The World Bank

Conference

FROM CURSE TO DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL RESOURCES, INSTITUTIONS, AND PUBLIC REVENUES

Peer Review Workshop

BEYOND THE RESOURCE CURSE: HARNESSING NATURAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT

Conference and workshop report

September 8-11, 2009, Holmenkollen Park Hotel Rica, Oslo, Norway

Jointly organized by Norad, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Chr. Michelsen Institute, and the World Bank

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Background for the conference and workshop

For countries that are exploiting new stores of non-renewable natural resource wealth, it is increasingly recognised that key determinants of success are the overall institutional framework and the political economy of rent extraction and management. In all too many cases, the discovery of oil or mineral resources has been associated with devastating political conflict and economic setbacks. Only a few countries have managed resource revenues in a way that promotes sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation. While a number of promising initiatives have emerged to promote good governance and transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sector, there is a clear need to strengthen and disseminate more systematic approaches to address the particular development challenges for natural resource-rich settings.

The Norwegian Government, the World Bank and other development partners have increasingly sought to provide comprehensive support to natural resource rich countries across the full extractive industries value chain. By targeting institution building and good practices in revenue management, development aid can potentially assist developing countries to become fiscally self-reliant. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Norwegian Oil for Development programme are examples of existing initiatives, together with the World Bank's global activity "Strengthening Political-Economy Analysis to Address the Resource Curse". The key objective is to assist governments and international stakeholders to prioritise actions to maximize the developmental impact of extractive industries, based on a systematic and realistic appreciation of the political-economy drivers of these types of settings. At the same time, there is recognition of a need for concerted international action to ensure that the potential benefits from extractive industries are not siphoned off illicitly.

Against this background, a back-to-back conference and peer-review workshop were held on September 8-11, 2009 in Oslo, Norway. The event was co-organized by the Norwegian Agency of Development Cooperation (Norad), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the World Bank, and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). The first day the plenary conference, 8 September, brought together over a hundred and twenty selected experts and policy practitioners from government, academia, civil society, the private sector and multilateral agencies. The one day conference highlighted promising areas to support development in resource-dependent economies and key entry points for linking domestic and international efforts to harness extractive resources for development. Presentations were held on the state of art research on the resource curse, policy options for revenue diversification, transparency in the use of extractive industry resources beyond EITI, and the challenge of illicit capital flows from resource rich settings.

In the subsequent peer-review workshop, 9-11 September, 53 participants from different units and country offices of the World Bank, as well as colleagues from the co-organizing institutions, evaluated the preliminary findings from the cases from sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, Niger), East Asia (East Timor, Laos, and Mongolia), and a comparative analysis of five Latin American cases. Technical policy options were analyzed in light of the in-depth analysis of the political-economy constraints specific to resource-rich countries. A wide variety of views both from internal and external clients/audiences of the activity were represented. Major presentations and discussions that took place in the course of the various sessions are summarized below. The complete agenda is included in Annex 2.

Main Findings

Disconnect between theory and practice in resource-rich countries. Although there is a wide agreement on what constitutes best practice and first-best principles in the various stages of the extractive industry value chain, these policies are rarely adopted and implemented in resource-dependent countries. Participants pointed repeatedly to institutional quality and political-economy drivers as the source of this gap.

Moving beyond political will explanations and understanding political economy drivers. The participants coincided in saying that effectively engaging with resource-rich countries not only requires technically sound practice advice, but also an appreciation of the political economy. There is a knowledge gap between the economics and the political economy of the resource paradox. Examining the micro politics of the natural resource management (NRM) sector in a systematic way is therefore critical to identifying tractable reforms as well as the interventions that can help to increase accountability in initially weak institutional settings.

Endogeneity of politics and economics. While high natural resource dependence can cause governance failures, a weak governance environment can lead to resource dependence. Thus there is simultaneity and reverse causality between institutions and the resource paradox. Perverse incentives are often the result of the enormous wealth generated by the extractive industries, which can in turn be used to avoid and discourage transparent oversight and investments in institutional capacity.

Institutional conditions at the time of resource discovery can set countries on different developmental paths. Preexisting political-economy configurations influence the long term evolution of institutions and the economy in these countries. History matters and in particular the trajectory of previous commodity dependence cycles should be taken into account when discerning institutional incentives.

Political-economy analysis and "good enough" reforms. In spite of the existing agreement regarding best practice institutional arrangements for NRM, there is still much debate about the adequacy of these measures for low institutional capacity environments. The case studies highlighted the importance of political-economy analysis in helping to formulate context-specific minimum governance requirements. In low institutional environments, alternative mechanisms for distributing rents should be examined as a policy option. Partial reforms must also be considered when comprehensive best practice reforms are not feasible.

Supporting domestic constituencies for good governance in the extractive industries. Since change is domestically driven, development agencies should promote consultations between government, the private sector, and civil society. Development agencies can have a significant impact in the process if they help build the capacity of domestic civil society organizations and their understanding of the extractive industries. In their interventions, external actors need to be aware of a society's core imperatives and use this knowledge to mobilize coalitions for change.

The implications of the work shop studies for the work of the World Bank Country Management Units should be carefully considered. In particular in countries where the leverage of the World Bank and donors is limited, it is important to work with country teams in the dissemination of the case studies. Political-economy analysis is a tool that country teams can use to facilitate engagement with governments and create innovative proposals for reform that help mobilize constituencies for change.

Taking the agenda forward and next steps for the workshop team:

In the last day of the workshop, the Task Team Leaders of the activity met with senior management and team members in a closed session. After considering several alternatives, it was agreed that the following next steps will be taken:

- As the main output of the activity, the team will produce a thematic volume with chapters highlighting challenges along the value chain to capture the cross-country findings.
- The first draft of the volume's outline will be refined in the upcoming weeks and a second meeting will be held to finalize the chapter list and budget.
- The draft case studies will be revised to incorporate the feedback received from peer reviewers, workshop participants, and the World Bank Country Management Units.
- The case studies could be compiled in a companion volume or CD. The quality of the final papers and the sensitivity of their content will be used as criteria to select cases.
- A mid-term strategy review will be held in the third week of October.

Annex 1: Summary of Sessions

Conference

"From curse to development: Natural resources, institutions, and public revenues"

The conference 8 September entitled "From curse to development: Natural resources, institutions, and public revenues" was organized in three panels. It brought together international experts, development practitioners from Africa and other regions, as well as representatives from bilateral and multilateral agencies, civil society and the private sector. It provided an opportunity to continue and deepen the debate on institutional reforms for public revenue enhancement and fiscal self-reliance in developing countries.

