END-REVIEW OF THE PROGRAMME "DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND POLITICAL MANAGEMENT", GUATEMALA

Final Report

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END-REVIEW REPORT

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Final version

PEMCONSULT
PEOPLE·ENVIRONMENT·MANAGEMENT

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0. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

0.1. Background

The programme "Democratic Values and Political Management Support to Legally Registered Political Parties" (PVDGP), carried out by the Organisation of American States (OAS) with funding from NORAD[1] and Sida, is concluding its second phase (2004-2007). The present document is an external end-review of PVDGP, carried out in January-February 2008.

0.2. The Programme

The *development objective* of the programme is to promote democratic values and instruments for political management in the political parties (PP), so to raise the levels of institutionalisation, representativity and legitimacy. *The immediate objective* is to design and promote processes for institutionalisation and democratic change in the PPs and the party system in Guatemala.

In summary, the programme has developed activities to:
- *Strengthen the PPs*, both through multiparty and bilateral activities, and with particular weight on promoting the inclusion of young people, women and indigenous people. The main instruments have been training and technical assistance. The programme has in this context developed a number of training materials and methodologies.
- *Facilitate multiparty dialogue*, mainly through the Permanent Forum for Political Parties (FPPP).
- *Support the revision of the law on elections* and political parties (LEPP).
- Ensure a better understanding of the problems and the changes through the *financing of relevant studies*, partly financed in parallel by NORAD/MFA, and making these and other relevant documents available for the PPs (e.g. through a web page).

0.3. Effectiveness

This part of the review is principally to assess to which degree the objectives established actually have been achieved, i.e. the question is: to what extent has there been progress with regard to increased (i) *representativity*, (ii) *legitimacy* and (iii) *institutionalisation* of the political parties and the party system in Guatemala.

Unfortunately, the programme document does not state indicators for the objective, no specific baseline is identified and there has been no systematic reporting on this in the annual reports. The Review Team (RT) has therefore placed particular emphasis on identifying relevant indicators for the objective, for which information is available, so that a relatively solidly based assessment can be made regarding the achievement of the objective. There are actually quite a lot of studies available on different aspects of the parties and the party system, both financed by the programme or spin-off projects from

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[1] The agreement was originally with NORAD, but the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) took over the responsibility for the Norwegian bilateral aid (and consequently for the agreement with OAS) in 2004.

the programme and from other sources. In Appendix E to the present report, there is a summary of these different data-sources.

The *conclusions* that emerge from this analysis are as follows:

- Regarding the *political parties and the party system*: There has been some limited progress with regard to representativity and institutionalisation, but probably less with regard to legitimacy. From a more optimistic point of view, it is possible that some crucial change is about to happen regarding the stability of inter-party competition, as some major (UNE, FRG, PP) and some minor parties may be in a process of stabilisation, but this is too early to say for sure.
- The single most important change with direct relevance for the achievement of PVDGP's objectives is the change in the *legal framework* concerning elections and political parties represented by the 2004 revision of the LEPP. Of particular importance is the decentralisation of the voting, implying an increased number of polling stations, which has led to decreased abstentionism in the rural areas. Also important is the introduction of rules for party financing and a system for public financing of the parties.
- Regarding the *support to the congress* (a spin-off from the programme), the achievements are mixed: (i) on one hand there is an extremely high level of floor-crossing ("transfugismo")[2], but (ii) on the other hand some important laws that for many years had not been possible to get through congress have now actually been passed (among these the LEPP).

0.4.   Efficiency

This part of the review has principally consisted of comparing inputs with outputs and includes an assessment of cost-efficiency.

A comparison of the planned and actual activities and outputs shows a mixed picture. Some outputs have only been achieved partially, due to suspension of activities. The main findings are as follows:

- The sustained support to the reform of the LEPP has had a direct effect on the electoral campaign of 2007 and has thus improved participation of women and indigenous people somewhat. One effect of the reform of the LEPP is the diminished fragmentation of the party system.
- The FPPP was established and maintained, providing a healthy forum for political dialogue that has overcome the normal conflicts of two electoral campaigns.
- The PPs have enhanced their capacities to compete in the electoral campaign during 2007, presenting more government programmes, better campaign strategies and territorial organisation.
- The activities to promote closer relations between political parties and actors within civil society have roughly been carried out as planned. The general perception of the interviewees is that the relationship between political parties and sectors of civil society has improved.

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[2] I should be noted, however, that the objective for this support is to improve the functioning of the congress, not to strengthen the political parties.

- The activities to promote participation of women, young and indigenous peoples in leadership positions have only been partly carried out. Many political parties have by now secretariats for women, youth and indigenous people. Concerning the inclusion of women, indigenous people and youth, the outputs have not been reached in terms of more inclusion on party tickets that produce election.
- A particular effort has been made to establish a system of socio-political research activities that generate useful information for the institutionalisation and democratisation of political parties and the party system. A textbook system for management of PPs has been produced, a series of studies have been carried out and a website has been established. A problem is that the system has not been anchored in any permanent national institutions. OAS informs, however, that they intend to maintain the website in the future.
- During the last 5 years of PVDGP, the educational efforts towards the political parties (leaders and members) have benefited 800 persons directly, and three times as many indirectly. This number of beneficiaries has to be evaluated in relation to the achievement of results and at the same time the costs of carrying out the training courses, elaborating own materials: 10 volumes of a political training series "System for Political Management", printed in 500-1000 copies. The major part of the series was published in December 2007, based on previous draft versions tested during training courses.

Regarding the spin-off project *supporting the congress*, the political parties and former presidents of Congress commissions generally expressed satisfaction with the support received, and the quality of the PVDGP services and capacity to provide technical assistance. There seems, however, to be room for improvement regarding the coordination between the FPPP commissions and the Congress commissions.

All the parties interviewed refuted the hypothesis that support to the FPPP should have created competition with Congress or its commissions, and saw the support as complementary. There is an apparent need to secure more coordination and work on common agendas as the role of the FPPP and that of Congress are in fact complementary.

The RT has the following comments regarding *cost-efficiency*:

- The decision to write and publish own training materials instead of adapting and using existing materials is cost-heavy. As much material on political parties and party systems is actually available, it is not clear what the considerations to reach this decision have been. The decision is particularly debatable as the training materials were finished during 2007, when most training activities had ceased.
- As fixed costs constituted a considerable part of the budget, a reduction in the activity level (as it happened in 2006 due to the problems between the OAS head office and the PVDGP staff) implies that the relation between costs and outputs becomes particularly unfavourable, thus leading to a relative decline in cost-efficiency.
- The programme apparently originally had the intention to use a training-of-trainers methodology, but the political parties seem not to have used the trained trainers very much, if at all (the use has not been monitored). A more systematic use of this approach could have increased the outreach of the programme with limited extra costs.

- The concentration of training activities in the capital is a relatively costly way of operation. The intention was also to transfer the training activities to the provinces, but this was abandoned after some initial activities in four provinces.

0.5.   Relevance

It is a condition for the satisfactory functioning of an electoral democracy that there are PPs with a certain level of representativity, stability and capacity for dialogue. The deficiency of the PPs and the party system in Guatemala therefore has been the main justification for the programme since its start in the end of the nineties, and the programme has been designed to support the overcoming of these weaknesses. In general, this justification is appropriate, both from a Guatemalan and a donor point of view.

0.6.   Sustainability

The programme has been functioning for almost 10 years, but despite some progress, particularly regarding the legal framework and the willingness to dialogue, the political parties and the party system still have a series of obvious weaknesses. This reflects partly the very low point of departure, and partly that changes in political culture and democratic values is a long-term process.

In general, the RT considers that the (limited) progress noted is probably sustainable after the termination of PVDGP. This is particularly the case for the improved legal framework and the willingness to dialogue, while it is more doubtful whether progress on the issue of inclusion can be expected.

The termination of PDVGP will undoubtedly leave a void, as there are several important issues pending (among these a deepening of the reforms of the LEPP, the implementation of the law (particularly the rules for party financing), the implementation of the newly approved person register and promotion of the inclusion of underrepresented groups in the parties). Fortunately, it seems that other programmes and donors are willing and able to fill this void.

0.7.   Programme set-up and management

OAS in Washington has been solely responsible for the implementation of the programme, with the programme document and a bilateral agreement with each funding agency serving as the legal framework for the cooperation. Annual meetings were held to approve the annual reports and the work plans and budgets for the coming year. All main decisions between the annual meetings were the responsibility of the Washington office.

The communication and general relation between the Washington office, the local PVDGP office and the donors were initially quite well functioning, and there was initially a high degree of OAS ownership of the programme. However, the reorganisation of OAS in Washington during 2006 and the related staff changes implied a reassessment of the programme within OAS. The new authorities in OAS considered the programme to be cost-heavy and with poor results, at the same time as the engagement in the FPPP was considered as a political problem for OAS. The result was a strained relation between the head office and the programme coordinator, which

culminated with his resignation at the end of 2006. At the same time the level of communication between OAS and the donors deteriorated, leading to mutual lack of confidence.

The RT has the following conclusions regarding the set-up:

- Taking into account that the donors are present in Guatemala and followed the programme continuously, some of the problems could possibly have been avoided, if a formal coordination committee had been established with quarterly meetings, where necessary changes to the programme could have been discussed and approved. OAS could in that case have been represented either by staff from the head office or by delegation to the country representative. These quarterly meetings could probably also have solved the lack of communication between OAS and the donors in end-2006 and the beginning of 2007.
- The programme has been quite supply-driven. The programme could have benefited from a regular and formalised consultation process with the beneficiaries and the strategic partners.
- The appointment of a new programme coordinator without consultations with the donors was not in accordance with the signed agreements, and therefore unnecessarily strained the relationship between the parties.
- The financial management of the programme implied a centralisation at the Head Office level, which also implied triple work in accounting, something rarely seen in modern programme (or company) management.
- Despite being the sole responsible for the programme, the sense of ownership by OAS has since 2006 been very low. This implies a considerable risk that the lessons learnt from the programme will not be appropriated by OAS. This is lamentable, as a professional organisation should always try to learn from past experiences, good ones as well as bad ones.

0.8.   Main lessons learnt

Many lessons have been learnt during the implementation of the PVDGP, and many of these have been mentioned in the programme document (lessons from first phase), in the annual progress reports and in other materials produced by the programme. For the RT, the most important seem to be the following:

1. It is important to work with the PPs at all levels: rank and file members, mid-level leaders and the national leadership (i.e. both bottom-up and directly with the top). If some of the levels are omitted, the effectiveness declines. It does not mean that a given programme necessarily shall work with all levels as there may be complementarity with other programmes. This finding is in accordance with similar lessons learnt from programmes working with institutional strengthening of popular organisations in general.
2. As the PPs are a reflection of the idiosyncrasy of the society in general, programmes working with the PPs cannot stand alone but must be complementary to broader programmes aiming at promoting democratic values in the society.
3. Working with multiparty modalities is productive (and somewhat surprisingly it was assessed as very positive by the PPs themselves). The limits should be recognised, however, and the multiparty approach has to be supplemented with

more direct technical assistance to the PPs. This is often best done by party internationals that have similar values and goals.

4. It is important not only to work with the PPs but also with the legal framework for the elections and the parties ("the rules of the game"). This gives the possibility to secure legal requirements for transparency and party financing and can also improve the conditions for participation.

5. The creation of a Forum for PPs turned out to be an interesting innovation. Two important lessons seems to be learnt from PVDGP: (i) the support should be gradually reduced to avoid dependence and secure national ownership, and (ii) there is a fine line between facilitating and being proactive that has to be managed very carefully, as it may otherwise backfire.

6. The donors and the PPs do not have exactly the same objectives for the cooperation. The donors often give high priority to issues that do not necessarily have high priority in the PPs: internal democracy, participation of underrepresented groups, transparency etc. This has to be openly recognised and a common understanding should be reached. The experience is that this is possible.

7. Within the limits set by the difference in the objectives of the donors and the PPs, a participatory approach to project planning should be followed. As for other development assistance, a demand led approach is simply more efficient.

8. On a more practical level: Programmes have to respect the electoral cycles and adjust the planning to these (e.g. training programmes should not be carried out in electoral years and the scope for multiparty dialogue in electoral years is limited).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEN	National Executive Committee
DAC	Development Assistance Committee, OECD
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin-American Faculty for Social Sciences)
FPPP	Foro Permanente de Partidos Políticos (Permanent Forum for Political Parties)
INCEP	Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Políticos (Centralamerican Institute for Political Studies)
INGEP	Instituto de Gerencia Política (Institute for Political Management, under URL)
LEPP	Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos (Law on Elections and Political Parties)
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NIMD	Netherland Institute for Multiparty Democracy
NORAD/MFA	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation/Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OAS	Organisation of American States (OEA in Spanish)
PD	Programme Document
PP	Political Parties
PVDGP	Programa de Valores Democráticos y Gestión Política (Programme for Democratic Values and Political Management)
RENAP	Registro Nacional de Personas (National Person Register)
RT	Review Team
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency (In Spanish Asdi: Agencia Sueca de Cooperación Internacional)
ToR	Terms of Reference
TS	Technical Secretariat
TSE	Tribunal Supremo Electoral (Electoral Supreme Court)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
URL	Universidad Rafael Landívar (Rafael Landívar University)
UPD	Unidad para Promoción de la Democracia (Unit for Promotion of Democracy, OAS)
USAC	Universidad de San Carlos (San Carlos University)

Measures:

USD	US dollars. The present exchange rate is approximately 5.50 NOK and 6.30 SKR to 1 USD.
Qt.	Quetzales. The present exchange rate is approximately 7.90 Qt. To 1 USD.
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
SEK	Swedish Kroner.

Abbreviations, political parties Guatemala:

ANN	Alianza Nueva Nación
CASA	Centro de Acción Social
DCG	Demcracia Cristiana de Guatemala
DIA	Desarrollo Integral Auténtico
EGG	Encuentro por Guatemala
FRG	Frente Republicana de Guatemala

GANA   Gran Alianza Nacional
MAS   Movimiento de Acción Solidaria (won the 1990 elections, has since disappeared)
PAN   Partido de Avanzada Nacional
PP   Partido Patriótico
UCN   Unidad para el Cambio Nacional
UD   Unidad Democrática
UNE   Union Nacional de la Esperanza
URNG   Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala

Main political parties from other Central American countries:
ARENA   Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (El Salvador)
FMLN   Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (El Salvador)
FSLN   Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Nicaragua)
PLC   Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (Nicaragua)
PLH   Partido Liberal de Honduras
PLN   Partido de Liberación Nacional (Costa Rica)
PNH   Partido Nacional de Honduras
PUSC   Partido de Unidad Social Cristiana (Costa Rica)

1.   INTRODUCTION

The programme "Democratic Values and Political Management Support to Legally Registered Political Parties" (PVDGP using the Spanish Acronym), carried out by the Organisation of American States (OAS) with funding from NORAD[3] and Sida, is concluding its second phase (2004-2007). According to the project document, two external evaluations should be carried out during the period, and the agreement between OAS and Sida specifies that there should be a mid-term in-depth review and a final review in 2007.

Because of delays related to changes in PVDGP staff and staff at OAS in Washington, the midterm review was delayed, and when a public tender made by OAS in mid 2007 did not produce any qualified proposals, it was decided to abandon it and instead proceed to make an external end-review, which finally took place at the end of January 2008. The end-review was carried out by a team consisting of three external consultants:

- Thorbjorn Waagstein, economist, team leader
- Einar Berntzen, specialist in comparative political analysis
- Claus Thure Hastrup, specialist in political parties and political culture

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the study indicate that the end-review shall follow standard OECD/DAC methodology, assessing: (i) effectiveness, i.e. the degree to which the objectives have been achieved, (ii) efficiency (relation between inputs and outputs), (iii) impact (effects beyond the objectives), (iv) sustainability and (v) relevance. Furthermore the programme set-up and management shall be assessed. A particular weight shall be put on the identification of the lessons learnt from the programme.[4]

The Review Team (RT) visited Guatemala from January 21st to February 1st. The work was coordinated with a reference group consisting of the local OAS representative and the two donors funding the programme. At an initial meeting the RT presented an inception report, and progress was discussed at a midterm meeting on January 30. A debriefing meeting was held on February 1st before the departure of the team, where a note with preliminary conclusions was discussed. The team leader furthermore visited the OAS head office in Washington in the first week of February to interview the present and former responsibles for the programme at central level with the particular aim to discuss the lessons learnt from the programme and how these lessons can be used in possible future OAS projects with political parties.

During the field work, the RT has met with the programme staff, the different groups of direct beneficiaries, the main (and some smaller) parties, strategic partners, other international donors and external observers.[5] The RT would like to thank all the people met for their kind cooperation. All conclusions and recommendations

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[3]   The agreement was originally with NORAD, but the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) took over the responsibility for the Norwegian bilateral aid (and consequently for the agreement with OAS) in 2004.

[4]   The ToR are included as Appendix A.

[5]   The programme and list of people met are included as Appendix B.

presented are the sole responsibility of the RT and do not necessarily represent the viewpoints of neither OAS, nor the donors funding the programme.

2.   SHORT PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The original Program Document and the agreements with the donors

The point of departure for the review is the programme document (PD) from January 2004, and the agreements signed between OAS and the two funding agencies, Sida and NORAD/MFA. The *development objective* is to promote democratic values and instruments for political management in the political parties (PP), so as to raise the levels of institutionalisation, representativity and legitimacy. *The immediate objective* is to design and promote processes for institutionalisation and democratic change in the PPs and the party system in Guatemala.

The PD defines 10 outputs (resultados) to be achieved:

R1. The political parties will have the capacity to design and manage processes of party institutionalisation and change.

R2. The political parties will have a permanent multiparty forum for dialogue and negotiations to strengthen the party system and promote the good governance in the country.

R3. The Permanent Forum for Political Parties and the Congress of the Republic will provide conceptual, legal and methodological inputs to reform the Law of Elections and Political Parties as well as to develop processes of public debate on the reforms.

R4. Created and transferred to the political parties a system of internal political procedures and management of election campaigns on the basis of the identification of the best methodology and applied tools for political management

R5. The political parties will have developed the capacity to enter into dialogue with actors of the society based on the design and facilitation of mechanisms and processes of dialogue between the political parties, civil society and the government as a way to contribute to a culture of dialogue.

R6. Better and more effective participation of women, youth and indigenous in the leadership of the political parties, in party structures and on party lists in the elections based on an improvement of the competitiveness of these underrepresented groups.

