

End-Review of the Norwegian Support to the United Nations' Office for Human Rights in Angola

NORAD COLLECTED REVIEWS 33/2008

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Norad collected reviews

The report is presented in a series, compiled by Norad to disseminate and share analyses of development cooperation. The views and interpretations are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.

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ISBN 978-82-7548-361-2

End-Review of the Norwegian Support to the United Nations' Office for Human Rights in Angola

Final Report



Project: End-Review of the Norwegian Support to the United Nations' Office for Human Rights in Angola
Client: Norad
Period: April-June 2008

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Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations	ii
1 Executive Summary	1
2 Introduction and Background	5
2.1 Context and Background	5
2.2 UNHRO and the Angolan Portfolio	8
2.3 Methodology	11
2.4 Team, Acknowledgements and Disclaimer	12
3 Assessment and Findings	13
3.1 Relevance of the Portfolio	13
3.2 Program Effectiveness	16
3.3 Methodological Efficiency of UNHRO	21
3.4 UNHRO Monitoring System	24
3.5 Gender and Environment Dimensions	25
3.6 Coordination and Collaboration with Partners	30
3.7 Closing down of the UNHRO in Angola	32
4 Partner's View of the Way Ahead	35
4.1 The team's View of the Way Ahead	36
5 Lessons Learned	39

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAMPA	Association of Angolan Police Women
AI	Amnesty International
ANG/03	Project Document ANG/03 “Strengthening National Capacities for Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law in Angola to Consolidate Peace”, 2003-2004
ANG/06	Project Document ANG/06 “Strengthening the National Human Rights Promotion and Protection,” 2006-2007
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
GoA	Government of Angola
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
INIDE	National Institute for Education Research
MONUA	United Nations Observers Mission in Angola
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NHRAP	National Human Rights Action Plan
NOK	Norwegian Krone
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations
PRSP/ECP	Poverty Reduction Strategic Program / Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza
PHRC	Provincial Human Rights Committee
PSMS	Programme Support and Management Services (OHCHR)
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
SJA	Angolan Journalists Trade Union
TWG	Technical Work Group
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHRO	United Nations’ Human Rights Office in Angola
UNMA	United Nations Mission in Angola
UNOA	United Nations Office in Angola
USD	United States Dollar

1 Executive Summary

Norway first support to Human Rights activities in Angola was channeled through the UN Peace Keeping Mission in Angola - UNOA, and later UNMA. When UNMA's mandate terminated in 2003, Norway continued supporting human rights activities in Angola through agreements with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva. The first agreement pledged NOK 6 million to cover the period 2003-2004, with an extension until the end of 2005, and the second agreement, with a pledge of NOK 10 million, covered the period of 2006-2007. The actual total Norwegian contribution to OHCHR from 2003 to 2007 was USD 2.9 million. Of this, USD 2.5 million was earmarked for OHCHR project activities in Angola.

Norad, on behalf of the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, contracted Scanteam AS to review the Norwegian support to UNHRO activities during the period of 2006 to 2007 and to appraise the UNHRO Biennium Strategic Plan. However, the Government of Angola (GoA) decided in March to close the UNHRO in Angola. The Terms of Reference for the review was adjusted to comply with GoA's decision and the review team was asked instead to conduct an end-review of the UNHRO activities, covering the period under the two above-mentioned agreements.

According to the Terms of Reference the objectives of the End-Review of the Norwegian support to the UNHRO in Angola were to:

- Assess the achievements of the UNHRO through the Norwegian support during the periods covered by the two Agreements (late 2003-early 2008) in comparison with the planned results, and the efficiency of the methodology used to reach the planned outcomes.
- Assess how the UNHRO has coordinated its activities within the UN system.
- Assess the UNHRO's collaboration and interaction with government institutions and Angolan civil society organizations.
- Review the monitoring system of the projects.
- Assess how the gender and the environmental dimension dimensions have been implemented in the programme.
- Consult with the UNHRO partners regarding their views on the continuation of their activities, when UNHRO closes.

A summary of the main findings follows:

Angola lives a complex transition from state controlled economy, one party rule and civil war environment to a new era of market driven economy, multiparty political system and a post war reconciliation process. The efforts of the UNHRO were aimed at contributing to awareness raising and promotion of human rights within Angola transitional process.

The programs evaluated were **highly relevant** for the Angolan situation. At the outset of the ANG/03 program, a peace agreement had just been signed and Angola was embarking into a reconstruction phase, when national reconciliation was a key concern. Establishing and strengthening institutions for promoting human rights was of great relevance for supporting efforts towards national reconciliation. The ANG/06 objectives recognized the country's developments in terms of instituting human rights and aimed at reinforcing capacities recently built as well as expanding the institutional and organizational base for human rights, especially in view the prospect of elections in Angola in 2006. However, the portfolio

was too activity/task oriented, without a deep strategic sense behind some of the actions. This resulted on a **moderate relevance** for its outputs and activities.

The UNHRO achieved most of the planned outputs for the ANG/03 and ANG/06 programs. It also gave key contribution to important tangible outcomes, such as: the establishment of the Ombudsman; spaces for human rights coordination within state and government institutions; space for dialogue between state, government institutions and civil society; the Human Rights Coordination Committee, a coordinating structure for civil society organizations working on human rights in Angola. National and international exposure of human rights issues in Angola has increased; rendering the Angolan government and society more aware and possibly more accountable to human rights.

The UNHRO was **very effective** in its contribution to raise awareness and to support the creation/strengthening Human Rights institutions and organizations. This was done through technical assistance, study tours, conferences, workshops, training and funding to state and to non-governmental partners. Its support to the development of legal frameworks for improving human rights in Angola was also quite important.

UNHRO's approach to working with *government institutions* and organizations was for the most part though mainstreaming activities within the pertinent administrative structures. This has been the case for UNHRO support to the Ombudsman, Ministries of Education and Justice, Attorney General's Office, National Assembly, and for activities with the Ministry of Interior. The exception has been UNHRO support to the Angolan National Police. Methodologically, the UNHRO worked with the *UN system* in an integrated fashion as well, through providing technical assistance from the Office for training UN agency staff in Human Rights Based Approach and to embed human rights in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), contributing to joint programming (HIV/AIDS), in addition to advice provided to the Resident Coordinator and the UN Country Team on human rights issues. The Office approach to working with *civil society organizations* varied, from contracting their services, facilitating their exposure to international spaces involved in human rights, providing grants to finance their activities to substantially supporting the formation of a new civil society umbrella structure.

The variety of methods used by UNHRO was adequate to the context of human rights institutionalization in Angola, the limited mandate situation of the UNHRO, and the capacities of civil society over time. Weaknesses in management, administrative procedures and external factors generated shortcomings in the implementation of UNHRO approaches and generated inefficiencies.

Efficiency could have been better if UNHRO staff had received more attention from management at the Angola Office and administrative supervision from the Headquarters office in relation to Angola.

There has been no consistent reporting on outputs, outcomes and no analysis of possible impacts of UNHRO activities by the Office in Angola. There has been, however, monitoring by UNHRO management and by the Angola Desk Officer from Headquarters on the delivery of activities. *There was no consistent system for project financial monitoring used by the Office.* In addition, there has been regular reporting from UNHRO in Angola to Headquarters, including mid-year and end of year reviews, but not with the level of information required for results-based monitoring.

The UNHRO planned and delivered various outputs within the domain of gender and promotion of women's rights. However, according to the documentation and to informants, *the office did not practice gender mainstreaming within its portfolio of activities.*

Several important initiatives regarding socio-economic rights were undertaken, and activities prepared during 2006 and 2007. These activities have been carried out within the socio-economic rights projects through promotion activities including rights to housing and food, HIV/AIDS, and maternal health. The environment dimension was also addressed through UNHRO contributions to UN joint programming and through the Office's substantial assistance and technical advice to the Common Core Document and specifically to the initial report to International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural (ICESCR).

The issue surrounding the relationship between UNHRO work with civil society organizations and some NGOs in particular seems to concern more the appropriateness and timing of the support rather than whether UNHRO contributed to the human rights efforts of civil society. While some informants had too high an expectation about what UNHRO could have accomplished, it seems the UNHRO did not consolidate a systematic process of consultation and interaction with a number of partner NGOs.

The relationship between UNHRO and UN agencies was not always smooth; partially due to the limited leverage UN agencies have been enjoying working with GoA, and the different views and approaches UNHRO and UN Agencies have in moving the human rights agenda through joint programming and implementation, but mostly about how the UN Country Team (UNCT) should deal with human rights.

Most informants noted that the Government decision to close the UNHRO in Angola in March came as a surprise to them. There was a general expectation that the Office would remain in Angola for at least two more years and planning with partners were adjusted to this expectation. Therefore no one partner was planning an exit strategy for the UNHRO activities; seemingly not even the cooperating partners inside the government had an exit strategy. There were many ongoing activities with various Ministries and no dialogue took place regarding phasing out activities with the Office or alternative plans.

The meetings with informants for this End-review of the UNHRO in Angola took place soon after GoA decision to close the UNHRO became publicly known. Most informants were still processing the news and its possible implications. Some partner institutions and organizations noted the activities supported by UNHRO were integrated into their institutions and they would continue forward. Other partners expressed that they foresee difficulties in continuing with their activities due to financial constraints and suggested that donors should consider channeling their support through various mechanisms. Some of the direct suggestions were channeling of funding through: the Open Society and the or through the Human Rights Coordination Committee; Direct support to NGOs partners of the UNHRO; through promotion of Annual Conferences between CSOs and donors (a similar approach to the European Union support to CSOs), Regional Human Rights network; and through UN agencies.

UNHRO local team is currently in dialogue with UNDP and other UN agencies to explore options for securing continued support for UNHRO partners' activities through the UN system. The establishment of a human rights adviser at the Resident Coordinator's office is also being considered.

It is foreseen that in 2010 Norway will phase out development aid to Angola. Given this timeframe, the team recommends the Norwegian Embassy to consider providing support to some projects initiated by the UNHRO in Angola which are currently in a critical stage and in need of continued support to achieve tangible, sustainable results. The team's recommendations are discussed in the report.

The review team directly requested informants to express their views about the main lessons learned regarding their partnership with UNHRO and/or UNHRO operation in Angola. Their inputs and those of the team are presented in the report.

2 Introduction and Background

Norway first support to activities related with Human Rights in Angola occurred since the period when it was part of the UN Peace Keeping Mission in Angola - UNOA, and later UNMA. When UNMA's mandate terminated in 2003, the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, representing the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entered into an agreement with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva to support UNHRO activities in Angola. The first agreement, signed in December 2003, covered the period until the end of 2004, subsequently extended to the end of 2005. The Norwegian pledge under this agreement was NOK 6 million (approximately USD 1,052,632). A new agreement, with a total pledge of NOK 10 million (approximately USD 1,734,386), was signed on 28 November 2006, for the period of 2006 to 2007.

