporting, and these changes took years to effect.

These and similar critical comments have been levelled against aid-funded projects for many years. As such, they may be taken as generic, reflecting the inherent limitations of the project-based ‘mode of development.’

Lessons learned and key challenges ahead

Although laws and policies are in place to establish community ownership and management responsibilities over NR, in line with current national policies and international development thinking, implementation and enforcement are inadequate, reflecting lack of GOT commitment to the principles of active community agency and benefit-sharing (for example, projects II, VII, XI).

▪ ²⁸ Bryceson et. al. 2005:20-21.

As a result, communities are sometimes called upon to carry additional costs in NRM which are not adequately reflected in the benefits derived from their efforts (project I, WMAs in general). NRM can have negative consequences, especially for the poor.

On the basis of its review of relevant literature, interviews with Tanzanian and Norwegian officials, and brief visits to project sites, the evaluation team concludes as follows:

1: Achievements

Norwegian support for the MNRP has:

- Succeeded in reversing marine and terrestrial resource degradation in project areas;
- Allowed individuals, households and communities in project areas to derive subsistence and commercial benefits from improved NRM, and in some instances to reduce vulnerability to short-term climatic shocks;

2: Shortcomings

These achievements:

- Are of unknown cost-effectiveness since they have not been subjected to rigorous financial analysis;
- Have provided only limited benefits to households and communities;
- Are not financially or institutionally sustainable;
- Have been limited by inadequate institutional governance on the part of all major stakeholders.

3: Challenges ahead

Future collaboration between the governments of Norway and Tanzania in NRM must address the following:

- Non-transparent and unaccountable governance;
- Multiple donors and implementing agencies with varying operational and incentive structures;
- Weak internal and external aid coordination capacities;
- Weak implementation capacity at the local level;
- Failure to integrate NRM into government and aid-supported macro-economic, fiscal, budgetary, and social (poverty reduction) policies.

Recommendations for future Norwegian support for NRM in Tanzania

Norway has been a valued long-term partner in NRM in Tanzania and is planning to continue this role on the termination of the MNRP. Although the ‘bilateral donor funding national multi-sector programme’ mode of development assistance appears increasingly anachronistic in the context of current aid delivery thinking, this mode did in part achieve its main objective, namely, ‘increased benefits to rural communities based on sustainable natural resources management.’ However, the reasons why Norwegian and other donors should phase out this aid delivery mechanism are, we believe, more than adequately documented in this report.

We have stressed the importance of governance throughout this report. We consider it vital that Norway take a leading role in making the links between aid to NRM and good governance explicit.

For a decade, the GON has been committed to working with like-minded bilateral agencies in the fight for good governance--the so-called 'Utstein' group--consisting originally of the governments of the UK, Norway, the Netherlands and Germany, and subsequently joined by the Canadians and the Swedes. This group could form a nucleus of agencies to begin addressing the specifics of governance weaknesses in NRM, and related issues.

Recommendations

1. Some of the evaluation's findings are likely to be contested and their implications resisted by important stakeholders. In order to move forward, the evaluation team recommends that the evaluation results should be widely circulated and constitute an input into a *broad-based debate of development assistance for NRM in Tanzania involving development partners, the private sector, and civil society organisations from national to local levels*. This debate is already underway as a result of critical research, the findings of NR monitoring, and national and international reflections and discussions on policy and NRM institutional arrangements, and other factors.

2. Donors have provided finance and technical assistance on the assumption of 'additionality' (aid helps close the 'resource gap') without questioning the GOT's capacity to regulate and tax natural resources efficiently. As a result, aid effectively substitutes for revenues foregone and thus condones poor governance. The long-term goal of NRM support should be *to make the GOT financially independent of donor aid by valuing and taxing natural resources effectively and enforcing NRM laws and regulations*.

3. The Governments of Norway and Tanzania need to examine a number of fundamental issues relating to future aid modalities and institutional governance at different levels before committing to a new programme of NRM-related aid. Enhanced accountability or popular 'voice', the rule of law, the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, and corruption control are all critical for improved NRM. To signal the importance of these issues we propose a new objective for future Norwegian support to NRM, namely: *'improved governance in NRM-related institutions in national and local government, communities, and the private sector.'*

4. Rather than being considered semi-autonomous 'sectors', marine, forest, and wildlife hunting and tourism need to be integrated into the mainstream of economic planning, taxation and regulation. In the medium- to long-term, Norwegian and other aid must support the processes required to bring this about. Thinking on these issues is advancing rapidly, and we recommend that *Norway take a more pro-active role in furthering this process among development partners*.

5. To date, multiple, parallel donor programmes and projects in all NR sectors have undermined GOT coordination capacity and created incentives for continued dysfunctional management at the national level and below. Thus, the nature and extent of future Norwegian aid must be viewed in the context of the other 13 donors' (plus international NGOs') assistance to NRM in Tanzania. While this concern has encouraged the GOT and aid agencies to look for collective solutions in the form of general and sector-specific budget support, the continued practice of donors funding stand-alone projects is likely to undermine its effectiveness. The importance of

addressing the *aid coordination issue* and confronting the moral hazards attached to targeted aid for these sectors needs to be stressed.

6. The last mid-term review recommended termination of support for projects VIII, IX, and X and ‘bridging support’ for projects VII and XI. Subsequently, Norway declared its intention to withdraw from project VII (SRCP). After all the research and commentary on MIPM in recent years, it must be concluded that, unless MIMP management can be made to operate in a more transparent and accountable manner, including closer consultation and co-operation with ecotourism operators, there is little justification for investing more donor money into this subcomponent.

7. The mid-term review proposed that all forestry projects (projects I-VI) should be integrated into Norwegian support for the Forestry SWAP. Once the GON formulates a position that takes account of what other donors are doing and planning, and decides on how to proceed with the wider NRM/governance issues listed above, it may turn to the specifics of which sectors to support and how. GON must decide on its comparative advantage in relation to the various NR sub-sectors, in particular, wildlife management for tourism and hunting, freshwater and ocean fisheries, and forestry. *The desirability of supporting the forestry SWAP, and the modalities of such support, will emerge as a result of these processes.*

* * *

PART 2: Project summaries

This section summarises the main fieldwork findings and recommendations from the eleven projects supported by the MNRP. The team did not manage to cover all projects equally in the time available. Below, we indicate where information is inadequate to draw firm conclusions on project impacts and other indicators. Full fieldwork reports for each project visited are in **Volume 2**.

I: Catchment Forestry in Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Manyara and Morogoro

- Through lack of baseline and monitoring data, it is difficult to measure the costs and benefits of MNRP’s catchment forest management projects. However, the project has improved the quality of forests in all project regions--the number and intensity of fires have decreased significantly, woody vegetation and canopy cover have increased, the quantity and quality of water has improved--and enhanced the likelihood of long-run sustainability of project activities;
- Though community involvement in the management of catchment forests has been largely beneficial from the point of view of halting and reversing forest degradation, the benefits for the communities involved in Joint Forest Management (JFM) have generally been modest and limited to a few. Alternative income-generating activities have had limited impact and are unlikely to be cost-effective in their present form;
- Catchments forest projects under MNRP have worked through national, regional and district governments. However, the relationship between the projects and local government authorities (district councils) seems relatively weak. In some districts, District Forest Officers feel marginalised and the opportunities of working in multidisciplinary teams in project areas, especially on income generating activities, have not been fully explored;

- As a result of the successes in the regions where Catchment Forestry has been supported under MNRP, additional Regional Catchment Forest Offices have been established in Tabora, Mbeya, Iringa and Ruvuma Regions, receiving core funding from the national budget;
- Whereas JFM activities and the establishment of Village Natural Resource Committees have stopped illegal logging in some instances, in others it continues on a large scale. The capacity of VNRCs needs to be strengthened;
- JFM in catchment forests has resulted in important gains in forest quality but poverty reduction has been limited due to the high conservation status of the forests and consequent limited opportunities for subsistence use and commercial benefits;
- Community involvement in catchment forest protection provides benefits for some villagers:
 - Households plant trees on individual plots and cut firewood and harvest grass for their zero-grazed cows;
 - Income from the sale of honey and beeswax has increased in a number of sites, which has enabled some families to improve nutrition, pay school fees, buy food and corrugated iron roofing sheets;
 - Village governments earn cash from fines from offenders on village portions of the catchment forests.
- At the same time, there are many instances where income from forest products or other sources is inequitably distributed, with communities usually benefiting the least:
 - Most revenue from catchment forests goes to the central government. (Kilimanjaro Forest Reserve collected TShs 50 million in tourist revenue over a six month period for the central government, while one village collected only TShs 250,000 in six years).
 - In the team's opinion, the absence of a private sector rationale for income generation makes the exercise an inefficient use of scarce project resources.

II: Mangrove Management, Tanga

- Remote sensing data suggest that during the decade 1990 to 2000 mangrove areas increased from 115,500 ha to 133,480 ha., an increase of nearly 16 percent;
- According to the MNRP Mid-Term Review (Bryceson et al. 2005:62-3), by June 2004 the project had attained or surpassed project targets relating to accessing mangrove products and revenues, and involvement in diverse income-generating activities;
- By working through government structures, the project has increased the chances of sustainability under a decentralised NRM policy regime;
- Most coastal residents are aware of the importance of conserving mangroves;
- In many areas, bylaws have been passed and management plans approved;
- However, 'villagers express concern that delays in completing the modalities for cost and benefit sharing may reflect lack of commitment on the part of the government.' (Bryceson et al. 2005 op. cit., page 63). Anecdotal evidence suggests that unsustainable mangrove exploitation (logging, clearing for rice planting, and charcoal making) is taking place in various locations along the coast and in the Rufiji Delta;
- Formal approval of mangrove management agreements that clearly specify who carries the costs and enjoys the benefits of mangrove management are lacking. To the team's knowledge, no Joint Forest Management Agreements have

been signed, though draft agreements are ready after going through a cumbersome process in many villages, and regulations on the implementation of the law are equally awaiting signature;

- The project has completed many sensitisation and alternative income generation activities, including seaweed farming and beekeeping, but it is unlikely that these have yielded value for money or provided significant benefits for many people, the poor in particular. The main problem is how to link the costs with the benefits of mangrove conservation to the benefit of coastal communities.

III: Ruvu Fuelwood Project

- About 970 households have, or will soon have, 7.5 acres of forest land from which to derive food and income, both immediate, in the form of food and cash crops, and more long-term, in the form of trees. After five years, people are already making money. Farmers have bought bicycles, radios and mobile phones, and built better houses with metal sheet roofs;
- People's food security has improved because they have larger, more fertile areas on which to plant a variety of crops, and because they are able to sell poles and charcoal to cover the shortfall in food, as happened in a recent drought when many crops failed;
- Pressure has been taken off the forest. Many of those who would have been working inside the forest are now working on their own land, and those who are now farming the buffer strip act as unofficial forest guards;
- In addition to planting trees on their forest plots, many people have also started planting trees on their own shambas, despite there being no culture of planting trees on shambas in this part of the country;
- Relations between forestry officials and communities have improved. In the past, forestry officials were seen as 'enemies', and the officials' main contact with the people was through warnings and arrests. The forest officials give advice and expertise, bring seedlings and often just come to visit the villages. The people with plots help the officials to guard the forest;
- The concept of handing over a strip of degraded land on the boundaries of a protected forest to act as a buffer zone has great potential for replication in many parts of the country;
- Under the Local Government Reform Programme, local projects are to be taken over by LGAs. In this case, both council and central government/project staff see little sense in this take-over. The local government is already deeply involved in project activities, but does not have the resources to take over the project. The existing arrangement functions well and both sides are happy with it. In addition, the forest reserves are controlled by central government, and cannot be handed over to local government;
- TAFORI and SUA have played important roles in the project. They conducted a socio-economic study to identify farmers' exotic and indigenous species preferences, carried out on-station trials, and selected the most appropriate species for the project to distribute to the farmers. Trials continue on these species and TAFORI also receives information from the project about silvicultural problems. TAFORI scientists are also prepared to listen to and learn from farmers;
- Royalties and levies from forest products go directly to the central government and council treasuries. The project feels that the amount received back from central government is no reflection on their efforts to stimulate this revenue, and

that they should keep the money that they raise and invest it in order to increase production;

- Although actively promoted by the project, more efficient charcoal production and energy efficient stove technologies, beekeeping and fish farming, have not been widely adopted.

IV: Beekeeping in Manyoni, Kibondo, Tabora, Handeni and Kondoa

- MNRT (2005) indicate that in the pilot project villages beekeepers increased production of honey from an average of 175 kg/beekeeper in 1999 to 494 kg/beekeeper in June 2005, almost a 200 percent improvement. The average income per beekeeper by June 2005 was TShs 456,000. However, productivity is not uniform, with beekeepers in Manyoni District by far the most productive (average 1,400 kg of honey/beekeeper), while beekeepers in Handeni seem the least productive;
- Stingless honeybee-keeping started in August 1998. By June 2003, the number of domesticated stingless honeybee colonies was 689, reaching 857 by June 2005;
- Beekeeping is competing with tobacco production as a source of income in Manyoni District with several farmers abandoning tobacco for honey production;
- Not much progress has been made in capacity building of beekeepers in entrepreneurship. There are many examples where local communities have benefited little from private sector involvement (Kajembe *et al.* 2003). At the district level there is an apex organisation which draws its members from the village associations. This is very important for giving beekeepers a common voice, especially when it comes to price negotiations with private companies.;
- The project has reduced the use of bark hives, which are environmentally destructive. The introduction of stingless bees has made beekeeping more accessible to women and youth. Stingless bees can be kept at home and therefore offer distinct possibilities for women to get involved;
- Income from beekeeping in project areas is presented in **Table IV.1**.

Table IV.1: Average income from bee keeping in the pilot villages in 2004/05 (TShs)

District	No of trained bee keepers	Honey from stinging bees (kg)	Beeswax from stinging bees (kg)	Honey from stingless bees (kg)	Income from stinging bees	Income from beeswax from stinging bees	Income from stingless bees	Average income / beekeeper (TShs)
Kondoa	369	40,576	2705.5	142.5	40,576,000	5,411,000	712,500	126,557
Handeni	306	7,320	488	136.5	7,320,000	9,760,000	682,500	29,341
Tabora	393	172,473	11,498	297	172,473,000	22,996,400	1,485,000	501,156
Kibondo	350	144,665	9,644.3	150	144,665,000	19,288,600	750,000	470,581
Manyoni	373	520,155	34,677	559.5	520,155,000	69,354,000	2,797,500	1,587,953
TOTAL	1791	885,189	59,013	1,285.5	885,189,000	118,026,000	6,427,400	568,636

Source: Adapted from MNRT 2005

V: Natural Forest Resources and Agroforestry Centre (NAFRAC)

- Through HASHI/ICRAF project efforts, people in Shinyanga Region were able to restore over 350,000 ha of degraded land by 2002, raising the afforestation rate from 1,000 ha/year to 20,000/ha per year;
- Despite this considerable effort, only 11 percent of the area that is considered degraded had been put under woodland enclosure so far (Monela *et al.* 2005;

NAFRAC 2006). The 'demonstration effect' has been too weak to assure the spread of the project benefits to other parts of the region;

- Over the last 20 years, the HASHI Project has had a significant impact on household income through woodlot enclosures. Monela et al. (2005) estimate the value of benefits from ngitili at USD 14/person/month. Increased income is due to:
 - Increased soil fertility--previously unproductive land is turned into fertile land (maize harvest increased from 1 to 7 bags/acre);
 - Increased water retention; less time spent on fuel-wood collection, which frees time for other activities;
 - Assured pasture for cattle;
 - Potential to sell grazing rights of individual ngitilis; and
 - Income from fuelwood, poles and charcoal from individual ngitili.
- In April 2004 NAFRAC was established as a national centre to scale up HASHI activities, namely forest management techniques and agro-forestry technologies. While the centre is operating nominally, the shift from a project mindset and organisational culture to those of a national institution has not yet been achieved;
- The districts feel abandoned rather than empowered. There has been no exit strategy and little capacity-building aimed at the devolution of responsibilities to the districts, making sustainability problematic.

VI: Tanzania Forestry Research Institute

- The team agrees with the Mid-Term Review (Bryceson *et al.* 2005) that TAFORI contributes to some of the impacts of RUVU and NAFRAC, but it is difficult to determine direct or indirect impacts. Research impacts are normally long-term and in some cases indirect. There are little or no baseline data from which to chart trends. TAFORI claims impact from the following:
 - Research into indigenous tree species which people have specified are useful to them and they would like to grow on their shambas, for example, *Azela quarensis*, and other timber species in Ruvu, medicinal trees in Shinyanga with NAFRAC;
 - Research into exotic tree species to find the most suitable for local conditions in Ruvu and Shinyanga;
 - Research into agroforestry systems which suit local conditions, for example, *ngitili* in Shinyanga, researching into the effects of the agroforestry system practised in Ruvu on the soils of that area;
 - Bringing farmers and research together by listening to farmers' recommendations, by getting feedback from them and by doing some of their trials on farm, jointly managed by TAFORI and the farmers.
- TAFORI staff were sent to NAFRAC under an agreement between NAFRAC and the MNRT without consulting TAFORI. It seems that TAFORI was involved in developing the original MOU between ICRAF and MNRT. However, they were not involved during the formulation of exit modalities for ICRAF. The team learned that all ICRAF vehicles and equipment were pooled at NAFRAC without taking into consideration the wider needs of TAFORI as a national forest research institution.

VII: Serengeti Regional Conservation Project

- The main positive impact of the SRCP is an increase in the wildlife population following a reduction in poaching. But this led to an increase in crop destruction and danger of injury to residents, particularly by elephants;
- Food security has increased for employed people, including Village Game Scouts, but worsened for many farmers in the 21 project villages as a result of wildlife, particularly elephant, crop raiding. We know very little about how the benefits of conservation offset the costs at the household level;
- The rationale for SRCP was challenged when, with the support of the Wildlife Division of the MNRT, Grumeti Reserves Ltd (formerly Grumeti Safari Club Ltd) began to undermine key components of the SRCP, forcing the Norwegian Government to indicate its intention to withdraw from the project. Grumeti has acquired three hunting blocks in the western Serengeti, effectively scrapped existing agreements between villagers and investors in eco-tourism through WD pressure on Serengeti District Council, and has bought up villages' game meat quotas from community and resident hunting, thus terminating one of the main components of the SRCP strategy;
- These events have led to a heated debate, on the coherence of existing legislation and policies, the powers of the WD in the MNRT, and the long-term benefits to be derived from large-scale foreign investment in wildlife tourism. It seems likely that Grumeti, with its huge financial resources, will win the day. The team considers it important that the GOT and development agencies reflect further on the implications of the current implementation of Wildlife Management Area policy for the welfare of the supposed beneficiary communities;
- Tanzanian laws are in conflict regarding implementation of Wildlife Management Areas (WMA). Accordingly to the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999, villages are mandated to determine their land use plans and utilisation, whereas the 1974 Wildlife Act maintains that all wildlife resources are under the Director of Wildlife. This has brought confusion over the use of village land;
- SRCP worked collaboratively and had excellent relations with the Serengeti District Council and village governments until Grumeti came along. SRCP were successful in getting local people to support wildlife conservation by helping them to attract investors and by giving them game meat to replace the meat they would have hunted themselves according to their traditional practices;
- However, SRCP management expressed frustration in terms of the limited ability of the project to raise people's capacity at the village level and to move forward with the Ikoma WMA, before Grumeti arrived on the scene;
- The arrival of Grumeti raises major questions about the respective roles of the state and the private sector in policy-making, regulation, enforcement, and the provision of collective services.

VIII: Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Karatu

Project impacts include the following:

- Reduced illegal off-take of forest products from the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) and Northern Highland Forest Reserve (NHFR);
- Reduction of wild animal disturbances in parts of the NHFR bordering the villages of Karatu District;
- Regeneration of vegetation in the degraded parts of NHFR near Karatu villages;

- The watershed and water catchment capacity of the NCA NHFR has improved;
- Two batches of twenty heifers were supplied to ten women selected by their village governments and given training on dairy cow husbandry by the project;
- The cows produce 5-10 litres of milk daily. Between half and eighty percent of the milk is sold at TShs 250-300 per litre and the income is used for food, other domestic needs, and school fees;
- Adoption of improved stoves has reduced wood fuel consumption by 50-67 percent and concomitant time spent on fuel wood collection as well as the time spent for cooking;
- The tree species planted were selected by the beneficiaries. These were supplied to households so that the plantations could serve as a buffer zone to the natural forest bordering the villages;
- The compacted bricks activity has spent a lot of time and resources on successfully sensitising the populace on the need to use compacted bricks to conserve forests and vegetation. Production of bricks has begun but needs further investment;
- However, the mid-term review (Bryceson et al. 2005:107-8) suggests very patchy project implementation, inadequate reporting and poor communication by project management;
- The two most recent reviews maintain that the NCAA leadership is 'not sufficiently committed to processes of participation in decision making and benefit sharing.' (Bryceson et al., op. cit., page 111). The project management appears not to have allocated the required human, financial resources to the project, resulting in the absence of reports on the exact level of project implementation, leading to the impression that the project has failed.

IX: Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute

- The impact of TAWIRI's research programme is inherently difficult to assess. Research may have both academic/theoretical and practical/applied objectives. TAWIRI's applied research programme in Serengeti is designed 'to develop systems oriented management plans and sustainable consumptive levels regimes.' (sic) (TAWIRI 2006).²⁹ We may ask: how does this research relate to Grumeti's 'Serengeti West Development Project' and the tourism-conservation activities of Grumeti and other private actors?³⁰ In this respect, a recent report commissioned by the MNRT (Kajembe et al. 2005) addressing resource use conflicts in Western Serengeti cites official data sources but no TAWIRI research findings, though TAWIRI is cited as an institution that the authors had consulted. The team therefore lacks evidence on which to judge the academic and/or practical impact of TAWIRI research;
- TAWIRI has conducted 28 research projects on animals, vegetation, soil and socio-economics in Western Serengeti. Content analysis reveals that, of the 28 projects, 13 (46%) are largely 'natural science' and 15 (54%) include human-NR interactions. Contrary to claims that the programme has become more 'social science' oriented, a casual content analysis reveals no evidence of a trend away from natural science towards human-NR studies.

■ ²⁹ TAWIRI 2006, 'BHWI project, Final Project Physica (sic) Report'.

■ ³⁰ GRUMETI Safari Club and Grumeti Fund (no date) 'Serengeti West Development Project', PowerPoint slides.

■

X: College of African Wildlife Management, Mweka

- The specific impacts of CAWM training courses, including those in entrepreneurship related to the development of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs), are difficult to assess;
- Short courses in entrepreneurship have been beneficial to some exceptional individuals, but in general have been poorly targeted, have included inappropriate participants, and have failed to address fundamental issues, including good governance;
- CAWM's management style is not particularly student-friendly or efficient;
- Tanzania's transition to participatory NRM in general, and WMA in particular, is a fundamental transformation in Tanzanian society in terms of:
 - Accepted approaches to conservation and resource management;
 - Ownership of natural resources: centralised state control being devolved to the private sector and local communities; and
 - The degree to which people are expected to participate in development, conservation, and political processes. It is important to keep in mind that the cultural legacy of both colonialism and socialism is that rural Tanzanians should only act when told to do so by someone with authority. This is a relationship that both rural people and people with authority are going to have to struggle to transcend.
- This represents a fundamental socio-political transformation, namely the emergence of a vibrant civil society and a viable private sector to alleviate poverty by making rural people owners of their own natural resources;
- This is a process that is going to take a lot of training and education, but:
 - It is important not to become overly focused on technical training such as that provided by CAWM, although it is clearly important; and
 - Education for good governance--especially where it concerns community ownership, and participatory management, of natural resources--is unlikely to come from government institutions, nor would it be appropriate for it to be so;
 - Donors such as the Norwegians should consider supporting NGOs, CBOs, and civil society organisations that do this kind of work.
- Norway should continue to support both technical training and education for governance. However, it should be recognised that:
 - It is difficult to find reliable and quantifiable indicators for the types of broad objectives set by such training and education (as in the CAWM example);
 - Outputs (for example, the number of people who participated in a particular training course) should not be confused with impact;
 - It will be easier to understand the impacts of trainings if good data are generated both before and after the trainings occurs;
 - These data should not be limited simply to training needs assessments, but also incorporate broader types of critical social science research;
 - The types of information produced are likely to be qualitative and empirical;
 - However, they will help to design interventions that are relevant to the needs of rural Tanzanians, and that are more likely to have impacts that will benefit them, while empowering them to manage natural resources in a sustainable manner.

XI: Mafia Island Marine Park

- A number of recent studies have raised critical questions over the nature and extent of community participation in MIMP activities, and the team endorses these findings, adding some critical observations of its own on financial management and governance issues;

- Hogan (2003) argues that ‘the relationship between the park and the people is of a patron and the patronized rather than a partnership.’ While in the majority of villages, most people had little or no feelings of resistance to the park, direct resource users, particularly fishers and coral harvesters, had yet to be convinced of the benefits of the park's management methods and were thus resistant to restrictions;
- Hogan's recommendation to establish direct control of benefits by residents has not been followed up. This is understandable, as it challenges the present institutional set-up and the procedures of management of the now considerable proceeds from the tourism fees paid by the hotel sector;
- MIMP has taken responsibility for directly promoting eco-tourism rather than providing an environment for private sector initiatives, with sometimes negative consequences;
- The impact of lifting the ban on the export of finfish is not yet known, though the arrival of Tanpesca on the scene has not been accompanied by adequate guarantees for environmental protection regarding its shrimp farm hatcheries;
- The tourism industry on Mafia thinks that MIMP should concentrate on those areas that are genuine government responsibilities:
 - Development of appropriate policies, strategies and guidelines;
 - Formulation of laws and regulations; and
 - Monitoring and evaluation of implementation of its policies and enforcement of laws.
- **Table XI.1 Volume 2**, summarises the Marine Parks and Reserves Unit expenditures for 2003-05. A review of the Unit's income and expenditure suggests that poor corporate governance and lack of accountability to community and private sector stakeholders have resulted in the questionable use of both donor funds and tourist income. Only TShs 28 m out of about TShs one billion (less than three percent) have been used for community development expenses, a number of which seem of doubtful utility. Divers report that they very rarely see MP boats on patrol, yet TShs 70 m was spent on surveillance in 2005, with a large number of patrols reported (see **Annex 4**).³¹

▪ ³¹ 372 patrols are reported, but over an unspecified period.

Management of Natural Resources Programme, Tanzania TAN-0092
Final Evaluation



VOLUME 2: Field Reports

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Final Revised Report submitted to the
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and the
Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam

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**MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAMME
(MNRP-TAN 092)
FINAL EVALUATION**

Volume 2: FINDINGS FROM FIELD VISITS

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Volume 2: FINDINGS FROM FIELD VISITS

Introduction

This volume presents the main fieldwork findings from the eleven projects supported by the MNRP. The team did not manage to cover all projects equally in the time available. Below, we indicate where information is inadequate to draw firm conclusions on project impacts and other indicators.

Each section has the following basic structure: **Background, Objectives, Impact, Governance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Relevance and Sustainability**. Additional materials deemed useful for the purposes of the evaluation have been added under other headings. Project-level recommendations are included in the individual reports. Programme recommendations are presented in **Volume 1**.

I: Catchment Forestry Kilimanjaro (IK), Arusha, Manyara, (IAM) Morogoro (IM)

Background

The MNRT's Catchment Forestry Programme was initiated in 1976 and Norway has supported it since 1988. Since 1994, the programme has gone through three phases:

- Phase I (1994-8) which emphasised NRM and institutional capacity building;
- Phase II (1998-2002) where there was a move towards promoting participation to support NRM and developing benefit-sharing mechanisms with communities
- Phase III (2002-6) where the focus has been on enabling NRM to contribute to poverty reduction and improvement of the livelihoods of those living near the forests.

Objectives

Overall objective: 'Increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management in Tanzania'.

Immediate objectives:

- i. Participatory natural resource management organisations strengthened and benefit sharing mechanisms made operational' and
- ii. 'Income and employment generating private sector development efforts promoted in natural resource management.'

The evaluation of the catchment forestry project is based on brief visits to four project regions: Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Manyara and Morogoro. It is not possible to separate the impact due solely to the 18 years of Norwegian support for catchment forest protection in Tanzania from that of the programme overall, which started in 1976. However, increased resources available from Norwegian support have no doubt had a positive impact on the conservation efforts.

We believe that the range of catchment forest project areas visited by the evaluation team represents an adequate sample to give a picture of positive and negative features in catchment forest project areas in Tanzania

Field visits were undertaken to the following areas:

Figure I.1: Catchments forestry field visits

Region	Forest Reserve	District	Villages
Arusha and Manyara	Parts of Bereko, Ufyumi, Duluti	Babati	Haara, Wangwaray
Kilimanjaro	Chome/Shengena Forest Forest on the slopes of Mt. Kilimanjaro	Same Rombo Moshi rural	Mhero Maharo Lole Marera
Morogoro	Mkindo	Mvomero	Mkindo
	Kimboza	Morogoro	Mwarazi

In the following sections common observations are reported and if necessary expanded by examples from particular areas.

Impact

Catchment Forest Conservation

The combination of improved law enforcement and community involvement in the management of catchment forests has been largely beneficial from the point of view of halting and reversing forest degradation. The catchment forest component of the MNRP contained targets for reducing illegal activities by setting up forest patrols, confiscating forest products, putting out fires and imposing penalties on ‘wrongdoers.’ **Annex 3.4** summarises the achievements on these and other indicators.

Generally, the level of community participation in forest management has increased over time, though this varies with ethnicity and geographical location. Community participation was relatively low during Phase I and II but improved during Phase III. The impacts of improved conservation measures included:

- A decrease in illegal activities was reported from all forest reserves visited
- The most successful effort of communities in forest conservation was the reduction and control of forest fires, with a significant decrease in both number and intensity of fires reported at all visited locations.
- A reduction in the number of intensity of fires has resulted in increased regrowth of forest in those areas
- The water quantity in the catchment forests has improved as a result of forest protection, with reports of increased water flows at selected sites and mitigation of drought effects from others.

The impact in terms of illegal harvesting of timber is visible. In Kilimanjaro Region, for example, in the past, huge piles of cut timber, 300-500 pieces, would be stacked by the side of the roads and lorries would come to pick them up. These days is more likely that 20 planks are hidden in the undergrowth, which may then be loaded one or two at a time under the seats of minibuses. The successes notwithstanding, *illegal activities are still going on in the forests on a large scale*, as reported from Chome and other forest reserves in the Kilimanjaro Region. Forests Reserves in Morogoro Region, on the other hand are threatened by gold mining activities on a large scale (i.e. up to 2000 small scale miners)

The main reason that the intensity of illegal activities has decreased is the presence of the VNRCs in villages surrounding the Forest Reserves. Performance of VNRCs seems to depend on both the culture of individual villages and the leadership in those villages. If the leader of a village, for example is engaged in harvesting timber in the

FR, then it will be extremely difficult for the VNRC to do anything about it. The Mhero Forestry Officer, Kilimanjaro Region, reported that the VNRCs he works with in his two other villages are the chief timber harvesters in the village and that it is therefore very difficult for him to work with them. However, they do organise groups to put out fires in the forest reserve, so there has at least been some impact.

Livelihoods

While results in forest conservation were clearly visible in many areas, the benefits for the communities involved in JFM have been *very limited*. The general conclusion was that alternative income-generating activities have had limited impact and are unlikely to be cost-effective. The main reasons for this are three-fold: (1) the limited range of options for IGAs (typically tree nurseries, beekeeping, fishponds, improved stoves, and eco-tourism); (2) the amount of effort put into the promotion and facilitation of the offered activities; and (3) competition with very lucrative activities such as gold mining (Morogoro).

The most successful activities in all areas were the nurseries and tree planting, and not surprisingly as this is a traditional forestry activity and forest officers can provide direct technical assistance. Other activities are not in their area of expertise and thus require input from other partners.

The adoption of beehives, improved stoves and fish-ponds is not widespread as evidenced in Kilimanjaro and especially Morogoro Regions. For Kilimanjaro, programme statistics show that 196 beehives have been distributed, but only 250 kgs of honey were harvested, and 61 fish ponds dug. Compared with the number of villages (84) and the possible number of households in those villages (about 50,000), the programme is not making a significant impact on livelihoods. The situation was even worse in Morogoro, where there was practically no adoption of beehives, fish ponds or stoves in the village surrounding both Mkindo and Kimboza Forest Reserves. Villagers attributed this low level of adoption partly to the fact they had received only a one-off training on these activities.

Only Arusha–Manyara Regions reported increased income from the sale of honey and beeswax in a number of sites, which has enabled some families to improve nutrition, pay school fees, and buy food and corrugated iron roofing sheets. In addition, increased income availability from legal firewood, thatching and livestock grass and other forest products has contributed to poverty alleviation.

Box I.1 gives an example of conservation and income generation in Kilimanjaro.

Box I.1: Catchments protection and income generation (Kilimanjaro Region)

In Lole Marera, people have divided up a half-mile buffer strip of land into individual plots of half or a quarter of an acre, and each person in the three sub-villages nearest to the forest (410 households) who requests a plot receives one. People then plant trees on their plots. When the trees are growing they are able to cut firewood from them, and they harvest grass for their zero-grazed cows from under the trees on a daily basis. *The trees, however, belong to the district*, so the people are not allowed to harvest them when they have grown to maturity, *although they will have the option of buying them from the district* if they need timber. The people are happy with this arrangement, since they are gaining direct individual benefits from the forest. The income generating activities are very limited--there is a 'one size fits all' attitude, and beekeeping, fish farming and nurseries are generally the only IGAs on the menu. There needs to be a more creative approach to this. In a village in Same

district, villagers have started cultivating ginger on their own initiative and they are already transporting large amounts to Moshi and Dar es Salaam.

Source: Field visit, 10 May 2006

Eco-tourism activities have been established at various locations in all regions visited, with varying success in terms of impacts on livelihoods. In the visited areas in Morogoro, the impact of eco-tourism has so far been negligible. In Arusha/Manyara eco-tourism activities have been established in Duluti (IAM) catchment forest reserve with the involvement of private investors, and the number of visitors to the forest is increasing. However, no concrete figures for income generation at the local level were obtained. In Kilimanjaro region, some villages charge access fees for people who want to climb Shengena Peak. However, the revenue collected by Mhero VNRC of TShs 250,000 since 2000, palls in significance when compared to the TShs 50 Million, collected in tourist levies in Kilimanjaro FR from January to June 2006 alone for the central government.

There is a clear positive correlation between individual household access to and control over benefits, and satisfaction of communities with the JFM arrangement. Communal benefits such as improved water supply or improved access to wood to build desks for schools, are less attractive than benefits at individual household level, thus the latter will do more to ease pressure on the forest.

An interesting example of mixed tenure and benefit sharing arrangements comes from Kilimanjaro Catchment Forest Project. Some communities are getting almost no benefits, apart from a certain satisfaction that they have some ownership and responsibility over the forest now, others are allowed into the forest harvest grasses and dead firewood, while others again have access to the half mile buffer strip around Kilimanjaro FR, and while not owning the actual trees, they manage the area as their own. On the other hand total forest protection means there are *no direct benefits* for villagers. Inhabitants of the Wangray area get nothing from their efforts to protect the Ufyomi catchment forest that feeds Babati township water supply.

Governance

Generally, relations between people in the villages and forest officials have improved since the introduction of participatory activities. In the past, it could be dangerous for forest officials to go to the villages to try to catch people working in the forest illegally. People in the villages are now more likely to give information to forest officers. They have seen that forest officials can also help them, for example, to start up nurseries, to learn beekeeping and fish farming, and to help them to protect the forest which has now partly been handed over to them. This is an improvement for forest officials, who were previously seen only as the enemy, coming to arrest people in the villages and harass them if they were suspected of stealing from the forest.

Local government reforms have had positive impact because the by-laws made as part of project activities strengthen implementation of the project and in at least some cases there is pressure from local government leaderships to strengthen the activities of this project.

Governance issues that need to be addressed include:

- Working of VNRC committees

- Setting up of transparent mechanisms for revenue sharing and revenue collection
- Relationship between Catchment Forest Officers and Local Government Authorities
- Equitable sharing of revenue from forest resources between the stakeholders

While VNRC Committees have been established in all villages surrounding forest reserves, not all are fully functional. In Kilimanjaro, for example it was estimated that about 50% of the VNRCs are active. In Kimboza FR, , Morogoro, VNRCs while active, operated under a set-up which did not seem conducive to transparency with the VNRC themselves carrying out patrols, at times together with village government leaders. This does raise questions with regards to reporting and supervision. The VNRC as a committee under the village government should be responsible for coordinating patrols and reporting to the village government. If they do the patrols themselves together with the village government, who will the patrols report to? The lack of reports and data available from Kimboza FR seemed to prove the point. There does not seem to be any systematic record keeping at any of the villages visited in Morogoro Region, be it for patrols or for money received from researchers and tourists. This lack of record keeping and thus transparency in financial transactions is not conducive for trust building and good governance development. While benefits from patrols go to the village that carries out the patrol, other income, such as that from visitors to sites, is shared between villages. Villagers do not have adequate access to information on how much money has been collected or how it has been shared.

Currently, the major source of income for the VNRCs is the fines collected. This being their only source of income, it tends to act as an incentive for encroachment to continue. *There is an urgent need to address the question of equitable cost and benefit sharing from the village to the central level.* Even now, in some areas offenders are caught so rarely, that fines or confiscations cannot be regarded as a sustainable source of income for the VNRCs.

The relationships between central (ie catchment forest officers) and local (District government) authority varied from place to place. However, in general, the power and resource balance favours the catchment forest officers. In each district, there is a District Catchment Forest Officer (DCFO), who reports directly to the Regional Catchment Forest Officer (RCFO). In some regions, there seems to be conflict between the District Forest Office and the Catchment Forest Project as the latter seems to have the lion's share of power on matters concerning forest utilisation in the region and has resources, thus marginalising the District Forest Officers. This is an example of how donor funding empowers one group in government at the expense of others.

In Kilimanjaro, for example the half-mile strip around the forest reserve is controlled by district councils, which have the right to harvest the trees planted on it: in most cases the councils planted the trees many years ago. The catchment forest programme is now working with people to utilise this piece of land. In the two villages the team visited, the district authorities were harvesting the trees but not replanting. There does not seem to be an agreement between the people who are planting trees and the district, whose right it is to harvest them. According to the management plan for

Kilimanjaro FR, the communities manage the half-mile strip, but not the core FR. This means that the forestry authorities still hold almost complete control over the forest reserves.

But even at the central level, there can be conflict. TANAPA is aiming at incorporating Kilimanjaro Catchment Forest into Kilimanjaro National Park (KINAPA), which at present includes only the higher parts of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Once a piece of land is within a national park, there is almost no flexibility about its use, and TANAPA does not go in for buffer zones. The RCFM is worried that even the buffer strip will become part of KINAPA thus depriving surrounding communities of the fruits of the efforts they put in to maintaining the buffer strip. So there is district ownership of trees on catchment land, about to be taken over by KINAPA, with trees planted by people, who are at present able to use them for firewood. This heady mix of ownerships and presents huge potential for conflict if things are not documented and agreements made

On the other hand the JFM process has also assisted in conflict resolution: A case in point is that of Ihombwe and Ilakala villages, formerly sub-villages of Mhenda village, Kilosa District, Morogoro. For lack of clear boundaries between the villages, Kilosa District Council demarcated the boundaries unilaterally. This brought discontent among villages, each claiming to own land outside the traditional boundary. In 2004, through the JFM process, the three villages were brought together in a round-table to discuss and agree on village boundaries, which also covered part of the Palaulanga catchment forest reserve. This agreement was later endorsed by Kilosa District Council. The participatory process, thus led to a resolution on boundary conflicts by consensus of the stakeholders. This is a basic example of good governance instituted by the project.

Effectiveness

The overall objective of the programme is 'increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management in Tanzania'. This objective has not been fully achieved, although there has been some important progress. Some communities are getting almost no benefits, apart from a certain satisfaction that they now have some ownership and responsibility over the forest. Others are allowed to harvest grasses and dead firewood, while others have access to the half-mile strip around Kilimanjaro FR, and apart from owning the actual trees, manage the area as their own. Individual or household benefits are widely preferred to joint benefits, such as an assured water supply from the forest, or desks for the village school.

Some progress has also been made towards the two immediate objectives: 'participatory natural resource management organisations strengthened and benefit sharing mechanisms made operational.'. The project facilitated the formulation of VNRCs in all participating villages. The members of these committees were generally reported to have been democratically elected, with some committees striving for gender balance, albeit to different degrees. For example, discussions with villagers in Mkindo Forest reserve, Morogoro indicated that the composition of VNRCs in the surrounding villages is 20 percent females and 80 percent males, whereas in Kimboza FR, also Morogoro there is equal distribution. However, as reported above, the workings of these committees need to be strengthened.

The programme has taken some steps towards the objective, 'income and employment generating private sector development efforts promoted in natural resource management', but the benefits have been *very limited*. The range of options is confined to beekeeping, fish farming, nurseries and ecotourism.

The environment within the catchment forests and the forests themselves greatly improved during the project period. Species of flora and fauna that had become rare or disappeared altogether are now reappearing in some areas. Interviews from Morogoro Region indicates that the Catchment Forest Project is well equipped in terms of manpower and facilities, including transport to make frequent follow-up of activities. According to the 2004/5 MNRP implementation report the catchment forests project has 28 percent of all programme vehicles (17). However, Kilimanjaro Region reported a lack of resources, especially trained staff and transport.. Arusha,/ Manyara in contrast praised especially efforts in capacity building.