Opening Speech

Mr. Håkon Arald Gulbrandsen, State Secretary for International Development of Norway, opened the conference asking how developing countries can generate their own revenues and how development agencies can contribute to supporting and strengthening tax administrations. In his address, Mr. Gulbrandsen reiterated that assistance to natural resource rich developing countries continues to be one of the priorities for Norwegian international cooperation. Norway wants to share its experience and knowledge to improve the capacity of countries to manage the resource wealth. The Norwegian government will sustain its commitment to the Oil for Development Program[1], and it is eager to promote a broader collaboration in the area of promoting development from oil revenues. Resource wealth should be shared widely and contribute to the development of these countries.

Norway has recently released a report from the Government Expert Commission on Capital Flight from Poor Countries on the subject titled 'Tax havens and development: status, analyses and measures '.[2] The commission concluded that it is important that the international community takes coordinated actions to reduce capital flight from developing countries and the opportunities created by tax havens. At the same time, the development of extractives industries should be linked to the broader climate change agenda. This perspective is reflected in the 'Report no. 13 to the Storting 2008-2009 - Climate, conflict and capital.'[3]

Part 1: Natural resources and public revenues – the challenges

The initial session was chaired by Mr. Atle Leikvoll, Deputy Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway. Mr. Leikvoll welcomed participants and highlighted the symbolic value of holding this event in Oslo, the capital of one of the most successful countries in managing its oil resources for development purposes. He emphasized

[1] Link to the official description of the Oil for Development programme: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/development_cooperation/oil-for-development.html?id=446108

[2] The report, published as *Official Norwegian Reports* NOU 2009:19, can downloaded from: http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/2223780/PDFS/NOU200920090019000EN_PDFS.pdf

[3] Link to the Report 'Climate, conflict and capital' http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/Propositions-and-reports/Reports-to-the-Storting/2008-2009/report-no-13-2008-2009-to-the-storting.html?id=552810 (Accessed 5 October 2009)

that the goal of the meeting was not only to evaluate the experience of different countries in the management of natural resources and the way forward for policy reform, but more importantly to lay down the foundations for donors to contribute to institution building in resource-rich settings. Taxation, natural resource rent management, transparency and capital flight were introduced as central topics of the conference.

From foreign aid to domestic revenues: An overview of existing knowledge, knowledge gaps and main challenges

The first panel presentations provided an exposure of challenges for harnessing natural resources for development. Alan Gelb, Director of Development Policy of the World Bank, reviewed the existing technical knowledge on the impact of natural wealth in the development and growth of countries, and he contrasted the level of technical expertise with the limited understanding about the political-economy dynamics behind the resource curse. Gelb emphasized that the resource curse is not universal, but instead the curse is often associated with poor governance and human capital. Institutional quality at the time countries begin exploiting natural resources affects their developmental trajectories. Countries with better conditions before the exploitation of natural-resource rents generally do better also after. Consequently, more research is needed on how to strengthen institutions and constituencies to support prudent management of resources despite perverse incentives. Further, there is a need to explore the technical and political implications of alternative mechanisms of distributing rents.

He concluded his presentation posing the question of how external pressure can help countries to deal with the challenges related to improving the use of resource wealth, smoothing spending and dealing with price volatility, diversifying production and exports away from natural resources, and redistributing rents to citizens. Conditionality faces severe limits (e.g. the recent experiences from Chad) and is weakest when resource prices are high. Soft pressure may slowly change behaviour but is unlikely to be decisive. Peer pressure is promising, but the environment of peers needs to be extended to include the resource rich countries themselves.

Fiscal and financial policies for extractive industries in turbulent times

Charles McPherson, Technical Assistance Advisor for the IMF, described how there is a disconnect between theory and practice in the area of natural resource management. McPherson contrasted theory and practice in three areas. First, in the taxation design and administration the theory recommends progressive/flexible taxation based on profit/rent with a professional and predictable administration. In practice taxation is often regressive, based on proxies of profit, renegotiation is frequent, and the administration is often weak. Second, in state participation in extractive enterprises theory recommends revenue participation, commercial orientation, and professional bureaucracy. In practice there are often limited revenue contribution versus taxes, non-commercial objectives, and politicization of state-owned companies. Third, the revenue and expenditure policies theory recommends MTEFs, focus on sustainable resource income, and resource funds integrated with budget and asset management. In practice MTEFs are rarely introduced or effective, non-resource deficits grow rapidly, and resource funds are not integrated with the budget. McPherson also analyzed the link between price and revenue volatility and contractual instability. In a context of high international prices, rigid and regressive taxation designs the ability of governments to take advantage of the surge in prices has been limited, and the pressed situation has led to the renegotiation and reneging of contracts in numerous countries. Finally, McPherson suggested that pressure through civil society, education and peers are possible entry points for development agencies emphasizing transparency.

Accountability and transparency of resource management

The head of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Jonas Moberg, discussed the role of this organization[4] as a forum for dialogue and a platform for broader reforms. EITI can generate demand for long-term reforms beyond transparency. EITI sees transparency as a mean to reach accountability and not the end in itself. The next two years would be a critical for the initiative since most candidate countries have to conclude their validation process. Looking back, lessons learned are that EITI's work is a long-term reform process focusing on building trust and confidence. The effects of EITI's work on corruption are hard to measure, so any evidence on impact is difficult to give. Another lesson is that capacity and will to change should not be confused. Will and commitment are crucial. Experiences from Liberia shows how transparency can be increased with limited resources as long as there is political and managerial commitment. Moberg concluded by praising Norway for being the only developed country that so far has joined the EITI and called for others to follow its example as a way of increasing the leverage of the initiative.

Part 2: What institutions matter for public revenue enhancement – and why

The second panel focused on the institutions that contribute to public revenue enhancement. William Kingsmill, Senior Advisor to the Africa Region Vice-presidency of the World Bank, began the session by stressing that the complexity of the extractive sector requires collaboration across development agencies and thanked Norway for assisting governments and supporting the work of the World Bank in this area.

Institutions, capital flight and the resource curse

Ragnar Torvik, Professor of Economics, the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, walked the audience through the different waves of research on the resource curse to focus on the role of institutions in limiting the potential negative effects of resource dependence. As he explained, resources have the opposite growth effect in countries with strong and weak institutions. Torvik underlined that institutions in other countries and international rules interact with domestic governance and resource wealth, especially those that relate to capital flight and tax benefits. As an example, tax havens with banks facilitating tax evasion and corruption are central actors in handling the rents from the extractive industries.