R7. The political parties and the civic committees have internal structures and trained leaders to be able to multiply training in democratic values and political management.

R8. A system of applied socio-political research is producing permanent and useful information to support the institutionalisation and democratisation of the political party system.

R9.   A strategy for political communication for PVDGP has been designed, validated and carried out, becoming a focal point of reference for the political parties.

R10. The UPD-OAS (Unit for Promotion of Democracy, OAS) program for democratic values and political management in the Central American Region has been assisted in design and implementation.

According to the PD, these 10 outputs will be achieved through three approaches ("abordajes"), each of which has a number of strategic "axes" ("ejes"). In the agreement with NORAD/MFA, there is further a list of "specific objectives", which in reality is a restatement of the outputs that broadly (but not entirely) corresponds to the 10 outputs in the PD. *The RT has chosen to use the PD to compare planned and achieved outputs.*

In summary, the programme has developed activities to:
- *Strengthen the PPs*, both through multiparty and bilateral activities, and with particular weight on promoting inclusion of young people, women and indigenous people. The main instruments have been training and technical assistance. The programme has in this context developed a number of training materials and methodologies.
- *Facilitate multiparty dialogue*, mainly through the Permanent Forum for Political Parties (FPPP).
- *Support the revision of the law on elections* and political parties (LEPP).
- Ensure a better understanding of the problems and the changes through the *financing of relevant studies*, partly financed in parallel by NORAD/MFA, and making these and other relevant documents available for the PPs (e.g. through a web page).

The PD does not state indicators for the objective, and no specific baseline is identified. The indicators for the outputs stated in the PD have not been followed systematically and are only partially reported on in the annual reports. The RT has placed particular emphasis on identifying relevant indicators for the objective, for which information is available, so a relatively solidly based assessment can be made regarding the achievement of the objective. This is discussed in section 5 below on the effectiveness of the programme.

2.2.   Modifications during implementation

At the 2006 annual meeting, is was agreed to modify the original agreement and the logical framework for the programme. The main change was to change the issues of inclusion of young, women and indigenous people from crosscutting issues to three new "ejes" ("axes") to make sure that there was sufficient emphasis on these and to extend the activities to local (provincial) level. The work plans for 2006 actually reflected these changes, but they were never formalised in a restatement of objectives, outputs or indicators. At the same time, some of the outputs were in reality abandoned during 2006 without any formal decision made in this respect, and only very few provincial activities actually took place.

The rather complicated structure of the PD (outputs, "aboradjes", "ejes" and lines of action), the fact that the changes made in 2006 were not formalised in a new logical

framework, and the shifting formats for reporting, make it somewhat difficult to compare the planned outputs with the activities carried out and the outputs achieved. Furthermore, the changes in staff during 2006 means that the "institutional memory", both in the programme unit and in the OAS head office in Washington, is rather limited and sometimes conflicting, complicating somewhat the work of the RT.

3.   METHODOLOGY

The team has – as required in the Terms of Reference (ToR) - used normal DAC evaluation guidelines. According to these guidelines for evaluations, the evaluation has to be participative and forward looking, which is also what the review team intended, emphasising lessons learnt from the programme.

The DAC evaluation guidelines imply (as indicated in the ToR) that the following 5 aspects are analysed:

- *The effectiveness*. This part of the review is principally to assess to which degree the objectives established for the projects actually have been achieved. The main information for this part has come from different studies, whether carried out as part of the programme activities, financed in parallel by NORAD/MFA (Latin-American Faculty for Social Sciences - FLACSO) or from other sources, complemented with interviews with the political parties and external observers.
- *The efficiency* of the implementation process. This part of the review has principally consisted in comparing inputs with outputs.
  -   Actual outputs have been compared with the planned outputs. The main data-sources have been the annual reports and interviews with the programme staff.
  -   Assessment of the choice of solution and its cost-efficiency. This is mainly based on the team's experience from other similar programmes.
- *The impact.* This part of the review is a broader evaluation of other long-term effects of the program beyond the scope of the objective, whether intentional or not. As the objective is very broadly stated, the RT does not have much to contribute to this point, as it is part of the analysis of the effectiveness.
- *The relevance*. This part of the review is an overall assessment of the relevance of the programme related to the needs of Guatemala, the 1996 peace accords and the NORAD/MFA and Sida aims of support to Guatemala.
- *The sustainability.* This part of the review assesses whether the positive impact is likely to continue in the future, both for the political parties, the political culture and the legal framework for the elections and the political parties.

The review has mainly concentrated on the second phase of the programme (2004-7), but has taken into account both the fact that there has been a first phase and that important activities have been part of spin-off projects, mainly a FLACSO research project (financed by NORAD/MFA) and a project to support congress (financed by Sida).

The main *activities* carried out were the following:[6]

- Study of the *project documentation*, mainly the PD, the annual work plans, the annual reports and the minutes from the annual meetings.
- Interviews with the *direct beneficiaries*. Three main groups have been identified: (i) the mid-level party members who have received training as part of the programme (women, young, indigenous people and responsibles for training), (ii) the party representatives ("enlaces") in the FPPP, and (iii) members of congress (even if they have mainly benefited from the spin-off programme).
- Interviews with *leaders* of the main political parties and some of the minor parties.
- Interviews with *programme staff.*
- Interviews with *strategic partners* and outside *observers.*
- Interviews with other *donor agencies.*

4. THE PROGRAMME CONTEXT: THE PARTY SYSTEM IN GUATEMALA

The nature of parties and party systems has an impact on the prospects for developing a stable democracy, on whether it acquires legitimacy, and on the effectiveness of policy-making. The institutionalisation of political parties and party systems is therefore important for the process of democratic consolidation. Whether or not institutionalised parties and an institutionalised party system exist makes a big difference regarding the functioning of democratic politics. Without an institutionalised party system, the sustainability of mass democracy is jeopardised.

Although democracy and elections are not the same thing, elections are a necessary ingredient in the notion of procedural democracy and elections contribute to the consolidation of democracy, when important decisions are actually made through the electoral process with ample participation. Parties are crucial because they dominate electoral politics: democratic governments are elected through parties. To win governmental power, political actors must win elections, which entails organising a party. Thus, political parties perform several democratic functions. With regard to the electorate, parties perform the functions of representation and integration: They express people's demands and simplify and structure electoral choices as well as integrate voters into the system. Political parties also provide linkages between the electorate and the political system: they aggregate and channel interests and preferences in civil society and they provide for the recruitment and training of political leaders. Last, but not least, political parties perform the government-related functions of holding government accountable by implementing party policy and exercising control over government administration as well as organising opposition and dissent. Hence, parties that are able to perform their democratic functions may contribute to processes necessary for democratic consolidation: they may contribute to conflict resolution, constitute a vital ingredient in the institutionalisation of democracy and thereby contribute to regime legitimacy.

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[6] See also the work programme in Appendix B.

The current evolution of electoral democracy in Guatemala began in 1984, three decades after the overthrow of the elected government of Jacobo Arbenz, which marked the end of Guatemala's first experience with electoral democracy (1944-54). The mode of democratic transition was one of a controlled transition from above: the last military government of Mejía Víctores (1983-85) presided over the process of transferring formal political power from the military to elected civilians. Elections were held in July 1984 for a Constituent Assembly, which drafted a new constitution, and presidential and parliamentary elections followed in 1985. However, this democratic opening was limited by the continuation of the civil war and leftist groups were still outlawed. Despite two failed coup attempts against the Cerezo government (1986-91) and Jorge Serrano's attempted *autogolpe* in 1993, which also failed, civilian elections continued, but the political opening initiated in the mid-1980s was not completed until a negotiated settlement to the armed civil conflict was achieved by the signing of the final Peace Accord in 1996. The transition to full electoral democracy was completed by the political legalisation and inclusion of the left: the transformation of the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala* (URNG) into a political party in 1998 and its participation in the 1999 general elections.[7]

How can the Guatemalan parties and party system be characterised in a comparative Central and Latin American perspective at the turn of the century, after 15 years of electoral politics? Compared to the other Central American countries, the development of Guatemala's parties and party system can be characterised as highly unstable, irregular, fluid, or "inchoate"[8]. Because of its violent interruption and replacement with a long period of authoritarian regimes and civil war, Guatemala's first experience with electoral democracy (1944-54) did not leave any democratic legacy in terms of political parties after the return to limited democracy in 1984-85. With the exception of the Christian Democratic Party of Guatemala (DCG), which was founded in 1955 and is Guatemala's oldest existing party, the beginning of the democratic opening in 1984 was accompanied by the formation of new parties. For the next 15 years Guatemala had an extreme degree of party turnover, even compared to other Latin American countries that have or have had fluid or "inchoate" party systems, such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil[9].

It is not uncommon in countries with proportional electoral systems that small parties disappear after an election or two. However, in Guatemala even relatively large parties have disappeared or declined just as quickly. Since the first presidential election in 1985 every single presidential election has so far been won by a new party. No party that managed to win the presidency has been able to remain in power after the next election. The DCG won big in 1985: the presidential candidate Vinicio Cerezo won by 70% in the run-off and the DCG gained an absolute majority in Congress. Thereafter the DCG declined rapidly and has barely survived. The 1990 presidential election was won by Jorge Serrano of the *Movimiento de Acción Solidaria* (MAS). After the failure of Serrano's attempted self-coup in 1993, the MAS disappeared. In 1995 the presidential election was won by Álvaro Arzú of the *Partido de Avanzada Nacional* (PAN), which also won an absolute majority in Congress. However, the 1999-election spelled disaster for the PAN: FRG's Alfonso Portillo won

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[7] It should, however, be noted that the left, through the FDNG, also participated in the 1995 general elections.

[8] Mainwaring and Scully, 1995

[9] Ibid.

the presidency as well as a comfortable congressional majority. Both the 2003 and 2007 presidential elections were also won by new parties: the *Gran Alianza Nacional* (GANA) coalition and the UNE, respectively. This continuous party turnover and subsequent decline in the electoral fortunes of governmental parties is an indication of the low degree of institutionalisation of the Guatemalan parties and party system.

A recent comparative study on the degree of institutionalisation of Central American parties and party systems[10], which applies the theoretical framework of Mainwaring and Scully, concludes that Guatemala (including the 1999 general elections) had the least institutionalised party system in the region. Achard and González developed an index of institutionalisation, where 1 indicates the lowest degree of institutionalisation and 3 indicates the highest. Guatemala's score is 1.08, while the other Central American countries' scores vary between 2.56 (Honduras) and 2.18 (El Salvador)[11] [12].

With its uninterrupted democracy since 1949, Costa Rica has the longest democratic tradition in Central America. Costa Rica has had a stable two-party system (the Party of National Liberation, PLN, and the Party of Social Christian Unity, PUSC) with a moderate degree of ideological polarisation until 2002. Honduras has a stable two-party system, with a low degree of ideological polarisation, consisting of the Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH) and the National Party of Honduras (PNH), both of which existed long before the democratic transition in 1981. The PLH was founded in 1892 and is the oldest existing political party in Central America. Nicaragua has developed in the direction of a two-party system as a result of the political pact of 2000 between the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) and the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC). In contrast to Honduras and Costa Rica, the degree of ideological polarisation is higher in Nicaragua. The party systems of Panama and El Salvador are multiparty systems characterised by moderate pluralism. The Panamanian party system has a moderate degree of ideological polarisation, whereas the Salvadoran party system has a high degree of polarisation. On the left, the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) has consolidated its electoral base since it first competed in democratic elections in 1994. On the right, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), founded in 1981 and representing the economic interests of the organised elite, won the 1989 presidential election prior to the democratic transition and has won all presidential elections since 1994. The Guatemalan party system is also a multiparty system, but far more fragmented than the other multiparty systems in the region. With regard to the degree of polarisation, the Guatemalan party system is moderately polarised. However, with regard to the number of parties with parliamentary representation the Guatemalan party system is very fragmented.

In sum, at the beginning of the 21st century the basic characteristic of the Guatemalan party system in a regional comparative perspective is its instability and its weak institutionalisation.

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[10] Achard and González, 2004
[11] This and the following section draw from Achard and González, 2004
[12] See table in Appendix D

5.   EFFECTIVENESS

Using the above comparative overview of the development of the Guatemalan party system as a baseline, we now turn to a closer analysis of the Guatemalan parties and party system with a focus on the period from 2003-2007, the period of the PVDGP. To what extent has there been progress with regard to the objective of the programme, i.e.: increase the (i) representativity, (ii) legitimacy and (iii) institutionalisation of the political parties and the party system in Guatemala?

The programme has worked at different levels: (i) The PPs, their internal functioning, inclusion and capacity for dialogue, (ii) the legal framework for the PPs and the electoral system ("the rules of the game"), and (iii) as a spin-off, support to the congress. Furthermore, technical assistance has been provided related to specific issues of importance for the consolidation of democracy, (e.g. a draft framework law on national security, a draft law on consultations with indigenous people etc.), some of these with additional project financing.

5.1.   Political parties and the party system (2003-2007)

In order to "measure" the 3 items of the objective we have suggested various operationalisations or indicators of each one of them (See Table 1 in Appendix E)

(1) Representativity

With regard to the issue of the representativity of the political parties, one indicator is the number of indigenous mayors (male and female) elected. In the 2003 municipal elections, 122 indigenous mayors were elected, whereas 129 were elected in 2007[13]. If we look at indigenous representation in Congress, there has only been an increase from 16 to 18 from 2003 to 2007.[14] Another way of measuring the degree of inclusion of the targeted groups is by looking at whether or not the political parties have established secretariats for such disadvantaged groups.[15] Another indicator is the degree of representation of such groups in party structures, including the indigenous representation on the National Executive Committees (the CENs) of political parties.[16] The inclusion of issues of importance to disadvantaged groups on the agendas of political parties is also an indicator of representativity.[17] With regard to the item of representativity, some timid progress can be registered. Although the number of female deputies elected to Congress remained the same (18) in 2007 as in 2003, perhaps the most salient difference between 2003 and 2007 is the existence in 2007 of a female indigenous presidential candidate for the first time in Guatemalan history.

(2) Legitimacy
We discuss this item under Institutionalisation, see below.

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[13] See table 2 in Appendix E
[14] Table 3 in Appendix E displays the number of indigenous deputies elected by party
[15] See Table 4 in Appendix E.
[16] Table 5 in Appendix E.
[17] See Table 6 in Appendix E.

(3) Institutionalisation

In order to "measure" the degree of progress with regard to the notion of institutionalisation of political parties and party systems we have chosen to use the approach elaborated by Mainwaring and Scully[18]. According to Mainwaring and Scully, the concept of institutionalisation of political parties and the party systems may be operationalised by way of the following 4 variables:

(1) The degree of *stability in inter-party competition.* Stability in the nature of inter-party competition depends on the ability of the major parties to maintain electoral support over time in order to stay in the game. This variable can be measured by two indicators: (1) electoral volatility, and (2) floor-crossing (transfugismo). Electoral volatility is measured by the Pedersen index, which considers the net change in votes/seats of political parties between elections. The electoral volatility has varied in Guatemala but has been and remains much higher in Guatemala than in other countries in the region.[19] The tendency that the presidency has been won by a different party at every presidential election since 1985 continued in both 2003 and 2007: GANA won in 2003 and UNE won in 2007. On the other hand, there is presently a tendency towards a greater persistence of some of the major parties: UNE, FRG, GANA and PP. "Transfugismo" (floor-crossing) is a complementary way of measuring this variable. As can be seen in table 9 in Appendix E, the level of transfugismo is extremely high in Guatemala: between 2003 and 2007 47% of the members of congress switched parties[20]. According to many of the interviewees the extended practice of transfugismo is likely to continue also in the current legislature (2008-2012). Transfugismo affects vertical accountability negatively: it is impossible for voters to hold their elected party representatives accountable for their political actions since they keep changing parties. Party switching indicates weak partisan loyalties and weak party ideologies. Thus with regard to this variable there has been only limited progress, mainly due to the persistence of some of the major parties. The high degree of instability of inter-party competition is intimately linked to another weakness: the weak bonds between civil society, the electorate and the political parties.

(2) The *linkage between parties and social constituencies* among the population. This variable is difficult to measure directly barring separate case studies of each individual party. However, the age of the parties may be used as a proxy indicator for the strength of the linkages between parties and citizens. Although most Guatemalan parties are still relatively young, some of the major parties have managed to preserve their continuity across several elections (PAN, FRG, URNG, UNE).

(3) The extent to which the electoral process and the political parties are *considered as legitimate political institutions* by the voters. This variable can be measured by a series of survey data comparing different points in time. According to such survey data the legitimacy of political parties in Guatemala continues to be low, but there is a slight tendency towards improvement. According to a series of yearly opinion polls from 2004 to 2007 made by

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[18]   Mainwaring and Scully, 1995
[19]   See table 7 and table 8 in Appendix E
[20]   Monografía de los Partidos Políticos 2004-2007, xiv

Borge & Asociados for the newspaper El Periódico, political parties are ranked third lowest and Congress lowest, when respondents are asked to rank public institutions according to how well or badly they esteem them[21]. These polls show no change between 2004 and 2007. On the other hand, it is clear that the effects of the reform of LEPP - in particular the decentralisation of polling stations - have contributed to the strengthening of the electoral democracy in Guatemala (See the paragraph "The legal framework" below). This variable can also be measured indirectly by looking at the level of electoral abstention. A high level of electoral abstention may indicate low legitimacy. The level of abstention has tended to decrease since 1999.

(4) The level of *institutionalisation of political parties individually*. This variable can be measured by considering membership, organisational structures and their territorial presence outside the capital area. Indicators of lacking party institutionalisation are: caudillismo, clientelism and factionalism. Party finance and other resources are also relevant. With regard to membership, Guatemalan parties have tended to have a low number of affiliates. However, the LEPP of 2004 requires parties to have a minimum of 15,220 members in order to become formally registered as a party. Table 10 in Appendix E shows the development of membership figures of Guatemalan political parties between 2004 and 2007. According to the LEPP, parties are also required to organise assemblies at the provincial and municipal level every year. The LEPP also ameliorated the financial situation of political parties by increasing the value per vote from 2 quetzales to 2 US dollars. Conversations with the interviewees and available analyses indicate some limited progress on this variable. However, the FLACSO team within the area of socio-political studies, which has made an attempt to measure the degree of institutionalisation of political parties in Guatemala by looking at formal criteria[22], has demonstrated that there is no correlation between a party's organisational strength and its electoral success. This fact may indicate the continued importance of caudillismo and clientelism as the main methods of electoral mobilisation, and constitutes a strong disincentive for party institutionalisation.