Collaboration between MNRT and the RNE on project matters was very high and project officers were fully used.

Extension efforts in tree planting are clearly visible in many areas and villagers have commented that CF project staff assist them on a regular basis with tree planting. However, the team noted with concern the *minimal effect of the project on income generating activities and governance*. (See **Impacts**)

While Joint Forest Management (JFM) is hailed as panacea for catchment forest management, evidence on the grounds seems to suggest that a top-down approach still prevails to some extent, and is also seen at the village level with all functions and activities related to forests management vested in the village government and the VNRCs. This does not constitute active participation of the key stakeholders at the household level. Nevertheless, Madoffe and Munishi (2005) showed that in terms of disturbances, catchment forests are better protected than forests under local government control.

Efficiency

In general, project funds and staff were efficiently used. There are insufficient data on project spending to assess the efficiency with which project inputs have been translated into outputs and impacts. External consultants were satisfactorily used and contributed on issues of water, inventory and economic analysis. The project management feel that in the context of the project the consultants did not have any weakness.

While expenditure show a high level of disbursed funds in the regions visted, some regions reported serious problems in the *timing* of the disbursement of funds from central level, affecting programme activities. In Kilimanjaro, for example, last year no money was received for three months, which meant that the programme more or less ceased to function. In terms of outputs achieved, efficiency has been fairly low, with a high percentage of funds spent on law enforcement (patrols).

The output 'facilitate establishment of small scale income generating activities to households' had a target of 50 households per region. While 64 households may have been reached in the case of Morogoro, the impact of this activity in terms of livelihood improvement is negligible. Since the facilitation in 2003, for example,

hardly any beehives or fishponds have been constructed. Similarly, the target for energy-saving stoves was 1,000 but only 252 households have been reached. The high percentage of funds spent on patrols, checking up on alerts and apprehending poachers, suggests that using local people as forest guards is not yet working as intended.

The Kilimanjaro Catchment FR generated TShs 50 million in tourist levies from January to May 2006. This goes directly to the central government treasury. There is little incentive for the forest authorities to provide better services, if they do not see the financial benefits of so doing. There is *even less incentive* for those living in the villages where the tourists pass to provide services, since they receive a tiny amount of the fee that tourists pay. For example, Mhero VNRC has made TShs 250,000 from tourism since 2000. A scheme where the benefits are divided more evenly between authorities and communities would provide an incentive for communities to protect their forests.

Relevance

The project is relevant to the GOT's National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty ('MKUKUTA') and to Tanzania's international obligations, including the Global Biodiversity Convention. Catchment forests are instrumental in protecting water sources and ensuring that rivers continue to flow, to supply hydroelectric dams, domestic users in towns and cities, agriculture and industries with water.

The Catchment Forest Project is designed to enhance conservation and sustainable use of forest areas of critical importance for water catchment in Tanzania. Water supply is suffering from land degradation and deforestation. Efforts to secure the catchment areas are therefore vital for the development of the country.

In addition, catchment forests are found throughout Tanzania's Eastern Arc Mountains, which are recognised internationally for their exceptional biodiversity.

Sustainability

In places where people are gaining benefits from the forests, they are in turn protecting the core forest reserves, and in this respect there is potential for the programme activities to be sustainable. Examples for this were especially found in Kilimanjaro region. However, in other areas, where benefits are not available, where VNRCs are the ones spearheading the destruction of the forest, a great deal more work needs to be done in awareness raising, participation, capacity building, and—above all in providing alternative income generating opportunities. The question of who will do this work also needs to be addressed – at the moment it is all done by central government staff, in the form of district and regional catchment forest managers. The district forestry officers play little meaningful part in the programme, and thus extra expertise which could be harnessed is not. A more practical arrangement between local and central government needs to be worked out. In addition, for alternative income generating activities linkages to the private sector are vital together with a more creative approach towards IGAs. In Same district, one village has started cultivating ginger on their own initiative and they are already transporting large amounts down to Moshi and Dar es Salaam, and earning significant amounts of money.

While the institutional framework is in place at central, district and local levels, the sustainability depends on how the catchment forestry framework is infused into the

local government structure. At present there seems to be parallel structures with the districts being marginalised in terms of power relations. The VEO is answerable to the District Council, but at the same time a front line actor at the local level for catchment forest conservation. Thus conflicts of interest could ensue.

Catchment forest officers face a big challenge in combining their dual roles as law enforcers and extension officers promoting a participatory approach. The participatory approach selected for the project is in line with national policies and contemporary development principles. However, that the participatory approach is not something that can be learned or adopted overnight, either by those who were used to give orders, or by those who were used to receiving them. Sustained capacity building in participatory methodologies for all stakeholders is therefore crucial.

There has been a positive attitude change towards catchment forest conservation by both the government and the communities in catchment forest at Olmotonyi project area. Some activities including law enforcement by villages, beekeeping, collection of resources in the catchment forest are sustainable.

Although district authorities collect levies/fees on tree felling, local hunting, fishing, charcoal burning and commercial firewood, there is no revenue collected on the use of catchment forests.

Overall Assessment

The project has improved the use of catchment forests in all project regions and provided opportunities for the establishment of some sustainable activities in JFM. The concerted efforts in public awareness raising coupled with community based project activities have resulted in many villagers now having a feeling of ownership of conservation activities and some feel strongly that they have a stake in the catchment forests. This was particularly expressed at Arusha /Manyara.

In terms of the two immediate objectives the achievements are modest. While Village Natural Resources Committees (VNRCs) have been created in all villages surrounding the forest reserves visited, their performance varies significantly. In most villages, benefit sharing has not been made clear. The only tangible benefits enjoyed for the moment by many villages are a share of the fines or wood products confiscated from illegal timber cutters in the forests. In Lole Marera, Kilimanjaro, the people have taken the initiative to divide up the half mile buffer strip into household plots, which provide individuals with immediate and tangible benefits.

Income and employment generating private sector development efforts promoted in natural resource management – the programme has taken some steps towards this objective, but their extent has so far been very limited. The range of options is extremely limited, confined to beekeeping, fish farming, nurseries and ecotourism and the efforts spent on making these activities a success is mirrored in the low rate of implementation/ uptake of these activities.

Recommendations for future interventions

The assessment of the Catchment Forestry Project has shown that good results have been achieved in terms of forest conservation; however, more effort needs to go into the strengthening of participatory natural resource management organisations and institutional linkages and the promotion of IGAs as a means of reducing pressure on forest reserves.

Thus the challenges to be addressed include:

- Strengthening of the institutional set up for participatory natural resource management in terms of:
 - Capacity building for village governments, VNRCs and District Authorities
 - Developing practical mechanisms for effective collaboration between local and central government
 - Developing mechanism for equitable distribution of costs and benefits from the conservation of catchment forests
 - Increasing the transparency of cost and benefit flows for all stakeholders
- Addressing the question of income generating activities in a more creative and proactive way through:
 - Providing more appropriate support to IGAs in terms of choices and support
 - A multidisciplinary approach at the local government level, thereby providing access to a range of skills for various possible interventions
 - Capacity building in entrepreneurship
 - Proactive seeking and forging of linkages with the private sector.

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II: Mangrove Management, Tanga

NOTE: Time constraints made it difficult to look at Mangrove Management systematically. This field report is based on general observations on the process of mangrove forest protection in Tanga, and takes the form of a case study. As such, *the team does not pretend to have covered the TOR in relation to this component of the MNRP*. However, the team believes that the fundamental issues underlying mangrove management are similar to those underlying other NRM components of the MNRP.

Background

Mangroves are found along Tanzania's coastline and on islands, including Mafia Island. Mangrove forest reserves cover about 116,000 hectares. Mangrove forests represent a special and valuable ecosystem where terrestrial and marine species interact. Mangroves protect the coastline, provide breeding habitats for fish, prawns and other marine species, and for centuries the termite-resistant mangrove wood has been exported and used for building houses and boats and for firewood. Mangroves are diminishing rapidly at global level, and Tanzania is no exception.

Since colonial times, all mangrove forests in Tanzania have been forest reserves owned by the government, but decades of uncontrolled exploitation and destruction have shown that government cannot provide sustainable management without the active cooperation of local communities.

Therefore, from the early nineties, and with even more emphasis under the National Forest Policy of 1998, and the Forest Act of 2002, the Mangrove Management Project (MMP) has worked towards devolving mangrove management to villagers, with the promise that they would not only bear the costs of sustainable management and enforcement of restrictions on use, but also benefit from any harvesting of mangroves.

Such benefit sharing would be agreed upon between government and village communities through Joint Forest Management Agreements (JFMA). The MMP was included in the MNRP in 1994, covering about 100 coastal villages divided into three coastal zones (Bryceson et al. 2005:61).

Thus, according to this policy and law, over the last decade, extension services promoted awareness on mangrove ecosystems among local people, Village Environmental or Natural Resources Management Committees were established that organised replanting of degraded mangrove forests, issued byelaws restricting use and organised patrols to enforce these. Artisanal salt-making works in mangrove areas were summarily closed all along the coast. This process has been ongoing for at least a decade, with substantial support from Norway and other donors.

Objectives

The main objective of the present project phase (2002-06) is ‘increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management.’

Immediate objectives are:

- ‘Participatory NRM organisations including CBNRM and CBFM strengthened and benefit sharing agreements made operational’ and
- ‘Income and employment generating private sector development efforts promoted in NRM.’

Impact

According to the Mid-Term Review of the MNRP (Bryceson et al. 2005:62-3), by June 2004 the project had attained or surpassed project targets relating to accessing mangrove products and revenues, and involvement in diverse income-generating activities, including bee-keeping. In many areas, bylaws have been passed and management plans approved.

Remote sensing trend data show that during the 1990s mangrove forests increased from 115,500 ha to 133,480 ha, a 16 percent increase.³²

What is lacking is formal approval of mangrove management agreements that clearly specify who carries the costs and enjoys the benefits of mangrove management. Project-sponsored ‘income-generating’ initiatives as an alternative to mangrove exploitation have been patchy in coverage and limited in the benefits they have brought to poor people living in coastal village communities. By now, most coastal residents are aware of the importance of conserving mangroves. The problem is how to link the costs with the benefits of mangrove conservation to the benefit of coastal communities. The following case study highlights these issues.

Tanga case study

Anybody familiar with the Chumvini area (literally ‘the salt place’) just on the outskirts of Tanga town on the road to Mombasa, as it was 15 years ago, will remember a buzzing place densely covered in wood smoke from hundreds of rough sheds (banda), where seawater was boiled in large tin pans to make salt. Chumvini then bordered a mangrove forest that was rapidly cut down to provide much of the firewood for the process.

■ ³² Tanzania Conservation Management Programme 2002, ‘Remote Sensing of Mangrove Change along the Tanzanian Coast’.

Not any more. Chumvini has changed drastically over the last fifteen years. In a major operation, the government closed all salt-making operations in mangrove forests, in some cases with the help of the police force, in 21 villages in Tanga region alone. Those from outside Chumvini returned home; many Chumvini residents turned to artisanal fishing.

In Chumvini, now only some few local shops and huts remain after the expulsion of the salt-boilers, and the mangrove forest has started to grow back. But there are still several ladies sitting at the roadside offering salt in buckets and plastic bags. Where is this being produced nowadays?

How do local people cope? What has happened to the hundreds of people who were expelled from their businesses and livelihoods? How are they living today, and are they benefiting at least indirectly from better management of the mangrove forests? The team

followed up on some of them, in Chumvini and Chongoleani in Tanga district.

Governance

To the team's knowledge, not a single Joint Forest Management Agreement has been signed yet, though draft agreements are ready after going through a cumbersome process in many villages, and regulations on the implementation of the law are equally awaiting signature. So apparently, mangroves are recovering and guarded fairly well in many villages, while local people do not benefit from their exploitation by outsiders. An example is Chongoleani village in Tanga Rural District (**Box 3**).

Box 3: Saltmaking in Chongoleani

Chongoleani villagers have planted mangroves on 300 hectares of intertidal land that had been cleared in the past, and the village environment committee has also set up teams of patrols to curb illegal cutting. As a result, traders are reported to smuggle mangrove poles to foreign countries, and even when the forest is legally harvested, the village doesn't get any share from revenue accruing from sale of the poles either. "This has drawn resentment from the villagers because they feel that they don't get due returns for their stewardship of the forest." The proposed modalities for cost and benefit sharing are still waiting approval from the central government.

A recent visit by members of the Journalists Environmental Association of Tanzania (JET) to Pangani District, found that mangrove and other forests are being depleted as large volumes of charcoal are smuggled to Zanzibar and elsewhere. However, most of the charcoal comes from terrestrial forests.

The issue is how villagers can be expected to continue conserving and protecting mangroves and forests when they do not get direct material benefits. What often happens is that the government takes all the revenue and does not plough back any benefits or even funds to service the ecosystems and rehabilitate the destroyed environment. The challenge is that policy, law and government practice must turn natural resources into wealth that directly improves the quality of life of local people. Otherwise there is no future for sustainable management of the mangrove ecosystems.

Source: Editorial 2005, *The Guardian*, Dar es Salaam, 18 October

Effectiveness

The Mid-Term Review (Bryceson et al. 2005:63) maintains that official and community consciousness about the need for mangrove conservation and management has led to successful initiatives. Yet, as in other projects 'villagers express concern that delays in completing the modalities for cost and benefit sharing may reflect lack of commitment on the part of the government.' Anecdotal evidence suggests that unsustainable mangrove exploitation (logging, clearing for rice planting, and charcoal making) is taking place in various locations along the coast and in the Rufiji delta.

Efficiency

The project has completed many activities concerned with sensitisation and alternative income generation, but it is unlikely that these activities have yielded value for money or provided significant benefits for many people, the poor in particular. Given the size of the mangrove areas covered by the programme, the funds available for promoting income generating activities are most inadequate. For example, Kilwa, Lindi and Mtwara districts were allocated only TShs 1.8 million.

Relevance

Mangroves are a small but vital component of Tanzania's total forest and woodland cover (Bryceson et al. 2005:61). Degradation resulting from over-exploitation, of which salt-making is only one (relatively minor) cause, has had detrimental effects on marine life and coastal inhabitants' livelihoods. Improved mangrove management is therefore a potential key for sustainable NMR and improved livelihoods.

Sustainability

In addition, this is not a full-time job. At spring tides, the wells get flooded and filled up from above which makes the water dirty, while rains dilute the seawater as well. So salt-boiling is restricted to neap tides, about two weeks per month. So, if this is your only source of income, you make not more than about TShs 35,000 per month in the dry season, which is much less than the minimum wage. This income can certainly not feed a family.

With this precarious and risky economy and tiny profit margin, we ask the old man and the ladies for other ways of making money with salt. For example, do they know how much the salt is being sold for just further down the road, and would they consider making more money by selling their produce themselves? This proposal is rejected outright by all here: "Everybody has his/her own work, we don't interfere with each other. And we don't have the time to sit at the roadside anyway, we are busy producing the salt!" They also claim they don't even know the price charged at the roadside. Any other improvements in their lives since they were removed from the Chumvini area? They cannot tell me of any.

On the way back to town, the team stops at the main road, where two well-dressed ladies sit behind much smaller 5-liter buckets, salt piled up on them, and they also offer small plastic bags of maybe a kilo. What are the prizes here? Well, the 5-liter bucket sells at TShs 2,000, the bags at TShs 500. Now, this sounds indeed like an excellent profit margin of ca. 200 percent: buying 16 kg for TShs 2,000 and selling 5 kg for the same price?

The salt boilers must know these retail prices. Indeed, they do understand economics. They calculate the whole production process very sharply up to every detail, and subcontract others, mostly young men, for cutting and transporting the firewood and carrying seawater from the wells to the saltpan. They can only afford to pay them much less than the minimum day labourer rate. Why do people accept this degree of exploitation and self-exploitation, and allow the retailers to make money relatively easy, by sitting at the roadside the whole day just selling the salt? We were even told by the salt boilers that the retailers grind the salt by hand to 'loosen it' and increase its apparent volume. So they know the trade.

Salt-boilers: below the poverty line?

We are taken to a large intertidal area called Kisutu only about 1-2 km away, where smoke leads the way to two small traditional salt-making enterprises, just like the

ones that had been removed from Chumvini. These do not use mangroves, but coconut and cashew trees, so there is nothing illegal about them, we are told. We meet three women and an old man who run this place, and they have indeed moved here from Chumvini years back when the government stopped the salt-making businesses there to save the mangroves from annihilation. At Kisutu, only some few could continue making salt, while others have moved away or taken up other trades, as we are told.

Mzee Babu, Bibi Mshiri, Bibi Kibua and Bibi Mrugu are eager to explain how they make a living with producing salt from seawater. It is hard work, they sometimes need to employ young men to carry the water and transport the coconut trunks that are burned below the saltpans, and the profit margin is very small. So they have to do as much work as possible themselves, sometimes with the help of their children.

You start with digging the so-called 'wells' in the intertidal area to get at the seawater. Three people dig for a day to reach 3-4 meters down at the groundwater level. There are three wells now in operation, but they last only some few months, until they get silted up and have to be abandoned. You then buy a few buckets and ropes for collecting the seawater. If you do not own a hut with the saltpan, you can rent it for TShs 1,000 per day from the person who built it. Equally, the well you have dug is your property, and if you are not using it, you may lease it out for TShs 500 per week.

The firewood is bought from farmers on nearby shambas. The going rates are TShs 1,500 for a coconut tree, plus TShs 1,000 for the one who cuts it, and another TShs 1,000 for transporting it to the site. The water is then collected from the well, often a job for a young man who is paid another TShs 1,000 per day. With this and the hire of the saltpan, you have already spent TShs 5,500 before even starting making salt.

In a day's work and by boiling thirty 20-litre buckets of water, you can produce 4 'ndebe' (tins) of salt, of about 16 kg each. At the production site a ndebe is sold for TShs 2,000, that is not more than TShs 8,000 for around 64 kg of salt. So with an investment of TShs 5,500 and a day of hard work, you can make TShs 2,500, provided you have a customer to buy the salt from you. Customers don't come every day, and Mama Mshiri shows me a heap of salt piled up at the corner of the shed waiting to be collected by the one who ordered it. Because in this business, you work on orders, to be sure you get paid at the end of the day.

How do we explain the apparent tolerance of this unequal, even exploitative relationship when judged by Western standards? Well, we have come across this phenomenon in much of the informal sector, where people rely on a network of suppliers and customers to maintain a production or trade that secures the basic daily income and provides for at least a meal in the evening. In the absence of any formal contracts, social relationships and trust between the members of the network are tightly-knit, and they would rather continue with exploitative arrangements as long as it ensures their day-to-day livelihoods. Fear of disrupting the existing lifeline makes them wary of 'offending' their customers, who may also provide working tools and materials, e.g. be the owner of the saltpan. Though relatively poor themselves, such people are commonly called 'watajiri' (rich persons), and rather seen as benefactors, not as exploiters. They are relied upon for small loans in case of family problems, emergencies and bad times in general. Strong reasons indeed for remaining loyal and keeping good relationship with the watajiri, as long as there are no better sources of income.

What about other villagers formerly working in the salt industry? Most are farmers and fishers anyway. We are introduced to a lady member of a group of 27 seaweed farmers. She complains bitterly that the price offered by the buying company is far too low, only TShs 70-100 for a kilo of dried seaweed. So half of her group have now abandoned seaweed. For a living, she grows cassava and also makes mats and baskets. Another villager has some modern beehives that give him as much as 10 litres of honey twice a year that he can sell at TShs 2,500 per litre. This does not seem attractive enough, as there are only about 15 people in the beekeeping business in Chongoleani. **Box 4** relates the life of a former salt-boiler in Chongoleani.

Box 4: A former salt-boiling Mtajiri from Chongoleani

Until the early nineties, salt-making was a huge industry in Chongoleani, a densely-populated village of about 2,800 people on the north coast of Tanga Bay. We meet Mzee Mwinjuma, a 53 years old farmer, livestock keeper and councillor of the village government. He is introduced as a former 'mtajiri' who owned 15 of the around 150 saltpans that operated all along the fringes of the vast mangrove forest bordering the seaside of the village. In those days, he used to provide firewood and employ day labourers to produce the salt. Lorries and dhows were coming from far to collect the salt and mangrove poles for sale all over the country and even to Kenya. This was big business then for many men like him who owned and worked the saltpans. But women also got good income as the many visiting lorry drivers and dhow crew needed to eat.

Mzee Mwinjuma was a rich man then, and it was not easy for him to give up his salt-boiling business. However, as he explains, the extension officer from the Forestry Department finally convinced the villagers that if they continued to cut down the mangroves separating them from the sea, the waters would destroy their village. Also, there would be no fish anymore to catch in the sea, as they needed the mangroves to breed.

He didn't want this to happen, so after many meetings and talks the Chongoleani villagers agreed to work with the Forestry Department in removing the saltpans, replanting the bare mangrove areas, forming a Village Environmental Committee for management of the mangroves and enforcement of the restrictions on their use. Nowadays, people caught cutting mangroves illegally are fined TShs 5-10,000 or sent 3 months to prison. Special permission is given to cut some bundles of mangrove poles for building houses only, and a small fee of TShs 2,000 is paid to the Village Environmental Committee for that, but poor people are not charged.

These days, Mzee Mwinjuma farms maize, cassava, beans and rice, and he breeds some improved cattle he received from a German project in the eighties. He also employs a few youngsters to make mud bricks. For these youngsters, he is the 'mtajiri' again, but there is not much money in mud bricks. Altogether, he said, that he is worse off now than in the past, but what can you do? You have to protect the environment for the future of the village!

Source: Fieldwork, Chongoleani, April 2006

So it is clear that so far none of the trades promoted by the government to generate alternative income, such as seaweed farming and beekeeping, have made good money for the people who have given up the profitable salt boiling. A major campaign of planting 2000 cassia trees also failed, as most seedlings died, presumably for lack of watering and care.

Still few people openly complained. Obviously, we could not escape being seen as a donor representative brought there by government officials. You don't bite the hand that may feed you. And when leaving Chongoleani, our colleague from the Forestry Department told us that we were actually very privileged that the village did not charge us TShs 20,000 for the visit. Indeed, this seems to develop into another line of income from the donor world that penetrates Tanzania to the last village: charging entrance fees from consultants and project visitors.

* * *

III: Ruvu Fuelwood Project

Background

The Ruvu Fuelwood Project became operational under Phase II of the MNRP in 2000. According to the Mid-Term Review (Bryceson et al. 2005:69), the project provided an opportunity 'for villagers to participate in protecting the core of a government forest (sic!) by being given an opportunity to utilize and benefit from the periphery of the same forest.' The project consists of capacity building, participatory Agroforestry development, socio-economic studies (by TAFORI) and more efficient technology in charcoal production.

The Ruvu Forest Reserves (North and South) are located on the main road, 50 km west of Dar es Salaam. The management of the Ruvu Forest Reserve began in 1957 when it was established to supply a paper mill. This proved to be unsuccessful, and a new objective for the reserve was formulated, to supply Dar es Salaam with fuelwood. This continued in an unsystematic way for decades, but then in 1999 an energy-based project was devised, the Ruvu Fuelwood Development Project, under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. This project started in 2000 with the dual purposes of providing a continuous source of fuelwood and alleviating poverty in the local communities.

The project has given out 3 ha (7.5 acre) plots of land from a strip of degraded land along the southern edge of the forest reserve to people in four pilot communities. On this land they are permitted first to harvest the remains of the forest to make charcoal for sale, and then to plant both trees and crops on the land. Most farmers are able only to cultivate an acre or two each year, therefore the trees are planted on a rotational basis. After four or five years, the first trees can be harvested for poles and firewood. The people cultivating the forest land also become active in protecting the core forest reserve. So far, a total of 8,000 ha have been set aside from the margin of the FR for the use of local people. There are 340 existing plots and up to 800 new plots for the villages which are joining the project. An average village in this area has around 600 households, and the four pilot villages have each about 70 forest plots.

Objectives

The prime objective of the project is 'to promote sustainable forest resources management, through increasing forest regeneration and forest products to meet rural and urban (especially Dar es Salaam) primary energy requirements, while providing a realistic economic base for the communities surrounding the forest reserve.'

The short-term objective is 'to empower community participation in forest resource management and improve efficiency in production and utilisation of wood fuels, hence increasing benefits to rural life.'

Impact

About 970 households have, or will soon have, 7.5 acres of forest land from which to derive food and income, both immediate, in the form of food and cash crops, and, eventually, in the form of trees. After four or five years, people are already making money – between February and April 2006, 18,000 poles were sold, bringing in a total of TShs 11.7 million. Farmers have bought bicycles, radios and mobile phones, built better houses with metal sheet roofs and some have even acquired second wives. The town council forest officer calculated that out of about 1,110 trees planted on one

acre, people could sell poles worth TShs 472,000 (at TShs 500 each). This figure does not take into account any firewood consumed or sold.

However, not everyone in the villages has applied for or received a plot. Several reasons were given as to why people might not want to apply for a plot:

- it is seen as risky to put in hard work now but only see the gains in 4 or 5 years, although this is increasingly not a factor, as people see that their fellow villagers are making substantial amounts of money;
- many younger people, especially men, prefer to go to Dar es Salaam and find casual jobs there, which brings them immediate returns;
- households with small businesses already have a source of income and are not able to take on anything extra;
- households with insufficient labour are not able to deal with the amount of work required for the plots.

Protection of the forest reserve. Some pressure has been taken off the forest. Many of those who would have been working inside the forest are now working on their own land, and those who are now farming the buffer strip act as unofficial forest guards. It is difficult to drive a lorry across a plot belonging to someone, and villagers can use their newly bought mobile phones to call the forest authorities if they find someone working in the forest illegally. There are also fewer incidences of fire. Although the intensity of harvesting is less in parts of the forest near the pilot villages, there is still pressure from other parts of the forest beyond the buffer strip, *so the project has not yet made a significant difference to the overall condition of the forest.*

Tree planting. Many trees have been planted, some of them valuable indigenous trees (including *Khaya anthotheca*, *Azelia quarensis*, *Baphia kirkii*, and *Dalbergia melanoxylon*). Their survival rate is estimated at 86-94 percent, which is far higher than if the forest authorities had planted trees themselves. Although the timber trees take a long time to grow, they are interspersed between faster growing trees, so that people are sure to receive some income while the slower trees mature. When cutting down the degraded forest for replanting, farmers leave selected indigenous trees and also trees which it is illegal to cut down, such as *mpingo*, *mkongo*, *mvule*, and *mninga*. With TAFORI, the project is using the experience of indigenous tree management to draw conclusions about their growth and productivity. As well as planting trees on their forest plots, many people have also started planting trees on their own shambas, despite there being no culture of planting trees on shambas in this part of the country.

The Kibaha town council Forest Officer expressed some reservations about the limited number of species, commenting that it was bad for biodiversity and also dangerous if disease hit one species of tree. He suggested that they might encourage the planting of more indigenous trees, or carry out more research in order to identify a greater range of useful indigenous trees.

Governance

The way the *forestry officials* work with the communities has improved. In the past, they were the 'enemy', and the forest officials' main contact with the people was through arrests and cautions. 'They were like police', explained a group of women in Mwendapole village. Now they are working together for each other's benefit. The forest officials give advice and expertise, bring seedlings and often come to visit the villages. ('We've become social!' said one forester). The people with plots help the

officials to guard the forest. A direct result of the communities' role as forest guards has been that forest officials now have much more time to work with communities.

Joint Forestry Management

The usual constraint on JFM is that communities close to the forests remove a significant protection burden from the catchment authorities, but often receive very few benefits in return, and may be harmed by the removal of a source of income in harvesting forest products. However, under this project, communities are receiving tangible benefits, for which they protect the core forest, since they feel that the forest authorities are working with them. In many cases, forest authorities are reluctant to allow local people to derive material benefits from forest protection efforts, but it is clear from this example that there is space for flexibility. Ruvu North FR is a production forest, but Ruvu South, where the project has started similar activities in one village, is a protected forest. The concept of handing over a strip of degraded land on the boundaries of a protected forest to act as a buffer zone may be anathema to many traditionally trained foresters, but it has great potential for replication in many areas throughout the country.

Kibaha Town Council has been closely involved with the project. Council staff have provided training in several areas such as beekeeping, setting up SACCOS and especially in agriculture and agroforestry. The council has been kept informed about project activities.

Under the LGRP, local projects and initiatives are to be taken over by LGAs. In this case, both council and central government/project staff were adamant that there was little sense in this. Local government is already deeply involved in project activities, but they do not have the resources to take on a project of this nature. The existing arrangement functions well and both sides are happy with it. In addition, the forest reserves are controlled by central government, and these cannot be handed over to local government.

TAFORI has played an important role in the project. They have often worked in conjunction with *SUA*. *TAFORI* and *SUA* conducted a socio-economic study, partly to identify farmers' exotic and indigenous species preferences. They then carried out on-station trials and selected the most appropriate species for the project to distribute to the farmers. Trials continue on these species and *TAFORI* also receives information from the project about silvicultural problems. For example, some *Casuarina equisetifolia* trees were dying for no obvious reason, and *TAFORI* were able to solve the problem. *TAFORI* are also prepared to listen to and learn from farmers. For example, *Azelia* trees were not doing well in *TAFORI* nurseries, but when farmers tried planting them directly onto the shamba, they did much better.

TaTEDO, an NGO specialising in energy efficient technologies, has worked with the project to design and provide training on fuel-efficient stoves and on improved charcoal kilns. *TaTEDO* are also doing some training in entrepreneurship, so that people can market their produce themselves.

Levies and royalties

The farmers producing forest goods for sale are not liable to any levies or royalties. They sell their produce from their shambas to traders who come in to buy. The traders, when transporting the goods out of the forest, pay royalties to the forest and a

council levy. However, the Ruvu Forest Reserve office has decided that in order to stimulate a new market they will not impose royalties on poles, which leave the forest free of charge, and the price of the royalty is not transferred to the price farmers receive for selling their poles (TShs 450-550 per pole). The same does not apply for charcoal, which pays forest royalties of TShs 600 per 28 kg bag. For this reason, much of the charcoal does not pass the forest gate, but is taken out at night or along small paths out of the forest. The council levy on charcoal is TShs 200 and on poles is TShs 100 per pole (but TShs 250 for poles harvested from the natural forest). For firewood, since a market has not yet been identified, there are no royalties for the time being.

Royalties and levies will only become relevant to people in the forest area if they decide to start marketing and transporting their products themselves. For the moment, with the lack of knowledge and contacts about various levies, transportation and where the markets are located, the best option for farmers is to continue selling to traders who come to the shambas. But ultimately, people could increase the income raised by organising the marketing of their own produce, possibly through their network or SACCOS.

The royalties and levies all go directly to the central government and council treasuries. Ruvu FR receives annually TShs 105-110 million from forest revenues. The project feels that the amount they receive back from central government *is no reflection on their efforts to stimulate this revenue*, and that they should keep the money that they raise and invest it in order to increase production. At local government level, the environment is not a priority, so the money raised by levies on forest products is likely to be spent on health or education, rather than being ploughed back into the environment. The environment benefits if there is something left after the priority issues are dealt with.

Contracts

Initially, the project gave out contracts to people when they took on a forest plot, but they found that there were loopholes and omissions in the contracts, e.g. problems arose because there was only one name on the contract, and the contracts were in English so most people were not able to read them. The project have been working on a new contract, but it has taken a long time and people are complaining that, without a contract or agreement of some kind, they do not feel secure in their ownership of the trees that they have planted on someone else's land. Others pointed out that the contracts, where they exist, are for 10 years, but many of the trees planted will take longer to mature than 10 years. The forest authorities say that the contracts will be renewed, but people protest that spoken promises don't give them adequate security. The forest authorities said that this period is the one specified in the Forest Act (2002) when providing local people with benefits from the forest reserves. The forest authorities need to provide more clarity to people on this issue and ensure that contracts are issued as soon as possible.

Gender relations

Initially, the forest plots were assigned to households, but with only the name of the head of the household, generally the man, on the registration document. A group of women in Msangani explained that a man and wife cultivate together, but when the

time comes to sell, the wife may not see any of the proceeds from the sale of the tree products. The husband argues, 'but your name isn't on the document, what right do you have to this money?' For this reason, many women in the villages have applied for their own plots, secure in the knowledge that they will have control over the money earned. Of 281 plots allocated, 61 (22 percent) have gone to women. However, a group of women in Msangani said that in an ideal world, it would be better if one household had one plot on which both the man and the woman worked together, then shared the money.

More needs to be done to address gender issues within the households. If project managers are serious about working at household level, then they need to understand the dynamics of the household and that access to assets, especially money, is rarely equitable. It is a demotivating factor for many women, who put in much of the work onto the forest plots, to fear that they will not see any benefits. The project has recognised that there is a problem, and is now working on it as a result of pressure from women, for example, ensuring that the photographs of both man and wife are on the contract, and that if they divorce then they have to follow the regulations laid down in the Marriage Act when it comes to their forest plot. However, this does little to tackle the problem of fair distribution of assets within a marriage. A woman taking on her own forest plot and cultivating it herself is not a solution which works for all households, not least because the forest plots are large and involve a great deal of work. **Box 5** provides an example where a woman has used her forest plot to good effect.

Box 5: A woman and her forest plot

Enne Haule is a divorcee with three children, who joined the project in 2001. Her husband left her in 2000, and gives her no support in bringing up the children, so she needed to find a way to ensure that her family had an adequate income, and that the children could receive a good education. Out of her 7.5 acre plot, she cultivates an acre a year, which is all she can manage on her own. She cuts the existing trees and makes charcoal, which she sells. She plants maize in the short rains, and then requests trees from the forest authorities so that she can plant them during the long rains. Between the trees, she plants other crops, such as beans and cassava. She is willing to try out new activities, for example, one year she planted *Crotalaria* between the trees in the short rains in order to suppress weeds and improve the fertility of the soil, she has planted *Jatropha*, from seeds she acquired on a study tour, she has become a trainer for building improved stoves, and in 2003 she started a nursery and raised seedlings, 600 of which she was able to sell making almost TShs 200,000. She is now paying for her oldest child to attend secondary school, and says that about 70 percent of her income comes from forest related activities. When some men in the discussion group suggested she might like a husband who would be glad to take on such a lucrative enterprise, she was adamant that this was not part of her plan and that she was managing very satisfactorily on her own.

Source: Field interview, May 2006

Food security and well being

People's food security is better, partly because they have larger areas with better fertility on which to plant a variety of food crops, and partly, as happened in a recent drought when many crops failed, they were able to sell poles and charcoal to cover the shortfall in food. An increase in well being has also occurred, since people have resources on which to fall back in emergencies, e.g. food shortages, sickness in the family, and also they are able to meet expenses they previously would not have been able to, such as sending children to secondary school, and buying items such as bicycles to increase mobility.

Efficiency

The funds disbursed in 2004/5 were spent as per the budget, with the exception of TShs 30 million earmarked for the project manager to study abroad, which he has delayed until autumn 2006. The implementation of the work plans at a high level shows that inputs have been efficiently turned into outputs.

In terms of achievements against indicators, as stated in the 2005 evaluation, without distinguishing between the targets for Lake Zone and Ruvu and without baseline information, it is difficult to assess whether the levels stated in the indicators have been met.

Indicator 1: At least 50 percent of households in Ruvu area are reached and sensitised on AF interventions. It is not possible to come up with precise figures, but as an example, in Msangani village, there are about 600 households, and 73 plots. People in this village told us that there is a waiting list of people demanding plots, and their estimate was possibly 50 people. This means that at least one fifth of the households of this village understand the advantages of agroforestry and having a forest plot. There are likely to be many others who have received and understood the 'message' but who are not able or ready to take on a large undertaking of this sort.

Indicator 2: AF contributing to at least 20 percent of household income through sales of agroforestry products. For many farmers this may not yet be the case, since the ones who have acquired the plots more recently will not yet be harvesting tree products. But for the ones who have started selling their trees, they claim that the income has made a significant difference to their financial capacity. One lady from Msangani village, estimated that about 70 percent of her income now comes from selling forest products. Increasingly this may become the case for other farmers.

Indicator 3: At least 10 percent of households reached are practising at least one AF technology. As indicated above, over 10 percent of households in one village (and the figures are similar for the other villages) are already practising rotational agroforestry on their forest plots.

The productivity of the managed plots is said to be higher than that of the forest (the forest is subject to events such as fires, illegal harvesting, non-ideal spacing, weed competition) – 6.4m³/ha as opposed to 1m³/ha from natural forests. At the same time, these plots are producing crops – in the first two or three years, maize, cassava, beans, cowpeas, etc. can be grown between the trees, maize in the short rains, and other crops in the long rains. Some farmers plant pineapples in the third or fourth year, since pineapples can tolerate shade. The output of these plots is being maximised with full use of the land. It is likely that the fertility of these shambas will be above average, since maize is not grown on them every year, only the first two or three, and the soil will benefit from leaf litter (except in the case of Eucalyptus), and from the reduction in erosion as a result of the tree cover.

Effectiveness

The prime goal of the project has largely been met. Forest regeneration, in the degraded fringes of the reserve, has taken place, although it is not natural regeneration and many of the species are exotic. Purists might take exception to these exotic species, but the alternative is unutilisable degraded forest. In addition, most of the exotic trees will be cut down before they seed properly, therefore the threat of becoming invasive is reduced. As a result of this regeneration, forest products are being harvested, both for local and Dar es Salaam use. However at the moment, they

are mostly not meeting energy needs – this is because harvesting has recently begun and people are rushing to make some money to meet immediate needs, by harvesting and selling poles. Project management predict that when more of the trees become mature, people will start making more charcoal, particularly from an indigenous tree, *Baphia kirkii*, which has not yet grown large enough for harvest. Firewood, although available, has not yet secured a market, although moves are in process to seek this market. In this respect, therefore, the project is not meeting its objective as a fuelwood project. But there is also a huge demand for poles, which would otherwise come from the forest – 18,000 poles were sold in the space of three months this year. This sale of poles, and of small amounts of charcoal, is providing a realistic economic base for those in the participating communities, with many people saying they have already significantly increased their incomes and thus their well-being.

The short-term aim has also largely been met. Communities are participating positively and actively in forest management, although not in the management of the core forest, which is still under central government control. But people are happy with this situation, since their requirements for wood products are largely being met, with the added bonus of having extra space in which to cultivate crops. They have a part in the management, however, by assisting in the protection of the forest – they alert the forest officers to any illegal activities, and at the same time, their very presence as a buffer zone discourages people from going through into the core forest.

Efficiency in production and utilisation of wood fuels has not yet entirely been met. Production is more efficient, as indicated by the statistics under **impacts** above. However, the improved methods of fuelwood utilisation have not yet realised their full potential. People said that they have tried the new method of charcoal production but that they have mostly continued with the traditional method, which produces much less charcoal of a lower quality (a traditional kiln produces two 28 kg bags from 1m³ of wood, while an improved kiln produces 3-3.5 bags from the same amount of wood). Reasons given were that it took too long to produce the charcoal (up to 7 days longer) and they needed the income faster. The main reason is more likely to be resistance to change, so it is important that the project continue to work with people to promote these kilns. Fuel-efficient stoves have also been introduced, but these have also not taken off as envisaged. Women still prefer to cook on three stones, although they are eloquent in their praises of the new stoves. One man commented that once firewood becomes a saleable commodity, people may change their minds about using stoves which consume less firewood.

Relevance

The project is extremely relevant since it tackles several key issues with the one central activity. It contributes towards the protection of a forest reserve by the communities, it provides a sustainable source of forest products for the Dar es Salaam market, taking pressure off forest reserves, and it contributes towards the government drive for poverty reduction by providing a source of income for a large proportion of the communities involved. These all fit in with national policies – of poverty alleviation via MKUKUTA, participation in forest management and protection of the environment, and at the same time with the Millennium Development Goals, of reducing poverty and protecting the environment.

Sustainability

There is great potential for this project to be sustainable. In the beginning, most people did not take up the offer of the free land for tree planting, since they were convinced that the forest authorities were using them as free labour, and would later come and claim the trees planted as their own. Uptake was slow at the beginning, therefore. However, as a result of working with the forest authorities and seeing that trees ready for harvest are not appropriated by them, demand for plots is now extremely high, and other villages not included in the project are requesting that the initiative be replicated in their villages. People have clearly seen the benefits of being provided with a large plot of land, and are happy to plant both trees and crops on the land. In the four pilot villages, there is a waiting list of about 200 people, who have requested plots, but not yet received them.

The project is providing seedlings free to the farmers, but this can be weighed against the benefits gained by the forest authorities in increased forest protection and the reduction of pressure on the core forest reserve. The distribution of seedlings is a crucial element and would continue. Some people in the villages have produced seedlings, but water availability is a serious constraint. Farmers would not be able to afford to buy the number of seedlings needed to plant an entire plot, estimated at 1,110 seedlings per acre, costing around 166,500TShs. In future, as more trees are planted, fewer seedlings will be needed, since several of the preferred types of tree (e.g. *Eucalyptus*, *Senna*) coppice well.