Botswana's experiences with managing natural resource revenues and their relevance for other resource rich countries

Serwalo Tumelo talked about his experience as former Permanent Secretary in Botswana's Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and the process his department went through of putting in place a national development system. The aim was to secure sound macro-economic policy and increase spending in social development. Botswana started the exploitation of minerals in 1972. The country is often described as a success story because the government has managed to turn rent into positive development for the citizens. In the presentation, Botswana's long-term national development plans were highlighted as a method of promoting responsible management of the resource rent. Tumelo described the broad consultative process behind the Botswana system that set the foundations for growth, budget sustainability, and economic diversification. The consultative process led to politicians having long-term visions and created expectations and demands from the population. He reiterated that domestic ownership of the reform process remains central to ensure policy durability. Other important elements had been good governance, separation of powers among the three arms of the State, political stability, multiparty parliamentary democracy, and sound macro-economic policies.

[4] The organization's web page www.eiti.org provides information on the background and rationale for EITI, as well as relevant literature.

In his summary of the panel, Kingsmill remarked the importance of including civil society organizations in the consultative development process and that donors should support building their capacity.

Tax administration - an entry point for reforms

Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Research Director of the Public Sector Reform Unit at CMI, showed why and how taxation can be used as an entry point for reforms in public institutions. Taxation has historically proven to be an important driving force to strengthen accountability because of the social fiscal contract created between citizens and the government. Bargaining over taxes is central to building relations of accountability between state and citizens based on mutual rights and obligations. How can taxation be improved in resource rich countries? Besides strengthening the administrative apparatus for tax collection, effective ways to tax the informal sector must be identified. In addition tax exemptions should be reduced or eliminated. Thus, development agencies have a responsibility to reconsider their strategy in countries where they themselves benefit from tax exemptions. Donors must be aware that technical support does not work in the absence of political support. On the national level, building of expertise and capacity on natural-resource taxation and strengthening of tax auditing functions would increase local knowledge and possibly strengthen incentives. On the international level peer pressure through professional learning networks (e.g. the OECD's outreach program) and South-South cooperation (e.g. African Tax Administration Forum) together with international initiatives addressing illicit money flows to tax havens could help to improve political incentives.

Part 3: New approaches to development in Africa – implications for institution building and public revenues

The last panel was moderated by Per Øyvind Bastøe, Director of the Economics and Public Administration Department, Norad. He introduced the panel by referring to new encouraging initiatives, including ATAF, which aims to strengthening tax administrations across Africa through South-South exchanges. He underlined the importance of supporting such initiatives. Further, he emphasized that Norwegian experiences from, for instance Zambia, showed that development agencies could play an important supportive role by providing targeted technical assistance based on needs assessment to enhancing mineral revenues.

The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) – at the centre stage to mobilise

Allen Kagina, Commissioner General of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), presented the objectives and the process that led to the creation of the African Tax Administration Forum. ATAF will be formally inaugurated 19-20 November in Kampala, Uganda. However, ATAF has already organized a series of meetings for tax administrators across Africa, covering themes such as tax evasion and transfer pricing. The current financial crisis and downturn in commodity prices have contributed to create momentum for enhancing domestic resource mobilization, and many African countries are taking steps to improve the capacity of their tax administrations. Some desired features of enhanced domestic revenue mobilization are (i) less volatile income bases; (ii) incentives for accountability are created; and (iii) vulnerability to revenue losses from trade reforms is reduced. Further, current systems for tax collection may be strengthened by improving fiscal policies, gradual trade liberalization, improvement of tax and customs administration, and increased transparency may be achieved both at the national and international level. Kagina used tax havens as an example of challenges for domestic revenue collection. ATAF's goals include reducing vulnerability and reliance on external flows through cooperation and targeted technical and capacity development.

The economics and politics of copper taxation in Zambia

Olav Lundstøl, Country Economist at the Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia, examined the current economic and political dynamics of cobber taxation in Zambia. He illustrated how second-best solutions are the best alternative in a context in which the state have limited capacity to enforce complex tax regimes based on profit taxes. A comprehensive needs-assessments based on actual data are necessary to identify an effective tax regime through which mining can promote sustainable development. Lundstøl emphasized that a key assumption in most assessments of efficiency in mining tax regimes in poor but mineral rich economies, has been that the actual cost, revenue and production-export are easy to establish. Consequently, there has been an overemphasis on profit based mining tax. However, very limited audited data exists that can reveal the actual efficiency of such mining tax regimes in the developing world. This relates in particular to ensuring government/national benefit sharing, but it is also relevant for calculating actual tax burden and average effective tax rates for the private sector. An outcome of this situation is that attention, in line with Paul Collier (IMF seminar Sept 2008), needs to move from what is often conceived as first best mining tax regime design, towards the so-called second or third best options. In the actual developing country context these might turn out to be both more efficient and effective when the different elements are considered.

Two main conclusions from his presentation were that (a) mining cannot promote sustainable development without an effective resource tax regime that ensures reasonable benefit sharing; and (b) that the countries need to routinely produce and use audited cost, revenue and export data to re-examine to what extent the tax regime has produced the expected impact.

Strengthening institutional capacity in resource dependent African countries

Anand Rajaram, Sector Manager of AFTPR at the World Bank, who closed the panel called for a more nuanced approach in the analysis of policy options in low capacity settings. He stressed that country experiences suggest that successful development is an internally generated process. Development assistance should pay attention to the obstacles of collective action and engage key stakeholders to improve their capacity. Interventions should be as simple and context specific as possible. He recommended that the focus on building strong public administrations should be coupled with 'visionary leadership' and 'engaged civil society'.

Wrap-up: Where do we go from here?

Poul Engberg-Pedersen, Director General of Norad, summarized the conference discussions and highlighted how important the link is between natural resource revenues, taxation and aid. Especially in fragile states, politics should be considered and technical advice should not only focus on economic growth. Norway supports the EITI and the Oil for Development program and has recently developed programs such as REDD and global initiatives against tax havens and capital flight. Norad wants to build on the work on domestic revenue generation from Zambia and Tanzania, and is exploring how to spread knowledge to more countries. He wrapped up the conference by inviting the participants for views on how to move the initiative forward.

Participants agreed on the need to developing knowledge on institutions building in developing countries and promoting South-South collaboration. The ATAF was seen as one possible platform to facilitate such exchanges in Africa. Many interventions highlighted that this type of support would require long term engagement and a holistic approach that brings together government, private sector, and civil society. Global public goods must be linked with something that actually matters to the people on the ground. Other commentators made the point that the question of whether to extract resources at all should be raised more often given that it is not clear that natural resource rents would have a positive impact on the economy of the country.