The *main conclusion* regarding the recent development of political parties and the party system is that there has been some limited progress with regard to representativity and institutionalisation, but probably less with regard to legitimacy. From a more optimistic point of view, it is possible that some crucial change is about to happen regarding the stability of inter-party competition, as some major (UNE, FRG, PP) and some minor parties may be in a process of stabilisation, but this is too early to say for sure.

The single most important change with direct relevance for the achievement of PVDGP's objectives is the change in the *legal framework* concerning elections and political parties represented by the 2004 revision of the LEPP.

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[21] Borge y Asociados: Comparativo Encuestas 2004-2007, page 4.
[22] See table 11 in Appendix E

5.2.   The legal framework

The first democratic LEPP (Decreto 10-85) was modified in 1987, 1989 and 1990, before a special electoral reform commission led by the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE) proposed a series of reforms in 1998, based on a mandate conferred to it by the Peace Accords. Since then, the Constitutional Court approved most of them, but in Congress it was not possible to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority until a dialogue between the political parties led to the "National Shared Agenda" ("Agenda Nacional Compartida") in 2003. The FPPP, constituted in 2002, picked up the reform proposals and negotiated them with Congress, leading to the congressional approval of a reform of the LEPP. The main changes introduced to the LEPP in 2004 (Decreto 10-04) that took effect in May 2004, relevant to institutionalisation, were:

1. The introduction of a minimum requirement with regard to the number of affiliates, raising the number from 5000 to 15,220. In June 2007, out of 21 political parties, 13 of them had fewer than 20,000 members, 5 had between 20,000 and 40,000 affiliates, and only three parties had more than 40,000 members.[23]
2. The electoral threshold for maintaining a political party's legal status was increased from 4% to 5% of the valid votes cast (the exception made for parties that manage to elected one member of congress still remains).
3. A political party must have a minimum party organisation in at least 50 (of 332) municipalities and in 12 (out of 22) provinces.
4. Public financing of political parties was raised to 2 USD per vote received.
5. A limit was set on the amount of money parties are permitted to spend on electoral campaigns (40 million Qt. or around USD 5 million) and minimum campaign access for all parties in the media.
6. The number of registered voters was increased in an effort to enhance and purge the electoral register ("padrón electoral"), especially in rural areas.
7. The decentralisation of the electoral process established new polling stations ("Juntas Receptoras de Voto") increasing the number to 687, thus considerably reducing the distance to the polling stations.

The FPPP played an important role in promoting the reform of the LEPP. This law has undoubtedly had a major effect with regard to achieving the programme goals:

*   The main major progress is related to the increase in the registration of voters and decentralisation of the polling stations, which seems to be the main explanations behind the increased participation (60% of the registered voters in the first round and some 48% in the second round of the 2007 elections). This increased participation is in itself an important step towards the consolidation and greater legitimacy of electoral democracy in Guatemala.
*   Preliminary numbers indicate that women have increased registration more than men (from 2003 to 2007 an increase of 12% for men and 24% for women in the electoral register). No numbers are registered for indigenous people.
*   It has also become a bit more difficult to register new parties for the election, implying some reduction in the number, apparently without any negative effect on democracy/openness. At present, 13 parties have representation in Congress

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[23]   ASIES 2007: xiii.

out of the 16 that participated in the 2007 elections. The number of new registered parties has gone down in the period 2004-2007 compared to 2000-2003 (from 12 to 4).

- A public financing of political parties has been introduced and rules limiting the spending on electoral campaigns have been established. Even if enforcement (and compliance) is still unsatisfactory, it is an important first step.
- A law on a National Register of Persons (RENAP) has been approved, which potentially will reduce the possibilities of electoral fraud. However, the register has still to be implemented.

5.3.   The congress

The support to the congress is a spin-off from the programme and has not been reviewed specifically, but as it is closely related to PVDGP, some comments should be added. The progress at the objective level seems to be mixed:

- The so-called "transfugismo" (congress members changing political party between elections) reached as mentioned an astonishing 47% during the 2004-2007 period, indicating high volatility, low degree of institutionalisation and a weak party system in general.[24]
- On the other hand, several observers pointed out that some of the necessary laws, which it for years has been impossible to achieve consensus on, have actually passed congress or are close to (e.g. the revision of LEPP, the law on RENAP and a framework law on national security), indicating a more efficient Congress.

5.4.   Attribution

Of course, many other factors have influenced the PPs and the party system, among these other DP funded programmes, and it is not possible to single out the precise contribution of PVDGP, but there is no doubt the programme has been an important factor contributing to these (modest) changes.

6.   EFFICIENCY

6.1.   Comparison of planned and actual activities and outputs

A comparison of the planned and actual activities and outputs shows a mixed picture.[25] Some outputs have only been achieved partially, due to suspension of activities (output 2 concerning provincial platforms, output 9 on communication and output 10 related to the formulation of a regional programme), and others have indicators that are not precise enough to measure the degree of achievement. Some outputs are overlapping (e.g. output 2 and 3). The most significant achievements to which PVDGP has contributed are:

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[24]   I should be noted, however, that the objective for this support is to improve the functioning of the congress, not to strengthen the political parties.

[25]   A table in Appendix C shows the original outputs for the 2004-2007 period, the activities carried out and the indicators. An attempt is made to assess the degree of achievement of the various outputs.

- The sustained support to the reform of the LEPP has had a direct effect on the electoral campaign of 2007 and has thus improved participation of women and indigenous people somewhat. One effect of the reform of the LEPP is the diminished fragmentation of the party system[26] (outputs 1, 3, 4 and 6).
- The FPPP was established and maintained overcoming the normal conflicts of two electoral campaigns. Specific secretariats or commissions were created for deliberations on law proposals or specific issues of interest (11 during 2006-2007 but many of these supported by other programmes) (outputs 2 and 3).
- Political parties have enhanced their capacities to compete in the electoral campaign during 2007, presenting more government programmes[27], better campaign strategies and territorial organisation (outputs 4 and 7).
- The activities to promote closer relations between political parties and actors within civil society have roughly been carried out as planned. Sessions of discussions in order to reach consensus between women in civil society organisations and women in political parties have been held, with a focus on strengthening the leadership of women. Similar efforts to bring together representatives of indigenous organisations and representatives of political parties in Congress have taken place. However, an attempt in 2004 by the FPPP to secure a more continuous dialogue between political parties and the media did not materialise due to unfavourable conditions. The general perception of the interviewees is that the relationship between political parties and sectors of civil society has improved (output 5).
- The activities to promote participation of women, young and indigenous peoples in leadership positions within political parties and representation in elected political positions centred initially on inter party networks of women, young and indigenous peoples. These networks were active and functioning throughout 2004 and 2005. In 2006, the networks were transformed and support was instead given to commissions for women, young and indigenous people within the framework of FPPP. The networks constituted practical reference points for the modular training programs and reinforced each other mutually. However, in 2006 the modular training programs for indigenous people both at the national as well as the provincial level were not carried out. The provincial modular training programme for women was not carried out either. Most of the political parties have by now secretariats for women, youth and indigenous people. Concerning the inclusion of women, indigenous people and youth, the outputs have not been reached in terms of more inclusion on party tickets that produce election[28] (output 6 and 7).[29]

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[26] For the 2003 elections 23 political parties were registered, of which 19 survived. In the 2007, there were 17 parties running of which 13 survived.

[27] During the 2003 election only 3 parties presented government programmes while by 2007 there were 7 parties with programmes.

[28] There are now 20 women in Congress compared to 13 in 2003 out of 158 diputados, whereas the number of female mayors decreased from 14 in 2003 to 8 in 2007. In terms of the representation of indigenous people in elected positions, the number did not vary between 2003 and 2007 (18 in both years). The number of elected indigenous mayors only increased slightly from 119 in 2003 to 122 in 2007.

[29] It may be noted that some of the outputs were not achieved due to the limited capacity and possibility of the PVDGP to achieve the outputs. The achievement of the objectives may depend on other factors (e.g. struggles for power within parties), which the PVDGP does not control. For example, technical qualifications and training are necessary but not necessarily sufficient to achieve the

- The important increase in the level of electoral participation and the party leaderships' more tolerant and pluralistic behaviour, both in the FPPP and other multi-party events, is evidence of some achievement in relation to more democratic values. Another more global achievement is the increased level of information on the state of and necessities of the political parties (output 1, 2 and 5).
- A particular effort has been made to establish a system of socio-political research activities that generates useful information for the institutionalisation and democratisation of political parties and the party system. A textbook system for management of PPs has been produced, a series of studies have been carried out and a website has been established. A problem is that the system has not been anchored in any permanent national institutions. OAS informs, however, that they intend to maintain the website in the future.
- During the last 5 years of the PVDGP, the educational efforts towards the political parties (leaders and members) have benefited 800 persons directly, and three times as many indirectly[30]. This number of beneficiaries has to be evaluated in relation to the achievement of the outputs and at the same time the costs of carrying out the training courses, elaborating own materials; 10 volumes of a political training series "System for Political Management", printed in a 1000 and 500 examples each (8 volumes of teaching material and two manuals in order to improve the use of the other volumes). The major part of the series was published in December 2007, based on previous draft versions tested during training courses.

The development and immediate objectives of PVDGP are very ambitious considering the point of departure in the PD, where the weaknesses of the individual parties and the party system are listed.[31] Some of these, such as high degree of fragmentation of the political party system, high electoral volatility, limited inclusion of women, indigenous and young in party structures and leadership etc. are repeated as weaknesses in the joint diagnosis carried out in late 2006 during the formulation of "A Framework for the institutional development of the political parties in Guatemala"[32] and also in the different analyses carried out by FLACSO and other national research institutes.

6.2. Support to the Congress

The spin-off project supporting the congress has, as mentioned, not been thoroughly reviewed. The political parties and former presidents of Congress commissions generally expressed satisfaction with the support received, and the quality of the PVDGP services and capacity to provide technical assistance. There seems, however, to be room for improvement regarding the coordination between the FPPP commissions and the Congress commissions.

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promotion of women, young people and indigenous people to leadership positions within political parties.

[30] According to the PDVGP; see "Manual de Formación Política, Volumen IX", December 2007. page 3.

[31] Programme Document, page 10

[32] NIMD & ASIES November 2006

All the parties interviewed refuted the hypothesis that support to the FPPP should have created competition with Congress or its commissions, and saw the support as complementary[33]. There is an apparent need to secure more coordination and work on common agendas as the role of the FPPP and that of Congress are in fact complementary.

Four national agencies together with OAS have the responsibility for the implementation of the activities related to the congress. There have been some problems due to perceived contradictions between the role of PVDGP-OAS as an administrator of funds and an executor of activities, but it seems that a division of work regarding the support to the different commissions on the themes that are their main competences has actually been achieved.[34]

6.3.   Other activities related to PVDGP

FLACSO Guatemala has carried out a research project from mid 2004- 2007 as a longitudinal investigation financed by NORAD/MFA. The purpose was to track changes in the development of the party system and thus the progress of PVDGP. A series of studies have been carried out and most (10) published as a series of booklets ("cuadernos") during 2006, and are available at the FLACSO web site. The last four booklets are under publication and a revised book with the results will be published shortly. The work plan and contents of the studies were discussed with the PVDGP coordinator and some of the staff, who have also contributed to the series. The results of the studies came out at a moment where PVDGP had already changed its strategy and was undergoing internal changes and a decline in activities. An assessment of the FLACSO project and the results of the investigations does not form part of this end-review, but it must be pointed out that the research seems to constitute a valuable contribution to the understanding of the political party system and reveals a series of characteristics and the workings of both the formal and informal rules that shape the political parties and the party system. The findings of the FLACSO research indicate that formal changes in the political party system have taken place, but that substantial changes will require a sustained effort over time and changes in rules that go beyond what is presently conceived as necessary contents in a second generation of reforms of the LEPP.

As regards the relation between FLACSO and PVDGP these were concentrated to a reduced number of persons within PVDGP and the change of personnel in late 2006/early 2007 may explain the very limited contact since then. However, a fair amount of joint activities have been carried out as reflected in the Annual Reports of PVDGP and the research agenda of FLACSO was defined jointly.

One major activity outside PVDGP has been a joint effort between the Netherland Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), PVDGP, Universities and Research Institutions (URL, USAC, FLACSO, INCEP, UFM, INGEP-URL), and representatives from 11 PPs to define a "Framework for the institutional development of the political parties in Guatemala"

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[33]   Visiting officials from OAS reported to have received complaints in the regard from both the Government and some members of congress in 2006.

[34]   At the time of the review, a new agreement was reached between the donor (Sida) and the agencies, according to which OAS in the future only will administrate the funds for its own activities.

(publication November 2006). This Framework consists of an analysis of the situation of the parties and the party system, and it also includes a series of indicators to measure i) the strategic vision of the political parties, ii) institutional development of the political parties, iii) the system of political parties, and iv) the relations between the political parties and society. This system of indicators thus covers the same dimensions as PVDGP, but it has never been introduced into the programme.

During 2007, a specific analysis of the political parties' government programmes towards poverty was carried out by FLACSO (Department for analysis of poverty; "Serie Debates y Propuestas sobre Pobreza No.5"), financed by Sida.

6.4.   Cost-efficiency

The program implies a relatively heavy investment over the four-year period. The total donor contribution (which is expected to be almost totally spent by February 2008) was of USD 3.37 million (NOK 14 million and SEK 9 million).

The below figure shows the distribution of costs:

PVDGP costs, 2004-7

- Administration OAS 4%
- International staff 18%
- National staff 15%
- National consultants 25%
- Training 16%
- Other activities 10%
- Equipment, O&M 12%

As it can be seen from the figure, staff is a heavy component (33%), as is the use of national consultants (25%). Training is apparently only a minor cost component (16%), but this is an understatement as the program staff have been heavily involved writing training materials and carrying out training. The item "other activities" covers investigations and publications.

The relatively high costs of the programme have to be seen in the light of (i) the outputs achieved (as discussed above), and (ii) the objectives achieved (as discussed in the previous section). This gives rise to the following comments:

- The decision to write and publish own training materials instead of adapting and using existing materials is cost-heavy. As much material on political parties and party systems is actually available, it is not clear which have been the considerations to reach this decision. The decision is particularly debatable

as the training materials were finished during 2007, when most training activities had ceased.

- When fixed costs constitute such a large part of the budget, a reduction in the activity level (as it happened in 2006 due to the problems between the OAS head office and the PVDGP staff) implies that the relation between costs and outputs becomes particularly unfavourable, thus leading to a relative decline in cost-efficiency.
- The programme apparently had the original intention of using a training-of-trainers methodology, but the political parties seem not to have used the trained trainers very much, if at all (the use has not been monitored). The training-of-trainers methodology is potentially very cost-efficient, but experience from other programmes shows that for the methodology to be effective, a series of conditions have to be in place (among these that there is a rigorous selection procedure, a clear idea of which training the trainers are expected to carry out afterwards, and a support to and monitoring of the trainers' activities, at least at an initial stage).
- The concentration of training activities in the capital is a relatively costly way of operation. The intention was also to transfer the training activities to the provinces, but this was abandoned after some initial activities in four provinces.

6.5. The programme's capacity to adapt to the changing reality

The original strategy comprised a series of outputs both at individual party level, multiparty level and concerning the relations between the PPs and the society. Within these areas of work there have been major changes in the course of the 2004-2007 period. As the logical framework for the programme has not been formally adjusted during the period, reflecting the incorporation of new results or activities, and abandoning or downscaling of others, it is – as mentioned above - somewhat difficult to identify the changes made.

The planned mid-term review could have been a good opportunity for OAS and the donors to adjust the programme in a more systematic way, but the review was – as mentioned – not carried out. The adjustments introduced, mainly in the 2006 work plan, were thus based on internal reflections by the programme team. It was presented as a proposal for a new design of the programme and approved by the donors at the Annual Meeting in 2006.

The main observations regarding the programme's capacity to adapt, are the following:

- When the FPPP gained strength, the programme was quick to adapt and adjusted its strategy in order to serve as Technical Secretariat (TS) for the FPPP.
- The political parties have expressed satisfaction with the programme's response to the manifestation of needs for technical assistance.
- On the other hand, most political parties express lack of influence on the planning process of PVDGP, and thus on priorities, reflecting some discontent with a perceived lack of flexibility.

- The formulation of the spin-off support programme for Congress is an (adequate) adaptation to a specific demand for increased attention to the needs of the congress and its commissions.
- During some time (2004-2006) PVDGP participated in coordination bodies like the "Inter-Institutional Coordination Group", where exchange of information seems to have secured some adjustments of strategy (mainly plans to move activities to provincial / local level) and division of work, amongst others with UNDP and NIMD.
- The abrupt termination of PVDGP's role as TS for the FPPP made it difficult to achieve an orderly transfer of responsibilities from the TS to the PP.

7. RELEVANCE

It is a condition for the satisfactory functioning of an electoral democracy that there are PPs with a certain level of representativity, stability and capacity for dialogue. The deficiency of the PPs and the party system in Guatemala therefore has been the main justification for the programme since its start at the end of the nineties, and the programme has been designed to support the overcoming of these weaknesses.

In general, this justification is appropriate, both from a Guatemalan and a donor point of view.

Regarding the actual design of the present programme phase, this is also considered to be relevant. The design reflects several lessons learnt from the first phase, and the components included are roughly those, which were needed. Some caveats seem appropriate, however:

(1) The PD included activities to promote the multiparty dialogue and strengthen the PPs, also in the provinces. This is considered highly relevant, as the capital tends to have a disproportionate weight in the PPs, but the activities were only partially carried out, thus reducing the potential effect of the programme.

(2) The PD did not include specific activities to support the work of the congress. This was added later on, however, with separate funding from Sida, and there has been good complementarity between the two lines of support.

(3) The programme has in general preferred to develop its courses with own training materials and methodology, as mentioned above. This is understandable as it provided a way to ensure that the approach is in line with the overall programme approach, but is debateable on (at least) two grounds: (i) sustainability (if the training programmes are anchored in existing institutions, there are more possibilities that they can be continued after the programme has ended) and (ii) cost-efficiency (as mentioned earlier). The latter point is further stressed as the training materials contain ten volumes, which have only been finished in second half of 2007, while the main training activities ("diplomado" courses) were terminated in 2006.

In parallel with the programme, NORAD/MFA has (as mentioned above) financed a research programme with FLACSO, which has given important inputs to monitor the programme at objective level. Not enough has been done to make sure that the

outputs were discussed and shared with the programme staff, however, implying that the full benefit of the research has not been reaped.

