EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

Norad

'Striking the Balance'

Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis

ANNEX 1-12

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Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

An Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria crisis

Terms Of Reference

Introduction and rationale

1. Norway allocated about 2.8 billion NOK to assist in humanitarian crises in 2014, mainly through multilateral contributions and NGOs. Of this, 24% (NOK 688 million)[1] were allocated to Middle East countries. With NOK 511 million, Syria and neighbouring countries[2] was the second biggest recipient of Norwegian humanitarian assistance, and Norway was the eight biggest bilateral donor to the Syria-crisis in 2014. The volume has increased every year since the start of the crisis in 2011. Based on recent parliamentary debates, the budget is expected to further increase significantly in 2015 and 2016. This reflects that what was an acute humanitarian crisis in Syria in 2011 has become a long-term, complex humanitarian challenge requiring international engagement over many years.

2. Several previous evaluations have pointed to the capacity in the aid administration as one factor that may limit the effectiveness of Norwegian development assistance. A review of the humanitarian policy (2011) noted that Norway's limited ability to ensure that projects actually benefit beneficiaries on the ground as much as possible is directly tied to Norway's limited staff resources, which appear disproportionate to the amount of funding and number of funded initiatives.[3] On this background, the organisation and management of Norwegian assistance is especially important. In the case of Syria, the main responsibility is with the Section for Humanitarian Affairs and the Section for the Middle East and North Africa within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Norwegian embassies in Amman, Ankara and Beirut.[4] Norway rarely implements humanitarian assistance directly, but normally works through partnerships with multilateral organisations, NGOs and governments. A key question is therefore whether the Norwegian aid management system has a good organisational set up to enable optimal allocation of funds to different implementing partners, as well as to follow-up the quality and the results of the partners' efforts.

3. Previous evaluations of humanitarian assistance have shown that it may sometimes be difficult to identify a coherent strategy behind Norwegian efforts, and different initiatives (and policy areas) may pull in different directions.[5] Evaluations have also found that there tend to be weak

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[1] This includes assistance to Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine.

[2] Allocation in million NOK: Regional: 170; Syria 197; Lebanon: 99; Jordan 30; Turkey; 15

[3] *Midterm Review of Norway's Humanitarian Policy*. Norad Report 22/2011.

[4] In this document, 'the Norwegian aid management system', in short 'Norway', refer to any of these or other units involved in the Norwegian response to the Syria crisis

[5] For example, the most fundamental finding in the evaluation of the Norwegian assistance to Haiti after the earthquake was the lack of a documented country strategy for the assistance: http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-

synergies between the short-term humanitarian assistance and the long-term development work. The MFA has a general policy for humanitarian affairs, published in 2008, before the start of the conflict in Syria.[6] There is no written strategy for Norwegian assistance related to Syria at this point. Syria is not one of the 'focus countries' for Norwegian development assistance – the twelve countries identified for particular efforts to improve the effectiveness of Norwegian development assistance, and for which specific country strategies are planned.[7]

4. So far, no higher-level reviews, assessments or evaluations have been carried out of the Norwegian assistance related to Syria. An evaluation at this stage can identify where Norway's efforts are strong and where there is room for improvement, and hence contribute to make some readjustments to improve future assistance to Syria.

Purpose and objectives

5. The overall purpose of this evaluation is to contribute to effective and high quality Norwegian assistance to Syria and the neighbouring countries in the future. The main users are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian embassies of Amman, Ankara and Beirut.

6. The main objectives will be:
    *   To map the organisational set-up underpinning Norwegian assistance related to the Syria crisis, and key aspects of its strategic planning and management
    *   To assess whether this set-up is optimal with regard to enabling effective assistance related to the Syria crisis, given the resources available in Norway's aid management system
    *   To provide recommendations on the optimal set-up for future assistance to Syria

Scope and Evaluation object

7. The evaluation object is the planning, organisation and management set-up of Norwegian assistance to Syria and neighbouring countries as of today. It will be necessary to go back to 2011 to understand the background for the current set-up and see whether this has changed based on developments in the conflict. Although the evaluation object is limited to Norwegian assistance to Syria and the neighbouring countries, emphasis will be on general aspects of Norwegian aid management that can be of relevance to comparable situations and contexts elsewhere.

Evaluation questions

8. The following evaluation questions will guide the evaluation:

    1. *How is the Norwegian assistance to Syria planned, organised and managed?*

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ny/filarkiv/evalueringsavdelingens-filer/evaluation-of-norways-support-to-haiti-after-the-2010-earthquake.pdf
[6] *Norway's Humanitarian Policy.* The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008.
[7] These countries are divided in two groups. Vulnerable states: Afghanistan, Haiti, Mali, Palestine, Somalia and South-Sudan, and other countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal and Tanzania.

- o The Syria crisis has developed from an acute crisis to be both acute and long-term, and the volume has increased. How has this changed the organisation and management of the Norwegian assistance?
- o What is the total number of staff working on Syria related assistance and what is the total number of projects?
- o How do different departments and units in the MFA collaborate on issues related to the Syria crisis?
- o What is the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vs. the embassies?
- o Who makes decisions, how and on which basis are decisions made, and how does one make sure that decisions are implemented at different levels: Overall strategic decisions, decisions on allocation of funds to different partners, and management within each partnership?
- o What is the rationale behind the choice of (implementing) partners?
- o How does MFA/embassies follow up the different partners?
- o How does MFA/embassies follow up on results?
- o How does Norway ensure the quality of the partner's efforts?
- o How does the Norwegian set-up compare with other comparable agencies?

2. *What are the existing systems for learning?*
   a. What role does the humanitarian policy play in Norway's assistance to Syria?
   b. What systems are in place for the use of research and evaluations from other crises and from other agencies involved in the Syria crisis?
   c. How does Norway ensure that lessons learned and experiences gained from its ongoing operations are used for learning, and to adjust the strategic direction of Norwegian assistance?

3. *Is the current set-up optimal for channelling aid to Syria?*
   a. To what extent does the organisational and management set-up enable optimal use of all available manpower and expertise to facilitate efficient and effective Norwegian assistance to Syria?
   b. How does the set-up enable flexibility and adaptation to the continuously changing contexts and challenges?
   c. To what extent are humanitarian and development activities coherent, and how are these efforts coherent connected with other Norwegian initiatives in Syria and neighbouring countries?
   d. How can the current set-up be improved?
   e. What are the areas of best practices that Norway can learn from in potential future crises?

Methodology

9. The evaluation team will propose an outline of a methodological approach that optimizes the possibility of producing evidence-based assessments. All parts of the evaluation shall adhere to recognised evaluation principles and the OECD Development Assistance Committee's quality standards for development evaluation, as well as relevant guidelines from the Evaluation Department. The methodological approach should:
   - Rely on a cross-section of data sources and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, including in-depth interviews) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means.

- Where possible use quantitative data (i.e. on size of funds, number of staff, number of projects etc).
- Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

10. It shall include the following components:
- <u>Document review:</u> The consultants shall collect and review all relevant documents based on systematic searches in archives and direct contact with relevant persons and units in MFA, embassies and possibly Norad.
- <u>Mapping and analysis:</u> The collected documents shall be reviewed and analysed, leading to a mapping of the organisation, planning and management of Norwegian assistance to Syria and neighbouring countries.
- <u>Interviews:</u> Interviews with staff in MFA Norway and in the embassies of Amman, Ankara and Beirut, in addition to a selection of implementing partners if available. This requires visits to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.
- <u>Comparison with two or more other agencies:</u> The evaluation should compare the Norwegian organisational and management set-up with two or more other aid comparable agencies suggested by the evaluation team. This will primarily be done through a review of existing documentation, supplemented by phone interviews.

11. The evaluation team may propose an alternative approach that responds to the purpose and objectives in this Terms of Reference in other ways than those laid out above, demonstrating comparable rigor and ability to respond to the evaluation questions.

Organisation of the evaluation

12. The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation department, Norad. The evaluation team will report to the Evaluation department through the team leader. The team leader shall be in charge of all deliveries and will report to the Evaluation department on the team's progress, including any problems that may jeopardise the assignment. The Evaluation department and the team shall emphasize transparent and open communication with the stakeholders. Regular contact between the evaluation manager, team and stakeholders will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process. All decisions concerning the interpretation of these Terms of Reference, and all deliverables are subject to approval by the Evaluation department.

13. The team should consult widely with stakeholders pertinent to the assignment. Stakeholders will be asked to comment on the draft inception report and the draft final report. In addition, experts or other relevant parties may be invited to comment upon reports or specific issues during the process. The evaluation team shall take note of all comments received from all stakeholders. Where there are significant divergence of views between the evaluation team and stakeholders, this shall be reflected in the final report. Quality assurance shall be provided by the institution delivering the consultancy services prior to submission of all deliverables. Access to archives and statistics will be facilitated by Norad and stakeholders.

Budget and deliverables

14. The evaluation will be budgeted with a maximum input of 90 days of work.

15. The deliverables consist of the following outputs:
- Inception report not exceeding 20 pages to be approved by the Evaluation department

- Draft report. After circulation to the stakeholders, the Evaluation department will provide feedback
- Final report not exceeding 25,000 words (approx. 40 pages) excluding summary and annexes
- Oral presentation at a seminar in Oslo
- Policy brief not exceeding 4 pages

16. All reports shall be prepared in accordance with the Evaluation Department's guidelines and shall be submitted in electronic form in accordance with the progress plan specified in these Terms of Reference or later revisions. The Evaluation Department retains the sole rights with respect to distribution, dissemination and publication of the deliverables.