Norad, Norway's Development Cooperation Agency, contracted Scanteam AS to review the Norwegian support to UNHRO activities during the period of 2006 to 2007 and to appraise the UNHRO Biennium Strategic Plan. However, the Government of Angola (GoA) decided in March 2008 to close the UNHRO in Angola. The Terms of Reference for the review was adjusted to comply with GoA's decision and the review team was asked instead to conduct an end-review of the UNHRO activities, covering the period under the two above-mentioned agreements, from December 2003 to May 2008 when the UNHRO activities are supposed to be officially closed.

The *purpose* of the review is to provide the embassy with conclusions and lessons learned that can be used by the embassy in the discussion of future support to democracy development in Angola.

According to the Terms of Reference (Annex A), the objectives of the End-Review were to:

- Assess the achievements of the UNHRO through the Norwegian support during the periods covered by the two Agreements (late 2003-early 2008) in comparison with the planned results, and the efficiency of the methodology used to reach the planned outcomes.
- Assess how the UNHRO has coordinated its activities within the UN system.
- Assess the UNHRO's collaboration and interaction with government institutions and other partners. Special attention shall be given to the partnerships developed with Angolan civil society organizations.
- Review the monitoring system of the projects.
- Assess how the gender and the environmental dimension dimensions have been implemented in the programme.
- Consult with the UNHRO partners regarding their views on the continuation of their activities, when UNHRO closes.

2.1 Context and Background

Angola present situation in what regards human rights is closely linked to its long civil war (1974-2002) and attitudes with deep roots in the culture developed during the colonial and one party rule periods.

In the last decades, probably since the 1990's, Angola is in a multiple transition, which creates a very complex economic and political reality:

From a state controlled to a market driven economy – Angola is living a dramatic intensification of the private sector and a spectacular economic growth. At the same time it still faces a deep divide between the informal and formal sectors of the economy. The informal sector is very important for the survival of the poor but has a limited political influence and is generally seen by GoA as illegal economic activity. The formal sector is usually highly dependent from the good will of the political powers to operate. This situation limits the capacity of economical actors to have a role in the democratization process and in putting demands on state institutions;

From a one party rule to a multiparty system – Until the 1990's, opposition political parties were not allowed in Angola. The main opposition party, UNITA, was involved in the civil war and developed as a strong military structure. The 1992 elections ended up with UNITA not accepting the first round results. The civil war restarted and the development of a democratic political process was further damaged. However, since that period, more and more space is being conquered by other political parties, a process that suffers from ups and downs. One important weakness is the still unequal access the different political players have to state media;

From a war oriented society to a reconciled one – the long civil war ended up with a clear military victory of one side. However, the post war process included several measures that contributed to reconciliation (such as the integration of the military leadership of both sides in the national army). On the other hand, the role political parties play in the sense of identity of many Angolans, the difficulties with the economical integration of ex-soldiers, and the lack of a process to recognize the war crimes and compensate its victims, all constitute important challenges to a true reconciliation.

These simultaneous transitions mentioned above are taking place in an environment where Angola tries to consolidate its position in international arenas, presenting itself as a modern country. Angola's importance as an oil producer and the competition around access to it gives the country a considerable room for maneuvering and some immunity to international pressure. Furthermore, the fact that GoA has a considerable source of wealth (oil and diamond) from an activity that is independent from Angolan labor, results in weakening the capacity of internal actors to put pressure on the government.

Like other Angolan institutions and organizations engaged in the promotion and protection of human rights, the work of the UNHRO in Angola took place in a post-conflict culture particular to Angola's own historical development. Angola's economic and political tendencies have created restraints and opportunities for advancing human rights in the country. In turn, human rights organizations in Angola have seized available opportunities to increase the space for dialogue over human rights and try therefore to influence economic and political developments.

A short chronology of the institution of human rights in Angola through the United Nations follows:

1995 - UN started engaging Angola in the field of human rights as part of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III). A Human Rights Unit was created then with very limited resources and no clear mandate.

1997 - The United Nations Observers Mission (MONUA) was started, ending UNVEM III and transforming its Human Rights Unit into MONUA's Human Rights Division, still without a clear mandate but with more staff and additional resources dedicated to monitoring, protection and investigation.

1999 - MONUA ended but the Human Rights Division stayed, at the government's request. It became part of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) with the mandate (Security Council Resolution 1268 of 15 October 1999) to explore "[...] effective measures for restoring peace, assisting the Angolan people in the area of capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, the promotion of human rights, and coordinating other activities."

2002 - The United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) was established in August with the task to assist the GoA in the "[...] protection and promotion of human rights and in the building of institutions to consolidate peace and enhance the rule of law" (Security Council Resolution 1433 of 15 August, 2002).

2003 - The mandate of UNMA expired in February, and the Secretary General, in his Report dated 7 February 2003 (S/2003/158), noted that there were still "residual tasks foreseen under resolution 1433 (2002), including in the area of human rights" that continued to require attention. He proposed "[...] that the United Nations Resident Coordinator resume the responsibility for the United Nations activities in the country upon the conclusion of the UNMA mandate on 15 February 2003, including assisting the Government's efforts to implement the residual tasks under resolution 1433 (2002)."

The activities of the UNHRO in Angola were formally linked to the activities of the UNDP, that is, in the absence of a host country agreement between OHCHR and GoA, the UNHRO was included on UNDP's host country agreement with GoA as a technical cooperation project of the OHCHR. The UNHRO in Angola works therefore under the mandate of the UN Resident Coordinator. While the Office in Angola is to support OHCHR's mandate, agreements and guidelines, as a technical cooperation project implemented by UNDP in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), it follows UNDP financial management procedures and guidelines. The OHCHR in Geneva provides political guidance, technical and administrative support and guidelines to UNHRO in Angola. The Angola Office reports to both OHCHR in Geneva and to the UN Resident Coordinator.

The UNHRO was established in the early months of 2003 and kept developing its activities under the definitions above, focusing in promotion of HR but, some times and cautiously, getting involved in protection. Close relations were developed with several state institutions and civil society organizations in 2005

2006 – Although dialogue between the UNHRO and GoA informally started earlier, formal negotiation for the signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between GoA and the OHCHR with the purpose of establishing a clear mandate for the UNHRO in Angola, started in September 2006, when the High Commissioner wrote a letter to the GoA proposing to start negotiations for a MoU, which GoA welcomed with interest.

2007 - A sample MoU was submitted in November. This was an important year in regards to human rights in Angola at the international level: two special *rapporteurs* visited the country later in the year and Angola became a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council in May, elected for a three-year membership.

2008 – The Angolan government decided not to sign the MoU and asked the UNHRO to close the office by the end of May 2008. The context of OHCHR closure should not be seen in isolation, but as an incident in a series of internal developments, such as restrictions to civil society organizations (namely the ban of Mpabalanda, the only human rights organization in Cabinda), limitations to freedom of expression and harassment of journalists, threats and persecution of human rights defenders (including foreigners such as Sarah Wykes from Global Witness in February 2007) and public statements from GoA officers threatening the existence of CSOs. In spite of some public statements encouraging citizenship and legislation institutionalizing public consultation at different levels, many felt that public space was being reduced or, at best, limited.

The Human Rights Instruments submitted by Angola follows:

- CCPR-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1992
- CCPR-OP1 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1992
- CEDAW-Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1986 (2008 – under preparation)
- CEDAW-OP Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 2007
- CESCR-International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1992, 2008
- CRC-Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990 (2008 – under preparation)
- CRC-OP-SC-Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography, 2005
- CRC-OP-AC-Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 2007
- Common Core Document, 2008

2.2 UNHRO and the Angolan Portfolio

The UNHRO activities in Angola were supported by various donors such as Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy. OHCHR in Geneva financed human resources and other office running costs. The yearly OHCHR-approved income budget for the Angolan office from 2003 to 2007 by donor contribution can be found on Table 2.2.1 below.

Table 2.2.1: Yearly OHCHR-approved budget for Angola, contributions in USD by donors.

	Norway	Netherlands	UK	Italy	Sweden	Other	Total
2003	296,714	100,000	79,860	493,050	677,553		1,647,177
2004	318,598	100,000					418,598
2005	437,084					500,000	937,084
2006	817,501					1,042,100	1,859,601
2007	1,071,008					1,953,139	3,024,147
	2,940,905	200,000	79,860	493,050	677,553	3,495,239	7,886,607

Note: "Other" sources not identified by country. Source: OHCHR

Norway contributed 37% of the OHCHR budget for Angola from 2003 to 2007, with a total contribution of USD 2.9 million. Of this amount, USD 2.5 million was earmarked contribution for the UNHRO project activities in Angola. Norway financed UNHRO annual and bi-annual work plans; the Norwegian contribution was therefore provided with flexibility as fund allocations and re-allocations for project activities were made according to UNHRO identified priorities and needs.

The projects under review fall under two Agreements between the Norwegian Embassy and the OHCHR in Geneva to support UNHRO activities in Angola. These agreements are:

- ANG/03: The purpose of the program is “to strengthen national capacities in human rights, democracy and the rule of the law in Angola for the consolidation of peace.”
- ANG/06: The purpose of the program is “to cooperate with public and non-governmental institutions in Angola, as well as with the rest of the UN system, in strengthening the national human rights promotion and protection system.”

The stated objectives of the programs, corresponding budgets and percentage of allocations per objective are:

Table 2.2.2: UNHRO objectives and budgets for 2003-2007 (in USD)¹

Objectives ANG/03	Budgeted Expenditure	%
Mainstreaming of human rights in the Government, NGOs, and international institutions' programs and activities.	94,000	19
Promoting the rule of law by expanding access to and strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system.	120,000	25
Improving awareness of rights and protection mechanisms by facilitating community empowerment and actively support participation of civil society, particularly women's organizations.	272,300	56
Sub-total	486,300	
Objectives ANG 2005	Budgeted	
By the end of 2006, human rights will have been adequately incorporated into policies and programs of the Government and Non-Government actors as well as international actors including the UN.	871,000	50
By the end of 2006, the rule of law will be strengthened, and justice accessibility will have been significantly increased.	401,000	23
The enjoyment of civilian and political rights will have been substantially strengthened during the electoral process.	322,000	19
Respect for economic, social and cultural rights will have been improved and the PRSP/ECP will have been implemented following a human rights-based approach.	140,000	8
Sub-Total 2005	1,734,000	

¹ The team did not have access to documentation that identifies the figures for the actual expenditures per objectives.