A network has been set up in the four pilot villages. It deals with community issues, such as communication with the project about issues arising from the forest plots, deciding who will get a plot and who needs to be removed from their plot, and any conflicts which arise. They can call in forest officials if they need some assistance, but, as one network member commented, 'Why bother the foresters when we can solve most problems ourselves?' The network also saw the need for some sort of loan facility, after listening to demands from farmers. They contacted the project who brought in the council cooperative officer to help them set up a SACCOS. They still need more capacity building so that they can take over other functions, such as looking for markets for their forest products, looking into more efficient ways of selling their products.

The network and the SACCOS are both very new and have not yet had time to prove themselves, but the farmers we spoke to were aware of their existence and spoke of them with optimism and confidence, and it does appear to be very much driven by the demands and needs of the people in the villages, rather than by the project. Referring to the project, and how farmers can now run their own activities, one man said, 'We were with our mother, but now we can look after ourselves.'

People have shown initiative in demanding the project help them with activities, e.g. they wanted to run their own tree nurseries, which the project had planned to decentralise in 2004 – in the end they handed over some of the nurseries in 2001, in places where water is available, and farmers made TShs 3 m in 2005 out of the sale of seedlings. People from villages outside the project organised their own study tour to the project villages in order to see for themselves what was happening. As a result of this visit, they applied to the project for inclusion in future project activities. As of 2006, four new villages have been added to the project.

General issues

Poverty

In many cases, projects are hijacked by the better off members of the community. When we asked a group of men whether this initiative had been taken up by the poorer people in the communities, they cried 'but we are the poorest!' We replied that they didn't look like the poorest people, to which they responded, 'Of course, we aren't so poor any more because we've got money to buy things now!' They said that it is not necessary to have capital to begin working on a forest plot, since the major expense, the tree seedlings, is provided free by the project. If a family has sufficient labour and the will to succeed, then they are likely to make a success of the enterprise. The very poorest, who tend to be older people, or sick or lame people, would not be able to take advantage of such an initiative, but other ordinary poor people could. The people we talked to insisted that the richer members of the community had in many cases not joined the project, since they have many economic activities already and could not manage to devote the time required to such large plots. Also, hiring labour would be too expensive.

Farmers prefer the household approach rather than the village woodlot approach, where it is often not clear how the future benefits are going to be used or distributed. Money in individual pockets speaks more loudly than communal projects. In the past two years of drought, the families with forest plots have not suffered from the food shortages which other households have, since they have had a resource which they were able to fall back on and sell in order to buy food, thus reducing their vulnerability to natural shocks. In years without drought, many people have been able to lift themselves out of poverty and have begun to satisfy their families' basic needs.

One group of people who have not been touched significantly by the project have been younger people. Young men feel that they need money now and can't sit around waiting for trees to grow. They prefer to run to Dar es Salaam and make some money quickly by working on buses or other labouring jobs. We spoke to a group of younger men who have forest plots and they were scathing of this attitude, criticising their contemporaries for not looking seriously at their futures, but they are in the minority.

Income generating activities and improved technologies

The project has brought in activities in order to increase further the income of people in the communities, and to appeal to those who have not been able to take up forest plots, in order that they are not excluded from generating income for their families. They have offered beekeeping and fish farming. Neither have taken off seriously, although some people have hung bee hives in their forest plots and others are requesting permission to use the core forest reserve for siting beehives. Several problems were mentioned in connection with beekeeping – many people are afraid of bees, and complain that they don't have the necessary equipment and clothing for harvesting of honey; there has been a drought, which has meant that there is not enough water for bees; the modern hives are expensive to buy; and people report that those who do keep bees get very little honey, making it hardly worth their while. Fish farming has also not taken off, especially because of the drought conditions in recent years, although we met one farmer who kept fish in a pond in the forest and who had made some money by selling them.

Improved technologies have also not taken off in the way envisaged, although this is a country-wide phenomenon, and not only confined to this area. IBK charcoal kilns have been introduced, but, as mentioned above, people are not using them. In a group of women in Mwendapole, three had tried the improved kiln, and said that it worked

well, but all had subsequently gone back to the traditional method. The same applies to improved stoves. Although both women and men praise the stoves, very few are actually using them – in the same group of women in Mwendapole, out of 20 only 4 had built the improved stoves in their homes. We saw the stove of a woman which had been built for her as a demonstration, on her shamba. It was clearly used and the woman said it was very good, but she has not yet got round to building one at home, although she said she is planning to.

Scaling-up

The project manager has produced a concept paper and presentation in which he maps out a possible scaled up future for the Ruvu Fuelwood Development Project. Since the existing project has so far displayed many successes, both in protecting the core forest reserve and in increasing the incomes of those living near the forest, and since there is clear demand from other villages, which are now being included in the project, the project manager now feels that the next logical step should be to extend the concept to the four other districts touching the forest, so that the whole forest is surrounded by productive agroforestry plots. The plan would also include South Ruvu forest. The districts involved would be Kisarawe, Mkwanga, Rufiji and Bagamoyo. All these districts, as well as Kibaha, are highly affected by the demands from Dar es Salaam for primary energy supply and other wood products for building. The paper also recommends the wide-scale introduction of *Jatropha curcas*, which has multiple uses including oil for fuel, soap, candles, fertiliser, a host for vanilla, and which has an existing market in Arusha.

Local government, based at district level, would take the main responsibility for the scaled-up project while central government, in the form of the Ruvu Fuelwood Development Project as it is now, would assume a facilitation and strategic role.

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IV: Beekeeping in Manyoni, Kibondo, Tabora, Handeni and Kondoa

Background

The beekeeping sub-component is classified under the income and employment generating component of the MNRP. The aim of such a classification was to shift from project outputs to component approach so as to enhance the achievement of the national goal, aimed at increased benefits to rural communities and participatory approaches in natural resources management. Following such a classification, the beekeeping component planned five key activities to address the purpose of the component, which is 'Income and employment generating and private sector development'.

These include:

- Research and information management
- Extension information dissemination
- Collaboration with internal and external institutions
- Capacity building for resource managers and entrepreneurs
- Improving processing, packaging and marketing of bee products.

The subcomponent is currently operating in five priority districts, where honey production has traditionally been an important economic activity. These include

Handeni, Manyoni, Kondoa, Tabora and Kibondo. The project has intervened in three villages in each district, making a total of 15 villages.

Objective

‘Increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management.’

Immediate objective: ‘Income and employment generating private sector development efforts promoted in natural resource management.’

Impact

Biodiversity

The team noted the establishment of bee reserves as a positive impact towards maintaining or restoring biodiversity. The team visited a bee reserve established from Miombo regrowth at Kayui village, Manyoni District. Discussion with villagers indicated that the area has attracted bees as well as other wildlife, such as dik dik, and small cats. In addition, the project has introduced hives with stingless bees for demonstration purposes. Prior to the bee reserve being established the area was used as cropland and would now most likely be under tobacco.

Each of the three pilot villages, namely, Mwamagembe, Kayui and Sasilo has established a bee reserve. In addition, nine primary schools in neighbouring villages have established bee reserves, resulting in a total area of 10,103 ha under bee reserves in five villages. This is a significant achievement in terms of biodiversity conservation in Manyoni District.

The interest of the bee keeping groups to protect forest from fire and other threats contributes to conservation of forest resources and therefore to the sustainability of natural resource management at large (Bryceson et. al, 2005).

Improved traditional beekeeping

As a result of training, the number of local people involved in the bee keeping industry and producing quality bee products in the project districts was estimated to be 1,791 by June 2005, out of which 762 were female (42 percent). The number of appropriate beehives used was estimated to be 71/bee keeper at the same period. Consequently, the number of bark hives, which are not environmentally friendly, continued to decline and were estimated to have reached an average of two hives/bee keeper by June 2005 compared to an average of 200/bee keeper in 1998. The decrease in the use of bark hives was most significant in Manyoni, and apparently no bark hives were used in either Handeni or Kondoa.

MNRT (2005) indicated that in the pilot villages beekeepers were motivated to increase production of bee products, particularly honey, from an average of 175 kg/beekeeper in 1999 to of 494 kg/beekeeper in June 2005. However, productivity of beekeepers is not uniform, with beekeepers in Manyoni District being by far the most productive with an average of about 1,400 kg of honey/beekeeper, while beekeepers in Handeni seem the least productive.

The differences in productivity seem to be a function of (i) existing beekeeping culture, prior to project interventions, for example, Manyoni had by far the largest number of bark hives, and (ii) institutional support: Manyoni has an extremely committed District Beekeeping Officer and some staff from the failed UKIMBU

project are still stationed at the district. In addition, the district council as a whole is committed to beekeeping activities and supports activities with funds from the district. In Handeni, in contrast, there has been less of a traditional culture of beekeeping as evidenced by the absence of log-hives in pilot villages at the start of the project. As the field team did not visit Handeni, it was not possible to ascertain district council commitment directly.

According to MNRT (2005) the average income per bee keeper by June 2005 was TShs 456,000.

New technologies: stingless honeybees

The art of managing stingless honeybee colonies was introduced by the project to increase beekeepers' income, alleviate poverty and conserve the environment. Beekeeping with stingless honeybees started in August 1998 by domesticating seven colonies. By June 2003, the number of domesticated stingless honeybee colonies was 689. The number reached a record of 857 colonies by June 2005.

The target was to train 1,791 beekeepers on how to domesticate stingless bees by June 2005 with the intention of reaching an average of one colony per beekeeper. The target was therefore achieved by about 50 percent.

Production from stingless honeybees was 111 litres in June 2001. After some difficulties in 2003 and 2004, it reached 1,286 litres by June 2005.

Table 1 shows the average income of beekeepers in the pilot villages. The table shows the high level of productivity in Manyoni compared to other districts.

The team followed up on the impact of the project on the livelihoods at the village level by visiting Mwamagembe and Kayui village in Manyoni District. Discussions with villagers indicated that the price of honey from stinging bees at the village level is TShs 500/kg, while at Manyoni town the price reaches TShs 1,000/kg. The price of honey from stingless bees is about TShs 3,000-5000/kg at the village level and goes up to TShs 8,000/kg at Manyoni town.

Table 1: Average income from bee keeping in the pilot villages (TShs)

District	No of trained bee keepers	Honey from stinging bees (kg)	Beeswax from stinging bees (kg)	Honey from stingless bees (kg)	Income from stinging bees	Income from beeswax from stinging bees	Income from stingless bees	Average income / beekeeper (TShs)
Kondoa	369	40,576	2705.5	142.5	40,576,000	5,411,000	712,500	126,557
Handeni	306	7,320	488	136.5	7,320,000	9,760,000	682,500	29,341
Tabora	393	172,473	11,498	297	172,473,000	22,996,400	1,485,000	501,156
Kibondo	350	144,665	9,644.3	150	144,665,000	19,288,600	750,000	470,581
Manyoni	373	520,155	34,677	559.5	520,155,000	69,354,000	2,797,500	1,587,953
TOTAL	1791	885,189	59,013	1,285.5	885,189,000	118,026,000	6,427,400	568,636

Source: Adapted from MNRT 2005

It seems the domestication of stingless bees is making a remarkable impact in terms of household income generation among beekeepers (**Box 6**). The team noted with interest that bee keeping is strongly competing with tobacco production as source of income in Manyoni District with several people abandoning tobacco cultivation for honey production. As one beekeeper said: “Tobacco brings income, but is bad for your health and bad for the environment. Honey brings income and is good for your health and for the environment.”

Box 6: Bees, honey and school fees

Dyness Amos, a widow from Mwamagembe village was able to sell 40 litres of honey from stingless bees at a price of TShs 4,500/litre thus acquired a total of TShs 180,000. This enabled her to meet the costs of sending her child to Mkwese Technical Secondary school in Manyoni town.

Source: Field visit interview

At the district level there is currently no tax levied on honey producers while middlemen have to pay TShs 500 per 20 litres of honey. This is an incentive for honey producers.

Governance

Beekeepers' Associations

Beekeepers' associations initiated in the pilot project villages appeared in the eyes of the team to be a way towards good governance, provided they do not become elitist, but remain accountable to the local beekeepers. Mechanisms to ensure this need to be put in place by developing clear Terms of Reference with periodical training to improve the skills of the executive members, particularly on organisational skills, financial management and marketing strategies. Furthermore, it is important that these associations remain transparent in their operations and accountable to their members at the village level.

At the district level there is an apex organisation which draws its members from the village associations. This is very important for giving beekeepers a common voice, especially when it comes to price negotiations with private companies. In other words, this apex organisation is expected to serve as power broker between the private companies and the beekeepers.

There are many examples where local communities have benefited little from private sector involvement (Kajembe *et al.* 2003). To avoid such a situation to occur in the project area the apex organisation should serve as power broker. The private sector is a powerful sector with a high degree of self interest and considerable knowledge of marketing opportunities. This puts the village level beekeepers at a distinct disadvantage and these apex organisations can assist by giving the beekeepers a common voice and therefore a stronger bargaining position.

Effectiveness

Based on project reports and the team's visit to Manyoni, it is amply clear that the project has reduced the use of bark hives, which are environmentally destructive. Similarly technology improvement, especially the introduction of stingless bees has made beekeeping more accessible to women and youth. In many other areas, women are not involved in beekeeping activities. Stingless bees can be kept at home and therefore offer distinct possibilities for women to get involved.

The income derived from honey production together with the establishment of village beekeeping associations and the development of collection centres which facilitate processing and sale of honey and other bee products have attracted more people to practice bee keeping, some even switching from tobacco farming. However, less progress has been made in capacity building of beekeepers in entrepreneurship. This will be vital if beekeepers associations are to compete on the commercial market.

Efficiency

In terms of expenditure, the sub-component had a very high efficiency, utilising 99 percent of the allocated funds. In Manyoni District only TShs 9.5 m were received from MNRT during the 2004/5 financial year, with a further TShs 30 m disbursed between July and December 2005.

Production targets for honey and bees wax have been met and the average income of beekeepers from sales of honey reached TShs 500,000 by June 2005. The establishment of production centres, of which 10 have been envisaged in the project document, is lagging behind due to lack of funds (MNRT 2005). Only one collection centre was established at Kibondo, with a second one currently being finished at Manyoni.

The team cannot assess the efficiency of project spending on a cost-benefit basis, since the relevant data have not been collected. It appears that project inputs are more concerned with production than with marketing, and that the involvement of private investors and traders in honey promotion, branding and marketing is not considered a priority.

Relevance

In terms of relevance, the team agrees with the observation by Bryceson *et al.* (2005) that beekeeping is a traditional income generating activity that does not require high investment and is therefore accessible to poor households and women. In short, it increases livelihood options for poor people and is complimentary to conservation efforts. When promoting beekeeping activities, the importance of enabling people to produce good quality products and to assist them in locating markets for their products can not be overemphasised.

Sustainability

The fact that the project is anchored in the existing district council structure means that there are no problems with sustainability in terms of changing mandates or structures when the project withdraws. A bottleneck is the manpower at district and especially at ward levels. Manyoni district is contributing to beekeeping activities from district funds, allocating TShs 22.5 m to beekeeping activities. The Acting District Executive Director informed the team that funds expected from this year's tobacco cess are earmarked to provide monitoring tools for the beekeeping activities.

The project is also operating in an area where there is a culture of beekeeping. The challenge will be expanding the project to other districts where there may be less of a beekeeping culture.

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V: Hifadhi Ardhi Shinyanga (HASHI)

International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (NAFRAC)

Background

The Hifadhi Ardhi Shinyanga (HASHI) project was initiated in 1987 by the Government of Tanzania, as it was increasingly concerned about the excessive land degradation in Shinyanga. It continued on government funding until 1991, when Norwegian funding allowed for the establishment of the Shinyanga Soil Conservation and Afforestation Programme (SHISCAP), with three components including HASHI, research handled by the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) and Shinyanga Manzingira Fund. From 1994, HASHI/ICRAF has been part of the Norwegian-funded MNRP. The mid-term review of MNRP in 2000 recommended that HASHI should phase out its activities in Shinyanga and build capacity at the district level. HASHI should be upgraded to a National Resource and Competence Centre for Agro-forestry Management and District Development, in order to facilitate up-scaling of activities (Havnevik *et al.* 2001). MNRT commissioned a task force to prepare a proposal for the establishment of such a centre (Nshumbuki, *et al.* 2003).

The Natural Forest Resource Management and Agroforestry Centre (NAFRAC) was officially established on April 1, 2004 with a mandate to:

- Raise community awareness in natural forest resource management and agroforestry options
- Strengthen institutional set up and improve capacities of district staff to implement natural forest conservation activities
- Supply data and information to environmental working groups
- Bridge the gap between policy and practice in relation to natural forest resources management and agroforestry development; and
- Promote energy saving technologies and affordable alternative energy sources (NAFRAC Strategy 2004-2010).

The **Development Objective** for Norwegian support in Phase III of MNRP is ‘increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resources management.’ The **Immediate Objective** is ‘Scaling up of agroforestry interventions supported.’ The **Outputs** are:

1. Handing over of extension responsibilities to district councils
2. Building capacity of local communities including district councils and staff in agroforestry and extension
3. Replicate best agroforestry practices in selected areas
4. Participatory technology development, evaluation and assessment
5. Establishment of the Resource Centre (NAFRAC)

The field team assessed the impacts of the former HASHI in conjunction with the transition from the HASHI and HASHI/ICRAF project to NAFRAC.

Impact

Previous mid-term reviews of Phase II (Havnevik *et al.* 2001) and Phase III (Bryceson *et al.* 2005) had lamented the lack of baseline data for impact monitoring. While the lack of baseline data at the start of the project or phase cannot be remedied, MNRT through FBD in collaboration with IUCN-EARO, commissioned a ten people Taskforce to study the social, economic and environmental impacts of forest

landscape restoration in Shinyanga Region, Tanzania.³³ This was a very useful base for the team to assess impact and to undertake some verification at field level.

Biodiversity

Ngitili is an indigenous natural resources management system of the Sukuma ethnic group. The restored *ngitili* was reported to contain 152 species of trees, shrubs and climbers. Small and medium sized mammals, including hyena, wild pig, hare, rabbits, and 145 bird species that had become locally rare are now found in the improved *ngitili*.³⁴ The returning wildlife has also created problems, however, with some villagers suffering considerable crop damage. However, in most villages, the costs of wildlife damage, which have reached USD 63/family/yr in some cases, are greatly outweighed by economic gains. All districts in Shinyanga share a boundary with wildlife protected areas. So an increased area of restored *ngitili* or *miombo* will increase the area of buffer zone.

Afforestation

In 1986, the estimated deforestation rate in Shinyanga Region was about 20,000/year, while the estimated afforestation rate/year was only 1,000 ha. Through HASHI/ICRAF project efforts, however, the Shinyanga people were able to restore over 350,000 ha of degraded land by 2002, raising the afforestation rate from 1,000 ha/year to 20,000/ha per year. Despite this considerable effort, *only 11 percent of the area that is considered degraded had been put under woodland enclosure so far* (NAFRAC 2006; Monela *et al.* 2005).

Livelihoods

Over the last 20 years, the HASHI Project has had a significant impact on household income through woodlot enclosures. Monela *et al.* (2005) estimate the value of benefits from *ngitili* at USD 14/person/month. This is significantly higher than the national average consumption of USD 8.5 per month (Household Budget Survey, 2002). Examples gleaned from a visit to Wigelekelo village in Maswa District and a visit to a ‘demonstration farmer’ at Ikungulipu village, Bariadi District showed that increased income was due to:

- Increased soil fertility – previously unproductive land is turned into fertile land (maize harvest increased from 1 to 7 bags/acre);
- Increased water retention;
- Less time spent on fuel-wood collection, which frees time for other activities;
- Assured pasture for cattle;
- Potential to sell grazing rights of individual *ngitilis*; and
- Income from fuelwood, poles and charcoal from individual *ngitili*.

Discussions with project management and respondents in Bariadi District showed that political commitment to HASHI activities has been consistently high in the district since the start of the project in 1986. **Box 7** illustrates this point with an example from Bariadi District.

Box 7 : Success and conflict through *ngitili* restoration

In 1989, Mzee Magembe Mwahu was the only member of his family who had remained on the family land at Ikungulipu village, Bariadi, which by that time had become completely worthless through degradation. He heard of HASHI and contacted the project in 1990 to seek assistance. Mzee Mwahu has never looked back. He followed the advice of the project and has now 400 acres of improved *ngitili*, which he uses to graze his cattle, produce poles and firewood and sell grazing rights to others at TSHS 15,000/ha during the dry season.

There is a downside to this success story, though. Seeing the vast improvement to their land that has occurred, other clan members are now coming back to claim their rights to the land they previously abandoned as useless. The conflict has not yet been settled and this is an issue that has also occurred in other areas.

Source: Interview, April 2006

Total ngitili coverage in Shinyanga region is 78,122 hectares of which 46,593 hectares are communal ngitili and 34,206 hectares are individual ngitili (Kaale, *et al.*, 2003). This ngitili coverage was in only 172 villages. The total ngitili coverage in 833 villages of the Lake Zone is 377,756 hectares. Despite the relatively larger area coverage by communal ngitili, relatively higher values of benefits accrue from individual than from communal ngitili. The plausible reason behind this is that communal ngitili are sometimes closed down in order to either enhance natural regeneration or as a way to defer benefits to meet future household or village contingencies.

Discussions at Maswa District Council indicated that ngitili can contribute to lifestyle changes by affording pastoralists enough pasture to graze their cattle in one area rather than moving in search of pastures. Beneficial side effects of this are: (i) potentially less conflicts over resource use, particularly between farmers and pastoralists; and (ii) some pastoralists have reduced their number of cattle according to the carrying capacity of their ngitili, thus reducing pressure on the land.

Governance

There was apparent over-lap in responsibilities between traditional institutions and modern systems of governance responsible for ngitili management. This over-lap has actually served to strengthen management rules and regulations, as people usually adhere to the ideals of both traditional and modern ways of managing resources. During the workshop at NAFRAC (6 April, 2006) a woman from a village in Bunda District in Mara Region said that government regulations are helping women to get their rights.

During the visits to Wigelekelo village and the demonstration farmer at Ikungulipu village in Maswa and Bariadi districts, respectively, it was observed that there is a mixture of traditional and modern institutions in managing ngitili. Each community seems to have its own institutional arrangements, with different balances of power between traditional and modern institutions. This can be explained by the fact that in Wigelekelo the village government was relatively more powerful than the *Sungusungu* (traditional village police), while the opposite seemed to be the case for Ikungulipu village.

Mlinge (2002) documented the central role played by traditional Sukuma institutions--especially the *Dagashida*³⁵--in regulating access to and control of natural resources in the area. Monela *et al.*, (2005), however, found that the *Dagashida*, despite its prominence in documented literature, existed and was functioning only in Bariadi District. Erosion of the strength of *Dagashida* in other areas may have been due to the establishment of many villages under Ujamaa villagisation, that brought together people of different socio-cultural and ethnic backgrounds. In such villages, the strength of tradition was based on a combination of integrating cultures with modern approaches to management.

Thus, ngitili management in the majority of villages is organised under the Elder's Council, (*Baraza la Wazee*), Village Government, Ngitili Committee, and the

■ ³⁵ This is a powerful traditional institution among the Wasukuma that involves an assembly that formulates customary laws and punishes those who break it. It regulates adherence to customs, community rituals and defence.

Sungusungu, each of which was in one way or the other directly responsible for ngitili management. In the relationship, the village government remains the key player, making public decisions on ngitili management, although *Baraza la Wazee* still commands great respect among community members. The Village Government usually consults the *Baraza la Wazee* on how decisions should be implemented. In all this, there is a dynamic balance between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ institutions.

Effectiveness

The team noted that HASHI/NAFRAC has replicated agro-forestry practices in new villages in Shinyanga Region and parts of the Lake Zone. The project is also implementing participatory technology development with partners in those areas. These technologies are also taken up as witnessed during a workshop held at NAFRAC on 6 April 2006 attended by the team.

NAFRAC was established in April 2004, as a national centre to assist up-scaling of HASHI activities, namely natural forest management as well as agro-forestry technologies. While the Centre is operating nominally, the shift from a project mindset and organisational culture to those of a national institution has not yet been achieved. Equally, discussions in Maswa and Bariadi district councils with reference to the so-called handing-over of activities revealed that the districts feel abandoned rather than empowered. There was no exit strategy and little capacity-building was aimed at the devolution of responsibilities to the districts. This sentiment was very well summarised by Bariadi District Treasurer who said that there is no trust between the central government, its organs and the local authorities, particularly when it comes to financial management. The review team concurs with this view from experience and noted that it would have been more constructive to have built the districts’ capacity in terms of manpower, transport facilities and training rather than leaving them sidelined for much of the duration of the project.

The NAFRAC strategy from 2004–2010 lacks a clear vision of the Centre’s mandate. This contributes to the lack of understanding of the shift from HASHI to NAFRAC by local stakeholders and thus their feeling abandoned.

Efficiency

Following high levels of efficiency³⁶ in previous years (2002/3 and 2003/4), in the 2004/5 financial year there was an underspend of TShs 146,809,463. This amount was disbursed through NAFRAC to a number of stakeholders, who had been invited to submit work plans and budgets to MNRT for the use of these funds. However, details of the activities they were used for were not available at the project level. Beneficiaries of these funds included: Shinyanga, Mwanza, Tabora, Mara and Kagera Regions, DED Biharamulo, PFM, IUCN, Greenbelt Movement and Canada World Youth Programme.³⁷

In terms of achievements against indicators, NAFRAC has fulfilled most of the indicators to a satisfactory level. However, the indicators themselves do not give much information about impacts of activities. A number of workshops or seminars

▪ ³⁶ Efficiency for the programme means the rate of disbursement of project funding: was the budget spent on time? For the evaluation team, efficiency is the measure of qualitative or quantitative outputs, in relation to resource inputs. It is a measure of how economically various inputs of the project or programme are converted into outputs.

▪ ³⁷ NAFRAC Financial Report 2004/5.

conducted, for example does not give any indication about the effectiveness of the training.

Especially the activities and indicators for ‘Handing over activities to the Districts’ seem inadequate as they do not give any measure on how integration into the district is to be achieved. The term ‘handing over’ rather than ‘integrating activities into district planning and management’ can have negative connotations, e.g., the district is now left with a burden. This is also how it is understood at district level in many cases (see below). The project manager explained that an attempt had been made to plan at district and ward levels. While plans at ward level were implemented with a relatively high level of efficiency, activities at district level had not been implemented. This is hardly surprising though, as the wards had been involved in project activities for a long time, while the districts had not.

The implementation report of 2004/5 states that NAFRAC has 23 percent of all vehicles under MNRP (14), second only to the Catchment Forest Project with 17. It was further stated that the programme encourages NAFRAC to reduce the number of vehicles and motorbikes in order to minimise running costs in order to make collaborative management more effective. To the knowledge of the field team the number of vehicles has not been reduced. Further, a minivan purchased in September 2005 for approx TShs 75 million apparently broke down when it was transferred to NAFRAC and has not moved since. NAFRAC is still communicating with MNRT about this issue. Considering the comment of the programme to reduce the number of vehicles at NAFRAC, this would be a good opportunity to leave some transport facilities at the district level.

Relevance

The team endorses the statement by Bryceson *et al.* 2005, that the project is extremely relevant in relation to national policies and strategies. However, the project was designed as a parallel organisational structure with HASHI personnel at the district, who also had their own transport and finance. The team acknowledges the fact that the project has addressed some of the constraints facing people in the Lake Zone with regard to development of sustainable land practices especially in marginal lands like Meatu District.

Sustainability

The sustainability of ngitili restoration and management is dependent on addressing several socio-cultural and institutional aspects that threaten the erosion of the natural resource base and hence ngitili. Key among these are population growth causing land scarcity and weaknesses in conflict resolution mechanisms (Monela *et al.* 2005).

The local people are very motivated because of the obvious positive impact of ngitili and agro-forestry practices on biodiversity and livelihoods. Village discussions and the responses at the NAFRAC workshop clearly indicated that there is a great enthusiasm because of livelihood improvements through good environmental practices. Discussions in Maswa District revealed that some lifestyle changes are occurring with pastoralists adjusting the number of their cattle to the carrying capacity of their ngitili (10-16 cattle/ha) and adopting a more sedentary life. **Box 8** describes a potential threat to project sustainability related to the hand-over of responsibilities to LGAs.

Box 8: Constraints on sustainability?

“The good work done by HASHI over the years will disappear if NAFRAC does not make close follow-up, because the district does not seem concerned about the huge investment that has been put by HASHI in terms of tree planting and woodland conservation. This can be exemplified by the fact that residential plots have been surveyed in places that had been conserved by the village, thus frustrating the local people who had invested a lot of work in these areas.”

Source: Renatus Masanja Sattu, Village Chairman, Bomani Mwanhuzi Village, Meatu District, workshop participant

Understandably, the momentum of these achievements can only be sustained with good governance from the district level downwards. At the local level good progress seems to have been made in terms of empowering people to put their views and grievances forward and to start knowing and demanding their rights. This was evident in both village discussions and the very open discussions during the NAFRAC workshop. However, sustainability in Shinyanga is likely to face challenges because the districts have not been equipped to carry on the supporting activities at the villages. **Box X** highlights the difficulty of local government take-over of HASHI activities.

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VI: Tanzania Forestry Research Institute (TAFORI)

Background

TAFORI has the mandate to coordinate all forestry research activities in the country. In order to achieve this mandate, TAFORI has spearheaded the formulation of the Forest Master Plan for the period 2002-2009. In relation to the MNRP, TAFORI collaborates with the Ruvu Fuelwood Project to implement the research component and NAFRAC (formerly HASHI) to strengthen its research capacity. TAFORI has an independent research station at Kibaha, which works closely with the Ruvu Fuelwood Development Project, whereas in Shinyanga it has seconded five members of TAFORI directly to NAFRAC.

Development Objective

Increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resources management.

Immediate Objective

Scaling-up of agroforestry interventions.

Impact

The team agrees with the Mid-Term Review (Bryceson *et al.* 2005) that TAFORI contributes to some of the impacts of RUVU and NAFRAC, but it is difficult to determine its direct impact. Research impacts are normally long-term and in some cases indirect. TAFORI claims impact from the following research:

- Research into indigenous tree species which people have specified are useful to them and they would like to grow on their shambas, for example, *Azizium quarensis*, and other timber species in Ruvu, medicinal trees in Shinyanga with NAFRAC;
- Research into exotic tree species to find the most suitable for local conditions in Ruvu and Shinyanga;

- Research into agroforestry systems which suit local conditions, for example, *ngitili* in Shinyanga, researching into the effects of the agroforestry system practised in Ruvu on the soils of that area;
- Bringing farmers and research together by listening to farmers' recommendations, by getting feedback from them and by doing some of their trials on farm, jointly managed by TAFORI and the farmers.

TAFORI has played an important role in the Ruvu Fuelwood project. They have often worked in conjunction with SUA. TAFORI and SUA conducted a socio-economic study, partly to identify farmers' exotic and indigenous species preferences. They then carried out on-station trials and selected the most appropriate species for the project to distribute to the farmers. Trials continue on these species and TAFORI also receives information from the project about silvicultural problems. For example, some *Casuarina equisetifolia* trees were dying for no obvious reason, and TAFORI were able to solve the problem. TAFORI are also prepared to listen to and learn from farmers. For example, *Azizelia* trees were not doing well in TAFORI nurseries, but when farmers tried planting them directly onto the shamba, they did much better.

Governance

The formulation process of NAFRAC does not seem to have been of a participatory nature. Discussions with TAFORI officials at headquarters in Morogoro revealed that the staff stationed at NAFRAC have been sent there due to an agreement between NAFRAC and the MNRT without consulting TAFORI. It seems that TAFORI was involved in developing the original MOU between ICRAF and MNRT, however, they were not involved during the formulation of exit modalities for ICRAF. It seems that all ICRAF resources (such as vehicles, equipment) were pooled at NAFRAC without taking into consideration the wider needs of TAFORI as a national forest research institution.

As mentioned under NAFRAC the whole institutional set up and format of collaboration needs to be developed in more detail.

Efficiency

The expenditure during 2004/5 was less than 50 percent of the allocated funds. This was due to late disbursement of funds. However, it is not clear what caused this late disbursement.³⁸

The main activities at TAFORI headquarters during the period were the preparation of the National Agroforestry Stakeholder workshop that took place in March 2006 and one NASCO meeting.

TAFORI has funding from a variety of sources from which it can draw. These sources are NASCO (the National Steering Committee for Agroforestry), the government and from the ministry where they are working with projects such as Ruvu and NAFRAC.

Effectiveness

³⁸ A second evaluation team member was told a conflicting story, namely, that the ministry funding is particularly reliable and funds flow smoothly, and it does not happen that TAFORI runs out of money and thus is forced to stop work, as may happen in other government-funded programmes. It is unclear which version is the more credible (probably the one in the main text?)

Effectiveness in terms of contribution to the Ruvu and NAFRAC projects is reported under these projects. Discussions with the management at TAFORI headquarters indicated that minimal activities had been taken place due to late disbursement of funds. TAFORI planned and coordinated a workshop on Best Agroforestry Practices in March 2006. In addition, the database on agroforestry projects is now operational, although there are still gaps in the information. One NASCO meeting was held last year.

The support to TAFORI has been very relevant as shown by the positive impacts of the HASHI and Ruvu projects, which were substantially supported by TAFORI research efforts.

In order for TAFORI to fulfil its role as a national research institution, it should make more concerted efforts to broaden its base of expertise, especially in the socio-economic disciplines.

TAFORI as a research institution can contribute to developing indicators to measure impacts of sustainable resource use approaches on the resource base, as well as in governance. The lack of indicators and monitoring systems seems to plague most projects.

It is relevant that TAFORI are working in real rural situations with farmers who are planting trees and crops, so that they can see directly the results of their research and so that they are on hand to spot any problems and continue to research into them. Large international organisations might carry out work into high profile trees, but TAFORI is in a position to research into locally preferred species and to assist local farmers with propagation techniques.

TAFORI research is demand-driven. The focus of TAFORI work in Ruvu and Shinyanga is to carry out research which is directly relevant to the projects and which comes from the conditions found on the ground on farmers' shambas, for example, they have worked on a new hybrid of *Eucalyptus tereticornis* in Ruvu, but it is showing signs of disease on farmers' shambas, so they are now researching into the causes of this and ways to eliminate it.

TAFORI is essentially a technical institution, but in recent years it has come to see the importance of looking at the people in relation to the trees, rather than the technical aspects of trees and forests only. They have been involved in PFM work and have carried out socio-economic studies, for example, a socio-economic baseline survey and a study on JFM in relation to livelihoods and forest management. In their Forest Master Plan, which was drawn up with extensive consultation with their stakeholders, there is a list of priorities that includes the management of natural forests through PFM, community farm forestry and extension, as well as technical aspects.

TAFORI emphasises that working so closely with projects, as they do in Ruvu and Shinyanga, and with other institutions, such as SUA and ICRAF, has many advantages for them:

- It brings TAFORI into a higher profile, if it is paired with a large international organisation such as ICRAF;
- Capacity building for TAFORI staff, working with people from different backgrounds or with greater expertise;
- Training opportunities;
- More facilities available than if it had been TAFORI alone;

- Sharing of resources.

Working together in this way increased effectiveness, since each organisation can get on with its particular skill, while at the same time having a wider exposure to other fields, for example, TAFORI has gained essential knowledge about socio-economic aspects from working with projects whose focus is on people and trees.

TAFORI have done much research into agroforestry and these techniques are widely practised in the areas where TAFORI works, especially Ruvu and Shinyanga. However, it is not clear how much further than these areas these techniques have spread.

Sustainability

It is hard for a research institution to be sustainable, but TAFORI has weathered much over the years, and continues to find its niche in the development world. The present government is finding that environmental issues are an important factor in the fight against poverty, and so there is some assurance that funding will continue to allow TAFORI to continue their research into poverty related fields, such as agroforestry.

The team agrees with the observation by Bryceson *et al.* 2005, that TAFORI as a national institution has proved sustainable over a long period of time, even though it still suffers from manpower shortages, particularly in socio-economic fields.

Other points

Relations with local government

Although TAFORI does not have direct relations with local government at regional or district level, they say that when there are needs, local government foresters will call on them to solve problems and to consult over new ideas. Problems which they may come to TAFORI with include pest and disease outbreaks, which species are suitable for planting in local conditions, and seed selection and provision.

Relations with other institutions

TAFORI have worked together with SUA, to carry out trials in Kibaha, and with ICRAF in Shinyanga. They have an MoU with ICRAF which sets out their relationship and which can be referred to or reviewed if any problems come up--there are provisions to deal with any conflicts, although none have occurred. They are also working closely with the two projects in Ruvu and Shinyanga. Working together with such institutions yields a positive impact for TAFORI, and any difficulties are outweighed by the advantages afforded.

NASCO

TAFORI works as the secretariat for NASCO. Some extension work has been done and some dissemination of agro-forestry work, through a newsletter. This is a good forum through which to disseminate results of work done through the Ruvu and Shinyanga projects, but it is not clear how wide the audience is to receive the information.

* * *

VII: Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP)

Background

The Serengeti Regional Conservation project was preceded by the Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy (SRCS). The latter originated from the concerns with the level of poaching and population pressure resulting from immigration of people on the western side of the Serengeti National Park (SENAPA). This situation resulted in conflict between protected area managers and the local communities surrounding them. The original strategy consisted of an integrated rural development approach with sustainable utilisation of wildlife for the benefit of the rural communities.

SRCS was a joint project of the MNRT and IUCN funded by Norway and the European Union. The project began field activities in January 1989 with the objective of protecting the entire Serengeti ecosystem, an area of approximately 30,000 km².³⁹

When NORAD and the MNRT concluded the MNRP agreement, SRCS became a MNRP project (1994). During the first phase of MNRP, the major objective was to provide a framework for the integration of protected areas and resource conservation into regional development through increasing long-term planning capacity, strengthening district councils and ensuring participation of local communities. Throughout this process, the problems and solutions were defined ahead of community involvement.⁴⁰

During phase III (1994 to date), there have been two major activities, the involvement of the local communities in NRM and capacity building at local (CBO, district) level. During this phase, the WMA concept was operationalised.

However, the arrival of Grumeti Reserves Ltd (formerly Grumeti Safari Club Ltd) has undermined the implementation of the SRCP and forced the Norwegian Government to declare its intention to withdraw from the project if, as appears likely, Grumeti continues to enjoy support from the MNRT. Grumeti has acquired three hunting blocks in the western Serengeti, effectively scrapped (through WD pressure on Serengeti District Council) existing agreements between villagers and investors in eco-tourism, and has bought up villages' game meat quotas from community and resident hunting, thus terminating one of the main components of the SRCP strategy.

These events have led to a heated debate, *inter alia*, on the coherence of existing legislation and policies, the powers of the Wildlife Division in the MNRT, and the long-term benefits to be derived from large-scale foreign investment in wildlife tourism. It seems likely that Grumeti, with its enormous financial clout, will win the day. The team considers it important that the GOT and donor agencies reflect further on the implications of the current implementation of WMA policy for the welfare of the supposed beneficiary communities living close to wildlife areas.

Findings from some relevant recent research are summarised below.⁴¹

³⁹ The area consists of the Serengeti National Park, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Maswa, Kijeshi, Grumeti and Ikorongo Game Reserves and the area surrounding these protected areas in Tanzania as well as the Maasai Mara Reserve in Narok District in Kenya.

⁴⁰ A number of people were removed from Grumeti Game Reserve after it was gazetted in 1995 and this process was contested. Specifically, the evicted people maintain that they were not compensated as promised by the government. The Division of Wildlife did disperse the money, but it is not clear if it was received by the targeted people.

⁴¹ Relevant general and Serengeti-specific studies include: Emerton, L., & Mfunda I., 1999. Making Wildlife Economically Viable for Communities living Around the Western Serengeti, Tanzania; Murphree, M. 2000,. Community-Based Conservation: Old ways, new Myths and Enduring Challenges, paper

Wildlife Management Areas. WMA are a new category of protected areas in Tanzania (MNRT, 1998). The objective of WMAs is to promote the conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitats outside core protected areas, namely National Parks, Game Reserves and Ngorongoro Conservation Area, to transfer the management responsibility to local communities, thus taking care of corridors, migratory routes and buffer zones, and to ensure that local communities obtain substantial tangible benefits from wildlife conservation.⁴²

The potential economic opportunities for local people in WMAs include sale or leasing of hunting rights, sale of tourist services and wildlife products, employment opportunities and benefits in kind in the form of subsistence products. (Walsh 2000).

Tanzanian laws are in conflict regarding implementation of WMA. Accordingly to the Village Land Act No. 5 (1999), the villages have the mandate of determining their land use plans and utilisation while the Wildlife Policy (1998) maintains that natural resources that are found anywhere in Tanzania are under the Director of Wildlife. This has brought confusion over the use of village land. In some cases, hunting blocks fall under villages land and designated WMAs.

Human/elephant conflicts. Elephant numbers in the ecosystem rose from around 500 in 1961 to over 2,500 in the late 1970s. This dropped to some 500 by 1986 as a result of poaching. Elephant numbers steadily increased and exceeded 2,000 individuals by 1998 and remained at that level in 2003. Crop raiding has escalated since November 2003, and has become a significant issue for both village and district authorities in Western Serengeti. Crop raiding results from increasing cultivation on the boundaries of the elephant range, increasing elephant numbers, and increased security in the game reserves bordering SANAPA. Overall losses in 2002/04 were estimated at US\$ 150,000–200,000. The January 2004 district survey suggested that elephants had caused over US\$ 82,000 in crop damage, which represents some US\$ 204 per farmer that suffered damage. Village estimates of damage over the 2003/04 season are considerably higher, at US\$ 265,000. VIP/Grumeti Fund proposed to erect an electric fence along the boundary of the protected areas and has received some support locally but the issue remains controversial.