Phases and deadlines

17. The evaluation will be organised into four work phases; (i) inception phase; (ii) country visits and interviews; (iii) analysis and report writing; and (iv) dissemination. The main parts will be carried out over the period October 2015 – March 2016, while dissemination is planned for spring 2016. Each phase is associated with certain deliverables, specified below.

What	Who	When
Signing of contract	The Evaluation Department and Evaluation Team	October 2015
Draft Inception Report	Evaluation Team	November 9th
Final Inception Report	Evaluation Team	December 7th
Country visits, interviews and analysis	Evaluation Team	December/January
Draft Report	Evaluation Team	February 15th
Final Report	Evaluation Team	March 15th
Dissemination Seminar	The Evaluation department (presentation by team leader)	March/April

Annex 2: Timeline of the crisis

The timeline below provides a very brief overview of the main events and international responses in the crisis. More details are available in the inter-agency Syria Common Context Analysis, available at:
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/syria_crisis_common_context_analysis_june_2014.pdf

Figure 1: Timeline of the Syria regional crisis

Year	Evolution of the Crisis	International response
2011	Demonstrations across the country in the spring result in a military response and the detention of thousands of activists by the Syrian government First refugees begin to arrive in Jordan	• UN agencies and NGOs begin to work together in March in Jordan and Lebanon to respond to refugees
2012	Influx of refugees to Jordan and Lebanon, up to 500,000 by year end	• Jordan opens Zaatari refugee camp in July 2012 • UNHCR develops Syria Regional Response Plan, March 2012 • UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria attempts to develop a peace plan with ceasefire • UN declares Syria in a state of civil war in June
2013	Numbers of refugees continues to grow dramatically, reaching 1.4 million by the middle of 2013 and 2.3 million by the end of the year, primarily to Jordan and Lebanon, but increasingly to Turkey. Concerns grow about persons at risk in Syria	• UNSC Resolution 2118 on the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons agreed in September • First Pledging Conference for Syria results in 43 member states pledging US$ 1.5 billion
2014	Crisis escalates significantly, with 12 million Syrians having left their homes, 4 million refugees, mainly in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, but with the majority within the country itself In August 2014, crisis begins in Iraq, with Islamic State taking control of large parts of northern Iraq and then	• First Regional Refugee and Resilience Response Plan (3RP) issued December 2014 • Whole of Syria Approach (September 2014) developed • Second Pledging conference for Syria raises $2.3 billion • UNSC Resolutions:

7

	in eastern Syria	o Resolution 2139 on humanitarian access
		o Resolutions 2165 and 2191 enables cross-border support
		o Resolution 2170 condemning gross, widespread of human rights by extremist groups in Iraq, Syria
		o Resolution 2178 condemning violent extremism
2015	Refugee numbers grow to over 4.2 million Syrians, with over 2 million in Turkey, over 1 million in Lebanon and over 600,000 in Jordan	• Resolution 2209 condemns the use of chlorine gas as a weapon and 2235 establishing mechanisms to identify perpetrators • Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and Strategic Response Plan (SRP) developed • Third Pledging Conference for Syria raises $3.8 billion
2016	Refugee numbers continue to swell, with over 4.8 million 'persons of concern' to UNCHR; numbers in Jordan and Lebanon relatively stable, but Turkey hosting 2.7 million people.	• Joint Syria Crisis Conference (4 February 2016) hosted by governments of Norway, UK, Kuwait and Germany, and the UN raises over $12 billion.

Annex 3: Principles and commitments relevant to the evaluation

The evaluation explicitly did not seek to address the *adherenc*e of Norwegian assistance to the principles and commitments below, but rather the extent to which the planning, organisation and management of the aid management system <u>supports and enables</u> their implementation.

1. Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship

See http://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/principles-good-practice-of-ghd/principles-good-practice-ghd.html

Objectives and definition of humanitarian action

1. The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.

2. Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; impartiality, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; neutrality, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and independence, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

3. Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

General principles

4. Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.

5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.

6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.

7. Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.

8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.

9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.

10. Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action. Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability

Good Practices in Donor Financing, Management and Accountability

(a) Funding

11. Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.

12. Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations.

13. While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.

14. Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

(b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation

15. Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.

16. Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.

17. Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.

18. Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.

19. Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.

20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

(c) Learning and accountability

21. Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.

22. Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.

23. Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.

2. International Humanitarian Principles

See https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf

- **Humanity -** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.

- **Neutrality -** Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature

- **Impartiality -**Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions

- **Independence -** Humanitarian aid must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented

3.Principles for working in fragile situations

http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/43463433.pdf

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Do No Harm
3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective
4. Prioritize prevention
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives.
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts.
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors.
9. Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion.

Annex 4 Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation questions	Methods	Judgement criteria	Data sources	Judgement plus evidence
RELEVANCE/APPROPRIATENESS				
To what extent do existing *institutional systems and structures* for Norway's assistance to the Syria crisis enable flexibility and adaptation of response?	• Timeline construction, including of key decision points • Systematic documentary review of detailed mapping data, applying structured tools • Semi-structured interviews (MFA staff at HQ and Embassy level: partners at HQ and Embassy level)	• Extent to which scope for flexibility is integrated into planning and budgeting processes • Extent to which internal management structures actively enable flexibility and adaptation • Planning, programming and approval procedures enable agility in partnerships when conditions change	• Interview data • Project documents sourced via HQ, embassy and partner staff, MFA archives and Norad archives • Partnership agreements • Annual Budget proposals for MFA and Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs (*fordelingsnotater)*	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
To what extent has the *planning and management* of Norway's assistance been undertaken with a view to ensuring appropriateness?		• Degree to which the response to the Syria crisis has been organized within a strategic framework • Degree to which strategic planning or thinking has been informed by data / information arising from country level • Extent to which annual planning reflects the dynamics of the evolving crisis		• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
To what extent does the current aid management system emphasise the *use of learning* in ensuring relevant and appropriate Norwegian assistance to the crisis?		• Learning systems in place and active • Degree to which decision taken have been informed by analysis and/or research, including from other complex crises • Evidence of lesson learning / data from monitoring and evaluation systems applied in programme /		• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all

		strategy design / decision-making		
EFFECTIVENESS				
To what extent does the Norwegian aid management system enable optimal *choice of partners* and *sector of intervention?*	• Systematic documentary review of detailed mapping data, applying structured tools • Semi-structured interviews (MFA staff at HQ and Embassy level: partners at HQ and Embassy level)	• Partner selection processes integrate clear criteria for comparative advantage in relation to need • Range of partners reflects an appropriate balance of capabilities for achieving intended aims of portfolio • Individual sectors of intervention based on clear analysis of need • Composite sectors of intervention appropriately constructed in relation to intended aims of portfolio	• Interview data, including with key partners (UN and NGO) • Project documents sourced via HQ, embassy and partner staff, MFA archives and Norad archives, including monitoring and evaluation information • Partnership agreements (sample) • Annual Budget proposals for MFA and Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs (*fordelingsnotater)*	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
To what extent does the aid management system ensure optimal *allocation of funds?*		• Decision-making processes for funding based on criteria which reflect intended aims of the portfolio • Funding allocations reflect intended priorities of portfolio		• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
To what extent does the aid management system *emphasise follow-up* on the quality and results of the partners' efforts?		• Extent to which monitoring and evaluation systems emphasise the quality of aid and its results • Extent to which monitoring and evaluation systems are implemented • Extent to which information from monitoring and evaluation systems informs planning/decisions		• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all

EFFICIENCY				
To what extent do Norway's *decision-making processes* enable swift and timely delivery of assistance?	• Tracking of decision-making systems • Detailed mapping of sample of projects for speed of decision-making • Analysis of staffing data from mapping • Semi-structured interviews (MFA staff at HQ and Embassy level: partners at HQ and Embassy level)	• Organisational structure of decision-making systems supports timely implementation • Management systems support swift decision-making • Procedures for managing partnership agreements support speed of implementation	• Interviews, including with MFA staff at HQ and Embassy level and with partners • Project documents sourced via HQ, embassy and partner staff, MFA archives and Norad archives	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
To what extent does the organisational and management set-up enable *optimal use of available manpower and expertise* to facilitate efficient Norwegian assistance?		• Staffing numbers adequate compared to portfolio scale • Staff have adequate technical expertise in relation to portfolio composition • Evidence that external expertise drawn in when gaps exist	• Staffing numbers (as far as feasible) • Analysis of total budget allocations to the Syria response and those at country level • Annual Budget proposals for MFA and Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs (*fordelingsnotater)*	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
COHERENCE				
To what extent are activities being implemented as part of a *coherent portfolio*, rather than as piecemeal individual activities?	• Systematic documentary review of detailed mapping data, applying structured tools • Semi-structured interviews (MFA staff at HQ and Embassy level: partners at HQ and Embassy level) • Detailed mapping of sample of projects for integration with other	• Extent to which initiatives are geared to a set of overarching intended results for the portfolio (including humanitarian results) • Extent to which annual plans indicate a series of inter-related initiatives (rather than a set of piecemeal projects) • Extent to which responses are designed for coherence with other Norwegian initiatives in Syria and neighbouring countries	• Interview data (MFA staff at HQ and country level) • Project documents sourced via HQ, embassy and partner staff, MFA archives and Norad archives • Strategic documentation including the Humanitarian Policy	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all

