



Review of Norwegian support to Palestine through Norwegian NGOs

Final Report

March 2009

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

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ISBN 978-82-7548-385-8
ISSN 1502-2528

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**REVIEW OF NORWEGIAN SUPPORT TO
PALESTINE THROUGH NORWEGIAN NGOS**

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ABBREVIATIONS

AHLC	Ad Hoc Liaison Committee
AUF	The Norwegian Labour Party - Youth League
CBO	Community Based Organisation
DSPR	Department of Services for Palestinian Refugees (MECC)
EAPPI	Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel
EI	Education International
ELCJHL	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Jordan and the Holy Land
Fatah	Palestinian National Liberation Movement
FYO	Fatah Youth Organisation
GUPT	General Union of Palestinian Teachers
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
LDF	Local Development Forum
LIP	Labour Intensive Project
LWF	The Lutheran World Federation
MECC	Middle East Council of Churches
MFA	The (Norwegian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoH	(Palestinian) Ministry of Health
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NNGO	Norwegian Non Governmental Organisation
Norad	The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
Norcross	Norwegian Red Cross
NORWAC	Norwegian Aid Committee
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid

NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NRD	Norwegian Royal Society for Development
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OD	Organisational Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
oPt	occupied Palestinian territory
PA	Palestinian Authority
PARC	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PEA	Palestinian Energy Authority
PHC	Primary Health Care
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PRCS	Palestinian Red Crescent Society
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority
ROPA	The Representative Office of Norway to the Palestinian Authority
TIM	Temporary International Mechanism
TIPH	The Temporary International Presence in Hebron
ToR	Terms of Reference
UAWC	Union of Agricultural Working Committees
UEN	Union of Education Norway
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WCC	World Council of Churches
WCDI	Women Can Do It
WHO	World Health Organisation

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Introduction

This report presents the outcome of review of the Norwegian support to Palestine through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations. The review was commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for development Cooperation (Norad).

The purpose of the review was *learning*, with a view to improve future strategies and programs. The review was to assess the *relevance*, *value added* and *adaptability* of the Norwegian NGO support to the occupied Palestinian territory” (oPt)¹ in light of a volatile country environment.

A team of six international and Palestinian consultants linked to Nordic Consulting Group undertook the review which included two field visits, one to Jerusalem and the West Bank in May/June 2008 and to Gaza in October 2008. The team conducted individual and group interviews in the Palestinian areas and in Oslo and a comprehensive desk study of available reports, proposals and statistics was undertaken.

1.2 Main findings

1.2.1 Relevance

A main conclusion by the review is that the interventions by the Norwegian NGOs (NNGOs) have been relevant in the Palestinian context, as their programs have largely responded to the needs of Palestinian people, communities, partners and authorities. More specifically the programs have been relevant as they have promoted democratic practices in the Palestinian Civil Society, by strengthening plurality, transparency and participation.

They have contributed to the provision of crucial primary, secondary and tertiary health services to Palestinians. The support to health services in Jerusalem and Gaza, and mental health programs has been found to be of particular relevance, as the Norwegian programs and funding cover areas that are not – or inadequately – covered by public health system and/or NGOs.

NNGOs have in different ways contributed to uphold respect for international humanitarian and human rights law and countered illegal practices of land grabbing, house demolitions and closure practices by the Israeli interventions. This has been done through advocacy, legal assistance, accompaniment and institutional support. International and other observers consulted for the review, concur in defining advocacy and protection as areas that should be strengthened, but call for better coordinated advocacy, firmly based on international legal standards. The Norwegian NGOs could benefit from taking a more strategic approach to advocacy, which would include better defined target audiences and expected results. The

¹ The team has chosen to use the term occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt), as this term is used by the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

NNGOs should also seek to coordinate their advocacy efforts, both at Norwegian level, in the region and internationally.

The team found several examples where the NNGOs have had a clear added value for the partners and communities. They have among others provided specific expertise and working methods that have contributed to development of partner's capacity and ability to perform. There are strong indications that several key institutions, organisations and communities would not have developed to their current level of capacity without the support of their Norwegian counterparts. Without the Norwegian support, the capacity to deliver health services would have been at risk for two of the largest hospitals in Jerusalem.

The organisations with representatives in oPt, or with very frequent visits, demonstrate clearer outputs and results, at the same time the partnership they build are to a larger degree based on transparency and mutual trust than those without presence. Moreover, the organisations with presence in the oPt have also showed a larger degree of adaptability of their programs and approach.

The above suggests that sustained country presence through resident offices and support staff is an important element in ensuring effective and sustained support for partner organisations, institutions and their projects.

On the other hand and in some of the cases subject for this review the role of the NNGOs has been rather limited. Some NGOs have mostly channelled funds with minor follow up of specific projects. Others have only arranged casual exchange visits. For these organisations,² the particular added value of the Norwegian partner has been more difficult to establish. A project by the Norwegian Refugee Council is a particular case, as it only had one year of operation. The team finds that although the project was highly relevant – and appreciated - in the Gaza context, the particular added value of NRC is hard to establish, as this type of project is outside of the core competencies of the organisation, and similar projects are undertaken by a large number of NGOs and partners. However, the protection and advocacy work undertaken in the West Bank and Jerusalem were considered to fill an important gap.

The review suggests that there are areas that could be explored to further enhance relevance and added value of Norwegian organisations. There are still gaps in the international support to oPt. Zone C areas, the areas south of Hebron and in the North are still to a large extent left uncovered by both international and Palestinian organisations and with limited outreach and capacity of public service delivery. This is also where the poverty rates are highest.

Islamic charities and grass root organisations are believed to be one of the most important service providers and upholders of the social fabric at the grass root. This is a very important segment of the Palestinian society, but there has been very little interaction with both the international community as well as with the Palestinian Governmental and non-governmental institutions. Most Norwegian and international stakeholders recognise this as a problem, but very few initiatives have been taken to overcome the division. Accordingly, the Norwegian organisations and their partners should play a role in coming up with strategies to increase dialogue and cooperation in these areas.

² The Norwegian Royal Society for Development and AUF.

The NNGOs like the Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), the Norwegian Red Cross (Norcross), Norwegian Aid Committee (NORWAC), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and to a certain extent the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)) that have service provision element within their mandate, all proved to have flexibility when providing humanitarian relief and emergency support when the needs have been present. However, in oPt the need to combine humanitarian aid with more sustainable and long term approaches is more pronounced than in other crises. In this respect, the NNGOs have a more mixed track record. The most successful have not only focussed on providing humanitarian assistance (Norcross, NCA and NPA), but also systematically built capacity for partners to deal with future crises.

In the majority of cases, the humanitarian aid provided by the Norwegian NGOs have targeted the groups and areas most affected by the crisis. They have provided necessary assistance that has reduced the effects on individuals and families of intensified armed conflict, closure practices and sudden political and governance crises. Most of the assistance provided under the humanitarian budget line lies between what is usually regarded as humanitarian assistance and recovery and development assistance. This is also in line with the practices of the UN and other NGOs.³

There is however a need for a discussion between Norwegian Authorities and the NNGOs on the definition of “humanitarian” or “emergency” aid in the Palestinian context, and to develop criteria for the use of these funds. There are several reasons for this:

- There is a risk that humanitarian and emergency aid can be subject to political preferences and priorities.
- Programs supported under the humanitarian budget vote tend to overlook sustainability issues. Several projects included in the review would benefit from a longer-term institutional support. This is particularly relevant for support to capital and recurrent costs for the hospitals.
- Lack of clear criteria makes the project approval process too dependent upon individuals, and thus unpredictable.

This has mostly to do with Norwegian funding structure, as the global humanitarian and emergency funds are more flexible, and can more easily be moved according to new situations and priorities. The team recommends reintroduction of the “transition funds” (GAP-funds) or a similar funding mechanism, to allow more flexibility in the application of funding for programs that are not strictly emergency or long term developmental in nature. A three to five year perspective would be useful for such programs.

1.2.2 Partnership models

A range of partnership models have been implemented. In this review, three partnership models have been analysed: the *natural* partnerships, the *strategic* partnerships and *instrumental* partnerships. The team found that the different *types* of partnerships have had different advantages and challenges. There is however differences in how the NNGOs have managed to optimise the advantages and meet the challenges. Whether the partnerships have

³ See for example the United Nations Consolidated Appeal for oPT 2009.

been between “natural partners”, of strategic long term or instrumental, the key to improved organisational capacity and performance has been the close follow up and the systematic result-oriented engagement. This review found that internal conditions, as capacity, change orientation and conflict level in the partner organisation also are important factors for the potential for positive change.

A general finding is that the Norwegian organisations have established sound partnerships, based on respect and understanding. The partners consistently report that the Norwegian counterparts are particularly flexible, and have been able to adapt to new needs and situations rapidly. Several of the partners highlighted the advantage of having the Norwegian MFA as a back donor, as most other donors have stricter and more time consuming procedures for changes of projects, and are also less prone to finance projects that can be politically sensitive.

The Norwegian organisations have in different ways (and in varying degree) focussed on the issue of transparency and accountability with their counterparts. This has, almost without exception, been met with some sort of institutional resistance. The review shows that such resistance in most of the cases has been overcome with engaged dialogue, persistence and close follow up.

Although several of the NNGOs conduct participatory planning with their local partners, more systemisation of the approach and the timing is needed.

1.2.3 Sustainability

Despite the situation of “recession” in oPt, several of the NNGOS have worked together with their counterparts to overcome the enormous challenge of sustainability. NGOs have built capacity and improved planning, management and transparency and thus had a sustainable impact on a range of Palestinian organisations and institutions.⁴. Among others, this review has shown that the long-term and systematic approach by Norcross to enhance Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) and Stiftelsen Oljeberget with Augusta Victoria as particularly interesting cases, as they have built in improvement in governance structures and financial diversity, as well as improved management routines. Norcross has had a clear added value in systematically working to improve governance, management, planning which has made visible contributions to project effectiveness. The Augusta Victoria Hospital is today a modern, well-run specialised hospital serving Palestinians in Jerusalem and Gaza. A major part of this outcome can be attributed to Stiftelsen Oljeberget.

The NPA practice of gradually building organisational capacity in small Community Based Organisations (CBOs) is also a model to look into.

Other NNGOs could enhance sustainability by engaging more with their partners in defining longer term plans for organisational development and financial diversity. NCA has started this process with its main Church partners, and should further consolidate and systematise this. The Makassed hospital is in dire need for improved planning capacity and organisational reform. This is a task that goes beyond the mandate and capacity of NORWAC alone, and should be a joint task that includes the Norwegian MFA and other donors.

⁴ Impact here does not imply impact at societal level, but at organisational level

The main bulk of Norwegian NNGO financial support to oPt is provided by the MFA's humanitarian budget. The current short term funding is not conducive to sustainability and long term planning.

1.2.4 Conflict sensitivity

By and large, all the NNGOs made comprehensive analysis and share a common understanding of the Palestinian situation and context. However, with regard to conflict sensitivity the degree to which the organisations have systematically assessed conflict dimensions and conducted risk analysis has varied greatly. This has affected the ability of some NNGOs to modify or adapt programs accordingly.

The approach by NPA may serve as an illustration of integrating conflict sensitivity in programme planning, management and implementation. The conflict and context analysis have not only been systematically undertaken, but they have been comprehensive and well documented. There is a clear link between the analysis and the choice of partners and projects. This makes the NPA program consistent and with a high degree of adaptability.

1.2.5 Gender

Norwegian NGOs have to a varying degree included the promotion of gender issues in their programs. When it comes to specific analysis of gender, weaknesses are found that corresponds to the lack of explicit conflict and situation analysis in general. Most of the NGOs have an awareness of e.g. the situation for women, but gender analysis and assessment is mostly patchy and not very well documented. Participation of women is generally promoted with partners, and some Norwegian NGOs have designed particular programs to increase the participation of women in the public and political domain, as well as strengthen their situation in the labour market.

A few NNGOs have included gender data in their project reporting. NPA, which also has included the use of gender tools in project planning and monitoring with partners, is doing so most consistently. A more systematic gender approach as part of the capacity building of partners will most probably be the best measure in order to increase gender awareness in general.

1.2.6 Coherence and coordination

The programs and partnerships of the Norwegian NGOs are all consistent with the overall Norwegian policy for oPt. They are also mostly complementary to the Norwegian bilateral and multi-lateral aid.

The Norwegian authorities and the NGOs share the main analysis of the conflict (causes, actors, trends). However, while the authorities' analysis and plans are mostly framed within the politically negotiated two-state solution, an important reference for the NGOs' is international humanitarian law and human rights law.

The dialogue between Norwegian Authorities and the NNGOs is frequent, and characterised by openness and mutual trust. Differences are accepted and discussed in a relationship based on mutual trust and dialogue. The dialogue should be more systematised, especially in the oPt, as most meetings are informal and ad hoc.

As there is no single overall Norwegian framework or country strategy for oPt, policy guidance for priority setting and allocations are to be found in a range of governing documents, allocation notes and work plans. An overall strategic framework would be useful to guide the Norwegian aid effort including the NNGOs to improve coherence, transparency and predictability, and would be beneficial for the dialogue with the Norwegian NGOs. Such a policy and strategy for oPt could elaborate more on the Palestinian civil society, as there is not a fully shared understanding among Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials on the role of the civil society, and to what degree it should be prioritised. It is important that a strategic framework focuses on maintaining the flexibility that characterises the Norwegian support. Such a strategy should be publicly available, and prepared in consultations with the NGOs.

All the Norwegian NGOs programs can be regarded to be coherent with the PA's overall visions, policies and plans for oPt. Most of the Palestinian partners are engaged in dialogue with the authorities related to their interventions. This is most systematically undertaken by those organisations working in the health sector, where the Norwegian supported partners very often have a supported the role of the Ministry of Health.

Coordination between NGOs and the Authorities are severely hampered by the Palestinian Authority's (PA) lack of capacity to provide frameworks and policies to guide planning of interventions. Service provisions are locally almost non-existent, and the co-ordinating role is weak. Most PA Ministries do not have the capacity, interest or tradition to convene and consult with the civil society organisations. Overall plans are more characterised as "shopping lists", than real plans. The capacity for priority setting is particularly weak and is to a large extent subject to individual donor's influence.

Although coherence and coordination between state and civil society should be promoted, tension, different opinions, interests and priorities have to be accepted, in particular where the authorities are deviating from international (and its own) standards of democracy, participation and inclusion. There are authoritarian trends and human rights violations within the Palestinian state apparatus. The civil society has a watch dog role in that respect, which needs to be recognised and supported, also when unpopular with the PA. Some of the Norwegian NGOs have also sought to empower and support partners to influence state policies and law making.

For Gaza, it is difficult to speak about meaningful coordination and coherence, as the de facto authorities are not fully recognised by many and the Ramallah based PA has very limited influence. However, the Norwegian NGOs operating in Gaza have managed to keep a pragmatic balance, through dialogue with both authorities.

International strategic and operational coordination mechanisms have traditionally been weak in oPt. This is somewhat improving with an increased focus on the development of Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) within the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), under the auspices of UNOCHA. Norwegian NGOs should, together with their partners, increase their engagement in this process, particularly in the development of the CHAP, as it is a means to improve joint analysis of needs and gaps within the humanitarian and early recovery area.

1.3 Conclusions and recommendations

1.3.1 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad

The MFA and Norad should continue the support through NNGOs to oPt. However, some changes could be implemented to increase coherence, relevance and sustainability of the programs.

A comprehensive strategic framework for Norwegian support for oPt would enhance coherence, predictability and transparency, and could be used for dialogue with the NNGOs.

Recommendation 1: MFA should provide a strategic framework for the support to oPt that is widely disseminated. The NNGOs should be engaged and consulted in the development of the framework, particularly on the role of the civil society and protection issues.

Although the dialogue with the NNGOs is frequent and based on mutual trust, there is little systematic dialogue, and no formalised and regular venues for dialogue.

Recommendation 2: The MFA/Norwegian Representation Office should establish regular meetings with the NNGOs both in Norway and oPt. The meetings should have clear agendas, and minutes from the meetings should be distributed.

There is a large number of international and national actors undertaking programs in a range of sectors and areas in oPt. More systematic knowledge is needed when it comes to what works and what does not.

Recommendation 3: The MFA/Norwegian Representation Office should engage other donors in multi-donor studies and evaluations of specific program areas.

The short term financing of all MFA funded NGO activity is an obstacle for sustainability and makes the Norwegian support unpredictable.

Recommendation 4: The MFA should re-introduce the transitional funds (GAP-allocation) or similar funding mechanisms to ensure longer term perspectives or allow more flexible, wider scope and long term support for interventions that are not strictly of an emergency character. MFA should consider giving three year (or more) funding commitment to selected programs and partners, eg. Makassed, Augusta Victoria and PRCS.

The Norwegian support to health institutions through NNGOs and the UN makes Norway one of the main donors to the health sector for oPt. This is not reflected in work plans or priority areas for oPt.

Recommendation 5: The MFA should develop a strategy and action plan for its support to the health sector in oPt, in coordination with the NNGOs working in the health sector. It should also engage itself more directly with the MoH and other key health actors. MFA/The Norwegian Representation Office should, in cooperation with Norwac, also engage with other key international partners in a longer term plan for Makassed to include predictable funding, professionalised management and sound governance structure.

1.3.2 Norwegian NGOs – General Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The Norwegian NGOs with operational or service provision elements should maintain or establish representation in oPt. In cases where this would not be financially viable, the NNGOs should look at possibilities of establishing consortia with like-minded international NGOs or delegate their support to these NGOs.

Recommendation 2: All NNGOs should develop country strategies that should be shared with the MFA, Norad, the Representation Office, the other NNGOs and partners. Given the volatile context, the country strategies should be updated or reviewed on an annual basis.

Recommendation 3: The NNGOs should elaborate explicit context analysis in coordination with partners. The analyses should include gender assessment. Scenarios should be developed which eventually should be incorporated as contingency elements in their annual plans and programs to safe guard against the high risks of supporting interventions in a volatile political environment.

Recommendation 4: NNGOs should invest more in assessment of needs and analysis of coverage in the areas they are operating. They should make more systematic use of existing studies and material, and increase involvement in national and international coordination mechanisms, such as the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP)

Recommendation 5: The NNGOs should ensure that their advocacy is coordinated with other Norwegian and international actors. The advocacy should also be more explicitly based on legal assessments.

Recommendation 6: Further expansion of NNGO programs should respond to defined gaps in coverage, both in terms of geography and thematic areas. Examples are zone C (particularly South of Hebron), Gaza and Jerusalem

1.3.3 Norwegian NGOs – Specific Recommendations

To NORWAC

The Makassed hospital suffers from an unclear division between governance, management and operational activity, and needs to develop improved financial stability.