Districts bordering protected areas enjoy benefit-sharing schemes. TANAPA's SCIP fund injects resources into community-based projects such as schools and roads. However, these community projects do not offset individual losses caused by wildlife. Equally, the US\$ 47,500 that was dispersed to Serengeti District in 2002/03 (the latest year for which records are available) is only a fraction of the estimated cost of elephant crop raiding. Moreover, only around 30 percent of this went to villages that

presented to an International Conference on African Wildlife Management in the New Millennium held at Mweka, Tanzania. 13th – 15th December 2000; Severe, E.L.M. 2000. Conservation of Wildlife Outside Core Wildlife Protected Areas in the New Millennium. A paper presented to an International Conference on African Wildlife management in the New Millennium held at Mweka, Tanzania. 13th – 15th December 2000; TAWIRI (2003). Total count of elephant and buffalo in the Serengeti ecosystem, wet season 2003. Tanzania National Parks, & Frankfurt Zoological Society, Arusha; Walpole, M. Doinyo, Y., Kibasa R., Masanja C., & Somba M (2004). An Assessment of Human-Elephant Conflict in the Serengeti Ecosystem, with Recommendations for Monitoring and Mitigation, Serengeti, Tanzania.

■ ⁴² Severe (2000) has reported that more than 3.5 million people in 44 districts of Tanzania Mainland have part of their livelihood dependent upon WMAs.

suffer crop raiding. Thus, communities bordering SNP could be forgiven for feeling that they are paying more for the existence of the park than they receive back.

Objective

Increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management in Western Serengeti.

Immediate Objective

Participatory natural resource management organisations, including CBNRM, strengthened and benefit-sharing agreements made operational.

Impact

While there has been substantial success in achieving the objectives of SRCP there have also been negative impacts. Positive impacts include an increase in the wildlife population following a reduction in poaching. Yet this leads directly to an increase in crop destruction, as described above.

- The resident wildlife population in the 21 project area villages has increased, particularly impala, zebra, topi, waterbuck, lion, hyenas and elephants. Poaching has decreased. The number of poachers caught fell from 899 to 218 and fines fell from TShs 522,000 to TShs 98,000 between 1998 and 2005 (Muya 2006).
- There has been an increase in the number of paid jobs, for example, for Village Game Scouts (VGS). The 147 trained VGS are either employed by Grumeti Reserves or get some allowances from the village governments when they go on patrols. A VGS in Robanda village claimed to go on about five to ten patrol per month earning TShs 25,000-50,000. SRCP staff claimed that the people spent their money in building baked brick houses, buying proper beds, foam mattresses and having three meals per day. However, the further you go from the village centre the fewer benefits people have derived from tourism, and the fewer are aware of WMAs. People in outlying sub-villages speak of WMAs and tourism with a certain amount of disdain, and indicate that they mostly benefited a handful of village leaders and their clients. Village leaders made an effort to have us speak with certain people and not with others, and they refused to speak with us individually outside of the village office.
- Food security has increased for salaried people but worsened for many farmers as a result of elephant crop raiding. This is important, considering that fewer people are salaried than who grow food. The food security to a large extent to the people in the 21 villages has depended on the amount of rain and crop damage by wildlife.
- In 2003-05, Robanda village earned TShs 48 m, 68 m, and 92 m respectively. Over 90 percent of this money came from photographic tourism activities. The village spent this money on construction of classrooms, teachers' houses, primary school latrines, a dispensary, a police station, providing medical service to all Robanda villagers, paying school fees at primary, secondary, technical and university for orphans, children of destitute parents. Again, people's opinions of these services were very mixed depending on how far from the village office they lived.
- The increased number of huntable animals made village hunting easier and cheaper. However, the increase of hyenas and lions increased conflict by the carnivores attacking livestock and occasionally people, elephant increased localised tree damage and crop raiding to the extend of causing famine in an

unknown number of households. The impact of the programme, at least for some households, *is the opposite* of the stated objective above. This is a very significant point, suggesting that we know nothing about how the benefits of conservation offset the costs at the household level – nor do we know how benefits are distributed.

- The general increase of wildlife populations together with decrease in flight distance particularly of impala and zebra improved the photographic tourism by the camps on village land. However, Grumeti Reserves Inc. is chasing away other investors, and is likely to succeed, given the precedents in Sinya and Minjingu.

Governance

The district council collects and retains 100 percent of hunting license fees. The Wildlife Division of the MNRT collects tourist-hunting fees and is supposed to give 25 percent of the fees to the district council. The council retains 40 percent of this and gives 60 percent to the villages. This at least is what the regulations say, but we do not have evidence to show that this actually happens.

All information on revenue and expenditure is made public using public notice boards, letters to the villages and through presentations to village assemblies in a user-friendly manner. This is an important step in the right direction in terms of promoting a culture of transparency.

The emergence of Grumeti on the scene raises major questions about the respective roles of the state and the private sector in policy-making, regulation, enforcement, and the provision of collective services.

Tanzanian law clearly states that hunting companies take precedence over photographic safari companies in designated hunting blocks. Thus, the law clearly favours Grumeti Reserves. Unless significant reforms occur in how WMAs are planned and implemented, WMAs are unlikely to have significant impact on rural poverty (see review of CAMW below). Furthermore, it is not clear that the reductions in poaching (such as they are) are the result of community participation (which is actually an unlikely scenario) or stricter enforcement. It is important to remember that two game reserves have been gazetted and cleared in this area.

Furthermore, the enforcement capacity of Grumeti Reserves is greater than TANAPA. They have more enforcement rangers and better equipment. If enforcement is the issue, it probably makes more sense to let Grumeti unload more and more money, equipment, and personnel into the area. There needs to be more clarity about the relationship between enforcement and community support. Community support is very important in this area, but still poorly understood. Clearly, communities lack the capacity to do much effective enforcement.

Even if the Grumeti versus SRCP conflict is resolved, it is unclear whether Ikona WMA villages and Robanda are capable of increasing benefits and prosperity. As argued above, not all community members are experiencing increased benefits and prosperity, in fact quite the opposite. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the benefits that some community members currently derive will persist if they become an authorised WMA.

The council and village governments were involved in the regulation, management and exploitation of wildlife within the district until Grumeti arrived on the scene.

Grumeti came in with a lot of money and were well received by a number of well placed people in the GOT. They proposed to move the TANAPA headquarters from Fort Ikoma to further away from the park, and this proposal was being seriously considered by TANAPA.

The establishment of the Grumeti Fund has made a significant difference to the level of community benefits from wildlife in the district, injecting some US\$ 1.5 million over the past 2-3 years in various projects, many of them aimed at villages on the borders of the protected elephant range. Part of this assistance has included the deployment of a helicopter for elephant conflict mitigation activities, as well as the training of village game scouts (VGS).

The district council has limited capacity to regulate, manage and exploit natural resources, which is one of the reasons why companies like Grumeti are so well received.

SRCP worked collaboratively and had excellent relations with the district council and village governments until Grumeti came along. SRCP were having unusual success in getting local people to support wildlife conservation by helping them to attract investors and by giving them game meat to replace the meat they would have hunted themselves according to their traditional practices. However, SRCP management expressed frustration in terms of the limited ability of the project to raise people's capacity at the village level and to move forward the Ikoma WMA (this was before Grumeti showed up). Grumeti simply outspent SRCP, thereby putting them out of business.

This governance issue will not be resolved through technical approaches. Grumeti officials talk to the top people in Dar es Salaam who give orders to the districts, who in turn instruct the villages in both Bunda and Serengeti districts. Until authority is really devolved to communities, and until people understand and stand up for their rights, it will continue to be easy for this kind of thing to occur by starting at the upper levels of government and working down to the community level.

There is no two-way communication between Grumeti and the district council on issues of mutual interest; instead Grumeti tends to give instructions to the council staff through the central government's office in the district, dictating terms on matters which affect the council and the district. A hierarchically centralised government run by underpaid bureaucrats who have little regard for people's rights is likely to lend itself to this kind of intervention. The legislative reforms that took place in the 1990s, especially the Village Land Act, have been greatly weakened in terms of their content because of the interests of powerful individuals (both within the Tanzanian Government and the donor sector) to maintain this system. Furthermore, these reforms are unlikely to have their intended impacts without a cultural shift.

Box 9 illustrates why one set of stakeholders has lost out as a result of Grumeti's purchase of hunting rights.

Box 9: Bush meat governance in SRCP

One of the most popular activities of the SRCP was the distribution of game meat to partner villages. It was also one of the most controversial and contested. The way it worked was that in exchange for local cooperation in not poaching and in reporting poachers, the SRCP hunted and supplied local people with game meat at subsidised prices. People truly appreciated this aspect of the programme, and poaching did indeed decline in the area, although it is difficult to say if this was entirely the result of the programme or due to intensified enforcement by private hunting companies, especially Grumeti Reserves Ltd. This was one of the central points of contention between SRCP and Grumeti, as Grumeti used their hunting rights in the area to keep SRCP from hunting on behalf of communities.

SRCP staff complained bitterly that this move undermined their rapport with communities, which was undoubtedly the case. However, there is apparently another reason for their bitterness. According to a source with firsthand knowledge of SRCP, hunting on behalf of local people was one of their most effective means of misappropriating resources (money and meat). The way this worked was very simple: each village had an annual quota from the Division of Wildlife and the District, but few people in the village were aware of what their quota was in a given year. Due to this lack of transparency, it was possible for the SRCP to give people a portion (perhaps 20 percent- 30 percent) in their quota and keep the rest for sale or for their own consumption.

Source: confidential interview

Effectiveness

There has been increased benefits to the rural communities in the 21 villages in the project area, particularly in terms of social and welfare amenities. Household benefits have mainly been in meat supply and the (relatively few) who have paid jobs/activities from natural resource management. However, there is no longer a meat supply now that Grumeti Reserves has successfully stopped that part of the SRCP.

Benefit sharing agreements between the central government, the district councils and village governments are under threat as a result of the arrival of Grumeti. Robanda is frequently cited as a village that has received substantial community investments from Grumeti. However, there is no agreement between members of the Robanda village government that a WMA would be a true benefit for them. Many argued that they would be much better off staying in direct investment agreements with the investors that they already have instead of having to share those benefits with all the other villages in the proposed Ikoma WMA. Also, many indicated that there was significant political interference within their CBO designed to cause it to fail.

Efficiency

A report on the detailed implementation of the 14 activities planned for 2005-2006 with indicators to depict the achievement of targets was not available during the evaluation. However later communication with the PM showed that with the exception of the hunting activity all others were implemented, some exceeding targets. (visited NCA and HASHI).

During most of the period of phase III the project was not given the opportunity to carry out its functions for reasons discussed below.

One view is that turning the SRCS into a MNRP project weakened the entire initiative by scaling down its range of activities and narrowing its geographical focus. Abolishing the strategy's steering committee compromised the strategy's 'regional' ownership. In addition it is argued that there is inadequate technical expertise to implement all project activities.

Relevance

The project's objectives address important issues and problems, including poverty alleviation and improved livelihoods, conflict resolution between wildlife

conservation and rural human development by ensuring that benefits from wildlife reach the rural people and by legally devolving wildlife management use rights to the rural people.

Sustainability

The arrival of VIP/Grumeti Reserves Ltd on the Serengeti scene 'is seen as a threat to the future sustainability of the SRCP' (Bryceson et al. 2005:104). This is part of a larger legal struggle over the devolution of wildlife management to the community level. Specifically, the WMA regulations retain the authority of the Division of Wildlife over wildlife, no matter whose land it might be on, and they also clearly state that hunting rights take precedent over all other rights. This means that villages actually have very little control over wildlife resources and whatever land they are found on. This also means that the DOW and the district basically dictate the terms of agreements between villages and investors. Fixing this problem will require legislative reform and community level education on legal rights and the political process.

* * *

VIII: Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Karatu

Background

The Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) covers an area of 8300 km². The NCA was excised from the former Serengeti National Park and established as the NCA by the NCA Ordinance (1959). The administration and management of NCA was transferred from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism MNRT to the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA) in 1975. The NCAA is mandated to carry out three major functions, namely to:

- Safeguard and promote the interests of Tanzania Maasai in cattle ranging and dairy industry within the NCA.
- Promote tourism within the NCA.
- Conserve and develop natural resources in the NCA.

The rivers originating from the forests in Ngorongoro are the main water supply for many villages in Karatu district, some villages in Monduli district and all villages bordering the NCA. The NCA forests are of vital importance to a large number of people in Karatu and Monduli district.

Objectives

Increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management in the NCA and Karatu district.

Immediate objective

Participatory natural resource management organisations (including CBNRM, CBFM) strengthened and benefit-sharing agreements made operational.

The first phase of the NCA-Karatu project focussed on strengthening veterinary services in the NCA; the second phase on legal amendments, capacity building and buffer zone management; and the third phase was designed to ensure that natural resources contribute towards reduced income poverty, vulnerability among the poorest and to improve quality of life and social well-being.

Impact

- Reduced illegal off-take of forest products from the NCA and Northern Highland Forest Reserve (NHFR).
- Reduction of wild animal disturbances in parts of the NHFR bordering the villages of Karatu District.
- Improved regeneration in the degraded parts of NCA NHFR near Karatu villages.
- The watershed and water catchment ability of the NCA NHFR has improved as indicated by an increased volume of water flowing downstream.
- Reduction in bare ground in the NCA NHFR.
- The provision of twenty 20 dairy heifers all of which have calved has led to the production of 5-10 litres per dairy cow per day. About half to eighty percent of the daily production of milk is sold at TShs 250-300 per litre, consequently each cow owner has a cash income which is used for food, fees and other domestic needs.
- The improved stove has reduced wood fuel consumption by 50-67 percent and concomitant time spend on fuel wood collection as well as the time spent for cooking.
- In the heifer project, heifers were supplied to ten women who had been selected by their village governments and given training on dairy cow husbandry by the project. A second batch of cows was similarly supplied.
- The species to be planted in the nursery and tree planting activity were selected by the beneficiaries; the commonest chosen were *Eucalyptus*, *Gravillea* and *Dovyalis caffra* (michongoma). These were supplied to households for planting particularly those bordering the NCA northern highlands catchment forest reserve, so that the plantations could serve as a buffer zone to the natural forest bordering the villages.
- The compacted bricks activity has spent a lot of time and resources on successfully sensitising the populace on the need to use compacted bricks to conserve forests and vegetation. Production of bricks has begun but needs investment (machine).
- The target on energy saving stove activity is that every household in the nine target villages should have an improved stove in their household in order to reduce firewood consumption so that forest/wood and exploitation including illegal entry into the NCA is reduced.

The team's meeting with the project management yielded the followings:

- Good co-operation between MNRT and the RNE on project matters.
- Good mobilisation of project management staff.
- External consultants were satisfactorily used and CAMERTEC made a positive contribution to the project.
- The project funds and human resources were efficiently used.
- There was a high level of achievement in awareness building and beneficiary participation.

Governance

The mid-term review (Bryceson et al. 2005:107-8) suggests very patchy project implementation, inadequate reporting and poor communication by project management. The two most recent reviews maintain that the NCAA leadership is 'not sufficiently committed to processes of participation in decision making and benefit sharing.' (Bryceson et al., op. cit., page 111).

The project management appear not to have allocated the required human, financial resources to the project, resulting in the absence of reports on the exact level of project implementation, leading to the impression that the project has failed.

Effectiveness

The provision of heifers increased benefits to rural communities on sustainable basis and the choice of heifer recipients was democratic and participatory.

Out of the 12 activities planned for phase III; two (three dams in Karatu district and district environmental management plan) were not achieved, five (seedlings and woodlots agro forestry, training into entrepreneurship, improved stoves and interlocking compressed bricks) were implemented to varying degrees, and five (acquisition, heifer zero grazing, ecotourism, awareness raising and review of the NCAA management plan) were completed.

The heifer zero grazing and awareness raising were, according to this evaluation, the most successful in implementing the objectives of the project and the MNRP, as well as in achievements, effectiveness, efficiency relevance and sustainability. Both the catchment forest and the women and their households have benefited substantially. The five activities implemented to varying extents have contributed to the objectives of the project and MNRP.

In view of the importance of the project, the shortcomings noted by the mid-term and this evaluations need to dealt with by the MNRT (under the powers conferred to the minister 'the minister may give instructions to the NCA of a general and specific nature') to ensure compliance of the project requirements.

Efficiency

After calving, each woman gets between 5-10 litres of milk per day per cow. Family consumption takes on average 1-2 litres. The remaining is sold in Karatu at an average of TShs 300 per litre which brings to the household at least TShs 1,250 and up to TShs 2,400 which is higher than the risky TShs 1,000 from the forest.

The project management confirmed the above and further said that there has been improvement on the forest and water catchment properties as the flow on the waterfall has increased.

Relevance

The supply of heifers activity was relevant to Tanzania commitments to international conventions such as the Global Biodiversity Convention and implementing Tanzania policies and strategies; the Ruling Part the election Manifesto (2005), the Poverty Alleviation Strategy, the Local Government Reforms, the Land Policy 1995, the village Land Act 1999 and the Policy 1998.

The provision of improved stoves and bricks project was relevant to the Forestry Policy.

Sustainability

Most of the activities in this project particularly the heifer, tree seedlings, improved stove and brick components can continue even after the end of project support.

Discussion with the four women benefiting from the heifer project yielded the following:

Before they were given the heifers and calving of the heifers their livelihood was depended on sneaking into the NCA NHFR collecting firewood and selling it in Karatu township. Each day they were able to collect one bundle for sale in Karatu. Each bundle fetched on average TShs 1,000.

From the project personnel and the limited available literature thirteen activities / sub-activities were planned for phase III. Two of these “the preparation of Karatu district environmental management plan and the construction of three dams in Karatu district outside the NCA’ were not implemented. Six; review of the NCA GMP to incorporate the interest of communities, awareness building, eco-tourism, training on Zero grazing, acquisition, provision of 20 heifers were completed and the remaining five; nurseries and woodlots, agro-forestry, training in entrepreneurship, improved stoves and compacted bricks were implemented to various degrees.

The heifer project, as pointed above has some impact and is effective in the improved management of the NCA NHFR, contributes to Tanzania’s implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity, poverty alleviation, increase / improving household income and nutritional condition. It is sustainable and can permanently be overseen by the Karatu district council (enhancing implementation of the local government reforms) it however needs to be expanded to include more households within the current villages and to expand into other villages.

The seedling and tree planting which has been carried out to a limited extent has a great potential of soil conservation, providing alternative fuel to save natural forests and vegetation in the devastated district.

The heifer provision besides being effective and the partially implemented activities alone cannot fully meet the objectives of phase III of this project. Consequently it is recommended that the project be extended so that the activities planned originally are implemented in order to save Karatu district from desertification and meet the objectives of the project on condition that NCAA provides $\frac{1}{2}$ - $\frac{3}{4}$ of the funds.

The projects’ shortcomings were discussed with the two top executives of the NCA. The recognised the vital value of the project and will request up to 75 of the project costs from the NCA.

* * *

IX: Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute (TAWIRI)

Background

TAWIRI is mandated to carry out and oversee wildlife research in Tanzania.⁴³ The Biodiversity and Human-Wildlife Interface in Western Serengeti (BHWI) was initiated in 1999 as a joint research programme between TAWIRI and the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA). The BHWI project began in the Western Serengeti Region during Phase II of the MNRP.

In the past, research by TAWIRI concentrated to a large extent on academic natural science studies for obtaining higher degrees. The GOT Wildlife Policy (1998) and the current TAWIRI research policy emphasise research which is relevant to wildlife

⁴³ Its predecessor the Serengeti Wildlife Research Institute SWRI was established in 1980.

conservation needs. In line with the current Tanzania natural resources and poverty alleviation policies and keeping abreast with human/conservation changes occurring in the Serengeti region, the project 'Biodiversity and Human-Wildlife Interface in Western Serengeti' was conceived and initiated in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA) and the University of Dar es Salaam.

Objective

To conserve the Serengeti ecosystem and to improve TAWIRI's collaboration with national and international institutions through joint research work.

Immediate Objective

To quantify the impact of human activities on the vegetation, animal communities and soils in western Serengeti.

Impact

TAWIRI has undertaken important collaborative research on the Serengeti ecosystem, including BHWI the research programme. Some of TAWIRI's and other major research findings are summarised under SRCP above. Full references are in **Annex 3**.

Discussions with researcher at SWRC, TAWIRI project manager and TAWIRI Director of Research, written presentation by the Project Manager and the summary of project implementation, and other sources lead the team to conclude that the project has been well executed in accordance with the plan. The implementation met the goal and purpose of the programme as well as the objectives of the project.

Impact on income generation, poverty alleviation and improved livelihood is indirect through management authorities using TAWIRI project findings and implementing project recommendations. Impact on vegetation and wildlife is indirect through management authorities.

The impact of TAWIRI research is not easy to assess. We must start by asking: impact on whom and for what? If TAWIRI and its research partner organisations are involved in academic research, the impact is measured in terms of knowledge creation and the contribution of research to ongoing debates in the field of conservation and human development. Such research could have specific advocacy objectives, according to the dispositions of the main actors. If, on the other hand, TAWIRI undertakes applied research that addresses practical issues and problems, we would look for stakeholders who commissioned research of this kind and had opinions on its utility. For example, have TAWIRI research findings been commissioned and/or made use of over the current Grumeti issue? In this respect, a recent report commissioned by the MNRT (Kajembe et al. 2005) addressing resource use conflicts in Western Serengeti cites official data sources but no independent research, though TAWIRI is cited as an institution that the consultants had consulted. The team remains agnostic on the academic/practical impact of TAWIRI research. Applied research designed 'to develop systems oriented management plans and sustainable consumptive (sic) levels regimes' begs the obvious question: how does this relate to Grumeti's 'Serengeti West Development Project' and the tourism-conservation activities of Grumeti in general?⁴⁴

■ ⁴⁴ TAWIRI 2006, 'BHWI project, Final Project Physica (sic) Report', GRUMETI Safari Club and Grumeti Fund (no date) 'Serengeti West Development Project', PowerPoint slides.

BHWI project outputs

- Conducted 28 research projects on animals, vegetation, soil and socio-economics in Western Serengeti, 24 completed and 4 ongoing. Of the 28 research projects, 13 are largely 'natural science' and 15 include human-NR interactions. *There is no evidence of a temporal trend away from natural science towards human-NR studies.*
- Research results disseminated to management authorities, communities surrounding protected areas, scientific community and the general public through 1,000 copies of information leaflets, extension messages in 1,000 copies of project calendar, 500 booklets, 1,000 copies of newsletters, 11 community meetings, 2 integrative project workshops, 60 scientific papers in peer reviewed journals, scientific conferences and workshop proceedings and 14 research reports;
- Establishment of 10 research collaborations including some memoranda of understanding with local and foreign institutions and management authorities;
- Improvement of human resource capacity by facilitating the training of 82 people, many of them TAWIRI personnel, in a wide range of skills/specialties; one PhD, five master's degrees, 22 training sessions on research methods and proposal writing, 8 on computer skills, 20 on EIA, and one on participatory natural resources management and good governance.

Governance

The procedure of TAWIRI of doing research is not transparent compared to other research institutions. Basically if you want to build the capacity of the local institutions within conservation organization then publicity is important. All the themes which are thought critical in terms of wildlife and human interface within Western Serengeti were supposed to be accessible to all key stakeholders and then from there is where the themes could be agreed upon for implementation Furthermore the research costs should be clear ie minimum amount and maximum amount for all applicants.

- Selected themes should be publicised in the media for researchers, stakeholders who are interested to apply with clear procedures in place
- Developed themes should address the issues at stake to minimise depletion of natural resources in PAs around western Serengeti.
- CAWM has enough capacity ie students and lecturers to undertake natural as well as social sciences research, TAWIRI need to capitalize on this.
- Feedback of research results to the stakeholders and mostly the local people should be done effectively i.e. to reach larger area within the society. The people at the community level are tired of responding to a number of research questions with no feedback from the research results. If possible research documents need to be translated in Swahili version for research to be more meaningful to the local people in the area.

TAWIRI publications need to be accessible for other researchers, organisations, academicians to read them and make further research. It is very hard to access TAWIRI publications you need to follow a long way to obtain them.

The process of selecting themes for research, researchers and budget for each research should be open and with participation of key stakeholders not TAWIRI staff alone. This will help to select areas which are problematic to the area and more to solicit

resources from other sources/stakeholders and minimize duplication of research work where is not necessary.

In the process of implementing project activities there was sufficient stakeholder consultation with the MNRT, districts and villages. There was relevance in the awareness raising activities to the communities and to a certain extent protected area managers created income-generating opportunities.

Effectiveness

The objectives were relevant to the MNRP and nearly all activities were effectively and efficiently implemented.

Conflict incidence between humans and wildlife was reduced from 60 percent at the beginning of phase II to 30 percent at present (target was 20 percent) as indicated by the reduction of wildlife of flights distance e.g. impala has a flight distance of as low as 5 metres, there has been a high level of awareness and reduced poaching (except elephant poaching).

There is no empirical evidence on increase of income by 20 percent, however there are village supported activities on dairy goats, fishponds, piggeries, horticulture, baking and handcrafts that provide some income.

By June 2006 all data collection, analysis and dissemination, papers, workshops will be completed making 100 percent of target implemented. MOUs with NINA and UDSM have been concluded and operating relations with national institutions of high learning and research is high.

Efficiency

In recent years, expenditures have been timely and within budget allocations. Value for money in terms of costs and impact of research outputs is difficult to assess.

There was a high level of achievement of targets, overall 80 percent (acquisitions 100 percent, construction 80 percent, data 80-100 percent). People move towards protected areas in Western Serengeti because of lack of land use plans to control land use and social amenities e.g. hospitals, schools brought to the western Serengeti by SENAPA CCS.

As from the records; the budgets were not exceeded and during the last three years, expenditure was between 82 percent to 100 percent of the budgeted amounts, the objectives were achieved within budget and at reasonable cost.

In the context of project issues MNRT and RNE co-operated well, internal and external consultants were efficiently used and consultants contributed in fields where TAWIRI did not have expertise, e.g. vegetation and soils. Consultants produced reports on time. TAWIRI did not note any weakness on the part of consultants. Cooperation between the project and; communities, the districts and co-operating institutions e.g. SUA, NINA and the College of Africa Wildlife Management, Mweka was very good. Project funds, and TAWIRI staff engaged on project activities were efficiently used. The policy of non-compensation to the rural communities for injury, loss of human and livestock life and crop/property damage caused by wildlife affected project activities negatively while the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania promoted project activities. Other programmes / projects SRCP, SENAPA, TANAPA CCS (Ujirani Mwema) affected project activities positively.

Relevance

Western Serengeti requires extensive natural science and social science research to address the issues as explained above:

- Situation on the buffer zones, wildlife corridors (elephant range) is worsening
- Encroachment for agriculture towards PAs boundaries
- Human-elephants conflicts
- Crop raiding not yet mitigated
- WMAs not implemented due to conflict of interest between stakeholders.
- Illegal hunting especially during wildebeest migration.

The objectives and impacts were relevant and addressing important issues and problems:

- They provided solutions to some of the critical problems which TAWIRI and Tanzanian researchers by providing the first-class facilities listed above, motivation and capacity building of TAWIRI and its staff by providing training and skills to TAWIRI's research staff and appropriate knowledge and awareness on the conservation of the Serengeti eco-system to the rural people and other conservation stakeholders of western Serengeti.
- At policy level the impacts implemented provisions of the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania (1998) (devolvement of wildlife conservation and rural peoples participation in wildlife management), the Wildlife conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations (2002) by not only providing data on the involvement of communities in Wildlife management as an intervention of poverty reduction and Conservation of Biological diversity but the activities e.g. socio-economic appraisals carried out during the project actually involved the rural communities in wildlife research.

Sustainability

The awareness built, the training and capacity building carried out are sustainable as awareness and knowledge on the ecosystem will be passed over to young generations, the trained staff will train future and younger staff and some of the equipment provided will last a long time during which time TAWIRI will find financial sources to replace them.

Some of the equipment e.g. vehicles need replacement in the near future which can be obtained either through TAWIRI sources or an extension of the project to enable the carrying out of researches which are more relevant and more socio-economic researches. Overall, with the appropriate resource commitment from TAWIRI the project activities are sustainable.

Some project activities such as counting and collaring wild animals are sustainable while others are not and benefits from sustainable activities will continue while others will stop on termination of the project. There was adequate and appropriate participation of the rural people of Western Serengeti and protected area management authorities. However Grumeti Reserve scouts harassed both protected area managers and communities.

The main challenges included: field work being difficult and under difficult environment and initially with limited transport and communication. SWRC

recommends Norwegian assistance to continue because it rescued the centre in terms of transport, power, field equipment communication and staff development.

Elephants are a major problem, causing injury and death to humans and livestock. This is because their numbers have increased: in 1986, there were 500 elephants in the Serengeti while in 2003 there were 2500.

Some practices such as counting and collaring animals as well as rapid appraisals can be applied at other places outside the project area and the level of awareness on the need to conserve the wildlife and solve human-wild life conflicts is very high.

Some project activities should continue for a while to strengthen the capability for sustainability and to answer questions, which evolved as a result of the project activities.

The situation in Western Serengeti requires project support to continue in order to address the issues at stake. The approach should be redesigned for TAWIRI to be effective.

* * *

X: College of African Wildlife Management, Mweka

Background

The College of African Wildlife Management (CAWM) was established in 1963 with funding and support from the African Wildlife Foundation, which was founded roughly during this same period. It was established by an act of parliament ‘The College of African Wildlife Management Act’ in 1964.

The creation of the College was part of the transition to independence and part of a strategy by international conservation organisations to establish a permanent presence in East Africa and to continue promoting colonial-era conservation paradigms (Igoe, 2004). The college has been an essential component of the “Africanisation” of national parks throughout Anglophone Africa. It has created “an elite class of bureaucrats trained in Western ideologies and practices of western resource conservation” (Neumann 1998: 144).

CAWM was founded in order to provide technical training skills to wildlife managers. According to people who were trained at CAWM in the 1960s and 1970s, it was initially very technical. They learned skills like handling firearms, tracking poachers, and species identification. Today CAWM still teaches these kinds of skills, but the curriculum has expanded to include issues like community-based conservation, education & communication, as well as conflict management. CAWM faculty members include social scientists as well as wildlife experts. Members of the faculty hold differences of opinion about the best ways to approach conservation and whether western models are still appropriate to an African context. In other words, while still being ‘an elite class of bureaucrats’ they are all not equally sold on western ideologies and practices.

The transformation of CAWM is reflective of a larger transformation that has been occurring in the area of wildlife management in Tanzania, and indeed throughout Africa. Specifically, there has been an increasing recognition that ‘fortress’ conservation – ‘the protection of the environment through the forced exclusion of

local people – was failing (Brockington 2002; Igoe 2004). To quote the Mid-Term Review of Phase III of MNRP:

As other governments and organizations in the world, the Tanzanian government gradually realized that conservation and management of nature and the environment and natural resources could not be pursued on the basis of ‘the protection of resources against people.’ Instead, it had to be based on an approach emphasizing ‘protection and management together with people.’ A changed slimmed role for the state, based on its reorganization, including regional administrations, imply (sic) reduced funds for nature protection and management of state controlled forests, parks, and wildlife areas, thus underlining the need for this new approach. (Bryceson et al. 2005:15).

While this statement is accurate, it is important to note that the transformation it describes is about more than simple technical reform. First, the ‘protection of resources against people’ approach was undemocratic, and therefore out of step with the democratisation that occurred across Africa in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. As part of this transformation, communities and civil society in general took on a new role in conservation and the management of natural resources. Second, the strict preservation of natural resources proved inconsistent with Tanzania’s poverty alleviation strategies. Considering that between 70 percent and 80 percent of all Tanzanians depend on direct access to natural resources for their livelihoods, and that protected areas currently encompass between 27 percent and 41 percent of Tanzania’s total land area,⁴⁵ it became clear that something had to give. Further, considering that in 2001 Tanzania received US \$725 million in international tourist receipts, with an annual compound growth rate of 29 percent, and that tourism and related economic activities represents 16 percent of Tanzania’s total GDP, it was clear that tourism had tremendous potential to alleviate poverty and to relieve the pressure that protected areas had placed on rural livelihoods.⁴⁶ How would it be possible, though, to see that tourist revenues reached rural people?

One of the answers to this challenge was the creation of WMAs (Wildlife Management Areas). Under the WMA Regulations of 2005 (revised from 2002); communities neighbouring protected areas are allowed to set aside conservation areas under their village land use plans. These conservation areas are set aside for the purposes of conserving natural resources and attracting investors. They are run by communities, in cooperation with district governments, through community-based organisations. As WMAs may encompass lands from several villages, these CBOs may have representatives from several villages. Revenues generated by WMAs are meant to accrue to local people, thereby contributing to the alleviation of rural poverty.⁴⁷

▪ ⁴⁵ The total area of Tanzania includes large parts of Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, and Malawi. If these are not included, the total percentage is significantly higher. Also, the original figure of 27 percent did not include any of the parks created since 1997. The number is also larger if you include Game Controlled Areas, which do not necessarily exclude human use. Of course the area will also increase with the creation of WMAs.

▪ ⁴⁶ Source World Resources Institute:
http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.cfm?theme=5&variable_ID=252&action=select_countries

▪ It seems unlikely that such a high rate of growth could continue for many more years, as there are clear limits to the tourist market in Africa.

▪ ⁴⁷ The practice, of course, is much different. See the WMA report in **Annex 2**.

What is the role of CAWM in all of this? According to the Mid-Term Review, this movement towards devolved wildlife management has implied ‘an enormous reorientation to meet the new demands in training.’ In the area of WMAs, it appeared that government officials at the district and village levels, along with local people, would need to learn how to establish and run natural resource-based enterprises. CAWM was slotted under sub-component III of MNRP: *Income & Employment Generating Private Sector Development*. It was tasked with developing short courses in entrepreneurship for district and village officials, as well as for local people.

CAWM faculty has developed two short courses – a 4 week course, at the diploma level, for district officials and a two-week course, at the certificate level, for village officials and local people.

Objectives

- Increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management in Tanzania.
- Income and employment generating private sector development efforts promoted through natural resource management.

Impact

Unfortunately, the specific impacts of these types of trainings are difficult to assess and even more difficult to quantify. Concerning impacts, the Mid-Term Review simply states:

One of the major impacts of CAWM is that they have graduated a large number of well qualified wildlife management staff to a large number of African and non-African countries. In addition, the capacity within wildlife management at the district level has increased (Bryceson et al, 2005: 118).

This statement is difficult to substantiate. It also begs a number of questions about the performance of institutions of wildlife management in Tanzania, especially in terms of governance and the devolution of responsibility for wildlife management to rural communities, which is the foundational assumption of the CAWM training programmes funded by Norway.⁴⁸

Another approach would be to quantify the number of people who have undergone a particular training and consider that an impact. Indeed, one of the indicators put forth in the Mid-Term Review was that 60 Natural Resource Management Officers from districts with WMAs would receive training at CAWM. This is an attractive indicator, since it is easy to determine whether or not it has been met.

CAWM has developed a four week course in entrepreneurship, which targets district officials, as well as officers from TANAPA and the Division of Wildlife. In the Mid-Term Review, CAWM had set a goal for itself of training 60 Natural Resource Officers from Districts, with WMAs. In the pilot of this course, which was run in 2004, the course had 27 participants. Twenty of these participants came from district

■ ⁴⁸ Many of the statements in the Mid-Term evaluation are attributed to Gamassa, 2004 – including entire sections and even a table. I was unable to track down the document from which these statements were reportedly taken. However, as these statements come from the principal of CAWM they should have been accompanied by some sort of critical evaluation. Throughout the document, however, they were merely taken at face value. Many of these same statements resurfaced in interview with Principal Gamassa.

governments. This course has not been run again, and so the goal of training 60 district officials has not been met.

However, CAWM has followed up on one of the recommendations of the Mid-Term Review that it develop a course for people from the village level. In the past year, faculty at CAWM have developed a two-week course, which has been run twice. A total of thirty-three people participated in this course, although many were not from the village level – for reasons that will be explained below. CAWM plans to run this course once more before Phase III ends next month.

Unfortunately, these indicators tell us only the number of people who have been trained with Norwegian money. They tell us nothing about the quality and appropriateness of the training. Moreover, they tell us nothing about whether or not the trainees were able to incorporate the lessons from the training into their day-to-day work.

In thinking about impacts, therefore, the team chose to take a more critical approach. Specifically, we considered the following: (1) what were the assumptions behind the trainings and are they appropriate to the stated goals and objectives of MNRP and the current direction of wildlife management in Tanzania as briefly outlined above; (2) what was the actual content of the curriculum and how was it taught; (3) who were the trainees and how were they chosen; (4) what did they take away from these trainings; and (5) how have they applied these lessons in their work?

In order to find the answers to these questions we began by reviewing MNRP documents, the training needs assessment undertaken by CAWM faculty in designing the curriculum, and the consultative workshop that was undertaken following the training needs assessment. We also examined the curriculum itself, both in terms of content as well as in terms of what we have observed as a teacher at CAWM for the past academic year. We then proceeded to the field, where we interviewed a variety of people who had attended the CAWM trainings. We concentrated on Babati District. We also travelled to Simanjiro District. Finally, we interviewed the Community Outreach Officer for Tarangire National Park.

In our discussions with course participants, we learned a great deal about how they received and used the curriculum. Everyone we interviewed enjoyed the course and said that they learned a great deal. They also all said that the courses covered too much material in too little time, and that they hoped that this problem could be rectified for future courses.

People understood the curriculum with varying degrees of sophistication. We interviewed two village level participants, who had participated in the two-week course in April of this year. Both were members of the Burunge WMA CBO in Babati District. They appeared to have received only the take-home messages: the value of natural resources and present opportunities for entrepreneurship. They were impressed by the bee-keeping project that they visited, as well as the fruit and vegetable drying project. However, they admitted that they would need specific types of technical training if they were going to be able to have such programmes in their villages. They did indicate that they would soon be travelling to the other villages in their CBO to tell people what they had learned.

Two other participants in the two-week course were assistant game wardens from Simanjiro District. Both were young and more highly educated than the participants from Babati. One had studied to Standard 6, while the other held a Diploma in Community Development. In terms of the course material that they remembered, they spent more time discussing group exercises in planning, monitoring, and evaluating natural resource enterprises. They clearly remembered the details of these exercises, and could effectively reflect how they could apply these exercises in their own work – especially in mobilising people to formulate village land use plans that would promote enterprise opportunities at the village level. They had been very proactive in asking CAWM for a letter to their district council, requesting that the district provide resources for them to visit different villages and do this work. They both emphatically stated that the knowledge they gained would be of little use if they did not share it with others.

The Game Officer from Babati District, who had participated in the consultative workshop, said that he could no longer remember what the workshop was about. He spoke in general terms about the need for entrepreneurship in his district and more specifically about opportunities to develop natural resources for ecotourism throughout the district. Regarding the two CBO members who had attended the two-week course, he said that he had not expected them to learn a great deal from the course, just to see that natural resource entrepreneurship was possible. The rest, he said, he would teach them himself over time.

His assistant, who participated in the four-week course, said very little about the specifics of what she had learned. She said that they had done a field exercise to talk to people in neighbouring villages, but only mentioned that the villagers didn't like CAWM. When asked about whether the course helped her in her work, she said yes. Her elaboration was interesting, because it focused on the 'knowledge, skills, and attitudes' of rural people in her district more than on her own. Specifically she said, 'the course helped me, because at least a few people in the villages are clever enough to recognise that natural resources are important and have value.' When we asked again specifically how the course helped her, she responded, 'it helped me teach people about entrepreneurship.'

The most impressive respondent was the community outreach warden from Tarangire National Park. She began by saying that the benefits from Tarangire were social benefits like schools and dispensaries. They were good, but they did very little in helping people earn money so that they could become less poor. She said that without alternative income generation rural people would continue to use natural resources unsustainably, and that her outreach work would not be wholly effective. The best part of the course, she said, was enterprise design. Based on that exercise she had designed a seminar on simple book keeping for women's groups in villages adjacent to the park. She had also started three pilot women's groups, which she had trained in project identification, project planning, and monitoring & evaluation. Based on the course she was helping women fund their enterprises by establishing revolving funds and obtaining small loans. These groups are now engaged in selling curios and crafts, agro-forestry, and making energy saving stoves. Finally, she emphasised that men have far more opportunities than women, so micro-enterprise is an important tool for promoting gender equality in Tanzania. In this case, the CAWM short course has had clear and verifiable positive impacts.

Governance

Unfortunately, the question of governance is not addressed by the CAWM short courses. The Training Needs Assessment does mention some governance issues such as ‘unresolved land ownership conflicts’ and unclear WMA boundaries (Mwaya et al, 2003: 9). During interviews, the faculty members who undertook the assessment also mentioned issues such as corruption, political manipulation, and unscrupulous investors. However, they felt that these issues were beyond the scope of their terms of reference. *The four-week course originally included a component on ‘good governance,’ but it was removed from the syllabus before the course was actually taught.*

We were interested to learn why the faculty chose to focus narrowly on the question of entrepreneurship without addressing governance issues. After all, MNRP included a sub-component called *Participatory Management of Natural Resources*. Why was CAWM slotted only under *Income & Employment Generating Private Sector Development*? After all, several CAWM faculty members are experts in community and governance issues.