To what extent is Norwegian aid to the Syria crisis guided by *a strategic approach?*	initiatives	• Extent to which the response is guided/informed by the Humanitarian Policy • Evidence of a strategic design underlying portfolio content (partnerships/initiatives)	and any updates • Partnership agreements • Annual Budget proposals for MFA and Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs (*fordelingsnotater*)	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
CONNECTEDNESS				
To what extent does the current aid management system require the *alignment of activities* with those of key partners?	• Systematic documentary review of detailed mapping data, applying structured tools • Semi-structured interviews (MFA staff at HQ and Embassy level: partners at HQ and Embassy level) • Detailed mapping of sample of projects for alignment with partners	• Extent to which partnership agreements require alignment with key partners • Extent to which the selection of initiatives is conditional upon demonstrating alignment with other relevant initiatives • Extent to which alignment is reviewed and reported upon as part of follow up procedures	• Interviews with MFA staff and partners, at HQ and country levels • Project documents sourced via HQ, embassy and partner staff, MFA archives and Norad archives • Partnership agreements • Annual Budget proposals for MFA and Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs (*fordelingsnotater*)	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
COVERAGE				
To what extent does the aid management system prioritise the targeting of Norway's humanitarian and development activities to the needs of specific groups requiring assistance?	• Detailed mapping of sample of projects for clear statements on targeting • Semi-structured interviews (MFA staff at HQ and Embassy level:	• Extent to which strategic planning processes identify target groups for assistance • Extent to which procedures and systems require targeting to specific groups	• Interviews with MFA staff and partners, at HQ and country levels • Project documents sourced via HQ, embassy and partner staff, MFA archives and	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little

partners at HQ and Embassy level)		• Extent to which partnership agreements require an explicit statement, and endorsement, of the groups targeted	Norad archives • Partnership agreements • Annual Budget proposals for MFA and Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs (*fordelingsnotater)*	• Not at all
CONCLUSIONS				
Summary assessment against selected evaluation criteria	Analysis of findings	To be derived from findings above	Findings of the evaluation	• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
To what extent does Norway's aid management system, reflected in the planning, organisation and management of its assistance to the Syria crisis, provide scope to deliver 'good aid' to the Syria crisis??	Analysis of findings			• Fully • Substantially • Partially • A little • Not at all
RECOMMENDATIONS				
1. How could the current organizational and management set-up of Norway's assistance improve both the quality of its assistance and therefore its scope for 'good donorship'?	Derived from conclusions		Findings and conclusions	

| 2. | What are the areas of best practices that Norway can learn from in potential future crises? | Derived from conclusions | To be derived from findings and conclusions | Findings and conclusions | |

Annex 5: Methodology

1. The methodology for the evaluation was presented in the Inception Report of November 2015. It was implemented largely as planned, with the exception of an additional stream of systematic analysis (that of 25 framework agreements), which the team considered an important aspect for the study.

2. The evaluation was implemented in four stages. First, during the Inception phase (October and November 2015), the conceptual and methodological basis of the evaluation was developed. Secondly, data gathering, including field missions to Beirut, Amman and Ankara/Istanbul/Gazantiep, took place from November 2015-end January 2016. Thirdly, analysis and write-up, including a team analysis session in which members of Norad's evaluation department participated and a validation session with members of MFA, was conducted in February to early March 2016.Finally, dissemination of the evaluation, which will be led by Norad's evaluation department, will take place from May 2016.

1 Conceptual basis of the study

3. The conceptual basis for the study was developed during the Inception phase, above. It recognised four dimensions:

   - The evaluation object - the planning, organisation and management of the assistance to the Syria crisis - *does not take place in a vacuum.* It is part of a wider organisational system - here, Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad).

   - By extension, *the planning, organisation and management of Norway's assistance to the Syria crisis is not a merely functional or technocratic concern.* All aid management systems, dealing as they do in sensitive international relations, are embedded in webs of fundamentally political relationships. Here, the system in question is an explicitly political organism, being located within government.

   - Further along the logic chain, studying the elements of any aid management system contains the embedded assumption that the system *should be geared to the purpose of delivering 'good aid'* - howsoever defined. Norway's commitments to 'good aid' are enshrined, for example, in its endorsement of the Paris Declaration principles and, for this study, the OECD DAC's Fragile State principles.

   - Finally, Norway rightly takes pride in its reputation as a *'good donor',* reflected for example in its close involvement with the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. This aspect is not separate from elements of the aid management system, but inextricably linked to it.

4. From the evaluation team's perspective, therefore, the point of departure for this study was less whether Norway's planning, organisation and management of its assistance to the Syria crisis is 'optimal' in a purely technocratic sense. Rather, the more resonant question was identified as the extent to which Norway's aid management system provides an <u>enabling environment</u> for the delivery of '*good aid*' to the Syria crisis, and consequently supports and enables Norway to act as a '*good donor*' to the crisis.

5. The two overarching questions, and associated definitions, for this report are as follows:

Q1.To what extent does Norway's aid management system, reflected in the planning, organisation and management of its assistance, <u>support and enable</u> the delivery of 'good aid' to the Syria regional crisis?	*Defined as a system which <u>supports and enables</u> adherence to relevant international principles and commitments (International Humanitarian Principles, Do No Harm, fragile situations) for working in complex humanitarian crises*
Q2: To what extent does Norway's aid management system - once again, reflected in the planning, organisation and management of its assistance – <u>support and enable</u> Norway to be a 'good donor' (or at least the best donor it can be) - to the Syria regional crisis?'	*Defined as a system which <u>supports and enables</u> adherence to Good Humanitarian Donorship and the priorities set out in Norway's 2008 Humanitarian Policy of flexibility and predictability, further development of the Norwegian (partnership-based)model, and more efficient administration and learning.*

6. Around these central questions, the theoretical basis of this study was articulated (briefly) as follows. Although the evaluation concentrated on the second box – the planning, organisation and management of the assistance – the logic chain provided a useful backdrop against which to formulate findings and conclusions. The evaluation was explicitly <u>not</u> tasked to assess the results of Norway's assistance in relation to 'good aid'; nor the extent to which the country has acted as a 'good donor'. Rather, being internally-focused, it assessed the extent to which the planning, management and organisation of the assistance has supported the potential for 'good aid' and enabled Norway to act as a 'good donor'.

Figure 1; Logic model for evaluation of Norway's support to the Syria crisis

2. Evaluation criteria and questions

7. **Evaluation criteria:** To implement the evaluation in the framework of the logic model above, a set of evaluation criteria were applied. They were selected as appropriately geared to the purpose and objectives of the evaluation, and also for its learning intent.

8. All the selected criteria were interpreted and explored in relation to the evaluation object – namely, the planning, organisation and management of the assistance, rather than its results. The interpretation of the criteria for the evaluation is set out in Table 1 below. Coverage, coherence and connectedness, as humanitarian evaluation

criteria, were considered important for this evaluation because of the need for systems which facilitate a joined up and holistic response to meet priority needs.[8] Impact and sustainability, being relevant mostly to substantive programming and results, were not prioritised.

9. **Evaluation questions:** The Terms of Reference also provided a set of proposed evaluation questions. These were refined, compressed and adapted in the light of the Inception Phase. They are presented, aligned to the interpreted evaluation criteria, in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Evaluation questions and criteria

Evaluation Questions	Criteria
Planning	**Criteria:** *Relevance Appropriateness , Coverage*
• To what extent is Norwegian aid to the Syria crisis guided by *a strategic approach or intended results?* • To what extent has the planning of Norway's assistance been undertaken with a view to *ensuring appropriateness? (e.g. sector of intervention, targeting to areas / groups of greatest need?)* • To what extent does the current aid management system emphasise the *use of evidence and learning* in planning Norwegian assistance to the crisis?	
Organisation	**Criteria:** *Coherence Connectedness*
• To what extent does the Norwegian aid management system enable an appropriate *choice of partners* for the delivery of assistance? • To what extent does the aid management system enable funds to be allocated according to needs? • To what extent are activities being implemented as part of a *coherent portfolio*, rather than as piecemeal individual activities? • To what extent does the aid management system require the *alignment of activities* with key partners?	
Management	**Criteria:** *Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency*
• To what extent does the aid management system enable *appropriate use of available human resources and expertise* to facilitate efficient Norwegian assistance? • To what extent do existing institutional systems and structures for Norway's assistance to the Syria crisis enable *flexibility and adaptation of response*? • To what extent do Norway's decision-making processes enable *swift and timely delivery of assistance*? • To what extent does the aid management system emphasise *follow-up on the quality and results* of assistance?	

3. Evaluation Design

10. The evaluation was implemented in two parts, following the logic of the Terms of Reference, as follows:

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[8] See Evaluating Humanitarian Action using OECD DAC Criteria: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies ALNAP (2006)

EVALUATION PART	Exercise
1. MAPPING	1. **Mapping** of Norwegian assistance 2011-2015 in terms of its volume, implementing partners, countries and sectors of allocation (reflected in Volume II of the Evaluation Report)
2. EVALUATIVE FINDINGS	2. **Findings** against evaluation criteria and relevant evaluation questions (Table 1 above) 3. **Recommendations** arising from 1 and 2 above

11. Findings from the Mapping exercise (separately presented in Volume II) informed the main analytical part of the evaluation, which comprises Volume I: Evaluation report.

3.1 Building the evidence base

12. The composite data sources for the evaluation are shown in Figure 2. Their application within the methodology is explained below.

Figure 2: Data sources

3.1a Broad Mapping

13. The 'broad mapping' exercise, which comprised the first objective of the study, was tasked to map Norway's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Syria crisis 2011-2015. This aspect of the evaluation was descriptive in nature but still required the use of a systematic methodology, as follows:

- **Master database:** An overview of projects 'relevant to the Syria crisis' was created through one principal source (the STATSYS database), and then supplemented by several additional sources and processes of verification. The principal source was a 'master database' of all ODA projects generated by

Norwegian Statistics section[9]. The database provides information on project agreement titles and descriptions, recipient country or region, recipient and implementing partner, annual disbursement and 'project sector' according to the OECD DAC sector code[10] for the period 2011 to 2014.