Recommendation: NORWAC should, in cooperation with the MFA/ROPA engage with the Makassed hospital to improve management and planning capacity, and support the hospital in ensuring financial stability.

To AUF

Fatah Youth Organisation has not been able to develop into a democratic member organisation, largely because of lack of democratic practices and procedures within the mother party. There is currently a potential for change as Fatah plans its party convention.

Recommendation: The continued support for FYO should focus on capacity building with priority on democratisation, participation, inclusion and gender. AUF should also support the preparation for the planned convention. If this does not materialise within reasonable time (e.g. a year) AUF should reconsider its support to FYO.

To NPA

Recommendation:

While maintaining the head office and the bulk of the program in Gaza, NPA should consider further expanding in zone C, in particular South of Hebron. With the volatile access situation between Gaza and the West Bank, NPA should elaborate a plan to ensure increased capacity in the West Bank. This could include a satellite office in the West Bank.

To NRC

Recommendation: The planned re-start of NRC programs in oPt should be preceded by a lesson learned exercise from the previous experience. NRC should focus on organisational added value to fill identified gaps, e.g. on legal support. The programs should be based on sound and explicit assessment and analysis, and should be part of a strategic plan.

Union of Education Norway

Recommendation: UEN should make a strategic plan for a continued support of GUPT. This should include a gradual phase-out of the support to the Qalqilya branch, and a gradual increase for the national organisation. Continued support should be on the condition of the organising of a convention, improved management and governance structure, and democratic decision making procedures. UEN should also improve its capacity for monitoring and reporting.

To NCA

Recommendation: NCA should formalise its presence in oPt through registering as an international NGO. NCA also needs to revisit its country strategy. A priority should be to initiate organisational assessment of core partners, which should include issues like governance and division of responsibilities and roles.

To Norcross

Recommendation: Norcross should seek to institutionalise within PRCS the recently initiated evaluation and learning process. A continued focus on supporting PRCS organisational development and capacity for strategic planning should include a revision of scope of activities, taking into account the capacity of the PA and private actors. This could include revisiting the youth program. Norcross should also work with PRCS on separating governance and management structures.

2 EVALUATION APPROACH

2.1 The evaluation

The evaluation was conducted in three phases; an inception phase, a field work and analysis phase and a reporting phase. The main sources of information are qualitative, with some analysis based on Norad statistics.

In the inception phase the outstanding aspects of the Terms of Reference (ToR) were clarified, and the team made a selection of the NNGOs to be studied more in depth (in addition to the five already defined by Norad).

An initial document review and desk study was initiated, with the provision of relevant documentation by Norad, MFA and the nine NNGOs. Policy documents, strategic frameworks, project documents and advocacy publications formed the main base for the analysis. The team also reviewed base line studies, UN publications and PA planning documents.

As some of the documentation was not ready for the team before the field visit, the document analysis continued into the following phase. A first round of interviews was undertaken in Norway with key respondents in the NNGOs, Norad and the MFA, and a stakeholder meeting was organised with representatives from these organisations.

The team spent two weeks in the West Bank and Jerusalem in May/June. Because of the prevailing security situation then, the Norwegian Representative Office to the Palestinian Authorities (ROPA) advised against visiting Gaza. As the tension eased somewhat over the next months, the ROPA facilitated a two-day visit of one international team member in October.

The team held interviews (both individually and in focus groups) with key Palestinian partners, the Palestinian Authorities, NNGO representatives and the ROPA. The team spoke with some direct beneficiaries when visiting projects. The team also interviewed United Nations (UN) officials in the West Bank and Gaza.

The team visited more than 25 projects in Jerusalem, Gaza (Gaza town and surroundings), Tulkarem, Hebron, Qalquilya, Betlehem, and Jenin. The Gaza based team member visited also Rafa (Gaza).

The findings were systematised and analysed in the periods following the two field visits. The team also undertook a few follow up interviews in Oslo in this period.

In the inception phase, the team agreed with Norad and the stakeholders that the review would focus on the following elements:

- 1) The priority of all stakeholders is *learning*, with a view to improve future strategies and programs.
- 2) The primary dimensions of interest to all parties are to know the *relevance*, *value added* and *adaptability* of the Norwegian NGO support to the oPt in light of a volatile country environment.

- 3) The team will limit the assessment of output and results to a few selected projects. The team will have limited opportunity of assessing *impact* at society level, but will look at results and impact of support on individual institutions.
- 4) A full assessment of outputs and results for all assistance, as it extends over 10 years and include 37 Norwegian organisations (and an unknown number of local partners) would go far beyond the scope of this review (about 24 person weeks in three months).
- 5) The review would only assess projects and partnerships where the Norwegian organisation has (or is supposed to have) an influence on strategies and design of the project.⁵ It is meant to cover all of the oPt, which includes the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza.

2.2 Main evaluation questions

The team and Norad agreed that the following questions were the most central to the review:

Have the NNGOs programs been relevant and had an added value to the Palestinian situation?

The team assessed whether the programs have been designed to respond to local needs and priorities. The indicators applied were whether assessments of needs have been conducted, whether the NNGOs have sought to include the priorities of communities, partners and authorities and whether existing statistical material, baseline studies and development plans have been referred to. To assess the added value, the team took into account the programs and assistance of other international NGOs and aid actors.

To what degree, and how, have NNGO programs been able to adapt their programs (objectives, strategies, activities, choice of partners) to a changing context?

The review looked at the degree to which the organisations have undertaken systematic context analyses, and applied conflict sensitivity tools. The team assessed whether the NNGOs have analysis of the main dimensions of the conflict and the socio-economic consequences on the communities and the institutions. The review also looked at the extent to which this has been reflected in the design and approach to interventions.

What have been the advantages and disadvantages of the different types of partners and partnership models?

For this dimension, the team reviewed the partnerships according to different categories. It assessed how the NNGOs have selected their partners, and how the relationships have developed. It also assessed to what degree the NNGOs have “stayed the course” and how have they dealt with internal conflicts and challenges in partner organisations.

⁵ That would exclude NRC secondments to UN agencies and TIPH (Temporary International Presence in Hebron) and most of Norwegian Red Cross channelling of funds to ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) projects, but include support to umbrella organisations where the Norwegian organisation is a member (Norcross – International Federation of the Red Cross and Norwegian Church Aid – LWF).

To what degree have the outcomes of the interventions been sustainable?

Taking into consideration the constraints of the situation in the oPt (see below), the team analysed the sustainability of the interventions. Indicators included how the programs have contributed to increased institutional capacity of the Palestinian partners, and how program design aimed to overcome challenges for sustainability.

Have the programs been coherent with Palestinian priorities, Norwegian development and humanitarian policy and (globally accepted) best aid practices and principles?

The review looked into how the NNGOs and their partners related to the responsible Palestinian authorities and national priorities, and whether the Norwegian institutions have sought to strengthen partners' ability to influence PA policies and priorities. It also assessed whether the programs have been in coherence with Norwegian development and humanitarian policy – and with Norwegian overall political objectives for engagement with the oPt. For this, it was necessary to analyse the relationship between the NNGOs and Norwegian authorities, and how policies and strategies have been communicated and discussed, both at Oslo level and in the oPt.

This is an independent review. While the team consulted extensively with different stakeholders, it has weighted their comments in the light of their stake holding. The team has balanced the views of stakeholders in part by interviewing people from outside.

The team has, to the extent possible, triangulated all findings. Data and information from different sources, collected by different methods, and from different viewpoints, have been compared to verify findings. All interviews were conducted on the basis information provided and statements made have not be attributed either directly or indirectly in such a way as would allow the interviewee to be identified.

The Palestinian situation is highly politicised, and there are many versions of the reality. The team has aimed to maintain an objective and impartial analysis. The most important parameters for the analysis have been:

- International standards and guidelines for evaluating development and humanitarian programs (OECD DAC guidelines).
- International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law.
- UN Security Council resolutions.

2.3 Selection of NNGOs, partners and projects

The Terms of Reference specified that of the 37 organisations that had received funds for programs in the oPt, eight to nine would be studied in more detail. Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Norwegian Red Cross (Norcross) and the Royal Norwegian Society for Development (Norges Vel) were to be included, the remaining three to four would be selected by the team, in consultation with NORAD.

The team selected the additional four NGOs with the criteria that the total portfolio of NGOs

studied should 1) represent a substantial portion of the total funds, 2) reflect the variety of types of organisations 3) Reflect different partnership models and 3) represent the major sectors and programmatic lines the NGOs have been involved in.

The team found that the 37 organisations could be classified in five main *types* (not mutually exclusive categories)

- 1) Large professional development/humanitarian NGOs working globally
- 2) Solidarity organisations
- 3) Professional unions
- 4) Political parties
- 5) Faith based organisations

On *partnerships*, we found the following main models:

Instrumental: the partner that can best achieve desired results

“Natural partner” – a Norwegian civil society organization supports the establishment and/or strengthening of the equivalent organization in the oPt

Strategic partners – Partners who share the same vision and objectives

On this basis the following nine NNGOS were chosen for the review:

<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Partnership models</i>	<i>Programmatic and sectors</i>	<i>lines</i>
Norwegian Church Aid	Large professional NGO	Umbrella (WCC, LWF)	Education	
			Advocacy/protection	
	Faith based	Natural partner	Health	
			Capacity building	
Norwegian People's Aid	Large professional	Strategic partner Community based	Participation	
			Advocacy/protection (land rights, HR)	
			Service delivery/humanitarian	
Norwac	Small (health profession) solidarity organisation	Instrumental	Health	
		Direct implementation	Humanitarian	
Norcross	Large professional	Natural partner	Health	
			Humanitarian	
			Capacity building	

<i>Stiftelsen Oljeberget</i>	Single case		Health Advocacy/protection
<i>Norwegian Refugee Council</i>	Large professional	Instrumental	Humanitarian Advocacy/protection
<i>Norwegian Education Union</i>	Professional union	Natural partner Instrumental	Capacity building Education
<i>Labour Youth Party/Fatah Youth</i>	Political party	Natural partner	Capacity building Advocacy
<i>The Royal Norwegian Society for Development⁶</i> <i>(Desk Study)</i>		Instrumental partner	Service delivery

The nine selected NNGOs received approximately 65% of the total MFA/Norad funding to NNGOs during the period under review. When secondments and contributions to ICRC are taken out it represents an even higher portion of total funding.

The nine selected NNGOs are involved with a large number of Palestinian partners. In selecting the projects for the review, the team has been in close contact with the respective NNGOs and listened to their advice and suggestions. However, the team has its own independent decisions. The selection of the projects were undertaken to ensure that the following sectors and cross-cutting issues were covered: Civil society support, health, agricultural production, democracy support, support to minority groups and protection and advocacy.

2.4 Constraints

A major challenge the team has encountered has been the complexity and variety of the programs implemented by Norwegian NGOs in the oPt. The scope of the review spans over

⁶ It must be noted that The Royal Norwegian Society for Development finalized its program activities in the oPt in 2005, and an evaluation was carried out in 2003. Hence, the team will base its assessments on already existing material in this specific case.

nine years, in which 37 Norwegian organisations implemented projects supported by Norad and MFA funds.

Another constraint was the short inception period. Ideally this period should allow for a thorough analysis of documentation before making the main methodological choices and a selection of NGOs, partners and projects, before parting for the first field visit. The short period, and the fact that very little documentation was available until immediately before the field visit, meant that important choices had to be precipitated.

Most of the NNGOs and NORAD/MFA have had inadequate routines for filing and documentation. Although this has improved, it made it difficult to find all relevant documentation for the early years. The high turnover of personnel in Norwegian and Palestinian organisations has also contributed to loss of institutional memory which eventually made the collection of information on organisational and project performance dating back many years a challenge .

3 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT ANALYSIS

3.1 Palestinian context

During the period under review 1999-2007 a number of significant political developments have occurred in the oPt. These developments have had severe influence on the socio-economic development, on the development of civil society and the humanitarian situation.

The period under review has been divided into four phases:

- | | | | |
|----|---|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1) | → | 2000 | Post Oslo agreement |
| 2) | | 2001 - 2006 | The second Intifada |
| 3) | | Jan 2006 – June 2007 | Governance crisis |
| 4) | | June 2007 – Dec 2007 | Current situation |

3.1.1 Up to year 2000: Post Oslo agreement

Up until autumn 2000 the developments in the oPt were characterized by fairly stable political situation with measurable progress in economic and social indicators. The Oslo peace process with preparations for the final status negotiations was still the name of the game and there was some hope that progress could be achieved in the wake of the Israeli labour party victory during the Israeli elections in 1999. At the same time the Palestinians experienced economic progress (during 1995-99). Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement was controlling the Palestinian Authority (PA) with full hegemony, although voices of criticism were raised by some Fatah members. They were basically unsatisfied with their marginalised role in the PA, compared to the approximately 25.000 PLO bureaucrats, fighters and security forces who were allowed entry into oPt as a result of the agreement.

As a result of this, many PLO institutions experienced divisions and power struggles reflecting the divisions between Fatah and opposing parties, as well as the divisions within Fatah, mainly between the "old guard", the former exiled leaders in the circle around Arafat in Tunis, and those who remained in the occupied territories.

Other critical voices were voiced by the secular civil society. Although Hamas seemed to be cornered in the late 1990s, the movement was still a prominent social actor with a large number of active civil society organisations, especially in the Gaza Strip. The movement was, despite the pressure, a staunch opponent to the political discourse of the PLO and Fatah controlled PA. During this period the donor community was committed to support and to sustain the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, as well as to contribute to Palestinian socio-economic development. Furthermore, the donor community supported capacity building of PA institutions, while also supporting the secular civil society.

3.1.2 2001 - 2006: The second Intifada

The failed Camp David talks between Arafat and Barak in the summer 2000 ultimately led to the second Palestinian Intifada in late September 2000. With Sharon in power the bilateral

talks with the Palestinians ended. The Israelis no longer had a partner for peace as Arafat - in the view of Sharon the PLO headed a 'terror regime'. The Israeli Government held this view due to increasingly violent Palestinian resistance against the continued Israeli occupation.

In contrast to the first Intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the second Intifada expeditious turned from a mass uprising, primarily consisting of youth throwing stones at the occupation forces, into a militarised conflict in which Palestinian gunmen equipped with rifles were up against the Israeli army. Also the various Palestinian factions – most notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad – began using suicide bombs against civilian targets more intensely. These circumstances led the Israeli government to retaliate with excessive force. Hence, in 2002 Israel re-invaded the autonomous Palestinian areas, and during the same time the decision by the Sharon government to erect a so-called “security-barrier” (also known as the Wall) between Israel and the Palestinian occupied territories was taken. According to UN Special rapporteur John Dugard “the purpose of the Wall is to acquire land surrounding the West Bank Settlements and to include settlements within Israel”.⁷ The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 2004, that “the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regimes, are contrary to International Law”⁸

In the wake of the second Intifada, the PA more or less disintegrated as a consequence of the Israeli re-occupation of most parts of the West Bank, and the destruction of the PA infrastructure. What was left of the PA was struggling with attempts to reform the PA in order to make the Authority more transparent. This was done under pressure from the international donor community. The weakening of the PA during the first three to four years of the Second Intifada made the NGOs more important actors than during the times of negotiations (1993-2000). However, also Hamas was rising during these years.

In late 2004 Yasser Arafat died after having been isolated in his Ramallah headquarters for several years. Mahmoud Abbas became new president after presidential elections in early 2005. However, less than 50 % of the voters showed up at the polls. In the local elections clearly showed that Hamas was enjoying a significant popular support. In late 2005, Israel unilaterally disengaged from the Gaza Strip and evacuated some 6000 Israeli settlers from the area. This reinforced the disintegration of Palestinian authorities' control of Gaza.

The international community reacted to the intensified crisis by launching the Road Map in order to salvage the peace process. The Road Map itself is a not a very precise plan.⁹ The main idea of the plan states the need for creating an “independent, viable Palestinian state by the end of 2005,” side by side with Israel. The Road Map is divided into three phases, and resembles on most issues the Oslo process. It was adopted by the Quartet, consisting of America, Russia, the UN and the EU, as their common policy vis-à-vis the conflict. Due to the deterioration in the political and economic sphere, donor aid shifted from a focus on long-term development to emergency aid during the second Intifada, and the donor community to a large extend relied on UN agencies and civil society to take care of service provision.

7 UNGA, 2007, 12

8 ICJ: Legal consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

9 For the full text of the Road Map, see <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>

The consequences for the Palestinian civil population were severe. The measures taken by the Government of Israel in the oPt are felt by all Palestinians and touch all aspects of life. The decline of the Palestinian economy since the Intifada has left the per capita GDP at \$ 1.129 in 2006.¹⁰ This is a third less than the pre-Intifada level. This decline was primarily a result of the intensification of Israeli closure policies. This led to almost economic standstill and lack of employment opportunities, not only in oPt but also for the large number of Palestinians who used to work in Israel. Social, geographic and economic fragmentation was the ensuing result.

Another significant change was signs of increased conservatism, not only in Gaza, but also on the West Bank.

In the Palestinian context the hardship of daily life is felt most acutely by Palestinian women who carry the burden of responsibility within the household because of the death, imprisonment or unemployment of male members. Women must also bear the brunt of the anger and frustration of male relatives who feel humiliated because they cannot fulfil their traditional role as providers for the family. Thus an underlying theme, voiced by poor men and women as they describe the reasons and conditions for their impoverishment and vulnerability, is the profound crisis in the ability of male breadwinners to support their families. Men as well as women note that the crisis of the male breadwinner is a gendered crisis and a family crisis that places enormous stress on gender roles.

Statistics indicate that in 1996, the number of women actively participating in the Palestinian labour force did not exceed 13% of the total Palestinian labour force. This percentage dropped in 1999, when women's participation consisted of only 11.6%. The same statistics indicate that only 67% of working-aged men were participating in the labour forces. This indicates the existence of a process that keeps women away from gainful employment, and which restricts their role to the informal economic sector, where we see an increase in female labour. Thus, social and economic forces that promote a gendered division of labour are entrenched. Statistics indicate that 84.2% of women in West Bank, and 93.1% in Gaza Strip do not form a part of the official, paid workforce.¹¹

The deterioration in terms of economics and social and humanitarian development as a result of the second Intifada not surprisingly led to the need of more aid. Apart from acute emergency aid the need of assistance was particularly needed within sectors such as health, education, rights/protection and also the level of need in terms of advocacy related to the legitimate rights of the Palestinians increased with intensified conflict.

3.1.3 Jan 2006 – June 2007: Acute Governance crisis

In January 2006 the Palestinians held legislative elections. To the surprise of most observers the List for Change and Reform (Hamas) won. The international community responded with a boycott of the PA now controlled by Hamas.

¹⁰ World Bank, 2007, Two years after London

¹¹ The Legal And Social Status Of Palestinian Women. A Gap Analysis Report Using Cedaw As Reference, Found at [Http://www.mediterraneas.org/article.php3?id_article=278](http://www.mediterraneas.org/article.php3?id_article=278) (Last Visited Dec. 2008).