Objectives ANG 2006	Budgeted	
Increased engagement of the Government of Angola to their international and regional human rights obligations.	200,000	13
Significant improvement towards sustainable national human rights institutional and legal framework will have been achieved.	440,000	29
Human Rights based approach increasingly adopted by UN agencies in Angola.	45,000	3
The enjoyment of civil and political rights are actively promoted, protected and monitored.	429,900	28
The understanding of economic, social and cultural rights will increase substantially, and respect for these rights will have improved.	180,000	12
Enhanced awareness, increased knowledge and understanding of human rights by rights holders and duty bearers (cross cutting).	215,000	14
Sub-total 2006	1,509,900	
Total 2003-2008	3,730,200	

Sources: UNHRO reports

The human rights activities carried out by UNMA formed the basis for the 2003 Agreement, which ensured continued support for the ongoing activities rather than launching a new strategy. The 2003 program then builds upon the UN experience gathered since 1995 through its human rights presence in Angola, but the UNHRO was established with the clear intent to gradually shift the balance of its activities, moving from project implementation to a role of advisor, facilitator and builder of networks and alliances. ANG/06 was based on such premises.

The UNHRO was established with seven human rights staff, who implemented human rights activities through UNMA. At the end of 2003, the Office was staffed by five international human rights officers, three national officers, including one administrator, and four local GS-staff. The team could not acquire precise information about UNHRO office profile overtime; approximate figures are shown on Table 2.2.3 below.

Table 2.2.3: Staffing profile of UNHRO (at end-of-year)

	International HR officers	National HR officers	GS-staff	Consultants (1)	Total
2003	5	3	4		12
2004	3	3	2		8
2005	3	3	6		12
2006	3	5	7	2	17
2007	3	5	7	2	17
May 2008	2	5	7	2	16

Note 1: Informants noted that the number of consultants has been higher, but could not provide a figure. Source: UNHRO reports & staff, Vanessa Prytz (2005)

2.3 Methodology

This End-Review of the Norwegian Support to the UNHRO was carried out in five phases:

- *Preparatory phase*, consisting of a document review, discussion and revision of the Terms of Reference with the Embassy and UNHRO, preparation and acceptance of the Conversation Guide for the upcoming interviews, and administration of the logistical aspects of the field mission. The *Document review*, which included relevant documents related to the UNHRO activities supported by Norway, UNHRO activities in general, documents from the OHCHR related to the management, administration and activities of country offices, as well as more general literature central to the understanding of the framework conditions of the UNHRO work in Angola. A list of documents consulted can be found in Annex B.
- *The field mission*, which was initiated with an inception meeting with UNHRO staff, UNHRO donors, a representative from OHCHR in Geneva and the UNDP representative to Angola. Personal interviews with stakeholder groups in Luanda took place as well as telephone interview with former UNHRO staff abroad. During the field mission, the consultants also collected additional documentation. A debriefing meeting with UNHRO staff, UNHRO donors, a representative from OHCHR in Geneva and the UNDP representative to Angola took place at the end of the mission. The main findings and conclusions of the review team were presented and discussed during the debriefing meeting.
- *Data analysis and draft reporting writing*, when the team reviewed interviews with informants and read additional documentation, and follow-up with key actors to verify or update information received in the field.
- Feedback and comments from stakeholder groups on the Draft Report. The Draft report was sent for corrections and comments to OHCHR in Angola and in Geneva and to the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda. Joint and individual feedbacks were received from OHCHR and the embassy.
- Review of the Draft Report to incorporate comments and corrections, which led to the delivery of this Final Report.

The UNHRO in Angola did not operate with a uniform methodology for registering achievements and for measuring the impact of its main interventions. This has posed a **methodological constraint** to the assignment since assessment of results in one of the main tasks in the Terms of Reference. UNHRO program matrices featured too general indicators, there was an absence of base-line, and there has never been systematic registration of outputs or an attempt to collect information on outcomes and impact. The team had therefore to rely on triangulation using narrative program reports and key sources to generate the highest possible degree of reliability. The team generated matrices containing outputs, outcomes and possible outcomes of the activities of the UNHRO implemented from 2003 to early 2008 and asked the UNHRO staff to verify the information contained on these.

Another methodological difficulty was that the preparations of this review took place right after the Government of Angola decided to close the UNHRO with a one-month deadline for closure of activities. This meant that the fieldwork took place in May, the final month of the OHCHR presence in Angola. UNHRO staff supported the review's mission to the extent

possible, as they were understandably focused on the many tasks involved in closing down their operations in Angola. Moreover, during the field mission, the two most senior staff from the Office had already left Angola. These circumstances meant UNHRO had less time and staff for reviewing the results matrices prepared by the team.

2.4 Team, Acknowledgements and Disclaimer

The review was conducted by Ms. Riselia Bezerra (team leader) of Scanteam and Mr. Carlos Figueiredo of SNV-Angola. The field mission was carried out between April 28th and May 10th, 2008 in Luanda. The Norwegian Embassy in Luanda and the UNHRO provided support for collection of documentation and for the preparation of the program for the mission. The briefing and debriefing meetings were also organized by and held at the Norwegian Embassy. The team met with staff from the UNHRO, OHCHR Headquarters, government officials, members of civil society, and representatives of UN agencies. A list of persons interviewed can be found in Annex C.

The team was met, without exception, by a very positive and forthcoming attitude by the OHCHR staff, their implementing partners, other members of civil society, and the Norwegian embassy, for which we are extremely thankful. The team is also very grateful to OHCHR and the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda for their generous feedback on the Draft report.

This Report and its findings are the sole responsibility of the consultants, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, OHCHR, or any other institution and organization or informant spoken with.

3 Assessment and Findings

3.1 Relevance of the Portfolio

The purposes of the two Programs - to strengthen national capacities (ANG/03) and to strengthen the national human rights promotion and protection system (ANG/06), recognize the changes in the capacities and framework conditions for human rights activities in Angola overtime. The purpose moves from establishing human rights institutions, frameworks and networks to further developing and extending national capacities and testing them.

The objectives prioritized in terms of budget were:

- Improving awareness of rights and protection mechanisms by facilitating community empowerment and actively support participation of civil society, particularly women's organizations. *56% of the ANG/03 planned (and actual) budget.*
- Human rights incorporation into policies and programs of the Government and Non-Government actors as well as international actors including the UN. *50% of the 2005 planned budget.*
- Significant improvement towards sustainable national human rights institutional and legal framework. *29% of the 2006-07 planned budget*
- The enjoyment of civil and political rights are actively promoted, protected and monitored. *28% of the 2006-07 planned budget.*

At the outset of the 2003 program, a peace agreement had just been signed and Angola was embarking into a reconstruction phase, when national reconciliation was a key concern. Establishing and strengthening institutions for promoting human rights was of great relevance for supporting efforts towards national reconciliation. The ANG/03 program aims at supporting the process of institutionalization of human rights in the country. Accordingly, the ANG/03 objective prioritized in terms of resources focused on awareness of rights and protection mechanisms and incorporation of human rights into policies and programs of the Government and Non-Government actors.

At the end of the program and its extension to 2005, the Government of Angola (GoA) submitted another human rights treaty report (the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography), the Angolan Parliament had adopted the electoral law, GoA came up with a new version of a draft press law, the Commission on the Reform of Justice had just been formed, the work on the National Human Rights Action Plan was in its initial stage, and the Ombudsman was being established.

The ANG/06 objectives prioritized in terms of resources allocation - strengthening national human rights institutional and legal framework and promotion of civil and political rights recognized the country's developments in terms of instituting human rights and aimed at reinforcing capacities recently built as well as expanding the institutional and organizational base for human rights promotion, protection and monitoring. Moreover, the prospect of

elections in Angola in 2006 provided great incentives for continued support for promotion of civil and political rights.

The sequencing in the overarching objectives of the programs is therefore in line with changing realities on the ground and expected developments in Angola concerning human rights. They were also mostly aligned with the mission and mandate of the OHCHR.² The mandate situation of the UNHRO (see background sections) did not enable the Office to fully engage with the whole spectrum of the OHCHR mandate in that the pursuit of protection-related activities had been understood by GoA as outside of the Angola's Office line of activity. Moreover, the overarching objectives of the Angolan portfolio were aligned with areas included in the OHCHR's Plan of Action (May 2005) as areas identified as implementation gaps, namely knowledge, capacity, commitment and security gaps.³

The overarching objectives of the two programs are also in line with Norwegian Development policy in that they were intended at contributing to the strengthening of national ownership and to partners' capacities within the domain of human rights, and aimed at promoting women's and children's rights. Additionally, the support was channeled with a view to supporting coordination within the UN.

The overwhelming majority of the informants interviewed clearly expressed the relevance of the objectives pursued by the UNHRO. They considered the UNHRO focused on areas which were very pertinent to the Angolan context overtime. The review team has therefore assessed the **overarching objectives of the two programs as highly relevant**.

UNHRO outputs and activities support the program's purposes and many of its objectives. They also covered national actors - the State and civil society in a balanced fashion and the areas within the UNHRO agreed mandate in Angola: capacity building of human rights institutions and organizations, promotion, and monitoring. The planned outputs demonstrated moreover concern with geographic outreaching; the activities covered the capital as well as provinces and municipalities.

Table 3.1.1 below shows a categorization of activities based on the role taken by UNHRO in producing them. This table shows the activities of the UNHRO in Angola were, to a great extent, planned and delivered in accordance with the Office role as advisor, mediator and facilitator of national human rights institutions and organizations. The UNHRO developed and implemented numerous activities with clear sustainable outcomes such as its work with human rights legal frameworks (treaties, Justice), in the Education (curriculum) and Justice sectors (reform of the judiciary system, Ombudsman).

² The mission of the Office of the OHCHR is to work for the protection of all human rights for all people; to help empower people to realize their rights; and to assist those responsible for upholding such rights in ensuring that they are implemented. OHCHR, a part of the United Nations Secretariat, is guided in its work by the mandate provided by the General Assembly in resolution 48/141, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights instruments, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.

³ The HCHR in her Plan of Action (May 2005) identified four distinct gaps at the national level that stand in the way of effective implementation of human rights: knowledge, capacity, commitment and security gaps.