Faculty members interviewed indicated that they were interested in addressing governance issues, as well as other issues related to community participation, but that the decision to concentrate on entrepreneurship had already been taken at the ministerial level in advance of their involvement in MNRP. The CWAM Principal stated: ‘It seems that whoever made these decisions believed that community issues were only relevant to forestry. They saw wildlife as strictly enterprise, and forgot that community issues are important in the wildlife sector as well.’ This problem is also noted in the Mid-Term Review: ‘in the planning for phase III, CAWM felt that there was no room for negotiation and that the plan had been decided in advance (Bryceson et al, 2005: 120).

With the problem of WMAs predefined as one of entrepreneurship, all of the activities surrounding curriculum development were required to focus on this particular issue. *Questions of governance and other community issues fell by the wayside.* Other problems observed by the assessment team were not brought forward. The consultative workshop was also directed by this imperative.

The consultative workshop is especially instructive both in terms of who participated and their prescriptions for resource entrepreneurship for WMAs. Most of the participants were district officials, while the rest were lecturers from CAWM and SUA. All of their definitions and indicators were drawn from policy documents, rather than from empirical discussions of actual communities targeted for WMAs.

Significantly, participants did attribute poverty in Tanzania to bad policies, poor governance, and corruption, as well as poor social services, infrastructure, and lack of access to markets. Their recommendations, however, focused almost exclusively on the ‘knowledge, skills, and attitudes’ of rural Tanzanians and local government, and their ability to identify and establish enterprises. One group, for instance, noted that communities needed to be empowered and recommended to ‘induce morality to the target group’ (CAWM, 2003: 14). This same group noted the problem of bad laws and policies, and recommended that ‘communities should abide and respect laws and policies’ (ibid: 14). Another suggested that bad governance could be corrected by ‘planning & faithfulness’ (ibid: 17). All of the groups pointed out the need for people to take more risks, be more flexible, and to be more profit-oriented. *None of the*

groups mentioned land grabbing, displacement, or lack of access to natural resources as a cause of poverty in rural Tanzania.

As such, the resulting curriculum focuses heavily on changing people's 'knowledge, skills, and attitudes' in the areas of investment and enterprise management alone. In and of itself, this is not a bad thing. However, this would appear to be putting the cart before the horse. Without knowing their rights and responsibilities under the law, and to have the efficacy to exercise those rights and responsibilities, it is difficult if not impossible for rural Tanzanians to take effective ownership of the natural resources on which these putative enterprises will be based. Technical training therefore needs to take place as part of an integrated package, which includes education about rights, laws, and political participation.

Effectiveness

Did CAWM meet its objective of 'increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management in Tanzania?' This is a difficult question to answer.

As a CAWM faculty member pointed out, 'getting enough people to these courses is a difficult challenge.' The announcement for the courses goes through district governments, 'who sometimes do not forwards the information in a timely fashion.' This is the reason, for instance, why only 27 people participated in the pilot four-week course, instead of the intended 35.

There is still a larger challenge: getting the right people to the course and tailoring the course to their capacities and needs. In this regard, the limited data set we have suggests mixed results:

- Two participants who had difficulty in absorbing the course material;
- Two who apparently didn't care;
- Two who cared and appeared set to do something with their new knowledge and skills; and
- One who had done impressive work in applying the course material to a variety of activities that were completely in line with CAWM's objectives.

The process of finding participants through district governments also affects this dynamic. It appears that some district officials have used CAWM courses as opportunities for patronage instead of choosing participants who are most suited for the course and who are most likely to use what they learn to promote community-based natural resource enterprises. Although the two-week course targeted less formally educated people from the village level, large numbers of people from the district level with high levels of formal education has attended it. Two of the participants, for instance, had degrees from SUA. Another participated twice in the same course in two consecutive years. This situation not only limits opportunities for people from the village level, it also makes the courses intimidating for those who do attend.

There is no way of telling if our small sample is representative of all the people who participated in the CAWM short courses.⁴⁹ However, we believe the results are

■ ⁴⁹ It represents approximately 12 percent of the total number of students who participated in both courses, although participants in the four-week course are slightly underrepresented.

indicative of the bigger picture: people targeted by the course have different capacities, levels of commitment, and interests.

The question of capacity is important, since the curriculum will obviously be most effective if it is tailored to the capacity of specific participants. The two village-level participants had difficulty in absorbing what they were being taught and were clearly intimidated about being in a classroom with people who were more educated than they. We strongly believe, however, that even people lacking formal education have the capacity to learn the material in the CAWM short courses. However, it will be necessary to target these people more effectively. The question of effectiveness is a matter of perspective. Perhaps having one trainee as proactive and competent as the community outreach officer from Tarangire justifies the cost of the whole course, and perhaps not. If our sample is representative, then we could speculate that those 7-8 participants in the CAWM short courses made equally good use of what they learned and that another 14-16 have significant potential to do so over time. Depending on the knock-on effects of their results, this may indeed have been a very effective use of Norwegian money.

In order to understand and improve on this type of effectiveness, however, it will be necessary to: (1) have better base-line data on potential course participants and those most likely to carry forward the 'knowledge, skills, and attitudes' that they attain in CAWM short courses; and (2) to find more effective ways of targeting such people, especially from the village level.

Efficiency

As noted in the previous section, it is difficult to say if the objectives of the CAWM courses were achieved at a reasonable cost. CAWM spent about \$450 per student for the two-week courses and about \$900 per student for the four-week course.

Was this money well spent? That depends on what Norway views as an acceptable number of trainees who will carry forward what they learned from the CAWM trainings, and if what they do is actually effective and relevant to the needs of the communities with whom they work or from whence they come. If the expectation is that all the trainees will be so effective, then the objectives have not been achieved at a reasonable cost. If it is acceptable that a lower number be so effective, then perhaps it has. The central challenge is to come up with more effective ways for evaluating the impacts of these types of training (these are likely to be qualitative and empirical) and more effective ways for targeting the kinds of participants who are most likely to carry the trainings forward. **Box 10** discusses the efficiency with which the college is managed.

Box 10: Is CAWM managed according to business principles?

The Mid-Term Evaluation states: 'the feeling the review team got was that the College is run in an efficient and market oriented way' (Bryceson et al, 2005: 119). Based on a short visit to the College, it is easy to gain this impression. The grounds are well kept and the central buildings appear well maintained and it has an impressive motor pool. The College also has its hard-earned reputation as a centre of excellence, and has recently been accredited by the GOT as an institution of higher learning.

CAWM's future depends on its ability to attract students, and especially foreign students, who pay double tuition. In interviews and discussions, most students named the same fundamental problems, revolving around lack of support services and customer care.

Both Tanzanian and foreign students express dissatisfaction with the College. However, foreign students have more options for wildlife training than most Tanzanian student--most notably in Kenya and South Africa--at institutions that are competitively priced with CAWM. The foreign students currently enrolled at CAWM told the

team that they would not recommend the College to other potential students. A wildlife professional from Malawi told us frankly, ‘being at Mweka is too hard.’ She was speaking of what she perceives as a basic disregard of students and their needs.

A group of Swedish students and their teachers, who came to CAWM on an exchange programme, complained bitterly about their experience, stating repeatedly, ‘we are just waiting to go home.’ Their main complaint was that they had been put up by CAWM at a low-class hotel, where it was too noisy to sleep at night and their possessions were stolen. They resolved the problem by storing their luggage in a teacher’s office, which meant that they had to wait to change their clothes till they came to campus each morning. For what they paid, they certainly could have been put up in better and more secure accommodation. The teachers expressed doubt that they would be bringing groups in future years, which is unfortunate, because it is a five-year exchange that could potentially bring a large number of students to CAWM.

Other student complaints revolved around lack of water and electricity on campus. CAWM is often without electricity, even at times when TANESCO is not rationing power in other areas. These problems often result from poorly maintained infrastructure on campus and maintenance staff of questionable competence.

The electricity problem contributes to a more immediate computer problem. Even when electricity is available, however, the server is often down. These are problems that could be solved with generators, along with better maintenance and support services. Internet cafes in nearby Moshi maintain internet service even during TANESCO rationing. This problem is compounded by the fact that CAWM lacks adequate computer and internet facilities, while students are required to do research online for almost every class. In terms of actual computers, CAWM has one machine for every nine students, which the administration points out is the best for any institution of higher learning in Tanzania. In terms of computers that actually work and can be used to access the internet, the ratio is more like one machine for every 30 students.

These problems are in part the result of a lack of resources as described elsewhere in this report. However, more fundamentally, they reflect a lack of a service culture among both CAWM support staff and some faculty members. This in turn is in large part a legacy of the CAWM’s origins as a paramilitary institution, where students were to be seen but not heard.

This legacy is resistant to change. In a course on participation and communication, one Tanzanian student asked, ‘why does the College administration ask for our input when they never do anything with it?’ He was referring to student course evaluations and student government, which he said appeared to be cosmetic trappings of a service culture that did not exist. One of the biggest jokes among the students is the idea of the Customer Care Manager. As one German student put it: ‘They certainly don’t see us as customers, and they will never care about us.’

Source: Participant observation, interviews

Relevance

As the Mid-Term Evaluation of the MNRP notes, training and capacity building are essential components of both governance and sustainable resource management (Bryceson et al., 2005). Designing effective training programmes, and undertaking realistic assessments of their impacts, is therefore essential to Tanzania’s transition to resource management programmes and practices that: 1) are more participatory and democratic; and 2) will contribute significantly to the country’s current policies of economic growth and poverty reduction. To be clear, these two points taken together demand approaches that are both relevant and accessible to the 70 percent-80 percent of rural Tanzanians who depend directly on natural resources for their livelihoods.

One of the central assumptions behind the CAWM short courses is that people would need special skills to avail themselves of these rapidly developing opportunities. Specifically, they would need entrepreneurial skills – the ability to recognise investment opportunities, and to act on those opportunities by taking risks and making investments.

This idea has become a popular aspect of development and development training throughout Tanzania. The Swahili term for entrepreneurship, *Ujasiri wa mali*, is familiar to most people in the rural communities where I am working due to their participation in a variety of seminars and workshops. At a recent village meeting, in

which citizens of Minjingu village rejected their status as a WMA, an Arusha elder put forth the following challenge:

We like the idea of entrepreneurship. However, we do not want entrepreneurship where the money always seems to fall through holes in our pockets. We want entrepreneurship where we hold the money in our hands, and when we open our hands we can see that the money is still there. Then we can buy the things that we need.⁵⁰

This elder was commenting on the wealth that promoters of Burunge WMA had promised when they were seeking the support of the villagers—wealth that he felt had never materialised as promised. However, his challenge reflects a fundamental problem with WMAs: *most of the profits from WMAs accrues to outsiders, very little actually circulates back to the villages, and the little that does usually winds up in the hands of a few people.*

Proponents of entrepreneurship theory would argue that this problem occurs because rural Tanzanians lack the appropriate ‘knowledge, skills, and attitudes’ to take advantage of the opportunities presented by WMAs. Certainly, this point is valid to a certain extent. However, the problems with WMAs, and with natural resource management in Tanzania in general, are governance problems. Rural people, and usually local government officials, are unaware of their roles and responsibilities under the law. More fundamentally, rural people are not aware of their rights (such as they are) under legislation like the Village Land Act and the WMA regulations. As such, they are easy prey for unscrupulous outsiders—including Tanzanian government officials, private tour operators & commercial hunters, and representatives of international conservation NGOs.

Sustainability

It is unlikely that CAWM could continue these short courses very effectively without donor support, unless participants were willing to pay for their participation – an unlikely scenario since the majority of them are government employees or members of the rural poor.

The Mid-Term Evaluation points out that CAWM is financially dependent on donors to maintain training facilities as well as investing in capital developments and the replacement of assets (Bryceson et al, 2005: 118). At the time of the Mid-Term Review CAWM had recently emerged from a fiscal crisis. The refurbishment of CAWM dorms, which had been funded by Norway, had not been undertaken. The Mid-Term Evaluation notes that CAWM had ‘borrowed’ money from the Norwegian funds to pay ‘debts.’

Through interviews with CAWM teachers we learned that these debts consisted primarily of unpaid salaries to faculty and staff. Although CAWM has emerged from this crisis, it still has significant cash flow problems for reasons that are not openly discussed and therefore not verifiable. The Mid-Term Review noted that CAWM’s imprest register was not updated on a timely basis and that reimbursements were not retired within a reasonable period. This continues to be a problem at CAWM. It is not unusual for imprests to remain unretired for indefinite periods.⁵¹

■ ⁵⁰ Author’s translation from the original Kiswahili.

■ ⁵¹ Based on our observations, it often takes three to nine months for an imprest to be retired, and longer periods are not unheard of. At a recent board meeting, the chair of CAWM’s board of directors

Concerning the dormitories, however, this problem is apparently resolved. The dormitories refurbishments were complete at the end of last year. The responsibility for the financing of the refurbishments has been moved to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. CAWM is repaying the 'loan' that it made to itself directly to the Ministry. The responsible faculty member reported that the repayments would be complete within the next few months.

But are these developments actually leading towards sustainability, if we define sustainability as financial self-sufficiency? As the Mid-Term report correctly points out, 'the attractiveness of the institution to external actors, such as students, researchers, and contractors, is essential to CAWM's income generation' (Bryceson et al, 2005: 120). In other words, the sustainability of the College, as well as its reputation, depend on its ability to attract students and researchers. More specifically, foreign students are especially essential to CAWM as they pay double tuition -- \$6,000 per year as opposed to the \$3,000 paid by Tanzanian nationals. This \$3,000 basically covers the cost of training the student, and so there is very little that remains for building the College.

The number of foreign students has been declining at CAWM over the past two years. While it is too early to say if this represents a trend, it is definitely a cause for concern and should be monitored closely (see **Box** above).

The team's only critique of the content of this course is that it could be more explicitly related to WMAs and WMA regulations. Specifically, what are the implications of WMAs for different types of natural resource entrepreneurship? How might WMAs potentially facilitate local entrepreneurship? How might they potentially hinder it? What are the best strategies for creating investment strategies that are most favourable to local people, while still attractive to outside investors? What kinds of steps can district officials take to create an enabling environment for local entrepreneurs? Finally, how do governance issues fit into all this, with specific reference to WMA regulations?

The two-week course presents a bigger challenge, since it targets people coming from the village level, who presumably have less formal education and are less proficient in English. Furthermore, because of the shorter time, it is necessary to prioritise the topics to be covered. Indeed, the only negative thing that participants said about the short course is that covered too many things in too little time. They all agreed that it should be a longer course, as apposed to covering fewer topics, since they felt that everything it covered is important. We have also noticed that this is an inherent problem in CAWM's modular approach to teaching, as modules almost always cover very difficult and sophisticated topics in surprisingly short periods of two to three weeks.

In terms of content, the module outline identifies 'a commitment to alleviating poverty and improving livelihoods through good governance' as one of its two core values. However, there is no mention of governance issues in the actual topics covered. The course covers the same basic topics as the four week course, but in a more abbreviated and simplified fashion.

complained that it is awkward for him to explain CAWM's finances when he makes his annual report to parliament.

Again, the course could be improved if it focused on the issues outlined above. The challenge of language should also be addressed and it probably makes most sense for the course to be taught in Swahili. Finally, the emphasis on field trips, while interesting, is perhaps distracting to less formally educated participants. Those whom I interviewed only recalled the field trips, and were unable to expound at all on how they might actually go about starting an enterprise, although this issue was definitely covered in the course curriculum. The course should probably place more emphasis on how to start and run an enterprise, with constant reference to WMAs.

* * *

XI: Mafia Island Marine Park

Background

The Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP) was established in 1995, covers 822 km² along the eastern and southern part of Mafia Island and contains coral reefs with exceptionally high biodiversity and important areas of mangroves and sea grasses.

The success of the marine conservation and income generation aspects of the MIMP are crucial for the future of conservation, private sector development and income generation along the Tanzanian coast. Below, we focus on the participation of communities in MIMP project activities. This yields insights into the strict limits of 'community participation' as currently practiced, and the degree to which government stakeholders absorb virtually all the benefits from the substantial tourism and donor-project income that the park authority enjoys (see **Table 2** below).

The team also investigated MIMP's potential as an eco-tourism centre, concluding that the present institutional arrangements between government, private sector and village communities are not propitious for sustainable NRM, income creation and poverty reduction.

The team looked at the controversial Tanpesca, a large-scale investor in commercial export of finfish, which the GOT has only recently allowed, and prawn farm and hatchery on Mafia Island.⁵² The team examines the opposing arguments on the merits of allowing the export of finfish, arguments that also apply to the Lake Victoria Nile perch trade with the European Union. This part of the evaluation is also summarised in **Annex 1**.

The important developments just mentioned have major implications for the implementation of the MNRP. The team believes that the wider environment in which Norwegian project support has been disbursed seriously undermines the rationale for that support.

Objectives

Community participation and benefit sharing are central to MNRP support to MIMP. The objective of the present project phase is "Increased benefits to rural communities (households) based on sustainable natural resource management", and the immediate

■ ⁵² RNE has commissioned a substantial collaborative study on commercial coastal fisheries, which is underway. The evaluation team found that Tanpesca's prawn hatchery was not the subject of an Environmental Impact Assessment, and that Tanpesca ignored the findings of a report (Clay 1999) commissioned by the Board of Trustees, Marine Parks & Reserves, raising numerous issues concerning the possible contamination and pollution caused *inter alia* by the use of antibiotics in the prawn hatchery.

objective: "Participatory natural resource management organisations including (CBNRM, CBFM) strengthened and benefit-sharing agreements made operational." (MTR 2005, p.43). Workplans also highlight commitment to the strategy "to involve the stakeholders in the management of the Park and rational utilization of its resources. This is achieved through representation of stakeholders in various agreed fora pertaining to the Park management." (Work Plan 2003-2004).

Activities funded over the last years include sensitisation of local community members on self-compliance with Park regulations through seminars or workshops; joint sea and land based patrols with established village enforcement units; facilitation of Park Advisory Committee meetings; building capacity of districts and MIMP staff to effectively manage natural resources and facilitations of village law enforcement.

Impact

The institutions for participatory management created by the Marine Parks and Reserves Act 1994 are described in detail in the MIMP Self-Evaluation report (2003). They include firstly the *Board of Trustees (BoT)*, the body charged with overseeing the development and management of marine parks and reserves in Tanzania. The Board is a non-executive body appointed by and answerable to the Minister. It has up to 11 members (senior government officers, academic, private sector, NGO representatives and one member of parliament from a marine park area) and meets quarterly. In the interim periods, the Board's directives are implemented by an executive body, the *Marine Parks and Reserves Unit (MPRU)*, which has a permanent office in DSM.

Within MIMP the Board employs a Warden in Charge (WiC) who is responsible for implementing management activities within the park. The work of the Warden and his team are overseen and advised by an *Advisory Committee (AC)*, which also has 11 members. Seven are resident on Mafia and include 3 representatives from local communities, 1 each from the District Council, , and 2 from the tourism and fisheries private sectors. The other 4 representatives are from relevant institutions in DSM (academic, NGO, regional authority and the Forestry division).

The link between the marine park and the 11 villages formally recognised as 'within' the park is provided by a *Village Liaison Committee (VLC)* in each village. These committees are answerable to the Village Council (of which they are a sub-committee) and their members are elected by a village assembly in which all members are able to vote. The VLCs have a Chairman, a Secretary and 4 other members. Villages are encouraged to have two women to the committee though it is not a strict requirement. The secretary should be a secondary school leaver. Each village committee also appoints a Village Liaison Officer who is effectively a village ranger.⁵³

How do these institutions work and how far has the innovative and ambitious policy of participatory management and benefit sharing been put into practice more than ten years after the establishment of the park?

Governance

Community participation

⁵³ Rubens & Kazimoto (2003), Mafia Island, A Demonstration Case, WCPA-Marine & WWF Marine Protected Area Management Effectiveness Initiative, September, p.6

The MIMP section of the 2005 Mid-term Review mostly quotes MIMP reports that reflect a rather narrow definition of participation, when saying that "Regarding community involvement in management of natural resources, in Phase III of the programme 432 villagers were involved in 10 workshops/ seminars addressing various themes such as conservation and beekeeping. A total number of 615 combined sea and land-based patrols were conducted. To increase the attractiveness of Mafia to tourists, beaches are kept tidy and visitors are informed about MIMP. Four Park Advisory Committee meetings were conducted in the period." (ibid p.44) Most stakeholders would claim that 'participation' in seminars and beach cleaning activities has little to do with participation "in all phases of the planning, development and management of that marine park or marine reserve" and "sharing in the benefits of the operation of the protected area" as the MPR Act requires.

From the beginning of park operations, there have been a number of field studies, including project evaluations by other donors, which have interviewed stakeholders on their expectations and views on participation in management and benefit sharing, and on the effectiveness of the participatory bodies of MIMP in particular.

Recent studies have raised critical issues over the nature and extent of community participation in MIMP activities. According to Walley (2004)⁵⁴. Chole residents, who had formerly described the marine park as "theirs", ... stated bluntly that they hated the park as it was threatening their livelihoods. Walley suggested that the reasons for this included that MIMP had started to control the fishing practices of island residents themselves, and had also changed the original park zoning plan that further restricted Mafia residents from prime fishing grounds, and that these changes were seen as being unilaterally conceived by park officials and visiting experts with minimal involvement from residents. "By 2000 the park had become an expanding and increasingly oppressive bureaucracy that residents felt threatened their very survival." Thus there were indications that the institutional set-up created for stakeholder participation did not work adequately then.

Robinson and Mesaki (2002) conducted a thorough external mid term evaluation of the WWF/DFID Support to Mafia Island Marine Park Project (1999-2004)⁵⁵ that included a detailed analysis of the modes of operation of the participatory institutions in Mafia, especially the Advisory Committee, and the impact these had on attitudes of a wide range of stakeholders towards the park.

At the level of village communities, "the general picture ... is that communication initially (at the beginning of the current WWF Project, ...) was very active and open. In recent months, particularly after approval of the GMP and some steps taken by the park to enforce the zoning plan, communities feel that communication, and especially the participatory type of relationship they were promised, has been seriously lacking. The Team appreciates that some villages in response to the crisis situation in Jibondo may currently overstate this problem. The Team also wishes to specifically acknowledge that park staff have obviously tried hard to keep up this communication. Nonetheless the perception at village level is different."

⁵⁴ Walley, Christine J. 2004, *Rough Waters, Nature and Development in an East African Marine Park*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

■ ⁵⁵ Alan Robinson & Simeon Mesaki (2002) Final report, External review of project (Mid Term Evaluation), WWF/DFID Support to Mafia Island Marine Park 1999-2004 (TZ0057) March 15, 2002

Concerning the District authorities, they found that "the picture with the Mafia District is basically the same as with communities, at least that is the perception among District functional officers: the marine park is not involving them in a meaningful way in decisions which legitimately affect the District, whether it be within the park or outside. Again, the park staff is quite different, expressing the view that they have consistently worked with these officers." (ibid p.15)

Concerning the tourism sector, the team observed that "particularly at this current time the relationship between the hotel industry on Mafia and the Marine Park needs considerable improvement. ... tourism is by far the most significant potential source of revenue for the MIMP Conservation Fund. In addition, the hotels can in themselves be very positive contributors to community development: In two cases there are progressive and quite successful community initiatives being sponsored by hotels that can provide examples that MIMP would be wise to examine. Secondly there is an opportunity to involve the hotel's dive boat operators at least indirectly in enforcement by encouraging them to routinely report, perhaps on restricted frequency radios, when they observe possible violations of zoning regulations." (ibid p.42)

The team found that "the MPRU and its Manager may have assumed a more forceful role than intended in controlling the flow of information and oversight between the BoT and the management of MIMP. Similarly, there appear to be difficulties for the Advisory Committee to provide its input directly to the Board since some (possibly unjustified) filtration is apparently imposed by the MPRU. Since the Advisory Committee is intended to be the principle channel through which stakeholders express their views upward, the end result has been a general feeling by the Committee as well as by the stakeholders they represent that they are not seriously being listened to. This in turn has led to a perception among stakeholders that there is less than full commitment of the BoT and MPRU to a participatory approach to MIMP management. This is a serious disappointment for some stakeholders since it was the basis of this expectation that they originally supported establishment of the marine park. Although MIMP staff may not have control over this problem, they bear the brunt of this disappointment since they are the first line in the chain of management." (ibid p.3)

Hogan (2003) studied perceptions of local communities, of the District government and the MIMP management, also with particular focus on participation and benefit sharing in resource management.⁵⁶ She found that "the relationship between the park and the people is of a patron and the patronized rather than a partnership". While in the majority of villages, most people had little or no feelings of resistance to the park, direct resource users, particularly fishers and coral harvesters, had yet to be convinced of the benefits of the park's management methods and were thus resistant to restrictions.

As the majority of the paid members of the committees were male, women in some villages felt that men owned the institutional tool of the Village Liaison Committees and felt excluded. Women's participation was also weak in terms of attendance and feedback from the committee meetings.

⁵⁶ Hogan (2003), Report on a Consultancy, Preparation of a Strategy and Action Plan for Strengthening Relations between Mafia Island Marine Park and Local Communities, WWF/Mafia Island Marine Park, April 5th–17th 2003

A World Bank commissioned study in 24 coastal villages in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, including four in Mafia,⁵⁷ found that only 32 percent of the respondents felt that they had sufficient information about the activities of marine parks. In several villages, focus group participants thought that the marine park staff and environmental committees withhold some information from the rest of the village (e.g. how much money is collected in revenues or how financial resources are used). This study did not find proof that the MPAs studied have contributed to poverty reduction.

The evaluation team found during fieldwork in April 2006 that most of the critical points above are still being raised in Mafia today, particularly at village level and from tourism operators. The general impression is a continuing, and possibly deepening feeling of alienation between the MIMP management and the stakeholders, and the issues raised continue to be the same listed in the studies above.⁵⁸

Corrective measures taken by MIMP/WWF

Based on the findings of the studies presented above, in particular the MIMP self-evaluation and Hogan's work WWF and MIMP took several measures in the following years. Additional staff was employed and seminars and workshops were held to 'clarify village government roles'. Informal environmental education was strengthened with a programme of taking older children on glass-bottom boat trips and giving them seminars on the basics of coral reef ecology (2003/04).

In order to 'facilitate village natural resources planning', two District Land Officers were contracted to prepare a pilot land-use, natural resources and environment plan for Kiegeani village. A detailed activity plan and budget was prepared, District officers and a village committee were trained, and several planning activities conducted, to the point of producing a draft plan. The latter was severely delayed on the part of the District officers responsible. The latest development is that Kiegeani village is now being incorporated into Kilindoni township, so any land-use plans in process would be irrelevant. Not surprisingly, this experience has not encouraged MIMP or WWF to think that this type of activity is particularly constructive.

On the recommendation to 'Continue to support village governments in enforcing regulations', work was intensified by MIMP, mainly with MNRP funding, on establishing village enforcement units in each village, including training and provision of equipment.

The success of these measures remains to be seen. However, some of Hogan's recommendations were not addressed, in particular: "Act towards direct control of benefits by residents". This is understandable, as this recommendation challenges the present institutional set-up of park management of MIMP and the entrenched procedures of management of the now considerable proceeds from the tourism fees paid by the hotel sector.

Mafia Island Marine Park and Ecotourism

Objectives

The objectives for ecotourism development for MIMP for 2004-06 are:

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- ⁵⁷ World Bank (2003), 'Marine Protected Areas, Livelihoods, and Poverty Alleviation in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar: An Empirical Study of 24 Coastal Villages', September
 - ⁵⁸ See **Annex 1** for details.

- Development of eco-tourism guidelines based on national policies and international obligations;
- Training in development of eco-tourism information on nature, and
- Determining/assessing carrying capacity in eco tourism sites;
- Build capacity of villagers in eco-tourism development;
- Promote private sector involvement in activities related to natural resources management (including income generating activities);
- Improve collaboration with similar projects and NGOs

Effectiveness, Efficiency and Relevance

When looking at the wider MNRP objectives for the ecotourism sector (the first three objectives listed above) the team concludes that these all-important tasks *have not been started* in Mafia Island.

The assessment of the lodge and dive operators on the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the work done by MIMP for ecotourism promotion is *overwhelmingly negative*.⁵⁹

The tourism industry on Mafia thinks that MIMP should concentrate and do more work in those areas that are genuine government responsibilities:

- Development of appropriate policies, strategies and guidelines;
- Formulation of laws and regulations; and
- Monitoring and evaluation of implementation of its policies and enforcement of laws.

Box 11: Private opinions on MIMP

‘Practically I think only private projects- whether community-based or investors oriented--have a chance to protect the environment, and I think we could make something like that work if the donors agencies opened their eyes...’

Source: Interview with private investor,
April 2006

Sustainability

After all that has been said on the work done over the last years, it must be concluded that, unless MIMP works towards the objectives outlined above, and commits itself to proceed in close consultation and co-operation with the ecotourism operators, there is little justification for investing more donor money into this sub-component. Based on consultations with the lodges in Mafia, some money may eventually be needed for pulling down the campsite structures that have been built at the Kua ruins site.

Income and expenditure of the Marine Parks and Reserves Unit

A review of the income and expenditure of the Marine Parks and Reserves Unit for the period 2003/04 to 2005/06 (**Table 2**) reveals a rapid increase in income (+60 percent over three years) and a decline in the amount spent on community development from 5 percent in 2003 to 3 percent in 2005.⁶⁰

Table 2: Marine parks and reserves consolidated financial statements 2003-05

Expenditure category	2005	2004	2003
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⁵⁹ See **Annex 1** for details of lodge and dive operators’ opinions.

⁶⁰ Board of Trustees, Marine Parks & Reserves Tanzania, Annual Consolidated Financial Statements. Income is from park entrance fees and external support, including MNRP.

Administration & Management Expenses: Offices, boats, communications, insurances, BOT, PSC, Advisory Committee meetings, festivals & celebrations, PR, donations, transport & travel, International travel, staff accommodation, extra duty & lunch allowances, home leave & passage, accounting & reporting, funerals, etcetera.	400,485,283	294,295,954	243,552,752
Personnel Emoluments: Salaries & wages, staff pensions, staff uniforms, medical expenses, other allowances etcetera.	180,463,205	154,917,948	137,834,968
Feasibility studies & research: Studies for sustainable resource use; other studies; data collection expenses; studies for development projects	34,222,748	14,589,464	4,051,300
Survey Services Expenses: Moorings buoys, maps & charts production; fuel for surveys	916,000	5,935,748	1,050,000
Surveillance & enforcement costs: Patrols, field costs, honorary rangers, boat engines running, boat repair, prosecution, local workshops, seminars, study tour, security & enforcement honorarium etcetera.	69,881,538	63,758,117	34,230,016
Consultancies & other professional services	111,404,372	149,967,533	84,945,603
Public Awareness & Education: Promotion, publicity, local workshops, materials & publications, festivals, tourism PR, EE etc.	23,085,758	44,199,201	15,185,148
Regional & International Cooperation: Workshops, seminars, conferences, international fairs	2,548,300	12,347,468	3,350,231
Subventions to branches: MIMP, MBREMP, MIMR	204,279,927	120,791,612	0
Depreciation	0	107,526,780	94,716,987
Subtotal	3951,498	2978,149	2625,918
Community Development Expenses: Local community facilitations, Coordination & Supervision, Training for alternative income, Community Retention Fund, Training local tour guides, Workshops & seminars, Publication & printing, Donations	28,462,657	28,074,864	31,717,870
Grand total	1,045,751,793	996,406,693	650,636,878

Source: Board of Trustees, Marine Parks & Reserves Tanzania, Annual Consolidated Financial Statements


The following expenditure items are worth highlighting:

- Spending on surveillance and enforcement more than doubled during this period. Diving operators, who are in the park daily during the tourist seasons, claimed they *rarely or never* saw marine park patrols.⁶¹
- A number of consultancy contract were awarded to employees of MIMP and the Mafia District Government.

■ ⁶¹ Source: field interviews, April 2006. This finding also challenges the claim that dynamite fishing has been virtually eliminated as a result of surveillance by the MIMP management, which is one of MIMP's main claims for success.

Management of Natural Resources Programme, Tanzania TAN-0092

Final Evaluation



VOLUME 3: Annexes

Final Revised Report submitted to the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
and the
Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam

November 2006

**MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAMME
(MNRP-TAN 092)**

FINAL EVALUATION

Volume 3: ANNEXES

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Annex 1: Terms of Reference

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM

Terms of Reference (ToR)

Final Evaluation of the
Management of Natural Resources Programme (MNRP - TAN 092)

MNRT

(February 2006)

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Box I.1: Catchments protection and income generation (Kilimanjaro Region)3

In Lole Marera, people have divided up a half-mile buffer strip of land into individual plots of half or a quarter of an acre, and each person in the three sub-villages nearest to the forest (410 households) who requests a plot receives one. People then plant trees on their plots. When the trees are growing they are able to cut firewood from them, and they harvest grass for their zero-grazed cows from under the trees on a daily basis. *The trees, however, belong to the district*, so the people are not allowed to harvest them when they have grown to maturity, *although they will have the option of buying them from the district* if they need timber. The people are happy with this arrangement, since they are gaining direct individual benefits from the forest. The income generating activities are very limited--there is a 'one size fits all' attitude, and beekeeping, fish farming and nurseries are generally the only IGAs on the menu. There needs to be a more creative approach to this. In a village in Same district, villagers have started cultivating ginger on their own initiative and they are already transporting large amounts to Moshi and Dar es Salaam.3

Source: Field visit, 10 May 20064

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Background

The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) and the Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE) have been implementing the Management of Natural Resources Programme (MNRP) since 1994 to-date. The first Sector Agreement (TAN 092) was signed in December 1994. It was then extended by Addenda of June and December 1997; the second Agreement of December 1998 and the third Agreement of December 2002 covering a period of four years (2002- 2006).

MNRP is a commitment by MNRT to implement national natural resource-based policies so as to achieve high protection levels of natural resources and raise the levels of various stakeholders' participation in the management of natural resources. The overall **Goal** of the final phase of MNRP is that improved NRM should contribute on a sustainable basis to the reduction of income poverty and vulnerability to natural and man-made shocks among the poor. The **Objective** of the programme is "increased benefits to rural communities based on sustainable natural resources management in Tanzania." (MNRP Phase III Agreement 2002).

The first phase of the MNRP was implemented in 1994-1998. During this period the Programme efforts were directed towards supporting and supplementing MNRT's efforts to improve natural resource management and environmental planning, including institutional building and strengthening the capacity and competence within MNRT and implementing agencies. The main focus was coordinating planning and implementation of Norwegian-financed activities in wildlife, forest, beekeeping and fisheries. Phase I (1994 – 1998) covered Policy and Planning, Environment (then transferred to Vice President's Office), Forestry and Beekeeping (Catchment, Mangrove, HASHI, Ruvu Fuel Wood and ICRAF Agroforestry, Shinyanga), Wildlife (SRCP, NCA and CAWM-Mweka) and Fisheries (Mafia Island Marine Park). This phase was reviewed in 1997 (Sandlund, *et al* 1997).

The second phase (1998-2002) took on board beekeeping development and Biodiversity and Human Wildlife Interface (BHWI) under the Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute (TAWIRI), in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA); combined projects in thematic clusters, defined roles and

responsibilities within MNRT in the administration and coordination of the Programme and its projects, developed benefit sharing with local communities in order to translate the role of conservation in the development of communities' living adjacent to protected areas, and promoted participatory management approaches as tools to support natural resources management in Tanzania.

The Phase II outputs addressed: (1) improved capacity for managing and monitoring conservation (through CAMW-Mweka, MNRT (Policy and Planning) and TANAPA Planning Unit); (2) communities are increasingly involved and actively participate in natural resources management (HASHI, BD and RF); (3) improved natural resources management through applied research (TAWIRI and HASHI/ ICRAF); and (4) core protected areas and their buffer zones are adequately managed (SRCP, NCA management of natural resources, CF, MM and MIMP). Phase II was reviewed in 2001 (Havnevik, *et al* 2001).

The current phase III (2002 – 2006) is geared towards enabling natural resource management to contribute on a sustainable basis towards reduced income poverty and vulnerability amongst the poorest groups and improved quality of life and social well-being. During the current phase the Programme consists of a national level goal, a purpose and four Programme components. The programme is linked to strategies such as PRSP by contributing to the overall national level development goals. This has enabled MNRT to make a direct contribution towards alleviating poverty and improving livelihoods to the rural communities (households), as well as addressing the Millennium Development Goals.

MNRP's eleven projects are organised into four components, (i) Community-based natural resource management, (ii) Scaling-up of agro-forestry interventions, (iii) Promotion of income and employment generation, and (iv) Strategic programme implementation. Phase III was reviewed in 2002 (Bryceson, *et al* 2005).

The phase III of MNRP will end on 30th June 2006. Further Norwegian support for NRM is projected for 2007 onwards. Thus, MNRT and RNE agreed to conduct an evaluation, which refers back to the Programme document and agreement in order to provide a record of outputs, activities and inputs; discuss impact, relevance, and sustainability, as well as the fulfillment of obligations and regulations laid down in the Agreement. It is further expected that the evaluation report will be both backward and forward looking.

Objectives

The MNRP is a product of development cooperation between Tanzania and Norway and is based on Tanzania's development priorities. It was agreed during the annual meeting (12/04/2005) that an in-depth evaluation of its performance during the three phases of implementation should be conducted.

The overall objective of this assignment is to *evaluate the impact of the MNRP*. Specifically, the evaluation will seek to answer whether MNRP has been effective in achieving its objectives relating to target groups, particularly local communities; whether it has had any positive or negative unforeseen impacts; and whether it has

been efficient in achieving the intended outputs. Based on this evaluation, the mission team shall draw conclusions in terms of major lessons learnt and make broad recommendations for the future in terms of (1) activities to stop or to continue funding, and (2) future modalities of Norwegian support to NRM. The team will attempt to assess the positive and/or negative impact of governance on programme performance, both within the MNRP and more generally.

The specific objectives of the evaluation are to assess:

- i. Social and economic development changes that have occurred among rural communities as a result of MNRP;
- ii. The sustainability of activities and benefits after the withdrawal of project support;
- iii. The level, degree and appropriateness of participation by the intended beneficiaries and other stakeholders- namely government departments and agencies, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, international organisations (for example WWF and IUCN) and Norwegian organizations such as NINA and DN in the implementation of MNRP;
- iv. The level of local ownership of operations within programme areas;
- v. Any linkages formed as a result of MNRP activities which further advanced MNRP objectives or conversely, any missed opportunities which would have significantly enhanced achievement of objectives/targets.
- vi. Identify what developmental changes (economic, natural resources and tourism, environmental and social) at the target beneficiary level (rural communities) have occurred or are likely to occur.
- vii. The impact of institutional and organisational changes on programme management and impact, in particular the Local Government Reform Programme;
- viii. Strengths and weaknesses, significant lessons learned and key challenges that can be drawn from the experience of MNRP and its results;
- ix. Future Norwegian support for NRM in Tanzania, including the advisability of Norwegian involvement in the forestry sector SWAP; alternatives to traditional 'project' versus 'programme' approaches; and preconditions and guidelines for planning a new programme.

Scope of work

MNRP success is assessed in terms of the achievement of MNRP objectives: has the Programme achieved what was planned? Second, MNRP success may be considered in terms of positive but *unplanned* outcomes. The evaluation will look at both intended and unintended results attributed to MNRP, regardless of stated objectives.

The mission team shall assess issues related to the implementation of the NRMP. The evaluation should cover the activities carried out during the Programme period, from

July 1994 to the end of June 2006. The mission shall specifically focus on the following:

- i. The performance and efficiency of MNRP organisation:
 - Collaboration between MNRT and the Embassy of Norway;
 - Use and involvement of national field officers and external consultants, their contributions, benefits and weaknesses;
 - Cooperation with other key players; rural communities, district counterparts and collaborating institutions;
 - Use of programme funds and human resources
 - Internal; organization in MNRT; particularly relationship between the division of policy and planning and other divisions (in terms of planning, implementation, monitoring and overall coordination of natural resources management activities).
 - The extent to which experiences from MNRP implementation have provided input to the policy level and the other way around, how other national policies and programmes have affected implementation of MNRP.
- ii. The implementation of MNRP activities:
 - Stakeholder consultations at all levels: national (MNRT), districts and villages
 - Relevance and effect of awareness-raising activities conducted in rural communities
 - Extent of income generating opportunities
 - The extent to which targets have been achieved as regards awareness raising and participation
 - MNRP contribution to national implementation of the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity
- iii. MNRP impacts and sustainability:
 - Improved use of natural resources, the sustainability and the replicability of the established practices of natural resources management in MNRP areas of operations
 - Level of awareness and behavioral change among the rural communities about natural resources management
 - The extent to which the natural resources-related activities contribute to reduced income poverty and improved livelihoods.
- iv. The impact of formal and informal institutions that govern and regulate relations between the various stakeholders- central and local government and government agencies, donor agencies, private companies (foreign and local), communities, CBOs and NGOs- on the achievement of programme objectives, in particular (1) levels of income poverty among 'target' communities and households; (2) vulnerability among the poorest groups; (3) quality of life/social well-being;

- v. The extent to which an understanding of Tanzania's political, social and economic context has (1) informed the organisation and management of NRMP and (2) affected programme performance and impact.