- **Projects by recipient country:** During initial interviews with Norad Evaluation Department and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Sections it was established that projects 'relevant to the Syria crisis' were likely to exist across five countries including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, as well as the 'Middle East and North Africa' region. From the master database, a list of all projects in each of these countries/ region[11] were extracted[12] and formed the basis for further verification with responsible departments within MFA (including MFA sections, Norad Civil Society Department and relevant Embassies). Information relating to projects operational in 2015 were obtained from the Norad PTA database[13].

- **Projects supported through multilaterals or global initiatives**: It was also established that support to the Syria crisis was channelled via multilaterals and possible other global mechanisms. A further list of all projects to 'multilaterals' and 'global unspecified' was also extracted from the 'master database' as a basis for identifying relevant projects channelled in this way. Information relating to projects operational in 2015 was obtained from the MFA's Grant Portal.

- **Verification:** The MFA's Section for the Middle East and North Africa and NORAD's Section for Civil Society Strengthening provided lists of their projects relevant to the Syria crisis. Other relevant MFA sections were then requested to verify the projects (for which they had responsibility) that were relevant to the Syria crisis. Section-specific lists for verification were sent to: MFA Sections for Cultural Affairs, Global Initiatives, Human Rights and Democracy, Humanitarian Affairs, Multilateral Development Banks, Peace and Reconciliation and UN Policy, as well as Norwegian Embassies in Ankara, Beirut (including Damascus) and Amman. Verification via email and further interviews (including during country visits) were obtained from eight sections (of nine contacted) and all four Norwegian embassies. Projects attributed to the Norad Sections for Education and Development Initiatives were also included as these were self-evidently related to the Syria-crisis. Finally, the Section for Humanitarian Affairs provided estimates for 2015 'support to Syria and Iraq' that were used to update the mapping data for 2015.

3.1b Evaluative Findings

Methods applied

14. The analytical phase of the evaluation built on the findings of the Mapping exercise above. A mixed-method approach[14] was applied to maximise validity and reliability.

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[9] Extract of STATSYS database provided by a Norad staff member on 11 November 2015. For further details, see Statistical Classification Manual published by Norad's Department for Quality Assurance
http://www.norad.no/Resultater+og+kvalitetssikring/Norsk+bistand+i+tall/Statistikkportalen
[10] Sector coding identifies the specific areas of the recipient's economic or social structure the transfer intends to foster.
[11] Categorised in the master database as 'recipient country'.
[12] Projects related to embassies of Cairo, Tel Aviv and Tehran were removed from the list.
[13] Accessed at Norad offices between 10-11 November 2015, with support of a Norad staff member. Data extracted from PTA included agreement number, title and partner, implementing institution, 2015 prognosis disbursement and DAC main- and sub-sector codes. Note that budget (prognosis disbursement) was used for 2015 data, rather than actual disbursement as available for 2011-2014 data. Other information such as 'partner type' was retrospectively added drawing on existing information.
[14] 'Combining methods is a way to overcome limitations and enhance strengths', recognising that 'different techniques meet specific purpose, from measurement and description of events and states to understanding of a situation or a process, bringing their own

Key methods and data sources are provided in the Evaluation Matrix at Annex 4, but to summarise, these include:

Table 2 Application of methods

Method	How applied
Systematic review of strategic and project documentation, applying structured tools to analyse: • Decision-making systems, institutional co-operation mechanisms • Follow-up on implementation quality • Results and learning systems • Risk identification and management • Needs analysis	This analysed a sample of initiatives (comprising 15 Embassy-managed projects and 30 centrally-managed initiatives); and 25 framework agreements or multi-year grants. Structured tools (see Annex 9) were applied, with information extracted against defined parameters and then quantitatively and qualitatively analysed.
Semi-structured interviews	Interviews applied a semi-structured format for discussion with MFA and Norad staff at HQ and Embassy level: plus partners at HQ and Embassy level (see Annex 7)
Field study	Conducted in three countries affected by the Syria response: Lebanon (Beirut), Jordan (Amman) and Turkey (Ankara, Gazantiep, Istanbul). Missions were of 4-5 days' duration and usually involved one day spent with the relevant Embassy staff. Interviews (using a semi-structured format – see Annex 7) were conducted with relevant embassies as well as with implementing partners, both UN and NGO. Additional documentation was sourced which was unavailable at HQ level e.g. Embassy Annual Plans.
Review of other agencies	This involved limited review of three other bilateral agencies: DANIDA, Sida and (to a very light extent) the Netherlands. These agencies are not considered 'comparators' to Norway in a rigorous or robust sense. However, all three are also major humanitarian donors, contributing broadly similar percentages of funding to the UN's Syria regional response plan (around 2%).[15] Denmark, similarly to Norway, implements its assistance through partners, though including private consultancy firms. Specific methods included review of publicly available material, supplemented for Sweden and Denmark with telephone interviews.
Review of web-based information to keep abreast of developments both in the crisis and in Norway's response to it	Signals also provided by Evaluation Department

15. These methods were selected because:

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strengths and limitations.' Stern, E, Stame, N, Mayne, J, Forss, K, Davies, R and Befani, B (2012) Broadening the Range of Methods for Impact Evaluations DFID Working Paper 38, April 2012

[15] All sources: OECD DAC webstats and http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/netherlands, accessed 20.11.15

- They are appropriate ones for an evaluation of an aid management system
- On the basis of data review during the Inception Phase, they were considered both feasible and sensible – though with the caveat of data paucity, above
- Combined, they form a relatively effective means of triangulation
- An emphasis on interview, particularly at field study level, maximises the breadth of perspectives and data that can be secured (these prove particularly important for a comparatively informalised system)
- Given the context of data paucity, reliability on secondary data alone was to increase unreliability – field study was considered (and prove) essential to ensure a degree of validity

16. In implementation, the rationale for the choice of these methods was validated.

Sampling

17. Sampling parameters for analysis of documentation for detailed mapping of documentation (see Annex 8 for sample composition) were as follows:

   i. A sample of projects were selected for firstly, each of the relevant 'recipient countries' i.e. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Middle East, Multilateral, and Global Unspecified and secondly, spanning each of the 5 years between 2011 and 2015. A greater weight was placed upon more recent years, reflecting the priority on the current situation. For each country/ region, one project was selected for each country/region in 2011 and 2012, whilst two projects for each country/region were selected for 2013, 2014 and 2015.

   ii. Subsequently, within each country and across years, sampling was based on the following criteria and priorities:
      - *Investment value*: projects selected within the 10 largest projects (where possible)
      - *Partner type*: reflecting key partner types (according to size of investment) and therefore prioritising multilateral, Norwegian NGO, and international NGO partners, whilst covering other types where possible
      - *Key partners:* reflecting key partners within each 'partner type' (according to size of investment)
      - *Relevant Sections* of MFA (according to size of investment)
      - *OECD DAC codes*: reflecting a range of project purposes (again with greater representation of DAC codes with greater investment)

   iii. The sampling strategy resulted in a broad sample of 48 projects with broad coverage across partner types, partners, MFA sections and DAC codes.[16] When projects with limited to no documentation had been screened out, this resulted in a list of 30 projects. Project documentation was subsequently sourced from the MFA and Norad archives.[17]

   iv. Additionally, a sample of 15 Embassy managed projects were also analysed in detail for the evaluation, with information supplied by the relevant Embassies. The sampling parameters for these were as follows for the Amman and Beirut Embassies (the Ankara Embassy had only three funded projects, all of which were analysed):

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[16] An initial overview indicated further representation of the Middle East, Peace and Reconciliation and MDB sections would better reflect the investment through those sections and the sample was adjusted accordingly.
[17] Documentation related to MFA and Norad-managed projects were sourced via respective MFA and Norad staff members.

- Spread of projects by size
- Spread of projects by date – prioritising 2014 and 2015
- Spread of projects by key partner types
- Spread of projects by HQ section

18. A structured tool was then applied to analyse documentation along the relevant parameters (Annex 8).

Evaluation Matrix

19. An Evaluation Matrix (presented at Annex 4) was developed, and forms the main analytical 'spine' of the evaluation, against which data was gathered and analysed. It was built upon the evaluation questions (though the ordering of these was amended for the report drafting) and embeds the evaluation criteria above. All other enquiry tools, such as interview guides, were geared towards it.

20. The first column of the Matrix provides the relevant evaluation question, aligned against the relevant criterion. The second column provides the methods which were applied (methods are set out per question, and the forms of triangulation between them made clear); and the third the relevant indicators for judgement. Column 4 sets out the relevant data sources, and column 5 the internal set of criteria applied for formulating judgements.

21. The indicators and methods included in the Matrix were initially based on findings from the Inception phase; experience from other similar studies; and a review of the available information. During the implementation of the evaluation, an additional evidence stream was added, namely analysis of documentation on 25 framework agreements. Cumulatively, the evidence available against each question / performance indicator enabled a response to the relevant evaluation question, though subject to the caveats on data paucity, below.

Data analysis

22. The evaluation Matrix constituted the gearing instrument throughout the Evaluation. All analysis was conducted against its indicators, aligning data streams to them; and checking took place during analysis to ensure that all indicators had been covered.

23. Data was collated in the analytical template provided at Annex 9. To support internal analysis, a structured ratings schema was employed. However, this provided an internal framework for the team to structure the generation of findings; it was not intended for, or used to, generate a set of summative 'ratings' to be quoted in the final report.