Peer Review Workshop

"Beyond the Resource Curse: Harnessing Natural Resources for Development"

The conference referred to above was followed by a peer-review workshop 9-11 September. The workshop was arranged for 53 participants from different units and country offices of the World Bank, as well as colleagues from the co-organizing institutions. The main aim was to evaluate the preliminary findings from case studies done on sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Latin America.

Objectives of the project, workshop and case studies

The three task team leaders for the activity explained the objectives of the workshop and the political economy approach to analyze extractive industries along the value chain used in the study. Kai Kaiser, Senior Economist at PRMPS, referred to the growing interest in political economy to inform the work of the World Bank and other development agencies. To meet this demand the Public Sector Governance Unit has developed a problem-driven framework that applies political economy analysis to concrete problems in a way that is operationally meaningful. The study uses this framework to drill down in the particular subject of natural resource dependence. During the first two days of the workshop, the team would take stock of the cases, validate them, and understand what the implications are for country engagement in these cases. The case studies would serve as inputs for a future thematic volume that synthesize the cross-country findings and policy lessons. The outline of that volume has been distributed to participants along with the background materials on the resource paradox.

Naazneen Barma, Young Professional at EASPR, reviewed the objectives and the structured comparative approach routed in the value chain that have guided the case studies. This framework uses micro political economy analysis to identify key stakeholders and drivers in the different stages and the interdependence among the different links of the value chain. A range of cases were selected to represent a variety of mineral rich and hydrocarbon rich countries, which are at different stages of their natural resource exploration and exploitation. This approach was chosen to achieve the dual research and practice objectives of the activity. On the one hand, the study was designed to allow the team to distill generalizations across the cases that will be synthesized in the global product described before. On the other hand, drawing on the political economy insights the case studies seek to identify a set of feasible 'good enough' reforms and sequenced interventions tailored to the specific context of each country that contribute to mitigate the institutional and governance challenges.

Lastly, Tuan Minh Le, Senior Economist at AFTPR, explained the necessity of using a broader approach in the engagement with natural resource rich countries. EITI has provided an important entry point, but there are still risks of shifting non-transparency up and down the value chain. Understanding political economy will lead to more effective World Bank support. However, it is important to recognize the sensitivity of the studies which seek to balance rigorous evidence based research with operational relevance. With this in mind he asked the directors and sector managers to provide their guidance on what their needs are and the challenges they face in resource rich countries.

Management Perspective on Challenges across the Extractive Industry Value Chain

The first panel offered the management perspective on the role of political economy work on the natural resource management sector. Onno Ruhl, Country Director of the World Bank in Nigeria, stressed that promoting reforms in resource rich countries requires particularly innovative approaches since donors and development agencies have limited leverage as stressed. Country directors and teams are the main audience of this activity. They are aware of political and economic incentives of major stakeholders, but they do not analyze them in a systematic way. CMUs also realize that stating the obvious can help bring about change and be an effective tool to create dialogue, but he warned that this needs to be done in a productive way. This has implications for the work of the Bank, which is perceived as not neutral by domestic actors. Change is generally domestically driven and a political economy perspective is useful to design programs that are creative and realistic at the same time. Katherine Bain, reflecting on her experience as Ghana Country Manager, added that stakeholder dialogue is a valuable platform for reform. The Bank has to be able to act quickly when reform windows of opportunity open and develop tools to support South-South exchanges.

Anand Rajaram called attention once again to the necessity of looking at good-enough minimum requirement policy options that best fit the specific context of low capacity resource dependent countries. He explained that since last October all the papers have gained in depth and understanding of the political economy drivers in the different extractive sectors and the conditional impact of natural resource wealth. This type of analytical work intends to help World Bank staff to identify the decision function of governments and how initial conditions influence trajectories going forward. Barbara Nunberg, Sector Manager for EASPR, explained that interest in this area in the East Asia and Pacific region grew out of the work of the Mongolia CGAC. She underlined the need of moving beyond “political will” and going to a more systematic analysis of politics and especially around the commitment issue and risk of reneging. It is important to look at reform dynamics over time and make political economy assessments a repetitive exercise since political environments can change rapidly. She recognized that political-economy approaches are still new for the Bank.

Research Frontier in Harnessing Natural Resources for Development

Next, Rick van der Ploeg, Professor of Economics at the University of Oxford, recommended that the authors conducting political economy analysis in resource rich countries consider ten questions when making policy recommendations. These were: 1. Keep it in the ground or take it out? 2. How to take it out of the ground? 3. How fast to take it out of ground? 4. Natural resources and war? 5. Once out of soil, what happens to revenue? 6. Is it invested in human capital, infrastructure, and private capital or saved in a sovereign wealth fund? 7. Is there capital scarcity? 8. Are there absorption constraints? 9. How to cope with volatility of commodity prices? 10. Is there a curse and, if so, can it be turned into a blessing?

Successes and Challenges of Engagement in the Extractive Industries: Experiences Learned from Ghana

The successes and challenges of EITI implementation in Ghana were presented by a panel featuring representatives from the countries Ministry of Mining, the Parliament, and a civil society organization. The panel was chaired by the Ghana Country Manager, Katherine Bain, who provided a brief description of the political economy characteristics of the country and its resource dependence profile. She explained that the country team has used political economy assessments not only to inform policy notes “Lessons from Mining and Implications for Oil” as well as the EITI ++ scoping paper, but also to facilitate dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders. One of the objectives of this work was to help reformists to stick to their own roadmaps by providing good technical inputs on economics and politics.

Amadou Tuffour, Senior Adviser on Extractive Industries to the Ministry of Finance, characterized the current mining legislation as overly generous to foreign companies. The royalty formula and sliding scales are difficult to enforce and lead to low revenue mobilization. There is low verification capacity that often interacts with the excessive discretionary power of the executive creating poor accountability and transparency in the management of the sector. Currently, the country does not have a mineral sector strategy and mining policy is not linked to economic and social development objectives. In this context, the discovery of oil presents important challenges related to potential public sector wage demands, rise in energy subsidy, and quasi-fiscal activities by state-owned enterprises. In order to prevent patronage and political capture of future oil revenues, he recommended unbundling GNPC into a regulatory authority and a national oil company.

Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Energy and Mines Committee, Honorable Moses Asaga, discussed the legislative challenges around the implementation of EITI in Ghana. He referred to weaknesses in the country's political institutions that translate in a domination of the executive in the policy-making process and a limited role of Parliament as a counterbalance. He also described the conflict of interests and corruption risks that arise from the fact that members of parliaments are appointed to the boards of directors of mining companies.