Hamas had difficulties in setting up a new government, as they tried to establish National Unity Government from the start. Initially they did not succeed. It was only after Gaza experienced fierce fighting between Fatah and Hamas in late 2006 that more serious negotiations took place in order to find peaceful means of solving the internal Palestinian discord. In March 2007 Fatah and Hamas – after Saudi Arabian mediation – signed an agreement and decided to establish the first Palestinian National Unity government. However, it did not last long and in June 2007 new internal Palestinian fighting broke out in the Gaza Strip, causing at least 300 deaths and more than 700 wounded. The result was complete Hamas control over the Gaza Strip, while Fatah was in control of the West Bank.

Economically the period was characterized by total collapse. The Hamas controlled PA did not have the economic means to pay salaries to the PA employees, which among other things led to numerous strikes. The increase in the Israeli closure policies and expansion of settlements led to a complete standstill in the Palestinian economy. Today more than 460.000 Israeli settlers live on the West Bank (incl. East Jerusalem). Hence, there has been an increase of the Israeli settler population of almost 100% since the peace process began in the early 1990s. Construction is ongoing in at least 88 settlements.¹²

The consequences of the new developments were extreme in the Gaza Strip. In the words of John Dugard, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights; "Gaza is a prison and Israel seems to have thrown away the key."¹³ In fact the situation in Gaza was so grave that UNRWA in 2007 warned that: "Gaza risks becoming virtually a 100 percent aid dependent, closed down and isolated community within a matter of months or even weeks"¹⁴.

The Boycott of Hamas did not mean the donor community stopped aid to the Palestinians, but it was disbursed through the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM)¹⁵, or directly through the office of the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas.

The already existing socio-economic and political differences between the West Bank and Gaza were exacerbated to such a degree that one now can talk about two different realities.

In terms of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians the period was characterised by a large number of quick incursions especially in the Northern West Bank and Gaza.

3.1.4 June 2007 – Dec 2007: Current situation

The internal Palestinian fighting in June 2007 led to the existence of two parallel Palestinian governments: one led by Hamas in Gaza and a new government led by Salam Fayyad in the West Bank recognized by the West. The existence of a new secular led government in the West Bank also led to the resumption of bilateral talks, which was intensified in November 2007 as a result of the US initiated Annapolis Conference. However, so far no clear signs of a breakthrough are visible.

¹² Peace Now, 2007.

¹³ Haaretz, 27.09.2006

¹⁴ Quoted in Alexander, 2007, 25

¹⁵ The TIM managed by the European Commission was set up to support a sustained minimum level of public service delivery.

Economically there are only few improvements, which is related to the international donor community's aid to the Fatah led PA in Ramallah as well as the large and increasing inflow of remittances from Palestinians in other Middle Eastern countries. The aid community have continued their focus on the state and institution building by giving significant budget support for the PA (in Ramallah), while in Gaza mainly emergency aid is coming in. The situation in Gaza is by far the most worrying from a humanitarian perspective. In 2007 the World Bank issued a warning that Gaza's economy was facing an irreversible collapse unless closure was eased.¹⁶

According to the World Bank the most worrying aspect of the Palestinian economy is its changing composition. The growth in GDP and foreign donor aid is increasingly entertaining government consumption and investment, and private consumption and investment in services is funded from remittances. Investment in the manufacturing and other production of goods hardly exists, leaving only little productive basis for the future. Due to the existence of the settlements, the closure regimes, the construction of the Separation Barrier, the lack of freedom of movement and lack of control over external borders are major constraints to economic development. According to the World Bank "the closures increase uncertainty, raise transportation costs and shrink available markets, which prevents Palestinian firms from attaining economies of scale. The current fragmentation of the West Bank resulting from an extensive system of permit restrictions, the Israeli separation barrier, settlements and physical impediments must also be reversed"¹⁷.

The conflict between Fatah and Hamas remains unresolved, as is the case with the splits within Fatah. The social fabric is increasingly fragmented and polarised. Civil society organisations are under pressure. In Gaza, several organisations have been restricted from operating by the de facto authorities. In this context many human rights and women organizations have been denied as legitimate institutions and their work has been often interrupted.¹⁸

3.2 Norwegian political involvement and financial support

The oPt is currently the second largest recipient of aid from the Norwegian Government, after Sudan. In the period of review, the assistance has grown sharply, from about 200 million NOK in 1999 to more than 600 million in 2007. The planning figures for 2008 indicate a further increase, to 800 million, a 400% increase in less than 10 years. Norwegian total support to oPt between 1999 and 2007 adds up to more than 3.5 billion NOK.

The Norwegian assistance provided to oPt reflects the prominence of the "Middle East Peace Process" in the Norwegian Foreign Policy agenda. After having had a direct facilitation role throughout the Oslo process, Norway stepped back from direct political involvement, and has focused on aid support and coordination. To that end, Norway chairs the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) at a global level, and co-chairs with the World Bank, the United Nations and the Palestinian Authority (PA) the Local Development Forum (LDF), the local donor

¹⁶ Quoted in Samhuri, 2007, 11

¹⁷ World Bank, 2007, Investment climate, IV


¹⁸ Examples on these organisations include the Women Affairs Center and the Women Affairs Technical Committees.

structure¹⁹.

While the assistance has been in support for development, cultural, political and humanitarian activities, the overarching purpose has been political – to contribute to a two-state solution.²⁰ The assistance has been provided through several budget votes²¹ and channels – bilateral support to the PA, support through Norwegian NGOs (NNGOs), and support to Palestinian organisations and institutions through the Norwegian Representative Office, and multilateral assistance through UN organisations like UNRWA, (UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and UNICEF, and more recently to the World Bank Trust Fund.²²

The aid through NNGOs has also increased substantially, from about 55 million in 1999 to 140 million in 2007. The NNGOs have received support both from Norad and the Norwegian MFA, with the latter administrating the main bulk of the support. Norad mainly provides long-term support for capacity building of the civil society, while MFA reserves its NGO funds for more acute humanitarian aid and emergency support. The peaks in 2002 and 2006/2007 mainly reflect the increase in humanitarian aid due to the heightened conflict level and severe governance crises in these periods. During the same periods the NNGOs portion of the total support has been at its highest, 28% in 2002 and 29% in 2006 (compared to 18% in 2004).

Figure 1 – Norwegian Official Development Assistance to the oPt 1999 - 2007 (in 1000 NOK).



¹⁹ The Local Development Forum (LDF) was previously called the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC). Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS) is the secretariat of LDF.

²⁰ Initial conversations with MFA staff, Norad annual report 2003, internal MFA documents.

²¹ The most important being the regional allocation for Middle East (post 152.78), Humanitarian (164.71), Peace and Reconciliation (164.70) and Transitional funds (162.70).

²² A full overview of the distribution will be provided in the final report.

For the MFA, the strategic role of NNGOs and the Palestinian Civil Society has frequently changed with the change in the overall political context in the oPt. In the years following the signing of Oslo Accords, they were seen as crucial strategic partners in support of building civil society institutions. It was seen as a complementary strategy to the main agenda to support state building in preparation for the final status negotiations since functioning institutions were seen as a condition for taking over roles and responsibilities previously taken on by the Israeli Civil Administration.

After the 1993 accords the Middle East section of the MFA opened the door to a variety of institutional cooperation agreements, in which the Norwegian institutions like Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), Statistics Norway (SSB), Norconsult, Asplan Viak and the research institute FAFO partnered with their Palestinian institutions such as the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), Palestinian Energy Authority (PEA), the Ministry of Planning (MoP)²³ and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) as main partners. Gradually the Norwegian inputs changed to more financial and less Technical Assistance inputs. According to MFA representatives, the priority institutions are currently the Palestinian Energy Authority, the PCBS, the Palestinian Legislative Council,²⁴ President's Office and the Central Election Committee. There is still recognition of the role of the NNGOs in humanitarian assistance and civil society support. However, several MFA representatives indicated that support to NNGOs and civil society institutions are seen as less of a priority in the current situation, but that might change if another political crisis unfolds.

The NNGO support to the oPt dates back to the mid 80s, when the solidarity movement started sending volunteers, mainly health workers to support Palestinian refugees during the war in Lebanon. The cooperation was gradually extended to the oPt, where a few organizations set up projects with Palestinian partners. The Oslo agreements and the increased Norwegian political interest in the peace process triggered an increase in NNGO projects and presence in the late 90s. The Norwegian authorities had an interest in augmenting the Norwegian engagement, both to support the fragile Palestinian institutions, and to improve knowledge and understanding of the Palestinian situation within the Norwegian public. In several cases the NNGOs initiated or expanded their activities and presence at the direct request from the MFA.

Between 1999 and 2006, there were thirty-seven different Norwegian organisations channelling Norwegian grants to the Palestinian institutions. These organisations were a mix of solidarity organizations, development organizations, humanitarian organizations, political parties, professional and labour organizations, religious groups and research institutes. While some of the NNGOs have only received limited funding and worked with one or a few Palestinian partners for a limited time, others had broad development goals and work with a wide range of Palestinian institutions. Their total budgets vary from a few thousand to more than 100 million NOK. The programs and modus operandi are also very different in focus, scope and purpose.

²³ Previously Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC).

²⁴ This project has been put on freeze since the PLC is not operational.

4 PROFILE OF THE SELECTED NORWEGIAN NGOS

4.1 Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)

Norwegian Church Aid is a faith-based organisation working on long-term development, emergency preparedness and response, and advocacy. Most projects are implemented through local partners and church umbrella organisations such as Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and Action by Churches Together (ACT).

The partnership with Church organisations working with the Palestinian issue goes back decades. Of particular importance has been the relationship established with Middle East Council of Churches (MECC) who bring the ecumenical partners together regionally and DSPR (Department of Services for Palestinian Refugees), a MECC organisation covering Palestinian refugees in the whole region. Another main partner in the region is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Jordan and the Holy Land (ELCJHL).

In addition, NCA also has established partnerships with Palestinian and Israeli human rights organisations, and financed inter-religious dialogue initiatives between Israeli and Palestinian religious groups. An aim for the organization has been to contribute to equity and protection for marginalized groups²⁵. The Palestinian program was monitored and followed up from the Oslo office until 2005, since then the organization has had an office in Jerusalem, under the auspices of the ELCJHL.

Selected NCA projects for the review are:

Support to Lutheran Schools (private schools) in Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Ramallah. Implementing Partner: Evangelical Lutheran Church of Jordan and the Holy Land (ELCJHL). This project covers four Lutheran schools in the West Bank. NCA received emergency funding from the MFA for the schools in 2006. According to NCA, 2200 students (49% girls/51% boys) attended the Lutheran schools in 2006, out of which 60% were Christian and 40% Muslim.

Ecumenical Accompaniment. Implementing partner: World Federation of Churches. Four times a year, Norwegian Church Aid sends a group of Norwegians to the Middle East, as Ecumenical Accompaniers in Palestine and Israel. Their mission is to accompany Palestinians and Israelis in their non-violent actions and concerted advocacy efforts to end the occupation. Participants of the programme are monitoring and reporting violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, supporting acts of non-violent resistance alongside local Christian and Muslim Palestinians and Israeli peace activists, offering protection through non-violent presence, engaging in public policy advocacy and, in general, standing in solidarity with the churches and all those struggling against the occupation. The programme has been supported by the MFA since 2003 and has been granted a budget of around NOK 2 million for 2008. The programme is implemented by the World Council of Churches (WCC). NCA forms part of the Jerusalem based steering group.

Support to Al Ahli Al Arab Hospital in Gaza. This private hospital in Gaza, owned by the

²⁵ Norwegian Church Aid Middle East Introduction 2005-2009

Diocese of Jerusalem of the Anglican Church, has received emergency support from the MFA through the NCA for several years totalling 2 million NOK. Located in the Centre of Gaza town, Al Ahli Arab Hospital receives patients from a number of heavily populated neighbourhoods. It works closely with the Palestinian Ministry of Health, receives the overflow from the government hospital in the central area of Gaza. It receives both Muslim and Christian patients.

Vocational Training programme in Gaza. Implementing partner: Middle East Council of Churches - Department of Services to Palestinian Refugees (DSPR). DSPR is one of NCA's oldest partners in the region and receives long-term funding from Norad as well as emergency funding from MFA. NCA gives them budget support to carry out their vocational training program in Gaza. Through the vocational training centres NCA supports professional education of unemployed youth. Specific measures are taken to include girls and keep them in schools till they have graduated.

4.2 Stiftelsen Oljeberget

Stiftelsen Oljeberget [Mount of Olives Foundation] was set up as a response to the severe financial crisis of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) hospital Augusta Victoria (AVH). Its support functions are twofold; initially it was mainly a funding mechanism for the Scandinavian countries donations to save Augusta Victoria, but it also evolved into being an important technical support to improve management and administration. The Mount of Olives Foundation is represented on the board of Augusta Victoria.

General support to Augusta Victoria Hospital, East Jerusalem. Supporting the operation and development of the Augusta Victoria Hospital has served to maintain this strategic property and services for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem. From 1995 the hospital saw patients from the West Bank and Gaza could not come in freely because of Israeli checkpoints. Due to effective lobbying the Lutheran World Foundation managed to facilitate cancer patients coming out of Gaza and through the established bussing system patients and employees could access the hospital from the West Bank. Accessing the AVH was one of the few ways Palestinians from the West Bank could enter Jerusalem in 2007.

4.3 Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

Norwegian People's Aid started out in 1982 with solidarity campaigns with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. NPA began its activities by sending out health-workers like nurses and physiotherapists to Lebanon. The primary focus was on rehabilitation of war-victims and on the promotion of Palestinian Youth Rights in the Lebanese society.

NPA has been working in Palestine since 1987 and has had an office in Gaza since 1996. A rationale behind the NPA program has been "to contribute to a positive change, politically, socially and economically for the disadvantaged social groups in the society by supporting and fostering community-based and democratic organisations". Furthermore, NPA has stated that: "NPA is trying to contribute to the development of a democratic Palestinian state, with a strong and vital civil society".

NPA programs put special emphasis on the right to organize and participate for all in civil society, and support to marginalized groups and areas, with special attention to women's rights and position in Palestinian society. For the occupied Palestinian areas the goal for the

development program is to ‘contribute to a free and Democratic Palestinian Society with focus on the right to organise and a fair distribution of resources’²⁶. Under this main goal NPA’s effort is organized under the headings “Freedom to Organize”, “Land and Resource Rights” and “Violence against Women”. Under the heading freedom to organize focus is among other things democratic rights and participation, competence building, gender equality and advocacy. Target groups for this work are youth, farmers, refugees and workers, both male and female, and women especially.

In addition NPA is providing emergency aid in the occupied territories through support to voluntary organizations in the agriculture, fisheries and education sectors²⁷.

Selected NPA projects include:

The right to my land. Implementing Partners: Maan Development Centre and Union of Agricultural Working Committees (UAWC). The project provides training to local farmers’ groups on the West Bank and Gaza Strip to recognise and promote their rights, and to organise the defence of their rights to land and water resources. The villages in the areas concerned are threatened by Israel’s building of the so-called ‘Separation wall’, which is built straight across many Palestinian farmers’ fields. Many villagers have had to leave their farms and land since the means of their existence has been lost. The first phase of the programme was implemented through Maan Development Centre.

Women Can Do It. Implementing Partner: Palestinian Working Women's Development Society. The aim of the project is to improve working women’s social, financial and legal status. The project is a collaboration with the Labour Party’s Women’s Committee, which runs “Women Can Do It” courses in a total of 18 countries. For the last two years, courses have also been held in Gaza and on the West Bank. Trainers from Norway and the Balkans visit Palestinian areas and teach women from local organisations and parties about good management practice, self-confidence, the importance of body language in human communication, subjugation techniques and how to have your say in political meetings .

Youth Reading Campaign. Implementing partner: Tamer Institute for Community Education. The project aims to encourage young people towards active participation in their local community and to facilitate young people’s self-expression through their creative skills. This project involves the mobilisation of young volunteers to work with younger people. Around 500 young people are participating in various activities concerning human rights, creative skills, art and the mobilisation of local communities. A group of about 100 are undertaking intensive training in the running of information and mobilisation work within their own neighbourhoods. The Tamer institute runs special initiatives for children and young adults with learning difficulties. These include the “My First Book” competition in which children are encouraged to send in their stories. The best are selected, published in booklet form and sent to libraries and recreation clubs. Young people meet in writing groups and journalist clubs, publishing their work in one of the largest Palestinian newspapers.

Promoting young people as active participants in local communities. Implementing partner:

²⁶ Policy and Strategy for NPA’s International Humanitarian and Development Work” 2008-2011.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Al-Yamoun Youth Centre. This programme presupposes not only that young people make themselves active, but also that adults open their eyes to the kinds of resources that young people can contribute. Public notification of the project is given each year so that more, smaller organisations may get the chance to promote their work with, for and among young people. Young people decide upon their own activities and contribute to strengthening the bonds between each other and their respective local communities. Different groups and organisations are selected on the basis of their applications and a documented ability to achieve involvement and results. Leader training and networking activities is also part of the program. Networking aims to overcome the obstacles that have arisen as a consequence of the occupation and the splitting up of Palestinian land. Different types of meetings for Palestinian youth forms part of this networking activity.

Renovation of irrigation and water system, reclamation of land and job-creation in the Tubas region. Implementing partner: Aqaba Rural Woman Society. The project aims at providing income for disadvantaged farmers by the rehabilitation of the agricultural land and maintain continued source of water in order to reduce unemployment rate in villages of Al-Aqaba and Tayaseer. Aqaba Rural Women Society is a Palestinian non-profit, non-governmental organization located in Al-Aqaba village of Tubas and close to Jenin city in the Northern part of West Bank. The main objectives of the project are to protect agriculture land of the farmers from confiscation, reclamation of the land (120 dunums), construct 8 water cisterns and 2 water collection pools (300m³), supporting walls (850m²) and stone terraces (1500m²), in order to make it easy for plantation.

4.4 Norwegian Aid Committee (NORWAC)

NORWAC sprung out of the solidarity movement with its roots in the Palestine Committee's activities in Lebanon during the civil war of 1978-1981 and after that became active in supplying medical relief in Palestine. Palestine Committee had a solidarity mandate (political), and MFA was hoping for a purely humanitarian organisation that could second humanitarian staff with the same speed. NORWAC was born out of this request from the MFA. NORWAC worked tightly with Palestine Committee up to the 90's when a clear 'divorce' between the two organisations occurred. NORWAC was set up as a separate organisation in 1994.