Table 3.1.1: UNHRO activities according to the Office's roles

UNHRO Role	Activities
Advisor	<p><u>Workshops</u>, the Office carried out many training activities, both with its staff acting as trainer, as well as using activities as a mean to train national actors in human rights. e.g. Visits to PHRCs aimed at gathering input to the NHRAP and to elaborating provincial human rights action plans, providing advice to SJA on new press regulation, Angolan National Radio.</p> <p><u>Support to UN Agencies</u>, e.g. joint program HIV/AIDS, RBA workshops</p> <p><u>Workshops</u>, e.g. inclusion of human rights into the official curricula of the school system at the primary and secondary levels, with UNESCO, INIDE and CSO; workshops in gender equality and awareness and CEDAW.</p> <p><u>Training</u> e.g. the Catholic Church of Kwanza Sul on democracy and elections with 35 traditional chiefs, the National Counseling Centre training series on democratic processes, rule of law, political tolerance and conflict resolution in Malanje and Menongue, the Union of Journalists series of lectures.</p>
Mediator	<p><u>Conferences</u> e.g. conference on the Mandate and the Functions of the Ombudsman's Office, Angolan San Conference, in cooperation with the Bar Association follow-up conference on access to justice, treaty reporting, "Forum on the Right to Food" (jointly with the Ministry of Agriculture and FAO); conference on women participation in political life.</p>
Facilitator	<p>The UNHRO played an important role in coordinating processes.</p> <p><u>Study tours</u> e.g. the 9th Commission, Ombudsman.</p> <p><u>Substantive support to National Human Rights Institutions and the State</u> e.g. treating reports, Ombudsman, Ministry of Justice (including the Judiciary Institute), Office of Prosecutor General, Procuradoria Provincial, National Assembly December 10th Activities, Case-Tracking.</p> <p><u>Contracting of external consultants</u> e.g. drafting NHRAP, National Human Rights Institution, Revision of Penal Code)</p> <p><u>Contracting of partners</u> e.g. to produce radio programs for the National Radio, Contracting of NGOs for police training, printing training manuals and information material (leaflets, booklets etc.)</p> <p><u>Grants to activities of implementing partner organization</u> e.g. Mãos Livres, Angolan Bar Association, Rede Mulher, Development Workshop, Diocesan Commission for Peace, Justice and Migrations, SOS-Habitat, AJAD Humanos, Norwegian People's Aid, Angolan Bar Association (establish legal assistance centers), "Land Network", SCARJOV, Universities-African Moot Court competition, Lawlenu Association, HRCC, ACT project.</p> <p><u>Collaboration with partner</u> e.g. NHRAP/Visits to PHRCs/Coordinating Committee,</p>

Implementer Training, e.g. Police training, training for radio presenters and journalists on HIV/AIDS, Prosecutor General's Office joint training program for monitors of human rights.

The above categorization of the UNHRO activities also shows some lack of a clear strategy and a certain level of incoherence with the role and mandate of the UNHRO. It can be argued that a flexible approach, responsive to opportunities, could be more appropriate than a rigid discipline in relation to pre-defined goals. However the evaluation team considers that a more strategic approach, for example in partner selection could have been very beneficial. The UNHRO in Angola was meant as a transitional institution and therefore the need to ensure relevant activities are embedded in national bodies. This the UNHRO in Angola have not done with consistency, which particularly applies to activities in the Security sector (Police), socio-economic rights (land issues), to a lesser extent the Justice sector (case tracking, training of monitors), and Gender. Neglecting to mainstream UNHRO activities, and especially the police program which was funded over a long timeframe, went against UNHRO's own programmatic objectives (see objective 1 in the 2003 & 2005 programs and objective 2 in the 2006 above) and its role as facilitator of human rights national institutions and organizations.⁴

Some informants noted that UNHRO did not pay sufficient attention to building national capacities to secure the continuation of the important work the Office developed. According to these informants, UNHRO tended to take a larger role than advisable concerning the delivery of training activities particularly. UNHRO should have instead focused over time on training of trainers to enable national institutions (e.g. the police command) and organizations to continue the work. This criticism of the UNHRO's approach to implementation refers to the AGO/06 in particular, as informants regarded that national capacities at the outset of the UNHRO's activities in 2003 were still in formative stage.

The UNHRO efforts in supporting various national institutions such as the Attorney General's Office (human rights monitoring), Ministry of Education (curriculum), and Ministry of Justice (mediations and arbitration laws), attest to the Office's concern with the sustainability of its efforts. However, because this approach was not consistently pursued by the Office, and the importance of mainstreaming activities within the mandate of the OHCHR and the stated programmatic approach of the UNHRO in Angola, the **outputs and activities of the program are assessed as *moderately relevant***.

3.2 Program Effectiveness

Taking into account the methodological difficulties discussed in section 2.3 of this report, the *UNHRO achieved most of the planned outputs for the ANG/03 and ANG/06 programs*. A

⁴ Some informants from UNHRO mentioned that although various attempts were made to have a more structured approach to human rights training, only at the end of 2007 the Ministry of Interior showed some interest in an approach that would integrate the program in the National Police force. Previous attitude has always been one of accepting only ad hoc training sessions. Other informants inside and outside of the UNHRO, however, expressed the view that UNHRO did not put sufficient effort to develop and lobby for a more structured approach.

small number of activities were cancelled, new ones added and some modified, but overall UNHRO achievements were based on its plans of action. The outputs, achieved results, outcomes and possible outcomes of the UNHRO projects can be found in Annex D.

The main achievements of the UNHRO were:

- The UNHRO made a strong contribution to institute human rights in Angola at both awareness and practical levels and to create a space to discuss human rights in a way that relates to the lives of most Angolans. The Office exposed GoA and civil society to human rights instruments and national and international networks.
- Through UNHRO support of study tours, conferences and participation in competitions, opportunities were created for interactions between institutions and organizations of different countries with relevant contextual affinities to Angola.
- The UNHRO promoted, facilitated and supported official and practical commitments from the GoA to establish a legal framework for improving respect for human rights in Angola through initiating a process towards fulfilling its reporting obligations by submitting a Common Core Document to treaty bodies and its initial report to the ICESCR, establishing an Ombudsman and accepting extra-conventional UN human rights scrutiny under a UN human rights council.
- The Common Core Document and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural were submitted to the treaty body in 2008. The parallel report prepared by civil society organizations was in May under preparation.
- Important legal frameworks for increasing the access to justice by Angolans, and especially for women (Mediation), have been or are on the way to be formally established. Arbitration law adopted and mediation and conciliation laws drafted.
- A significant number of national actors, both Government and Non-Government, received human rights training or information (at least 150 judiciary personnel and around 2,200 police officers). Training material was reproduced and used in the training of police officers or handed over to the FAA. Of these, 50 women representing 7 police divisions were trained in human rights. In this regard, an Evaluation of the Human Rights Police Program was made available to the Police Command in May 2008, providing clear recommendations on how to institutionalize a Human Rights program in the Police Command and increment the effectiveness of the program.
- Magistrates and technicians from the Prosecutor General's Office were trained on how to use and how to maintain case-tracking databases and on human rights monitoring.
- Staff at UN Agencies trained in Human-Rights-based Approach to Programming and Development.
- The preparation of women involved in politics was increased.
- Angolan law academic students and teachers participated in the 2006 and 2007 African Moot Court competition, incrementing the awareness of the need to introduce Human Rights into public and private university curricula.
- Inclusion of Human Rights into the curriculum of basic and medium education through the dissemination and training of teachers on the use of teacher manuals.

- Support to the National Assembly for the Yearly commemoration by the National Assembly of the International Human Rights Day, 10 December.
- Dissemination of Human Rights principles and promotion through the media – newspapers and radio.
- The outcomes and possible outcomes of UNHRO activities were:
- Spaces for human rights coordination have been created within state and government institutions.
- Spaces for coordination and dialogue around human rights issues have been created between state, government institutions and civil society.
- Spaces for coordination and dialogue around human rights issues have been created between civil society organizations.
- Increased national and international exposure of human rights issues in Angola; possibly rendering the Angolan government and society more aware and accountable to human rights.
- The Ombudsman has not yet been able to produce significant outcomes. While some NGOs felt excluded from the Ombudsman others felt included in through the consultations supported by the UNHRO over the legislation. It seems, however, NGOs are currently refraining from demanding better performance from the office.
- The realized trainings have been very positively assessed by the Angolan National Police and an increased knowledge about human rights has been created within the Police. However, a more strategic collaboration - through engaging the existing police training system - with the Angolan National Police has not been achieved and the sustainability of the training program is uncertain. There has been no study regarding the outcomes of UNHRO police training.
- The interventions with the Diocesan Commission, with Mãos Livres and the Angolan Bar Association have to some extent increased access to human rights counseling and services at the community level.
- The support to Rede Mulher and to Norwegian People's Aid has somewhat increased the focus on the situation of women and the role of women in political life.
- The UNHRO has made a strong contribution to the creation of Angola's first civil society umbrella structure for human rights coordination.

UNHRO accomplishments in terms of outputs are high, and a number of its activities have produced tangible outcomes. Nonetheless, there have also been disappointments in UNHRO performance in some of its programmatic areas. The Office management and administration has also impacted project performance.

While coordination and support to the UN system has been featuring in all of UN programs since the Office establishment, UNHRO was unable to establish a clear plan for mainstreaming human rights activities within the UN system. The UNHRO depends for coordination purposes on the UNCT and preparations of the new UNDAF was delayed due to coordination difficulties with the GoA and UNCT own issues, such as lack of a Resident Coordinator.

A systematic approach to gender mainstreaming in UNHRO activities has also been overlooked, what is further discussed in section 3.5 below. UNHRO's inability to institutionalize the human rights training program in the Angolan National Police has been a reason for disappointment. Although no results monitoring has been carried out regarding the outcomes of the police program, according to most pertinent informants the training of police officers has raised awareness of human rights concepts and practices in the police force. Additionally, the extension of the police program in 2007 to the Association of Angolan Police Women (AAMPA) generated a positive dynamic to the program as a whole. It included a previously ignored women association, AAMPA, and police women on training activities.

Cooperation and training with the Angolan National Police started with the UNMA mission, when human rights training of police officers took place. Within the ANG/03 program, the UNHRO envisaged to create trainer capacity among the members of the National Police. This was a highly relevant approach, given that the Angola National Police was growing, now reaching 80,000 members, and UNHRO resources for the program (USD 156,000) had to focus on enabling the institution to incorporate the training. In addition, the National Police launched a Modernization and Development strategy in 2002, of which training and education of the police corps, including human rights concepts and practices, was a stated goal. However, at the request of the Police Command a change in the training program took place in 2003 and UNHRO began instead to provide training, through the contracting of external consultants, as part of the activities of the Civic and Moral Department of the Police. The UNHRO also provided training Manuals in Human Rights.

Approximately 2,200 police officers were trained by the UNHRO program. Nevertheless, the program did not succeed in achieving its pedagogical goal or to create pedagogical skills among the participants, as pointed out in the recent Evaluation of the UNHRO Training Program with the National Police (*Sistematização da Implementação de Formação de Formadores em Direitos Humanos na Polícia Nacional de Angola 2003-2007*, April 2008). The evaluation also noted several areas of improvement, among of which the need for redefining the police courses based on a needs assessment, accompanied by a base-line study; improving the educational modules in Human Rights; and, the provision of an educational manual for Human Rights pedagogically focused in a way that allows the police officers to appropriate the subjects. The evaluation also called attention to the implications of excluding police women to the effectiveness of police work within the parameters of human rights. According to the evaluation, the inclusion of police women in training and promotion within the career structure of the police can make a strong contribution to improve the overall performance of the National Police as police women can provide more and better service to the Angolan population where 57% are women.