Methodology

The team will work closely with MNRT and RNE and the Programme Coordination.

The mission team shall adopt a consultative and participative approach. Hence, besides a thorough review of documents and materials produced by MNRT and PROTEAM, the mission members are expected to hold in-depth consultations with key stakeholders and beneficiaries and undertake visits to selected projects to obtain information from beneficiaries and other key stakeholders.

Special reference should be made to national policies, strategies/priorities concerning poverty reduction, environmental and natural resources management in Tanzania.

Consultation should be made with relevant agencies at central, regional, district and local levels, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, selected projects and other relevant institutions, NGOs, donors and individuals at the team's discretion.

At the end of the fieldwork, the team should present its findings and preliminary conclusions in a debriefing meeting with participants from MNRT and the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam.

Duration and dates of assignment

- i. The Team Leader shall be allowed up to 10 days in advance to the field work to prepare the work, collect necessary and relevant information and to make arrangements for the missions field work.
- ii. The fieldwork in Tanzania shall be implemented during a period of two - three weeks in – April 2006.
- iii. The Team Leader shall be given another three man-weeks after the fieldwork for completing the final report.
- iv. The team leader shall submit a debriefing note to the Royal Norwegian Embassy and MNRT. Two weeks after the debriefing a draft report should be sent to RNE and MNRT for comments/corrections.

Work schedule

The Team Leader will collaborate with the Programme Coordinator and the Counsellor (RNE) to develop an indicative mission schedule prior to the mission, and

will be revised by the mission team with the support from the Programme coordination and counselor (RNE).

The tentative timeframe for the evaluation is:

- i. Briefing meetings with MNRT and RNE
- ii. Reviewing the relevant documents; Agreements, Programme/Project documents, reports, minutes of the meetings, midterm review reports. Some of these documents may be forwarded to the Team Leader (upon request) prior to the mission
- iii. Meeting and working with PROTEAM
- iv. Visiting and conducting interviews with key individuals, groups or organisations concerned
- v. Visiting selected projects (to be jointly selected by MNRT, RNE and Team Leader), local authorities (villages and districts) and NGOs
- vi. Preparation of draft evaluation report
- vii. Presenting the draft report to MNRT and RNE for comments
- viii. Finalising the report
- ix. Debriefing with MNRT and RNE and submitting the final report to MNRT and RNE

Team qualifications and composition

The mission team will be composed of the maximum of five team members of which two shall be Tanzanians. Members of the evaluation mission should not have been directly involved in the design and/or implementation of MNRP.

The team members should have a good understanding of socio-economic and political conditions and natural resource management in Tanzania. In addition, team members should have experience in the following fields:

- i Government structures at national and sub-national levels for natural resource management policy-making, implementation, monitoring and accounting; including parastatal organisations attached to relevant ministries;
- ii Natural resources programme and project management, including collaborative/participatory natural resources management approaches;
- iii Environmental and natural resource management in the marine, forestry and wildlife fields;
- iv Institutional capacity building;
- v Livelihoods and poverty reduction;
- vi Economic and financial programme/project analysis;
- vii Financial and value for money auditing;
- viii *The team leader* should have a broad understanding of governance policies and structures in Tanzania, in particular public access to information, accountability mechanisms, policy implementation and service delivery capacity; and
- ix Computer literacy, good reporting skills.

Annex 2: Response to the Terms of Reference

BUSINESS CARE SERVICES LTD

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAMME (MNRP – TAN 092)

RESPONSE TO TERMS OF REFERENCE

0.0 Overview

The Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE) and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) have asked Business Case Services (BCS) to respond to the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Final Evaluation of the Management of Natural Resources Programme (MNRP – TAN 092) financed by the Royal Norwegian Government (1994-2006) and implemented by the MNRT. Our response to this request is structured as follows.

- First, we propose a methodology, including a simple analytical framework to guide the evaluation, in particular the project-level fieldwork component;
- Second, we propose how to evaluate the issues covered in the objectives and scope of work;
- Third, we propose a brief description of how BSC propose to manage the evaluation and present the evaluation team;
- Lastly, we present a timeframe and a budget for the assignment.

1.0 Methodology

The proposed methodology is set out in section 4 of the TOR, pages 6-7. It is proposed that the evaluation team will: (1) work closely with MNRT, RNE and the Programme Coordination; (2) review documents produced by MNRT and PROTEAM; (3) hold in-depth consultations with key stakeholders and beneficiaries; (4) undertake visits to selected projects; (5) refer to national policies, strategies/priorities concerning poverty reduction, environmental and NR management; and (6) interview relevant agencies at national to local levels and the RNE, other relevant institutions, NGOs, donors and individuals.

BCS endorse this methodology, and suggests in addition (7) reviewing other relevant documents, including academic literature, non-MNRT programme and project reports, videos and news reports that may prove relevant to the objectives of the evaluation.

This section explores methodological issues and is structured as follows. First, we propose an analytical framework for evaluating the MNRP and its constituent projects. Our main concern is to find ways of evaluating programme impacts in the (likely) absence of reliable and relevant (including baseline) information. We then comment on the objectives and scope of work of the evaluation as contained in the TOR in light of the proposed analytical framework.

1.1 Analytical framework

The overall objective of this assignment is to evaluate *the impact of the MNRP*. The methodology required for impact evaluation must be able to distinguish the impacts of the MNRP from all other potential impacts on intended beneficiaries as

well as on the natural resource base. The following discussion relates to projects within the overall programme.

Figure 1 is a simple representation of project and other influences on intended project beneficiaries, including communities.




Figure 1: Project and other influences on project beneficiaries

A major challenge for evaluators is, of course, how to separate project impacts from other influences on people's welfare and livelihoods over time. Many factors may influence group, household and community welfare, for better or for worse. Such influences may be 'natural', 'man-made' or a combination of the two. Examples of negative natural influences ('shocks') on overall welfare are drought, storms and flooding. All of these have occurred in Tanzania during the lifetime of the MNRP. Examples of negative natural/human influences are soil erosion, crop pests and animal diseases. Human influences include the activities of government, the private sector and community members. Government activities include service provision, taxation, the allocation and protection of property rights, and the regulation and monitoring of natural resource use by communities and private commercial actors.

In addition to social, natural and 'socio-natural' influences on individual, family and community welfare, the inputs and activities of the project--particularly investments financed by the programme and external and local technical assistance--need to be assessed. But how does one separate the impacts (positive and negative) of the project from the impact of influences outside a project's 'control'? How do *interactions* between the project and the 'environment' in which the project is located affect 'project' outputs and outcomes? How do we measure all this in terms that will convince the impartial observer?

1.2 Understanding project contexts

For each site visited we propose to sketch the opportunities and constraints to project effectiveness resulting from the local environment. We take the local environment to include socio-cultural, economic, and political institutions and

relationships. In formal terms, a propitious or supportive local environment⁶² is one in which the forces that determine the life chances of individuals, families and communities blend in a virtuous circle of causes and effects. Here, positive project impacts would be the result of specific project initiatives interacting with positive influences in the local environment.

If the local environment is on balance unpropitious for individual, family and community⁶³ welfare improvements, then a project may expect at best to mitigate the negative effects of these contextual factors, at worst to be undermined by them, leading to insignificant or zero benefits for the intended project beneficiaries. The possible theoretical combinations of project and environmental factor impacts are represented in **Figure 2**.

Figure 2: Project and non-project effects on beneficiaries

	Environmental influences:		
Project influences:	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Positive	<i>Positive effects</i>	Indeterminate	Indeterminate
Neutral	Indeterminate	<i>No effects</i>	Indeterminate
Negative	Indeterminate	Indeterminate	<i>Negative effects</i>

When projects and environmental influences (socio-cultural, economic, political, ...) impact positively on project beneficiaries, evaluators may identify significant, positive improvements in beneficiaries' welfare indicators, whereas when both sets of factors are neutral there will be no discernable impact, and when both sets of factors are negative the welfare benefits will also be negative. All other combinations of project and non-project influences lead to *indeterminate* impacts from the beneficiaries' perspective.

It is unlikely that positive project performance will outweigh negative environmental effects, since environmental factors (**Figure 1**) are likely to weaken, neutralise or seriously undermine any positive effects that project interventions might hope to achieve.

Projects to be evaluated should have in place routine monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems to measure project impacts, starting from a baseline at the beginning of project implementation. *If there is no baseline, then it is extremely difficult to assess impact.* We know that many projects lack such baseline data.⁶⁴ For the purposes of this evaluation, we will ask: have the projects that we evaluate collected baseline data and monitored project activities on the basis of such data? The hypothesis is that the project has no relevant or reliable baseline data on which

▪ ⁶² The 'local' is the immediate environment in which cause-effect relationships are relatively direct. Wider levels of influence extend to the district, the region, the national capital, and even further, into the global economy.

▪ ⁶³ Families and communities are not homogenous, harmonious entities but sites of generational, gender-based and socio-economic conflicts. The rural livelihoods framework of analysis highlights inequalities in land and livestock ownership within 'communities' and the different strategies employed by the better-off to take advantage of opportunities for accumulation and by the worse-off to survive. Livelihoods analysis also stresses the nature of local governance on such opportunities, for example, the nature and extent of rent-seeking among officials from the village level up.

⁶⁴ It is rare for projects to collect the information on which to base a solid impact assessment. See MNRP Mid-term Review, January 2005, page 5.

to attempt to measure the impact of project activities. We propose ways of dealing with this in the following section.

1.3 Fieldwork

On the basis of discussions with our clients, BCS will send individual team members to a sample of MNRP project sites across the range of ‘sectors’: forestry, fisheries, and wildlife. It will not be possible to visit all completed or on-going projects in the time available for the evaluation. Our clients should indicate as soon as possible whether they consider it important to evaluate completed projects from the point of view of the long-term sustainability of project activities and benefits.

Phase III of the MNRP contains a list of process and output indicators for the four components of the Programme, including specific project-level indicators (components 1-3) and programme-level indicators (component 4) , as follows:⁶⁵

COMPONENT 1 COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CBNRM) INCLUDING CBFM ORGANISATIONS STRENGTHENED AND BENEFIT SHARING AGREEMENTS MADE OPERATIONAL (10 indicators)

COMPONENT 2 SCALING UP OF AGROFORESTRY INTERVENTIONS SUPPORTED (3 indicators)

COMPONENT 3 INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATING PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN THE NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROMOTED (10 indicators)

COMPONENT 4 STRATEGIC PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION TO RESPOND TO CHANGED POLICY AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT INITIATED (4 indicators)

A number of indicators refer to trends from 2002 to 2004 and 2006, which presupposes the availability of at least three sets of data for this period. In our site visits we will establish whether projects have or have not collected adequate monitoring information to quantify the process and output indicators mentioned above.⁶⁶ BCS will request PROTEAM and RNE to provide documentation that will allow the evaluation team to assess progress on some of the above, particularly COMPONENT 4.

Where indicators refer to the 2002-04 period, the evaluation team will refer to the 2005 mid-term review⁶⁷, and, where data are available, update findings to 2006.

Most of the indicators will be investigated at the project level.⁶⁸ There are alternative techniques that can be employed in the event of a lack of project

▪ ⁶⁵ Programme Agreement between the GON and GOT, December 2002, ANNEX 1., 1.7. BCS will check indicators for the first two phases of the Programme.

▪ ⁶⁶ Our introductory discussion highlights the importance of distinguishing between processes and outputs, and outputs and impact, and the analysis of indicators will follow this distinction. The emphasis will be on impact and outputs. Indicators will be classified by type (

▪ ⁶⁷ Bryceson et. al., 29th January 2005.

▪ ⁶⁸ Components 1-3 contain some indicators that refer to specific localities whereas others are general. BCS will clarify which indicators refer to which projects where this is not obvious from the context.

baseline and monitoring data related to the various indicators. The most obvious techniques are the following:

- Look out for concrete evidence of project impacts that are difficult to attribute to non-project factors. If these impacts are visual, they will be photographed and appended to the evaluation report. GSM trend data are available for at least one forestry project (HASHI).
- Interviews and group discussions with project beneficiaries and other key informants may yield insights into project participation and ownership, individual and collective benefits and their likely sustainability.

BCS will provide fieldworkers with a checklist of categories of beneficiaries and key informants to contact, and questions to ask. *Focus groups* will be a vital source of information, and fieldworkers will be required to conduct group discussions as a matter of priority. It will be important to identify discussants independently, and not from among those living nearest the project headquarters, so as not to privilege atypical respondents.

Apart from project beneficiaries, field workers will interview project managers and advisors, local government officials and councillors, private sector, CBO/NGO and faith-based actors as appropriate, using the checklist mentioned above. Issues that evaluators will address include: stakeholder participation in project management, project impact (both planned and unplanned), sustainability, reasons for successes and failures in project activities, and lessons learned for the future.

Given the short duration of the evaluation, it will not be feasible to undertake household-level investigation or other quantitative data collection, though evaluators should obtain the results of any surveys and other studies that have been undertaken in project areas that might be relevant to the objectives of the evaluation.

2.0 Objectives and scope of work of the evaluation

Above we reflected on the methodological problems inherent in addressing objective (i.) of the evaluation. Our comments on the specific objectives and the scope of work follow. **Figure 3** summarises the objectives and related SOW. The inception report (see below) will go into greater detail in specifying our interpretation of the scope of work in more detail.

Figure 3: Objectives and scope of work⁶⁹

Objective	Scope of work
(i) Socio-economic development changes among communities through NMRP	(v) Impact of formal and informal institutions on achievement of project objectives (ii) Extent of income generating opportunities (iii) Contribution to poverty reduction and improved livelihoods (iv) Vulnerability among poorest (iv) Quality of life/social well-being
(ii) Sustainability of activities and benefits	(iii) Improved use of natural resources (iii) Sustainability/replicability of NRM practices
(iii) Participation of beneficiaries in NMRP	(i) Rural communities (ii) Stakeholder participation at village level (ii) Awareness raising and participation

■ ⁶⁹ The Latin numerals in brackets refer to the TOR and SOW.

	(iii) Behavioural change on NRM
(iii) Participation of other stakeholders: GOT departments & agencies, RNE, Norwegian/international organisations; (vii) Impact of LGRP on programme management	(i) Performance and efficiency: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MNRT and RNE collaboration • MNRT internal efficiency⁷⁰ • National field officers and external consultants • District counterparts • Collaborating institutions (DN, NINA) (ii) National, district stakeholder consultation
(iv) Local ownership of operations in programme areas	(ii) Stakeholder participation at village level
(v) Linkages/missed opportunities to achieve targets	Programme contribution to meeting Convention on Biological Diversity targets.
(vi) Economic, social, NR/ environmental, tourism, developmental changes among rural communities	(iii) Improved use of natural resources (ii) Extent of income generating opportunities (iii) Contribution to poverty reduction and improved livelihoods
(viii) Strengths and weaknesses, lessons learned and challenges	(i) Use of programme funds (i) Use of human resources
(ix) Future Norwegian support: involvement in forestry SWAPs; GBS versus projects; preconditions and guidelines for new programme	(v) Understanding Tanzania's political, social and economic context has (1) informed NRMP organisation and management and (2) affected programme performance and impact

Source: adapted from final TOR, pages 4-6.

2.1 General comments

BCS find the TOR comprehensive and adequate for the purpose of evaluating the impact of the MNRP.

Above we distinguish between (1) the activities and procedures required for programme implementation and (2) the outputs and impacts of the programme resulting (in part) from these activities and procedures. It is possible to analyse MNRP in a linear manner from inputs and activities to outputs and impact (see **Figure 1**). It is also possible to start at the end, beginning with the impact and outputs and 'working backwards' to look for explanations for the observed impact and outputs in the MNRP's organisational and management set-up.

BCS proposes to 'start at the end', by investigating personal, household and community benefits derived from project activities ('impact'), and then look for explanations in project inputs, processes and outputs.⁷¹ The rationale for this approach is to save time and focus on programme and project impacts. It is possible, for example, to find high degrees of consultation, participation and awareness among community members in project areas that do not translate into behavioural changes or enhanced benefits. By examining benefits first, fieldworkers will have a better idea of what they are looking for in terms of explaining the patterns they find.

2.2 Specific comments

Objective (ii) is to assess the 'sustainability of activities and benefits after the withdrawal of project support.' (TOR, page 4). To the extent that information is available, the team will review experiences from completed projects and, if

⁷⁰ '... relationship between the division of policy and planning and other divisions (in terms of planning, implementation, monitoring and overall coordination of natural resources management activities).' Scope of Work (i).

⁷¹ This approach must incorporate the methodological complexities in determining causality discussed above.

possible, speculate on sustainability issues for projects that are still being implemented.

Objective (iii) refers to ‘the level, *degree and appropriateness of participation* by the intended beneficiaries and ... government departments and agencies, the RNE, international ... and Norwegian organisations ... in the implementation of MNRP.’⁷²

BCS believes that it is important to address the ‘who benefits?’ question by examining the entirety of stakeholders, as laid out in the evaluation’s objectives and scope of work. Adopting this perspective will allow the evaluation team to investigate the benefits that accrue from the MNRP to all stakeholders. Such an analysis may yield insights into the overall nature of the programme, and allow the team to address TOR (viii) and the related SOW. BCS will look into this issue in greater detail in the Inception Report.

We link objectives (iii) and (vii) in order to highlight interactions between officials in MNRT, PO-RALG and local government authorities (LGA) in project areas. The implementation of the LGRP has important implications for local level governance--for example, service delivery, tax collection, and participatory planning--that may impact on project activities and processes. To the extent possible, BSC will investigate the impact of LGRP reforms on relations between the programme and related projects on the one hand and PO-RALG and LGA on the other.

The above analysis will help the team to address TOR (ix), which examines the future structure of Norwegian support to the NRM sector. This component of the TOR will also include reflections on how successful projects can be scaled up in order to increase coverage and impact. As well as the scaling-up option, consultants will propose ways in which the sustainability of successful projects can be assured in the medium-term, including institutional responsibilities and accounting mechanisms. These issues will feature in the post-evaluation phase (August-October 2006), when further Norwegian support to NRM will be planned.

2.3 *The impact of institutions: governance*

The TOR invite the consultancy team ‘to assess the positive and/or negative impact of governance on programme performance, both within the MNRT and more generally.’ (TOR page 4). Here we sketch our understanding of governance issues and propose a methodology for addressing them.

The World Bank Institute identifies six dimensions of governance, namely:

- Voice and accountability
- Rule of law
- Regulatory quality
- Political stability
- Government effectiveness
- Anti-corruption

All six dimensions of governance appear relevant for evaluating the MNRP.

Figure 4 presents one possible classification of institutional issues and levels at which they can be addressed in the main NRM sectors supported by the MNRP.

▪ ⁷² TOR pages 4-5. Emphasis added.

Figure 4: Analytical framework for evaluating institutions in the NRMP

	Fisheries RM	Forestry RM	Wildlife RM
Voice & accountability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community participation Redress of grievance 	National District Project	National District Project	National District Project
Rule of law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Knowledge and protection of property rights 	National District Project	National District Project	National District Project
Regulatory quality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fair application & enforcement Transaction & compliance costs 	National District Project	National District Project	National District Project
Political stability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human rights Peace & security 	National District Project	National District Project	National District Project
Govt effectiveness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service delivery: availability, equity, quality, cost 	National District Project	National District Project	National District Project
Anti- corruption <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Separation of powers Access to information 	National District Project	National District Project	National District Project

During the inception phase, it will be necessary to identify the ‘boxes’ that will give the evaluation its empirical focus with regard to institutional and governance issues. BCS will propose some guidelines on how to do this in the Inception Report.

3.0 Evaluation strategy and team

3.1 Strategy

BCS has identified two groups of consultants, one that will evaluate projects under the MNRT umbrella, including site visits, and one that will focus on coordination, institutional analysis and the use of programme funds.

The first group (5 consultants) will spend up to three weeks in background reading and project site visits, where they will conduct interviews and focus groups and observe the physical results of project activities.

The second group consists of (1) the team leader, (2) a number of very short-term consultants (2-3 days), (3) one consultant who will examine institutional issues for 2-3 weeks, and (4) an accountant or auditor.

The team leader will coordinate the evaluation, review programme and other relevant documents and general literature, and compile the inception report and draft and final evaluation reports.

The short-term consultants will write brief issues papers on their understanding of the key governance challenges in forestry, water and wildlife sectors. They will be recruited on the basis of their experience in these sectors, but will not have worked in MNRP projects. The issues papers will serve to triangulate the findings of the

field visits as regards institutional issues, and will also provide useful background for thinking about future Norwegian support, as required in the TOR.

BCS will: (1) provide office space with a guaranteed power supply for the team leader and consultants while they are in Dar es Salaam; (2) enter into contractual agreements with consultants; and (3) manage the evaluation's finances and payments under the supervision of the lead consultant.

3.2 Evaluation team

The evaluation team strategy is designed to identify both sector specialists and 'cross-cutting issues' analysts. The main cross-cutting issues are governance and gender. The division of labour is not strict in the sense that all consultants making field visits will be required to address both 'sector specific' and 'cross-cutting' issues.

CVs for the proposed evaluation team are in **Annex 2**.

Dr Brian Cooksey will lead the evaluation team. He holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Birmingham (U.K.) (1978) and has been working in Tanzania since 1979. He has also worked in Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Nigeria, Madagascar, Rwanda and Mauritius. Brian Cooksey has overall responsibility for liaising with PROTEAM and the RNE, identifying the consultancy team (in collaboration with PROTEAM), interpreting the TOR, overseeing fieldwork, drafting reports, and undertaking any other tasks related to the management of the evaluation.

Mr Leonce Anthony is a Certified Public Accountant with experience in both government (parastatal) and private sector accounting. He will look at the ways in which the \$50 million disbursed by the NRMP has been allocated and spent. In particular, he will review the accounting procedures between the funding agency (GON) and the recipient (GOT), the use to which program funds have been put (investment and recurrent expenditures), and (if possible) whether the program represents value for money.

Professor George Kajembe is Head of the Department of Forest Mensuration and Management in the Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation, Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro. He holds degrees in forestry and NRM from universities in Tanzania, the Netherlands and Norway. He will visit and report on community forestry projects under the MNRT and contribute to the 'local governance' component of the assignment.

Mr Bakati Mbano holds degrees in zoology and wildlife management. Mr Mbano has many years of experience in wildlife research, management and conservation. He is a former Principal of Mweka College, Moshi, and Director of Wildlife in the MNRT. He will visit and report on wildlife and hunting tourism projects under the MNRT and also contribute to the 'local governance' component of the assignment.

Dr Jim Egoe is assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Colorado at Denver, USA. He has published extensively on conservation conflicts in Simanjiro, where he conducted PhD research between 1991 and 1997. He is currently a visiting lecturer at Mweka College of African Wildlife Management. Dr Egoe will contribute a reflection on the impact of external support to Mweka

College and provide inputs into the situation analysis of governance issues relating to community-wildlife issues.

Ms Isabell von Oertzen holds an MSc in agricultural science and has worked on a diverse range of projects in Africa (Ghana and Tanzania), Asia and Australasia. For the last five years Ms von Oertzen has worked as Project Coordinator on the SIMMORS project in Urambo and Kigoma Districts. Ms von Oertzen will visit and report on one or more CBNRM projects.

Ms Kate Forrester holds a Masters degree in environmental forestry, has undertaken research in Turkey and Tanzania, and has worked as a consultant, project advisor and part-time journalist for the last decade, based in Iringa. Her work covers *inter alia* community, cultural, gender and age-related development issues. Kate Forrester will visit one or more CBNRM to examine project impact and sustainability and the influence of community-level and local government factors on project performance.

Dr George Jambiya has a PhD from the University of York, Canada, and has worked at the Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), where he is currently responsible for policy analysis. He will be responsible for much of the institutional analysis for the assignment, looking critically at national-local administrative processes, resource flows and accountability mechanisms. In addition, he will comment on aid

Dr Sibylle Riedmiller has lived in Tanga since 1982 and is founder of the award-winning Chumbe Island Marine Park on Zanzibar. An educationalist by background, Sibylle Riedmiller has broad experience in sustainable development in small-islands, and eco- and marine-tourism. She will be responsible for visiting and reporting on the MMP and mangrove projects.

Short-term consultants

BCS will hire a number of short-term consultants (3-5 days) to provide focused inputs on key issues, including the institutions governing the various sectors in which the MNRP operates. The objective of these inputs is to provide useful general background for the specific project investigations and to inform BSC's reflections on the way forward in Norwegian support for NRM. BSC have identified short-term consultants with project-level experience within the relevant sectors.

Timeframe

Figure 5 is a proposed timeframe for the evaluation.

Figure 5: NRMP evaluation timeframe

	MARCH					APRIL				MAY					JUNE			
Week	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
B Cooksey						IR					DN			DR				FR
K Anthony																		
G Kajembe																		
B Mbano																		
J Igoo																		

BCS will liaise closely with PROTEAM for all matters concerning transport to project sites.

BCS understands that PROTEAM will make available all relevant project reports and evaluations in advance of the fieldtrips.

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Annex 4: Main MNRP indicators

MNRP projects generated the following indicators in line with the programme's goal and objective.⁷⁴

Component 1: Participatory natural resource management organisations strengthened &

Indicator	Achievement
By June 2004, at least 50% of 185 villages have access to available resources such as timber, fuelwood, fodder etc. as compared to 2002 levels in accordance with agreements	A total of 347 villages are involved in natural resources management activities equivalent to 188%
By June 2004, 100 villages adjacent to 23 pilot CFRs have taken over management responsibilities, thus reducing management costs (patrolling, fire fighting, boundary management) as compared to levels of June 2002	245 Village Natural Resources Committees are in place, taking over management responsibilities. Each village has its own village management area and villagers participate in fire protection strategies and against illegal activities. Fines against wrongdoers were instituted and villagers participated in fire fighting and boundaries maintenance.
By June 2004, at least 93 VNRCs are mobilising fellow villagers in planning and implementation of activities such as patrols, fire fighting etc in the CFRs	A total of 372 patrols were conducted. More than 13 fire incidences combated.
By Dec. 2004, illegal incidences in CFRs reduced by at least 50% as compared to 2002 levels	Number of villages participating in Joint Forest Management has increased to 245 as compared to 185 in 2002. Confiscated 5,038 pieces of timber, 7.4 tones of sandal wood, 1,147 cows, 46 saws and 11 bicycles justifies the impact of joint patrols.
By June 2004, local communities in 100 villages have access to mangrove products and cash accrued from mangrove sales (at least 50% of the royalties) is ploughed back to support villages	Villages in Mangrove management access resource; 84 out of 100 Mgt. Agreements. This is more than 84%. Also 29 by-laws have been approved. The communities charge TShs 200 per 20 poles
By June 2004, at least 20% of 100 villages in and adjacent to mangrove forests are taking part in income generating activities	The communities are taking part in eco-tourism development (and earned 15.1 million), fish farming (282 households), beekeeping activities (number ?), seaweed farming, solar salt farming, shrimp farming
By December 2003, communities in 14 villages of Bunda and Serengeti Districts are utilising animal quotas and by June 2004, are planning and carrying out conservation activities in Bunda and Serengeti Districts	347 animals hunted and shillings 20.7 million accrued to 14 villages the money finances community development activities in respective villages
By June 2004, communities in 11 villages in Mafia Marine Park increase financial gains at household levels as compared to current levels	Eco-tourism activities introduced at Kua Ruins, seaweed farming, beekeeping activities and doormats making. Improved fishing techniques are also promoted in all eleven villages. (Figures?)
By June 2004, a sum total of TAS 3 million accrues to villagers from raising tree seedlings and these are planted in areas contiguous to the Northern Highland Forest Reserve of Ngorongoro	A nursery of 14,000 seedlings of various trees has been established. However selling is a problem and most of the seedlings are used by communities themselves.
By June 2004, at least 30% of the 9 target villages in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area are benefiting from use and sale of milk and bricks.	In collaboration with Heifer Project the NCA – MNR facilitated procurement of 10 heifers and distributed to 10 villagers

■ ⁷⁴ 'Agreement between Norway and Tanzania for NMRP Phase III 2002-2006, Agreed Project Summary', Annex 1: Main indicators. We comment on the utility of these indicators in the main report.

benefit-sharing agreements made operational

Component 2: Scaling up of agroforestry interventions supported

Indicator	Achievement
By 2004, at least 50% of the 833,500 HH in the Lake Region and Ruvu Area reached and sensitised on agroforestry interventions	670 hh from 5 villages in RUVU have been reached and sensitized on agroforestry interventions.
By 2004, at least 10% of HH reached in the Lake Victoria region and Ruvu are practising at least one agroforestry technology type (intervention)	390 hh equivalent to 58.2% are practicing two agroforestry interventions rational woodlots and boundary tree planting, as a way to sustaining forest resources and household livelihood.
Agroforestry contributing to at least 20% of Household income through sales of agroforestry products	By 2004, Agroforestry technology contribution to hh income has been revealed to 131.26% While hh per capita income before the project intervention was TAS 320,000/- per annum, the Ruvu fuelwood project has increased it to 740,000/-

Component 3: Income and employment generating private sector development efforts promoted in natural resource management

Indicator	Achievement
At least 600 beekeepers in the project area increase honey quality and quantity currently at 6 buckets (1 bucket = 20 litres) per beekeeper to 12 by 2004	By June 2004, 1400 beekeepers were trained, practicing appropriate beekeeping technology and increased production from 15 and 1Kg to 24 and 2Kg of honey and beeswax respectively.
By 2006, private sector involvement in beekeeping and other income generating activities related to natural resources increased by X%	Number of Private sector involved in the beekeeping sector has increased. These private sectors involved in conservation and management of beekeeping resources are currently setting aside bee reserves, buying and selling bee products (Phina Investments, Gold Apis.), supporting communities (SUA TU Linkage project (Tabora), HEIFER International, World Vision, Africare and CARE, Tanzania)
By, 2004, bee products quality control mechanism in operation	Drafts of honey and beeswax quality assurance in place.
By 2004, revenue from eco-tourism in Mafia Island Marine Park is increased from the current TAS 10 million to TAS 30 million and proportionally shared by villages as per formula laid down in the legislation	?
By 2006, at least 60 natural resource officers in District Councils (with WMAs) acquire skills in wildlife entrepreneurship	CAWM-Mweka trained 27 wildlife resource managers dealing with Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in natural resources entrepreneurship skills
By 2004, beekeepers in the project area increase cash income by 50% from sale of honey and beeswax as compared to the income of the year 2002	Cash income per beekeeper from sales of honey (stinging and stingless honeybees) and beeswax increased from Tshs 180,000 in June 2002 to 266,300 by June 2004
By 2006, CAWM conduct at least 4 client based courses	Two courses conducted
By 2004, income from eco-tourism in Catchment Forest areas increased by 20% from TAS 12 million in 2002 to X% revenue ploughed back to the villages	Eight camping sights have been established. Revenue have increased from 12 m. to 15.5 million. Local people also collected Tsh 950,000 through cultural and ecotourism. There were no formal ploughing back of 25% of revenue
By 2006, revenue generation of protected areas in the Serengeti region increased by 25% compared to levels in the year 2002 following increased accessibility of local communities to wildlife resources after reduction of	Apart from community hunting, the Ministry is developing wildlife Management Areas, that will access and benefit from the resources, also Public-Private Partnership is encouraged (e.g. Ikoma bush Camp). The

human/wildlife conflicts	figures are shown in SRCP reports
By 2006, the number of people skilled in the wildlife based private sector tourism industry increased by 10% from the current levels of unskilled personnel in the Northern Tourist Circuit	CAWM-Mweka has conducted two major training in natural resources entrepreneurship skills and eco-tourism development. The courses came from the private sector, communities and MNRP field managers. Also it provides certificate courses in the same field. Details in the CAWM report.

Component 4: Strategic programme implementation initiated to respond to changed policy and legal environment

Indicator	Achievement
At least 50% of unallocated funds disbursed for project-related activities to CBOs, NGOs, Civil Society organisations based on criteria set and approval of projects	MNRT proposed to add a component on the promotion of appropriate technology on wood fuel production and use was endorsed by the annual meeting held in 11.04.2003 The Component covers existing new districts in Iringa (Mufindi and Njombe) and Dodoma (Kondoa and Dodoma rural) regions. The implementing agencies are MNRT, MEM ⁷⁵ , PO-RALG ⁷⁶ , TaTEDO ⁷⁷ and EDEN ⁷⁸ . This institutional collaboration is intended to provide competence and sharing of experiences.
Secretariat for national level agroforestry strategy coordination and implementation made operational by January 2003	National Agroforestry Steering Committee (NASCO) is operational. It draws members from MNRT, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS) and their associated institutions, and the Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA). The Director of Forestry and Beekeeping is Chairs NASCO and TAFORI act as a secretariat. The financing of NASCO is done through Component IV of MNRP.
Natural Resources Forum on public private partnership formed and operational by June 2003	Not in place
Committee for national level agroforestry strategy coordination and implementation made operational by January 2003	NASCO in place
Flexible response to new initiatives/proposals undertaken at annual meetings as shown by minutes starting March 2003	MNRT has been putting into actions (in Component IV) all initiatives undertaken in annual meetings of April 2003 and March 2004 (see also work plans for 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05 respectively).

⁷⁵ Ministry of Energy and Minerals

⁷⁶ President's Office – Regional Administration and local Government

⁷⁷ Tanzania Traditional Energy Development and Environmental Organization

⁷⁸ Essential Development for Enhancing the Nation EDEN

Annex 5: MNRP ACCOUNTING ISSUES

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Management of Natural Resources Programme (MNRP) – TAN 092
On 13th June, 1988, the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania entered into an agreement (Main Agreement) regarding Co-operation of Economic and Social Development of the latter. Subsequently on 2nd December, 1994, the two Governments entered into Specific Contract Agreement on the provision of Financial Assistance to the Management of Natural Resources in Tanzania. The implementation of the Programme has been going on in 3 phases, namely, Phase I from 1994 to 1997 (comprising 11 projects), Phase II from 1998 to 2002 (comprising 12 projects) and Phase III from 2002 to 2006 (comprising projects). The Specific Contract Agreements between the two Governments for the financing and implementation of MNRP (Article VII) provide for a thorough review of the Programme to be conducted before the end of each respective phase in order to assess the outcome of the Programme which shall form the basis for further discussions and the final decision as to whether the Programme shall be continued in a new phase. This review is being conducted in compliance with that requirement.

1.2 Assignment Requirements

The TOR for the Final Evaluation of the Programme include a component on “Accounting Issues”, the objective of which is to assess the overall adequacy or otherwise of the Programme’s accounting reports in portraying (achievement of) the intended impacts. Specifically, attention was to be paid to the following matters:

- a) What accounting procedures were agreed between Norway and Tanzania at the outset? (document this with examples)
- b) Did Norway (NORAD until recently) at any time during the first decade of the program request more detailed or different accounting procedures?
- c) What were the Norwegian concerns when these issues were first raised?
- d) At what point did the Ministry begin providing more detailed breakdowns of expenditures in response to Norway’s request?
- e) How do the latest accounts differ from earlier ones? (Document this)
- f) Add a professional opinion on whether, over time, the accounts were capable of providing any indication of value for money.

In discussions between the consultant and RNE officials it was again clarified that this part of the evaluation was more concerned with the big picture of Programme impacts than detailed accounting results, the reports for which are now (particularly since 2004) satisfactorily informative and accurate. It was also clarified that the evaluation was to give sufficient

weight to what can or should be done to make accounting reports more informative on Programme impacts in the future.

1.3 Work Done and Methodology

This part of the assignment was carried out between 31st May and 15th June 2006. It was limited to desk review of relevant literature and no field visits were made. The actual work involved holding some discussions with RNE officials concerned with the Programme, going through Programme document file boxes that were made available by the Embassy to identify those that had a bearing on accounting and financial reporting issues, reviewing the identified documents, making assessment of the reports on the basis of the assignment requirements listed above, and compiling a report thereon.

The Programme box files examined contained documents relating to 1994 to date. Specific documents reviewed included the following:

- Specific Contract Agreements between NORAD and MNRT
- Agreed Minutes of Annual Meetings of NORAD/MNRT, the development partners of MNRP
- Annual Financial Reports
- Audit Reports
- Audit Management Reports
- Comments and Action Reports on Audit Queries
- Annual Implementation Reports
- Field Visit Reports
- Annual Plans and Budgets
- Technical Review Reports
- Programme Evaluation Reports

2.0 FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1 Status of Programme Reports

a) Observation

A lot of information is available on the Programme projects from its commencement to date, kept in file boxes annually/by project. However, the documents are not arranged in subject order and, therefore, it takes considerable time to locate all the documents relating to one to one aspect of the Programme/project, e.g. Annual Financial Reports.

b) Recommendation

The services of a documentation/filing expert could be used to facilitate rearrangement of the Programme/project files in a more user-friendly way.

2.2 Accounting Procedures Agreed Between NORAD and MNRT

(a) Provision Relating to Financial and Accounting Matters

- (i) The MNRP Agreement of December 1994 between the Governments of Norway and Tanzania is summarised in **Appendix 5.1**.

The Agreement describes the financial reporting responsibilities of the GOT in some detail, but falls short of requiring the MNRT to provide detailed reports of expenditure by project and category, let alone any indication of value for money. No further information on detailed accounting procedure or reporting requirements at this early stage of the Programme was available. However, from correspondence on successive Auditor General's Reports and queries, Agreed Minutes of Annual Meetings, PWC (Consultant)'s Report, Programme/Project Evaluation Reports etc., it appears that the accounting and reporting procedures of the Programme evolved gradually as the need for more information increased in the light of actual implementation. In January 2000 MNRT issued, for the first time, the "Operational Manual for Norway/Tanzania Sector Agreement Programme on MNRP" which provides some details on separation of roles/duties and authority of key Programme executants as well as the formats and timing of reports to be issued by MNRT.

ii. Other Sources of Information

Accounting procedures requirements for the Programme were also ascertained from the following sources: -

- Agreed Minutes of Annual Meetings between NORAD and MNRT on MNRP
- Auditor General's Audit Report on the programme's Annual financial statements, particularly Management Audit Reports and follow-up correspondence between the parties concerned.
- Specific request letters from NORAD to MNRT.
- Programme Operational Manual issued in 2000.

iii. Auditor General's Reports

During the initial years of the Programme compliance with some of the relevant clauses of the specific Sector Agreement between NORAD and MNRT (see **Appendix 5.1**), as well as the standard of book-keeping, were low. For example, the Management Audit letter of the Auditor General on the Programme's Financial Statements for the Fiscal Years 1994/1995 and 1995/1996 raised queries with regard to the following areas:

- Non – compliance with the Programme Agreement Document (failure to submit Programme Accounts within the time stipulated in the Agreement.
- Non-preparation of Bank Reconciliation Statements;
- Discrepancies between store ledger balances and physical balances;
- Inaccurate recording of transactions; and

- Some payments for which none supporting documents ere made available.

It should be pointed out that in auditing the Programme's accounts, the Auditor General is guided by generally accepted accounting practices, Government of Tanzania accounting policies and practices as well as the provisions of the Sector Agreement between NORAD and MNRT. *Close follow-up by NORAD on these queries resulted in MNRT taking corrective action to the satisfaction of the Auditor General.* Similarly, the Auditor General raised queries on other matters in subsequent Annual Financial Statements which again were followed up by all parties concerned and in this way the standard of accounting for and reporting on the Programme activities evolved and improved to the satisfaction of NORAD . For example, the NORAD delegation expressed appreciation for improved report when adopting the MNRP 2000/2001 Progress report at the 4th Annual Meeting of Programme development partners of Phase II.

2.3 Requests by NORAD for More Detailed Information/Different Accounting Procedures

These requests were made mainly during the Annual Meetings between MNRPs development partners (recorded in the agreed minutes).

2.4 Norwegian concerns over Accounting Procedures/Reports

The Norwegian concerns on the accounting procedures were raised at different points in time over the 10 years Programme period included among others: -

- Non-compliance of accounting principals, procedures and controls to approved best practice government accounting standards and the Public Finance and Procurement Act of 2001 that led to: -
 - some of the expenditures were not approved and/or supported by appropriate supporting documents as evidence of a financial transaction;
 - transfer of allocated budgets of one cost item to another without prior approval from Norway as stipulated in the contract;
 - payment in advance for services that were eventually not supplied to the projects, including construction of a conference hall at RUVU Farmers Centre at a contract sum of TShs 66 million which was paid to M/S Tanzania Building Agency; Mapping activity that was contracted to the Institute of Resources Assessment of the University of Dar es Salaam for TShs 100 million.
- Delay by the MTNRE of submitting financial reports and audited accounts to Norway, as per terms and conditions of the contract.

- The commitment of Development Partners as detailed in the agreement between Norway and MTNRE was not reflected in the financial statements at Programme level.
- Norway could not establish the impact to the ministry, local government and participating communities of various project expenditures in tune with MKUKUTA, vision 2025 and the Millennium Development Goals. Norway wanted to know whether the interventions (i.e. Programme activities) lead to (a) efficient and cost effective service delivery by the Ministry and districts; (b) social economic benefits to local communities resulting in poverty reduction.

In view of the fact that there was no baseline surveys when the projects were started and the management information system was not designed to capture both the accounting and impact aspects of the Programme, it is very difficult to establish the same from the financial statements of the past ten years.

2.5 Provision of More Detailed Expenditures by the MNRT

The Ministry responded to successive requests for more information by either the RNE or The Auditor General as the requests were made. However, with the adoption of the Programme Operational Manual in 2000, subsequent reports were more informative notably the 2002/2003 financial statements. The financial Statement for the year ended June 2004 was particularly comprehensive as it included all previous requests for more information or changes in accounting treatment/procedures.