Technical provision to Makassed Hospital. The Makkassed hospital is located in the contentious area of East Jerusalem, and is a referral hospital from health institutions all over the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. The project has focussed on upgrading central hospital facilities in order to be granted the hospital license by the Israeli Health Authorities. The project has installed a new kitchen, a full upgrading of the electrical system, including generators, instalment of a modern fire system and instalment of a central heating boiler and an updating of the laundry services. The project is renewed on an annual basis as it is covered by the MFA emergency funding.

4.5 Norwegian Red Cross (Norcross)

The Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) was mandated in 1969 is to provide humanitarian, health, cultural and social services when and where needed to Palestinian people both in Palestine and Diaspora. In 1996, and 1999, PRCS was mandated by the Palestinian Authority to provide National Ambulance, Blood Transfusion and Pre-hospital Emergency Services in Palestine.

Planning, OD, International Cooperation and Finance Departments: To develop well-functioning systems and strengthen cooperation amongst branches and departments. The main objective of this programme is improved organizational capacities of the PRCS. This has a direct positive impact on the quality and the quantity of the services it provides to the most vulnerable.

Primary Health Care Department: Improved Reproductive Health services provided to women in ten PRCS PHC Centres in the West Bank. The main objective of this programme is improved general health and well being of the most vulnerable of the Palestinian population, with a shared responsibility for health care and health issues between the national society, local authorities and community members.

Palestine Red Crescent Society - Youth and Volunteer and Rehabilitation Departments: Mobilize youth to actively obtain, promote and share knowledge about PRCS principles, goals and program activities resulting in participation and investment in social development to assist vulnerable groups in the Palestinian community. The main objective of this programme is to mobilize youth to actively obtain, promote and share knowledge about PRCS principles, goals and program activities among volunteers. This will bring about volunteerism and their participation and investment in social development to actively assist vulnerable groups in the Palestinian community by the strengthening of volunteerism and social and cultural services to the community in 60 locations in Palestine. The Norwegian Red Cross has been supporting this program in the West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon Refugee camps, within a three-year cooperation agreement (2006-2008) within the framework agreement it has with Norad.

Palestine Red Crescent Society – Community Based Education Department: Social education through sports, pedagogical games and cultural activities. The goal of this programme is to improve the quality of life of disabled children (especially mentally disabled children). The objective of the programme is caring for the well being of the disabled and their families through the provision of opportunities for ability development, empowerment and integration by working together with the community and the disabled people and their families. The Norwegian Red Cross has been supporting this program in West Bank and Gaza with Norwegian MFA funding for the last three years 2006 – 2008. During 2008 the program will be extended through Swedish RC support, while for the period 2009 – 2011 it will be integrated within the three-year cooperation agreement for NORAD funding.

4.6 Norwegian Refugee Council

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is a Norwegian NGO specialising in assistance and protection to refugees and internally displaced persons. NRC started its activities in oPt in 2006, when it set up a main office in Jerusalem, and a sub office in Gaza. NRC has only implemented one project in oPt:

Income generating project in Rafah Municipality. Implementing Partners: Rafah and Deir al-Balah Municipalities, PriceWaterhouseCoopers. In September 2006, NRC initiated a Labour Intensive Project (LIP) in cooperation with the Gaza municipalities of Rafah and Deir al-Balah, creating 63 000 man-days of work by the time the project was finalised in December 2007. The reason for the termination of the funding by the MFA for this project is not clear. NRC has undertaken assessments as basis for the development of programme activities within education and ICLA in 2009.

4.7 Union of Education Norway (UEN)

Union of Education Norway is Norway's largest trade union for teaching personnel, and is the second largest trade union in the country. UEN was founded in 2002, and is a continuation of two other teachers' unions, the Norwegian Union of Teachers and the Teachers' Union Norway. (In the following, we will use also UEN for the cooperation prior to 2002).

Union of Education Norway is involved in international solidarity work in 13 countries. The strategy contained in this work is based on support for trade unions and educational purposes. UEN has been involved in the oPt since after the first intifada. UEN does not have presence in oPt.

Institutional cooperation with the General Union of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT), national level (until 2001)

The institutional cooperation was suspended in 2001 due to internal conflict within GUPT, and problems in financial reporting. The program is planned to restart in 2009.

Institutional cooperation with GUPT Qalqilya branch. The project started in 1999, but was substantially increased in 2002 as a response to the damages to the GUPT office in Qalqilya caused by the IDF interventions. The program has included the re-establishment of the office, publication of a magazine for members and students, and training and workshops for the leadership and members.

4.8 AUF - Norwegian Labour Youth

Norwegian Labour Youth (AUF) has since 1994 cooperated with Fatah Youth Organisation on organisational development and democratization projects. The overall goal of this cooperation is to further democratization in the Palestinian Territories. The organizations launched a joint project in the mid 90s that was aiming at developing Fatah Youth Organisation (FYO) and developing its democratic structure. This project is part of the continuous partnership between AUF and FYO, which aims at Preparing Fatah Youth Organization to the internal local elections and the national congress. Moreover, this project aims at preparing Fatah Youth Organisation to promote the democratic organisational building during the year 2008.

The projects were supported by the MFA until Fatah Youth Organisation was officially recognized as a political party in 1996. As the MFA cannot support political parties directly, the funding was continued through Norad.

4.9 The Norwegian Royal Society for Development (NRD)

NRD's aim is to contribute to viable local communities through sustainable business development both domestically and in numerous countries worldwide.

NRD was invited into cooperation with the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) by the Palestinian Solidarity Groups of Norway after the Oslo Agreement in 1993. This was due to NRD's engagement in agricultural development and mode of operation as an NGO promoting cooperative movements in rural communities. NRD did not have representation in the oPt. The cooperation with PARC ended in 2005.

5 PARTNERSHIP MODELS

One of the objectives of the review was to assess advantages and disadvantages of the different types of partners and partnership models.

The NNGOs included in the study do all work through some sort of partnerships. However, the character of these partnerships varies greatly. The team has chosen to distinguish between *natural partners*, *strategic partners* and *instrumental partners*.

A general finding is that the Norwegian organisations have established sound partnerships, based on respect and understanding. The partners also report that the Norwegian counterparts are particularly flexible, and have been able to adapt to new needs and situations rapidly. Several of the partners highlighted the advantage of having the Norwegian MFA as a back donor, as most other donors have stricter and more time consuming procedures for changes of projects, and are also less prone to finance projects that can be politically sensitive.

Although some of the NNGOs conduct participatory planning with their local partners, more systemization of the approach and the timing is needed. The local partners expressed their appreciation of the NGOs that conducted annual or semiannual consultation with them, considering this a real demonstration of what partnerships mean.

5.1 Natural partners

“Natural partnerships” are those formed between a Norwegian civil society organisation with its own constituency and a Palestinian organisation that plays (or is supposed to play) a similar role and conduct similar tasks in its own society. This type of partnership is believed to be more attractive for developing country organisations, as it would expect the Norwegian organisation to contribute with particularly relevant experience that can be transferred.²⁸

The “Natural partnerships” can be of particular relevance in a nation or state building process, with only rudimentary state and civil society institutions. The Norwegian support post Oslo agreement had a particular preference for this logic, as the MFA promoted and supported “natural partnerships” between established Norwegian state institutions and civil society institutions alike. Norwegian political parties supported Palestinian party organisations, the labour union and professional unions supported their counterparts, and interest organisations for disabled people supported the build up of similar organisations in Palestine.

What many of these partnerships have in common is that both of the sister organisations are members of an international organisation. Norcross and PRCS are members of the IFRC, the Union of Education, Norway and GUPT are both members of Education International (EI), Norwegian Labour Party and Fatah meet in Socialist International, where Fatah has observer status. NCA and its partners are members of the World Council of Churches and other international Church networks. In relation to these fora they have, at least formally, equal status. This gives the partnership a touch of “equal partners”, that goes beyond the “donor-

²⁸ See for example the Government commissioned report (“Rattsø Utvalget”) on the role of the civil society as a channel for development aid, ”Nye roller for frivillige organisasjoner i utviklingssamarbeidet. Utredning fra utvalg oppnevnt av Utenriksdepartementet, overlevert 15. juni 2006.”

recipient” relationship. These umbrella organisations will often give one Norwegian member organisation a lead role in supporting a particular member organisation that needs further capacity building and institutional support. Both Norcross and the Union of Education Norway have been assigned such a lead role.

The partners of the four Norwegian organisations in question all highlight positive experience in working with Norwegian counterparts with a similar mission, such as a high degree of professionalism, respectful approach and particularly relevant expertise. “They know what they talk about, because they have experienced it themselves”. The relationship has also given access to professional networks through exchange programs, training programmes, seminars and workshops.

There are some crucial differences between the four Norwegian organisations though. Norcross and NCA are also international professional aid and emergency organisations, which would be expected to have a set of institutional skills and capacities for capacity building *and* technical support. Likewise, their Palestinian counterparts are service providers, administrating quite large funds for public goods. Union of Education Norway and AUF, however, are there to represent the interests of their members within the political domain, and are not “project designers and implementers”.

Norwegian natural partners are very much appreciated by important Palestinian organisations and institutions. They have clearly provided important Norwegian networks, and often served as inspirational models. Some have provided in depth understanding of the role of the Palestinian organisation, and have been able to identify themselves with their counterpart.

All of the NNGOs have encountered internal tensions and power struggles in their partner organisations. The power struggles have particularly affected Palestinian organisations close to Fatah, and do to a certain extent reflect the rivalry between Fatah and other political organisations, and the factionalism within Fatah itself.

5.1.1 The Norwegian Red Cross and Palestinian Red Crescent Society

The Norwegian Red Cross (Norcross) is one of the oldest National Red Cross Associations globally, and has had a crucial role in the Norwegian society as it is a cornerstone in domestic preparedness systems, and has been a major service provider in health and rehabilitation. Norcross have social outreach programs for youth and elderly, and organises one of the largest voluntary movements in Norway, mainly through the alpine rescue teams.

The cooperation with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society goes back decades, to the early days of Palestinian diaspora. The PRCS played a crucial role for emergency care and health services for the Palestinian refugees, and was in many ways regarded as the “PLO Ministry of Health”. PRCS is still the responsible national society for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.

The Norwegian support increased dramatically after the return of the PLO to oPt in the wake of the Oslo accords. PRCS established itself quickly as one of the health actors within oPt, with a wide range of services, including several hospitals, ambulance services, primary health care clinics, a blood bank and rehabilitation programs.

Norcross has had two parallel strategies for this partnership. 1) to support in building mainly emergency response capacity and 2) to foment organisational development through

supporting improved governance and management structures.

Norcross, as most NNGOs, initially faced some resistance when promoting transparency and efficiency within their partner organisation. However, this has improved significantly through an “engaged persistence”, and the continued support to PRCS. The OD program that was implemented resulted in improved planning, management routines, financial procedures and oversight. These improvements are now greatly acknowledged by PRCS top management, who stated that the improved transparency led to increased flexibility for the management, not less as they initially feared. It also had the spin off that other donors increased their confidence in PRCS, and have increased financial contributions.

PRCS and Norcross coincide in that the main success factor has been the presence in oPt by Norcross. A strength of this partnership has been that Norcross not only has put requirements on their partner, but also provided expertise and funds to ensure the changes take place. Norcross initiated evaluations of the main programs for learning and development. The evaluations have been planned and conducted in close relationship with PRCS, and could potentially serve as a good model for the other Norwegian-Palestinian NGO partnerships.

5.1.2 Union of Education Norway and GUPT

General Union of Palestinian Teachers – GUPT, was originally (1969) created as a union for PLO teachers in the diaspora. It also had a parallel set up in the oPt, with the base in Jerusalem. The entry of PLO into oPt after the Oslo agreement brought many of the exiled “original” GUPT members who claimed participation in the GUPT leadership. A struggle for power followed, and a PLO/Fatah appointed exiled GUPT member challenged the elected leadership already in place in the oPt. This led to the existence of two “parallel” GUPT structures, one based in Ramallah and one in Jerusalem.

In the late 90’s, the UEN initiated cooperation with the elected GUPT in the oPt. As the internal conflict developed, UEN found it difficult to maintain a financial cooperation. Main factors were the reluctance to arrange a National congress with elections, and the very close relationship between the GUPT leadership and the Palestinian Authorities. From 2001, the UEN decided to halt financial support to the central organisation or any of its projects, but they did maintain a dialogue through meetings in oPt.

The Akershus branch of UEN had developed a friendship program with GUPT Qalqilya, a branch that were hit particularly hard during the second Intifada. Parts of the town have been enclosed by the “security wall”, which separates the Qalquilya population. The GUPT Qalqilya leadership was targeted by the IDF, and the office and equipment was completely destroyed during the incursions. UEN Akershus supported the rebuilding of the office, and the UEN initiated in 1999 a formal cooperation with the Qalquilya branch. In addition to ensuring an office available for members, the project has comprised training for leadership and members and the publishing of a teacher’s magazine.

UEN has been a very important “mentor” for GUPT Qalquilya. The partner highlights the flexible approach of UEN to overcome difficulties caused by e.g closure practices. The Qalquilya branch is one of the best functioning branches of GUPT due to the support from UEN. UEN has been a very important professional “model” for GUPT Qalqilya, when it comes to management, organisational culture, democracy and gender. Female teachers are now represented in the Union’s leadership.

UEN procedures for monitoring are weak, and the contact with the partner organisation has been irregular. This has not been a major problem until now, as GUPT Qalquilya is a very small branch, with limited activities and limited financial support. However, a renewed contract with the national GUPT organisation will require a totally different approach.

Due to the solution of the internal conflict in GUPT, UEN increased dialogue with GUPT at central level throughout 2008, and will include support to Central GUPT in the coming frame agreement with NORAD. The national GUPT has the potential of playing a very important role in oPt. The recent broadening of the base to include private schools, UNRWA and university teachers can give GUPT a central role when it comes to represent the interests of teachers, and to influence Palestinian education sector.

However, the organisation remains weak institutionally, with a high dependence on one individual and practically non-existing governance structures. The team finds that the timing for a renewed agreement with Central GUPT is good and relevant, as the long awaited Convention is planned for 2009. However, there should be clear conditions for the support, which would include the actual arrangement of the Convention, that governance structures are put in place, transparent administration and finances, and regular institutional audits.

5.1.3 NCA and Church organisations

Other than the advocacy role, NCA as such does not have activities in Norway. Its owners – the Norwegian churches and church organisations, undertake social community work and run hospital and other health services. In that sense, some partners are often more similar to the church organisations that NCA represents, than to NCA itself. There is also contact between the NCA partners and the Norwegian church organisations, both in Norway and in oPt.

The relationship with the partners has changed over time. NCA did not have representation in oPt until 2005, all contact with the partners was undertaken through field visits from Norway. All of the partners agree that the practical side of the follow up has improved, and made the project application and implementation easier. However, there are some issues to be clarified on what role NCA should play in the public, whether it should be seen as part of the local Church or whether it should have a more independent role as an international NGO.

Management issues and administrative development have clearly been put more on the agenda since the opening of the office in Jerusalem. The Church organisations operating in the oPt have complex management and governance structures, with somewhat unclear division of roles between the different levels within the organisations. To a certain degree that is also the case for the relationship between the different organisations. NCA has started a process to look into this further, in order to ensure more transparency and efficiency for the partners. This is a positive development, and would encourage NCA to further strengthen its office in oPt. NCA should also formulate a strategy for the strengthening of the partners, preferably in close cooperation with the partners in question.

A more independent position towards its partners would also be beneficial, and NCA should seek to register as an international NGO.

5.1.4 AUF and Fatah Youth Organisation

AUF is the biggest youth party in Norway, with more than 8000 members. It has an influence

in the mother party, and has been a very important recruitment organisation for the Labour party leadership.

It is difficult to relate a party like Fatah to the Norwegian Party system. The relationship between the Norwegian Labour Party and Fatah, and their youth organisations, has more to do with Fatah's observer status in Socialist International and Fatah Youth's similar status in the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY) than a choice based on shared political vision and program. Politically the similarities are hard to establish, and the political agendas, the party cultures and structures are very different.

AUF is organised as an independent youth organisation, with registered members, active local branches, elected political leadership and a secretariat. Fatah Youth has a very loosely defined structure. The leadership is appointed by the mother party, it is not elected. A long promised congress has still not taken place. Fatah youth as such does not have registered members, but some of its "subsidiary" networks, such as the student organisations and women's network, count on active members and elected leadership.

The AUF approach has been to improve the democratic structure and processes in FYO, but reports that this has been a difficult task, as the main decision maker is the leadership in Fatah. Fatah itself has also resisted attempts to increase democracy and participation, and has not had a congress in 20 years. The party culture of favouritism has affected the relationship with AUF. An example has been that the selection of representatives for delegations visiting AUF in Norway has not been based on active participation in the youth movement, but rather on family ties of party elites.

Some recent changes in the Fatah Youth leadership, and credible reports of concrete plans to arrange the congress shortly, imply new opportunities for the partnership. The follow up by AUF has been somewhat irregular, partly because of entry obstacles imposed by the Israeli authorities. However, the contact and follow up has increased over the last year. It is important with a continued close follow up and support throughout the next phase. AUF should also agree with FYO clear objectives for the coming period, including the arrangement of the party congress with democratic election of a new leadership. AUF should review the partnership with FYO if the congress is not taking place within a year.

5.2 Strategic partners

While natural partnerships are usually "obvious", the strategic partners are chosen by the Norwegian organisation. Structures, functions and roles are often highly different; the focus is rather on finding partners who share the same vision and objectives. This sort of cooperation among partners with same vision and objectives has a number of advantages, not least for the Norwegian NGO. They will have a high degree of freedom in selecting their partners, and can also more easily close down a partnership.

On the other hand, many Palestinian organisations can also "shop around" for donors, who do not necessarily coordinate their support. When it works optimally, the Palestinian NGO will have the opportunity to cooperate with a partner that is committed, and shows a high degree of solidarity. These partnerships have the potential of having long-term impact.

Among the Norwegian NGOs working in oPt along this type of partnership are Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), to some extent Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), NRC and the Norwegian

Royal Society for Development.

5.2.1 Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)

NPA works with a high number of partners. Some have national coverage working to influence the national agenda, others are small local CBOs with no former project experience. The fear of misconduct and need for results, have led international NGOs and donors to have preference for well functioning Palestinian NGOs. This has resulted in a “monopoly” by secular Ramallah based organisations, and who master English as well as the aid lingo and project proposal requirements of the big donors. These organisations have been criticized for being out of touch of the lives of poor people outside the big cities.

In this sense, NPA has gone the opposite direction when defining partnerships. They have developed innovative procedures to select new partners, to ensure that also small community based organisations without prior project management skills and knowledge of English can go into partnerships with international NGOs. NPA has used the flexibility of the MFA funds, to test out new partners who do not have a track record of project management.