The UNHRO did not seem to have much influence over the entry point for the police training program; however, it remains unclear the reason why the program has never been institutionalized over time into the Police academies and/or medium level police institute. Over time the UNHRO built a good relationship with the Ministry of Interior and maintained good relations with the Angola National Police. It seems that concerning the police program, the Office remained in an accommodation mode regarding methodology. The two consultants hired by the UNHRO to conduct the training activities at the beginning of the program were the same at the end, when UNHRO closed activities. One of these

consultants was an employee of the Civic and Moral Department of the Police, which in principle should have facilitated the mainstreaming of the training program into the institution. The recent evaluation of the UNHRO Training Program with the Police concluded that while the training program made a contribution to human rights promotion to the police, its contribution was weakened by the methodology used.

Given the resources at the disposal of the Office, the UNHRO produced many accomplishments. But it could have done better if the management had pursued a commonly built, revised and implemented programmatic strategy internally. The Office planning procedures were erratic and monitoring has not been used as a management tool, a topic discussed further in section 3.4 below. Overall, office meetings were more occasions to appraise the status of implementation. In addition, programmatic discussions happened between officers and the Chief of Office. However, UNHRO management neglected building a team spirit that would be conducive to strategic planning and joint ownership.

The UNHRO management counted on a small number of staff but composed of dedicated program officers. The national staff had good local knowledge and network capabilities, which helped the Office in building relatively good working relations with critical government institutions such as the Interior Ministry, Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Judiciary, the Ministry of Education, and the National Assembly. The Chief of Office was also apt in balancing the OHCHR's diverse roles of promoter and protector of human rights. Nonetheless, the performance of the UNHRO suffered from a management style that failed to maximize existing capacities through building a team spirit and internal coordination. The UNHRO projects could have benefited from better coordination between staff managing projects targeting similar or same beneficiary groups and regions, such as training of monitors and of police. Internal coordination could have produced efficiency gains, avoided confusions (derived from UNHRO implementing training activities in the same province/municipalities but in an uncoordinated fashion) and generated synergies in implementation, which could have improved staff and the beneficiaries learning outcomes. Management indecisiveness in changing implementation approach (e.g. police program, relations with NGOs) also impacted UNHRO achievements.

The combined effect of UNHRO limited resources, weak planning procedures, monitoring and internal coordination was overstretching of existing capacities in the office through overambitious programming of activities. This resulted in inappropriate internal and external diagnosis of projects/activities, including political feasibility, some inadequacy in sequencing of activities to ensure sustainable results, and neglect in building the Office's own administrative and managerial capacities (technical, administrative and managerial) as well as in house expertise on human rights issues to minimize the recourse to consultants in the long term.

The UNHRO, however, for most part enjoyed the support of its partners and they expressed appreciation for the Office's pro-activeness. The work of the UNHRO with the Ministry of Education is one such case. The UNHRO support was well articulated, jointly developed, and implemented with the appropriate departments. The entry-point of the support, incorporating human rights into curriculum, ensured ownership and enhanced the sustainability of the support. UNHRO work with the Inter-Ministerial Commission on treaty body reporting is another example. Being the process as important as the outcome, Angola did very well in the first. All actors were involved with the commission traveling to the 18

provinces of the country to raise awareness and to collect data. The work of the UNHRO in supporting the Ministry of Justice with the judiciary reform was yet another exemplary case of the Office's measured initiative in lobbying for increased access to justice through providing technical assistance for reviewing the penal code and studies on mediation and arbitration.

3.3 Methodological Efficiency of UNHRO

The UNHRO portfolio of projects is composed of a number of different types of interventions and implementation arrangements. The ANG/03 implementation methods mostly derived from those established by the Human Rights Division of the UNMAS, with the exception of the National Human Rights Action Plan. The ANG/06 portfolio shows both a continuation and expansion of methodology used from 2003.

Table 3.1.1 above shows the various categories of activities used by UNHRO. They broadly fall within the following categorization:

- Contracting of external consultants or of partners;
- Grants to activities of implementing partner organizations or funding of punctual activities of partner organizations;
- Joint activities with partners through technical assistance from the Office, holding conferences and workshops;
- Substantive institutional/organizational support and collaboration with partners through technical cooperation;
- Study tours;
- Advocacy;
- Direct implementation through training, workshops, and conferences.

UNHRO's approach to working with *government institutions* and organizations was for the most part though mainstreaming activities within the pertinent administrative structures. This has been the case for UNHRO support to the Ombudsman Office, Ministries of Education and Justice, Attorney General's Office, National Assembly, and for activities with the Ministry of Interior. The exception has been UNHRO support to the Angolan National Police. Methodologically, the UNHRO worked with the *UN system* in an integrated fashion as well, through providing technical assistance from the Office for training UN agency staff in Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and to embed human rights in the UNDAF (the UN country team has approved HRBA for the next UNDAF), contributing to joint programming (HIV/AIDS), in addition to advice provided to the UNCT on human rights issues.

The UNHRO approach to working with *civil society organizations* varied, from contracting their services, providing grants to finance their activities to substantially supporting the formation of a new civil society umbrella structure.

The variety of methods used by UNHRO was adequate to:

- The context of human rights in Angola, where the legal and institutional framework for human rights has been in a formative stage, and therefore institutional support,

through mainstreaming activities and through technical cooperation from the Office, being highly relevant.

- The mandate situation of the UNHRO in Angola, which required support from and the close collaboration of GoA.
- The capacities of civil society overtime.
- The internal coordination abilities of the UN system in Angola.
- The organizational capacities of the OHCHR over time.

Weaknesses in management, administrative procedures and external factors outside of the UNHRO control generated some shortcomings in the implementation of UNHRO approaches and some inefficiency. These are:

- Internal coordination: The UNHRO implemented interventions targeting the same group and regions but failed to create synergies and efficiency gains from implementing these activities in a coordinated fashion (e.g training of police and monitors in provinces).
- Human resources management and lack of operational guidelines: The Office had an administrator and an administrative assistant and a secretary; yet program officers had insufficient administrative support, having to spend much time taking care of project administration and logistics. Additionally, most project officers had no training in basic accounting and administration, which created further inefficiencies. This was compounded by the absence of a consistent system for project financial monitoring in the Office, which made financial reconciliation difficult. Lack of operational guidelines and training for using them, combined with insufficient administrative supervision sometimes resulted, for example, in disbursements being made when contracts were not complete according to procedures. Corrective measures consumed time from administrator, leaving less time for supporting program officers. UNOPS-OHCHR went on a joint mission to Angola producing a report with a series of recommendations, but follow up in the Angola office on these recommendations seemingly did not happen. Moreover, local staff in Angola had earmarked resources for training, including training in 'Accounting and Administration', which could have been addressed locally or at Headquarters. Although some staff training took place, UNHRO management in Angola could have better utilized such resourced to improve the efficiency of the office.
- Poor internal monitoring: The Office neglected to use monitoring as an instrument for improving project and portfolio performance as well as to identify and assimilate lessons learned. This created inefficiencies since the office failed to create procedures which could improve internal coordination, enable them to avoid building an overambitious portfolio of activities, focusing instead on improving its performance on activities and areas they had better chance to generate greater impact.
- Financial flows: The financial administration of UNHRO in Angola was complex. Funds disbursements started in the UNHRO, to OHCHR, to UNOPS/UNOG then to UNDP and back to UNHRO, before funds reached those concerned. Disbursement delays were reported both in the initial stages of 2003 and in the beginning of 2004, the latter explained by the introduction of a new financial management system at

UNDP(ATLAS), of which only one person had authorized access in UNDP. The UNHRO suffered seriously from restrictions established by UNDP regarding payment procedures, when a new policy excluding cash advances was introduced during the second half 2007, which in turn negatively impacted project implementation. According to UNHRO documentation, without this constraint the implementation of the activities budget would have been close to 100%.

- Insufficient administrative guidance and supervision from Headquarters: While Headquarters has been providing political and technical support to the UNHRO in Angola on an ongoing basis, administrative guidance and overall administrative supervision has been, until 2007, weak. Country offices like the UNHRO in Angola are normally established under pressing circumstances, such as in the aftermath of peace agreements, and the need for administrative guidance and supervision from Headquarters is unquestionable. The fact that UNHRO in Angola operated until 2007 with no operational guidelines (systematic project financial monitoring, an accounting system complying with international standards, including auditing) and training for use them is illustrative. The OHCHR is a relatively new institution and has been building its management and administrative capacities and support to country offices. In 2005, the High Commissioner elaborated her first Action Plan. As part of the Strategic Management Plan for 2006-2007, the Programme Support and Management Services branch (PSMS) was established to support efforts to build its management and administrative capacities. By early 2007, standardization of procedures began and PSMS started reaching out to field offices. PSMS and UNOPS visited the Angola office in 2007, providing advice on the reorganization of financial system (from cash based process to bank transfer payments wherever possible). In this occasion, administrative and office support issues were discussed as well as appropriate measures for implementation. These measures were brought to the attention of the senior management in PSMS and the Africa unit, who actually approved budgetary support for implementation of these measures. The Admin and Finance officer from the Angola office was brought to Geneva for staff training in administration during October 2007. Communication with and support from Headquarters in general and the Africa Unit in particular improved notably since October 2005, when a Desk Officer was assigned to cover Angola (among other countries).

External factors:

- Human resources: Although the Office had an important increase in local staff from 2003 to mid 2007 and enjoyed a good level of staff stability, the UNHRO had periods when the Office was understaffed. Difficulties in finding international staff were probably related to living conditions and cost of living in Angola. Recruitment of international staff, however, was underway but interrupted due to the decision to close the office. Finding well qualified local staff was difficult because of shortage of such personnel and non-competitive salary offered by the UN vis-à-vis the private sector. Due to difficulties with recruitment, for three to four months during early 2004, for example, the Office was understaffed and only had one active international human rights officer due to the change of Head of Office and a maternity leave. The

OHCHR also had difficulties in replacing the Chief of Office, as his staying was extended beyond his own desire.

- Difficult country conditions for human rights work: The UNHRO worked under challenging conditions in Angola. It had to overcome GoA's skepticism about having an OHCHR representation in the country and work toward expanding understanding about what human rights work entail. The UNHRO also had a small pool of partners with the necessary capacities to complement its work. It also took on the task of building partner's capacities as the Office was building its own. The high demand and need for human rights interventions in the country, combined with difficult environment for human rights work, and the limitations in the mandate created pressure on the Office staff.