Lastly, Steve Manteaw representing the Ghanaian NGO ISODEC reflected on the role that civil society organizations have in the EITI implementation. Despite its limitations, EITI has served as a platform for engagement and has allowed civil society to champion the review of Terms of Reference for audit and push EITI legislation. EITI has also helped to identify inefficiencies in Ghana's tax policy and administration which include large capital deductibles and carrying over balances. The main challenges that remain unaddressed are the delays in transfers of communities' share of benefits, need of capacity building at the local level, weaknesses in the audit process, and evasion of ground rents.

Cross-cutting Challenges and Lessons on Entry Points along the Extractive Industry Value Chain in Mineral Rich Settings

The third day of the workshop was opened by a panel that analyzed the cases and suggested next steps to translate political economy work into programs. Stephen Ndegwa, Lead Specialist at AFTPR, underscored that the cases show that each country has a core imperative. Identifying such project and the actors that drive it is central to the work of the World Bank. Development agents and bilateral donors can play a relevant role in facilitating dialogue around a national vision and in building coalitions for change. A political economy and institutional lens will undoubtedly increase the effectiveness of those engagements. Ndegwa advised participants to consider partial reforms when best principle comprehensive reforms are not feasible. He also point to the need of discussing more the success stories, even in difficult settings.

Governance for Extractive Industries: the "How" of Reform

Randi Ryterman, Director of Governance and Innovation, World Bank Institute (WBI) explained in her presentation that the WBI is working closely with the Africa Region and other global partners on a new multi-stakeholder process to better manage natural resources. Multi-stakeholder approaches, particularly when nested in a strong appreciation of country priorities and the prevailing political-economy, can yield some progress. A dynamic view of the incentives and influence of stakeholders in the extractive sectors is particularly promising for identifying potential constituencies for reform and creating a platform for key actors to come together.

Highlights from the Case Studies

AFR-EAP-LAC Country Case Overview

Country (Author/s)	Resource Dependency Profile	Organization of the Sector	Award of Contracts and Licenses	Regulation and Monitoring	Revenue Mobilization	Revenue and Expenditure Management	Intergovernmental Benefit Sharing	Public Investment Management
Angola (Oliveira and Hansen)	Petroleum, diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, feldspar, bauxite, uranium, and gold. 2 million barrels/day (2008). Petroleum accounts for: 79.8% of total fiscal revenues (2007), 55% of GDP, and 39.1 % of total exports (2000-2005).	Sonangol has exclusive rights to petroleum and gas exploration. Sonangol is oil concessionaire, regulator, and tax gathering agent. Sonangol is relatively insulated. Stability in senior management.	Licensing procedure clearly defined. Recent license process with pre-qualified companies to operate. No information on contract terms is available. Local insiders receive preferential treatment.	MINPET has little institutional capacity, only quarterly monitoring is possible. Sonangol's technical capacity of international standard.	Resident companies have to pay 10% withholding tax. Non-oil taxation is still small segment of overall public revenues.	Procurement practices of awarding contract to local companies with direct ties to the government ("Angolization"). 4-5 % of GDP in subsidies.	Decentralization project (MAT/ UNDP/ DFID/ Norway/WB)	Weak capacity to efficiently implement planned programs, projects and activities. Mid-term Plan 2009-2013. PIM focused on physical infrastructure. No policy-based budgeting, opaque and non-comprehensive budget, no budget credibility.
DRC (Chevallier,. Mutamba and Kaiser)	Diamonds, gold, cobalt, zinc, 80% of world wide resources of coltan, 10% of world wide resources of copper). Mining contributed 25% (1980) and 2.4% (2005) of total fiscal revenues, 52.7% of GDP, and 11.9% of total exports (2000-2005).	Gecamines restructuring, contract rights Informal/artisanal mining. 16% of the Congolese population directly or indirectly dependent on small scale mining. Smuggling problem. Institutional redundancies and weak coordination.	Renegotiations. Large bundled awards.	Very weak.	Very low revenue mobilization	Very weak.	Constitutional Sharing. Provinces should receive 40% of collected mining royalties (25 % for the provincial administration and 15 % for the area where mining activities are conducted), 10 % of surface rents, and 40 % of all tax revenues and mining-related tax revenues.	Very weak.
Ghana (Ayee, Le, Shukla, Søreide, and	Gold, diamond, bauxite, and manganese. Estimates of	Institutional redundancies and weak coordination. Small scale mining.	Political influence in award decisions. Outdated legislation. Weak	Weak capacity, government capture by mining interests.	Royalty revenues 12% government revenues (while 33% of exports).	Weak. Procurement Acts not being enforced	Royalties to be disbursed to traditional authorities as	Patronage politics. Pork and barrel.

Treichel)	Ghana's petroleum reserves (discovered in 2007) vary between 1bn and 1.5bn barrels. Commercial extraction has not begun. Gold accounts for: 33.4% of GDP and 11 % of total exports (2000-2005).		regulation. Co-existence of legal and customary systems. Patronage and conflicts of interest.	No company has received sanctions. Low oversight from the Parliament.	Lowest rate of royalties applied (3%), exemptions corporate tax. No guidelines or standard methods of pricing leading to varying pricing methods used by mining companies.		follows: 25% to the stool and 20% to the traditional authority.	
Niger (Chevallier, and Yungu)	Uranium, gold, and petroleum. Largest of uranium and the third largest producer in the world. Reserves of around 300 million barrels of petroleum. Uranium exports account for: 4.3% of total fiscal revenues and 62 % of total exports (2003).	SOPAMIN, external mining companies are state-owned. Small scale mining.	Closed negotiations, high level diplomacy involved. Bidding used in Petroleum contract (bundled awards (CNPN), emphasis on signing bonus). No pre-qualification of bidders (large number of licenses to unqualified bidders). Special exemptions for Areva. High royalties.	Elite capture. Lack of capacity in the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. Institutional redundancies and weak coordination. Lack of transparency.	Low. 13.2% (2008) of public revenues. External assistance dependency.	Very weak. Volatility of revenues. No compliance with EITI. SOPAMIN accounts are not public.	1999 Constitution 15% of royalties for communes in mining region. Tuareg rebellion in the Northern region. Recurrent issue.	Budget execution rate declined. Opaque procurement practices. Mining companies are expected to invest in the mining regions. Bundled project CNPN.
Nigeria (Gboyega, Le, and Søreide)	Crude petroleum, coal, tin, columbite. The largest petroleum producer in Africa and among the top ten globally. Estimated at 34 billion barrels in reserves (2003). Petroleum accounts for:	The sector is dominated by joint venture operations between the Nigerian government (NNPC) and six major international petroleum companies—Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Agip, Elf, and	Closed negotiations, high levels of government. No pre-qualification of bidders. Bundled awards, signature bonuses. Inadequate geological information.	Strong political involvement. Navy colludes with bunkering groups. Ministry of Petroleum not sufficiently controlled by the Parliament.	86% (2004) of federal revenues, since then declined. Weak due to theft and smuggling. Production and revenues below target.	Centralization of revenue collection Windfall fund.	13 % is retained by the originating state. The rest is divided between the Federal Government and the Federal Account. Niger Delta conflict. Conflict over windfall fund.	Controlled by the president/governors. Weak control on expenditures at the state level.