With the purpose of full transparency and equal access to funds, the calls for proposal are published in the newspapers. The announcements include criteria and process for the selection. NPA has experienced a few incidents of groups protesting that they were not selected, but the transparent procedures have helped solving these situations. The organisations are provided with training and capacity building, and those who has the capacity and documented that they work professionally are being asked to enter in longer term partnership (usually under the Norad framework).

At another level they will select more mature and well-known organisations. If NPA has a fund for women projects, they call several active women organization directly and request applications. From this small pool they will eventually select the new partners.

NPA has a practice of involving partners when it comes to its own strategic choices, overall needs assessment exercises and planning. This is very much appreciated by the partners, as it has fostered flexibility, mutual confidence and transparency.

The NPA work on developing the partners’ technical, financial and organization capacity has also helped the organisational development of the organisations.

NPA officials conduct frequents field visit. However, a number of the West Bank based NGOs complained that the contact with NPA was mainly with the Gaza branch of the NGO, and that they often felt neglected. Hence, some WB based partners argued for the need of a West Bank office for the NPA. From NPA’s side the, the issue of setting up a West Bank sub-office has been discussed on-and-off since the beginning of the Second Intifada. However, as local West Bank staff would have difficulties meeting their Gaza counterparts, a main concern for NPA has been that it could affect negatively the efforts in of maintaining the NPA Palestinian program as one. This, together with the additional administrative costs a new office setup would entail, the organisation has retained not invested in a second office in the West bank. With the expansion of programs in the West Bank, and the volatile access situation between Gaza and the West Bank, NPA should elaborate a plan to ensure increased capacity in the West Bank. This cold include a satellite office in the West Bank.

5.2.2 Norwegian Church Aid

Most of the work NCA conduct in oPt is based on the “Natural Partnership” model, as most of their partners are church based (or other religious based) organisations. However, NCA has recently included partnership with non-church organisations. A case in point is Palestinian Working Women’s Society for Development. What is characteristic about this partnership is that they share visions and objectives.

5.2.3 The Norwegian Royal Society for Development (NRD)

The NRD program in oPt was implemented exclusively through the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC). PARC was founded in 1983 i.e. during the time that the West Bank and Gaza was under the management of the Israeli Civil Administration. It was founded by a group of Palestinian agronomists responding to the deterioration in agricultural extension programs by offering expert advice to marginalized, poor farmers in the area. It developed as an organisation with close ties to the Communist Party.

NRD and PARC signed an agreement in January 1995 with the purpose of supporting projects in rural Palestine. The agreement covered all activities financed from NRD with funds from MFA and NORAD. Until 1997 the projects funded by NRD was based on support by the MFA. From 1997 the project financing was transferred to Norad and became a part of a Framework Agreement between NRD and Norad with a requirement of 20 percent equity provided by NRD. This “equity” is financed by another Norwegian NGO, the Palestine Groups of Norway.

An external evaluation of NRD’s cooperation with PARC in 2003 concluded that the PARC programs and projects largely had responded to the overall objectives when it came to results and outputs, but that PARC suffered from severe deficiencies in governance, management and financial routines. The international partners and donors, including NRD, had to a very limited degree sought to build administrative and financial capacity. NRD’s role in the cooperation has first and foremost been as a financial intermediary towards funding PARC’s program, with some follow up of specific projects. The cooperation closed in 2005.

5.3 Instrumental partners

While the former organisation have partnerships as core part of their programs, and capacity building of these partners as a goal in itself, other NNGOs are much more focused on projects, activities and results, and see partnerships as a means to achieve other goals. Not surprisingly, the two NNGOs working with instrumental partners are humanitarian organisations. Humanitarian organisations will usually be more prone to look at the immediate needs of the population (the beneficiaries), rather than the development of a civil society.

5.3.1 NORWAC

NORWAC works mainly in the Gaza Strip and in East Jerusalem. Since the establishment of the PA in 1994 NORWAC made a strategic choice to help build up public health infrastructures. It then phased out the partnership with PRCS, and initiated a long standing

relationship with the newly established MoH. The main focus has been the investments and infrastructure of the hospitals. Some capacity building activities have also taken place, NORWAC has used its extensive network in Norway to facilitate exchange programs between health institutions and professionals in Norway and oPt.

This has been a challenge in the wake of the political split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There are currently two Ministries of Health, the internationally recognised in Ramallah is formally the partner of NORWAC, but in order to continue their engagement in Gaza NORWAC has had to maintain informal contact with the Hamas “MoH” in Gaza.

5.3.2 The Norwegian Refugee Council

NRC started its program with a large employment project in Gaza, with two municipalities, Rafa and Deir al Balah. The project and the partners was a “take over “of a Norwegian MFA funded program that had been running for a few years. The municipalities are more to be seen as implementing partners for a specific result, rather than traditional partnerships. Capacity building as such was not part of the project, although some of the individuals included in the project did receive some training. The municipalities highlight the close follow up and support from the NRC Gaza office as a positive experience, as it allowed them to adjust the projects accordingly.

6 RELEVANCE AND ADDED VALUE

6.1 Relevance of projects and programs

The main dimension the team has looked at is the *relevance* of the programs. The team has assessed whether the programs have been designed to respond to local needs and priorities. The indicators applied are whether the NNGOs have sought to include the priorities of communities, partners and authorities, whether needs assessments have been used, and whether existing statistical material, baseline studies and development plans have been referred to. When assessing relevance and added value, the team has looked at to what degree the NNGOs have taken the programs and assistance of other international NGOs and aid actors into account when planning and designing their intervention.

Because of the vast variety of the activities, the relevance of the projects and programs have been analysed within the main sectors and programmatic areas the Norwegian organisations have activities: health, support to minority organisations, rural development and agricultural production and protection, and advocacy.

A main finding is that the programs and projects included in the review to a large extent respond to the overall needs and priorities of the Palestinian communities and authorities. Partners, communities and authorities are generally consulted and/or included in the assessment and design of the programs. However, with a few exceptions, there is little evidence of systematic use of existing base line studies and statistical material. While there are some good examples of programs that are well coordinated with other international and national actors, much more can be done to ensure complementarities and avoid overlapping of services. It should be noted however, that the main obstacle is the poor capacity of the PA and the international community for the provision of good coordination mechanisms for operational planning and implementation.

6.2 Relevance of supporting Palestinian civil society organisations

The question is not so much *whether* it is of relevance to support civil society organisation, as it is quite established that civil society *can* be of particular relevance in a nation building process, as they can be agents for change in a more democratic direction, through creating higher levels of awareness among the citizens and pressure governments to act more accountable. Many civil society organisations furthermore can give voice to the demands of marginalised groups and communities.²⁹

²⁹ See also Paffenholz list of seven core functions of civil society that are relevant for peacebuilding: 1. Protection of citizens from violence from all parties; 2. Monitoring of human rights violations, the implementation of peace agreements, etc. 3. Advocacy

⁴. Socialization for democratic values and a culture of peace as well as for in-group identity of marginalized groups; 5. Inter-group social cohesion, i.e. bringing people together from adversary groups; 6. Facilitation on the local and national level between all sorts of actors; 7. Service delivery to create entry points for peacebuilding. Thania Paffenholz. "What Civil Society Can Do for Peacebuilding." Summary of the results of a three year policy relevant research project on the occasion of the presentation at NORAD in Oslo 10th of December 2008

The team has looked at the NNGOs approach for their civil society support, their analysis of the Palestinian society, and the choices they have made when selecting partners and civil society segments to cooperate with.

An important element for the analysis of the relationship civil society and state, is that oPt is still not a state formation. Most of the Norwegian partner organisations work towards a two-state solution. However, it is not certain when and whether it will materialise, and more voices raise the option of a one state solution with equal rights.

However, the NNGOs have avoided the main pitfalls and risks when selecting partners in the very heterogeneous Palestinian civil society scene. Many of the Palestinian NGOs have been criticised for being elitists and removed from the grass roots. Some are also known to be small “kingdoms” of political and economical power bases for personalities and groups. As in other situations where donor money flows easily, several local NGOs are also formed more in response to donor preferences (rent seeking) than to local needs. The NNGOs included in the review are aware of these trends, and have avoided working with large “project specialist” NGOs, and have selected local partners with defined constituencies or NGOs working closely with the communities.

A general finding is that there is a lack of comprehensive analysis of the Palestinian civil society, its composition, what role it should have in the future, and its relationship with the authorities and a possible future state formation. When the NNGOs do have an explicit analysis, it is rather patchy, and focused on the organisations and segments that are supported. This is an area where the NNGOs, Norad and the MFA could benefit from cooperation, and develop joint analysis on the main issues.

This should also include an analysis of Islamic charities and grass root organisations, which are important service providers and upholders of the social fabric at the grass root. This is a very important segment of the Palestinian society, but there has been very little interaction with both the international community as well as with the Palestinian Governmental and non-governmental institutions. Most Norwegian and international stakeholders recognise this as a problem, but very few initiatives have been taken to overcome the division. The team believes the Norwegian organisations and their partners could play a role in coming up with strategies to increase dialogue and cooperation with these organisations.

6.3 Relevance of support to the health sector

The health sector receives by far the largest part of the Norwegian ODA to oPt channelled through NGOs. Although health has not been defined as a priority sector for Norwegian support to oPt, it constitutes one of the largest sectors measured in NOK, and Norway is regarded as one of the most important donors in the health sector³⁰.

The health services supported by Norwegian NGOs span from primary health care centres run by PRCS to support to advanced cancer treatment by a 3rd grade hospital. Most of the support is channelled through private organisations, except for the NORWAC support to MoH run hospitals.

³⁰ WHO official in oPt.

At an overall, national level, there is clearly a need for continued health services. According to the UN, access to medical care, in particular pre-natal medical care has been reduced over the last years, because of strikes by health care workers, access problems resulting from the closure regime and deteriorating economic conditions. Most of the hospitals have had to reduce services, due to a lack of medical supplies and other shortages and the lack of parts and problems in maintaining medical equipment because of the PA financial crisis. The reduction of services has affected diagnostic services and vital specialised treatment, such as kidney dialysis.³¹

However, within the health sector there are many national and international actors. Traditionally, mainly private actors ran the health service for Palestinians, but over the last years the MoH has taken over more services. Due to the lack of comprehensive overview of needs and services, the sector both has uncovered needs and overlap of services. When analysing the relevance of the Norwegian NGO health programs, the review team has looked at whether the NGOs and the partners have made an assessment of the needs, the services covered by other actors, and the degree to which the services are actively coordinated with the authorities and others.

When using these criteria, the team finds that most of the health programs included in the review are relevant, as they respond to particular needs not covered by other actors, and/or the NNGOs/partners have particular expertise in the particular area. The team finds that the health services in Jerusalem and Gaza to be of particular relevance for this reason, as well as the rehabilitation centres operated by PRCS. For other services, e.g. the PRCS primary health care centres, there are more indications of overlap and parallel services.

An example of a programme that is regarded as particularly relevant by its main recipient is NORWACs overall programme of making MoH hospitals in the West Bank and Gaza self-sufficient in oxygen provision. The oxygen factories have reduced running costs and, more importantly, helped these hospitals to maintain treatment capacity throughout the crisis over the last years. A continued dependency on Israel for oxygen would have been devastating for the hospitals during the severe import restrictions and boycotts imposed after the Hamas came into power. This is particularly the case for Gaza, but also the West Bank hospitals were able to rely on its own oxygen production throughout the boycott of the PA in 2007.

In Gaza the siege is having devastating effect on the health conditions and the health institutions. There is a need for continued international support to overcome the closure practices on the running of health services. NNGOs support two Gaza hospitals, the MoH run Shifa hospital supported by NORWAC and the NCA supported Al Ahli Arab Hospital. These have complementary profiles and services.

The import restrictions on medicine, equipment and gasoline have left the health institutions constantly over stretched, with no development activities taking place in the sector. The obstacles for referral practices to more advanced treatments outside Gaza have also had a backpressure on the existing health services inside Gaza. The World health Organisation (WHO) does not exclude certain over capacity in the hospitals during quiet periods with

³¹ United Nations, "Consolidated Appeal, 2009 Occupied Palestinian territory". Geneva 2009. Downloaded at [http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.nsf/h_Index/CAP_2009_oPt/\\$FILE/CAP_2009_oPt_VOL1_SCRE EN.pdf?OpenElement](http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.nsf/h_Index/CAP_2009_oPt/$FILE/CAP_2009_oPt_VOL1_SCRE EN.pdf?OpenElement)

reasonable access, but clearly recommends further strengthening of hospitals and primary health care, rather than reduction of services. Gaza remains a very unstable area, with a great need of high capacity for emergency health response, as was proven in the internal fighting in June 2007 and the Israeli attacks on Gaza in December 2008/January 2009. During those periods, the hospital services were totally overstretched, but were of utmost importance in treating victims of the fighting.

A third relevant NNGO support is the support to the Palestinian hospitals in Jerusalem. These are the most advanced hospitals in oPt, and are the only Palestinian referral hospitals for the West Bank and Gaza for cases like advanced cancer treatment.

The hospitals are also important for strategic reasons, as the maintenance of Palestinian services, and the right to access to Jerusalem for Palestinians. The hospitals also contribute to keep connections between the Jerusalem institutions and their sister institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and therefore maintain the integrity of the Palestinian Territory. If further developed, these hospitals could also decrease dependency of the Palestinian on the Israeli health services.³²

The team would also highlight the PRCS rehabilitation centres as particularly relevant health services. There are few services available to mentally disabled children and youth in the oPt. In the Palestinian society, mental disability is still associated with shame and guilt, and most children are kept at home, with no education or social contact. PRCS has based its project on a very good analysis of the situation for mentally disabled in the Palestine. The approach is based on several strategies: adapted educational services available at community centres, home visits to ensure that the whole family network is included, and support to integration of individuals into regular schools.

The primary health care centres operated by the PRCS do also respond to an important need of the population, in particular for pregnant women. However, in this field there are many health actors, both private and public, which to a certain degree is overlapping or competing.

There is a need for an overall mapping of these services to determine needs vs. offer. The health authorities should ideally lead such a mapping, but the MoH does still not have the capacity for mapping and overall planning and coordination of services. MoH is also interested in taking over such services but it is questionable whether they would have the capacity and knowledge to do so.

6.4 Support to Christian minority institutions

Historically, the Palestinian Christians and Moslems have enjoyed good relations. Although there is little intermarriage between the different religious groups in Palestine, there is a high degree of integration in education, social life and in the political sphere. The Christian community has traditionally had a privileged status in the Palestinian society, both in terms of economic situation and educational levels. Christians are also well represented in the political system, many prominent PLO leaders and PA officials are Christians³³. This also reflects the

³² The existence and upgrading of these hospitals have reduced the dependency on Israeli and Jordanian hospitals, for which there are very strict screening routines.

³³ Lende, Gina: "Med Jesus for Palestina: palestinske kristne. Artikkel i Babylon 2004 Volume 1

predominantly Palestinian nationalist sentiment among the Christians and the Christian churches, particularly since the first intifada.³⁴ Most Christians perceive the Israeli occupation as the greatest threat to their continued presence in oPt, but the growing Islamism, particularly in Gaza has led to some targeted attacks on Christian individuals and institutions.

Christian institutions also have a long tradition of providing important services to Palestinians of all religions. Most notably are the primary and secondary schools, vocational training and health services. The Christian society is under pressure, and is rapidly shrinking due to migration. This has particularly been the case in Jerusalem, as the Israeli policy does not allow Jerusalemites who marry West Bank or Gaza Palestinians family reunification. Although this affects all Palestinian Jerusalemites, the impact on the Christian society is more severe because of its size.

The team finds that the support to the Christian institutions has been highly relevant, as it serves to maintain the Palestinian society as a multi religious society, and promotes tolerance and understanding. The case of Gaza can serve as an illustration. As religious fundamentalism has been growing, inclusive and efficient Christian institutions have been important to counter intolerance. More than 90% of the students benefitting from the vocational training program run by DSPR are Moslems. The same is the case of the El Ahli hospital. This is also one of the only hospitals which managed to serve both sides during the internal armed conflict in 2007.

NCA has also supported private schools run by the Protestant Church. These are well run schools mainly for middle class Palestinians, with around 50/50 distribution of Christian and Moslem pupils.

The added value of these schools in relation to the public schools, lies in high quality education and extracurricular activities – eg music, environment and ecumenical teaching that could serve as a model also for the public schools. However, the NCA support lacks some strategic focus on what the project should achieve. The strategy document mentions equal access to education as a main objective, and it was for a while supported with humanitarian funds. However, the target groups have not been the less advantageous, and should thus not qualify for humanitarian assistance.

There is in general a discrepancy between what NCA representatives state is the main purpose and objective of its activities in oPt and what the program and project documents refer to as main objectives. While NCA representatives at all levels frame the program within the importance of maintaining the Christian minority and its institutions for the sake of pluralism, ecumenical/inter-religious tolerance and maintenance of key services, the country strategy and project documents make little reference to this. The team advises NCA to reformulate its strategy and program documents to be more in line with what the organisation really want to achieve.

The team finds that the unbiased provision of services found in e.g the vocational training in Gaza and the hospitals should continue to be at the core of the Norwegian supported programs. LWF and the Augusta Victoria Foundation are in the process of developing a

³⁴ Ibid. Lende also relates this Palestinian identification with the development of a Palestinian "contextual theology", related to Liberation Theology.

territorial plan for the LWF property on Mount of Olives, with the main purpose of avoiding confiscation of land, and ensure continued Palestinian use of the property. The development of the plan itself is (co-)funded by Stiftelsen Oljeberget and the MFA. In a second phase there are plans to build a sports area open for all Jerusalemites, and to develop a housing scheme that is supposed to benefit Christian families only. Although there are some arguments in favour of supporting a threatened minority, the team recommends that Norwegian ODA should be reserved for projects benefitting all communities, and not for investments exclusively for any religious group, as this might create schisms between Christian and Muslim communities which both suffer from the Israeli discriminatory housing policies.

6.5 Relevance of support to participation and democracy support

Several of the NNGO programs are aimed, in different ways, to promote democratic practices and participation of different groups. At an overall level, the team finds that such programs are relevant to the Palestinian situation. The Palestinian society, organisations and state institutions are known to be hierarchical, where young people and women are underrepresented. Several studies, among those the recent Norad commissioned research project on Civil Society role in Peacebuilding³⁵, conclude that socialisation for democratic values is an area the civil society can have a particularly positive impact.

6.5.1 Promoting participation of women and youth

One of NPA's strategic lines has been to promote participation for marginalised groups, in particular women and youth. Programs like Women Can Do It (WCDI) are designed to help Palestinian women articulate their needs, and gain self confidence in their struggle to improve political, social, financial and legal status. The team finds that the project is perceived to be relevant in particular by educated women already participating in the public life. The training provided is supposed to be replicated (a Training of Trainers concept). However, the women who had undertaken the trainings expressed a need for further development and adaptation of the WCDI concept in order to make it relevant also for women at community and grass root level, particularly in Gaza.