In principle, UNHRO employed effective implementation approaches and the results achieved were satisfactory. The inefficiencies generated during implementation were due to a combination of structural problems (external factors) and some slippage on the part of management as well as weak administrative structuring and routines. The office in Angola could have benefited from administrative guidance and stronger supervision from OHCHR, which started taking place in 2007 when PSMS established standard administrative and financial management procedures and visited the Angola office. In turn, UNHRO in Angola could have taken better advantage of the resources made available at Headquarters to the office in order to achieve operational efficiencies through training, for example.

3.4 UNHRO Monitoring System

The UNHRO in Angola had no monitoring system for its activities from 2003 to 2005, according to previous evaluations of the UNHRO (Pritz 2005), information documented in UNHRO reports, and confirmed by pertinent informants. The office made an attempt to monitor its activities on the basis of performance indicators at the mid 2007, when a consultant was contracted to assist UNHRO staff and management to establish a monitoring system within the capacities of the Office. As shown in the UNHRO reports and pointed out in a desk review of the UNHRO activities in Angola (Jones 2007), this attempt has not been followed up and the whole activities of the UNHRO have been carried out without feedback from monitoring. Activities were accounted for only in narrative form. There has been no consistent reporting on outputs, outcomes and no analysis of possible impacts of UNHRO activities by the Office in Angola or OHCHR.

It is worth noting that the OHCHR introduced a structured monitoring system to be used by country offices, which includes simple but pertinent indicators for human rights activities. The proposed UNHRO 2008-2009 biennium strategic plan for Angola featured such new system in its planning.

There has been, however, monitoring by UNHRO management on the delivery of activities. UNHRO partners confirmed that the Chief of Office in Angola visited partners to confirm and verify that planned activities have been delivered. Additionally, office meetings were conducted when the staff registered which activities had been accomplished.

Financial monitoring of projects was carried out by each UNHRO Officers in the projects they were responsible for. There was, however, no consistent system for project financial monitoring used by the Office. Most officers had neither financial management training nor

training in basic accounting. Each officer conducted the financial management of their projects according to their own system and capacity. Furthermore, the officers were not provided with financial software and training to use them, thus financial consolidation in the projects was difficult.

The financial monitoring of the UNHRO administration was weak as there were no robust procedures for neither monitoring the financial management of project or a system for consolidating financial information. Moreover, according to pertinent informants, the office administration had a weak accounting system and this significantly deteriorated since 2006 (e.g. financial authorizations, cash management, archives). The review team observed this drop in the systematization of financial documentation of the Office looking through the filing in the administration office. There has been no auditing of the UNHRO in Angola.

3.5 Gender and Environment Dimensions

Gender and environment are cross-cutting issues in the Agreements between Norway and the OHCHR for the support of the UNHRO activities in Angola. This requirement is to comply with Norwegian development policy of focusing on poverty reduction and on intensifying efforts to promote women's and children's rights. Environment and Gender are priority areas in Norwegian development cooperation.

As shown on Table 3.5.1 below, the UNHRO planned and delivered various outputs within the domain of gender and promotion of women's rights. However, according to the documentation and to informants, the office did not practice gender mainstreaming within its portfolio of activities. Informants noted that there was willingness within the Office to mainstream gender within its portfolio of activities and that the Chief of the Office recognized a lack of sufficient attention to it within UNHRO programming. However, informants also stated that gender never became an issue around which the Office came together to jointly assess their capacities and derive a strategic approach to gender, and consequently a plan on how to build the necessary capacities to achieve gender mainstreaming within UNHRO activities never materialized. Although training on gender mainstreaming took place in connection with the AGO/2006 program and the 2008-9 Strategic Plan evidenced that this dimension would be taken further into the Office's activities, the lack of technical capacity at the practical level remained pervasive.

The contradiction arising from recognition of the importance of mainstreaming gender into their programming and the absence of action to reach such a goal by the UNHRO management can partly be explained by the practice of overextending office staff with activities, which is related to management difficulties in prioritizing in light of many competing demands and limited capacity, in the absence of a more focused strategy characterizing the management of the UNHRO in Angola, what is above elaborated (Section 3.2).

Some informants also expressed that the human rights context in Angola was such during most of the activities of the UNHRO in Angola that promotion and protection are everyone's concerns and gender becomes a less relevant issue in such situation. As Angola had just come out of a long-lasting civil war, civil and political rights become a priority from a human rights programmatic viewpoint, and that these rights affect the whole population. Reconciliation and stabilization of peace in a post-conflict environment must encompass

those who were previously more directly involved in the conflict. Ensuring that human rights reach the adult male population, among others, is also relevant. The important role that women played during the war and in the context of peace building, however, cannot and should not be disregarded.

Table 3.5.1: UNHRO Gender outputs, planned and actual

Planned Output (ANG/03)	Actual Outputs
1.2. Rights based approach and gender perspective is mainstreamed into the activities of international and national organizations and in UN Agencies programming.	<p>Preparations for Joint Gender Programming were initiated in 2004 and are expected to materialize in 2005 through the reactivation of the Gender TWG. The contribution of the Office will focus on ensuring that the CEDAW recommendations are reflected in the Joint Programs.</p> <p>The Office furthermore participates in several of the other cross-cutting UN Thematic Groups such as gender equity (start-up in 2005), HIV/AIDS and information management.</p>
3.5. Increased participation of women in political life.	<p>Financial support to the Rede Mulher-project <i>“Political Rights of Women”</i> aimed at increasing the political participation of women.</p> <p>The Office organized a half-day training exercise on the logical framework approach for network members in order to enable them to present a high-quality project proposal.</p>
1.3. One treaty report is presented.	<p>Substantive support to the Ministry of Family and the Promotion of Women for the elaboration of the combined initial, second and third and combined fourth and fifth periodic CEDAW treaty report.</p> <p>Financial and substantive support to the NGO Rede Mulher aimed at elaborating the CEDAW shadow report.</p>
3.6. Human rights promotion and protection actions are locally coordinated.	Financial support to the AI Angola-project <i>“Campaign to Stop Violence Against Women”</i> .
4.2 Democratic principles being promoted during the electoral campaign.	Partnership with the Norwegian People’s Aid and support to Angolan women’s rights organizations in the program of <i>“Strengthening participation of women in political life”</i> . Training for trainers courses were held in Luanda, Lubango and Malanje. Two other training activities targeted journalists, on <i>“gender and communication”</i> , and the enhancement of information and experience sharing among relevant organizations, during a meeting on <i>“women</i>

and elections”. Conference in October targeted at enhancing programs for political empowerment of women in Angola and at serving as catalyst for a more efficient collaboration between the various actors.

Planned Output (ANG/06)	Actual outputs
4.1 Access to justice is strengthened through supporting the overall legal reform and other measures.	The Office recruited two Brazilian experts to elaborate a proposal for the planned mediation law (which can particularly impact women). OHCHR also provided an expert tasked with analysing the new draft Penal Code, the human-rights-related comments of which was presented.
4.3 Knowledge and respect for Human Rights has increased at the National Police and in private security companies	The new project with the Association of Angolan Police Women to strengthen the role of women in the police force carried out its first two-day training with the participation of 50 women representing 7 police divisions.

As illustrated on Table 3.5.2 below, the UNHRO planned and delivered various outputs supporting poverty reduction within the domain of environment. These activities have been carried out within the socio-economic rights projects through promotion activities including rights to housing and food, HIV/AIDS, and maternal health. The environment dimension was also addressed through UNHRO contributions to UN joint programming and through the Office’s substantial assistance and technical advice to the Common Core Document and specifically to the initial report to International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural (ICESCR).

As noted in UNHRO documentation and confirmed by informants, several important initiatives regarding socio-economic rights were undertaken, and activities prepared during 2006 and 2007. In some cases, however, they failed to materialize because government partners withdrew support to them. When the staff member in charge of this area left the office in mid 2007 and no replacement was found, work with this area was negatively affected. It is worth noting that a replacement was found for the officer in charge of socio-economic rights but late, as the vacancy had to be re-advertised due to the lack of qualified candidates. The recruitment process was suspended when the decision to close the office came.

Table 3.5.2: UNHRO planned and actual outputs supporting poverty reduction.

Planned Outputs (ANG/03)	Actual Outputs
5.2 Joint programming with a clear rights-based approach to socio-economic rights under execution with several other UN agencies in Angola	The Office hosted four-day training on a “Human-Rights-based Approach to Programming and Development” for all Heads of UN agencies and senior program staff, facilitated by international experts. A follow-up meeting in September discussed further steps to applying the approach to

further joint programming and to the implementation of UNDAF programs.

The Office fully participated in the UN Week on Poverty Eradication and took an active part in joint programs of UN agencies in Angola.

The Office gave support to an information project on the new land law launched by the "Land Network", in cooperation with FAO and UNDP.

The Office took the responsibility for one day of a training course for radio presenters and journalists from several regions of Angola on HIV/AIDS.

ANG/06

1.1 Ratification of remaining core treaties plus regional human rights instruments.

Two Special Procedures of HRC (Arbitrary Detention and Freedom of Religion) carried out missions and made important recommendations.

The Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing attended the National Urban Forum (a joint initiative of the Ministry of Urbanism and the HR Office), focusing on the mechanisms of participation of civil society in the definition of public housing policies.

The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression was postponed. Nonetheless, the office carried out the one-day workshop with the Angolan Union of Journalists (SJA) on experiences with press freedom in Angola and other African countries.

With the National Assembly and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office lobbied strongly for the outstanding ratification of the three core conventions against torture, racial discrimination, and on the rights of migrant workers. The issue has been transmitted to the Council of Ministers, but no final decision has been taken so far.

1.2 Common Core Document – and possibly a shadow document by civil society – elaborated and presented to the respective treaty bodies (with emphasis on ICESCR and ICCPR

With substantial assistance and technical advice from the Office, the Common Core Document and first report to International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural (ICESCR) drafted and submitted to the Ministerial committee in 2008.

Shadow document in final review phase in May 2008.

2.4 National Protection system is strengthened at provincial level.

Legal aid centers established or under establishment in three priority provinces.

Angolan San Conference supported and taken place.

The Prosecutor General's Office and the HR Office extended their joint training program for monitors of human rights; workshops were organized in 8 provinces and 6 municipalities. Beneficiaries of the training were mostly officials and representatives from the police, the armed forces, the judiciary, national and international NGOs, churches, traditional authorities, journalists, and other civil society members and community leaders.

3.1 UN Agencies have improved knowledge of and increasingly making use of RBA in their activities

The Human Rights Office promoted the consistent inclusion of a Human Rights-based approach into the mid-term review of the UNDAF 2005-2008 and the elaboration of the new UNDAF 2009-2013. The UNCT endorsed this policy.

The Office has facilitated several training sessions on the HR-based approach to programming for program staff of the UN agencies in Angola.