Ensuring validity and reliability

24. The evaluation placed considerable emphasis on analytical rigour and validation. To support the first, an analytical meeting among the evaluation team, also attended by Norad Evaluation Department staff, was held to ensure agreement and full consolidation of evidence against the performance indicators. To support the second, a validation meeting on the draft report was held in March 2016 with members of MFA staff to a) identify areas of factual correction on the draft report and b) adapt draft recommendations as appropriate.

25. The evaluation design minimised threats to validity in four ways:

- Firstly, the layered approach to evidence generation, including basing the exercise on the solid foundation of the mapping exercise, allowed for a logically sequenced approach, with each layer of findings/analysis grounded on the one before;
- Secondly, the use of the evaluation Matrix ensured a systematic approach, with evidence plotted into a structured analytical template, in turn geared to the logic model and evaluation questions. Gearing all data collection tools and instruments to this ensured systematic data collection and for gaps to be apparent;
- Thirdly, an emphasis on triangulation and the use of multiple sources of data enabled findings to be verified and checked. This was particularly important given the limited documentary data available in some cases and in the context of a comparatively informalised system;
- Fourthly, the emphasis on analytical rigour and validation above ensured full consensus on the findings and confirmed the evidence base for these.

50. Specific methods for ensuring validity and reliability at analysis stage included

- *Triangulation* – confirming and corroborating results reached by different methods – e.g. confirming that the articulation of strategic intentions for the Syria response, voiced in interview, was present in some form of documentation
- *Complementarity -* explaining and understanding findings obtained by one method by applying a second. E.g. the rationale for the choice of partner articulated in an agreement document being further explained through interview
- *Interrogation* - where diverging findings emerged from the application of different methods (e.g. findings from the portfolio mapping on central archives diverge from evidence available at field level) - these were interrogated to either reconcile, or explain, the differences apparent. In the event, the only major contradictions emerged was the sense of a transparent system, which prove in fact more opaque (see Limitations, below).

4. Limitations encountered and mitigation

51. Key limitations, and how these were managed during the evaluation, are provided below.

Table 3: Managing limitations

Limitation	Mitigation
1. The lack of an overall strategic document for the response means the absence of a **Theory of Change** for Norway's choice of strategic positioning or partnership/intervention	The evaluation developed the conceptual basis for the study, including the indicative logic model above, to support the theoretical basis of the evaluation
2. **Significant data paucity** considerations. ➤ At least six different information storage systems were found to exist (see Annex 5). Accessing information prove extremely challenging ➤ High variability of information was available on archive systems, meaning that tracing decision-making processes prove very difficult ➤ Financial data prove particularly difficult to access and interrogate: multiple systems	The evaluation made strenuous efforts to ensure that all elements of the study used as rigorous methods as feasible to ensure the validity of information. For the mapping exercise, specific methods are supplied in Volume II, Mapping, but these involved the preparation of a database, supplemented by several additional sources and processes of verification, including confirmation of data by relevant sections. Financial data was

contained multiple forms of data, and figures were not readily accessible. Information was at times either 'out of sync' or directly contradictory. ➤ Interlocutors and informants for the study were acting under considerable time pressure – both within Oslo and in relevant Embassies. This had an effect on information provision e.g. some interlocutors were not available for interview such as the current and former Special Envoys for the Syria response and the Charge d'Affaires for the Damascus Embassy.	validated by members of relevant Sections (though not all responded to requests for confirmation). For detailed mapping, use was made of all the available information on archives, rather than only the specific project documentation available. This included e.g. project reports, internal communication records and other information. However, in some cases, this was still incomplete. A strong emphasis was placed on triangulated methods to ensure validation where feasible.
3. Staffing and institutional memory constraints ➤ Staff responsibilities within Sections are not clearly mapped in MFA or Norad systems. Precisely quantifying numbers did not prove feasible. ➤ High levels of staff turnover meant that institutional memory was also lacking, limiting the depth of data available from the earlier years of the period.	Staffing numbers were gathered from interviews, in the absence of robust internal information. Interviewees were expanded to include representatives from partners. A particular effort was made to interview staff members who were previously involved in the crisis, e.g. former members of the Section for Humanitarian Affairs, or individuals who had formerly worked in Embassies, to try to compensate for the limited institutional memory.

Annex 6 Map of MFA/Norad Archives

See overleaf.

Norwegian Aid Statistics

- Online and public
- Updates annually (before 1st April)
- Same information as STATSYS but simplified
- Overseen by Statistics Section

STATSYS

- Covers aid budget from Ministry of Climate and Environment and International Development Cooperation
- 90% of information comes from PTA and 10% from others
- Overseen by Statistics Section
- Updates annually (information up to 1st April 2014)

Norfund

FK Norway

Auditor General

Centre for International Cooperation in Education

Other Ministries (dependent on receipt of resources from ODA budget). For 2015:

- Ministry of Climate and the Environment
- Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion
- Ministry of Education and Research
- Ministry of Justice and Public Security

PTA

- Grant management tool
- Not widely used before 2009
- Used centrally by sections, and Norad as well as Embassies
- Links to other systems (P360, MFA Archives and Agresso)
- Provides information to STATSYS, quality assured post input by Statistics Department

P360/Norad Archives

- filing / archiving system for Norad projects

Agresso

Accounting System

Norad Project Managers

Embassies Project Managers

MFA Project Managers

MFA Archives

- All documentation relating to projects/ applications

Description of Archive Systems

System	Operated by	Description
STATSYS	*Norad Statistics Department*	Norad collects statistical information primarily from the PTA system (90%) but also through Norfund; Fredskorpset Norway; the Auditor General; the Centre for International Cooperation in Education, and other Departments (including Funds for Refugees in Norway) (10%) to be used in official reports to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Additionally the database is used to generate background material for parliamentary propositions, analyses, reports, evaluations, dissertations, articles, strategies, books etc. Norad's statistical database contains historical data, and not prognosis figures. It is updated annually on 1st April.
PTA	*Operated by: All project managers in Sections of MFA, Embassies and Norad*	The PTA system has been designed for the MFA/Embassy/Norad as a tool for planning and managing development cooperation. Specifically: • Preliminary registration in the PTA (including statistics) once the Section/ Embassy plans to support a programme. (Agreement Phase A) • All obligations agreed upon must be planned in the PTA, once the Agreement is signed. Planned disbursements are registered in the PTA according to the budget, and updated prior to annual meetings, reallocations and the Annual Performance Report and Plan (Agreement Phase B) • When the last disbursement is furnished, the agreement phase will change from B (follow-up) to C (completion). The disbursement card will be frozen.
Norad archive/ P360	*Operated by:* *Norad Project Managers*	The project managers have the responsibility to make sure that the archives are correct and that all documents believed to have value for a programme are registered and filed.
MFA Archive	*Operated by: Overseen by MFA Archives Department and Archived by Project managers*	The project managers have the responsibility to make sure that the archives are correct and that all documents believed to have value for a programme are registered and filed.

Norwegian Aid Statistics	*Operated by Statistics Department Norad*	Public Database based on information from STATSYS.
Agresso	*Project managers and Finance*	Accounting system used by MFA, Norad and Embassies.

Annex 7 Semi-Structured Interview Guides

   1. Semi-structured interview guide: GENERIC (tailored per interlocutor)

Notes:

- **Questions administered selectively,** as appropriate
- **Tailoring** conducted for different strategies/interventions for interlocutors who are HQ staff, Partner UN agencies, Partner NGO and Donor Partners respectively

1. APPROPRIATENESS/RELEVANCE

a. What were the main drivers for the assistance/partnership at the time? How was it understood to respond to the priorities unfolding in the crisis?
b. What analysis was conducted / learning applied to help inform intervention designs?
c. How were target groups selected?
d. How were interlinkages with other Norwegian/partner interventions/programmes considered?
e. How has the assistance evolved over time? Was this consistent with the unfolding of the complexities of the crisis? Were there any areas where you felt that the assistance was not 'in sync' with the priority humanitarian/development needs, or that it should have been differently targeted?
f. [For partners] Are you content with how Norway engaged with you to support your response to the Syria crisis? Do you feel they listened to your needs and priorities?
g. To what extent were issues of capacity, including the capacity of your own local partners, considered?
h. What efforts were made to develop a common vision and understanding between Government of Norway and [partner name]? Did you feel a sense of shared priorities?
i. How has your co-operation on the Syria crisis with MFA/Norad changed over time? Have you been provided with sufficient flexibility to adapt as needed?

2. EFFECTIVENESS

a. How well set up would you say Norwegian assistance has been to respond to the crisis in terms of information flows and decision-making? Are there any areas where it could have worked better?
b. How well does the system work in identifying sectors for intervention, in your opinion? Do you know what the criteria are for identifying priority sectors?
c. How well is the system set up to identify the 'best' partners, in terms of capacity to deliver high-quality assistance?
d. How well is the system set up to enable you, or your organisation, to optimally allocate funds/ Are there any changes you would make?
e. To what extent does the aid management system *emphasise follow-up* on the quality and results of assistance? Realistically, are any systems implemented?
f.   [For partners] How well has the allocation of funds to [your organisation] worked? Have you had enough funds for the right sort of activities? How have you been required to report on quality/results of Syria-related interventions to MFA/Norad?

3. EFFICIENCY

a. Would you say that decisions are made swiftly under the aid management system? Have you experienced any positive/negative examples?

b. Have the decision-making processes worked well to enable a complex response to a complex crisis?
c. In your opinion, are sufficient staff available to ensure decision-making and delivery of high-quality assistance? Where would be any priorities for additional human resources?