It should be noted that NCA and NPA have several programs aimed at strengthening the participation of women in the political domain as well as within the labour force (programs not included in the review), and have several women organisations as partners.

When it comes to promote participation of women within partner organisations and programs, the picture is mixed. Most Norwegian partner organisations reflect the Palestinian society, they are by and large male dominated, with limited participation of women in management positions. However, there are examples of NNGOs that have included gender perspective and promoted female participation quite consistently, like UEN with GUPT Qalquilya and AUF with FYO. NPA also include gender assessment as part of their trainings and workshops with partners.

Both NPA and Norcross have youth programs. There is clearly a need for programs designed

³⁵ Thania Paffenholz (ibid).

to engage and mobilise youth. More than half of the population is below 18, while their job and education possibilities have been reduced drastically. This group also has very little influence on their own situation, and their demands are rarely heard. Male youth are also at a high risk for being recruited into violent and extremist groups.

However, many actors have programs directed to youth, but little has been done to document what works and what does not. The team would recommend the MFA and the NNGOs to engage with other donors, UN and the NNGOs, to do more lessons learned from experiences of different youth programs and their actual impact on the lives of the youth.

Some lessons from the NNGO programs are useful though. A main result of the NPA youth programs is the establishment of dialogue between the youth movements and the Authorities (PA), where issues of relevance for the youth can be raised in a more consistent way. Of the specific NPA youth programs, the team would like to highlight the Jenin project with Yamoun as a good example of a program that has succeeded in mobilising youth. The relevance of this project is also connected to the fact that very few international organisations support programs in this area, which consistently scores low on economical and social indicators compared to the rest of the West Bank.

The Norcross/PRCS youth volunteer program engages a very high number of youth all over the West Bank. While this high degree of mobilisation is a great asset, it does not seem to be capitalised enough. The youth volunteer program seems to be isolated from the regular PRCS activity, and has the character of a youth activity club rather than a voluntary movement. While creating meeting places for youth can have a value in itself, the team would recommend the PRCS/Norcross to further look into the design of the program, and to look at ways to link the youth programs with the PRCS operational activity.

6.5.2 Support for political parties and unions

The Norwegian support for political parties and the unions are also to be seen as relevant objectives, as they focus on increasing participation and internal democracy. However, the projects included in the review have suffered because of the partner organisations resistance to put in place democratic structures and procedures.

The team finds that the AUF support to Fatah Youth Organisation until now has not succeeded in increasing youth participation and influence. However, the project has now a renewed relevance, as the potential for impact is actually increasing due to recent developments within Fatah. However, if tangible results are not forthcoming within a year, the continuation of the support should be reviewed.

The same analysis is applicable also for the cooperation between UEN and GUPT. The unions have an important role in the Palestinian society, not least when it comes to the potential for increasing Palestinian teacher's influence on education policies. However, UEN's support will only have relevance when the elections have taken place, and proper governance institutions are established.

Both AUF and UEN needs to increase substantially their follow up and support in order to deal with the challenges within their partner organisations.

6.6 Relevance of support to rural development and agricultural

production

In the Palestinian Territory, national and international support to agricultural programs has been neglected, despite an increased need for investment and support in the sector. Agricultural programs are needed because of many factors they potentially can address: rural development, livelihood support for families, and support to Palestinian families and communities to maintain presence and counter land confiscations or reclaim confiscated land. The agricultural production has decreased significantly, but is regarded as having potential for economic growth.

The Norwegian support to agricultural production is quite limited, but a few interesting experiences are worth mentioning.

The core of the program the Royal Norwegian Society for Development conducted in the oPt until 2005, was support to rural development. Its partner, PARC, has been a leading non-profit organization working in the field of rural development, environment protection and enhancement of rural women's role and status. Several evaluations concluded that the organisation had achieved very good results for marginalised communities in these areas, despite problems in financial management and administration.

While many international actors – and particularly donors – shy away from right based land projects in e.g zone C, NPA was commended by its partner organisations for its willingness to engage in sensitive projects, such as the land reclamation project in Aqaba (Jenin area), which is located in zone C, as well as being engaged in projects supporting the population being targeted by the construction of the Wall. The agricultural programs in Gaza have been important for two main reasons – the recovery of agricultural land that was confiscated by the Israelis, and later released – and contribution to extremely strained family livelihood. The coverage of the program is quite limited, but there is clear output at family and community level when it comes to increased self reliance and reclaimed ownership.

6.7 Protection and advocacy

The Israeli closure regime and the continued illegal settlements have had detrimental effects on the rights of the Palestinians.³⁶ The severe restrictions on movements have had devastating effects on the economy and have negatively affected Palestinian's access to basic services, including health and education.

Several of the NNGOs projects are aimed to mitigate and counter such effects, either as stand alone projects, or have protection elements within larger programs.³⁷ The team finds these

³⁶ See two recent UN reports for a detailed analysis of the occupation related to international human rights law and international humanitarian law. "Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem". Report of the UN Secretary-General. A/63/518. General Assembly, 5 November 2008 and "Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan". Report of the Secretary-General. A/63/519. General Assembly, 5 November 2008

³⁷ The NNGOs do not necessarily use the term "protection" for these activities, but the team finds the term useful. The team parts from a generally accepted definition of protection: "all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of human rights, refugee and international humanitarian law. Protection involves creating an environment conducive to respect for human

projects and activities of high relevance, as they respond to the most pressing needs experienced by Palestinians.

NCA's participation in the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) is one example of a programme designed to ease the effects of the occupation on freedom of movement. The accompaniment project clearly serves its purpose, and has had impact on the safety of vulnerable populations. One example is the accompaniment of school children in Hebron, which has had a positive effect on children's access to education and their feeling of safety. The presence of accompaniers at check points is perceived by the affected populations to reduce delays, ease physical and psychological harassment and is helping deterring further violations. The project also accompanies communities exposed to attacks from violent settlers, mainly in order to ensure access to the fields. Some communities report that they only dare to venture to the fields when they are accompanied by internationals.³⁸

One of the major resultants of the occupation measures in the past five years is the tightening of the closure and the restriction of mobility in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Closure practices have severely affected all aspects of life including the access to health services. Populations living in villages and towns along the wall have difficulties accessing even basic health services. On access to secondary and tertiary hospital services, the movement restrictions affect all the West Bank and Gaza populations, as travel permits are required to access the hospitals in Jerusalem. These are not always forthcoming, and even patients with life threatening conditions, holding travel permits, are frequently turned back at check points.

Considerable efforts have been undertaken by Norwegian funded health institutions to ensure access to health services despite the restrictions. A central core of the PRCS/ICRC ambulance projects has been to ensure free access of wounded and sick people to health care. When also ambulances had problems of crossing check points, a system of back-to-back ambulances was put in place to overcome severe travel restrictions.

When referred patients increasingly were denied access, both the Augusta Victoria hospital and the Makassed hospitals in Jerusalem initiated transport projects to ease access. Augusta Victoria have put in place bussing services where the buses pick up the patients in their place of residence in the West Bank and Gaza, and take them through the numerous check points to Jerusalem. The two Palestinian hospitals have also made accommodation arrangements so that day patients and accompanying family members who need to prolong their stay can stay over.

When mitigating the effects of the closure regime, there is an inherent dilemma between responding to the needs of the people, and the risk of cementing and accepting illegal practices. The team finds that the NNGOs working in the health sector – and their counterparts - have managed to balance the issues well, and implemented innovative and practical measures to ensure access to basic health, but also managed to stay away from

beings, preventing and/or alleviating the immediate effects of a specific pattern of abuse, and restoring dignified conditions of life through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation. OCHA, Glossary of humanitarian terms in relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Reliefweb. [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/KKEE-6DMRTJ/\\$file/glossary.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/KKEE-6DMRTJ/$file/glossary.pdf?openelement)

³⁸ "Evaluation of the impact of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel". External evaluation. Palestinian Counseling Centre, Jerusalem May 2008.

building infrastructure and parallel institutions.

6.7.1 Documentation and advocacy

The different Norwegian NGOs have approached advocacy differently, mainly according to different mandates and institutional policies and traditions. Organisations like Norwegian Red Cross are bound by the neutrality policy of the movement, and would generally not denounce perpetrators or prescribe solutions to a crisis. They do however call for attention to the situation of the Palestinians suffering from occupation and closure practices, mainly through “human interest” stories and information on their programs. They also call attention to the rare cases where ICRC have released statements on the situation for Palestinians.

NORWAC has also chosen a low profile on advocacy, mainly to ensure continued access to Gaza. They do inform the MFA on the situation, to influence analysis and policy.

For other NNGOs, like NPA, NCA and NRC, advocacy has been much more important part of their programs. NPA is probably the organisation which most extensively and consistently has advocated for a solution to the Palestinian situation. The Secretary General has been very outspoken in a number of press releases, employees have written op-eds in various Norwegian daily papers, they have had close contact with the highest political echelons (in Norway), they have hosted seminars and published a critical and well researched book on the Palestinian predicament (in Norwegian). The advocacy is quite consistently based on international law, and is mostly directed towards the Norwegian public and policy makers.

The NCA advocacy is also mainly directed towards the Norwegian public. The testimonies of the accompaniers are used to spread knowledge about the effects of the closure regime, including through media coverage and blogs. The advocacy also targets particularly parishes and other Christian groups, as many of the accompaniers are recruited from the parishes.

NRC’s advocacy has been more aimed to international actors and the public. The Geneva based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has included the situation for Palestinians who have been displaced by illegal demolitions and the construction of the wall.

NRC was also active in promoting coordination of protection – in particular for the internally displaced persons. The representative chaired the protection working group, which served to bring national and international NGOs together, in attempts to streamline protection responses, and identify gaps. This coordination was appreciated by the other NGOs, as it was the first time they were brought together to address protection issues systematically.

Documentation of violations of international law is regarded as a relevant and important part of protection of civilians. The NCA accompaniment project includes documentation of cases. This information is shared with OCHA, and is included in systematic reporting and mapping.

6.7.2 Access to legal rights

Some NNGOs (NPA and NCA), international NGOs and partners provide legal assistance for Palestinians, but mostly through smaller projects, and single cases. International and Palestinian observers reckoned legal aid still to be a gap, and that the existing programs (Norwegian funded and others) could be more systematic, more coordinated and also present collective cases. The NRC plan to restart its program in the oPt includes the ICLA project

(Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance). The review team thinks this project can potentially be a useful response to an identified need. A thorough assessment of existing programs and actors would be needed, that also look at lessons from earlier experience.

International and other observers consulted for the review, concur in defining advocacy and protection as areas that should be strengthened, but call for better coordinated advocacy, firmly based on international legal standards. The Norwegian NGOs could benefit from taking a more strategic approach to advocacy, which would include better defined target audiences and expected results. The NNGOs should also seek to coordinate their advocacy efforts, both at Norwegian level, in the region and internationally.

6.8 Gender considerations

When looking at whether the programs are equally relevant to the needs of men and women, the team has looked at whether gender assessment has been included in the design of the programs, and whether the reporting of result is differentiated between female and male beneficiaries. (Women's participation is dealt with under 6.5.1)

When it comes to specific analysis of gender, weaknesses are found that corresponds to the lack of explicit conflict and situation analysis. Most of the NGOs have an awareness of e.g. the situation for women, but gender analysis and assessment is mostly patchy and not very well documented, as is the contextual analysis in general.

Those with particular gender related programs (NCA and NPA) have the most elaborated analysis, and have included differentiated reporting in several of the programs. An example is the NPA emergency support to agricultural sector in Gaza and West Bank, which includes a breakdown on female and male beneficiaries, both direct and indirect, and whether the participating organisations are male or female oriented. The same procedure is followed by NCA and partners in the vocational training and the support to private schools. Norcross is much less consistent about such reporting, but has encouraged PRCS to include project based gender data in the general programming.

Some of the NNGOs, such as NPA, have also included gender assessment tools in the general project planning and monitoring workshops and trainings with counterparts.

7 ADAPTABILITY AND CONFLICT SENSITIVITY OF THE NNGOS

One of the main aspects the team was requested to look at was whether and how the NNGOs have been able to adapt their programs to a changing context.

7.1 Adaptability

The team finds that the NNGOs generally have proved to be flexible in adjusting programs and projects to new situations, but that they have met the challenges in different ways.

The first major challenge was when the second intifada erupted around 2001. Most of the NNGOs had by then planned for continued stability and an environment conducive for development. NPA and Norcross, while maintaining the institutional support to partners, added activities to respond to the new situation. NORWAC, which was preparing for a gradual phase out due to less need for emergency support, quickly adjusted these plans, and increased its support to the then strained health institutions. The organisations also responded well to the increased closure regime the Israeli authorities imposed in the wake of the intifada, and included elements in the projects to ease the negative effect on partners and beneficiaries.

A second challenge was the revelation of corrupt practices and lack of transparency within both the PA and civil society institutions around the same time. Several of the organisations, like NPA, Norcross and Stiftelsen Oljeberget, increasingly focused on transparency issues, and supported their partners to put improved financial and management procedures in place. Others were less attentive to this issue, the external evaluation of the Norwegian Royal Society for Development (Norges Vel) cooperation with PARC concluded that there was little transparency regarding revenue and transactions, due to poor financial and administrative routines. Few of the donors, including Norges Vel, made any efforts to improve these routines.

The Governance crisis in 2006/2007 also raised new challenges for the Norwegian NGOs and their partners. Most of them have responded by increasing humanitarian support and emergency measures for the affected populations.

7.2 Conflict sensitivity

The main indicators the team has looked at when it comes to conflict sensitivity were 1) whether the NNGO have sound analysis of the main dimensions of the conflict (internal political divisions and the continued occupation) and the impact on the society and the organisations, 2) whether projects and activities have aimed to mitigate the effects of the conflict or minimize risk of further deteriorations, and 3) whether the NNGO have aimed to increase transparency, and if procedures have been put in place to reduce possibilities of misuse of funds and influence.

The team finds that all of the Norwegian organisations included in the review have sound analysis of the causes of the conflict, actors, trends and consequences for the society. All of the organisations are also aware of the potential to aggravate tension and conflict, but only NPA has an *explicit* conflict sensitive approach. This is reflected in thorough and well-

documented analysis, with links to the programmatic strategies. For most of the NNGOs, gender assessment, meaning analysis of how the conflict affects men and women differently, is only partially undertaken, and to a more limited degree streamlined into programs.

In general there is a need to develop explicit conflict analysis and response strategies that will be regularly updated and modified according to the new developments and changes within the oPt. How the conflict affects women and men differently should also be part of such analysis.

7.2.1 The Hamas – Fatah division

The division between Hamas and Fatah is permeating Governance institutions, the Civil Society and communities. The team has looked at whether the Norwegian funded projects and activities have aimed to mitigate the effects of this division, or if there is potential for aggravate this tension. The team found that this dimension is recognised, and several of the agencies report that they take care to keep a balance between the parties.

Some of the NNGOs have had explicit policies to avoid getting caught in between Fatah and Hamas. NPA's strategy has been to avoid working with organisations with a high stake in the internal political organisations belonging to either of the two main parties. Through informal networks and a profound knowledge of Palestinian society, NPA analyses the potential partner organisation's affiliation, ability to organise and willingness of inclusion. It should be noted that choosing partners that are *not* affiliated with the main parties does not necessarily imply neutrality, as these also can have their political agendas.

Also some of the Gaza hospitals have been affected by the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. When the fighting was at its most intense in June 2007, the wounded needed to be kept separated, some at the MoH hospital (Hamas) and some at the PRCS hospital (Fatah). Although this was a pragmatic emergency measure to avoid tension and fighting among relatives, the perception that these two hospitals are biased has persisted. Such issues are sensitive for the Norwegian counterparts, but should nevertheless be taken into account, and discussed with the hospital management. On the other hand, NCA supported El Ahli hospital has had a specific strategy to serve equally wounded and sick from all factions, families/clans and parties. This policy of impartiality and neutrality has been possible to maintain due to consistent dialogue and negotiations with all parties.

Although the knowledge is somewhat personalised, and the analysis and strategies are seldom documented, the team finds that a high degree of conflict sensitivity has facilitated NORWACs continued work in e.g. Gaza throughout periods of intense conflict and closure. The public health services in Gaza have been affected by the conflict between Hamas and Fatah, in the way that the actual control and leadership of the health institutions are contested. NORWAC has solved this through maintaining close relationship with the Ramallah based MoH and their highest functionary in Gaza, and at the same time liaising with the de facto health authorities in Gaza. The team recommends that the NNGOs should use these and other experiences, to elaborate more on issues of neutrality and impartiality, and the principle of "do no harm".

A related dimension of the conflict that needs to be addressed more thoroughly is the West Bank – Gaza division. Adding to the Hamas – Fatah tension, the strict closure regime has created two different societies, with few lines of communication left. Most of the Palestinian partner organisations with presence in both areas are experiencing difficulties in communication and finding common grounds. This has impacted partner organisation in

different ways.

While for some it is mainly a question of communication and lack of meeting points, a few others have experienced tension between the main management (most often Ramallah based) and the Gaza section. An illustration is the recent teacher strike in Gaza, where the GUPT management did not consult with the Gaza section before calling for the strike. The strike was very controversial in Gaza, and a common perception there was that this strike was responding more to the PA interests than the interests of the teachers.

The issue of denied access to Gaza imposed by the Israeli Authorities intensifies the gaps and the way the NNGO implements projects in the West Bank and Gaza. The problem of maintaining a regular presence in Gaza reduces the possibilities to monitor implementation to ensure that funds have been oriented towards the right beneficiaries as indicated in project documents. Reliance on reporting by the partner organizations becomes in this case the main source of information.

7.2.2 Impartiality and neutrality

It is necessary to distinguish between *impartiality* and *neutrality* when providing humanitarian aid and basic services, and civil society organisations roles as representatives of certain interests and political alternatives. Palestinian civil society organisations cannot be expected to be neutral towards their own society. Some partner organisations are political in nature (Fatah Youth), or represent particular interests, (GUPT) which is a legitimate role.

By and large the projects of the NNGOs with service provision element have aimed to be impartial, i.e. not discriminating between the beneficiaries and providing services according to needs, and to a certain degree neutral – that the service is not biased according to political preferences, or benefitting certain groups or elites.

NRC, when starting up their program in Gaza, was aware of the potential for conflict, as the municipalities are political entities, and subject to rivalry between the factions. NRC therefore had as an objective for the project to reduce tension between the factions.

7.2.3 Transparency

Most of the NNGOs have increasingly addressed transparency issues within their partner organisations. NPA, Norcross and Stiftelsen Oljeberget have most systematically worked with their partners to put procedures in place to ensure financial transparency. NCA is still in this process, and has already achieved some results. However, this process should be further intensified and systematised, with a clear strategy.