5.2 Joint programming with a clear rights-based approach to socio-economic rights under execution with several other UN agencies in Angola

As forced evictions continued in Luanda, the Office published in 2006 a one-page press release in Angola's (state-owned) daily newspaper on the right to adequate housing and the international obligations with regards to evictions. The press release was debated in a radio program on Rádio Ecclésia.

The Office funded the participation of SCARJOV, an Angolan NGO, in the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on HIV/AIDS Review.

The preparations for a "Forum on the Right to Food", organized jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture, FAO, and the Office, expected to take place in the 1st quarter of 2007, were suspended at an advanced stage upon government request.

Four UN agencies (including UNHRO) signed in 2007 a MoU on Maternal and Child Health. The project has been implemented under the technical direction of an inter-agency working group.

The Human Rights Office played an active role in the formulation of a proposal from the UNCT to the Spanish MDG Achievement Fund in the area of economic governance concerning the provision of water and sanitation. This project was approved in 2007 and is scheduled to start in 2008.

Most informants noted that the UNHRO at the initial year of its activities focused on civil and political rights and they regard that this was an appropriate focus, given that Angola was embarking into a transitional phase from conflict to peace. Increasingly, however, attention was paid by the UNHRO to activities supporting the promotion of socio-economic rights, within the context of the Office's mandate.

3.6 Coordination and Collaboration with Partners

During the first years of implementation of UNHRO program there was no specific forum for general coordination between government, UN agencies and donors on sectors traditionally linked to human rights concerns, such as democratic governance, transparency and judicial reform/access to justice. Likewise, there was not a forum for coordination between civil society and the UN as well as between civil society organizations working with human rights related issues. The incorporation of civil society organizations into the programming of UNHRO had to be based on mutual pro-activeness between the Office and civil society organizations, which were at a nascent stage. The Norwegian support to UNHRO initiatives to strengthen the capacities of civil society organizations to promote and protect human rights provided the conditions for the Office to take a greater role in building relationship with civil society actors.

As described by Prytz (2005), the UNHRO applied a dual capacity enhancement strategy by which the capacity of both duty-bearers to meet their obligations and rights-holders to claim their rights was enhanced. Both the number of staff (between 8 and 17 overtime) and the Office budget had to be spread between these two tracks of support. In order to achieve such strategy, which is in line with that of the OHCHR as stated in the 2005 Action Plan, the Angolan Office had to make strategic decisions to concomitantly support human rights work with the whole spectrum of the State apparatus. As such, UNHRO sought activities which enabled the engagement of both duty-bearers and rights-holders. As can be observed from UNHRO activities (see Annex D), a sizable amount of UNHRO resources were dedicated to promote and facilitate coordination and dialogue around human rights issues between state, government institutions and civil society.

From a strategic viewpoint, sustainable national human rights institutional and legal framework is an important premise for civil society work concerning human rights. The Office contributions to such objective directly and positively impacted the Angolan society as a whole, including NGOs and other civil society organizations. The role most exercised by UNHRO in Angola has been that of a facilitator (see Table 3.1.1 and Annex D) and most of the Office's resources were directed towards promotion of enabling framework conditions for human rights, work which the Office performed mostly jointly with civil society organizations. Furthermore, the birth of the first Angolan human rights NGO coordination and network umbrella organization was actively promoted and supported by the UNHRO.

The issue surrounding the relationship between UNHRO work with civil society organizations and some NGOs particularly seems to concern more the appropriateness and timing of the support rather than whether UNHRO contributed to the human rights efforts of civil society. Some informants pointed out that UNHRO failed to adjust its dual capacity strategy, skewing its support to governmental institutions at the cost of civil society. These informants argued that while the value of UNHRO support to legal and institutional

framework conditions in Angola was unquestionably high, the Office failed to recognize that its presence in the country was temporary and thus the need to prepare NGOs and other civil society actors to take over some of its activities. These informants noted that this criticism is essentially pertinent to UNHRO modus operandi since 2006, when there were sufficient civil society organizations able to exercise a stronger role in promoting and protecting human rights, yet still in need of the Office's guidance and financial support. According to these informants, the UNHRO failed to recognize this window of opportunity, inadequately taking instead the role of implementer, ending-up leaving the country without contributing to the consolidation of mechanisms that could secure continuation by civil society actors of human rights activities, including some of its own.

Other informants, however, regarded UNHRO support to civil society in the whole quite adequate, given UNHRO's resources, mandate situation and difficult working conditions at the political and institutional levels. These informants thought appropriate for UNHRO to focus on building national institutions for human rights such as the Ombudsman and State capacities for the institutionalization of human rights in Angola, and noted civil society organizations were also beneficiaries of this work. It is exactly UNHRO's contribution to establishing legal and institutional frameworks for human rights in Angola that will enable civil society to continue their human rights work, but under improved conditions.

While some informants had too high an expectation about what UNHRO could have accomplished in relation to the Office's resources — financial, human, and political leverage, it seems the UNHRO did not consolidate a systematic process of consultation and interaction with a number of partner NGOs. This statement seems to contradict with the fact that the UNHRO was very proactive in supporting the establishment of the Human Rights Coordination Committee, an umbrella organization intended to enhance coordination and cooperation between NGOs working with human rights concerns and between these and other actors. From the viewpoint of UNHRO, the establishment of the Human Rights Coordination Committee was a strategic decision to enable NGOs to exercise a stronger role in promoting and protecting human rights and a more structured and reliable mechanism for attracting donor contributions. Seemingly partner NGOs and the UNHRO did have a similar strategic approach to strengthening the role of NGOs in promoting and protecting human rights; where they seem to differ is in timing and in the quality of interaction the Office had with some partner NGOs.

Some NGOs favored a sequenced approach, through which the UNHRO would in 2006 hand over some of its activities and corresponding financial support to them as well as play an advisory role, so they could build on their experience, which would have put some partner NGOs in a stronger position when UNHRO closes operations in Angola. On the other hand the UNHRO, believing on the possibility of GoA signing the MoU with the OHCHR, which would clarify its mandate and ensure continued support for its activities, did not foresee the need to strategize its departure and counted instead on eventually handing over some of its activities to other actors — civil society organizations and UN agencies, over a longer period of time.

The fact that Angolan NGOs have already made several steps in working together, NGOs have a coordination structure, and that NGOs whose existence depended at their initial stage on the support of the UNHRO have implemented human rights activities without the support of the Office, indicates some success on the part of the UNHRO strategy.

Nonetheless, the closure of the office is likely to impact negatively as UNHRO has been a proactive partner. According to all NGO partners, the office played an essential role in not only strengthening capacities but also in providing the necessary space for them to develop human rights initiatives. But, the pace of the Angolan civil society to continue building its capacities and to increasingly take over human rights activities cannot rely solely on the existence of UNHRO in Angola.

The different viewpoints between UNHRO and some of its NGO partners, however, seem not to have been sufficiently worked out. This negatively affected the quality of interaction between them. While responsibility for maintaining good relationships belongs to UNHRO as much as to organizations working to promote human rights in Angola, UNHRO should have taken an institutional response by providing greater transparency to partner NGOs regarding the resources available to the Office for CSO support and discussing UNHRO strategy in building national capacities in view of its own resources and working conditions.

The relationship between UNHRO and UN agencies was not always smooth; partially due to the limited leverage UN agencies have been enjoying working with GoA. In addition to lack of a Resident Coordinator, coordination difficulties within UN agencies also posed some challenges for the UNHRO to provide a greater contribution to the UN in terms of human rights mainstreaming. Despite of the not uncomplicated working situation for UN agencies in Angola, the UNHRO was able to make significant partnerships within GoA as pointed out throughout this report. This has been a result of management's determination to thrust human rights forward in a way that would produce tangible results for most Angolans. Working with government structures had therefore to be one of the office's main accomplishments. UNHRO partnerships within GoA has thus been the outcome of UNHRO's staff networking abilities and audacity in confronting a difficult political terrain in Angola, led by a committed management.

The modus operandi of the UNHRO in Angola at times conflicted with the seemingly more cautious approach some other UN agencies. UNHRO management expected more boldness from its UN counterparts in moving the human rights agenda through joint programming and implementation, but mostly in dealing with human rights situations, such as expulsion of migrants in Lunda-Norte, to mention a recent example.

3.7 Closing down of the UNHRO in Angola

Since 1995, the United Nations was engaged in Angola with activities aimed at promoting human rights. Since then, the program grew, becoming more rooted and recognized by the Angolan actors in State institutions as well as in civil society. In spite of a lack of a strong mandate – including protection, the UNHRO was able to engage effectively key national institutions and organizations. Negotiations aiming at a MoU, which could have provided a fuller mandate, were unfolding since 2006. It seems that the GoA was resistant in providing a full protection and monitoring mandate, but through out the period of negotiation there was good will and expectation that the OHCHR would have a MoU signed. Only by the end of 2007 some doubts about the real end result of this process started to emerge. In March 2008 GoA finally expressed its decision not to sign the MoU and requested the UNHRO to cease all activities and to close the office at the end of May.

What lies behind the GoA decision to close the UNHRO presence on the ground is something difficult to specify, considering that this decision was probably taken with contentions between conservative and progressive ranks of government. It is important to highlight that, although the closure of the UNHRO in Angola does not seem to put most of the work done at the risk, it will surely affect the pace at which the progress in human rights will take place in Angola. In this section the evaluation team accounts for the *perceptions of informants* regarding the factors likely to have played a role in GoA's decision to close the UNHRO office in Angola. The perceptions expressed by interviewees were:

- In the last period of 2007, several actions could be interpreted by the GoA as a tougher stance from the UNHRO. The UNHRO speech on December the 10th was often referred as an example of a too frontal stance for a government as the GoA, given the occasion when the speech was delivered and the timing in relation to the negotiation of the MoU.⁵
- The timing to negotiate the MoU was probably not well managed. The period around the selection of Angola to enter the United Nations Human Rights Council was identified as the best window of opportunity to have secured an agreement.
- The visits and the reports from special *rapporteurs* on Freedom of Religion and Arbitrary Detention were not well received by the authorities. Tumults in Luanda prison occurred at the end of the second visit, probably by coincidence, but could also have contributed to the unease around these missions. Mistakenly, few people see those missions and their report as part of the UNHRO (according to OHCHR procedures, *rapporteurs* must be professionals independent from the institution). This may be partially explained by the role that OHCHR plays in assisting in the preparations of such missions, from logistic to more substantive input, including facilitation of contacts.
- The selection process for the participants that constituted the civil society delegation to the VI Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council has been regarded as a possible contributing factor. Disagreement by some members of the Human Rights Coordination Council (the Angolan NGO platform) on the legitimacy of the selection process conducted by UNHRO was formally registered through a letter sent to the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- A sense of lack of flexibility from the OHCHR, a “one size fits all” approach, when negotiating Memorandums of Understanding. The interviewees expressing this concern defend that a pedagogical, long term and flexible approach is needed to conquer sustainable progress.⁶

⁵ It is not clear to the evaluation team if a real “radicalization” took place in that period. In several occasions during this period OHCHR refrained and had the office in Angola refraining to take initiatives, precisely bearing in mind the ongoing negotiations, the issue of migrants expelled being one such example.