4. COHERENCE

a. Do the programmes/initiatives you are familiar with contribute to any overall results (of Government of Norway) in relation to the Syria crisis?
b. Are you aware of any strategic thinking/overview of Norway's response to the Syria crisis – either centrally within MFA/Norad or at country level?

5. COVERAGE

a. How did you identify the target groups to which Norwegian assistance is directed? Are these the right groups, do you think?
b. Are there any other groups to which Norwegian assistance should be directed? Why/how?

6. CONNECTEDNESS

a. Do the Norwegian programmes / initiatives you are familiar with link to other Norwegian programmes/initiatives targeting the Syria crisis? How?
b. To what extent are relationships/interconnections between partners and initiatives (UN, NGO or other) actively encouraged by Norway's aid managers? Are there clear mechanisms for co-ordination?

2. Semi-Structured Interview Guide for Embassies

1. APPROPRIATENESS/RELEVANCE

a. How do you plan and budget to respond to the Syria crisis? How do you adapt to need?
b. What guides the Embassy's response to the Syria crisis? Is there an explicit strategic framework/set of strategic priorities?
c. Do project planning, programming and approval procedures enable funding and projects to adapt as needed?
d. How is your planning informed by data / information arising from the country/countries in the region?
e. How does the Embassy learn from what has been implemented? Are there systems for learning?
f. Are projects / programmes based on analysis/evidence? What is the source for this?
g. How well is the system set up, in your opinion, to identify the 'best' partners, in terms of capacity to deliver high-quality assistance?

2. EFFECTIVENESS

a. How does the Embassy select partners to implement projects? What criteria are used?
b. Does the Embassy try to have a balance of partners, or does it prioritise needs at the time?

c. Are there any intended results in relation to the Syria crisis? If so, is funding geared to achieve these?
d. What monitoring and evaluation systems are in place for projects? How are these implemented and do they look at the quality of aid?
e. To what extent does information from monitoring and evaluation systems inform Embassy planning/decisions?

3. EFFICIENCY

a. Do decision-making systems support timely implementation?
b. Do Embassy management systems support swift decision-making?
c. Do procedures for managing partnership agreements support speed of implementation?
d. What staffing numbers are available to work on the Syria crisis? Are these adequate compared to portfolio scale?
e. Staff have adequate technical expertise in relation to portfolio composition
f. Has there been any use of external expertise to support the Embassy's work on the Syria crisis?

4. COHERENCE

a. Do you fund projects individually, or do you take more of a portfolio approach, aiming for a set of linked (coherent) initiatives?
b. Do projects set their own results, or do they have to aim to achieve results set by the Embassy?
c. How do you report to HQ on project progress? What departments do you liaise with there? Do you find the communication useful?
d. Are you familiar with any linkage between Syria-related initiatives funded by the Embassy and other Norway-funded projects and programmes in Lebanon/Jordan/Turkey?
e. Does the Humanitarian Policy guide the Embassy's decision-making, or is it more of a background reference?

5. COVERAGE

a. How did you identify the target groups to which Norwegian assistance is directed? Are these the right groups, do you think?
   b. Are there any other groups to which Norwegian assistance should be directed? Why/how?

6. CONNECTEDNESS

a. Do partnership agreements require partners to work with specific local partners- or do they have the freedom and flexibility to select?
b. Is showing alignment with other initiatives part of the selection criteria for projects?
c. Does the Embassy have to review / report on alignment with other relevant Syria-related initiatives as part of follow up procedures?

Annex 8 Project and framework agreements analysed for detailed mapping

Table 1: Detailed mapping – projects

Agreement number	Responsible unit	Agreement title	Agreement partner
MEU-11/0027-1	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	ICRC Iraq 2011 operational appeal	ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
QZA-11/0896-34	Section for Civil Society Strengthening, Civil Society Department, Norad	Oil for the Common Good Iraq	Norwegian People's Aid
QZA-15/0216-4	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	ICRC Emergency Appeal 2015 Iraq	Norwegian Red Cross
QZA-12/0831-9	Section for Civil Society Strengthening Civil Society Department, Norad	Get moving! Towards positive change in the lives of children and youth	Right to Play
QZA-12/0688-36	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Jordan - Syrian refugees	WFP - World Food Programme
LBN-11/0018	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	NORWAC. Health projects.	Norwac - Norwegian Aid Committee
LBN-13/0023	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Support to UNRWA RRP for Syria 2013	UNRWA - UN Relief and Works Agency
LBN-13/0036	Section for Multilateral Development Banks,[18] Department for Economic Relations and Development, MFA	The Lebanon Syrian Crisis MDTF	World Bank
LBN-14/0003	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Save the Children Education project in Lebanon	Save the Children Norway
LBN-14/0010	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	NORWAC. Lebanon Program 2014	Norwac - Norwegian Aid Committee
MEU-15/0020-2	Section for Global Initiatives, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Education for refugee children Lebanon	UNICEF- United Nations Children's Fund
LBN-15/0013	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	NORWAC. Lebanon Program 2013	Norwac - Norwegian Aid Committee
MEU-11/0062	Section for Humanitarian	Emergency shelter	Norwegian Refugee

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[18] Formerly the Section for Multilateral Finance and Global Economic Issues. Current names used for sections where appropriate.

	Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	intervention for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon	Council
MEU-12/0079	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	NCA Displaced Persons Turkey Border Areas	Norwegian Church Aid
MEU-13/0065	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	UNHCR RRP/SHARP Syria 2014	UNHCR - UN Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
MEU-13/0063	Section for Peace and Reconciliation, Department for Regional Affairs, MFA	Football and peace promotion in Iraq and the Middle East 2013 NFF	Norges Fotballforbund
MEU-15/0004	Section for the Middle East and North Africa, Department for Regional Affairs, MFA	Regional Development and Protection Programme Syria	Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
QZA-12/0016-14	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Syria Emergency Appeal	Norwegian Red Cross
SYR-13/0002	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	NORCROSS bilateral co-operation with SARC	Norwegian Red Cross
SYR-13/0024	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Protective Emergency Education Syria 2012-2013	Save the Children International
SYR-14/0011	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	WHO Health Services Syria	WHO - World Health Organization
QZA-14/0254-12	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Syria education	Save the Children Norway
SYR-15/0012	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	NPA humanitarian Syria 2015-16	Norwegian Red Cross - local office
MEU-12/0032	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Norcross support for Syrian refugees in Turkey	Norwegian Red Cross
QZA-13/0122-26	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Education for Syrian refugees in Turkey	Norwegian Refugee Council
TUR-13/0006	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Norcross support for Syrian refugees in Turkey	Norwegian Red Cross
TUR-14/0002	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Norcross support for Syrian refugees in Turkey	Norwegian Red Cross

QZA-15/0178-16	Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Turkey	Norwegian Red Cross
PAL-15/0001	Section for the Middle East and North Africa, Department for Regional Affairs, MFA	Annual Contribution to UNRWA General Fund 2015	UNRWA - UN Relief and Works Agency
QZA-12/0533	Section for Human Rights and Democracy, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs, MFA	Media in conflict	IMS - International Media Support

Table 2: Embassy-managed projects

Embassy	Reference number (where available)	Projects
Ankara Embassy	N/A	NRC Education in Gaziantep SC Hatay Education Project Ankara Embassy - ICAN Gendered Needs Assessment
Damascus/Beirut Embassies	SYR 14-0013 SYR 13-0300 SYR 14-0007 SYR 15-0009	Common Space initiative Agreement between MFA and ECSWA re: validation and communication of the national agenda Heinrich Boell Foundation – cultural initiative Heinrich Boell Foundation – follow=on grant
Amman Embassy	JOR-13/0013 JOR-13/0014 JOR-14/0001 JOR-15/0003 SYR-12/0010 JOR-14/0003 JOR-15/0015 SYR - 13/0007	Project with Jordanian Football Association Agreement with UNFPA, UNICEF and UN Women re: Project on provision of services to Syrian SGBV survivors Agreement with Save the Children Jordan on the Protection and Engagement of Children in Host Communities Project on education implemented by FAFO, a Norwegian Research institute and ARDD-Legal Aid, Agreement with NPA - "Immediate relief to Syria" Project with Save the Children: Improved Education and Livelihoods opportunities for vulnerable people NRC education project NPA project "Supporting Democracy in Syria through Local Councils

Table 3: Multi-year/framework agreements/multilateral agreements analysed

Agreement number	Agreement partner	Partner/agreement
GLO09/188	NPA - Norwegian People's Aid	Multi-year co-operation agreement mine and cluster munitions 2009-2011
GLO 4269	Norwegian Red Cross	Three-year co-operation on Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness 2009-2011
QZA 11/228	ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross	Contribution to ICRC Headquarters Appeal for 2011