	89% of total fiscal revenues, 46.2% of GDP, and 95 % of total exports (2006).	Texaco. Institutional redundancies and weak coordination. Small scale operators.					Governors have discretion over expenditure.	
East Timor (Anderson, Barma, and Porter)	Petroleum-rich country. Estimates revenues in excess of USD 1 billion from FY05-09 (WB). Derives over 90% of revenue from the petroleum sector (2005). Petroleum revenues represent 320% of non-petroleum GDP (2007)	A new National Petroleum Authority (NPA) authorizes and supervises Production Sharing Contracts for the JPDA and TL's exclusive zone. National Oil Company, down/upstream equity. Petroleum production began in 2004.	Legal framework for petroleum production, taxation, and revenue management considered international best-practice. Licensing is transparent. Competitive tendering.	Implementation depends on international technical assistance (from the same countries oil companies are incorporated). Reduced inspection and audit capacity.	Derives 98% of revenue from the petroleum sector.	Petroleum Fund (2005) robust, transparent. Withdrawals from the Fund are integrated into the budget. Parliament must approve withdrawals above the estimated sustainable income.	Expenditure decentralization controls, weak targeting and accountability systems	Proliferation of cash transfers. Capital spending unconstrained by strategic investment framework, leading to 'grand projects'.
Laos (Naazneen Barma and Verena Fritz)	Copper, tin, gold, and gypsum mining. Mining accounts for: 17% of total fiscal revenues (2008).	Overlapping institutional mandates between Ministry of Energy and Mines (Department of Mines) and Ministry of Planning and Investment.	Licensing processes are opaque, as many awards are made outside the formal process. High-level political decision-making.	Extremely low monitoring capacity in the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Tax-relation enforcement and monitoring weak.	Revenue terms of specific concessions and licenses are not made public. No standardized fiscal regime exists. Revenue collection has recently been re-centralized, along with other PFM systems.	Currently no stabilization fund to help manage revenue volatility from mining sector revenues.	Dominance of provinces in deciding investment priorities, with limited role of sector ministries.	Investment planning is the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (separate from MOF). Procurement and project cycle monitoring appear to be weak. No audits of investment projects to date.
Mongolia (Verena Fritz and Christopher Finch)	Coal, copper, molybdenum, fluorspar, tin, tungsten, and gold, petroleum. Mining accounts for: 39% of total fiscal	Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia is the lead agency.	General lack of transparency and regulation in cadastre system and license allocation procedures; consequently	Hyper-involvement by Parliament in mining legal and regulatory issues; also much executive involvement.	Rapid expansion of public revenues – creating 'fiscal space' and consequently pressure to spend.	Parliament override the executive budget proposal by introducing significant changes and additions.		The public investment program has increased extremely rapidly since 2005, challenging domestic capacity. Public investment used as a

	revenues (2008), 26.3% of GDP (2000-2005), and 81 % of total exports (2008).		significant opportunity for discretion in the licensing process—both administrative corruption and state capture.					political tool for elections—extremely politicized in Parliament.

Political-Economy of Recent Commodity Boom-Slump Cycle: LAC Case Studies

Country (Author/s)	Resource Profile	Organization of the Sector	Award of Contracts	Regulation and Monitoring	Revenue Mobilization	Revenue and Expenditure Management	Intergovernmental Benefit Sharing	Public Investment Management
Bolivia (Carlos F. Toranzon Roca)	Mining, smelting, petroleum. Gas accounts for: 20.9% of total fiscal revenues, 5.0% of GDP, and 23 % of total exports (2000-2005).	State retains ownership of natural resource. Concession to foreign state-owned companies (Petrobras, Repsol).	Change in Hydrocarbon law. Renegotiation of concessions granted by the Gonzalez Losada government.	Low technical capacity. Smuggling problems.	Increase in revenues as a result of higher prices for natural gas and renegotiation of contracts with Argentina and Brazil. Decreasing production that imply fewer public revenues.	Proliferation of cash transfers and use of revenues to finance current expenditures. Subsidies to domestic consumption of hydrocarbons.	Fiscal decentralization to third tier governments. Higher transfers to the Tarija. Subsidies to agro industry in the Santa Cruz region.	Emphasis on physical infrastructure. Low rate of budget execution, budget credibility. Savings as a result of low execution.
Chile (Patricio Navia)	Copper, other minerals. Cooper accounts for: 23.4% of total fiscal revenues, 16.6% of GDP, and 50 % of total exports (2004-2008).	CODELCO is the largest copper producer in the world. It provides for one third of production, the rest comes from 10 large private companies, most multinational, and several small- and medium-sized private companies. COTELCO comprises a network of more than 50 subsidiaries and joint ventures with public and private companies.	Transparent. CODELCO has exclusive rights to the best known reserves. Foreign companies exploit less	Adequate technical capacity and resources.	The Government appropriates a share of mining rents through taxes levied on private firms and through dividends and taxes paid by public companies. No special tax regime for private firms, same as in other sectors 15% tax. In 2005, an additional 5% was approved. 10 % of CODELCO's exports revenues are transferred to the military.	Fiscal rule that implies a Central Government (CG) structural balance target of 0.5 % of GDP Legislature can only revise budget downwards.	Unitary state. Full centralization of government. Extractive and processing industry rents accrue to central government.	Increase in social transfers. Financing of Pension Reform.