⁶ According to OHCHR, an overview of existing MoUs demonstrates that a full mandate does not exclude negotiations and is not incompatible with different texts to reach the same goals. It should also be noted that copies of several MoUs were shared with GoA – with different wordings, from

- The perception that Angola is not a high priority country for the OHCHR within the context of OHCHC having to streamline operations.
- The increasing sensitivity of the Angolan government to international scrutiny and criticism, in the context of forthcoming elections.

more succinct to more detailed. Seemingly, GoA had a problem with the essence of the High Commissioner's mandate and not so much the way it was being formulated.

4 Partner's View of the Way Ahead

Most informants noted that the Government decision to close the UNHRO in Angola in May came as a surprise to them. Informants were aware of the process of negotiation of the MoU between GoA and the OHCHR, which officially started in September 2006, and there was a general expectation that the Office would remain in Angola for at least two more years.

Some informants, however, had doubt about GoA signing the MoU in view of their perceptions of the events that took place during the last final phase of the negotiation, as above mentioned. Whatever the reasons behind GoA decision to close the UNHRO in Angola, it seems that no one was planning an exit strategy for the UNHRO activities; seemingly not even the cooperating partners inside the government had an exit strategy. There were many ongoing activities with various Ministries and no dialogue took place regarding phasing out activities with the Office or alternative plans.

The meetings with informants for this End-review of the UNHRO in Angola took place soon after GoA decision to close the UNHRO became publicly known. Most informants were still processing the news and its possible implications for them, for those working with human rights issues, including GoA, and for the country, especially with the prospect of the upcoming elections.

Regarding their views on the continuation of their activities when UNHRO closes, some partner institutions and organizations noted they did not have yet sufficient time to think this through and design an alternative plan. They expressed that UNHRO have been a proactive partner, a source of technical cooperation and a bridge to networks in human rights and they are not yet sure another such partner can be found soon.

Other partner institutions and organizations noted the activities supported by UNHRO were integrated into their institutions and they would continue forward. Informants from government institutions noted that these activities were implemented or are being implemented because they were of interest to the government and GoA therefore should secure funds for their continuation.

Some partner organizations expressed that they foresee difficulties in continuing with their activities due to financial constraints and suggested that donors should consider channeling their support through various mechanisms. Some of the direct suggestions are that donors should channel funds through:

- The Open Society and through the Human Rights Coordination Council;
- Direct support to NGOs partners of the UNHRO;
- Promotion of an Annual Conferences between CSOs and donors (a similar approach to the European Union support to CSOs);
- Regional Human Rights network (e.g. Coligação da Paz, based in Nairobi);
- Through UN agencies.

UNHRO local team is currently in dialogue with UNDP and other UN Agencies to explore options for securing continued support for UNHRO partners' activities through the UN system. The establishment of a human rights adviser at the Resident Coordinator's office is also being considered. UNDP and UNICEF have officers who previously worked for

OHCHR in Angola, providing them with the opportunity to establish a human rights focal point for the UN system.

In the aftermath of GoA decision to close OHCHR activities in Angola, OHCHR, with backstopping of the UN country team, has played a minimal role in providing guidance regarding the programmatic aspects of the Office in view of its eminent closure. This lack of a guidance from Headquarters and from UNVT has been particularly acute since the two most senior staff, the Chief of Office and the Deputy, were no longer in the country and the replacement for the Deputy was hired into the institution three months prior to the news that the Office would be closed. There was therefore no senior staff on the ground with institutional knowledge of OHCHR procedures and guidelines for the programmatic aspects of the Office to guide the staff towards the development of an exit strategy.

The OHCHR did send a delegation to Angola in March to negotiate the closing date with GoA. The elaboration of an exit strategy was part of the mission's Terms of Reference. The team requested a copy of the exit strategy as well as the report from the delegation but was told they were confidential and for internal use only. It is the team's impression that seemingly an exit strategy from OHCHR did not materialize.⁷ The OHCHR, however, did provide an administrative road map for closing activities and has sent officers from the Headquarters to support the UNHRO during the final weeks of closing down of operations.

It is noteworthy that the one-month notice, the timeframe mandated by GoA to close the UNHRO in Angola, posed a challenge to OHCHR staff in Angola and in Geneva. However, the possibility of closing down the Office has been on the table as long as the Office was operating without a MoU with GoA. The 2005 evaluation of the UNHRO in Angola (Prytz 2005) recommended the elaboration of a programmatic exit strategy and provides guidelines in this regard. While the short deadline for the closing down of the Office in Angola was unexpected by all, the UNHRO in Angola has been aware of the need to develop an exit strategy for its activities for a long time.

4.1 The team's View of the Way Ahead

It is foreseen that in 2010 Norway will phase out development aid to Angola. Given this timeframe, the team recommends the Norwegian Embassy to consider providing support to some projects initiated by the UNHRO which are currently in a critical stage and in need of continued support to achieve tangible, sustainable results. The team's recommendations take into account focal areas within the UNHRO's Biennium Strategic Plan 2008-2009 and what is feasible for the Norwegian Embassy to support within a shorter timeframe. The team also makes suggestions for organizations through which support could be channeled, but wants to emphasize that these are suggestions based on the organizations' role as UNHRO

⁷ According to OHCHR an exit strategy does exist and the road map is part of it. However, the office in Angola failed to prepare a document that would address programme issues, which is the responsibility of the Angolan office, despite of recommendations and guidelines from Headquarters. Still according to OHCHR, the impression that an exit strategy did not materialize may be due to the fact that it was a minimalist one due to the extremely short deadline to cease all activities and to close the office.

partners and their areas of work. These suggestions are therefore not based on any administrative appraisal.

The activities the team suggests for future support are:

Embedding the Human Rights Police Training Program into the Angolan National Police: It has been noted in this report that although UNHRO's Police training program has made contributions to the National Police, it has not been able to mainstream the program into the institution or achieve its pedagogical goal or create pedagogical skills among the participants, as pointed out in the recent program evaluation (April 2008). This evaluation also notes that currently enabling conditions do exist for the program to become both institutionalized and embedded. The team therefore suggests that Norwegian support be given to this end, as a way to provide continuity of UNHRO work to a critical area. The team also suggests that support to police women, including AAMPA, be emphasized as much as possible. This support could be channeled through the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, which has been the former implementation partner of the UNHRO for the Police Training program.

Support for promoting women participation in political life: UNHRO provided support to partners' activities aimed at increasing the political participation of women. At this juncture, it is import to continue such support in view of upcoming elections in Angola. The team suggests the support of programs that target women in general but greater emphasis on poor women. In principle the support can also be channeled through the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, which already supports organizations that promote political debates between political parties among other activities related to the upcoming elections. Norwegian People's Aid was also a partner of the UNHRO in what relates to gender issues and women empowerment in politics.

Support to the Angolan participation in the African Moot Court competition: As noted in this report, UNHRO made a strong contribution to introduce human right to primary and secondary school curriculum. The Office had been providing support to Angolan law academic students and teachers to participate in the African Moot Court competition as part of its efforts to extend human rights to the curriculum of all universities in Angola. Further support to Angolan participation in the upcoming African Moot Court competitions as well as promotion of a dialogue with universities to establish human rights into the curriculum of Law Schools are highly relevant. Continued support to this program, extending it to the promotion of human rights into the curricula of public and private Law Schools, could be achieved through the Angolan Bar Association (*Associação dos Advogados Angolanos*), or alternatively, through the Open Society. The team recommends consideration of prioritizing support to the participation of women, especially those of poor backgrounds.

Continued support to the Reform of the Judiciary: The UNHRO was providing technical assistance to the Reform of the Judiciary and made important contributions to the arbitration and mediation laws. The team suggests the secondment of a Technical Assistance to the UNDP team currently working with the Ministry of Justice in this project. This secondee should have a solid, practical background in human rights and judicial reform as well as strong management skills. If agreeable to the UNDP, the purpose of this Technical Assistance would be to lead or assisting in leading the UNDP project and therefore provide

greater focus on the purposes and sequencing of the reform process. This should include achieving better integration of formal and traditional justice systems.

5 Lessons Learned

The team directly requested informants to express their views about the main lessons learned regarding their partnership with UNHRO and/or UNHRO operation in Angola. The lessons learned presented in this section reflects those provided by informants but also additional inputs from the review team. For clarification purpose, “lessons learned” refer to knowledge derived from stakeholders’ experience with the implementation of UNHRO activities in Angola and from the evaluation of UNHRO activities; they identify *strengths and weaknesses* of program design and implementation.

- Mainstream activities into institutions and organizations to ensure ownership and sustainability.
- Early on build capacity of staff to mainstream gender, but providing instruments they can use. Use consultants who have had experience in implementation.
- Use indicators that can actually be instrumental for officers and managers in monitoring the projects.
- A structured but simple monitoring system is useful for improving project and portfolio management and performance.
- The role of facilitator and mediator should be more exercised than the role of protagonist.
- Proper assessment of projects/programs, including political feasibility, is important for effectiveness of operation.
- Good flow of communication, information and support between OHCHR Headquarters and the country office is key for enhancing the comparative advantages of the institution.
- Selection of management personnel for the country office by OHCHR in a way that complements skills and knowledge in the managerial and administrative aspects of a country office is a significant contribution for achieving an effective and efficient operation.
- OHCHR adoption of a staff rotation policy is important and it becomes increasingly operational, with more country offices. Such policy is particularly important in countries where work with human rights is challenging institutionally and politically and living conditions difficult, and therefore the need to assess staff rotation in view of maintaining management performance and the diplomatic skills that are so important to keep an appropriate and flexible approach.
- OHCHR must secure that staff conduct is in line with the institution’s mandate. Any suspicion of misconduct should be fully investigated according to OHCHR guidelines.
- A small, quick response team to support possible emergencies at country offices such as abrupt office closure can secure the smoother closure of operations and transition of many human rights activities from the country office to alternatives institutions

and organizations.⁸ OHCHR could consider adopting a procedure of a MoU with another UN agency to hand over UNHRO activities. A policy on rapid response to crises and emergencies, with clear guiding principles, could also be developed.

⁸ The quick response team here suggested would be formed by experienced staff exercising their normal functions within OHCHR, but their TOR would include the function of “roving officers” in case of emergencies, in which case they can be called to emergency sites at short notice. This team should include an experienced staff able to guide and support the country staff in developing and implementing an exit strategy.