2.6 Difference Between the Latest (Financial Year 2004/2005) and Previous Programme Financial Statements.

The latest Programme accounts differ from those of earlier period in the following ways: -

- a) They are more timely and therefore in compliance with the relevant clause of the Agreement;
- b) They are more accurate and, therefore, more acceptable to the Auditor General;
- c) They are more informative and therefore more acceptable to Norway.

2.7 Ability of the Accounts to Provide an Indication of “Value for Money”

For non-commercial or social activities “value for money” is usually measured in terms of achievement of the desired impacts which often go beyond the normal input – output relationship. Since impacts are very often the result of interaction of multi-variables (see **Annex 3.2**) accurate measurement requires two important pre-requisites, namely: -

- The Management Information System (MIS) must be designed to provide the required the required impact data at the project outset; and
- Baseline information should be available at the beginning of the period for which impact is being measures.

Our observations and recommendations in this respect are as follows: -

(a) Observations

The records of the Programme that we reviewed indicate that:

- i. Its information system was designed more towards outputs than impacts
- ii. The concern and demand by NORAD for disclosure of impacts came late in Phase III with the reorientation of Programme activities towards Poverty Alleviation and sustainable development in line with the Government of Tanzania's current policy emphasis (see note at the end below). These concerns were mainly raised during Annual Meetings and during project planning.
- iii. In many cases, baseline studies on Programme projects were done much later after project start-up;
- iv. Annual Reports are now giving some information on impacts for some Programme projects; and
- v. Taken together, all the current quantitative information available on Programme projects could be used to give indication of impacts if the Programme MIS is suitably tailored.

b) Recommendations

In view of the above observations we recommend as follows:

- i. Reporting on Programme impacts should be made a clause in the Specific Contract Agreements;
- ii. Experts should be commissioned to redesign the Programme MIS to target impact reporting; and
- iii. If future Programme phases will continue to target poverty alleviation and sustainable development as the current phase does, then Participatory Beneficiary Assessments should be included as a necessary part of Programme evaluation, since targeted beneficiaries are a better indication of desired/planned impacts.

Appendix to Annex 5:
Utilization of Project Funds by Main Activities and Expense Type

Table 5.1: Utilization of MNRP funds by project main activities, 2004-05

Project Name	Main Activities	Amount
Biodiversity and Human – Wildlife Interface Project	Backlog activities	38,219,134.00
	Carry out collaborative research investigation and animal diversity patterns	43,350,000.00
	Disseminate research findings to stakeholders	81,512,136.00
	Build research capacity through collaboration with internal and external institutions	127,340,174.00
	Facilitate planning, monitoring and coordination of activities	66,650,000.00
	Total	357,071,444.00
Mafia Island Marine Park Development and Conservation Project	Backlog activities	40,325,446.00
	Sensitize local community to comply with park regulations	1,873,000.00
	Law involvement facilitation	7,850,000.00
	Support community in planting mangroves and trees in beach on eroded areas	250,000.00
	Building capacity on ecotourism	1,034,000.00
	Exchange visits to Aman Nature Reserve (Tanga) and Mkomazi Game Reserve	4,660,000.00
	Provision of working gears to village enforcement units	6,191,800.00
	Study on fisheries revenue collection system in collaboration with District Authority	6,796,750.00
	Conduct 2 seminars on environment committees adjacent to park area	575,000.00
	Facilitate training of 10 women groups in entrepreneurship skills	1,814,000.00
	Facilitate planning, monitoring and coordination of activities	12,021,534.00
	Total	83,391,530.00
Natural Forestry Resources Management and Agro forestry Project	Backlog Activities	50,556,028.00
	Institutionalize participatory Natural Resources Management Approaches in District Councils and Local Communities	32,137,000.00
	Carry out participatory Technology Development Evaluation and Assessment	82,484,000.00
	Facilitate capacity building of NAFRAC	171,870,691.00
	Eco-museum Cultural Heritage and Capacity Building	66,791,172.00
	Regional Forest Office (RFO) – Shinyanga	22,000,000.00
	RFO – Mwanza	10,000,000.00
	RFO – Tabora	52,200,000.00
	RFO – Mara	3,200,000.00
	RFO – Kagera	8,000,000.00
	RFO – Biharamulo	3,000,000.00

	IUCN	33,594,280.00
	Green Belt Movement	1,015,968.00
	Jeunesse Canada Monde	5,464,931.00
	PFM (Director of Forestry & Beekeeping)	5,444,000.00
	Others	245,366.00
	Total	584,392,436.00
Catchments Forestry Project	Backlog Activities	122,379,304.00
	Involve local communities in management of catchment forestry	143,376,035.00
	Build capacity at local and district levels	222,173,333.00
	Promote ecotourism development	10,774,567.00
	Capacity building for resource managers and entrepreneurs	22,422,238.00
	Improve processing and promoting of non-wood forest products	7,719,500.00
	Promote appropriate technology on use of fuel wood	10,323,193.00
	Total	539,168,170.00
Ruvu Fuel Wood Project	Backlog activities	22,160,360.00
	Capacity building of local communities and staff in agroforestry strengthened	32,830,000.00
	Participatory (AF Technology) research and development strengthened	30,365,000.00
	Replication of best AF practices to selected areas carried out	9,308,400.00
	Socio-economic studies to capture policy implications carried out	3,087,500.00
	Appropriate technology on wood fuel production and use	9,502,500.00
	Administration and office upkeep	34,418,944.00
	Total	141,672,704.00
Capacity Building and Infrastructure Development – Mweka	Conduct short course training for 21 Authorized Associations members responsible for WMA – Mweka	35,714,366.00
	Other expenditures – architectural consultancy	2,511,835.00
	Total	38,226,201.00
Coordination and Capacity	Backlog activities – 2003/2004	726,755,605.00

Building		
	Support development of ecotourism guidelines based on national policies and international best practice	29,610,772.00
	Support measures for HIV/AIDS prevention	11,230,000.00
	Support development of guidelines for benefit and cost sharing	16,770,800.00
	Support national level agro-forestry initiatives through the National Agro Forestry Steering Comm	60,000,000.00
	Support capacity building at local government-level in collaboration with PORALG	56,375,000.00
	Develop mechanisms for enhancing institutional collaboration and sustainability for Natural Resources	126,000,000.00
	Facilitate MNRT institutions in developing effective management information system	87,159,952.00
	Promote cultural heritage and eco-museum activities	24,217,000.00
	Facilitate information sharing and lessons learned from best practices	11,350,000.00
	Implement human resources development capacity programme within MNRT	30,543,503.00
	Develop guidelines and facilitate implementation of monitoring and evaluation program	173,976,309.00
	Total	1,353,988,941.00
Mangrove Management Project	Involvement of local communities in mangrove management	122,694,760.00
	Building capacity at local and district levels	63,090,118.00
	Income and employment generation	47,876,200.00
	Facilitate monitoring and coordination of activities	15,937,497.00
	Promote appropriate technology on wood fuel production	30,888,077.00
	Total	280,486,652.00
Beekeeping Development Project	Backlog activities	580,406.00
	Workshop of FBD on the strategic planning	16,720,000.00
	Capacity building of Beekeepers Association leaders on marketing strategies	9,419,594.00
	Facilitate socio-economic survey in 15 villages	5,350,000.00
	Facilitate training in improved design of hive types of sting less honey bees in 15 villages	5,475,000.00
	Carryout farm training and follow up of 1095 beekeepers to improve quality and quantity of bee products	6,235,000.00
	Facilitate establishment of 10 collection and selling centres in 10 BDP villages	8,625,000.00
	Establish monitoring mechanisms for controlling and inspecting chemical residues in bee products	13,400,000.00
	Facilitate workshop among local institutions on harmonizing efforts	5,250,000.00
	Facilitate training of 50 entrepreneurs at village beekeeping development groups	10,900,000.00
	Demarcate and gazette 5 proposed bee reserves in the plot areas in 5 districts	6,125,000.00
	Develop 5 management plans for bee reserves in the pilot areas	5,750,000.00
	Train leaders of Beekeepers Association on	5,564,000.00

	marketing strategies	
	Facilitate participation of 10 beekeepers and DBO's to attend show/trade	15,650,000.00
	Train and establish DEMO apiaries in 15 elected primary schools	7,750,000.00
	Facilitate 5 district councils to formulate by-laws	3,530,000.00
	Prepare one documentary film on the sting less bee honey	12,281,000.00
	Facilitate planning, monitoring and coordination of project activities	10,900,000.00
	Total	149,505,180.00
Ngorongoro Conservation Area	Backlog Activities	21,015,072.00
	Support agro forestry activities	8,151,000.00
	Support to 10 households to acquire quality heifers in collaboration with Heifer Project	6,625,000.00
	Review the general management plan to incorporate the community interest	33,310,350.00
	Organize conservation awareness week in collaboration with Karatu District Authority	8,775,000.00
	Total	77,703,722.00
Serengeti Regional Conservation Project	Involve communities in Natural Resources Management	14,799,513.00
	Support villages to establish non-traditional income generating activities (Error!)	2,509,525.00 ⁷⁹ Corrected!
	Facilitate establishment of management of Wildlife Management Areas	231,337,560.00
	Facilitate planning, monitoring and coordination activities	76,445,015.00
	Total	325,091,613.00
	Grand Total	3,930,698,593.00

■ ⁷⁹ The original document had a total of TShs 2.5 billion for this activity, which seemed unlikely!

**Table 5.2: Utilization of Project Funds by Expense Type,
Coordination and Capacity Building Project, 2004-05**

Expenditure Description		Year to:	
		June 2005	
		Available	Expended
Capital			
1200 Inservice Training			
12003	Overseas	61,198,331	40,132,327
12004	Local/MIS Training	78,206,163	74,825,593
	Sub Total	139,404,494	114,957,920
1900 Consultancy			
19001	Foreign	106,544,827	105,783,241
19002	Local	45,922,880	45,216,100
	Sub Total	152,467,707	150,999,341
Fixed Properties & Renovation			
3400			
340012	MNRP Motor Vehicle & Equipment	515,521,402	476,429,795
34003	Computer, Accessories & MIS Network	16,400,000	8,369,495
	Sub Total	531,921,402	484,799,290
	Total	823,793,603	750,756,551
Recurrent			
1100 Personal Expenditure			
11003	Salary and Wages	12,962,063	12,873,281
11004	Personal Expenditure	9,380,794	4,821,194
11005	PAYEE	-	-
	Sub Total	22,342,857	17,694,475
1300 Traveling			
13002	Domestic	62,176,455	59,033,841
13003	Overseas	30,407,397	26,531,992
	Sub Total	92,583,852	85,565,833
1500 Office Running Expenses			
15001	Office Stationery and General	12,809,894	7,332,238
15002	Telephone and Telegraphs	4,894,809	4,718,824
15003	Postage	2,703,593	2,684,911
	Sub Total	20,408,296	14,735,973
Motor Vehicle General Maintenance			
1800			
18001	Fuel and Parking	12,222,729	11,670,000
18002	MV Repairs and Services	17,216,043	17,305,814

Sub Total	29,438,772	28,975,814
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3200 Financial Costs and Technical Services

32007	Bank charges and Commissions	11,849,457	11,216,802
32008	Management and Audit Fees	30,425,000	28,696,500
34004	Computer Charges	18,595,714	18,795,266
Sub Total		60,870,171	58,708,568

3500 Conference and Workshops

35001	Workshops and Salaries	46,643,053	45,750,450
35005	Conference and Committee	74,259,457	73,307,600
	Other Expenditure	221,410,761	21,560,428
	Other Expenditure (Loan)	46,716,248	46,716,248
Sub Total		389,029,519	187,334,726
Total		614,673,467	393,015,389
	Disbursement to Project and		
36001	MNRP Component IV Activities	2,015,667,687	2,015,667,687
36003	Other Receipts		
Total		2,015,667,687	2,015,667,687
Grand Total		3,454,134,757	3,159,439,627

Table 5.3: MNRP Costing Table, FY 2004-05

Activity	Coordination & Capacity Building	NAFRAC	Catchment Forestry	TAWIRI	Beekkeeping Dev.Project	Mangrove	RUVU	SRCP	MIMP	r Activity
Subvention	348,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	348,000,000
Per Diem	83,210,000	122,265,000	19,125,000	45,900,000	27,675,000	20,880,000	6,600,000	6,960,000	11,110,000	343,725,000
Diesel	23,700,000	25,300,000	16,950,000	15,091,200	3,600,000	17,910,000	8,400,000	7,140,000	5,850,000	123,941,200
Technical Equipments	84,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84,000,000
Consultancy Fee domestic	48,900,000	3,600,000	6,750,000	-	20,250,000	-	-	-	-	79,500,000
Beehives	-	-	2,400,000	-	45,000,000	4,050,000	15,000,000	5,400,000	900,000	72,750,000
NINA time	-	-	-	62,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	62,000,000
Service & Repair	8,400,000	5,400,000	20,950,000	4,800,000	3,600,000	-	4,800,000	6,300,000	2,400,000	56,650,000
Travel/Transp ort Tickets	20,216,667	12,900,000	1,300,000	15,800,000	1,000,000	2,385,000	300,000	420,000	-	54,321,667
Material	-	17,000,000	2,200,000	7,680,000	200,000	5,100,000	15,600,000	2,952,000	-	50,732,000
Maintenance	7,200,000	-	-	9,600,000	3,000,000	26,493,000	210,000	-	3,600,000	50,103,000
Scholarship	43,200,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43,200,000
Gum boots	-	-	36,640,000	-	-	-	-	450,000	-	37,090,000
Petrol	-	-	11,742,000	-	-	17,955,000	480,000	-	5,600,000	35,777,000
Audit Fee	30,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30,000,000
Wages	-	-	13,500,000	-	2,160,000	10,920,000	-	1,600,000	-	28,180,000
Printing Fee	5,000,000	2,467,000	1,280,000	4,000,000	15,000,000	-	-	-	-	27,747,000
Laboratory analysis	-	27,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27,000,000
Operational costs	-	26,700,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26,700,000
Stationary	6,400,000	-	9,850,000	900,000	5,000,000	3,350,000	180,000	700,000	-	26,380,000
Conference Facilities	9,100,000	13,456,000	-	-	1,500,000	280,000	850,000	742,000	450,000	26,378,000
Facilitation	-	7,140,000	1,200,000	-	2,000,000	2,250,000	5,580,000	7,200,000	900,000	26,270,000
Casual Labourers	-	-	11,745,000	-	-	1,800,000	11,770,000	-	600,000	25,915,000
Computers & Accessories	14,736,000	-	7,500,000	300,000	2,000,000	-	-	-	-	24,536,000
Refreshments	1,200,000	-	9,290,000	-	3,000,000	8,800,000	1,705,000	-	-	23,995,000
Contract	20,916,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,916,500
Boarding & lodging	6,000,000	-	-	-	13,500,000	-	-	-	-	19,500,000
Dry ration	-	-	15,396,000	-	-	2,760,000	-	-	630,000	18,786,000
Equipments	4,800,000	12,500,000	-	-	-	440,200	-	-	-	17,740,200
Transport	16,000,000	-	-	-	750,000	90,000	-	-	-	16,840,000
Student Allowances	-	-	-	16,167,598	-	-	-	-	-	16,167,598

Bank charges/Commission	12,000,000	-	-	2,530,000	360,000	-	-	-	-	14,890,000
Internet charges	12,240,000	-	180,000	1,800,000	-	-	-	-	-	14,220,000
Grant	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,000,000	-	-	14,000,000
Protective Gears	-	-	-	-	11,250,000	900,000	-	150,000	-	12,300,000
Working gears	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,300,000	-	-	10,300,000
Data collection & analysis	10,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000,000
Renovate	-	10,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,000,000
Tech.Booklets/Pamphlets	-	9,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,500,000
Containers	-	-	720,000	-	-	1,800,000	4,400,000	1,800,000	-	8,720,000
Honey presser	-	-	600,000	-	5,400,000	900,000	1,800,000	-	-	8,700,000
Sample Processing	-	-	-	8,400,000	-	-	-	-	-	8,400,000
Maintenance Equipments	-	-	7,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,500,000
Poly tubes	-	-	7,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,500,000
Seeds	-	-	6,480,000	-	-	-	400,000	-	-	6,880,000
Package Materials	-	-	-	-	6,600,000	-	-	-	-	6,600,000
Postage & Stamps	2,400,000	-	2,000,000	-	1,200,000	450,000	180,000	360,000	-	6,590,000
Bicycles	-	-	-	-	-	2,850,000	2,550,000	-	600,000	6,000,000
Calendars	-	6,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,000,000
Fees	6,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,000,000
Purchase (Lab.chemicals)	-	6,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,000,000
Research Allowances	-	-	-	6,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	6,000,000
Brochures/leaflets	-	2,000,000	1,800,000	-	-	-	-	2,000,000	-	5,800,000
Production charges	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,500,000	-	-	5,500,000
Honorarium - Facilitator	4,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900,000	5,400,000
Training Fee	-	-	-	-	5,000,000	-	-	-	-	5,000,000
University Fee	-	-	-	5,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	5,000,000
Air tickets	3,600,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	560,000	4,160,000
Canoes	-	-	-	-	-	3,600,000	-	-	-	3,600,000
Equipments Maintenance	-	3,600,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,600,000
Gill nets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,600,000	3,600,000
VHF Road	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,600,000	3,600,000
Utilities	-	-	-	-	-	2,000,000	1,200,000	-	-	3,200,000

Training Materials	2,000,000	-	-	-	1,000,000	-	-	-	-	3,000,000
Wheel barrow	-	-	2,000,000	-	-	750,000	-	-	-	2,750,000
Cleaning supplies	-	-	2,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,500,000
Canoes	-	-	2,400,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,400,000
Report	2,200,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,200,000
Maintenance of trails	-	-	2,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000,000
Sites	-	-	2,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000,000
Training Allowance	2,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000,000
Posters	-	999,500	-	-	-	-	-	1,000,000	-	1,999,500
TV Programme	-	1,600,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,600,000
Back up files	1,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500,000
IEC Materials	-	1,500,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500,000
Maintenance Forest road	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500,000	-	-	1,500,000
Binoculars	-	-	1,350,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,350,000
News/leaflet typesetting	-	-	-	1,300,000	-	-	-	-	-	1,300,000
Hand-held Radios	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,200,000	1,200,000
Beekeeping gears	-	-	960,000	-	-	-	-	-	150,000	1,110,000
Currier charges	-	-	0	-	1,000,000	-	-	-	-	1,000,000
Watering canes	-	-	1,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000,000
Mushroom nut	-	-	900,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	900,000
Raincoats	-	-	-	-	-	900,000	-	-	-	900,000
Spades	-	-	400,000	-	-	450,000	-	-	-	850,000
Life jacket	-	-	300,000	-	-	-	-	-	540,000	840,000
Fish net	-	-	640,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	640,000
Uniform	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	630,000	630,000
Chairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600,000	-	600,000
Repair (Plant)	-	600,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600,000
Telephone Bills	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	600,000	-	600,000
Open plastic shoes	-	-	-	-	-	540,000	-	-	-	540,000
Seed collection equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	500,000	-	-	500,000
Fingerlings	-	-	149,000	-	-	-	350,000	-	-	499,000
Calipers	-	-	-	-	-	450,000	-	-	-	450,000
Tables	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	450,000	-	450,000
Technical Supervision	-	-	-	-	-	-	360,000	-	-	360,000

Basket traps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300,000	300,000
Design Fee	-	-	-	-	-	-	300,000	-	-	300,000
Spinning machines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300,000	300,000
Seedlings	-	-	-	-	-	142,800	-	-	150,000	292,800
Participation Fee	-	-	-	-	-	230,000	-	-	-	230,000
Wet shoes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	180,000	180,000
Fish hooks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150,000	150,000
Bus ticket domestic	-	-	100,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	100,000
Cabinets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80,000	-	80,000
Total	839,419,167	317,527,500	231,297,000	207,268,798	181,045,000	141,426,000	114,815,000	46,904,000	44,900,000	2,124,602,465

Annex 6: Persons met, interviews, group discussions

1. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism

Mr I Mfunda, Coordinator, Management of Natural Resources Programme
 Mr P Lyatuu, Assistant Coordinator, MNRP
 Mr G Nanyaro, Director, Fisheries Division
 Mr W V Haule, Assistant Director of Fisheries
 Mr M R Mlolwa, Ag Assistant Director of Fisheries
 Mrs J S Urono, Ag Assistant Director of Fisheries
 Mrs B S M Mngulwi, Senior Fisheries Officer
 Mr E Severre, Director of Wildlife
 Mr Mayeta, Game Officer, Wildlife Division
 Mr F Lyimo, Assistant Director of Wildlife
 Mr D Kiweli, Assistant Director of Forestry

2. Royal Norwegian Embassy

Dr E Jansen, Counsellor
 Mr S Torgersbraaten, Counsellor

3. Projects

Catchment Forestry: Arusha, Manyara, 12-13/04/06

Name	Place	Position
Cuthbert S. Mafupa	Olmotonyi	PM
Dinah M. Omondi	Olmotonyi	District Catchment Officer
Protas P. Massawe	"	Forestry Surveyor
Arnold A Shoo	"	"
Gabriel B. Kalukule	"	"
Yohana A. Kyoo	Lake Duluti	Guide
Gambai J. Gwandu	"	"
Francis Ngotti	Babati	District Catchment Officer
Paulo Amoni	Haraa vi	Village Chairman
William Menele	"	VEO
Joseph Hondi	"	Secretary Beekeeping
Raheli Feo	"	Secretary Forestry
Ally Hamisi	"	Member VFC
Bakary bura	"	"
Mohamed R. Kombe	"	"
Ayubu Omari	"	Commander VFS
Thiophili Sirili	"	"
Hasan K. Mayunga	"	Beekeeper
Florencis Kanza	"	"
Elisamia Mlay	"	Chair VFC
Seleman Nangay	"	Beekeeper
Juma Nangay	"	Member village government
Omary Ally	"	"
Freta William	"	Beekeeper
Bariki Mringo	"	"
Humphrey W. Silaa	"	F.O.
Abdallah Mwendi	Wanwarry	Catchment Bonga
Issa S. Nyange	"	VFC Chairman
Hassani Omeyi	"	VFC Secretary
Mfaume Juma	"	Member VFC
Abdala Salimu	"	"
Jeradi Wlakeria	"	"

Issa Aliy	Wanwarry	Member VFC
Elizabeth bura	“	“
Dolorosa Gastaju	“	“
John Gwande	“	“
Omari A Pimiya	“	“

Kilimanjaro Catchments Forestry 10-12/05/06

Name	Place	Position
Mr. Mkumbo	Same	Regional Catchment Forestry Office
Mr. Mkiramweni	Same	DCFM
	Mhero village, Chome FR, Same District	VG and VNRC
		Local forest officer
		Visiting people in their homes and shambas to see stoves, beehives, terracing, etc.
Mr. Chezue	Rombo District	DCFM
		DFO
	Maharo village, Kilimanjaro FR, Rombo district	VG and VNRC
		Walk about the village to see activities – half mile strip, tree planting, stoves
	Lole Marera village, Kilimanjaro FR, Moshi Rural district	Discussion with VNRC and VG representatives
		Visit to people's homes and shambas to see stoves, beehives and fish ponds
		Interview with three women harvesting grass from their plot
		Interview with plot owner (male)

Ruvu Fuelwood Forestry 03-08/05/06

Name	Place	Position
Edward Shilogile	Project office, Ruvu	Project Manager
		Presentation of project – Project Manager
Ally Kipengele Kitwana Sinde Abdallah Kapoyola Selemani Mchelenga Malki Majimoto Emil Mpili Issa Kapondoma Hadija Juma		Members of village network
	Msangani/Mkuza village area	Group of women Group of men Visit to forest plot
Enne Haule		
Adam Msoma	Kibaha	Forestry Officer, Kibaha Town Council
Grace Mgalawe	Kibaha	Agriculture Officer, Kibaha Town Council
Kulwa Masambu		Cooperative Officer, Kibaha Town Council
	Project office	Presentation of projections for future of project initiatives – Project Manager
Mr Liana	Project office	Assistant Beekeeping Officer

	Mwendapole/ Kongowe village area	Discussion with a group of women Discussion with a group of men Discussion with a group of young men
Zahiri Msangi	Project office	Forest assistant
Gerard Otieno		Forest officer
Joseph Sondi		Forest officer
Beatus Mwalongo		Forest assistant
Dhahiri Liana		Beekeeping assistant
Salum Cheyo		Forest assistant
Tullah Abong'o		Forest assistant
Edward Shilogile		Senior forest officer

Beekeeping, Manyoni 07/04/06

Name	Place	Position
Paulo Mpuya	Manyoni	Project Coordinator, Beekeeping Sub-Component
Hussein Msuya		Division of Forestry and Bee Keeping, DSM
Edwin Meela		District Beekeeping Officer, Manyoni, Project Manager
Simon Mpangara		Assistant Beekeeping Officer, Manyoni
Chesko Lunyungu		Assistant Beekeeping Officer, Manyoni
Emmanuel Migilimo		Chairman Manyoni Beekeepers Association

Mwamagembe village 09/04/06

Alfredi N. Yuda		Ag Village Executive Officer
Paul M. Nducha		Village Chairman
George Swedi		Chairman Beekeepers Association MWABEA
Edwin Meela		District Beekeeping Officer
Sabina Samsoni		Chairperson of Subvillage
Magdalena Rubeni		Secretary MWABEA
Zaituni Sadiki		Member MWABEA
Nestory Joseph		Beekeeping Officer
Antoni Ely		Member MWABEA
Jecoma J Ameck		Member MWABEA
Waziri E. Kisesa		Member Village Government
Yothamu E. Mchagu		Member MWABEA
Edward Kauliagut		Member MWABEA
Francis Lazaro		Member MWABEA
Jeremiah Nyungu		Beekeeper
Edson Ralebi		Member MWABEA
Chesko J. Lunyunku		Beekeeping Officer, Manyoni
Simon M. Mpangala		Beekeeping Officer
Emmanuel Migilimo		Chairman Mabelu
Daines Mpendakazi		Member MWABEA
Daines Amosi		Member MWABEA
H.J.Msuya		Beekeeping Officer, MNRT, DSM
Elias Bottow		Assistant Secretary MWABEA
Yohana Saimon		Member MWABEA
Yohana I. Masudi		Member MWABEA
Jeremia Albert		Member MWABEA
Christopher Mtem		Member MWABEA
Abasi Rajabu		Member MWABEA
Paulo M. Mpuya		Project Coordinator, Beekeeping

		Sub-component, DSM
Hadija Josua		Member MWABEA

Kayui Village, 09/04/06

Mussa A. Gambilla		Chairman Kayui Village
Luhembe M. Honawelu		Village Executive Officer, Kayui
Mhe Charles Mongo		Councillor, Mgandu Ward
Berther Majani		Assistant Chair KABEA
Luhomba Juma		Chair KABEA, and chair VNRC
Sosper Nicodemo		Chair Sub-village
Iddi Saidi		Beekeeper
Rajabu Seleman		Member KABEA
Shabani Maulidi		Member KABEA
Bahari Saidi		Member KABEA
Magdalena Yorama		Member KABEA
Tatu Baicari		Member KABEA
Margreth Lyanga		Member KABEA
Roda Yona		Member KABEA
Parisi Sakalani		Member KABEA
Mariou Marina		Member KABEA
Abel Lazaro		Beekeeper
Athumani Abdallah		Member KABEA
Lucy Meshack		Member KABEA
Jumanne Sefu		Member KABEA
Husseni Mayula		Member KABEA
Wilson Richards		Member KABEA
Simon Wina		Member KABEA
Frank Dulli		Member KABEA
Mussa E. P. Mkweti		Member KABEA
Devidi Majani		Member KABEA
Ruheya O. Saidi		Member KABEA
Yohana Samsoni		Member KABEA

**HASHI - National Forest Resource Management and Agroforestry Centre
NACRAF, Shinyanga 04/04/06**

Name		Position
Emmanuel T. Minja		Head of Capacity Building and Empowerment Section, NAFRAC
Musa A.M. Munga		Team Leader, Forest Survey and Mapping, Lake Zone, NAFRAC
Masondore M.A. Buhabi		Beekeeping Technician, Capacity Building and Empowerment Section, NAFRAC
Ramadhani J. Mziray		Forest Officer, Research and Development Section
Elias Mangindi		Forest Officer, Administration Section
James M. Machanya		Head, Administration Section
Pastory P. Mwesiga		Training Officer, Capacity and Empowerment Section
Siima S. Bakengesa		Head, Research and Development Section
Eliasenya R. Nuko		Forest Officer, Capacity Building and Empowerment Section
Hadji Hatibu		Forest Officer, Capacity Building and Empowerment Section
Mlenge, W.C.		Center Manager, NAFRAC

	Shinyanga	Regional Offices 04/04/06
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Brigadier General Dr Balele		Regional Commissioner
Ms Nuru H.M. Millao		Regional Administrative Secretary
Joseph Nandrie		Regional Natural Resources Advisor – Shinyanga
Ms M.W. Sanka		District Commissioner, Kishapo District (formerly Shinyanga Rural)

	Wigelekelo Village, Maswa District	05/04/06
Limbe Juliandu		Village Executive Officer
Joseph Sungwa		Secretary, Dam Committee
Sprian Nganika		Chair, Dam Committee
Masingwa Kija		Villager
Angelina Mipawa		Treasurer, Dam Committee
Roda Chalya		Committee member
Mabanha Yegela		Committee member

	Maswa District Council	05/04/06
Kosmas Lugola		District Administrative Secretary
Likopa		Ag District Natural Resources Officer (DFiO)
David Lyimo		Ag District Executive Officer (DNRO)
R. Z. Saidi		District Community Development Officer
Gibanga Akoba		District Planning Officer
Mary Maramia		District Community Development Office
SusanaWugamba		Ag District Forest Officer

	Bariadi District Council	05/04/06
J.K. Kitundu		District Executive Officer
Amon Chonya		District Treasurer
J. Maleko		Admin Officer
Dr A.G. Maduhu		Ag District Medical Officer
G.L. Mkombo		District Natural Resources Officer
M.R. Mambaa		District Commercial Officer, for Planning Officer
P.T. Mikinsa		District Engineer
Z.M. Gakuba		District Education Officer
Susanna L. Sabani		Ag District Agriculture and Livestock Development Officer
Minza Stephen		Ag District Water Engineer
Cosmas Nshaye		TASAF
John Kunali		District Cooperatives Officer
S. Conhuli		District Cultural Officer
Ikungulipu Village		Bariadi District 05/04/06
Magembe Mwahu		Famous farmer

NAFRAC workshop for capacity building in Agroforestry and Natural Forest Management
06/04/06

Name	Place (District, Village)		Position
Tangawizi Elias	Shinyanga R	Bugogo	Farmer
K.M. Safi	Serengeti	Mugumu	DFO
Agnes Kenge	Misungwi	Masawe	Farmer
Michael Machenje	Kwimba	Buyogo	Farmer

Mukina Machibutula	Kwimba	Bupamwa	Farmer
Amos Mkarimu	Serengeti	Mugumu	Farmer
Richard Bugayu	Misungwi	Bukumbi	Farmer
Eliud Mayunga	Serengeti	Mugumu	Farmer
Mhanda Mabula	Maswa	Wigelekelo	Farmer
Sambaluli Masanja	Maswa	Wigelekelo	Farmer
Nkwabi Ikoba	Kahama	Bunasami	Farmer
Daud Bujiku	Kishapu	Busongo	Village Chairman
Anthony Katakwa	Shinyanga	Gulungwashi	Farmer
Helena N. Bundala	Kahama	Mwendakulima	Farmer
Deogratias Makungu	Kwimba	Ndugu	Ag. DFO
Amos Nkahogo	Kahama	Kagongwa	Farmer
Patrick Ndulu	Misungwi	Misungwi	DFO
Christopher Mwinula	Shinyanga U	Seseko	Village Chairman
Deoscory A.M. Msoma	Shinyanga U	Old Shinyanga	Farmer
Magembe Mwahu	Bariadi	Ikungulipu	Farmer
Wali Mahulu	Bariadi	Madilana	Farmer
Peter Mandalu	Maswa	Gulungwashi	Farmer
Andrew Maregesi	Bunda	Bunda	DFO
Ester Masalu	Bunda	Balili	Farmer
Mabula Langumba	Bunda	Kabasa	Farmer
Patroba Rufunjo	Bunda	Bunda	Farmer
Renatus Masanja Salu	Meatu	Bomani	Village Chairman
Mussa Sambe	Meatu	Mwambegwa	Farmer
Gambangadi Kaliba	Meatu	Mwambegwa	Farmer
Elizabeth Mihayo	Shinyanga U	Balili	Farmer
Mwandu Mboje	Maswa	Bukigi	Village Chairman
Mungo Bundala	Shinyanga R	Ikonda	Village Chairman
Simon Ndaki	Shinyanga U	Mwamagunguli	Farmer
Salum Swagi	Shinyanga R	Bugogo	Farmer
John nnko	Musoma	Musoma	DFO
Adam S. Warioba	Musoma	Nyakato	Farmer
Athuman Bagosha	Meatu	Nyalikungu	Farmer
Joseph M. Mugasa	Musoma	Bukabwa	Farmer
Ezekiel Sumbuka	Magu	Magu	DFO
Embassy Mbucha	Kahama	Nsungamile	Farmer

NAFRAC Debriefing, 06/04/06

W.C. Mlenge	Centre Manager NAFRAC
Siima Bakengesa	Head, Research and Development (TAFORI)
Emmanuel Minja	Head, Capacity Building and Empowerment
Haj Hatibu	Documentation Section
Pastori Mwesiga	Capacity Building and Empowerment Section
James Machanya	Administration Section
Ramadhani Msirai	Forestry Research Section
Elias Mkwilima	Coordinator, Canada World Youth Programme
Elias Sanya Niko	Gender Specialist
Elias Manondi	Administration Section

TAFORI

Interviews held with Mr. Evarist Sabas – TAFORI Morogoro, and Mr. Matthew Mdolwa – TAFORI Kibaha

Serengeti Regional Conservation Programme, 06-09/04/06

John Muya	Fort Ikoma	P/Manager
Laurent Katakweba	Fort Ikoma	T/Officer
Wilton Jothan	Fort Ikoma	T/Officer
Julius Molais	Bunda town	DED
Eliuter Nywage	Bunda town	DNRO
S.G. Mtei	Bunda town	DFO
C.P. Matenya	Bunda town	DGO
Mara P. kitende	Bunda town	GO
B.S. Mushingi	Bunda town	CDO
Fabian N. Mahemba	Bunda town	DPO
Mwita Ryoba	Mihale V.	C/man VNRC
Mrs. Taabu Kihanga	Mihale V.	Secret. VNRC
Abisai Ondiga	Mugeta	
Juliwas Mriba	Mugeta	
Donald Petro	Mugeta	Member
Petro Wama	Mugeta	Member
Gidadi Tangera	Mugeta	Member
Jackson Laudi	Mugeta	Member
Mnana Nyituki	Mugeta	Member
Nyangweso Masouna	Mugeta	Member
Eliasi Merekwa	Mugeta	Member
Omari I.M. Musaye	Mugeta	Invited
Richard kyamaris	Mugeta	Invited
Shanyangi Masaki	Mugeta	Invited
Bendi Baragi	Mugeta	Invited
Esther Wama	Mugeta	Invited
P. Skatu	Mugeta	Invited
Hon. Daniel M. Majani	Mugeta	Counsellor
Shamache Wandu	Mugeta	Member
Samson M. Gisura	Mugeta	Member
Bhoke Kulieme	Mugeta	Member
Mturi Rukaka	Mugeta	VNRC-Secretary
Moshi Mtenga	Mugeta	VGS
Haji Musa	Mugeta	VCS
Charles Simango	Mugeta V	VGS
Girlibaty Nyituki	Mugeta V	VGS
Mwajuma Rukaka	Mugeta V	Member VNRC
Jamhuri mariba	Mugeta V	Treasurer VNRC
Nyerere Merara	Mugeta V	Member
Daudi Charles	Mugeta V	VGS
J.B. Kilonzo	Mugumu	DED-Serengeti
Isack Kisa	Mugumu	DPLO
Kisuda Mweso	Mugumu	CDO
Mokiri Warento	Mugumu	DGO
Laurent Yohana Mzori	Fort Ikoma	AGO
Beatrice Ernest Mbanga	Fort Ikoma	AGO
Kenyatta R. Mosoka	Robanda	C/person VNRC
Michael Kunani	Robanda	Ag VEO
Julius Nyagorera	Robanda	Member V. Govt
Joseph N. Magori	Robanda	Member V. Govt
Nyangi D. Sirocha	Robanda	Member V. Govt
Mariam Matele	Robanda	Member V. Govt
Josephine kishashonga	Robanda	Member V. Govt
Agnes Kisiri	Robanda	Member V. Govt
Fredy R. Mabenga	Robanda	VGS
Paul makondo	Robanda	“
John Wambura Joseph	Robanda	“
Marambo M. Manginare	Robanda	“
Peseu Nyamtengera	Robanda	Member V. Govt

Mahesi M. Sigori	Robanda	
Yohana Makongo	Robanda	
Mneuka Funga	Robanda	RMA
Wanna Elias	Robanda	Member VNRC
Shakanyi Magige	Robanda	VGS
Yohana M. Magho	Robanda	Treasures
Lameck M. Kitenamoze	Robanda	Teacher
Giengera Massoka	Robanda	Teacher
Tatu Sirocha	Robanda	VGS
Mazanza Magori	Robanda	Teacher
Machwele S Kunani	“	VNRC
John K. Jumapili	“	Commander VGS
Anderson Manchare	“	Member V. Govt
Juma Gaugeri	“	Sect. VNRC
Kumari Samiaza	“	Import. Elder
Tuki Nyaresoni	“	Teacher
Masauta Shitagara	“	Chair VNRC
Joyce N. Mabenga	“	Member V. Govt
Daniel Nyamsema Mahiti	“	Secr. CCM
Nyambeko G. Gerecha	“	VGS
David Alnyakacharo	“	Office attendant
Dr. Marcus Borner	Seronera	Regional Director
Joseph Ole Kuwai	Seronera	Country Director
Rian	Sasakwa	MD
Brian	Sasakwa	Chief Antipoach
Sospeter Nyigoti	Robanda	D CCM Chair

NCA – Karatu Project, 05-10/04/06

Emanuel Chausi	NCA-Crater	CEO-NCAA
Kawasange	“	PM-Project
Mshana	“	
Steven Lelo	Karatu	Co-ordinator
Salustin Hallu	“	Ext. off. NCA
Dr. Johnson Mariki	“	Distr. Animal Health
Aloyce Songay	“	CEO-HIMAKA
Dismas Macha	“	FO-NCAA
Emerita M. Duange		Cow owner
Edwiga Sikuku		Cow owner
Yohana Lusiani		“
Ana Lohi		“

TAWIRI-BHWI, 05-11/04/06

Name	Place	Position
Dr. Simon Mduma	Arusha	Ag. DG
Lukas Marugu	Seronera	Researcher
Dr. Marcus Borner	Seronera	FZS Reg. Dir.
Dr. Julius Keyyu	Arusha	PM. –BHWI
Dr. George Sabuni	Arusha	Dir. Research

Mweka College of Wildlife Management

Interviewee	Position
Deogratias Gamassa	Principal, CAWM
Reginald Mwaya	Short Course Coordinator, CAWM
Ladislau Kahana	Lecturer, CAWM
Nashon Mekokacha	District Game Officer, Babati
Veronica Sang’udi	Assistant DGO, Babati
Tadey Gway	Chair, Burunge WMA
Tatu Chimbalabal	Treasurer, Burunge WMA

Jarthan Molell	Game Warden, Simanjiro
Caroline Mbaga	Game Warden, Simanjiro
Sekela Mwangota	Outreach Officer, Tarangire National Park

Mangrove Management & Forest Catchment Projects, Mafia Marine Park 2.-20.4.06

Name	Location	Position
Mr. Lema	Tanga	Catchment Forest Officer
A.H. Mrema	"	Mangrove Officer
Bruna Mallya	"	Mangrove Project Manager
John Rugira	"	District Catchment Forest Manager
Rebecca Savoie	"	Project Manager ACDI/VOCA-SEEGAAD
Eric Allard	"	Owner-Manager Seaproducts Tanga
M.M.Mathew	Amani Nature Reserve HQ	Assistant Conservator
James Onai Semwacha	Marungu Village	Village Natural Resources Officer
Joseph Macha	"	Farmer & fisher
Batholomeo Damas	"	"
Caporata Sururu	"	Farmer
Haduja Hessa	Machui Village	Project Councillor
Mwindaji Gau	"	Village Chairman
John Selemani	"	Ward leader
Zunguo Mnyali	"	Group chairman
Ramadhani Jumaa	"	Councillor Village Gvt.
Idrissa Idi	"	"
Gendo Shame	"	"
Denys Roberts	Kigombe Village	Owner-Manager of Peponi Resort
Ayubu Selemani	"	Village Environmental Officer
Mumbi Haji	"	Village Chairman
Mkuu Mohamed	"	Village Government Councillor
Z. Chomoka	Pangani	District Fisheries Officer
Thad Peterson	"	Hotelier, Coord. NGO Friends of Masiwi NR
Mama Kibua	Tanga Kisutu area	Saltmaker
Mzee Bobu	"	"
Bibi Mshiri	"	"
Mama Mrugu	"	"
Mama Mwanahudi	Putini Village	Seaweed farmer & farmer
Mzee Adamu	"	Fisher
Mwinjuma Waziri	Chongoleani Village	Councillor, Village Gvt., farmer, former saltmaker
Sindi Ismaili	"	Councillor, Vill. Env.Committee
MIMP - Mafia		
Alli M. Libaba	Mafia-Kilindoni	District Commissioner
M. Gwakilahi	"	District Executive Officer
Jacob Kayange	"	District Planning Officer
Godfrey Mokoki	"	District Fisheries Officer
Mr. Mtani	"	Fisheries Officer
Florian Oscar Hemile	"	District NR Officer, MIMP Advisory

		Committee Member
W.S. Mkumbwa	"	District Forest Officer
Khadija Geho	"	UWT Chairwomen
George Msumi	MIMP-HQ Utende	Warden in Charge
Anthony S.G. Melele	"	Assistant Warden in Charge
Sylvester Kazimoto	"	Head of Enforcement Unit
Ali Rashid Mgeni	"	Community Conservation Officer
Januari Ndagala	"	Research Officer
Haji Machano	"	WWF-Monitoring & Research
Mussa Ally	"	Park Ranger
Jason Rubens	Mafia - Utende	WWF-Project Officer RUMAKI, former Technical Advisor to MIMP
Captain Masoud Kipanga	"	WWF- Community Conservation Assistant
Prof. Ian Bryceson	"	Research Coordinator & NORAD consultant
Miwadi Ahmadi Ferusi	Juani Island	Fisher & beekeeper
Hamadi Abdalla	"	Fisher
Mwenge Ahmadi	"	Fisher
Juma Shehare Juwani	"	Oyster farmer & fisher
Mzee N.N.	"	Village Chairman
Iddi Escamona	Mlongo village	Beekeeper & farmer
Ali Isuma	"	"
Mzee Bakari	"	Village Liaison Officer, MIMP field station
Jean de Villiers	Chole Island	Owner-Manager Chole Mjini Conservation and Development Co. Ltd
Anne de Villier	"	" & MIMP Advisory Committee Member
Marco Stantioni	"	Dive Master Chole Mjini
Mussa Hassan Mshangama	"	Ass. Hotel manager, former fisher
Rajabu Tawakali	"	Head waiter, former Chairman of Chole Mjini Economic Assoc, former fisher
Mfaume Ali	"	Waiter & carpenter, former fisher
Peter Byrne	Mafia - Utende	Owner Kinasi Lodge
Antonella Balestra	"	Tour Operator Monarch Tours Zanzibar
Audie Murphy	"	Dive Master
Wally Casati	"	Manager Mafia Island Lodge
Maura Cavallo	"	Manager PolePole Resort
Mois Kassam	"	Dive Master PolePole & Mafia Island Lodge
Madhav Rao	Mafia - Kilindoni	Tanpesca Alphakrust Senior Manager, MIMP Advisory Committee Member
I. Babuji	"	Tanpesca Alphakrust Hatchery - Production Manager
Massimo Lancellotti	DSM	PolePole Resort owner

Dr. Magnus Ngoile	DSM (phone interview)	MACEMP Team leader, BoT Member
Nicola Colangelo	DSM	Tourism Investor & BoT Member
Rose Hogan	DSM	Consultant MIMP, former IUCN Advisor to Rufiji Environmental Management Project

Annex 7: Response to comments on the Zero Draft

Note: The team thanks all those who provided critical feedback to the draft report. Where possible, we have responded to their comments by editing the text of the first two volumes. In this annex, we respond to a number of critical points made by various commentators. The comments we respond to in this Annex are in four categories: (1) the evaluation's coverage of the terms of reference; (2) factual errors and omissions; (3) project priorities; and (4) the interests and intentions of the evaluation team and its members.