The programme has been designed with a combination of multiparty support and bilateral support to individual parties. The multiparty support is highly appreciated by the PPs as an efficient tool that both strengthens the PPs and at the same time promotes dialogue.

8. IMPACT

In the DAC terminology the impact refers to other effects of the programme, which go beyond the objectives (as discussed in the section on effectiveness). This broader impact may be intentional or unintentional, and may be positive or negative.

However, in the case of the present programme, the objectives are stated so broadly that most of the possible impact is covered by the objectives. The RT has therefore only few observations regarding other possible impacts of the programme.

One such observation is that when PVDGP started, there was only little concern among the different national and international agencies in Guatemala regarding the PPs. In some sense, they seemed to be looked at as a necessary evil. PVDGP has undoubtedly changed the attitude towards the political parties and raised the awareness regarding the necessity to approach them. As a consequence, more national and international agencies are now working with the PPs. A possible negative impact such as overfunding of activities is not discernable.

9. SUSTAINABILITY

Concerning the sustainability of the outputs and effect/impact of the programme on the PPs and the party system in Guatemala, it must be noted that consolidation of changes in values and political practices is a long-term effort. In this sense, the objectives of the programme were very ambitious when the starting point is taken into account.

9.1. Other future donors support

PVDGP has been the first major effort to support both individual PPs and the party system and this has led to the appearance of many other activities aimed at supporting political parties, some as direct spin-offs from PVDGP and others from alliances established during its implementation. Even though the termination of the programme will no doubt leave a void, there are other agencies that might fill it in the near future. Agencies such as UNDP and NIMD are likely to continue their support to both individual parties and multiparty dialogue (including the FPPP). The support to the Congress and its different committees will continue in 2008. The different political foundations (Konrad Adenauer, Friedrich Ebert, NDI) are active and will continue to support individual PPs. Furthermore, the national universities and research institutions are developing a series of studies and courses, and some even have programmes for

formation of leaders in the provinces (e.g. INGEP which is carrying out a sustained effort in this direction with support from six Swedish PPs).

9.2.   The changes in the electoral system and party financing

A major factor of sustainability for the efforts invested in strengthening the PPs and the party system is the effect of the revision of the LEPP of 2004. The changes in participation (due mostly to the greater number of polling stations) point towards a greater inclusion of women and indigenous people in the electoral democracy as such, laying a foundation for further work on inclusion in the PPs and civic committees at local level. A series of national (and international) NGOs are working in this direction with a "bottom-up" approach. The existence of a public policy on promotion of women for instance, and the gradual enhancement of women's participation in the political parties by many actors ranging from the parties' women secretariats to grassroot organisations also point in this direction.

The changes in financing of the political parties may be modest, but it does provide the parties with resources to train party members with own means and is thus a considerable factor for sustainability of the efforts to promote systematic training of mid-level party leaders.

The modification of the LEPP has been a step towards a better functioning electoral democracy in Guatemala, but both PVDGP and the electoral observation mission of OAS for the 2007 elections point to at least two issues that justify a second generation of reforms of the LEPP. The first is the need for the implementation of the national person register (RENAP) so that the citizens have a single identity document, which will further eliminate possibilities for electoral fraud. The other is the need to strengthen the norms on financing of political parties electoral campaigns. At the same time, the TSE has to improve its capacity to control and apply the law and norms, also in the case that a political party does not comply fully with the information regarding the financial support received and the spending undertaken during electoral campaigns.

9.3.   The effects of the termination of the programme

All the political parties are (not surprisingly) of the opinion that the support has been terminated too early. The expressed demand for support for the PPs and their institutionalisation is in itself an important indicator for the need. The sustainability of the effects on party changes and adaptation of democratic values is difficult to assess, as the changes are mostly formal and in the discourse (on issues such as inclusion). Regarding internal democratisation, there is need for a sustained long-term effort from within. The present LEPP does provide some incentives for changes in party practices, but as enforcement of the sanctions in the LEPP has been lax (or non existent) there has to be real changes in the pattern of election of candidates, including a rupture with the present ways of financing campaigns and brakes on "transfugismo", before internal democratisation and inclusion can become common.

9.4. The documentation and training materials

A direct contribution from the programme is the publication of a collection of 25 booklets during the last four years. The major publication is the series on the "System for Party Management" produced to assist the PPs in the effort to achieve improved institutionalisation. The documentation of PVDGP has been distributed to the various actors engaged with the programme, including the PPs. This is a basis for sustaining the training effort, but it depends on the willingness and capacity of the PPs' political training departments and of its use amongst other donor-funded programmes (such as UNDP and NIMD) and national research and training institutes (FLACSO, ASIES, INGEP, URL, USAC). At this point, it is difficult to assess whether this will actually happen, as for instance the national institutes themselves are producing analysis and training material.

The PVDGP team has in particular expressed its worry that it has not been possible to make a more orderly transfer of the materials and experiences to a national institution. A proposal for financing an extension of the programme to support new training activities and ultimately to identify and make this transfer (i.e. to at national institution) was not accepted by the donors.

9.5. Multiparty dialogue

The practise of multiparty dialogue seems to have taken root as a practice amongst the political parties, and the willingness to engage in dialogue is manifest. All the major and also smaller parties have expressed their willingness to continue the FPPP as a forum for dialogue. There are many opinions about how to continue, what the agenda should be, and as to whether it is a good idea to "institutionalise" it. All the parties seem to be aware that the future of the FPPP depends on them. For a foreseeable future this forum is therefore probably sustainable, and its resilience during more than two electoral periods must be considered a major achievement for the PPs and for the support provided by PDVGP. A matter of concern is the function of the TS, as the "nationalisation" of the TS was not secured before PVDGP left the function to a rotating FPPP-board. Most PPs consider that there still is a need for an external, impartial agent to facilitate the multiparty dialogue, at least for some more time. NIMD is at present considering the financing of en external facilitator chosen by the PPs.

10. PROGRAM SET UP AND REPORTING AND MONITORING

10.1. Project Set-up

OAS in Washington has been solely responsible for the implementation of the programme, with the PD and a bilateral agreement with each funding agency serving as the legal framework for the cooperation.[35] Annual meetings were held to approve the annual reports and the work plans and budgets for the coming year.

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[35] The existence of two separate agreements with the donors seems to be an unnecessary complication. Even if OAS has reported separately to each donor on the use of the funds, the distribution of costs on each donor has been arbitrary and the programme could just as well have been financed through a joint financial mechanism, which would have made life easier for all parties.

The financial management of the programme is centralised at the OAS head office in Washington, where all procurements – independently of the amount involved – are authorised, following a request by the programme coordinator, and subsequently payment is made by the OAS office in Guatemala. The accounts are also made at the Washington head office, but to keep track of the execution of the budget one parallel accounting is kept at the programme office and another parallel accounting is kept at the national OAS office.

10.2.   Relation between OAS and the donors.

Implementation and coordination went relatively smoothly until 2006, where there was a low level of execution of the work plan (according to the annual report only around 70% of the activities were carried out), a fact that was questioned by the donors. OAS explained that the low level of execution was due to changes in staff at the OAS head office and further hinted at a lack of capacity or willingness of the programme coordination to comply with the administrative and financial procedures in OAS. It has not been possible for the RT to corroborate this last point.

When the present phase started, the programme staff were coordinated by an international expert, who had been hired during the previous phase through an international tender. This coordinator resigned in December 2006, as he realised he did not have the confidence of the OAS head office, and the technical coordinator, who according to OAS served as acting coordinator, left shortly after in late January 2007. The programme was thereafter without a coordinator for almost two months. The donors complained in late March that they had not been informed of this and asked for an explanation regarding the slow implementation of the programme. They were subsequently informed by OAS that a new coordinator had been contracted. This appointment caused controversy with the donors as they were not consulted in the process, as it was stipulated in at least one of the bilateral agreements.

At the Annual Meeting in 2006 the donors asked OAS to develop a exit strategy to secure the sustainability of the processes after the program terminated. At the same meeting the donors reluctantly accepted the constitution of a research and documentation centre within the programme (called CEREP) as a new line of action, but made it clear that this was not to become a new institution. The donors stated that they respected the FPPP decision to try to create a "Multiparty Institute", but that they were not willing to finance it. At the Annual Meeting in 2007, the donors turned down a proposal for a work plan that was mainly made up of academic/research and dissemination activities (the CEREP), but still depended on a full-fledged institution (plus hiring consultants for the academic work). Despite the fact that OAS was closing important activities (secretariate function for FPPP and the "diplomado" courses) and down-sizing other activities, the donors accepted the hiring of the new coordinator as a compromise, as there was less than a year left of the programme. The donors further did not accept the hiring of a new technical coordinator or more consultants.

10.3.   Participatory approach.

No formal steering committee or advisory board with inclusion of the beneficiaries was set up for the programme. The programme has passed through two phases previous to the present one, and the formulation of the 2004-2007 document is mainly based on (i) an external evaluation in 2003, (ii) lessons learned by and planning within the programme staff and (iii) some external studies. No direct involvement of the beneficiaries seems to have taken place. All the political parties interviewed expressed a need for more direct participation in the design of the programme, and information regarding the programme documents and financial information. On the other hand, there seems to have been specific presentations of the annual work plans and broad announcements of the activities offered by the programme, as well as flexibility in the adaptation to specific needs expressed by the parties and the FPPP.

The relations with the national research institutions and NGOs working with the same issues have been varied. Some have been close collaborators, like FLACSO, which has undertaken a series of studies as a follow-up and monitoring, while others have had only very little direct contact with the programme.

The annual work plans were discussed and approved at the annual OAS-donor meetings, where a common ground was sought on the issues to be addressed i.e. the theme of inclusion, which was given more attention in the 2006-2007 plans as a direct line of action.

As a conclusion, PVDGP was not in its design based on a participatory approach, and it seems that more participation during actual implementation could have been productive. The relatively supply-driven approach may in part be explained by the role as an "impartial broker" assumed by PVDGP-OAS in order to play the role as facilitator and provider of support to all political parties without discrimination.

Moreover, the approach seems to have offered a reasonable mix of support that was demanded by the political parties, and both OAS and the donors can legitimately have their own agenda (e.g. inclusion) so that the actual work plans are based on finding a common ground.

10.4. Monitoring

The programme monitoring has been principally at *activity level*. An insufficient level of consolidation makes it somewhat difficult to get an easy overview, however.

At *output level*, there has been no systematic follow-up on the indicators defined in the PD. It would have been very useful if a more effective tracking of the people trained had been undertaken, which would have made it possible to continuously assess the efficiency of the training activities (among these the beneficiaries of the "diplomado" courses).

At *objective level*, no systematic monitoring has been carried out (definition of indicators and means of verification and the subsequent following of these indicators). The strategic management of the programme would no doubt have benefited from a systematic monitoring of the objectives, which furthermore would not have been very demanding as abundant information, which could have been used as a means of verification, is actually available from different sources,.

10.5.   Reporting

The programme has made annual reports, which have formed the basis for the annual meetings. The reports are in general of good quality, but suffer from the relatively complicated programme structure (outputs, approaches, axes, lines of action) and the lack of a proper monitoring system, particularly at the objective level. As mentioned earlier, the frequent changes in format complicate the reading unnecessarily.

10.6.   Risk management

The risk analysis of the PD concentrates on risks at the macro-level; at development and immediate objectives level, and does not cover the output level. The Annual Work Plans and Annual Progress Reports however contain short analyses of the political context that serves to highlight some of the assumptions and risks on which the strategy and activities are based. There is no systematic follow-up on the original risk analysis. The programme would have benefited from a risk management strategy that could have allowed OAS and the donors to take mitigating measures, and which would have facilitated the monitoring of the development of the programme in the political context of Guatemala.

The risks identified were;
1. That no process of internal change in the political parties can take place unless "the rules of the game" for the political party system allow for these internal transformations. The obstacles to overcome in order to improve the quality of the leadership, the stability and competitiveness of the political parties system are the fragmentation and volatility that characterises it. When the 2004-2007 phase of PVDGP started, the rules of the game as determined by the LEPP actually favoured the instability and volatility of the party system, and a change in the LEPP was seen as both a prerequisite for success and a risk factor (and could as such have been a "killer assumption").
2. The second risk is that the political parties have had a very gradual internalisation of the activities carried out by PVDGP and of its function as TS for the PFPP. The political parties tend to want to carry out other types of activities that respond more directly to their interests.
3. The third risk is related to a possible excess supply of development cooperation to the political parties. The risk is that the political parties and the system will not have sufficient capacity to absorb the cooperation offered and take advantage of the opportunities and resources at their disposal. This points to the "insufficient institutional density" or weak party structure of the Guatemalan political parties.

As regards *risk number 1*, the RT has pointed to some of the positive aspects of the reform of the LEPP that took place in 2004 and again in 2006. All actors agree that these reforms were fundamental in establishing a better legal framework. However, the scope of the reform was limited, as recognised by PVDGP itself, the political parties and the national research institutions. The so-called second generation of reforms will have to be more comprehensive and profound and there is not as yet a consensus regarding the reforms needed amongst the PPs interviewed.

PVDGP states[36] that the reforms might have to encompass decisions regarding; the electoral system (parliamentary or presidential), representation in Congress (Comités Cívicos Departamentales), voting districts, representativity (d' Hondt or Saint-Laguê), electoral threshold, type of electoral party lists (closed, open, etc.). These issues have been raised with some concern by the national research institutes and political parties and it will take a special effort to put them on the political agenda in the post 2007-electoral context.

The research undertaken by FLACSO on the state of the political parties and the party system and the scope and limitations of the reform of the LEPP also point to severe weaknesses in the rules of the game on the same dimensions as pointed out above and on the need to identify more closely the Guatemalan political party "model", which differs from the ones in more consolidated democracies.

Concerning *risk number 2,* the way in which PVDGP left the function as TS for the PFPP certainly contributed to increased tensions among the PPs and also with the programme itself, as the PPs felt it was very abrupt and they had to find solutions in the middle of an electoral campaign. As regards the risk of non-compatibility between the PVDGP initiatives or "offer" to the political parties and the actual incorporation of these in a change of practices the risk is difficult to assess.

The expressed needs from the parties have been in relation to support to individual parties and here another not identified risk materialised by 2005, as the TSE banned direct support to individual parties. PVDGP-OAS had already in 2003 taken note of the resolution of the TSE regarding bilateral financing of political parties, which had created confusion and doubts with respect to the programme's possibilities to provide bilateral technical assistance to the political parties. This should have been formulated and monitored as a major risk, as it turned out to actually affect the direct work with the parties substantially.

The *risk number 3* did not turn out to be a major risk. The actual risk was not so much the growth in the number of offers from development cooperation agencies and national research institutes, as it was the lack of a proper coordination between the agencies and the donors. Some coordination actually took place in the "Inter-institutional Coordination Group" 2005-2006, and the common indicators constructed in 2006 are a good, but not sufficiently applied, instrument for harmonisation between the different projects working with the political parties.

Several factors hampered the achievement of the outputs and efficiency of PVDGP as identified in various reports from the programme. These might have been analysed as risks and served to improve the strategy and determine the scope of the outputs:
- The continued resistance to change from party leaderships and personalities that hindered major progress on reduction of centralism, verticalism, authoritarianism (aspects of internal democratisation), racism and "machismo" (aspects of inclusion).
- The always-difficult relation between the organised civil society and the political parties in Congress is partly a reflection of the strained relation between the mass media and the members of congress (diputados).

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[36] In the annual 2007 work plan, page 6

- There is "resistance" towards changes in nearly all sectors and actors in the Guatemalan society; from private mass media, the governing elites, political parties and civil society in general, as a result of the insufficient development of democratic values and practices.
- The programme experienced slow implementation during 2006, due to the adaptation to changes within OAS. These changes in leadership and to some extent priorities affected the level of execution of PVDGP, at least temporarily.
- The manner in which the programme was concluded without a proper transfer of the Party Management System and lessons learned and its possible institutionalisation constitutes an obstacle to the achievement of the programme objectives in itself.

10.7.   Ownership

OAS has, as mentioned, had the full responsibility for the formulation and the implementation of the programme. OAS was clearly enthusiastic about the outcome of the first phase of PVDGP (2000-2003). The second phase was a more ambitious continuation of first phase, and also included preparatory activities to study whether some of the lessons learnt could be used in a possible new regional programme in Central America. More activities in this direction were actually included, financed separately by NORAD/MFA, with the perspective of possibly financing a full-blown regional programme at a later stage.

With the election of a new General Secretary in OAS in 2005 a process of reorganisation began and a new Assistant Secretary ("Subsecretario") for Political Affairs was appointed in March 2006. The responsibility for PVDGP was originally in the Unit for Promotion of Democracy (UPD) (now dissolved), but was subsequently transferred to a new department for Governance and Modernisation of the State under the Assistant Secretary (AS) for Political Affairs. The reorganisation also implied substantial changes in staff at the Washington Office, including the officials responsible for PVDGP.

During conversations with the RT, the AS stated that he was worried about the programme during his visits to Guatemala in 2006. He considers the programme to be too cost-heavy and schematic in its relation with the PPs (lack of contextualisation) and finds that the outcomes are very poor, taking into account the present deplorable state of the PPs and the party system in Guatemala. Furthermore, the emphasis the programme put on the FPPP caused political problems for OAS, as on one occasion the then Vice-President of Guatemala was insulted at a meeting in the FPPP, where PVDGP was acting as TS for the forum. Summing up, PVDGP does not seem to be a programme that OAS is particularly proud of. Consequently, there was of course no particular interest in the possible regional programme, using the lessons learnt from PVDGP.

OAS plans to continue working with PPs in the future, but with a different approach (smaller projects, more contextualised). Among the themes will be: systems for financing of the PPs, strengthening of the electoral authorities, support for political dialogue, particularly within the parliaments, and possibly support to the creation of offices in the parliaments, which can carry out technical analyses for the PPs.

In conclusion, the ownership by OAS is presently very low. This carries a considerable risk that the lessons learnt will not be appropriated by OAS. This is lamentable, as an organisation should always try to learn from past experiences, good ones as well as bad ones. Learning organisations should never ignore the past but learn from it; if not they are bound to repeat their mistakes.