Ecuador (Simón Cueva A.)	Petroleum. Petroleum accounts for: 26.0% of total fiscal revenues, 11.8% of GDP, and 46.9 % of total exports (2000-2005).	Private companies' production doubled between 1998 and 2005. Petroecuador production fell in the same period. Transfer to Petroecuador of Occidental's field.	Instability of contracts. Longstanding underinvestment in oil exploration. Arbitration.		Increase in revenues due to high international prices, production is falling.	Stabilization fund, fiscal responsibility rules, earmarks were suppressed. All fund savings transferred to the budget.		Large public investments, subsidies to fuels, public services and transportation. Fiscal spending increased 70% in 2008.
Mexico (Alberto Díaz-Cayeros)	Iron and steel, petroleum, mining. Petroleum accounts for: 33.3% of total fiscal revenues, 3% of GDP, and 17.2 % of total exports (2000-2005).	Very complex and opaque management of PEMEX	PEMEX Monopoly of petroleum exploitation Lack of investment in the company has led to limited new exploration projects.		High fiscal dependence on petroleum revenues, not in exports or GDP.		Centralization of expenditure in the Federal government. Revenues windfalls (*excedentes petroleros*) are part of the common pool of resources shared with states.	
Trinidad and Tobago (Richard Auty)	Petroleum and liquefied natural gas. Petroleum accounts for: 36.4% of total fiscal revenues, 28.4% of GDP, and 59.9 % of total exports (2000-2005).	BP and state-owned Petrotrin produce 95% of the oil. Most of the oil is processed in the domestic refinery. BP also produces 70% of the gas and BG a further 23% with four small companies producing the rest.	New gas production enjoys a decade-long tax holiday and the contracts exclude provision for windfall taxation.		Revenue windfall of extra 32% of non-energy GDP annually (2004-2008).	Increased consumer subsidies, an expansion of loss-making state enterprises and state-led resource-based industrialization that prioritized low-rent steel over higher-rent LNG.		Over-rapid domestic absorption of the windfall rent. Union-appeasing public spending programs and projects, and pork barrel investment projects

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Annex 2: Agenda

From curse to development:
Natural resources, institutions, and public revenues

Conference

Day 1: Tuesday, 08 September 2009.

08:30-09:10	**Registration and coffee**
09:10 – 09:30	**Opening and Introduction** by ***Håkon Arald Gulbrandsen***, State Secretary for International Development
09:30 - 11:00	**Part 1: Natural Resources and Development – the Challenges** Moderator: ***Atle Leikvoll***, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway Speakers: • ***Alan Gelb***, Director, Development Policy, The World Bank: *From foreign aid to domestic revenues: an overview of existing knowledge, knowledge gaps and main challenges.* • ***Jonas Moberg***, Director, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): *Accountability and transparency of resource management.* • ***Charles McPherson***, Technical Assistance Adviser, Tax Policy Division, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF: *Taxing extractive industries in turbulent times.* Discussion, summary of the session
11:00 – 11:15	**Coffee break**
11:15 – 12:45	**Part 2: What Institutions Matter for Public Revenue Enhancement – and Why** Moderator: ***William Kingsmill***, Senior Advisor, Office of the Vice President, Africa Region, The World Bank Speakers: • ***Ragnar Torvik***, Professor, Norwegian University of Science and Technology: *Institutions, capital flight and the resource curse.* • ***Serwalo S.G. Tumelo***, Chairman of the African Alliance Botswana and former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Gaborone: *Botswana's experiences with managing natural resource revenues and their relevance for other resource rich countries.* • ***Odd-Helge Fjeldstad***, Research Director, Chr. Michelsen Institute: *Tax administration - an entry point for reforms.* Discussion, summary of the session
13:00 – 13:45	**Lunch**
13:45 - 15:30	**Part 3: New Approaches to Development in Africa – Implications for Institution Building and Public Revenues** Moderator: ***Per Øyvind Bastøe***, Director, Economics and Public Administration Department, Norad Speakers: • ***Allen Kagina***, Commissioner General, Uganda Revenue Authority: *The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) – at the centre stage to mobilise domestic revenues.* • ***Olav Lundstøl***, Country Economist, Norwegian Embassy Lusaka: *The economics and politics of cobber taxation in Zambia.* • ***Anand Rajaram***, Sector Manager, AFTPR, The World Bank: *Harnessing Africa's natural resources for growth and poverty reduction.* Discussion, summary of the session
15:30 – 15:45	**Coffee break**
15:45– 16:15	**Closing Session: The Need for Policy-Relevant Research** • ***Poul Engberg-Pedersen***, Director General, Norad: ***Wrap-up: Where do we go from here?***
16:15 – 17:30	**Reception with cocktails**

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Beyond the Resource Curse:
Harnessing Natural Resources for Development

Authors' Peer Review Workshop

Day 2: Wednesday, 09 September 2009

08:00-9:00	<u>**Breakfast**</u>
09:00-09:30	**Beyond the Resource Curse: Looking for Entry Points across the Extractive Industries Value Chain** <u>Objectives of the project, workshop and case studies:</u> • ***Kai Kaiser***, Senior Economist, PRMPS • ***Tuan Minh Le***, Senior Economist, AFTPR • ***Naazneen Barma***, Public Sector Specialist, EASPR
09:30-10:30	**Management Perspective on Challenges across the Extractive Industry Value Chain** <u>Speakers</u>: • ***Anand Rajaram***, Sector Manager, AFTPR • ***Onno Ruhl***, Nigeria Country Director • ***Katherine Bain***, Ghana Country Manager • ***Barbara Nunberg***, Sector Manager, EASPR • ***Craig Andrews,*** Lead Mining Specialist, COCPO
10:30-10:45	<u>**Coffee**</u>
10:45-11:15	**Research Frontier in Harnessing Natural Resources for Development** <u>Speaker</u>: • ***Rick van der Ploeg***, Professor of Economics, Oxford University /Deputy Director, OxCarre
11:15-12:15	**Successes and Challenges of Engagement in the Extractive Industries: Experience Learned from Ghana** <u>Chair:</u> • ***Katherine Bain***, Ghana Country Manager <u>Speakers</u>: • ***Hon. Moses Asaga***, Chairman of the Energy and Mines Committee and Member of Parliament of Ghana • ***Amaoko Tuffour***, Senior Adviser on Extractive Industries to the Ministry of Finance of Ghana • ***Steve Manteaw***, Director, ISODEC
	Focus on Hydrocarbons: Preliminary Findings and Lessons from Country Case Studies
12:15-13:05	**Angola** <u>Speakers</u>: • ***Ricardo de Oliveira***, African Politics, University of Oxford • ***Kjetil Hansen***, Senior Public Sector Mgmt. Specialist, AFTPR <u>Peer reviewers</u>: • ***Ricardo Costa Gazel***, Senior Economist, AFTP1 • ***Arne Wiig***, Senior Researcher, CMI • ***Alexandra Gillies***, Consultant, AFTPR
13:05-14:05	<u>**Lunch**</u>