Coverage of the TOR

(1) The MNRT argues that 'the report does not provide an overview of achieved objectives with reference to social and economic development changes as a result of MNRP...'⁸⁰

Our response is twofold. First, given budgetary and time constraints, it was not possible to cover all aspects of the TOR equally, nor was it possible to do justice to all eleven projects in the current MNRP portfolio.

Second, and more important, in our **Response to the Terms of Reference (Annex 2 above)**, which was accepted by the MNRT, we are at pains to stress the difficulty of asserting relationships of cause and effect between programme/project inputs and outputs. All projects lacked adequate baseline data against which to measure social and economic development changes. We further argue that: 'A major challenge for evaluators is ... how to separate project impacts from other influences on people's welfare and livelihoods over time. Many factors may influence group, household and community welfare, for better or for worse.' (Section **1.1 Analytical Framework**).

That said, the team does make numerous claims concerning the social and economic development impact of the Programme. These are summarised in the Main Report.

The MNRT remarks that the draft report is based on 'unofficial information. The TOR (**Annex 1 above, Methodology**) require the team to undertake 'a thorough review of documents and materials produced by MNRT and PROTEAM, [and] the mission members are expected to hold in-depth consultations with key stakeholders and beneficiaries and undertake visits to selected projects to obtain information from beneficiaries and other key stakeholders.' The team considers that this was done. In addition, the team held discussions with 'relevant agencies at central, regional, district and local levels, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, selected projects and other relevant institutions, NGOs, donors and individuals at the team's discretion.' In its Response to the TOR (**Annex 2, Methodology**) BCS endorse the proposed 'methodology, and suggests in addition ... reviewing other relevant documents, including academic literature, non-MNRT programme and project reports, videos and news reports that may prove relevant to the objectives

⁸⁰ United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Division of Policy and Planning, Management of Natural Resources Programme – TAN 0092), Comments to the draft final evaluation report, page 2.

of the evaluation.’ With the exception of videos, the evaluation team has made full use of all the sources of information proposed, both ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’.

Factual errors and omissions

The evaluation team has corrected factual errors pointed out by those providing comments on the draft report. Any remaining errors and omissions are the responsibility of the evaluation team.

Interests and intentions of the evaluation team

The response of MIMP was to dismiss the conclusions of the evaluation, and to question the integrity of the evaluator. The evaluation team member is described as someone ‘whom we feel, through experiences elsewhere, is always not in favour of government initiatives on sustainable development. She does not feature a very good record apart from being interested in investing in tourism.’ The report is described as ‘very biased’ and too concerned with issues of ‘popular governance’ rather than ‘natural resource governance.’ Since this hostile reaction challenges the rationale for the evaluation, and in particular its emphasis on governance issues, which we were at pains to emphasise as the main factors underlying sustainable NRM in Tanzania, we have not thought it practical to revise the MIMP component of the evaluation, but instead respond in detail to MIMP’s main criticisms. We consider it unfortunate that MIMP have chosen to question the evaluator’s integrity, particularly when the governance issues that we discuss at length, and which constitute the main focus of the evaluation report, have been the subject of substantial debate over a number of years.

Finally, according to MIMP, ‘We feel that a more focused evaluation is needed that will consider performance indicators, outcomes and impacts.’ We partially endorse this recommendation, but do not think that another evaluation is required. Rather, we recommend an independent piece of in-depth research examining coastal tourism, conservation and livelihoods issues, with an emphasis on governance and the role of foreign aid.

The following is a selection of MIMP comments on the draft report and the response of the evaluation team. The team is ready to discuss the critical points made by MIMP management in the interests of improved future cooperation between the Governments of Tanzania and Norway.

Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP)

NOTE: The text in quotes is reproduced from MIMP’s comments.
The consultant’s response is inserted in track mode.

‘Generally the evaluation of MIMP seems not to be based on MNRT documents but rather discussions from hoteliers, fish processing plant, few fishermen’s and rural communities. The report distorts the real situation in connection to community participation and involvement of other stakeholders.’

The job description of the Evaluation team was:

In contrast to earlier evaluations, which were 'Midterm reviews', that is progress of implementation against plans, the overall objective of this assignment was to *evaluate the impact of the MNRP*. According to the TOR to this Evaluation Team, the "MNRP success is assessed in terms of the achievement of MNRP objectives: has the Programme achieved what was planned? Second, MNRP success may be considered

in terms of positive but *unplanned* outcomes. The evaluation will look at both intended and unintended results attributed to MNRP, regardless of stated objectives."

While certainly one input, MNRT documentation alone cannot contribute to this, as reports to the donor have to focus on activities implemented against the planning documents and are necessarily apologetic. **Impact analysis** has to seek other sources of information, particularly direct information from the beneficiaries and stakeholders.

This is also demanded explicitly by the TOR and **Appendix to consultancy contracts, NRM Programme Evaluation Fieldwork, Additional Guidelines**: "The mission team shall adopt a consultative and participative approach. Hence, besides a thorough review of documents and materials produced by MNRT and PROTEAM, the mission members are expected to hold in-depth consultations with key stakeholders and beneficiaries and undertake visits to selected projects to obtain information from beneficiaries and other key stakeholders.... Interviews and focus groups with intended project beneficiaries are key sources of information. For obvious reasons, **fieldworkers should *not* ask project managers which sites/people to visit**, but should select their own, time permitting, at a distance from the project HQ... Report what people say. Quote people's opinions. Get the beneficiaries' views. Put these statements in text boxes, citing location and date, and name of the person quoted if authorised and appropriate", and:

"The consultants' task is to make a **frank and honest, independent assessment of programme impacts, focusing on governance issues**." (Emphasis [in the original](#)).

Concerning the documentation to be consulted, Business Care Services (BSC) added: (7) 'reviewing other relevant documents, including academic literature, non-MNRT programme and project reports, websites, videos and news reports that may prove relevant to the objectives of the evaluation.' This addition was accepted and forms part of the TOR.

On the particular focus of this evaluation, the TOR and Guidelines for the Evaluation Team say:

"Governance issues

Governance is *the* key theme of this evaluation, and is likely to figure as a major concern for future Norwegian support for NRM. Fieldworkers are requested to reflect on the importance of governance as a potentially **critical condition** for project success and sustainability. The Response to the TOR lists six dimensions of governance. The main evaluation report will report on governance issues from the national to the local level; fieldworkers will discuss governance issues in the local project environment. Discussions between team members (for example, when traveling between field sites) should allow for further refinement on which dimensions of governance are crucial for addressing the TOR. **Accountability, quality of service provision and regulation** are obviously important. **What about the rule of law and corruption?"**

"To anticipate this discussion, it is crucial to determine how stakeholder interests are expressed, how grievances are handled, and how collective 'voice' is articulated, both formally and informally."

"How much information on revenue and expenditures does the LG make available to the public? Is the information presented in user-friendly formats? Who makes use of this information and how?"

"The fieldworker should look for examples of interest articulation and conflict resolution. What are the origins of disputes over NR access and use? How are they resolved? Who are the winners and losers? Are there examples where community or public interests prevail over those of politicians and bureaucrats? Do projects get involved in dispute management?"

In view of this situation, the following observations are recorded:-

*i **Community participation***

The analysis of community participation about MIMP given by the author needs more analysis with the application of relevant materials and sources. The community participation practiced by MIMP is guided by the Fisheries Act No. of 2003; Marine Parks and Reserves Act No. 29 of 1994, National fisheries Policy (1997) and other related documents.'

Concerning **Participation**, the Fisheries Act 1994 has serious flaws. More in-depth analysis is provided in the original full-length draft of the Consultant that draws from several earlier (similarly critical) consultancy reports on the subject, most of which have unfortunately not been made available to NORAD before, e.g. evaluative studies commissioned in 2002 and 2003 by WWF and DFID, the other major donor to MIMP. The Consultant also analysed studies commissioned by the Ministry of Natural Resources (Task Force 1998, 1999) where shortcomings in the functioning of the present institutional setup lead to a series of recommendations for major reforms. The fact that these recommendations have not been put into effect since then does not mean that they are not still relevant. The full Consultant's report summarizes these studies as in the following (apparently not included in the Final Evaluation Report):

"Marine Parks & Reserves: institutional reform initiatives since 1998

The structural weaknesses of the present institutional setup for participation were perceived already in the early stages of MIMP development. In 1998, Ngoile, Melamari and Makoloweka found that "the economic, social and conservation benefits of MPRs are constrained by problems related to institutional and legal set up for effective governance." The MPRU in particular was seen as "not able to effectively and efficiently execute its functions. The main reasons have been that it is a government unit with multiple reporting structure, legally overlapping mandates with the Board of Trustees and the Director of Fisheries." (MNRT, Report on the Future of the Marine and Reserves Administration in Tanzania by the Ministerial Task Force on the proposed merger between Marine Parks and Reserves with the Tanzania National Parks, DSM 1999)

Based on their analysis and recommendations to the BoT, a Ministerial Task Force was created in 1999 to look into legal, institutional and financial implications of several alternative options and to recommend the most appropriate and feasible reform of the present set-up. The background was that any reform proposal should respond to the Government's "vision and intention to hive off non-core government functions to autonomous government agencies and the private sector with the view

of enhancing effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of services." (Task Force, 1999)

The criteria used for the analysis included whether the options would be easy and cost effective to implement and enhance revenue generation, financial sustainability, administrative efficiency and effectiveness, while retaining the social obligation towards local communities that was central to the MPR Act 1994. The findings of the detailed analysis are summarized in the table below. The sequence of the five options for institutional change given below reflects the ranking they were given by the Task Force in 1999.

Table... Summary of Marine Parks & Reserves institutional reform options (1999)

Institutional Option	Action needed	Limitations
1. Transfer of MPRU to TANAPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfer BoT functions to TANAPA; • Amend TANAPA ordinance for expanded mandate; • Repeal MPR Act 1994; • Presidential Order sufficient, no parliamentary approval needed; • Budget of TANAPA to be increased by 5% only. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no legal provision for transfer of central government functions to parastatal (but can be done by Presidential order)
2. MPRU as Corporate Body "Aquatic Parks & Reserves Authority" (APRA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement section 42 of MPR Act 1994 • Only minor amendments to MPR Act 1994; retains control of MNRT over MPR and participatory elements of Act; • Presidential order sufficient; • Allocate financial & human resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishes a new Government corporation, when Policy is moratorium on creating public bodies and rather reducing their number; • Requires heavy start-up funding & additional financial & human resources.
3. Merger of MPRU with TANAPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major legislative changes, dissolving TANAPA and MPRU to create a new organization. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lengthy legislation process; • Weakens community participation elements of MPR Act; • MPR may be marginalized by terrestrial parks.
4. MPRU as Executive Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repeal MPR Act 1994; • Transform MPRU into Executive Agency; • Create legal division between administrative and resource management structure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lengthy legislation process; • Legal base, the Executive Agencies Act 1997 has no provision for participatory elements of MPR Act, thus no room for Village Liaison Committees & Advisory Committee: "Government controls everything, takes all benefits" • Board of Trustees not transferable, would be turned into a mere Advisory Committee to the PS-MNRT • No room for focus on Poverty

		alleviation of MPR Act 1994; • Weakening control of MNRT over MPR as Executive Agency under Civil Service Department
5. Retain Status quo of MPRU	None	• Unclear hierarchy, double reporting relationship, multiple lines of command (MPRU under BoT and Director of Fisheries); • Problems with efficiency, transparency & accountability.

Source: Extracted and compiled from MNRT, Task Force Report, DSM 1999

Therefore, based on the analysis summarized above, the Task Force recommended the transfer of the MPRU to TANAPA, as it was seen as the most feasible and cost-effective in terms legislative and administrative changes required, and accommodated the participatory elements of the MPR Act 1994. The least desirable option was then retaining the status quo of the MPRU. However, as no political decisions were taken for a change, the status quo has remained in power up to date.

Discussions on reform of the organizational structure and scheme of service of the MPRU continued in the BoT though with increasing sense of urgency. The option that is being pursued for the restructuring of the MPRU at present, is to turn the unit into a parastatal corporate body like TANAPA & TAFIRI under MNRT. This was considered second best in the 1999 report. The major limitation seen in 1999, the need for heavy startup funding & additional financial & human resources is not considered as relevant anymore as finances are now available (from Worldbank-funded MACEMP), and also more staff and budget have already been allocated to MPRU in recent years. So the change is considered more feasible.

While financial constraints appear less serious in view of the generous funding made available under the MACEMP, this is no sustainable solution. Importantly, the basic question remains whether the other limitation observed in 1999, the policy moratorium on creating public bodies and reducing their number remains valid though?" (end of quote of the Consultant's full report).

ii Ecotourism Development

"The discussion on eco-tourism is not reflecting the true picture. For instance, the hoteliers' uses all diving sites in Marine Park, rural communities manage and benefits from historical sites and 30% of revenue from park entrance fees is used to facilitate community development activities. Details are provided in relevant documents."

The discussion presents the full picture of detailed interviews, both direct and per email, to ALL hoteliers and dive operators in MIMP, which are all quoted verbatim in the Consultant's full report, some of which is included in the Final Report. All interviewees complain of a major lack of transparency on the amount received and the use of the tourism fee, and dissatisfaction with the neglect by the MIMP Management of environmental and conservation tasks that are genuine government responsibility and crucial to ecotourism.

iii Investments in Mafia

‘The TANPESCA and prawn farming issues should be excluded from the evaluation since a separate study on the baseline information, competition with small-scale fishing communities, food security and the impact on the lift of ban on the export of finfish products from coastal inshore waters is conducted.’

Response see below.

iv Collaboration with District authorities

‘The author should as well consult Midterm Review reports (Havnevik, *et al* (2002) and Bryceson *et al* (2005)) and MNRP reports that discusses the working relationship between MIMP and districts as well the efforts by MNRT to support capacity building at local (villages and district) levels.’

Response see below.

Details are provided in annex 11.

COMMENTS FROM MIMP

1. Overview

‘MIMP Management considers this report to be very subjectively negative. It does not reflect in any case objective synthesis of real situation of MIMP’s objectives of resource management. In the first place the findings (which are not shown in the report) were based on a single evaluation actor whom we feel, through experiences elsewhere, is always not in favour of government initiatives on sustainable development. She does not feature a very good record apart from being interested in investing in tourism.’

Defaming the Consultant is not a good strategy of defense, especially as the insinuations above have no relevance and no basis. The Consultant has 20 years of experience in planning, managing and evaluating donor-funded development projects, mostly with government, and she has no interest, and never had, in investing in tourism.

‘Many of the findings and statements within the report are not validated with proof. In addition, the report ought to numerate both positive and negative aspects of the project to give a clear picture to the Norwegian tax payers on how their money is being spent. The report in many cases is giving more weight on popular governance as opposed to natural resource governance and is theoretically advocating the private sector to be the most appropriate player in natural resource management to the expense of the government institutions. Having highlighted this, we have several comments on this very biased report.’

Indeed, for a consultancy explicitly focusing on **Governance**, the impact on the 'populace' and the views of the stakeholders is of central importance. The very focal and clearly predominant opinions of all stakeholders (including the informal and formal private sector, that is resource users at village level and tourism operators) were, that they wanted more transparency, involvement, participation and voice in the Park management. By far most people interviewed in villages and in the tourism sector do NOT feel that participation in MIMP works as intended. This means that, even though MIMP management and staff may work hard and many are dedicated to perform their duties, their efforts are frustrated by a flawed institutional structure and

common administrative procedures that are biased against transparency and participation.

2. Background

The terms of reference which are not shown on the report, but we question the relevancy of the issue of export license to TANPESCA within the evaluation. There is already a broader professional research going on which is being funded by NORAD. This scientific study is also addressing this issue. It is, therefore, wise to wait for the findings

Given the great importance of the TANPESCA investment for both, providing a market outlet and increased income for fishers and sustainability of fisheries resources in the Park, this particular company is central to the aims of the MNRT impact evaluation. The TANPESCA plant featured highly in interviews with many fishers, including women octopus fishers!

3. Impact (The link between Park & villages)

The evaluation team ignored the issues that MIMP Management always practices bottom-up approach in making decision concerning resource utilization, that is why there is no way for the Warden-In-Charge for example to give out a fishing permit to any one if the village says **NO** to such a person. On the side of benefit sharing the team gave little weight on to issue of an increased marine resources that the villagers are being given high priority in utilizing within the zoning plan e.g. in specified use zone which is very near to the core zone, only residents within MIMP area are allowed to fish. Moreover, MIMP villagers are given resident user certificates a sign of empowerment and assurance of ownership to resources. ***(A total of 3,637 marine resource users within MIMP have been give resident user certificates)*** The evaluation report could not see this.

In detailed interviews, stakeholders in village communities and in the tourism sector overwhelmingly deplored a major lack of transparency, information, consultation and participation. The shortcomings of the present supposedly 'participatory' Park management structure are also highlighted in internal government documents quoted above (Task Force Report 1999) and the several evaluative consultancy reports quoted that all depended on field work, as did the present report.

The MIMP management is well aware of the shortcoming in the functioning of the present institutional setup, as also reflected in MIMP reports, e.g.: "The local communities do not feel adequately involved in the management of the Park. Apparently, the elected representatives do not feel obliged to give feedback to the mass once they return from village liaison committee, Park management, Advisory Committee meetings or other fora. Representation per se of local community to outside fora is lacking or weak. Apparently, village representatives need incentives in order to motivate them to fully participate in fora held outside their villages and to provide appropriate feedback or to share information with their fellow villagers." (MIMP Annual report 2003-04, p.8)

The report ought to point other impacts as the increasing number of threatened species such as turtles (increase of over 90% of safe hatchlings and number of hatches) and dugongs (two incidences of dugong catches by fishermen) plus the increasing number of whale sharks, Dolphins, and giant

fruit bats (an opportunity for increased tourism) as attributes to conservation efforts.

Concerning the District Authorities being not involved in meaningful decision making. Here the team also did not take trouble to find out who are these two representatives from the Mafia District Council to the MIMP Advisory Committee (AC). Because one is appointed by the Mafia District Full Council and the other is the District Natural Resource Officer who is representing the Mafia District Executive Director, then at this set-up how can one say that the Mafia District Council (M.D.C) functional officers are not involved in meaningful decision making while nothing is decided without going through the AC?

This observation refers to *quotes* from two consultancy studies (Robinson & Mesaki 2002, Hogan 2003) where major shortcomings in the relationship between the MIMP Management and the District Authorities are highlighted. These have also been discussed in detailed interviews of this Consultant with the WiC on the continuing situation of lack of understanding between MIMP and the District Authorities on a number of important issues. The WiC expressed disappointment on the enormously delayed signing of a Memorandum of Understanding. It was not the intention of the consultant to 'blame' the MIMP management for this stalemate, but to point at the need of intervention by higher authorities to solve this long-lasting problem.

4. Governance

The evaluator is quoting “Walley (2004)” whose literature is literary very vague in terms of understanding the GMP. MIMP has all been striving for sustainable resources use. Unsustainable fishing practices by the island villages have to be stopped. This has not been done by forceful means. A gradual process of gear exchange scheme has been put in practice. Chole Island fishermen were the very first recipients of the scheme. The evaluator did not include this nor the quoted Walley. The GMP was not known to the villagers interviewed by Walley, as to the MIMP population in general, as it was not translated to Kiswahili until 2004.

MIMP has installed VHF radios to all MIMP villages and 11 hand held radios to village enforcement units. These are used as communication tools to report incidences of illegal resource-use. This is an indicator of collaborative management which the evaluator fails to see. The reporting system has made it impossible for dynamite blasting as opposed to areas outside the MIMP. It is very simple to substantiate such reasoning but the evaluator cannot visualize this

Handheld VHF radios operated by a few people are an extremely weak and insufficient means of communication with village communities and a wide range of stakeholders. They cannot replace regular information sharing, e.g. through mass media (radio programs in particular which are heard in all villages and by many people) and frequent meetings at village and hotel level where issues are discussed. In addition, there have been numerous reports that people representing villagers in the Advisory Committee do not often share the agenda, discussions and recommendations with their constituencies, see above.

It is very dangerous to pick more information on the street and include them in an official report without working on them. The zoning plan has not been revisited since 2000, nor any changes have been made to the zones stipulated within the GMP.

“This study did not find any proof that MPAs studied have contributed to poverty reduction.”

This is a quote from a large-scale World Bank (2003) study based on detailed data ‘Marine Protected Areas, Livelihoods, and Poverty Alleviation in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar: An Empirical Study of 24 Coastal Villages’, September 2003. The figures presented in the full Consultant's report are:

"The disappointing finding that MIMP, like the other MPAs, had not contributed to poverty reduction, is illustrated with the following table that extracts and compares data of the selected MPAs.

Table... MPA impact and income generation on household level

Interview items/MPA	Tanga	Mafia Island	Menai Bay	Jozani-Chwaka Bay	Misali Island Pemba
What is the impact of the MPA on household ability to influence decisions on marine and coastal resources?	0.4	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.2
Average impact of MPA on the level of unity and cooperation in the village	-0.2	-0.8	-0.3	-0.5	-0.3
Average impact of the MPA on local culture and traditional values	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.2
What is the impact of the MPA on job opportunities to earn cash income?	0.2	-0.1	0.0	0.1	-0.2
What is the economic impact of the MPA on your household?	0.2	-0.2	0.0	0.1	-0.2

Note: responses coded as follows: -2=strongly reduced; -1=slightly reduced; 0=no change; 1=slightly increased; 2=strongly increased

Have you been involved in income generating components of the MPA? (Answer: No)	74%	87%	74%	74%	94%
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Source: Data compiled from World Bank (2003), ‘Marine Protected Areas, Livelihoods, and Poverty Alleviation in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar: An Empirical Study of 24 Coastal Villages’, September

According to these data, MIMP performed poorly on all items, similar to the other parks and managed areas. This is remarkable when considering that the other parks had much less donor funding invested into them. It has to be acknowledged though that the findings in Mafia were likely depressed by inclusion of Jibondo in the sample, a village that has completely opted out of the park and refuses any cooperation since 2001. Still, there was apparently no strong evidence of successful community involvement and income generation in the other two within-park villages either."

This report (which one, the World Bank study?) is not very analytical in terms of socio economic study of MIMP villages compared to those of outside MIMP and changes over time. Definitely the SACCOS and gear exchange scheme must have positive effects on poverty alleviation let away the increased resource base utilization

catalyzed by ready markets of the processing companies and fish businessmen from Dar es Salaam and alternative livelihood activities such as Mari culture. ***To date Tshs 140,445,000 have been disbursed as loans to 185 fishermen under the gear exchange scheme. This amount of money remains in MIMP. In addition, MIMP has contributed Tshs 20,000,000 to 11 SACCOS groups in MIMP villages whose capital contribution is Tshs 41,000,000 involving 740 villagers.*** This programme is unique in Mafia district. ***Sea weed farming is currently contributing Tshs 79,200,000 annually as income to sea weed farmers compared to Tshs 7,200,000 in the year 2000 let alone beekeeping and handcraft products.***

Detailed interviews with AC and BOT members revealed major dissatisfaction with lack of transparency and on decisions of how the money is being spent, as is also reflected in minutes of the respective meetings. In the AC meeting of 16.3.04, for example, the members expressed concern that so much was being used on MIMP offices rather than being returned to the Park inhabitants. In case of the 10,000,000/- requested for furniture of the so-called community center at Kiegeani, the AC urged the MIMP management to look for ways to make some of the furniture locally so as to increase local employment.

On the issue of loans and SACCOS: Though certainly welcomed and needed by stakeholders, loans as such do NOT yet signify an improvement in livelihoods. It is the investments done with the loaned funds, and the increased income achieved with these investments that would, after repayment of the loan, allow an assessment of poverty alleviation. Loans can even contribute to more poverty if investments fail. The majority of seaweed farmers, beekeepers and handicraft producers interviewed did not assess their trade as successful. Most complained vocally about low prices and marketing problems. This is not specific to MIMP: all along the coast, these "AIGs" (Alternative Income Generating activities) are giving disappointing results which have been found quite typical for other similar programs in the Western Indian Ocean (Ireland et. al., Alternative Sustainable Livelihoods for Coastal Communities, A Review of Experience and Guide to Best Practice, IUCN, 2004). As a result, recent large-scale programs initiated by WWF, such as RUMAKI for example, do NOT advocate the promotion of these particular crafts (seaweed farming, beekeeping, doormat making etc.).

The evaluator also failed to consider future plans and relied mainly on historical information. It is true that communication with local community at initial stages was maintained due to the WWF-DFID project which ceased by June 2004. This must have a serious setback on our activities together with losing our extension officer (he died). Corrective measures have been planned under the WWF's RUMAKI project where a strategic plan for improving involvement by the local community has been prepared and will be funded starting from July 2006. A new extension officer has been recruited.

It is indeed hoped that RUMAKI will improve involvement of the local community. But for this to become effective, the institutional setup of MPA management in Tanzania urgently needs reform, based on recommendations of the 1999 Task Force and the more recent deliberations in the MPA-Board of Trustees.

The evaluation team has not explicitly given examples of incidences that have lead to bad relationship and even conflicts with the tourism industry. On the contrary, MIMP is currently taking the burden of being a buffer of the deteriorating relationships

between these hotels which do not have a forum. Their representation to Advisory Committee and Board is, therefore, affected since they cannot sit together and develop issues to be discussed at by the above fora. The evaluator was expected to assess the hotel community interests versus MIMP objectives. *Hoteliers are opposed to seeing fishermen in specified use zones which are zones where fishermen within the park are given priority.*

The above assertions contrast with the detailed interview responses given by ALL hoteliers who, despite of internal divisions, expressed very similar views on issues they have with MIMP. The findings are all available in verbatim protocols and can be shared with MPRU and MIMP. It is true that there is no Ecotourism association in Mafia, which would facilitate dialogue with the MIMP Management. It is also acknowledged that the Senior MIMP Management has supported one lodge in a threatening political conflict that was fuelled by intervention of one member of the MIMP management for personal interests.

The real situation is hoteliers feel that entry fees (\$10 per person per day) are jeopardizing their business as opposed to MIMP objective of sustainable resource management. Hence it is very vivid that they are opposed to entry fees by their clients to safeguard their business (charging their visitors about \$100 and above) which the evaluation team member as a hotel owner is dreaming in investing in MIMP follows suit. This is an inference of her spending extra time in two incidences of official visits to MIMP.

Again, this is contrary to what the hoteliers said, see verbatim interview responses. And the consultant wants to state clearly that she has NO interest in investing in MIMP. The extra (unpaid!) days were added to collect more data to seek clarification on several critical issues for a more consolidated report, as three days on site are clearly insufficient for an impact evaluation. (What an odd conclusion that spending extra days in Mafia means interest in investment there!)

The evaluation has simply concluded that the views and issues raised by the AC are not listened by the Board without giving exemplar cases. This needed to be dealt with proof. The real situation is that matters that need to be tabled to the Board from the AC are being channeled through the Secretariat and the AC Chairman is invited to the Board meeting for clarification and emphasis. The evaluator has been misled on this issue and was supposed to seek more information.

Sources of this are detailed interviews with AC and BOT members, and the above quoted studies.

The evaluation team is also totally misled by their member by uttering that the Manager of Marine Parks and Reserves Unit (MPRU) based in Dsm may have assumed a more forceful role than intended. She should elaborately explain the over-limits of which result into forceful role, short of that she should be made to understand that she has advised the evaluation team to address an appeal to personality fallacy (ad hominem). The management of the MNRP project is directly linked to the MNRT. The Manager has very little influence to the project apart from encouraging its implementation.

Again, this is a QUOTE from one consultancy report (Robinson & Mesaki 2002), which was supported by interview statements of AC and BoT members. All are

explicit on structural flaws of the present set-up. As is known by MPRU and MIMP, the BoT is seeking to reform the institutional structure of MPR management at least since 1999, see details above. The Consultant shares their critical views.

5. Corrective measures.

The evaluation team is quoting recommendations by Rose Hogan in direct control of benefits by residents. We must also not forget that benefit sharing is also directed by the main Act. The team has also failed to explore how the communities benefit from the conservation fund through funding of public utilities and social services including contribution of education, health and water sectors. ***A total of Tshs 150,000,000 have so far been spent to support the community on these areas.*** MIMP has also been sponsoring about ***121 students in secondary school education plus offering 397 text books to Kitomondo secondary school*** and is open to sponsor local villagers in vocational education.

The use of the proceeds of the tourism fee is discussed in sections of the Consultants' report that were not included in the Final report. Members of both, AC and BoT expressed concern that there is little room for proposals on their use by stakeholders, and that stakeholders are generally not aware of how much is available, neither villagers nor hoteliers. Proposals seem to always originate from the MIMP Management and have a certain bias in favour of (sometimes fancy) equipment for MIMP HQ (e.g. the telescopic tower & computerized TV video equipment etc.). The BoT then tends to cut this down in favour of the contributions that favour village communities that are also in the list, but would find it hard to suggest alternative spending. Interviews at village level revealed that the building projects initiated by MIMP appear oversized and that they are marred by accusations of corruption (e.g. the Juani dispensary). It is also noted that the building work undertaken by MIMP does not use the much less costly and more appropriate building technology (Cinvaram) that is promoted by MIMP, which in the villagers' eyes means that MIMP "preaches water and drinks wine".

The "considerable proceeds" term used by the evaluation team is very misleading. It implies that MIMP is now in a position to sustain its management costs, which is not.

The respective section in the full Consultant's report says: "Already in 2005, this tourism fee has surpassed 100.000 US\$ per year and thus overtaken MNRP support to MIMP. If well managed and overheads are cut, this amount would be nearly sufficient to fund basic operations, which has been estimated to require about 150.000 to 200,000 US\$ in the World Bank (2003) study mentioned above. Despite of this, the management continues to portray a picture that entrance fees are insufficient, to an extent that an official delegation of the Norwegian Embassy visiting Mafia in 21-22 February 2005 concluded that, "the sources of revenue to MIMP are very limited. Hence a need to review the rates." (MNRP implementation report Sept.05)." The consultant would have many suggestions on how to cut costs in MIMP Management, and how to work much more effectively. Years of high 'spending pressure', where generous donor funding has to be spent in a short time (and is often necessarily wasted in the process) has created disincentives for cost efficient operations and for sustainability. Accountability to stakeholders in particular is frustrated by donor money that they are not made aware of and that is not accounted for with them. Depending more on contributions from stakeholders, and even taxpayers' money, naturally makes Park authorities more responsive to stakeholders'

needs and creates stronger incentives for transparency and accountability, and thus better governance.

The phrase “fees paid by the hotel sector” is also misleading and can mean that the hotels are paying fees to MIMP. It should read “fees accrued through the tourism sector” since it is the visitors who are paying the fees. MIMP has not started charging even concession fees to hotels and to non boarding activities carried out by the hotel owners.

Tourists are part of the hotel sector, and compulsory fees paid by tourists increase the overall cost of a destination and have thus an effect on tourism operators, even if such fees are not paid through the hotels but at a gate.

6. MIMP and Eco-tourism

It is true that MIMP has concentrated much on eco-tourism. Now that a Tourism Warden has been employed, promotion of eco-tourism will be done. The first task will be to establish a tourism management plan, an activity which is underway and will also involve the tourism sector. The tourism sector which the team is advocating is contributing nothing towards resource management apart from enjoying the profits accrued through conservation efforts. However, the evaluation team has used the term “overwhelmingly negative” to mean that MIMP has been suppressing eco-tourism. This also is seriously jeopardizing efforts by MIMP of training 34 village tour guides, encouraging villagers to maintain scenic areas such as Kua ruins, environmental cleaning (which the hotel society are opposed to) etc. The team has not considered joint initiatives with tourism sector in training of MIMP staff in open water skills, diving, and first aid and reef ecology. ***On a number of occasions dive centers have been reporting incidences of unsustainable resource use and the park positively responded by taking patrol measures***

This response rather reflects the generally negative attitude of the MPRU towards the tourism sector. Apparently, the government does not acknowledge the massive support to local communities by one of the lodges in Mafia, the Chole Mjini Conservation and Development Co. Ltd that amounts to up to 500,000 US\$ which has been documented in the Consultant's report (not included in the final report). The MIMP Management apparently also ignores the help offered by all lodges, especially dive operators, with monitoring of infringements of park regulations. ALL dive operators stated in the interviews that they have 'given up reporting infringements to MIMP, as nothing happens then.' In interviews it is generally claimed that the patrol boats are NOT coming out when dive operators report infringements, and nets in the core zone have repeatedly been pulled up by dive operators themselves and been taken to the MIMP premises. Not to mention the numerous taxes paid by the hotel sector to Government that also indirectly contribute to natural resource management.

Furthermore, the work done by MIMP in support of tourism is generally seen by the tourism sector as misguided. While failing on the basic work that is genuine government responsibility, as also reflected in the MNRP planning documentation (development of appropriate policies, strategies and guidelines; formulation of laws and regulations; and Monitoring and evaluation of implementation of its policies and enforcement of laws. See MNRP implementation report September 2005), MIMP got engaged in guide training and building tourism facilities, activities which should be left to the private sector which is much more competent in these fields. One-week

seminars conducted by SIDO for MIMP can do very little to 'train guides', which in the case of villagers with little formal education would take years of training in English language and guidance skills. The massive concrete campsite built at the Kua Ruins is poorly designed and does not reflect any understanding of the ecotourism market that it is meant to cater for. By contracting SIDO and the District Engineer for such work, and excluding the local tourism sector, MIMP has not made the best choices. What are the credentials of SIDO and the District Engineer in the field of ecotourism?

7. Sustainability

The evaluation team ought to clarify consultancy contracts versus implementation of work plans. It could be wise to vividly show these contracts within the report. Otherwise this is a stray of knowledge. MIMP in cases of technical support has been utilizing the District technical staff to assist implementing workplans purely on the basis of their capacity as district staff and not as consultants as the evaluation team is pointing out.

I assume this refers to the "Study on Fisheries Revenue Collection System in collaboration with District Authority FY 2004-05" that was conducted as a consultancy and funded with at least **!The Formula Not In Table** Tshs (in one financial year, as this activity was spread out over two financial years) with Norwegian funds.

The consultancy report of this activity (Ministry of Local Government, Opportunities for Increasing Income to Mafia District Council through Revenue Collection in Marine Resources -Draft-, September 2005, 42 pages) was written by employees of MIMP: Sylvester Kazimoto (Head Enforcement Unit), January Ndagala (Research Unit) and officials of Mafia District Council: Godfrey Motoki, Ishmael Mtani (Fisheries Officers), Charity Sichona, Simon Katamba. This is only one case, there may be more.

Using donor money to give highly paid consultancy contracts to MIMP and District staff for work, which is part of their duties, is normally considered misuse of funds. Do Tanzanian government regulations allow civil servants to give consultancy contracts to themselves? Donor regulations certainly do not.

In matters of controversy the team is advised to seek more information. For the matter the number of patrols pointed out in MIMP annual reports are being negated by the tourism sector or an individual. It would be advisable for the evaluator to even look at patrol reports etc. Instead the team has been influenced to simply show that MIMP is cooking data in its annual reports.

There is indeed a major discrepancy between the figures reported in MIMP reports and observations of all dive operators who are out in the sea nearly every day. This situation is not new, as similar observations are reported in Robinson & Mesaki 2002, who observed that "Many stakeholders, including the hotel staff who have their own boats on the water almost every day taking tourists out, expressed doubts that there are as many enforcement patrols as are being reported by management, and that the absence of patrols on predictable days (e.g. weekends, although this might not be true?) is being taken advantage of by fishermen in restricted zones. There is also a

perception that there is more boat use by VIP park visitors and consultants than routine patrol (presumably this is not true, but again the perception is real)."

The evaluation team is also using MPRU's consolidated financial statement instead of that MIMP. This can be misleading and may not give a clear insight of MIMP budgetary expenditure. The first place the data is based on recurrent budget from GOT and not MNRT funds. It is also absurd to note that the evaluation team is questioning the legality of MPRU to disburse such funds to MIMP as the later is a subcomponent within MPRU setup. The evaluator did not take trouble in going through the Act

The MPRU financial statements include MIMP, MBREMP and Misali Island Marine Reserve data. The use and distribution of ALL funds, including the Norwegian contribution, are illustrative for the question of **how much is being invested for the benefit of local communities**. This is of central interest to NORAD who wanted to support community-based management of natural resources above all.

There is no questioning of the legality of MPRU to transfer funds to branches. The shortening of the Final Report cut out the full meaning of this section which refers to the fact that the law does not provide for transfer of funds raised from tourism fees (the CDTF) from one MPA to another, as may have happened with the 10 million Tshs transferred to MBREMP for Fishing gear exchange in 2004 (to be checked).

8. Concluding remarks

'Having said that there is a general feeling that the evaluation team has been influenced by their member hotel operator to concentrate much on the tourism sector to the point of ignoring other pertinent issues and has not taken much of its time to explore these conservation issues. By being so prejudice, the team is suggesting donor funding to be stopped sacrificing other efforts. We feel that a more focused evaluation is needed that will consider performance indicators, outcomes and impacts.'

It has to be stated here that the sections of the Consultant's report that had been included in the Final Evaluation Report present a *summary* of observations and data. More detailed information is presented and discussed in the full report on the different aspects of the evaluation (Participation, Ecotourism etc.) The shortening and selection of sections for the Final Report is understandable, as space was limited, but this has also contributed to a more forceful 'negative' picture. While all sections, even in their summarized and selective form, do indeed represent genuine findings from a wide range of sources, documentary and interviews, the discussion of the findings by the MIMP Management and MPRU would be much easier and productive if the full report is made available. The Consultant is ready to discuss all her findings in detail with MIMP and MPRU Management.

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