10.8.   Summary of main conclusions regarding programme management

- The set-up implies that annual work plans and budgets had to be approved by the donors at annual meetings. All main decisions between the annual meetings were the responsibility of the Washington office. Taking into account that the donors are present in Guatemala and followed the programme continuously, some of the problems could possibly have been avoided, if a formal coordination committee had been established with quarterly meetings, where necessary changes to the programme could be discussed and approved. OAS could in that case have been represented either by staff from the head office or by delegation to the country representative. These quarterly meetings could probably also have solved the lack of communication between OAS and the donors in late 2006 and the beginning of 2007.
- The appointment of a new programme coordinator without consultations with the donors was not in accordance with the signed agreement, at least with NORAD/MFA but also with the spirit of the agreement with Sida[37], and therefore unnecessarily strained the relationship between the parties.
- The financial management of the programme implied a centralisation at the head office level, which also implies triple work in accounting, something rarely seen in modern programme (or company) management. The administrator informed the RT that procurements were in general relatively swift despite the centralised approval procedure, but this has not been verified by the RT as it is beyond the scope of the present review.
- From 2006, the level of ownership by OAS has been very low. This implies a considerable risk that the lessons learnt from the programme will not be appropriated by OAS.

11.   LESSONS LEARNT

Many lessons have been learnt during the implementation of PVDGP, and many of these have been mentioned in the PD (lessons from first phase), in the annual progress reports and in other materials produced by the programme. For the RT, the most important appear to be the following:

1. It is important to work with the PPs at all levels: rank and file members, mid-level leaders and the national leadership (i.e. both bottom-up and directly with the top). If some of the levels are omitted, the effectiveness declines. It does not mean that a given programme necessarily shall work with all levels as there may be complementarity with other programmes. This is in accordance with similar lessons learnt from programmes working with institutional strengthening of popular organisations in general.

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[37]   Which states that major changes in the programme shall be consulted with the donor.

2. As the PPs are a reflection of the idiosyncrasy of the society in general, programmes working with the PPs cannot stand alone but must be complementary to broader programmes aiming at promoting democratic values in the society.

3. Working with multiparty modalities is productive (and somewhat surprisingly, it was assessed as very positive by the PPs themselves). The limits should be recognised, however, and the multiparty approach has to be supplemented with more direct technical assistance to the PPs. This is often best done by party internationals that have similar values and goals.[38]

4. It is important not only to work with the PPs but also with the legal framework for the elections and the parties ("the rules of the game"). This gives possibility to secure legal requirements for transparency and party financing, and can also improve the conditions for participation.

5. The creation of a Forum for PPs turned out to be an interesting innovation. Two important lessons seem to be learnt from the PVDGP support to FPPP: (i) the support should be gradually reduced to avoid dependence and secure national ownership, and (ii) there is a fine line between facilitating and being proactive that has to be managed very carefully, as it may otherwise backfire.

6. The donors and the PPs do not have exactly the same objectives for the cooperation. The donors often give high priority to issues that do not necessarily have high priority in the PPs: internal democracy, participation of underrepresented groups, transparency etc. This has to be openly recognised and a common understanding should be reached. The experience is that this is possible.[39]

7. Within the limits set by the differences in the objectives of the donors and the PPs, a participatory approach to project planning should be followed. As for other development assistance, a demand led approach is simply more efficient.

8. On a more practical level: Programmes have to respect the electoral cycles and adjust the planning to these (e.g. training programmes should not be carried out in electoral years and the scope for multiparty dialogue in electoral years is limited).

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[38] As also stated in IDEA (2007)

[39] In an evaluation report of NIMD (2005) it is stated as "to push without being pushy; to facilitate without being soft, and to inspire without imposing ideas". This is a good way of stating the fine line a programme like PVDGP has to tread.

APPENDIX A

TERMS OF REFERENCE

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE

FINAL Version

Terms of Reference

End Review of the program *"Democratic Values and Political Management"*, implemented by the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States (GS/OAS) in compliance with agreements with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NORAD/MFA) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

1 Background

The goal of the program "Democratic Values and Political Management Support to Legally Registered Political Parties" (hereinafter referred to as the Program) is to promote democratic practices and modern political management in the political parties and the party system in Guatemala, by raising levels of institutionalisation, representativity and legitimacy.

Norway – through the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) – initiated the Program in 2000 under an agreement with the GS/OAS. The GS/OAS set up a coordinating office in Guatemala handling *Programa de Valores Democraticos y Gerencia Political* (the coordinating office is hereinafter referred to as PVDGP), which has been responsible for implementing the Program. During the initial period (2000-2004) Norway was the sole donor. The Program was evaluated in March 2003. The reviewers acknowledged it to be well-functioning and coherent, thus recognising the long-term goal of strengthening political parties and the party system in the Guatemalan setting.

Sweden (Sida) joined as a donor in 2004, through the Swedish Embassy in Guatemala. Norad (later NORAD/MFA) and Sida signed parallel but similar agreements with OAS for the period up to 2007. Sweden and Norway encouraged a common reporting system, and on most occasions held joint annual meetings with OAS as the implementing partner.

Total financial support from Norway throughout the entire operation of the Program (2000-2007) amounts to 24.5 million NOK (close to 3.5 million USD). Under the current agreement, which covers the period 2004-2007, funding from Norway has amounted to 14 million NOK (approx. 2.2 million USD). The Swedish support amounts to 9 million SEK (approx. 1.3 million USD), thus giving a total support of around 3.5 million USD for the period 2004-2007.

Since 2004 the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) has contributed to activities organised by the Program. The financial contribution from the NIMD amounts to close to 150,000 USD, however the NIMD has not granted institutional support to PVDGP.

Since 2005 Sida has funded a spin-off program providing technical assistance to the Guatemalan Congress. OAS is one of four implementing partners in this initiative. The OAS module of the Congress program is coordinated by PVDGP.

In 2004 the Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala/Norad launched the idea of a research project that would track the progress of the Program in the context of the development of the party system in Guatemala. FLACSO-Guatemala was selected to undertake this longitudinal investigation ("*investigación de seguimiento*") up to the elections of 2007. From 2004 to 2007 the NORAD/MFA contributed about 3.4 million NOK (approx. 370,000 USD) to the social and political research project run by FLACSO.

Justification and limitations

Since 2004 the Permanent Forum of Political Parties (PFPP) – a multi-party arena for legally registered parties – has been a key element in the organisation and orientation of the Program's activities. Through the Coordination Office, OAS has functioned as Technical Secretariat to the PFPP. The PFPP has become an important actor in Guatemalan politics, giving impulses to political agendas, which, in some cases, have been successfully carried over to the legislative bodies. Other activities have centered around the PFPP and the advertising it commissions, in particular material promoting the participation of women, and young and indigenous people in the party structures.

With effect from 30 April 2007, OAS decided to withdraw permanently as the Technical Secretariat for the PFPP. The donors were informed in December 2006 of this decision, which was taken unilaterally by the GS/OAS. The justification for this decision was that OAS was perceived as a political actor due to its provision of the Technical Secretariat for the PFPP and that OAS electoral observation mission was to be installed in the country in May 2007. In June 2007 a process to undertake a mid-term evaluation initiated by Sida in cooperation with GS/OAS was aborted due a call for tender that failed to elicit offers that met the qualification requirements needed for the assignment.

Given, firstly, that the Permanent Forum for Political Parties is a cornerstone in the design and operation of the Program, and secondly, the prospect that planned components would be phased out or not executed, Norway and Sweden found it unfeasible to enter into a dialogue on new agreements with the GS/OAS after the current agreements expire on 31 December 2007. Taking into account the cancellation of the mid-term review and the fact that both agreements have clauses granting the donors the right to carry out independent reviews/evaluations, the donors Sweden and Norway have considered it viable to collaborate on an end review of the Program.

Bearing in mind the key role that the Program has played in preparing a forum for multi-party dialogue, motivating common agendas in Guatemalan politics, it is vital that the results of the Program should be analysed, consequences drawn, and lessons learned. Further, given the innovative design of the Program, the donors consider the experience worthy of dissemination in the international community concerned with the strengthening of representative democratic institutions in developing countries.

Against this background, the donors will commission a team of evaluators to undertake a Joint End Review that evaluates the Program under the current agreements (2004 to 2007), including, where relevant, achievements and challenges since its start in 2000. The End Review shall not review spin-off programs, programs supported by other donors run by the Coordination Office, nor the research program

mentioned above, but it should nevertheless take into consideration the effects of such initiatives on the performance, capacity, planning and decision-making processes of the Program.

2 Purpose, context and intended use

The End Review shall have the following general objectives:
- to conduct an overall analysis of the evolving levels of institutionalisation, representativity and legitimacy among political parties and the party system in Guatemala culminating in the elections of 2007, and to evaluate and appraise the relevance and impact of the Program in the context of these developments
- to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the Program in reaching results that accord with the goals and objectives set out in the agreements for the period 2004 to 2007, and to appraise the sustainability of these results
- to describe lessons learned for the donors, OAS and stakeholders, thus providing material suitable for dissemination in the international donor community as well as public information to the political parties, academics and key socio-political actors in Guatemala

3 Scope of the work

The review shall provide an overall analysis of the development of political parties and the party system in Guatemala (defined as institutionalisation, representativity, legitimacy, volatility and inclusion) culminating in the elections of 2007, against a backdrop of comparative second-hand material on political parties in Central America and/or a selection of relevant countries in the Latin American region.

The general analysis shall address the following issues:

1. The perceptions of key political actors and political analysts/commentators concerning the causes of non-inclusive party structures and socio-political agendas and the value of multi-party forums and networks in promoting changes in the participation and influence of women, and young and indigenous people.

2. The effects of legal and political reforms on evolving patterns of multi-party dialogue, institutionalisation, participation and legitimacy of the political parties and the party system in Guatemala, in particular the reform of parties and elections.

3. The role and effect of the PFPP and its commissions in reaching common agendas for the implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords.

4. The perceptions of key political actors and political analysts/commentators in Guatemala concerning the value and impact of the PFPP in bringing social demands into the political agenda and in negotiating political consensus on issues of national concern, in particular political issues regarding women, and young and indigenous people.

5. The role and effect of multi-party networks and capacity-building initiatives in promoting the participation, influence, appointments and selection of women, and young and indigenous people in party structures and nomination processes.

The End Review shall assess the following:

The relevance and impact of the Program in relation to its goal of raising levels of institutionalisation, representativity and legitimacy of the political parties and the party system in Guatemala in the period up to the general election of 2007.

The specific objectives of the Program are:
- To develop the capacity of the parties and the party system to design strategies that strengthen institutions and encourage change.
- To facilitate the institutionalisation of the Permanent Forum for Political Parties (PRPP) as a forum for the articulation of initiatives that strengthen the party system and democratic governance.
- To identify and adopt better practices in democratic institutionalisation of parties and party systems that will serve as a basis for designing strategies that strengthen institutions and promote change.
- To promote dialogue between the political parties and the main actors in Guatemalan society.
- To design and execute a political communication strategy to improve party relations with the press and the public.
- To design and execute political training programs for mid-level party members, especially women, and young and indigenous people, that will serve to promote the building of democratic political identities.
- To promote the participation of women, and young and indigenous people in party structures and on party lists.
- To design and execute formative process research to follow up and provide feed-back on the execution of the Program, as well as provide academic and political input relevant to the understanding of the Guatemalan party system.
- To assist in the design and execution of a regional Central American program to strengthen parties and promote change.

1. *The effectiveness of the Program shall be assessed in relation to:*
    - reaching results that accord with the Program's specific objectives,
    - promoting multi-party dialogue and interchange between parties and civil society in ways that facilitate incorporation of social demands in party programs/plans, and which achieve consensus on agendas that can transfer into the national legislature,
    - promoting increased participation and influence by indigenous people, women and young people in political parties, party structures and party politics.

2. *The efficiency of the Program shall be assessed in relation to:*
    - adapting designs and strategies to changing political circumstances in order to achieve the Program's goals and objectives,
    - the cost-efficiency of training activities run by the Program or by the Program in partnership with other institutions with the aim of introducing

institutional capacities and skills into party organisations and among party leaders/active members, including initiatives such as the Diploma of Political Management training scheme,
-   cost-efficiency of personnel structures (inputs), the balance between full-time international/national staff and part-time/contracted staff and consultants, their capacities and skills in securing outputs (activities, products etc),
-   knowledge management, institutional learning and planning processes, including the creation and functioning of CERP (Centro Estratégico de Recursos Politicos y Electorales).

3. *The contextual (socio-political) relevance of the Program shall be assessed in relation to:*
   -   establishing cooperative relationships with national institutions/partners and political actors, including relationships with members of Congress, party leaders, and universities and research institutions,
   -   the participation and selection of beneficiaries among members of political parties with respect to attendance in initiatives/activities such as ad hoc commissions, multi-party networks of women, and young and indigenous people, training and other ad hoc initiatives,
   -   the cooperative relationship and relevance of the research undertaken within the FLACSO area of social political research (the formative research project on political parties).

4. *The sustainability of the Program shall be assessed in relation to:*
   -   the results of the Program in light of its specific objectives,
   -   the quality of planning to ensure the sustainability of processes and structures
   -   the likelihood of the initiated processes, structures, forums and networks being institutionalised following the termination of support from Norway and Sweden
   -   the ownership, involvement and responsibility of the OAS head office in the management of the Program and the initiatives set in motion in Guatemala.

5. *The quality and efficiency of donor coordination, of the donor partner relationship, of the program management, and of the Program's administrative and financial procedures shall be assessed in relation to:*
   -   donor coordination, support modality (parallel donor agreements with OAS) and cooperative relationship between donors and donors/OAS,
   -   authority and management structures and communications within the different OAS entities involved in the implementation of the Program,
   -   the aptness of the internal decision-making and management procedures and channels of communication in ensuring effective operation of the Program in line with agreed obligations,
   -   the capacity and readiness of OAS to secure open and effective communication with the donors on substantial changes and matters of importance for the implementation of the Program,
   -   the transparency, consistency and compliance with obligations laid down in the agreements, derived accords and communications from the donors with regard to financial statements, auditing, hiring and procurement procedures.

6. *The risk management of the Program shall be assessed in relation to:*
   - the aptness, responsiveness and capacity to address changing conditions and changes in political context (internal and external challenges),
   - adaptation, cooperation and coordination with other sometimes competing programs that address the same target groups and themes as the Program.

4. Organisation and stakeholder involvement

The NORAD/MFA, represented by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala, will coordinate the End Review in cooperation with Sida, represented by the Swedish Embassy in Guatemala. The GS/OAS will be consulted concerning the Terms of Reference.

The undertaking will be monitored by a Reference Group, headed by the NORAD/MFA and with members appointed by Sida and the GS/OAS. The Reference Group will engage in a dialogue with the review team, provide relevant information, propose and facilitate contacts with stakeholders and relevant actors to be interviewed. The review team shall present the inception document, to be commented on by the Reference Group, and may address questions and concerns in the course of the evaluation.

The donors will convene at a seminar to present the results of the evaluations to political parties, party leaders, and political commentators.

5. Methodology and implementation of the review

The End Review shall be undertaken by a team of 3 consultants and a local team assistant. The donors will appoint a team leader, who shall be the contract partner and responsible for the end review in relationship to the donors. Minimum requirements for team members are a graduate degree (minimum MA), an academic profession or documentation of equivalent experience. Collectively the team shall have the following qualifications/knowledge base;
   - evaluation practice within the OECD/DAC normative
   - academic merits in democratic institutions and political parties
   - familiarity with the Guatemalan Peace Accords, democratic institutions/development, political parties and the party system in Guatemala
   - familiarity with the evaluation of multilateral/intergovernmental organisations, preferably OAS.

The research for the review shall include a maximum of 3 weeks of field work in January 2008, interviews with relevant actors in Washington and Guatemala for the team of evaluators. The preparation for the review, the field work and the completion of the report will not exceed 4 weeks for the team leader. A maximum of 7 weeks may be shared between the other team members.

The consultants shall employ the following methodology, to which they are invited to add complementary elements of interest:

- in-depth interviews with relevant former/current leaders/management/staff at the GS/OAS headquarters in Washington, the Representation and Coordination Unit in Guatemala
- interviews with OAS staff involved in the operation in Guatemala and in Washington
- interviews with the secretaries general of all the political parties, and party leaders
- a questionnaire directed at the individual beneficiaries of the Program.

6. Timelines and reporting

After an initial appraisal the review team shall provide the Reference Group with an inception document not exceeding 6 pages by 24 January 2008, presenting the main orientation of the review with a list of actors to be interviewed and a format for the questionnaire/survey.

The evaluator shall present a report written in English, not exceeding 40 pages. The report shall include an executive summary in both English and Spanish with main conclusions and lessons learned form the Program. The format and outline of the report shall follow the guidelines of Sida's evaluation report. It is the responsibility of the evaluators to ensure that the report is written in correct and comprehensible English, permitting publication without further editing.

A draft of the report shall be delivered to the Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala, with a copy to the Swedish Embassy in Guatemala, no later than 12 February 2008. After receiving comments from the Reference Group, the evaluators shall make necessary revisions and hand in the final version of the report no later than 20 February 2008. The final report shall be submitted on paper to the Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala, and submitted in electronic form to the donors and the OAS as agreement partners.