14:05-14:55	**East Timor** Speaker: • ***Catherine Anderson***, Consultant, EASPR Peer reviewers: • ***Eivind Tandberg***, Senior Adviser, Economics and Public Administration Department, Norad • ***Tuan Minh Le***, Senior Economist, AFTPR
14:55-15:45	**Nigeria** Speakers: • ***Alex Gboyega***, Professor, University of Ibadan (Nigeria) • ***Tina Soreide***, Economist, FEU Peer reviewers: • ***Onno Ruhl***, Country Director, Nigeria • ***Ricardo de Oliveira***, Lecturer, Oxford University (United Kingdom) • ***Alexandra Gillies***, Consultant, AFTPR
15:45-16:00	**Coffee**
	Focus on Mining: Preliminary Findings and Lessons from Country Case Studies
16:00-16:50	**Ghana** Speakers: • ***Joseph Ayee***, Professor, University of Ghana • ***Tina Soreide***, Economist, FEU Peer reviewers: • ***Katherine Bain***, Ghana Country Manager • ***Olav Lundstøl***, Country Economist, Norwegian Embassy Lusaka • ***Naazneen Barma***, Public Sector Specialist, EASPR
16:50-17:20	**Closing Session: Cross-cutting Challenges and Lessons on Entry Points along the Extractive Industry Value Chain in Petroleum Rich Settings** Speaker: • ***Stephen N. Ndegwa***, Lead Specialist, AFTPR
18:30-19:30	**Dinner**

Day 3: Thursday, 10 September 2009

08:00-9:00	**Breakfast**
09:00-09:30	**Governance for Extractive Industries: the "How" of Reform** Speaker: • ***Randi Ryterman***, Director of Governance and Innovation, Institute
09:30-10:15	**Extractive Sector: Actionable Indicators across the Value Chain** Speaker: • ***Maks Kobonbaev***, Consultant, PRMPS Peer reviewers: • ***Ted Dreger***, Governance Specialist, PRMPS • ***Adnan Vatansever***, Consultant, PRMPS/AFTPR

10:15-11:05	**Niger** Speakers: • ***Jérôme Chevallier***, Consultant, MNSED • ***Robert Yungu***, Senior Resource Management Officer, AFTPR Peer reviewers: • ***Brigitte Bocoum***, Senior Mining Specialist, COCPO • ***Harald Tollan***, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway • ***Tony Verheijen***, Senior Public Sector Specialist, AFTPR
11:05-11:20	**Coffee**
11:20-12:10	**Democratic Republic of Congo** Speakers: • ***Jérôme Chevallier***, Consultant, MNSED • ***Kai Kaiser***, Senior Economist, PRMPS Peer reviewers: • ***Craig Andrews***, Lead Mining Specialist, COCPO • ***Tony Verheijen***, Senior Public Sector Specialist, AFTPR • ***Jan Isaksen***, Senior Research Fellow, CMI
12:10-13:00	**Mongolia** Speaker: • ***Christopher Finch***, Senior Country Officer, EACCQ Peer reviewers: • ***Asmeen M. Khan***, Lead Governance Specialist, EAPVP • ***Maks Kobonbaev***, Consultant, PRMPS
13:00-14:00	**Lunch**
14:00-14:50	**Laos** Speaker: • ***Naazneen Barma***, Public Sector Specialist, EASPR Peer reviewers: • ***Craig Andrews***, Lead Mining Specialist, COCPO • ***Eivind Tandberg***, Senior Adviser, Economics and Public Administration Department, Norad • ***Kai Kaiser***, Senior Economist, PRMPS
	Findings from Latin America
14:50-15:40	**Emerging Lessons from Latin America Country Cases: Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago** Speakers: • ***Steven Webb***, Advisor, LCSPS • ***Emily Sinnott***, Senior Country Economist, LCSPE Peer reviewers: • ***Charles McPherson***, Technical Assistance Adviser, Tax Policy Division, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF • ***Kai Kaiser***, Senior Economist, PRMPS • ***Gary McMahon***, Senior Mining Specialist, COCPO

15:40-15:55	<u>**Coffee**</u>
15:55-16:45	**Cross-cutting Challenges and Lessons on Entry Points along the Extractive Industry Value Chain in Mineral Rich Settings** <u>Speakers</u>: • ***Stephen N. Ndegwa***, Lead Specialist, AFTPR • ***Brigitte Bocoum***, Senior Mining Specialist, COCPO
16:45-17:00	**Closing Session: Wrap-up and Evaluations** <u>Speaker:</u> • ***Kai Kaiser***, Senior Economist, PRMPS

Day 4: Friday, 11 September 2009.

	Project Team Meeting *(Closed session)*
8:00-9:00	<u>**Breakfast**</u>
9:00-11:00	**Round-Table Meeting** **Next Steps: Thematic Volume and Peer Review Process** • ***Kai Kaiser***, Senior Economist, PRMPS • ***Tuan Minh Le***, Senior Economist, AFTPR • ***Naazneen Barma***, Public Sector Specialist, EASPR • ***Anand Rajaram***, Sector Manager, AFTPR • ***Barbara Nunberg***, Sector Manager, EASPR • ***Asmeen M. Khan***, Lead Governance Specialist, EAPVP • ***Odd-Helge Fjeldstad***, Research Director, CMI • ***Emily Sinnott***, Senior Country Economist, LCSPE • ***Steven Webb, Advisor***, LCSPS • ***Craig Andrews***, Lead Mining Specialist, COCPO • ***Maks Kobonbaev***, Consultant, PRMPS • ***Adnan Vatansever***, Consultant, PRMPS/AFTPR • ***Lorena Viñuela***, Consultant, PRMPS/AFTPR
11:00-15:00	**Authors meet in teams**.

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Annex 5: Further Resources

All the presentations are available in the World Bank's Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Portal on Governance and Political Economy Analysis:
http://connect.worldbank.org/units/prem/PD-GPEA/EIfD/web/events/2009-09_Oslo_EIfD-Conference.aspx

To learn more about the CMI and natural resources, please visit:
http://www.cmi.no/news/?545=from-curse-to-development-natural-resources

The CMI conference page gives access to all the presentations and a selection of relevant literature. Please see http://www.cmi.no/news/?545=from-curse-to-development-natural-resources to get access to the information package.

Norad Oil for Development Program's page:
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/development_cooperation/oil-for-development.html?id=446108

Norway Supported Petroleum Governance Initiative:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,,contentMDK:22189072~menuPK:6201087~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336930,00.html

The Latin America Chief Economist's Office, PREM and SD Flagship on Commodity-led Development background papers and country case studies are posted at:
http://go.worldbank.org/55O3DOM6N0

Oil, Gas, and Mining Department:
http://ifcnet.ifc.org/intranet/coc.nsf/Content/Home
http://www.worldbank.org/mining

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