NORWAC and NRC have had a different approach to transparency. They have both channelled their funds through renowned international auditing companies that also arrange for competitive bids and undertake the actual purchases of equipment. This is a non-bureaucratic arrangement that both ensures financial transparency of their own contributions, and swift implementation which is needed for humanitarian projects. However, there is little lasting impact on the partners' ability to improve financial management and transparency.³⁹

³⁹ See also the Chapter 5 on partnership models for more detailed analysis on work with the partners

8 SUSTAINABILITY

The team was asked to assess whether the NNGO interventions have been sustainable, including how the programs have contributed to increased institutional capacity of the Palestinian partners, and how program design has aimed to overcome challenges for sustainability.

Within this review, the team has followed an approach for defining sustainability that is closer to the term “connectedness”. While the concept of sustainability would imply that the activities or institutions are able to continue beyond the life of the project or external donations, connectedness refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.

The primary reasons for the above are the recognition of the complex and unique situation in the oPt, which is summarized in the dependency on aid, non-sustainable economy and occupation, all factors that will go contrary to sustainability, understood in traditional terms. However, projects and assistance can still produce sustainable outcomes.

The team also recognizes that in vulnerable and unstable situations aid organizations tend to increasingly focus on humanitarian aid, and specialize in projects of rapid distribution. Furthermore, in some instances aid organizations are pressurised to respond rapidly without allowing for desired time of planning, feasibility assessment and long-term impact analysis. Altogether, this leads to intensified dependency on aid money and therefore sustainability beyond the life of the projects becomes more challenging.

Given the foregoing, in assessing the sustainability of the projects/interventions, the team has looked into whether or not the NNGOs have required that the right governance structures are in place before intervening. Secondly, the team has assessed the extent to which the projects improve resilience, knowledge and innovative solutions, and include an element of institutional and capacity building especially in emergency and disaster preparedness.

Despite the situation of “de-development” in oPt, several of the NNGOS have worked together with their counterparts to overcome the enormous challenge of sustainability. NGOs have built capacity and improved planning, management and transparency. The team finds that several Norwegian NGOs have had a sustainable impact⁴⁰ on a range of Palestinian organisations and institutions, while others have to a lesser degree taken due regard to the issue.

The team finds that the organisations that most systematically have addressed sustainability issues in these terms have been Stiftelsen Oljeberget when working with the Augusta Victoria Hospital, and Norcross’ Organisational Development program with PCRS.

Although the initial purpose of Stiftelsen Oljeberget was to respond to the severe financial crisis of the LWF run hospital Augusta Victoria, it soon became evident that the hospital was

⁴⁰ Impact here does not imply impact at societal level, but at organisational level

suffering from very unclear divisions of responsibility between the board, the management and the operational functions, and that it had very weak systems of financial and administrative control. The subsequent profound reform of the hospital was made possible because of a unique mix of personalities, experiences and skills from Oljeberget and the hospital itself. Clarification of roles, and professionalization of the governance level as well as the management was key to the success. The Augusta Victoria is today a modern, well-run specialised hospital serving Palestinians from Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. The hospital is, as all Palestinian hospitals, still dependent on external funding. However, there is a sound financial diversification, and the hospital is a much more robust institution that has the ability to adapt to changes in the environment. The team believes a major part can be attributed to Stiftelsen Oljeberget and NCA support.

The team finds that the Norcross focus on supporting organisational development in PRCS has contributed to the sustainability of the organisation. With the support of Norcross, PRCS has improved its strategic focus, planning capacity and efficiency. However, there are still many challenges in these areas. The organisation has still some overall decisions to make on core functions and activities. What is important is that the Norcross program has improved the capacity of the organisation to deal with challenges, such as improved planning capacity, strategic vision, financial management and learning.

Norwac's strategy of enhancing the Palestinian hospitals self sustainability, in particular through the provision of oxygen factories, has improved the hospitals' resilience and independence. However, building institutional capacity is another challenge, which can be illustrated by the Norwac's support to the Makassed hospital. On the one hand, the investments in crucial hospital infrastructure are sustainable outputs, as they have decreased running costs, and facilitated the certification by the Israeli health authorities. These investments have in many ways ensured the survival of the hospital. However, the hospital is facing huge challenges when it comes to planning capacity and governance and management issues.

The lack of a sound financial plan is also threatening the sustainability of the institution, which survives on short term and ad hoc financial contributions. The hospital is in need of a major structural adjustment, a challenge that goes far beyond the capacity of Norwac alone. However, the fact that Norwac/MFA is the single largest external donor puts a large responsibility on the organisation and the Norwegian authorities. It is important to note that Norwac was not asked by Makassed to face the more structural challenges. However, Norwac, with an active support role of the MFA/Norwegian Representative Office, could put in place some measures to facilitate longer term planning and reform. One would be that the MFA would commit to longer term financial support. This would imply a change in the current relationship, where Norwac is mainly responsive to the requests of the management. A longer term financial commitment should be on the condition that a reform process is initiated. The team would recommend the Norwegian authorities to engage more actively with other donors, to ensure a support group to accompany such a process.

9 COHERENCE

9.1 Coherence with National Authorities.

9.1.1 Coherence at Policy level

When looking at coherence with the national policies and plans of the PA, there are a few characteristics of the PA that needs to be addressed. The Palestinian territory remains occupied, which means a strong limitation to the authority and capacity of the PA.

The PA has been in a severe governance crisis since the February 2007 elections. There are currently two *de facto* governments, which actively undermine each other. The high degree of aid dependence and very weak donor coordination at operational level often means that donor preferences overrule PA priorities.

None the less, the PA has continued to produce national development plans. In the latest development plan presented by the PA (Palestinian National Policy Agenda 2008-2010) the PA states that: “The eventual Palestinian state will be founded on democratic and pluralistic principles and humanistic values. Its institutions will protect human rights, religious tolerance and the rule of law, promote gender equality and serve the needs of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, enabling all citizens to fulfil their potential”. Almost all of the Norwegian NGOs’ projects and programs are consistent with this overall aim.

The multifaceted activities conducted by the NNGOs are considered to be in accordance with more specific policy priorities of the PA. The Norwegian involvement with institutions in East Jerusalem and the work in area C is one example.

9.1.2 The lobby and advocacy role of Civil Society

The lobby and advocacy activities of the civil society are both directed towards Israel and the Palestinian Authorities. The awareness raising campaigns of NNGOs that deal with the occupation and its consequences for the Palestinian civil population are very much in line with PA priorities.

However, within some projects in the field of democratisation and protecting the rights of women, children, workers, youth and disabled, local partners play an active role in lobbying the Palestinian executive or legislative powers for implementing changes that aim to protect these groups. This is particularly the case with NPA partners, which in several cases have influenced the development of legislation on labour rights, laws protecting disabled and Family law.

NPA policy has been to support and strengthen Palestinian NGOs to influence the legal decision makers in oPt to the benefit of large segments of the population. The role of the civil society in a democracy should not be one of simply adhering to the policies of the Government, but also to have a watch dog role which implies to challenge, influence and provide alternative visions.

9.1.3 Sector coordination

The health sector is probably where coordination between public and private actors is best functioning. All of the NNGO health partners participate actively in coordination activities, and the Ministry of Health recognises the importance of private health institutions like PRCS, Augusta Victoria, the Makassed hospital and Al Ahli Hospital.

Evidently, institutions like NORWAC that has a direct partnership with the MoH are conducting projects that respond directly to the priorities of the health authorities. However, the private hospitals in Jerusalem, the Makassed and Augusta Victoria, are regarded by the authorities as part of the total health services in oPt, and coordinate closely with the MoH through referral agreements and other arrangements.

The MoH recognises the need for the private sector for a range of health services, but called for a clearer division of roles and responsibilities between public and private health services. This was welcomed by all of the partners included in the review, but they had serious doubts about the capacity of the MoH to take the lead in such a process.

In the other sectors, the capacity to plan and coordinate is even less. Almost all of the Palestinian partner organisations complained that the PA did not have the capacity to provide the necessary leadership in providing overall frameworks and plans within the main sectors the organisations work in. One NGO stated that “we are not aware that the PA has any plans when it comes to youth issues.”⁴¹ The lack of a tradition conducive to consultations and involvement of the civil society when developing plans, was also recognised by several PA officials to be a major obstacle to harmonisation of activities.

The operational coordination mechanisms provided by the international community have also traditionally been weak, which has resulted in a poor overview of where the most pressing needs and gaps are. OHCA, which has the mandate on the humanitarian side, has mostly worked on monitoring and advocacy on humanitarian access and the closure regime, and has only recently started focussing on strategic and operational coordination. An important tool is the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), which is meant to provide the main framework for defining priority areas. While several of the NNGO partners have participated in the CAP processes in 2007 and 2008, most of the NNGOs have not engaged directly. As this has the potential to improve a joint priority setting, it would be recommended that the Norwegian NGOs consider participation in the formulation of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) which provides joint analysis, objectives and priority areas for humanitarian and early recovery activities.

9.1.4 Gaza – issues on coherence and coordination

The particular governance situation of Gaza has made all coordination activities difficult. International and national NGOs must relate to two de facto competing authorities, with different priorities and policies. Most of the NNGOs have managed to keep a balance between the two, with formal relations with the Ramallah based ministries and at the same time keeping a pragmatic channel of communication with the de facto ministries in Gaza.

⁴¹ Interview conducted during fieldwork in Jenin during June 2008.

9.2 Coherence with Norwegian Policy

The overall Norwegian objective for oPt has been to support the establishment of a two-state solution. For the ODA, this has translated into a focus on state building within the framework of good governance, particularly through supporting and promoting the establishment and development of democratic institutions.

It should be noted that there is no single strategic framework for the Norwegian support to the oPt, policy guidance is to be found in a range of governing documents on oPt, including the Budget proposal (St. Prop 1), internal allocation notes within the different sections in the MFA, and the annual work plans for the Norwegian Representation Office. In addition there are strategies, policy papers and action plans governing global policy areas, such as for gender, civil society and humanitarian assistance.⁴²

As most of the governing documents on oPt are not public, the Norwegian NGOs rely on dialogue and meetings with the MFA for an understanding of Norwegian policy and priorities. Contact is quite frequent, both with the political level and the administration, and is characterised by openness and mutual trust. Differences are accepted and discussed, and the NNGOs frequently raise critical questions on sensitive issues. In oPt, the Norwegian Representation Office aims to have quarterly meetings with the Norwegian NGOs, but due to capacity issues, these have not been regular. They do have informal bilateral meetings with some of the Norwegian representatives.

In general, the Norwegian authorities and the NGOs share the main analysis of the conflict when it comes to causes, actors and trends. However, while the authorities' analysis and plans are mostly framed within the politically negotiated two-state solution, an important reference for the NGOs is international humanitarian law and human rights law.

The complex administrative management of MFA/Norad grants makes it difficult for the different sections within MFA/Norad to have a complete picture of the support to civil society organisations in oPt. Each budget vote is administered by different sections, as is follow up and monitoring. The Norwegian Representation Office does not channel funds to Norwegian NGOs, but it is involved in the allocation process, and provides grants directly to Palestinian civil society organisations.

Norwegian NGOs are seen as important partners, in particular for implementing humanitarian assistance. This assistance is seen not only as a means to avoid increased humanitarian suffering, but also to contribute to Palestinian state building, through building capacity for Palestinian institutions. Support to Norwegian NGO programs are also a way to ensure Norwegian engagement in the Palestinian issue. There is however, not a fully shared understanding among MFA officials on the role of the Norwegian NGOs and the Palestinian civil society, and to what degree it should be prioritised.

⁴² Norway's Humanitarian Policy sets the following four goals: ensure that people in need receive the necessary protection and assistance, finance humanitarian assistance based on the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, equip the international community to meet future global humanitarian challenges, and prevent, respond to and initiate the recovery of communities after humanitarian crises. The strategy was launched in September 2008 and was thus posterior to the review period. It is nevertheless based on established principles and practices for the Norwegian humanitarian assistance.

The review team would recommend the MFA to develop a country strategy as it has the potential to promote coherence, transparency and predictability, and would be beneficial for the dialogue with the Norwegian NGOs. Such a policy and strategy for oPt could elaborate more on the role of the Palestinian civil society in the framework of state building and nation building. Such a strategy should be publicly available, and consulted with the NGOs.⁴³

Monitoring and follow up of grant to Norwegian NGOs are not systematically undertaken by any of the sections. A common strategic framework would facilitate systematic monitoring. The team thinks that the Representation Office is best placed to undertake follow up of the NGO programs, but as it currently is not within the office's responsibilities and capacity, it would imply a strengthening of the office.

⁴³ See the "Office of the Auditor General's investigation into the effectiveness of Norwegian humanitarian assistance" document no. 3:2 (2008-2009) for a discussion on the need for strategic frameworks and country strategies. UK and Sweden have both developed country strategies for oPt that could serve as models, See "Strategy for development cooperation with the West Bank and Gaza. July 2008 – December 2011". Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden.

ANNEX I TERMS OF REFERENCE

A Review of Norwegian NGO assistance to Palestine 1999 - 2006

Terms of reference for Norwegian government assistance to Palestine from 1999 – 2006 through selected Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

1 Political and Humanitarian Context

Since the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000 the Palestinian society has witnessed a turbulent and tragic period. More than 3,600 Palestinian have been killed in violent confrontations, and over 4,000 Palestinian houses have been demolished by Israel. In June 2002 Israel started building the separation barrier that will effectively annex more than 10% of the West Bank when concluded. The construction has continued despite the 2005 opinion of the International Court of Justice that it is contrary to international law. The expanding presence of Israeli infrastructure in the West Bank – settlements, outposts, military infrastructure, etc. – adds to the geographic, political and economic fragmentation of the the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), to the detriment both of present livelihood and future viability.

Due to the imposed travel restrictions on goods and people, further reinforced by the construction of the barrier, the humanitarian situation in oPt has continued to deteriorate severely. Since 2001 the poverty rate has been on the rise. In 2004 53% of Palestinians lived in poverty. By the end of 2005 more than 28% of the national work force was unemployed. The poverty rate now stands at 57 % and food insecurity affects 34 % of the population. (Rep.kontoret kommer tilbake med oppdaterte tall på et senere tidspunkt)

Political elections took place in 2004 and in 2005 when the second Palestinian President was democratically elected. The same year Israel handed over the control of Jericho and Tulkarem to the Palestinian Authorities (PA) again, after Israel had re-entered the cities on the West Bank in 2002 and abandoned the settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the Northern West Bank. However, in January 2006 Hamas won the parliamentary elections and formed a new government which did not receive international recognition. Financial aid to PA ministries stopped as a consequence. This, together with the Israeli withholding of VAT revenues to the PA, created a very acute humanitarian situation and contributed to an aggravated security situation in which armed clashes broke loose between Hamas and Fatah affiliated factions in Gaza. The February Fatah-Hamas ceasefire collapsed in May 2007, and inter-factional violence resumed, culminating in the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June.

As a result the Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the short-lived National Unity Government (NUG), and formed a new government in mid-June without the participation of Hamas. In practice, there are now two authorities in control, the government of Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza.

Recent political developments have deepened the humanitarian crisis even further, in particular the Israeli decision to seal off Gaza completely – including a reduction in access to electricity and humanitarian assistance – after Israel declared Gaza a “hostile entity” in September 2007. Few residents can now exit Gaza, even in the case of medical emergency, and only extremely limited humanitarian supplies can enter Gaza. A complete halt to the import of raw materials and exports to Israel and the wider world resulted in 75,000 Gazan employees laid off by mid-September. Dependency on agencies such as UNRWA and WFP in Gaza now stands at 80%, which will further increase due to the continuing closure of Gaza’s external borders. (Rep. kontoret kommer tilbake med oppdaterte tall på et senere tidspunkt).

2 Norwegian NGOs in Palestine

Norwegian NGOs (NNGOs) have been active in the Palestinian Territories for decades, supported by humanitarian and development grants. Until 1993/94 most of their support concentrated on social and economic development based on their own needs assessments. With the Oslo-process the focus of the NNGOs increasingly shifted towards broader political goals as they became sensitized to Norway’s role as facilitator of the peace process. Although the actual impact of this is not known, it influenced considerably their thinking about cooperation with Palestinian partner organisations and how to interact with state institutions as these were built by foreign assistance at the same time.

At the time many NNGOs felt that the Norwegian Government wanted them to be more ‘hands-on’ in their relation to areas defined as vital to Norwegian strategic interests in the peace process, with more coherence between activities funded from different budget lines and more rationale behind choices of roles, partners and type of interventions. Another key challenge for the NNGOs was how to assist in humanitarian aid and service delivery for public sector institutions at different levels to improve the welfare system, while at the same time support civil society groups in their advocacy work directed towards political change, anti-corruption and improved respect for human rights.

New fundamental challenges came after year 2000 with the second Intifada, the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the growing open conflict between Fatah and Hamas for control over Palestinian political and security institutions. This had profound impact on the political, economic and security environment in which Norwegian NGOs worked in different partnership arrangements with local organisations.

In the period 1999 – 2005 Norway allocated **606 million NOKs** to the Palestinian Territories through **39 Norwegian NGOs**. Some organisations worked exclusively on funds provided either by Norad or MFA. Close to a half of the funds (289 million NOK) went to NNGOs that were involved in both humanitarian aid/relief work and long-term development assistance (see Annex). The capacity of the NNGOs ranged from small foundations with volunteer staff to large professional NGOs with a Norwegian representation in the country.

Modes of operation have varied. Some chose to be self-implementing; others did work through local partners or through NGO-consortiums. In order to capture the full picture of this situation 8 – 10 NNGOs shall be selected for more in-depth studies that will assess their internal coherence in terms of programs and organisational set-up, their links with national and international actors, compliance with relevant national development plans and how they

pursued gender strategies and other strategies for capacity building of the Palestinian civil society and highlight the lessons learnt from working through this period of turbulence (for more details on selection criteria see point 4 below).

3 Purpose, Objectives, Review Criteria and Intended Users

The overall purpose is to *describe* how the Norwegian NGOs organisations became involved, which sectors and programs they went into, how they chose their partner and then *assess* against shifting political and humanitarian circumstances the results achieved through their total assistance to Palestine in the period 1999 to 2006 (at least at outcome level). Based on this, the review shall *conclude and recommend* future priorities (sectors, programs and partners) for Norwegian NGO assistance to the Palestinian civil society.

More precisely, to what extent have they been able to fulfil the following objectives:

- a) Adjust their goals and activities to reflect changes in Palestinian political, social and economic conditions and priorities?
- b) Relate to the responsible Palestinians authorities and national priorities?
- c) Influence PA development policies and sector priorities with regard to poverty reduction and capacity building?
- d) Achieve sustainable results at outcome/impact level?
- e) Manage optimally the humanitarian, transitional and long-term development funds from MFA and Norad according to the guidelines for each budget line when applied individually and for combined funding operations?
- f) Use innovative and effective strategies to support local partners and help build a sustainable Palestinian civil society?