APPENDIX B

PROGRAMME AND PEOPLE MET

APPENDIX B. PROGRAMME AND PEOPLE MET

	Sunday 20/1	Monday 21/1	Tuesday 22/1	Wednesday 23/1	Thursday 24/1	Friday 25/1	Saturday 26/1	Sunday 27/1
8:00		Internal meeting, team	**PVDGP coordinator**: Roberto Menéndez	PVDGP responsible for **work with indigenous people,**	**Meeting with members of FPPP**: Commissions for Young, Women and Indigenous People	**Meeting with members of FPPP**: Contact persons (Enlaces) from the political parties	Document reading and start report writing	
9:00								
10:00		Initial meeting with the **donor agencies**	PVDGP responsible for **work with the congress**: Mauicio ,,,	Study of documentation, Norwegian Embassy				
10:30								
11:00						**UNDP**: Edelberto Torres Rivas, Consultor		
11:30								
12:00					Lunch with **former PRODECCA coordinator** Claus Wulff			Document reading and start report writing
13:00	TEAM ARRIVES							
14:00		Meeing with **PVDGP team**	Meeting with **Evaluation Reference Group**	**OAS Guatemala**: Diego Paz Manuel	PVDGP responsible for **work with investigation and documentation** Douglas Chacón		Meeting with Lill-Ann Medina, Norwegian Embassy	
15:00			Meeting with PVDGP responsible for **work with young and women** Medarda ……	OAS Guatemala, **programme for electoral Observation**: Terradez				
16:00								
16:30				**Accion Ciudadana:** Manfredo Marroquin				
17:00								
Evening				Meeting with **former PVDGP coordinator** Ecuadrdo Núñez				

	Monday 28/1	Tuesday 29/1	Wednesdat 30/1	Thursday 31/1	Friday 1/2	Saturday 2/2
8:00	**URNG party:** General Secretary Hector Nuila	**Congress Members,** Salon Casa Larrazabal zona 1	**Party CASA**, General Secretary Mario Mazariegos,		Writing of note with preliminary conclusions	
9:00	**UNDP,** Miguel Angel Barcarcel, responsible for support politiccal parties		**Universidad Rafael Landívar**: Victor Galvez	**FLACSO:** Paola Ortiz		
10:00						
10:30	**Party Encuentro Por Guatemala**, General Secretary and member of congress Nineth Montenegro,		**FOSS**: Dr. Gxabriel Aguilera			
11:00	**Fundacion Friedrich Ebert**: Ricardo Saenz,	**Party GANA**: General Secretary, Alfredo Vila	**INGEP:** Fernando Valdez URL			Departure rest of team
	El Periodico: Juan Luis Font 15 avenida 24-51 zona					
11:30						
12:00	Lunch with Juana Maria Camposeco and Åsa walton, Swedish Emb.	**ASIES:** Karin Maldonado	Midterm meeting with **Evaluation Reference Group**	Writing of note with preliminary conclusions	Final meeting with **Eavluation Reference Group:** Presentation of note with preliminary conclusions	
13:00						
14:00		**PVDGP:** Marisol Ralda , responsible for administration.	**Party GANA**: Jorge Mendez y Virna Lopez			
15:00	**FOSS:** Sandino Asturias aquí en la oficina del Programa	**Netherland Institute for Multiparty Democracy**: Doris Cruz	**Indigenous Organisation MOLOJ:** Hortencia Simon		Departure Team Leader	
		Party FRG: General Secretary, General Rios Montt				
16:00		**Party Partido Patriota:** Valentin Gramajo				

Participants, meeting with FPPP, Commissions for Women, Young and Indigenous People
Date: January 24th, 2008, 8:00-10:00
Place: Hotel Princess

NAME	PARTY
Patricia Camposeco	Unionista
Carolina Moreno	Unionista
Pablo Boiton	UNE
Ingrid Sosa	FRG
Carlos Cabrera	El Frente
Matilde Bajam	Los Verdes
Jorge Huertas	UNE

Participants, meeting with FPPP, Contact Persons (enlaces) for the Political Parties
Date: January 25th, 2008, 8:00-10:00
Place: Hotel Princess

NAME	PARTY
Edgard Augusto Ortíz	ANN
Roberto Villeda	Partido Unionista
Elizabeth Donis	UNE
Romeo Tzunum	Democracia Cristiana
Alfonso Reimers	PAN
Silvia Solórzano	URNG
Carlos Flores	PAN
Ana Polanco	GANA

Participants, meeting with Members of Conrgess
Date: January 29th, 2008, 8:00-10:00
Place: Congress.

NAME	PARTY
Carlos López	FRG
Nineth Montenegro	EG
Virna López *)	GANA
Jorge Méndez *)	GANA
Gudy Rivera	Patriota
Clemente Samines**	UNE

*) They were interviewed separately as they had to participate in an urgent meeting.
** Arrived at the end of the meeting.

People met at OAS, Washington:
- Raúl Alconada, Undersecretary, OAS
- Pablo Gutiérrez, Responsible for the Electoral Observation Programme

- Rubén Pereira, responsible for the project supporting the Guatemalan Congress
- Stephen Griner, former responsible for PVDGP in OAS

APPENDIX C

COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUTS

APPENDIX C. COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL OUTPUTS

The table below compares the planned and actual activities and outputs:

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
(R1)	The political parties will have the capacity to design and manage processes of party institutionalisation and change.	2004: • Agreement signed with NIMD on bilateral support to PP. • Technical assistance to 3 PP's on training plans and internal reorganisation. 2005: • Activities under the output stopped after TSE prohibition of such bilateral support. • Nonetheless 10 PP had received support for design of their own proposals for bilateral external assistance 2006: As a result of the change in output structure (R1) was incorporated under activities related to the inclusion of indigenous, women and young (the original R6). As no written change to the logical framework was made the RT will treat these activities under R6.	1.1 Existence of integrated diagnostics of the party situation. 1.2 Existence of plans for institutional strengthening and change approved by National Executive Committees. 1.3 Degree of enhanced party institutional density (difference between the existing party organisation on initiation of plan and end situation). 1.4 The Reform of the Law of Elections and Political Parties (LEPP) specifies core aspects of party strengthening, such as public financing and oversight (control). 2004: 3 indicators; 1.2 and 2 new ones	1.2 Seven (7) PP with internal plans for institutional strengthening (3 approved by their CEN) 1.3 Improvements in PP organisations achieved to some degree 1.4 The LEPP is a major improvement, but oversight and control of PP finances is weak. Need for 2nd generation reform Bilateral (financial) support to individual parties was already questioned by the TSE as early as 2003. Direct support to individual parties was stopped in 2005 after a TSE ruling forbade it.

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
(R2)	(In ProDoc) Los partidos políticos cuentan con un espacio multipartidario permanente de diálogo y negociación para el fortalecimiento del sistema de partidos y la promoción de la gobernabilidad en el país.) (In Agreement) The Permanent Forum for Political parties will consolidate itself as a permanent multiparty space for dialogue and negotiation concerning the strengthening of the party system and promote good governance of the country.	2004: • 43 internal meetings, 5 workshops • Creation of 3 Commissions FPPP with plans and activities • Contacts with Alta Verapaz (1 province) • 23 exchanges with government and social actors	2.1 Proposal for institutionalisation of the Forum. 2.2 Existence of 22 Provincial platforms of the FPPP. 2.3 Presence and assistance from all the legally registered parties. 2.4 Agreement in the Forum on creation of the National Institute for Political Parties and a plan for its creation 2.5 Number of social and economic actors with which the Forum interacts.	2.1 Various proposals for institutionalisation of the FPPP exist but none approved. 2.2 There have only been FPPP activities in 4 out of 22 provinces 2.3 FRG out in 2003, reincorporated in 2004. Weak presence of General Secretaries of PP's from 2005 onwards. 2.4 Proposal for creation of IMEP has been developed by Commission of FPPP. No consensus yet, and donors disagree.
(R3)	The Permanent Forum for Political Parties and the Congress of the Republic will have conceptual, legal and methodological input to reform the Law of Elections and Political Parties as well as to develop processes of public debate about the reforms. From 2005 this output is shared with the Programme for Technical Assistance to the TSE, also of OAS.	2004: • Systematisation of proposal for LEPP introduced to Congress • Cooperation with Congress Commission on Electoral Matters • PVDGP acting as Technical Secretariat for the FPPP • 2 seminars (women and youth) 2005: Together with PTA-TSE/OAS • Elaboration of working documents, TA and workshops in support of Congress Commission and TSE • RENAP; studies (comparative legislation),	No indicators in ProDoc 2004: Agreements made in FPPP 2005: No indicators, but outputs are specific law proposals	Follow-up on the "Agenda Nacional Compartida" Establishment of Commissions in the FPPP with specific plans and activities. The Ordinary Assemblies of the FPPP in 2006 show that its Commissions are working and relations have been built to many sectors in society

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
		perception study, TA and international experts in workshops Commission • Comparative analysis on electoral crimes • Proposal on crimes to be included in Criminal Code 2006: • Workshops and TA with TSE and Electoral Commission of Congress. • Support to analysis of aspects of RENAP law. Slow progress. • TA on electoral crimes and formulation of proposal. • The statutes of the PP updated and published • Multiparty vision paper on the need for a "National Security System" signed and proposal formulated on a "Framework Law on National Security System" • A "Multiparty Ethical Code of Conduct" was formulated		1.4 The LEPP reform (2004) is a major improvement, but oversight and control of PP finances is weak. Need for 2nd generation reform 2006: Approval of minor harmonisation of LEPP (Decreto 35-06) for 2007 elections 2005: RENAP Law approved, to be implemented after 2007 elections. In 2006 slight modification (Decreto 31-06). 2005: Proposal on Criminal Code not approved, pending
(R4)	Created and transferred to the political parties a system of internal political procedures and management of election campaigns on the basis of the identification of the best methodology and applied tools for political management.	2004: • Information on political and electoral reform systematised, mostly for use in work on reform of LEPP • Draft texts on institutional strengthening of PP (for later publications) • Analysis of existing toolbox for later actualisation • Workshops with PP (# ??) on internal reforms	4.1 Existence of a system for political management of internal processes. 4.2 Toolbox for political management of internal processes. 4.3 Printing of a manual on internal management. 4.4 Printing of manual for management of electoral	Mostly emphasis on reform of LEPP, not so much internal aspects of party strengthening. Materials on party strengthening published in 2007.

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
		2005: • Studies on Latin American experiences and practices of institutionalisation of PP (regulations etc.). • 3 international seminars; i)Electoral systems, ii) Indigenous peoples and PP, iii) Governance and political reforms • Investigation together with FLACSO; "Dilemmas in the functioning of PP in Guatemala" With the change of strategy in 2006 the CERP reorganised the database and secured publication of the "System for Party Management" during 2007	campaigns. 4.5 Degree of application of practices identified in the plans for strengthening and campaign strategies.	
(R5)	The political parties will have developed the capacity to dialogue with actors of the society based on the design and facilitation of mechanisms and processes of dialogue between the political parties, civil society and the government as a way to contribute to a culture of dialogue.	2004: • 3 sessions of discussion and consensus-making between women from civil society and political parties • 4 internal sessions of the indigenous movement • Public presentation of the Mayan Electoral Reform proposal to the assembly of the FPPP and members of Congress • An exchange between representatives of CACIF and the Specific Commission of the FPPP • 2 encounters in order to strengthen women leadership between female leaders of social movements and their homologues in the Inter Party Network of Women • A framework for continuous dialogue with	5.1 Level of positioning of the theme of institutionalisation of political parties in the media 5.2 Degree of inclusion in the political agendas of the movements of women, young and indigenous peoples of the theme of party strengthening 5.3 Level of presence and permanency of the interlocutors of the FPPP in the processes of dialogue 5.4 Degree of incorporation	The FPPP has maintained a presence in dialogues but not always with sufficient capacity for proposals and solutions. Discourse has changed and dialogue has been sought.

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
		the media established by the FPPP 2005: • Table of Dialogue on the Repercussions of the LEPP • Institutional presentation of FLACSO and the Programme of Multi Party Dialogue, ASIES (Study on Democratic Culture), INCEP etc. (involving 17 entities) • Individual consultations with leaders of civil society and political parties • Supervision of a consultancy with regard to the legal obligations of political parties to include the demands of women, indigenous and young people 2006: • 1 meeting with Acción Ciudadana, charged with the Data Base on indigenous legal themes • 1 meeting with all indigenous MPs to establish a network of support for pending legislation on indigenous matters • Meetings of dialogue of the agenda of the Commission of Women in Congress with representatives of women social movements and related governmental entities	of the political agendas of social organisations in the programs of political parties	
(R6)		2004: • 26 women found the Political Association of the Inter Party Network of Women 2005: • Meeting of the Secretaries for Women from 10 parties	6.1 Existence of internal organs which specifically stimulate the participation of women, young and indigenous people 6.2 Differentiated pedagogical training packages by type of population that are	Already in 2003 more than half of the parties (11 out of 18) had formal internal organs for women, young

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
	(R7 in Agreement) Better and more effective participation of women, youth and indigenous in the leadership of the political parties, in party structures and on party lists in the elections based on an improvement of the competitiveness of these underrepresented groups.	• Meeting of the Secretaries for Indigenous Affairs from 10 parties • Meeting of the Youth Secretaries from 4 organisations 2006: The output was divided into 3 different components; one for women, one for indigenous and one for youth. The activities were concentrated on investigations/studies and work with the FPPP and its secretariats and TA to secretariats and commissions. The Commissions of the FPPP then worked with the three target groups. Some activities were not carried out due to internal delays in OAS. A separate NORAD/NORAD/MFA support was given to a consultancy that led the Commission of Indigenous Communities in Congress to propose a Law on Consultation with the Indigenous People in accordance with ILO Convention 169.	implemented in political parties 6.3 50% or more of the members of the Inter Party Networks that conclude their training come from the Provinces 6.4 The relation between the number of women, indigenous and young holding party positions in the provinces and on national level at the beginning and the end of the network process. 6.5 Number of women, young and indigenous on electoral tickets with a chance for winning	and indigenous people. The creation of networks led to more autonomous activities and support shifted towards the secretariats from 2006. There is no documented major increase in number of province participants or representatives from the three groups increasing their electoral chances (some slight improvement for women)
(R7)	(Original in ProDoc: Los partidos políticos y comités cívicos cuentan con instancias internas, líderes y dirigentes formados y capacitados para la multiplicación educativa en valores democráticos y gerencia política.) (R8 in Agreement) Political parties and leaders capable of carrying out training in democratic	2004: • 5 modules (out of 10) of the "Programa Modular Nacional" carried out, with 97 participants on average, mostly women (out of 171) • URL trained 113 from provinces in a "Programa Modular Departamental" • 4 training booklets designed and revised for	7.1 Relation between number of leaders that start and finish training programmes. 7.2 40% of these leaders are women. 7.3 30% of these leaders are indigenous. 7.4 50% of these leaders are	7.1 Goal was 250 for 2004, actual achievement was 210. 7.2-5: 2004 IV Diplomado participants were young, but few women/indigenous (9 of 25).

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
	values and political management.	later publication. Lack of gender and multicultural content was corrected. • IV Diplomado Leadership and political Management carried out (by USAC), with delay and 25 out of 40 participants (young) • Follow-up Seminar for graduates from the 3 first "Diplomados" since 2000. • 25 Trainers of trainers from PP concluded 5 module course on political education and training in PP's. 2005: • National Modular Programme carried out with 82 intermediate leaders. • Provincial Modular Progamme carried out with 70 participants. • "Diplomado" in New Political leadership concluded with 29 participants (50% women) • Seminar for beneficiaries from the former diplomados 2006: The formal training courses were discontinued and the output included under "CERP", where most of the activities appear under output 6.	under 35 years. 7.5 50% of the total of trained come from the provinces. 7.6 The pedagogical (training) package (workpack) of the Programme is used in the internal training processes in the parties. 7.7 Existence of internal authorities for training and education with programmes designed and under implementation. 7.8 Number of trained leaders that form part of parties' permanent structures and electoral lists (candidates).	2004: 25 out of 37 concluded "training of trainers". Participants were responsible for PP training and 17 out of 25 men. 2005: Around 70% of participants concluded training
(R8)	Un sistema de investigación sociopolítica aplicado genera información permanente y funcional para la institucionalización y democratisación del sistema de partidos políticos. (R9 in Agreement) A system of formative process research will provide useful information for the institutionalisation and democratisation of the	2004: • Elaboration of the FLACSO publication: "Where are we headed? The Electoral Reform and the Reform of Political Parties" • Elaboration of a Data Base on Latin American political parties updated as of 2004 2005:	8.1 A system of socio-political investigation installed in national academic institutions. 8.2 An updated and sustainable database on political parties. 8.3 Continued publishing on	2004: 8.2 Data Base on Latin American political parties 2005: 8.2 Data Base on Best Practices of Institutionalisation

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
	political party system.	• Elaboration of a Data Base on Best Practices of Institutionalisation: identification of 37 Latin American political parties with relevant experiences, collection of 35 party statutes • 3 International seminars on electoral reform (June), indigenous peoples (September), ability to govern and political reform (November) and political parties 2006: • The completion of Data Bases on Electoral Systems, Political Parties and Party Systems • The completion of 8 booklets in the series "Formacion Politica" • Planned activities: 4 case studies of Latin American party systems, a handbook on how to interpret and handle opinion polls, a guide book on how to set up an office of communication within political parties	democracy and political management.	8.3 By 2007 PVDGP published a series of investigations (3) and the "System for Political Management" (10 volumes)
(R9)	Diseñada, validada y ejecutada la estrategia de comunicación política del PVDGP, convirtiéndolo en punto focal de referencia en materia de partidos políticos (R6 in Agreement): Designed validated and executed a strategy for political communication as a focal point of reference for the political parties.	2004: • Monitoring of the press, daily distribution of news • 32 radio programs • Internet communication with journalists • Institutional video and book on the FPPP 2005: • Technical assistance to The Commission of Communication and Institutional Promotion of the FPPP • A FPPP web site is under construction	9.1 Sequence of analyses of the political situation every three months 9.2 Media coverage of Program and FPPP activities (number of articles and news spots). 9.3 The existence of party organs charged with communication provided with capable human resources 9.4 Strategies designed and	2004: 9.2 32 radio programs, but the remaining activities are not quantified 2006: 9.1 41 political reports from 4 Central American countries 9.3 and 9.4 difficult to assess existence of secretariats today, but

	Outputs	Main activities	Output Indicators	Outputs obtained /achivements
		• A workshop on party institutionalisation tailored for journalists (10-15 journalists participated) 2006: • The CERP strategy was designed • The CERP web site was designed • A Monthly Electronic Bulletin on political themes was started • A monitoring of the press with particular emphasis on political matters was developed, 41 political reports from 4 Central American countries were issued	approved by National Executive Committees	parties have received training. PVDGP communication with press has been constant, and the web-page includes a toolbox on communication for PP amongst other documents.
(R10)	The UPD-OAS regional Central American program for democratic values and political management will have been assisted in design and execution.	No activities reported in the Annual Program Reports The Norwegian Embassy financed a separate regional programme for some 8-10 months during 2004-2005, run out of the PVDGP office.	10.1 The model of the programme in Guatemala serves as basis for the regional proposal. 10.2 Representatives from the programme and the FPPP advise on regional programme activities. 10.3 Political and pedagogical products of the programme are used in the implementation of the regional programme.	No results obtained. A proposal was presented and commented upon by donor late 2005. Output discontinued by OAS in 2006

The Logical Framework from the original Programme Document 2004-2007, on pages 12-13, contemplated the 10 outputs (results) described above, but also grouped them into 3 "Abordajes" (approaches) and 9 "Ejes" (axes). These 9 Ejes are also called "Lineas de acción" and they each equal one of the outputs. Thus, the most complete overview of PVDGP's outputs is the table in the Project Document pages 24 to 27, where there are 9 lines of action each with their corresponding output and Indicators. The only difference from the Logical Framework is that the outputs 2 & 3 are grouped as one (output 2), and with the same indicators.