QZA 11/0209	UNOCHA - UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Grant to the central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 2011
QZA 11/0229	ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross	Contribution to ICRC Emergency Appeals 2011
QZA 12/0017	UNOCHA - UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Contribution to the central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 2011
QZA 12/0089	UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees	Norwegian contribution to UNHCR's annual budget 2012
QZA 12/0104	NPA - Norwegian People's Aid	Mu1ti-Year Cooperation Agreement Mines, Cluster Munitions and other Explosive Weapons 2012-2014,
QZA 12/0180	Norwegian Red Cross	Co-operation Agreement on Armed Violence 2012-2014
QZA 12/0209	NRC - Norwegian Refugee Council	Agreement on the Norwegian Standby Capacity Programme 2012-2014
QZA 12/0688	WFP - World Food Programme	Multi-year core funding agreement
QZA 13/0068	UNOCHA - UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Contribution to the central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 2013
QZA 13/0122	NRC - Norwegian Refugee Council	Global Partnership Agreement regarding assistance to displaced people worldwide 2013-2015
QZA 13/0132	NCA – Norwegian Church Aid	Co-operation Agreement regarding water, sanitation and hygiene
QZA 13/0199	Norwegian Red Cross	Co-operation Agreement on Health Care in Danger 2013-2015
QZA 13/0699	UNOCHA - UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Contribution to the UN Central Emergency Fund (CERF) 2014
QZA 14/0332	NCA - Norwegian Church Aid	Grant for Reduction of gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations 2014-2015
QZA 14/0046	ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross	Contribution to ICRC HQ Appeal 2014
QZA 14/0093	UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees	Contribution to UNHCR annual budget 2014
QZA 14/0251	UNOCHA - UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Contribution to UNOCHA's core activities in 2014
QZA 15/0020	Norwegian Church Aid	Grant to Thematic program on reduction of gender based violence in conflict and post conflict contexts 2014-2017
QZA 15/0062	UNOCHA - UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	Contribution to the UN Central Emergency Fund (CERF) 2014
QZA 15/0076	NPA - Norwegian People's Aid	Global Co-operation Agreement on Humanitarian Disarmament 2015-2017
QZA 15/0178	Norwegian Red Cross	Global Co-operation Agreement 2015-2017
PAL 14/0005	UNRWA - UN Relief and Works Agency	General Contribution to UNWRA 2014

Annex 9 Structured analysis tools

Tool 1: Applied in each fieldwork country and for aggregate level analysis.

CRITERION	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	Country/Overall *Judgement plus evidence (fully, substantially, partially, a little, not at all)*
RELEVANCE/APPROPRIATENESS	To what extent do existing institutional systems and structures for Norway's assistance to the Syria crisis enable flexibility and adaptation of response?	• *Extent to which scope for flexibility is integrated into planning and budgeting processes*	
		• *Extent to which internal management structures actively enable flexibility and adaptation*	
		• *Planning, programming and approval procedures enable agility in partnerships when conditions change*	
	To what extent has the planning of Norway's assistance been undertaken with a view to ensuring appropriateness?	• *Degree to which the response to the Syria crisis has been organized within a strategic framework*	
		• *Degree to which strategic planning or thinking has been informed by data / information arising from country level*	
		• *Extent to which annual planning reflects the dynamics of the evolving crisis*	
	To what extent does the current aid	• *Learning systems in place and active*	

	management system emphasise the use of learning in ensuring relevant and appropriate Norwegian assistance to the crisis?	*• Degree to which decision taken have been informed by analysis and/or research, including from other complex crises*	
		• Evidence of lesson learning / data from monitoring and evaluation systems applied in programme / strategy design / decision-making	
EFFECTIVENESS	To what extent does the Norwegian aid management system enable optimal choice of partners and sector of intervention?	*• Partner selection processes integrate clear criteria for comparative advantage in relation to need*	
		• Range of partners reflects an appropriate balance of capabilities for achieving intended aims of portfolio	
		• Individual sectors of intervention based on clear analysis of need	
		• Composite sectors of intervention appropriately constructed in relation to intended aims of portfolio	
	To what extent does the aid management system ensure optimal allocation of funds?	*• Decision-making processes for funding based on criteria which reflect intended aims of the portfolio*	
		• Funding allocations reflect intended priorities of portfolio	
	To what extent does the aid management system emphasise follow-up on the quality and results of the partners' efforts?	*• Extent to which monitoring and evaluation systems emphasise the quality of aid and its results*	
		• Extent to which monitoring and evaluation systems are implemented	
		Extent to which information from monitoring and evaluation systems informs planning/decisions	

EFFICIENCY	To what extent have Norway's decision-making processes enabled swift and timely delivery of assistance?	• *Organisational structure of decision-making systems supports timely implementation*	
		• *Management systems support swift decision-making*	
		• *Procedures for managing partnership agreements support speed of implementation*	
	To what extent does the organisational and management set-up enable optimal use of available manpower and expertise to facilitate efficient Norwegian assistance?	• *Staffing numbers adequate compared to portfolio scale*	
		• *Staff have adequate technical expertise in relation to portfolio composition*	
		• *Evidence that external expertise drawn in when gaps exist*	
COHERENCE	To what extent are activities being implemented as part of a coherent portfolio, rather than as piecemeal individual activities?	• *Extent to which initiatives are geared to a set of overarching intended results for the portfolio (including humanitarian results)*	
		• *Extent to which annual plans indicate a series of inter-related initiatives (rather than a set of piecemeal projects)*	
		• *Extent to which responses are designed for coherence with other Norwegian initiatives in Syria and neighbouring countries*	
	To what extent is Norwegian aid to the Syria crisis guided by a strategic approach?	• *Extent to which the response is guided/informed by the Humanitarian Policy*	
		• *Extent to which any 'strategic thinking' has influenced portfolio design*	

COVERAGE	To what extent are Norway's humanitarian and development activities targeted to the needs of specific groups requiring assistance?	*• Extent to which strategic planning processes identify target groups for assistance*	
		• Extent to which procedures and systems require targeting to specific groups	
		• Extent to which partnership agreements require an explicit statement, and endorsement, of the groups targeted	
CONNECTEDNESS	To what extent does the current aid management system require the alignment of activities with those of key partners?	*• Extent to which partnership agreements require alignment with key partners*	
		• Extent to which the selection of initiatives is conditional upon demonstrating alignment with other relevant initiatives	
		• Extent to which alignment is reviewed and reported upon as part of follow up procedures	

Tool 2: Applied in detailed mapping of initiatives/framework agreements

Decision-making systems (who decides, who authorises funding, in discussion with whom, and based on what criteria)	
Internal co-operation mechanisms (discussion with other parts of the Norwegian aid system - which ones)	
Coherence (alignment with other relevant initiatives, is this a requirement of funding, how tracked)	

o Follow-up/oversight on implementation, quality and results (What systems, are these implemented, by whom)	
o Learning systems (Evidence of any learning systems applied to project selection or once project complete)	
Risk (operational, strategic, political - identification of, systems for management and mitigation)	
Needs analysis (evidence base for, linkages to context and conflict)	

Annex 10 References

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Annex 11 List of interviewees

Norwegian NGO Partners

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)	Trude Falck, Middle East
Redd Barna	Linda Bukasen and Espen Gran, Area Director Europe and Middle East
Norwegian Red Cross	Torgeir Vasaasen, Programme Coordinator Syria
Norwegian Aid Committee (NORWAC)	John Eivind Jensen, Country Director Syria
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	Bendik Sorvig, Senior Regional Adviser Middle East
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	Margrethe Volden, Head of Division Middle East and Asia

Turkey

UNDP	Matilda Dimovska, Deputy Resident Representative Berna Bayazit
IOM	Lado Gvilava, Chief of Mission Meltem Ersan, National Project Officer
Sida	Tomas Bergenholtz, Counsellor
OCHA Turkey	Barbara Shenstone, Head of Office Mete Temurcin, National Programme Officer
NCA	Andres Espana, Middle East Programming Coordinator
NPA	Simon Weatherbed, Head of Development Programmes Syria
IHH	Nalan Dal, Institutional Partnerships Coordinator
International Blue Crescent	Muzaffer Baca, Vice President
DFID	Jakesh Mahey, DFID Representative
Royal Norwegian Embassy in Ankara	Lise Albrechtsen, Counsellor Farahnaz Bahrami, Head of Integration Affairs Veselemoy Talgo, Head of Immigration Affairs

Jordan

Save the Children Jordan	Manal Al-Wazani Chief Executive Officer
NRC Jordan	Petr Kostohryz, Country Director
UNFPA – Jordan	Dr. Shible Sahbani, Humanitarian Coordinator
WFP Jordan EMOP	Jonathan Campbell, Emergency Coordinator for the Syrian refugees operation in Jordan
UNICEF Jordan	Robert Jenkins, Representative
UNICEF Jordan	Silene Martino Almeras, Partnerships Specialist,
ARDD-Legal Aid	Dr. Maria del Mar Logrono, Senior Gender Specialist
ARDD-Legal Aid	Zainab Alkhalil, Project Manager
NRC Middle East Regional Office	Carsten Hansen, Regional Director
UNHCR Jordan	Andrew Harper, Country Representative
WFP Regional Bureau for the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe	Selly Amalina Muzammil, Regional Donor Relations Officer
Royal Norwegian Embassy in	Heidi Johansen, Counsellor/Deputy head of mission

Amman	Hanan Shasha, Project Officer
	Jorunn Stubhaug, First Secretary
	Claudia Calilhanna, Executive Assistant/ Archivist
	Ambassador Sissel Breie, Ambassador
SIDA	Marie Wikström, Regional Programme Manager, Human Rights and Democracy

Beirut/Damascus

UNOCHA	Yannick Martin, Humanitarian Affairs Officer
UNHCR	Jean-Nicolas Beuze, Deputy Representative Inge Zondag, Assistant Reporting Officer
UNFPA	Asma Kurdahi, Assistant Representative
NPA	Stine Horn, Country Director
NORWAC	Kristil Haraldstad, Country Director
NRC	Niamh Murghnahan, Country Director
Norwegian Red Cross	Ane Tvedt, Country Manager
WFP	Seonghee Choi, Donor Relations Officer
Save the Children	Gisela Hurscher, Education Technical Adviser) Samar Abboud, Operations Director Nora Ingdal, Director of Education
World Bank	Mouna Couzi, Country Officer
UNICEF	Violet Speek-Warnery Chief, field operations Mette Noradstrand, Chief of Education
UNDP	Tom Thorogood, Deputy Special Representative Fadi Abilmona, Head, Conflict Prevention and Recovery portfolio
ECSWA	Basel Kaghadou, Head, National Agenda for the Future of Syria programme (telephone interview)
Royal Norwegian Embassy in Beirut	Ane Jorem, Deputy Head of Mission Manal Kortam, International Development Officer
Royal Norwegian Embassy for Damascus (located in Beirut)	Kaja Blattman, First Secretary