The review will cover both long-term development aid and humanitarian assistance, of which the latter counts for 65,6 % of the total support.

Main review criteria

The review shall follow the standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, but add relevant ALNAP⁴⁴ criteria for planning and evaluation for conflict zones, such as connectedness, coordination/coherence, coverage and participation. Also the new OECD/DAC approach to evaluation of activities working in and on conflicts will be applied whenever relevant.⁴⁵

Intended users

⁴⁴) ALNAP - Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Actions.

⁴⁵) OECD/DCD (March 2007) 3, "An Approach to DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Activities.

Main stakeholders in the review are:

- Norway as a donor (Norad, The Representative Office of Norway to the Palestinian Authority, MFA)
- Norwegian NGOs (see Annex for list)
- Palestinian partners, ranging from community-based organizations (CBOs) and national NGOs to PA governmental bodies and ministries.

Indirect stakeholders that should be consulted:

- Palestinian Authorities
- Other development actors in Palestine

4 Scope of Work, Indicators, Selection of in-depth Cases and Coverage

Scope of work

In order to meet the overall purpose of the review the following eight thematic issues shall be addressed:

1) *Added value*: What have been the strengths and weaknesses of the different partnership models used by NNGOs in terms of achieving their objectives - ranging from humanitarian aid, lobby and advocacy work directed at policy level, capacity building of civil society organisations, and service delivery - to special target groups at community level?

Can impact on policy, capacity building, service delivery and watchdog/advocacy be attributed to inputs from Norwegian partners?

2) *The RRD continuum*: To what extent did NNGOs and local partners relate their work to shifting requirements as the context moved back and forth on the RRD continuum? What consequences did this have for their selection of partnership models?

3) *Collaboration*: In what ways did NNGOs contribute to local and regional collaboration between public, private and civil society organisations in order to extend networks and professional capacity of their partners?

4) *Coherence*: To what degree did their activities comply with national development plans? Did the activities contribute to strengthening government and/or civil society's ability to promote poverty reduction and provide humanitarian relief? Did they strengthen the national authority's ability to govern?

Did public demands for coherence have any effect on the Norwegian NGOs' basic philosophy and aid principles or on how their activities were actually implemented? Were the NNGOs directly or through their partners involved in consultations related to the development of the Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP)?

5) *Sustainability*: Were NNGOs' partner policies and practical abilities effective in strengthening Palestinian civil society's capacity within a context of traditional, local power structures? To what extent did the NNGOs and their Palestinian partners succeed in promoting gender issues, build arenas to express their interest and views and help local authorities to improve their services?

6) *Flexibility and conflict sensitivity*: Did Norwegian NGOs and their Palestinian partners integrate conflict sensitive methods and approaches in the implementation of projects to mitigate changing circumstances? To what degree did security issues influenced their work?

7) *Development and innovation*: To what extent were potential synergies between humanitarian and development projects developed and utilised? How were gender issues integrated into project/programme design? What kinds of monitoring routines and evaluation systems were developed and implemented? What type of tools and instruments were field tested in order to measure results and effects? How accurately did they try to measure impacts on vulnerable groups?

8) *Partnership models*: Did different partnership and implementation models influence the approaches pursued by the Norwegian NGOs and their Palestinian partners?

Indicators

Each of these thematic issues should be formulated into research questions in an Inception Report before the field visit (see point 6 below). The level of ambition in answering these questions should be adjusted to what kind of information already exists and is accessible within the limited time available for the review process.

In-depth organisational selection criteria

From the list of 39 NNGOs a smaller sample of eight to ten organisations shall be chosen for closer examination. The purpose of this ‘mini-universe’ is to make the review more manageable. All categories of humanitarian assistance, service delivery, capacity building and advocacy organisations and their partnership arrangements shall be represented in the sample. A reasonable mix of different sectors, program approaches and size of activities, ranging from small to medium and large scale interventions, shall also be aimed for.

The sample shall include 3 organisations only with MFA-funding (the Norwegian Refugee Council being one of them), 3 organisations with only Norad funding (including the Royal Norwegian Society for Development) and 3 organisations with mixed funding from MFA and Norad (Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian People’s Aid and Norwegian Church Aid). The reasons for pre-selecting these five organisations are that they are all very experienced actors in humanitarian and/or development work and have been medium and large scale grant receivers during the whole review period. Other organisations in the sample shall be chosen by the review team, based on document reading, survey data and interviews in Norway. Altogether, the in-depth studies shall capture the full range of different overall objectives, modes of operation, sector involvement, volume, special competence and innovative approaches.

Geographical coverage

The review shall ideally include organisations working both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. However, since the security situation makes it unlikely for the Norwegian/international consultants to visit Gaza, other arrangements should be looked for. One option is to let the local consultants do the field work in Gaza and meet with the rest of the team afterwards either in Jerusalem or some other convenient location together with NNGO partners from

Gaza.

5 Implementation of the Review

Methodology

The review shall use at least the following data collection instruments:

- Desk study – review of key documents
- Structured/semi-structured interviews with key personnel at MFA, Norad, relevant Norwegian NGOs both at headquarters and local offices, as well as local partners.
- Field trips to the West Bank, - and if possible – to the Gaza Strip, meeting key personnel and partners, and gathering quantitative and qualitative, primary and secondary data.

Qualifications

The study shall be undertaken by a consortium of two or more highly respected research/consultancy organisations that will ensure the necessary institutional independence and objectivity of the review. For the same reasons the team shall be composed of one Norwegian, one international and two national consultants with special knowledge of the situation in the West banks and in the Gaza Strip. The lead institution shall be Norwegian.

The team as a whole shall have the following qualifications:

- Good general knowledge of current Norwegian and international development policy.
- Thorough knowledge of and experience with the Middle East region in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Palestinian civil society organisations in particular.
- Good knowledge of civil society as a channel for development cooperation, including good knowledge of the main sectors and thematic areas that Norwegian NGOs are working in.
- Documented experience with producing studies and reports of a similar form and magnitude.

Workload

The review is estimated to a workload equivalent to 18 man/weeks for the international consultants, and 6 man/weeks for the local consultants. The tasks will be divided between the team members, with approximately six man/weeks assigned to interviews and review documents in the archives in Norway (Norad, MFA and NNGOs), six man/weeks for field visits, and the remaining six man/weeks for analysis and report writing. It is expected that the whole process will take approximately four months, **starting in April/May 2008 and ending in July/August 2008**. An Inception Report with preliminary findings, review questions and field work methodology and procedures will be submitted to Norad and MFA for comments before departure for fieldwork.

The field visit will be indispensable in order to collect first hand data from the organisations, get partner views and adjust, interpret and verify observations and conclusions. The team will manage and coordinate the local consultant(s) over the course of the contract to the maximum benefit of the outputs described below.

Work Plan

The team shall undertake a consultancy organised as follows:

1. *Preparation phase* [April 2008]
 - a. Background reading
 - b. Discussions and interviews
 - c. Plan field visit
2. *Present Inception Report* for comments to Norad [May 2008]
3. *Field visit to West Banks and (if possible) to the Gaza Strip* [May/June 2008]
 - a. Adjust review methodology if necessary
 - b. Interviews with stakeholders
4. *Process & verify information* [May/June 2008]
 - a. Analyse information
 - b. Conduct additional interviews with NNGOs (if needed)
 - c. Produce draft report
5. *Final report* [August 2008]
 - a. Receive input comments on draft two weeks after circulation
 - b. Produce final report by the end of August 2008.

6 Reporting

The Consultant shall produce an Inception Report at the end of the preparation phase with initial observations, refined research questions, methodological approach and the final list of organisations for in depth studies.

The final report shall not be more than 40 pages (xcluding annexes)and include sections outlining:

Executive Summary including key findings & recommendations

- Background
 - Context Analysis of the Middle East conflict and Occupied Territories - in particular in the period 1999 - 2006 (or refer to already existing analysis)
 - Approach and methodology chosen by consultants
 - Stakeholders' SWOT Analysis
- Findings
- Overall assessments
- Conclusions and Recommendations

The Report shall be delivered in electronic form.

7 Budget

The lead consultant shall submit a budget with estimated costs of the Norwegian Team Leader (xx days), the international team members and the two local consultants (xx days) including travel expenses. The total cost is expected not to exceed 700.000 NOK.

8 Roles and responsibilities

The sharing of responsibilities among involved actors is outlined below. Asterix (*) indicates who has the overall responsibility for the task.

	Norad (Oslo)	MFA (Oslo)	Rep Office (Al Ram)	NNGOs	Team leader (TL)	Team member (TM)
Contract TL	x					
Nominate TM	x	x	x		x	
Contract TM					x*	
Drafting TOR	x*					
Input to TOR		x	x	x	x	x
Finalize/approve TOR	x		x			
Supply project documents	x	x	x	x		
Work Plan (inception report)					x*	x
Interviews Norway with	x	x		x	x	
Develop schedule for field survey			x		x	x*
Schedule interviews			x			x*
Field survey	x				x*	x
On-site debriefing	x?		x	x	x*	x
Analyse & verify data, write report					x*	x
Distribute draft report					x	
Present draft report in Palestine to:			x	X		x*
Present draft report in Oslo to:			x	X	x*	
Written input on draft report from:	x		x	X		
Write up final report					x*	x

Annex) Norwegian NGOs applications for funding in 1999 - 2005

A total of 39 Norwegian organisations received funding in this period either from Norad, MFA or from both. Close to two thirds of the funding (65,6%) came from MFA either as support to humanitarian work or as transitional assistance (figures in 1000 NOK). Years of support indicated in brackets.

Both Norad and MFA funding

Name of organization		Amount granted 1999-2005		
		Norad	MFA	Total
1.	Det norske Arbeiderparti (99-N, 03-MFA, 04-MFA)	72	480	552
2.	Fellesutvalget for Palestina (02-MFA,05-N)	95	10	105
3.	Kirkens Nødhjelp, KN (99-N, 00-N+MFA, 01-N, 02-N+MFA, 03-N+MFA, 04-N+MFA, 05-N+MFA)	11,474	16,463	27,937
4.	Kvekerhjelpen (99-N, 01-MFA, 03-N, 04-N)	2,625	200	2,825
5.	Norges Fredsråd (04-N+MFA, 05-MFA)	250	286	536
6.	Norges Røde Kors (99-MFA, 00-MFA, 01-MFA, 02-N+MFA, 03-N+MFA, 04-N+MFA, 05-N+MFA)	19,335	123,219	142,553
7.	Norsk Folkehjelp, (99-N, 00-N+MFA, 01-N+MFA, 02-N+MFA, 03-N+MFA, 04-N+MFA, 05-N+MFA)	66,885	48,482	115,368
	Sub total	100,736	189,140	289,876

Only Norad funding

Name of organization		Amount granted 1999-2005
8.	Atlas-alliansen (all years)	45,694
9.	AUF (99, 00)	352
10.	Bistandsnemnda (05-N)	2,183
11.	Den norske forfatterforening (99, 00)	250
12.	Det Kgl Selskap for Norges, SNV (all years) The Royal Norwegian Society for Development	25,333
13.	Fellesorganisasjonen for barnevernpedagoger, sosionormer og vernepleiere, FO (99, 00, 01, 02)	1,893

14.	FOKUS (99)	507
15.	Landsrådet for Norges barn og ungdomsorganisasjoner, LNU (99)	250
16.	Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, LO (all years)	7,685
17.	Lærerforbundet (99), 00, 01, 02)	1,225
18.	Norske Barne- og Ungdomsførettere, NBU (00)	110
19.	Norwegian Medical Society for the Middle East (99, 00)	1,199
20.	Norges KFUM/KFUK (03, 04, 05)	1,710
21.	Norges Speiderforbund (99)	7
22.	Norsk Ergoterapeutforbund (all years)	3,971
23.	Norsk lærerlag (99, 00, 01)	493
24.	Røde Kors Norge (99, 00, 01)	12,556
25.	Utdanningsforbundet (03, 04, 05)	2,056
	Sub total	107,474

Only MFA funding

Name of organization		Amount granted 1999-2005
??	Institute for Labour and Social Research (FAFO)	???
26.	Flyktninghjelpen (all years)	97,681
27.	J.J.Holst Minnefond (02)	17
28.	Kjemisk Forbund (99, 00, 01)	830
29.	Kjemisk Forbund, Palestinagruppene (02, 03, 04, 05)	1,160
30.	Leger uten grenser (02, 03, 04, 05)	32,193

31.	Mellomkirkelig råd (99, 00)	236
32.	Norwegian Org Research-Dev Pal Arab Society (00)	1,013
33.	Norwegian Aid Committee, NORWAC (00, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05)	45,790
34.	Norwegian Volunteers Service (01, 02, 03, 04, 05)	6,322
35.	Palestinakomiteen (99, 00, 02, 03, 04)	2,762
36.	PEN, Norge (01)	25
37.	Stiftelsen Oljeberget (00, 01, 02, 04)	19,650
38.	Stiftelsen Signo (03)	600
39.	Sosialistisk Venstreparti (03, 04)	341
	Sub total	208,620

GRAND TOTAL: Norad 208,210 (34,4%), MFA 397,760(65,6%), 605,970 (100%)

ANNEX II PERSONS MET

Abdel Shafi, Khaled	UNDP-PAPP	Head of Gaza Office
Abdul-Rahim, Farouk Dr	Makassed Islamic Charitable Hospital	Hospital Director
Abu Moghli, Dr. Fathi	PA, MoH	Minister of Health
Abu-Libdeh, Dr Bassam Y.	Makassed Islamic Charitable Hospital	Deputy Hospital Director
Al Ashgar, Naim	GUPT	Head of Qalqilya
Al Bakri, Mohammad	UAWC	Director, Gaza Office
Al Batran, Abdul Fatah	PTC	
Al Moghayer, Mohammed	NPA	Project Officer
Al Nabaheen, Yousef	NPA	Project Officer
Al Nasser, Seham Abu	PWWS	Field Coordinator, Gaza office
Arafat, Cairo	PA, MoP	
Aultun, Ingvild	Norcross	Internal Coordinator
Barhoum, Dr. Ali	Rafah Municipality	Mayor
Bauck, Petter	Norad	Senior Adviser
Belck-Olsen, Kirsten	NPA	Resident Representative Palestine
Bergan, David	NPA	Adviser, the Middle East
Bertinussen, Gudrun	NCA	Program Coordinator Middle East
Bie-Larsen, Arnhild	UEN	
Blyverket, Kathrine	UEN	
Brown, Mark	LWF Jerusalem	
Buchholz, Mette	Norcross	Program Coordinator Middle East & North Africa
Dabbagh, Constantine S	MECC/DRSP/NECC	Executive Secretary, Gaza Office

Daher, Mahmoud	WHO, Gaza	
Dayfallah, Niyaz	PTC	
Diaz, Marcos	Norcross	Country Coordinator
Dowani, Tala	UAWC	International Relations Coordinator
Dweikat, Ashraf	PTC	
Eik, Ketil	MFA	First Secretary, ROPA
Evensmo, Ivar	Norad	
Faraj, Hassan	Fatah Youth	
Fyhri, Torgeir	MFA	First Secretary Development, ROPA
Ghazaleh, Talal	Independent	Consultant for Norwac
Gjerde, Tor Erik	MFA	Middle East section
Grandi, Filippo	UNRWA	Deputy Commissioner-General
Haddad, Dr. Charlie D	ELCJHL	Director of Education
Hamada, Mahmoud	NPA	Project Officer
Handomeh, Mustafa	GUPT	
Haukland, Semund	Norad	Senior Adviser, Water
Heinrich, Kristin	Norcross	
Hidmi, Dr. Arafat S	Makassed Charitable Society Jerusalem	Chairman Board of Directors
Hidmi, Khaled	UAWC	General Director
Holter, Martin	NPA	Adviser, Middle East
Ingdal, Nora	NCG	(Former NPA Gaza Representative)
Jensen, John Eivind	NORWAC	
Khaddash, Abdel Salam	Tamer	
Khader, Sami	Maan Development Center	Director
Kharroub	GUPT	Finance officer, Qalquilya

Khateeb, Younis	PRCS	President
Lazzarini, Phillippe	OCHA oPt	Country Director
Lindberg, Steinar	MFA	Humanitarian Section
Løchen, Grete	MFA	ROPA
Mlitat, Alaa	Fatah Youth Organisation	
Mosa, Soheil	Rafah Municipality	Project Manager
Mounib	ELCJHL	Bishop
Muller-Nilsen, Aage	Stiftelsen Oljeberget	
Mundir, Amira	Fatah Youth Organisation	
Murad, Amani	MoH, Gaza	
Mustorp, Elisabeth	NCA	
Naser, Wedad	NPA	Project Officer
Nasser, Tawfik	Augusta Victoria Hospital	Chief Executive Officer
Nilsen, Aage Muller	Stiftelsen Oljeberget	
Nordahl, Christer	UNRWA	Deputy Director, Gaza
Nordby, Linda	NCA	EAPPI Accompanier
Qarmash, Fida	PTC	
Qubbaj, Renad	Tamer	
Ravn, Bodil Lawrence	Norcross	Head of Section
Rosnes, Sten Arne	MFA	Representative of Norway to The Palestinian Authority
Sabella, Bernard	MECC/DRSP	Executive Secretary, Central Office
Saleh, Mahmoud	PTC	Director
Samander, Issa	Maan Development Center	Project Coordinator
Shaqoura, Walid	MoH, Gaza	Director of International Cooperation
Shawneh, Oqab	GUPT	Cultural Coordinator, Qalquilya

Shawwa, Amjad	PNGO	
Shehadeh, Jamil	GUPT	President
Skuterud, Ola	IFRC	
Sletten, Eli Kofoed	Norad	Senior Adviser
Solberg, Torstein Tvedt	AUF	International Secretary
Sommerfelt, Atle	NCA	Secretary General
Steinmoeggen, Liv	NCA	Area Representative, Middle East
Suhrke, Ida	NCA	Program Coordinator, EAPPI
Tarazi, Zuhaila	El Ahli Hospital, Gaza	Director
Thomassen, Stine	Norad	Higher Executive Officer, Statistics
Thorsrud, Liv	NCA	EAPPI Accompanier
Tveit, Olav F.	Stiftelsen Oljeberget	Leder
Vasset, Magnhild	NRC	Head of Section
Vikan, Helene	Norcross	Program Coordinator
Wennesland, Tor	MFA	Representative of Norway to The Palestinian Authority
Yamin, Ayman	GUPT	Coordinator, Qalquilya
Zayed, Mutasem	Yamoun Youth	
Zoroub, Mohamed	Rafah Municipality	Financial Manager
Østnor, Kjetil	Stiftelsen Oljeberget	

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