In 2006 the annual meeting between the donors and OAS reached an agreement to modify the original Agreement and the Logical Framework, introducing three new "Ejes de trabajo" and regrouping other outputs under the heading CERP (Strategic Centre for Political Resources). The agreement (signed the 9th of June 2006) specifies that PVDGP should present a proposal for a modification of the Logical Framework "so that there would be a clear and direct relation between the structure of Objectives and outputs and the implementation strategy" (quotation form Agreed Minutes). This was never done. So, even if PVDGP formally had an approval for a modification of its Logical Framework, in practice the RT has not been able to trace it, as it has never been written down and presented as such.

The changes in 2006 mean that PVDGP had two somewhat different periods within the 2004-2007 Phase of the programme. The outputs were regrouped and for instance the newly named CERP merged outputs 1, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9. These changes and the modification of the "Intermediate Annual Outputs" (Programme Document pages 31-37) that together over the years should contribute to achieve the overall original outputs for the 2004-2007 Phase makes it somewhat difficult to trace the achievements of the outputs over time.

The different structures used in the Annual Reports also make it somewhat difficult to trace activities and results over time.

However, the different reports from PVDGP and interviews with personnel clearly indicate a reduction in activities during 2006, more focus on inclusion of women, indigenous and youth, through work with the FPPP and its commissions, and for the 2007 a crisis with change of personnel, change of strategy towards the FPPP (stop for Technical Secretariat function). The decision not to formulate another Phase of PVDGP and initiate the exit-strategy led to more programme internal activities, such as systematisation and publication of studies, toolbox and the "System for Political Management".

Summary of achievement of outputs (as organised in the original Programme Document 2004-2007).

Output 1 (R 1): The output was only in force during 2004 and 2005, due to TSE prohibition of direct support to political parties (considered financing of individual party activities). The OAS interpretation led to a discontinuation of the activities in 2005. In 2004 an agreement was made with NIMD, and even though political parties were not very active nor technically strong in soliciting technical assistance for party strengthening, some 7 PP received some kind of bilateral technical assistance.

Output 2 & 3 (R 2 & 3): These outputs overlap, and no separate indicators are formulated for output 3, which in practice is merged with output 2. Concerning the FPPP it followed up on the ANC (common national agenda) from 2003 and had strong impact on the approval of the reforms of the LEPP. The number of commissions was increased to 11, but the activities in the FPPP led to some tensions with the Government and some Congress Commissions. PVDGP functioned as Technical Secretariat to the FPPP until May 2007, when it decided to stop this activity. The decision proved to be controversial, as both the political parties and the donors saw it as a change of priorities and too premature. On the other hand, OAS argued that this had been foreseen for some time and was aimed to avoid conflict with its role as electoral observer. The creation of a multiparty training institute (IMEP) was contemplated (and some resources invested in design), but never decided upon. PVDGP did not have many activities directed towards the provinces, and the training activities there were discontinued, without having achieved the output indicators. During 2005 and 2006 an Inter-institutional Coordination of international donors, national research centres, universities and NGOs held several meetings and organised studies and joint sessions with the FPPP and its commissions. One of the topics was the proposal to create an "IMEP".

Output 4 (R 4): During 2004 there was mostly emphasis on reform of LEPP, not so much internal aspects of party strengthening. During 2005 some international seminars were held, but no model of best practices elaborated. With the change of strategy in 2006 the CERP reorganised the database and secured publication of the "System for Party Management" during 2007.

Output 5 (R 5): During 2004 and 2005 attempts were made to establish a dialogue between the political parties and the media. This did not produce the desired results and relations remain tense and with mutual lack of confidence. With regard to dialogue with organised women, indigenous and youth sectors, the dialogues were carried out but the impact in party organisations or structures negligible. From 2005 and onwards another dialogue and coordination took place in the Inter-institutional Commission, that consisted of international programmes (such as PVDGP-OAS, NIMD, UNDP) and national research institutions and some NGOs (amongst others FLACSO, INGEP, URL, USAC, ASIES, NALEB, UFM…), all involved in support to the political parties. Concrete results have been hard to identify in the documents, but interviewees point to improved coordination and division of work.

Output 6 (R 6): The inter-party network of women, youth and indigenous were formed as groups inside the parties and networks that began to propose autonomy from the parties. In 2006 the support was moved to the secretariats in the political parties as these had opposed further support to the networks. At the same time support was given to the respective Commissions in the FPPP, which still exist.

Output 7 (R 7): Formation and training has been a core activity of PVDGP with focus on women, indigenous and young members of the political parties. The national modular programme and "diplomados" were more successful than the provincial programme, which was abandoned after 2005 and only attended a total of 4 out of 22 provinces. More than 120 workshops were carried out and some 800 people participated directly in the activities.

At the end of the PVDGP in 2007 the publication of the "Political Training Series" (10 volumes) was completed. Several dozens of party members that had participated in the training programmes competed in the 2007 elections.

Output 8 (R 8): This output's activities were mainly undertaken in 2004-2005, but suffered a setback in 2006-2007. The "System for Party Management" was however published during 2007 as a systematisation of the efforts of PVDGP. In the start of the 2004-2007 phase there were some exchanges between FLACSO and PVDGP on results of investigations. As a parallel activity the NORAD/NORAD/MFA financed a research programme with FLACSO in order to monitor political and party system development and the progress of PVDGP in this context. Some interaction took place, including the determination of scope and content of some investigations, but the very relevant FLACSO investigations on the formal and informal functioning of political parties and the party system were published at a time when PVDGP was undergoing an internal crisis in 2006, and the results of the investigations were not incorporated into a redesign of PVDGP or change of strategy. After the change of PVDGP personnel (coordinator and some staff) in the beginning of 2007 contacts were sporadic.

Output 9 (R 9): As far as the internal PVDGP communication strategy is concerned the programme has maintained a constant line of work towards the media (newspapers, magazines, radio), the web-page has been modified, and it seems to be well known and well visited. As regards the political parties, they have received training and materials, and have had secretariats for communication, although it is difficult to assess the efficiency of the efforts.

Output 10 (R 10): The Norwegian Embassy financed a separate regional programme for some 8-10 months during 2004-2005, run out of the PVDGP office. No results obtained. A proposal was presented and commented upon by the donor late 2005. The output was abandoned by OAS in 2006.

APPENDIX D

INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

APPENDIX D. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Table: Index of Institutionalisation of the Political Party Systems in Central America

Country	Dimension 1: Volatility (2003)	Dimension 2: Stability (2003)	Dimension 2: Identification with political parties (1996-2003)	Dimension 3: Confidence in political parties (1996-99)	Dimension 3: Legitimacy of the electoral process (1996-99)		Index
Honduras	3.00	2.67	2.89	2.20	1.58		**2.56**
Nicaragua	2.75	2.78	2.79	1.91	2.00		**2.50**
Panama	2.19	3.00	3.00	2.35	2.19		**2.49**
Costa Rica	2.63	2.21	1.42	2.02	3.00		**2.32**
El Salvador	2.33	1.99	2.41	3.00	1.00		**2.18**
Guatemala	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00		**1.08**

Source: Diego Achard, Luís E. González et al. (2004) Un Desafío a la Democracia los partidos políticos en centroamérica, Panamá y República Dominicana, BID, IDEA, OEA, PNUD, SAN José, Costa Rica, p. 33.

APPENDIX E

INDICATORS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES

APPENDIX E. INDICATORS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES

Table 1. Overview of possible indicators for measuring the achievement of the objective

Item	Indicator	Means of verification, data sources
1. Representativity		
	The inclusion of women, indigenous people and young people as mayors and deputies in Congress	La participación Indígena en el Proceso Electoral Guatemala 2007: Una tarea inconclusa, Mirador Electoral: Cuadro 5 p. 5 and Cuadro 7 p. 6; M. Guisela Mayén (2007) Pautas para la Negociación de Dirigentes de Partidos Políticos con Organizaciones y Líderes Indígenas (Table 2 and Table 3)
	The existence of secretariats for women, indigenous people and young people in the political parties	Anisia Pasola Loaiza (2006) "El quién es quién partidario I: estructura partidaria", Cuadernos de información política No. 6, Área de estudios sociopolíticos, FLACSO, Guatemala (Table 4)
	Presence of women, indigenous people and young people in party structures	M. Guisela mayén (2007) Pautas para la negociación de partidos políticos con Organizaciones y Líderes Indígenas (Table 5)
	The inclusion of issues of importance fr women, indigenous people and young people on the agenda of the political parties	La participación Indígena en el Proceso Electoral Guatemala 2007: Una Tarea Inconclusa, Mirador Electoral: Cuadro 4 p. 4; Análisis de los programas de gobierno de los partidos políticos ante la pobreza Elecciones 2007, Serie Debates y Propuestas sobre Pobreza No. 5, FLACSO, 2007 (Table 6)
2. Legitimacy		
	Popular perceptions of the political parties	Survey data, Latinobarómetro, Comparativo Encuestas 2004-2007 Borge y Asociados, El Periódico
3. Institutionalisation		
(1) Stability of inter-party competition	1. Electoral volatility 2. Floor-crossing (transfugismo)	1. Can be calculated on the basis of electoral data (Table 7 and Table 8) 2. ASIES (2007) Guatemala: Monografía de los partidos políticos 2004-2007, Cuadro 2 p. xiv. (Table 9)
(2) Linkages between parties and constituencies among the population	The age of political parties as a proxy indicator	ASIES (2004) Guatemala: Monografía de Partidos Políticos 2000-2004; ASIES (2007) Guatemala: Monografía de los Partidos Políticos 2004-2007
(3) The legitimacy of the electoral process and political parties	Popular perceptions of the political parties and political institutions	Time series of opinion polls/Survey data, Latinobarómetro, Comparativo Encuestas 2004-2007 Borge y Asociados, El Periódico
(4) The institutionalisation of individual parties	Party organisation: membership and territorial presence; caudillismo (vs. formal internal democratic procedures);	ASIES (2004) Guatemala: Monografía de Partidos Políticos 2000-2004; ASIES (2007) Guatemala: Monografía de los Partidos Políticos 2004-2007; Cuadernos

Item	Indicator	Means of verification, data sources
	clientelism/nepotism; party finance	de información política No. 8, FLACSO, Tabla 8 p. 20 (Table 10 and Table 11)

Table 2. Number of male and female indigenous mayors elected in 2007 by political party

Political Party	ANN	CASA	CC	DIA	FRD	FRG	GANA	PAN	PP	PU	UCN	UD	UNE	URNG
Male mayors	2	1	2	2	1	11	26	4	10	10	3	2	48	6
Female mayors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Total	2	1	2	2	1	11	26	4	10	10	3	2	49	6

Source: La Participación Indígena en el Proceso Electoral Guatemala 2007: Una Tarea Inconclusa, Mirador Electoral, p. 5

Table 3. Number of indigenous deputies elected in 2003 and number of male and female indigenous deputies elected in 2007 by political party

Political Party	UNE	PP	GANA	FRG	PU	EG	PAN	URNG	Total in Congress
Total 2003	7	3	1	3	0	0	1	1	16 of 158
Male deputies 2007	6	4	1	1	1	0	1	0	14 of 158
Female deputies 2007	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4 of 158
Total 2007	9	4	1	1	1	1	1	0	18 of 158

Source: Proper elaboration by the ET based on M. Guisela Mayén (2007) Pautas para la Negociación de Dirigentes de Partidos Políticos con Organizaciones y Líderes Indígenas, p. 118; y Mirador Electoral

Table 4. National secretariats for targeted groups in political parties according to party statutes

Political party	Secretariat for juvenile affairs	Secretariat for women and women affairs	Secratariat for indigenous affairs	Secratariat for peasants and workers
ANN				X
CASA	X	X		
DCG				
DIA				
FRG	X	X		
PU	X	X	X	
UD				
PAN				
Los Verdes				
MR				
PP				
UNE				
URNG		X	X	X
TP/FRD				
PSN/GANA	X	X		X

Source: Anisia Paola Ortiz Loaiza (2006) "El quién es quién partidario I: estructura partidaria, Cuadernos de información política No. 6, Área de estudios sociopolíticos, FLACSO, Guatemala: p. 11-12.

Table 5. Indigenous representation on the National Executive Committees (CENs) of Political parties

Political Party	No. of indigenous people on the CEN	Total no. of people on the CEN	Percentage of indigenous representation
URNG	7	13	53.8%
TP/FRD	5	12	41.7%
UNE	4	21	19.0%
DCG	3	19	15.8%
UD	4	27	14.8%
Los Verdes	4	21	19.0%
MR	3	26	11.5%
FRG	2	21	9.5%
EG	1	12	8.3%
GANA	1	19	5.3%
PAN	1	25	4.0%
PU	1	28	3.6%

Source: Proper eleaboration by the ET based on M. Guisela Mayén (2007) Pautas para la Negociación de Dirigentes de Partidos Políticos con Organizaciones y Líderes Indígenas, p. 119

Table 6. The inclusión of themes of general interest for the indigenous population in the government programs of some of the Guatemalan political parties

Theme	UNE	PP	GANA	ANN	UCN	EG	URNG
Agrarian	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Nutritional and food security	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Health	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fight against racism and discrimination; inclusion and citizen participation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

Source: La Participación Indígena en el Proceso Electoral Guatemala 2007: Una Tarea Inconclusa, Mirador Electoral: Cuadro 4 p. 4

Table 7. Electoral Volatility in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic

Country	Parlia-mentary elections: Period	Parlia-mentary elections: No. of periods	Parlia-mentary elections: Mean Volatility (A)	Presi-dential elections: Period	Presi-dential elections: No. of periods	Presi-dential elections: Mean volatility (B)	Mean volatility (A+B)/2
Guatemala	1985-1999	4	43.6	1985-1999	3	53.8	48.7
Panama	1994-1999	1	24.9	1994-1999	1	23.0	24.0
El Salvador	1985-2003	6	17.9	1984-2003	3	24.1	21.0
Dominican	1978-	6	19.1	1978-	6	21.2	20.2

Country	Parlia-mentary elections: Period	Parlia-mentary elections: No. of periods	Parlia-mentary elections: Mean Volatility (A)	Presi-dential elections: Period	Presi-dential elections: No. of periods	Presi-dential elections: Mean volatility (B)	Mean volatility (A+B)/2
Republic	2002			2002			
Costa Rica	1978-2002	6	17.0	1978-2002	6	12.8	14.9
Nicaragua	1990-2001	2	15.4	1990-2001	2	9.3	12.4
Honduras	1981-2001	5	8.0	1981-2001	5	6.3	7.2
Region		30	20.9		26	21.5	21.3

Source: Diego Achard, Luís E. González et al. (2004) *Un Desafío a la Democracia los partidos políticos en Centroamérica, Panamá y República Dominicana*, BID, IDEA, OEA, PNUD, San José, Costa Rica, p. 33.

Table 8. Electoral Volatility in Guatemala 1985-2007

Electoral period	Congress seats mean volatility (A)	Presidential vote mean volatility (B)	Mean volatility (A)+(B)/2
1985-1990	47,4%	40,0%	43,7%
1990-1995	72,4%	68,4%	70,4%
1995-1999	37,3%	33,9%	35,6%
1999-2003	59,7%	69,0%	64,4%
2003-2007	38,0%	40,5%	39,3%
Total	51,0%	50,4%	50,7%

Source: Proper elaboration by the RT

Table 9. The extent of floor-crossing (*transfugismo*) among the deputies of political parties represented in Congress. The period between January 2004 and June 2007

PARTY	NO. OF DEPUTIES IN JANUARY 2004	NO. OF DEPUTIES WHO LEFT THE PARTY	NO. OF DEPUTIES WHO JOINED THE PARTY	NO. OF DEPUTIES IN JUNE 2007
FRG	43	16 (37%)	2	29
GANA (PSN+M17)	32	13 (40%)	5	24
UNE	32	15 (50%)	13	30
PAN	17	9 (53%)	8	16
PP	10	4 (40%)	12	18
PU	7	2 (28%)	0	5
ANN	6	4 (66%)	1	3
MR	5	4 (80%)	0	1
UD	2	1 (50%)	1	2
URNG	2	0	2	4
DCG	1	0	0	1
DÍA	1	0	0	1
UCN	-	0	11	11
EG	-	0	2	2
BIEN	-	0	1	1
INDEPENDENTS	-	0	10	10
TOTALS	158	68 (43%)	68	158

Source: ASIES (2007) Guatemala: Monografía de los Partidos Políticos 2004-2007: Cuadro 2 p. xiv.

Table 10. Membership figures of Guatamalan political parties in November 2004, May 2006 and June 2007

PARTY	DATE OF REGISTRATION	NO. OF AFFILIATES 30.11.04	NO. OF AFFILIATES 26.05.06[40]	NO. OF AFFILIATES 29.06.07
DCG	14.01.86	81,724	73,825	71,055
PAN	15.05.89	40,727	38,088	38,541
FRG	10.01.90	44,684	40,292	41,328
UD	15.07.93	9,535	15,993	19,304
PLP	07.03.94	13,290	12,348	13,183
Los Verdes	18.01.95	5,725	10,102	15,945
MR	06.04.95	7,491	15,324	18,510
DÍA	19.03.98	16,027	17,506	21,785
URNG	18.12.98	13,162	15,622	17,816
PP	13.06.02	14,802	23,890	40,412
PSN/GANA	30.08.02	9,589	21,373	24,502
UNE	06.09.02	9,905	20,425	78,744
PU	23.09.02	6,371	17,723	18,829
UNA	12.02.03	5,703	-	-
BIEN	03.06.03	6,386	15,228	17,835
ANN	06.06.03	6,742	15,727	20,529
PT/FPD	01.07.03	6,053	15,919	23,328
MPV	11.07.03	6,117	-	-
CASA	24.07.03	6,638	16,106	17,279
MSPCN[41]	28.07.03	-	-	-
PSG	12.09.05	-	15,209	16,865
UCN	20.11.06	-	-	18,530
EG	23.04.07	-	-	18,354
VIVA	12.06.07	-	-	16,266

Source: proper elaboration by the ET based on ASIES (2004) *Guatemala: Monografía de Partidos Políticos 2000-2004*: Cuadro 1 p. 185; and ASIES (2007) *Guatemala: Monografía de los Partidos Políticos 2004-2007*: Cuadro 1 p. xi.