Oslo

Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
Yngvild Berggrav	Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs
Ketil Eik	Senior Adviser, Section for Sub-Saharan Africa, Department for Regional Affairs (formerly Humanitarian Affairs)
Ingunn Vatne	Deputy Director, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs
Hilde Haraldstad	Director, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs
Roar Haugsdal,	Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Affairs (formerly Amman Embassy), Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs
Berit Løken	Archivist, Section for Information and Record Management, Services Department
Tom Eriksen	Senior Adviser, Section for Multilateral and Development Banks, Department for Economic Relations and Development
Espen Lindbæck	Deputy Head of Section, Section for Peace and Reconciliation, Department of Regional Affairs
Tone Elisabeth Bækkevold Allers	Head of Section, Section for Peace and Reconciliation, Department of Regional Affairs

Kjetil Halvorsen	Section for Middle East and North Africa, Department of Regional Affairs
Norad	
Ane Eir Torsdottir	Higher Executive Officer, Statistics Section, Department for Quality Assurance
Anne Kristin Østenby Martinsen	Leader/ Assistant Director Legal Section ,Department for Quality Assurance
Petter Bauck	Senior Adviser, Section for Development Strategy and Governance, Department for Economic Development, Gender and Governance
Marit Marie Strand	Senior Adviser Section for Development Strategy and Governance, Department for Economic Development, Gender and Governance

Other agencies

Sweden	Minna Stromberg Programme Manager, Syria CrisisUnit for Humanitarian Assistance Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
Denmark	Flemming Nichols, Minister counsellor Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Personnel Assistance Karin Eriksen, Programme Co-ordinator, Department for Humanitarian Action, Civil Society and Personnel Assistance Matthias Vaa Programme Co-ordinator Peace and Stabilisation Fund Department for Middle East and North Africa.

Annex 12 Key features of other aid management systems

1. A request of the Terms of Reference was to generate learning on the planning, organisation and management of assistance to the Syria crisis from two or more other comparable agencies.

2. This study has therefore gathered information on the management of the Syria crisis from Denmark, Sweden and (to a very limited extent) the Netherlands. All three major humanitarian donors, contributing broadly similar percentages of funding to the UN's Syria regional response plan (around 2%).[19] However, they are explicitly not comparators, but can provide learning for this study by providing insight into different features of planning, organization and management.

3. Methods applied were review of existing documentation, supplemented by phone interviews for Denmark and Sweden. The information generated is applied in Table 1 below.

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[19] All sources: OECD DAC webstats and http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/netherlands, accessed 20.11.15

Table 1: Key features of other aid management systems

Humanitarian assistance	Financial information	Strategy and planning	Organisational arrangements and staffing	Partnerships
Denmark				
Previously (2011) the 15th largest government provider of humanitarian assistance but annual humanitarian assistance increased by 33% in 2013, the largest increase in funding since 2005. Humanitarian Strategy 2010-2015 is being updated. 25% of resources are retained annually for sudden-onset crises.	**Humanitarian:** Since the start of the conflict in Syria in 2011 Denmark has delivered more than 1.4 billion DKK in humanitarian assistance (to end 2015). At the London pledging conference in 2016, Denmark committed DKK 688m to the crisis (including the contribution to the EU's Turkey facility). Development: Co-operation works partly through the 300m DKK stabilisation progamme and partly through EU's Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP of which Denmark is the delegated agency	Strategic Framework for Syria (focused on stabilisation) 2015-2016. Sets policy priorities as a political solution: stabilisation and recovery of moderate opposition-held areas in Syria: Support to the moderate opposition: Countering violent extremism (CVE): Promotion of transitional justice and human rights. No Humanitarian strategy for Syria explicitly – but Denmark is discussing how to more closely link humanitarian assistance to the crisis with effectiveness and efficiency issues. Annual planning cycles for humanitarian assistance. 80% of Danish humanitarian assistance now goes to protracted crises. Denmark has a focus on the linkage of development and humanitarian co-operation in protracted crisis - as delegated lead agency for the RDPP. 2015 paper commissioned to assess this - Coherence in Conflict: bringing Humanitarian and Development Streams together	Humanitarian assistance is managed by Danish Development Cooperation (Danida). The RDPP is also managed from within the Humanitarian section. Staffing: 2 people managing humanitarian assistance from Copenhagen (one is a full time project co-ordinator on the RDPP project). The system is 'administratively lean'. The Middle East and North Africa desk within MFA handles the development and Stabilisation work. Staffing: 4 people in Copenhagen work on the crisis including the programme co-ordinator for the Stabilisation programme; plus Embassies	Assistance is implemented through partners, including private sector consultancy firms. (Note: Denmark's 2015 evaluation of its Humanitarian Strategy pointed to challenges in its partnerships with the independent verification of results generated by partners). These work through Strategic Partnership Agreements. Denmark adopts an 'aggressive' risk strategy in relation to partner selection – multi-dimensional (Strategic, fiduciary, institutional, political) Because Denmark is administratively lean, mechanisms such as basket funds for civil society are employed, which are outsourced to a partner.

Humanitarian assistance	Financial information	Strategy and planning	Organisational arrangements and staffing	Partnerships
The Netherlands				
Over the past decade the Netherlands has been the 10th largest government provider of humanitarian assistance. Its annual humanitarian assistance decreased slightly by 2% in 2013. Policy framework priorities resilience, effectiveness through less duplication and more resilience; humanitarian access and neutrality; and greater accountability	At the London conference in 2016, the Netherlands pledged Euros 125m to the crisis. 291 million euros allocated to the Syria crisis in humanitarian aid since 2012. A special Relief Fund also exists for the period 2014-17, allocating €570 million on top of Netherlands regular expenditures on humanitarian assistance and emergency aid worldwide, including Syria, EUR 48.5 million was provided to Syria from the Relief Fund in 2015.	Humanitarian assistance policy has a strong emphasis on fragile states, but also a strong focus on aid actor efficiency and effectiveness.	The Humanitarian Aid Division of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (within the Stabilisation and Department) Humanitarian Aid coordinates and develops policy on humanitarian assistance. It also presents the Dutch position on humanitarian aid and related issues in international forums and organisations. The Middle East and North Africa office handles the regional response to Syria	Netherlands delivers is humanitarian aid through partners, and particularly the UN. It delivers around 75% of its assistance to the Syria crisis through a range of UN (particularly) and some limited (IFRC and Red Crescent) NGOs. Assistance is allocated through core contributions to UN agencies, particularly those involved in co-ordination (UNOCHA, CERF and UNHCR) The operating model reflects the significant faith in the UN system – however, a 2015 review pointed to the visibility/accountability to Durch citizens challenges this raises, as well as pointing to shortcomings in the UN response.[20]

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[20] Giesen, P and Leenders, R (2015) Review of the Netherlands contribution to the humanitarian response to the Syria crisis 2010-2014 Amsterdam: Humanitarian Strategy Consult

Humanitarian assistance	Financial information	Strategy and planning	Organisational arrangements and staffing	Partnerships
Sweden				
In 2013, Sweden provided US$785 million for humanitarian emergencies, making it the sixth largest government donor of humanitarian assistance. Sweden has a Global Humanitarian Strategy to which all humanitarian resources are subject. Circa 30% of all humanitarian resources annually are retained for use in sudden-onset crises Under Swedish law, neither the Minister nor the MFA can direct Sida on when or where to respond to humanitarian crises, ensuring that Sida remains neutral and independent, and free from political	At the London conference in 2016, Sweden pledged 300m SKK to the crisis. In 2015 Sida allocated a total amount of SEK 353 million to the Syria crisis response through UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and INGOs Development/stabilisation: Sweden's new Strategy for the crisis has a funding allocation of 1.5 billion SKK SEK 300 million per year in additional funding) doubling the total Sida contribution to the crisis Humanitarian: The humanitarian allocation broadly mirrors that of the Development strategy i.e. SEK 300m per year. Sida has a Rapid Response Mechanism by which partner organisations can apply for rapid funding for small interventions.	Sweden has recently published a five-year Strategy for the crisis, focusing on building resilience in Syria and neighbouring countries, with a focus on basic services, livelihoods, GBV, and human rights. The strategy is based on the application of OECD:s resilience systems analysis tool. Humanitarian funding is subject to a strict allocation process which operates on an annual basis. Syria decision-making comes within this process.	Resources for the Syria crisis are split between: Major UN contributions (handled by Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) The new strategy (handled by Sida's Middle East and North Africa desk), which has five staff working on it Humanitarian resources (handled by Sida's Humanitarian unit within its Asia and Middle East section). One staff member supported by grant management officers who sit at the relevant agency desks, and by a unit in Amman of five people.	Sweden has a 'menu' of partners (UN, NGO, Red Cross) through which it allocates resourcing, and who are subject to strategic partnership arrangements. For each crisis, including Syria, the relevant partners are provided with resources subject to the allocation process described, and subject to partners' intended priorities, comparative advantages etc. Sweden keeps a very close watch on the local partners being contracted by its strategic partners within the Syria crisis, due to political concerns.

Humanitarian assistance	Financial information	Strategy and planning	Organisational arrangements and staffing	Partnerships
imperative.				