Table 11. Degree of Institutionalisation of Political Parties in Guatemala

Political Party	Party Stability	Institucional Performance	Organisational Strength	Internal Democracy	Total (maximum 20)
DCG	7	4	3	0.3	14.3
FRG	7	3	2.5	0.2	12.7
PAN	7	4	1.5	0.1	12.1
UD	5	1	1.5	0.1	7.6
URNG	5	1	0.5	0.3	6.8
PP	3	1	2	0.3	6.3

[40] 26 May 2006 is the date of expiry of the 2-year period by which all political parties should fulfill the minimum requirement of 15,220 affiliates (equivalent to 0,3% of the total number of citizens inscribed in the electoral register (padrón electoral) used in the 2003 general elections. By this date only Los Verdes (the Green Party) and PLP failed to meet this minimum membership requirement.

[41] One of the parties that lost its legal status in 2003 for failing to pass the electoral threshold of 4% of the votes or elect one deputy to Congress.

Political Party	Party Stability	Institucional Performance	Organisational Strength	Internal Democracy	Total (maximum 20)
PSN	4	1	1	0.2	6.2
MR(PLG)	3	1	2	0.1	6.1
DÍA	3	1	2	0	6.0
CASA	4	0	0	0.2	4.2
UNE	3	1	0	0.1	4.1
TP	4	0	0	0	4.0
GANA(PSN-MR)	1	1	2	NA	4.0
PU	3	0	0.5	0	3.5
ANN	1.5	0	0	0.1	1.6

Source: Luís Fernando Mack (2006) "Entre lo fáctico y lo teórico: midiendo la institucionalidad partidaria en Guatemala", *Cuadernos de información política No. 8, Área de estudios sociopolíticos, FLACSO*, Guatemala: Tabla 8, p. 20.

APPENDIX F

RESUMEN EJECUTIVO EN ESPAÑOL

APPENDIX F. RESUMEN EJECUTIVO EN ESPAÑOL

0.1 Antecedentes

El "Programa Valores Democráticos y Gerencia Política, Apoyo a los Partidos Políticos Legalmente Registrados en Guatemala" (PVDGP) ejecutado por la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) con financiamiento de NORAD[42] y Asdi está concluyendo su segunda fase (2004-2007). El presente documento es una revisión final externa del PVDGP llevado a cabo durante Enero-Febrero del 2008.

0.2 El Programa

El *Objetivo de Desarrollo* del programa es promover la práctica de los valores democráticos y de instrumentos de gerencia política en los partidos políticos (PP) para elevar los niveles de institucionalización, representatividad y legitimidad. El *Objetivo Inmediato* es diseñar e impulsar procesos de institucionalización y cambio democrático en los PP y en el sistema de partidos de Guatemala.

En resumen, el programa ha desarrollado actividades enfocadas en;
- *Fortalecimiento de los PP*, tanto a través de actividades multipartidarios como bilaterales y con énfasis particular en la promoción de mujeres, jóvenes e indígenas. Los principales instrumentos han sido capacitaciones y asistencia técnica. En este contexto el programa ha desarrollado una serie de materiales de capacitación y metodologías.
- *Facilitación de un diálogo multipartidario,* principalmente a través del Foro Permanente de Partidos Políticos (FPPP).
- *Apoyo a la reforma de la Ley Electoral y de Partidos Políticos* (LEPP).
- Asegurar una mejor comprensión de los problemas y cambios a través del *financiamiento de estudios relevantes*, en parte financiados de manera paralela por NORAD/MFA y poniendo estos y otros documentos relevantes a la disposición de los PP (por ejemplo a través de una página web)

0.3 Eficacia

En esta parte de la revisión se valora principalmente el grado actual de avance para alcanzar los objetivos establecidos, o sea, la pregunta es hasta que punto se haya tenido avances con relación a un incremento de (i) *la representatividad,* (ii) *la legitimidad* y (iii) *la institucionalización* de los partidos políticos y el sistema de partidos en Guatemala.

Desafortunadamente el documento de programa no establece indicadores para los objetivos, no se ha identificado ninguna línea de base específica y no ha habido información sistemática sobre este punto en los informes anuales. Por este motivo el Equipo de Revisión (ER) ha puesto particular énfasis en la identificación de indicadores relevantes para el objetivo, dónde existe información disponible, para poder realizar una valoración relativamente sólida en cuánto a los avances para alcanzar el objetivo. De hecho

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[42] Originalmente el convenio se había firmado con NORAD, pero el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Noruega (MFA) asumió la responsabilidad de la cooperación bilateral de Noruega (y por ende del convenio con OEA) en el 2004.

existe una cantidad apreciable de estudios sobre los diferentes aspectos de los partidos y el sistema de partidos, tanto financiados por el programa cómo por los proyectos derivados del programa o de otras fuentes. En el anexo E de este informe se presenta un resumen de estas diferentes fuentes de datos.

Las *conclusiones* que salen de este análisis son las siguientes:

- Con respecto a *los partidos políticos y el sistema de partidos*: Ha habido un avance limitado con respecto a la representatividad y la institucionalización pero probablemente menor con respecto a la legitimidad. Desde un punto de vista más optimista es posible que se producirá un cambio crucial en la estabilidad de la competencia inter-partidaria dado que algunos partidos grandes (UNE, FRG, PP) y algunos partidos pequeños se encuentran en un proceso de estabilización, pero sería demasiado prematuro emitir una opinión clara a estas alturas.
- El cambio más significativo de relevancia directa para alcanzar los objetivos del PVDGP son los cambios en el *marco legal* con respecto a las elecciones y los partidos políticos contenidos en las reformas de la Ley LEPP en 2004. De importancia particular es la descentralización de las Juntas Receptoras de Votos, con un aumento del número de mesas de votación que llevó a un menor abstencionismo en las áreas rurales. De importancia son también la introducción de reglas para el financiamiento de los partidos y de un sistema de financiamiento público de los partidos.
- Con respecto al *apoyo al Congreso* (un proyecto derivado del programa), los resultados son mixtos: (i) por un lado existe un nivel extremadamente elevado de "transfugismo"[43], pero (ii) por otro lado algunas leyes importantes que antes estaban trabadas en el Congreso, de hecho han sido aprobadas actualmente (entre ellas la LEPP).

0.4 Eficiencia

Esta parte de la revisión ha consistido principalmente en la comparación entre los insumos y los resultados esperados e incluye una valoración de la relación costo-beneficio.

Una comparación entre las actividades planificadas y realizadas y los resultados esperados nos da un panorama mixto. Algunos resultados esperados solamente han sido alcanzados parcialmente, debido a la suspensión de algunas actividades. Los hallazgos principales son los siguientes:

- El apoyo sostenido a la reforma de la LEPP ha tenido un efecto directo sobre la campaña electoral del 2007 y así ha contribuido a mejorar un tanto la participación de mujeres e indígenas. Un efecto de la reforma a la LEPP es una disminución de la fragmentación del sistema de partidos.
- El FPPP se estableció y se mantuvo asegurando un foro saludable para un diálogo político que ha sobrevivido los conflictos normales de dos campañas electorales.

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[43] Se debe tomar en cuenta, sin embargo, que el objetivo de este apoyo era de mejorar el funcionamiento del congreso, no fortalecer los partidos políticos.

- Los PP han aumentado sus capacidades para competir en la campaña electoral del 2007, con la presentación de un mayor número de programas de gobierno, mejores estrategias de campaña y organización territorial.
- Las actividades para promover relaciones más estrechas entre los partidos políticos y actores de la sociedad civil han sido realizadas aproximadamente como planificado. La percepción general de los entrevistados que la relación entre los partidos políticos y algunos sectores de la sociedad civil han mejorado.
- Las actividades encaminadas a promover la participación de mujeres, indígenas y jóvenes a participar en instancias de liderazgo han sido realizadas solo parcialmente. Muchos partidos políticos tienen actualmente secretarías para mujeres, indígenas y jóvenes. Con respecto a la inclusión de mujeres, indígenas y jóvenes en posiciones ganadoras en las listas partidarias no se han alcanzado los resultados.
- Se hizo un esfuerzo especial para establecer un sistema de actividades de investigación socio-política para generar información útil para la institucionalización y democratización de los partidos políticos y el sistema de partidos. Una serie de volúmenes de textos para la gerencia de los PP ha sido producido, una serie de estudios han sido ejecutados y se ha establecido una página web. Un problema para el sistema de formación política es que no ha sido anclado en ninguna institución nacional permanente. La OEA informa sin embargo que se piensa mantener la página web en el futuro.
- Durante los últimos 5 años del PVDGP los esfuerzos de formación y capacitación dirigidos hacia los partidos políticos (líderes y miembros) han beneficiado directamente a unas 800 personas y el triple indirectamente. Este número de beneficiarios tiene que ser evaluado en relación a la obtención de los resultados esperados y al mismo tiempo en relación a los costos de llevar a cabo los cursos de capacitación y de producir los propios materiales; 10 volúmenes de una serie de "Sistema de Gerencia Política", impresos en 1000 y 500 copias cada volumen. La mayor parte de la serie fue publicada en diciembre del 2007, basado en versiones borradores comprobados durante los cursos de capacitación.

En relación al proyecto derivado; *apoyo al Congreso*, los partidos políticos y los ex-presidentes de las comisiones del Congreso expresaron una satisfacción general con el apoyo recibido y la calidad de los servicios del PVDGP y su capacidad de proveerles de asistencia técnica. Sin embargo, parece que todavía se puede mejorar la coordinación entre las comisiones del FPPP y las comisiones del Congreso.

Todos los partidos entrevistados refutaron la hipótesis de que el apoyo al FPPP creó alguna competencia con el Congreso o sus comisiones y consideraron el apoyo como algo complementario. Aparentemente se necesita asegurar una mayor coordinación y trabajo en agendas comunes debido a que los roles del FPPP y del Congreso de hecho son complementarios.

El ER tiene los siguientes comentarios sobre la relación *costo-eficiencia*:

- La decisión de producir y publicar materiales de capacitación propios en vez de adaptar y utilizar materiales existentes implica costos elevados. Como de hecho se dispone de mucho material sobre partidos políticos y sistemas de partidos no se tiene claridad sobre las consideraciones que llevaron a esta decisión. La decisión es

particularmente discutible ya que los materiales de capacitación se terminaron durante el 2007 cuando se habían llevado a cabo la mayor parte de las capacitaciones.

- Como los gastos fijos constituyeron una parte considerable del presupuesto una reducción en el nivel de actividades (como ocurrió en 2006 debido a los problemas entre la sede de la OEA y el personal del PVDGP) implica que la relación entre los costos y los resultados esperados se vuelve particularmente desfavorable, llevando a una disminución relativa en la relación costo-beneficio.
- Aparentemente el programa tenia la intención al inicio de utilizar una metodología de formación de formadores, pero los partidos políticos no parecen haber hecho mucho uso de los formadores formados, si los usaron del todo (no ha habido un monitoreo de su uso). Un uso más sistemático de este enfoque había podido incrementar el alcance del programa con costos adicionales limitados.
- La concentración de las actividades de capacitación en la capital es una manera relativamente costosa de operar. La intención era también transferir las actividades de capacitación a los departamentos, pero este intento fue abandonado después de actividades iniciales en cuatro departamentos.

0.5 Relevancia

Para que una democracia electoral funcione satisfactoriamente es una condición que exista PPs con un cierto nivel de representatividad, estabilidad y capacidad de diálogo. Por eso la deficiencia de los PPs y del sistema de partidos en Guatemala ha sido la justificación principal para el programa desde su inicio a finales de los años noventa y el programa ha sido diseñado para apoyar la superación de estas debilidades. En general esta justificación es apropiada tanto desde el punto de vista guatemalteca como el de los donantes.

0.6 Sostenibilidad

El programa ha funcionado durante casi 10 años, pero a pesar de algunos avances en particular con respecto al marco legal y la disposición positiva hacia el diálogo, los partidos políticos y el sistema de partidos todavía padece de una serie de debilidades obvias. Esto refleja de alguna manera el punto de partida muy bajo y en parte que cambios en la cultura política y en valores democráticos son procesos de largo plazo.

En general el ER considera que los avances (limitados) notados son probablemente sostenibles después de la terminación del PVDGP. Esto es el caso en particular para las mejoras del marco legal y la voluntad para el diálogo, mientras que existan más dudas de si se pueda esperar avances en el tema de la inclusión.

El cese del PVDGP dejará sin lugar a dudas un vacío como existen varios temas importantes pendientes (entre ellos una profundización de las reformas a la LEPP, la aplicación de la ley (en particular las reglas para el financiamiento partidario), la implementación del recién aprobado nuevo registro de las personas y la promoción de la inclusión de grupos sub-representados en los partidos). Afortunadamente parece que otros programas y donantes están dispuestos y tienen capacidad para llenar este vacío.

La organización y gerencia del programa

La OEA en Washington ha sido el único responsable por la implementación del programa, con el documento del programa y un convenio bilateral con cada agencia financiadora como el marco legal de la cooperación. Se celebraron reuniones anuales para aprobar los informes anuales y los planes operativos anuales y sus presupuestos para el año siguiente. Todas las principales decisiones entre las reuniones anuales eran la responsabilidad de la oficina de Washington.

La comunicación y la relación en general entre la oficina de Washington, la oficina local del PVDGP y los donantes funcionaba bastante bien al inicio y había un alto grado de apropiación inicial del programa de parte de la OEA. Sin embargo, la reorganización de la OEA en Washington durante el 2006 y los cambios de personal relacionados con ella, implicaron una reexaminación del programa a lo interno de la OEA. Las nuevas autoridades de la OEA consideraron que el programa tenía costos altos y resultados pobres y al mismo tiempo se consideraba el compromiso con el FPPP como un problema político para la OEA. El resultado fue una relación tensa entre la sede y el coordinador del programa que culminaba con su renuncia a finales del 2006. Al mismo tiempo se deterioraba el nivel de comunicación entre la OEA y los donantes, llegando a una mutua falta de confianza.

El ER tiene las siguientes conclusiones acerca de la organización:

- Tomando en consideración que los donantes tienen presencia en Guatemala y dieron seguimiento continuo al programa, algunos de los problemas posiblemente pudiesen haber sido evitados si se hubiera establecido un comité de coordinación con reuniones trimestrales para tratar y aprobar cambios necesarios en el programa. La OEA pudiese haber sido representada por personal de la sede o se pudiera haber delegado en el representante en el país. Estas reuniones trimestrales probablemente hubieran podido resolver también la falta de comunicación entre la OEA y los donantes entre fines del 2006 e inicios del 2007.
- El programa ha trabajado de manera bastante orientado por la oferta. El programa hubiese podido beneficiarse de un proceso de consulta periódica y formalizada con los beneficiarios y los socios estratégicos.
- El nombramiento de un nuevo coordinador de programa sin consulta con los donantes no estaba de acuerdo con los convenios firmados y por eso pensionó innecesariamente la relación entre las partes.
- La gestión financiera del programa implicaba una centralización a nivel de la sede con también implicaba una triplicación del trabajo en la contabilidad, algo raramente visto en la gerencia moderna de programas (o empresas).
- A pesar de haber sido el único responsable del programa, el sentido de apropiación de parte de la OEA ha sido muy bajo a partir del 2006. Esto implica un riesgo considerable de que las lecciones aprendidas por el programa no serán apropiadas por la OEA. Esto sería lamentable, una organización profesional siempre debería intentar de aprender de las experiencias pasadas, de las buenas así como de las malas.

0.8 Las principales lecciones aprendidas

Se han aprendido muchas lecciones durante la implementación del PVDGP y muchas de ellas han sido mencionadas en el documento de programa (lecciones de la primera fase), en los informes de avance anuales y en otros materiales producidos por el programa. Para el ER las más importantes parecen ser las siguientes:

1. Es importante trabajar con los PPs a todos los niveles: afiliados, dirigentes intermedios y la dirigencia nacional (o sea, tanto desde abajo hacia arriba, cómo directamente con la cúspide). Si se deja afuera algún nivel la eficacia decrece. Esto no significa que un programa determinado necesariamente tiene que trabajar con todos los niveles ya que puedan existir otros programas que lo complemente. Este hallazgo esta de acuerdo con lecciones similares aprendidas en programas que trabajan con fortalecimiento institucional de organizaciones populares en general.
2. Como los PP son un reflejo de la idiosincrasia de la sociedad en general los programas que trabajan con los PP no pueden trabajar de manera independiente sino necesitan complementar programas más amplios dirigidos a promover valores democráticos en la sociedad.
3. El trabajo con la modalidad multipartidaria es productivo (y de manera algo sorpresiva valorada como muy positivo por los propios partidos políticos). No obstante se debe reconocer los limites y el enfoque multipartidario debe complementarse con una asistencia técnica más directa a los PP. Esto se hace muchas veces mejor desde internacionales de partidos con valores y metas similares.
4. Es importante no solamente trabajar con los PP sino también con el marco legal para las elecciones y los partidos ("las reglas del juego"). Esto posibilita asegurar requisitos legales para la transparencia y el financiamiento de los partidos y también pueda mejorar las condiciones para la participación.
5. La creación de un Foro para los PP resultó ser una innovación interesante. Se parecen haber aprendido dos lecciones del PVDGP; (i) el apoyo debe ser reducido paulatinamente para evitar la creación de dependencia y asegurar la apropiación nacional y (ii) existe una linea divisoria muy fina entre facilitar y ser proactivo que se debe manejar con mucho cuidado ya que de lo contrario puede conducir a un fracaso.
6. Los donantes y los PP no tienen exactamente los mismos objetivos para la cooperación. Los donantes muchas veces dan alta prioridad a temas que no necesariamente tienen alta prioridad en los PP: democracia interna, participación de grupos poco representados, transparencia etcétera. Esto tiene que ser reconocido abiertamente y se debe llegar a un entendimiento mutuo. La experiencia indica que esto es posible.
7. Dentro de los límites marcados por la diferencia entre los objetivos de los donantes y los PP se debe perseguir un enfoque participativo de planificación del proyecto. Como en otros tipos de asistencia al desarrollo un enfoque orientado por la demanda es sencillamente más eficiente.
8. En un nivel más práctico: los programas necesitan respetar los ciclos electorales y ajustar su planificación de acorde con estos (por ejemplo, no se deben ejecutar programas de capacitación en años electorales y el alcance de diálogos multipartidarios en años electorales es limitado).

APPENDIX G

REFERENCES

APPENDIX G. REFERENCES

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