

NPA Mine Action Programme in Angola

Review 2004-2007

Appraisal 2008-2010

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Luanda/Bergen, August 2008

Table of contents

MAP OF ANGOLA	3
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	4
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	5
2. INTRODUCTION	10
2.1. A NOTE OF THANKS.....	10
2.2. PURPOSE OF REVIEW	10
2.3. MISSION, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS	11
3. ANGOLA – CONTEXT	12
3.1. INDEPENDENCE, WAR, ECONOMIC GROWTH, PEACE AND ELECTIONS	12
3.2. OTTAWA TREATY	12
3.3. MINE ACTION COORDINATION	13
4. REVIEW OF NPA MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 2004 - 2007	15
4.1 BACKGROUND.....	15
4.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE 2004 - 2007 PROGRAMME.....	16
4.3 RESULTS OF THE 2004 - 2007 PROGRAMME.....	16
4.4 LESSONS FROM 2004 - 2007.....	18
5. PROJECT APPRAISAL, 2008-2010 PROGRAMME.....	21
5.1. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL.....	21
5.2. INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE PROGRAMME	24
5.3. CAPACITY OF NPA VERSUS THE PROPOSED PROGRAMME	26
5.4. RIGHTS BASED APPROACH	30
5.5. DEVELOPMENT AND DEMINING	30
5.6. CROSS CUTTING ISSUES.....	33
5.7. EXIT STRATEGY	33
5.8. RISKS.....	38
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	39
6.1 KEY CONCLUSIONS	39
6.2 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	42
ANNEXURES	45
ANNEX A - TERMS OF REFERENCE	46
ANNEX B - ACTIVITIES, MEETINGS HELD AND PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND CONSULTED	51
ANNEX C - LITERATURE AND DOCUMENTS CONSULTED FOR THE ASSESSMENT	54
ANNEX D - NPA PROJECT DOCUMENT/LOGFRAME: MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 2008 – 2010.....	55
ANNEX E - NPA ANGOLA, LAND RELEASE: PROCESS OF DIALOGUE WITH CNIDAH.....	92

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MAP OF ANGOLA



List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<i>Abbreviation/ Acronym</i>	<i>Meaning in English</i>	<i>Meaning in original language (if applicable and/or different</i>
CED	Executive Commission for Demining	Comissão Executiva par Desminagem
CMI	Christian Michelsen Institute	
CNIDAH	Inter-sectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance	Comissão Nacional Intersectorial para Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária de Vítimas de Minas
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War	
EU	European Union	União Europeia
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	
GRN	The National Reconstruction Office	Gabinete Reconstrução Nacional
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines	
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards	
INAD	The National Demining Institute	Instituto Nacional para Desminagem
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey	
LRC	Land Release Concept	Conceito de Libertação de Terra
MPLA		Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation	Organização Não Governamental
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards	Padrões Nacionais de Acção de Minas
NORAD		
NPA	Norwegian Peoples Aid	Ajuda Popular de Noruega
SMART		
UN	United Nations	Nações Unidas
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission number III	
UNITA		União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance	

1. Executive Summary

The purpose of this report is to provide the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda with a basis for a decision on continued support to the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA's) Mine Action Program in Angola. It includes a *review* of the 2004-2007 programme and an *appraisal* of the NPA's Proposal for 2008-2010 including work plan and budget.

The anti-colonial war in Angola started in 1961 and the struggle lasted until November 11, 1975. After the proclamation of independence, a civil war broke out and continued intermittently to 2002. Angola's considerable natural resources (oil and diamonds) as well as major international interventions created the basis for feeding the war machine and contributed to the *widespread use of heavy and modern armaments*, important among them *landmines*.

The Mine Ban Treaty was signed by Angola on 4th December 1997. Angola has not formally reported any legal measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. *CNIDAH*, the *Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance*, created in 2001, is the national mine action authority with overall responsibility for strategic planning, coordination and supervision of demining, mine risk education and victim assistance and is financed over the regular State Budget. The *Executive Commission for Demining (CED)*, established in December 2005, coordinates and manages three national mine action operators. The CED does not have a fixed budget for Mine Action, but "spend what it deems necessary to get the job done".

From the start of operations in 1995 and throughout 1998, NPA saw rapid growth in the Angola Mine Action Programme. *Many of the technologies and techniques that are in use today, worldwide, was conceived and/or developed in the NPA programme in Angola during this time.* NPA also fronted a number of conceptual developments during this period, many of which were developed, and subsequently implemented in Angola. NPA took a broader view of the landmine problem, linking mine clearance with the use of land and the broader social and economic impact of the cleared land for the beneficiaries.

From 2002, with the peace accord in Angola and with the tidying up of administrative problems and arrival of new key personnel in NPA the square-metre output rose appreciably. *The output level has seen a rapid growth up to 2006* as the cost efficiency has improved, and was likely to be maintained for 2007.

The Mine Action programme now concentrates on three types of activities: humanitarian demining; surveys, mapping and marking; and mine-risk education (MRE) with the two first as main foci. The programme is conducted in a number of Angolan provinces. In 2005 there were projects and operations in Huíla, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Luanda, Malanje, and Uíge. Bases are kept in two of these provinces: Kwanza Sul and Malanje.

Review of the Mine Action programme 2004-2007

The report considers the results of the three main intended outputs from the 2004-2007 period:

- *Output 1:* comprising NPA's work on the *Angolan Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS)* has been **completed**. The ALIS data base has been assembled and is in use.
- *Output 2:* achievement in *Mine Risk Education (MRE)* is difficult to determine for lack of a clear objective and quantifiable indicators. But is **likely to have been achieved** in a formal sense.
- *Output 3:* under which "roads, bridges and arable land would be cleared for land mines and UXOs in order to improve access and facilitate rural development and rehabilitation of social infrastructure" is the main "*clearance objective*". This has been **achieved to some extent** but a number of circumstances have reduced the degree to which expectations have been met.

From the relatively high levels of funding in 2004 -2006, the financial basis for the NPA MA programme *declined* by some NOK 20 million in 2007. This was related partly to a generally declining interest in MA from the main donors and the planned closing of one base. The shortfall compared to earlier years was not only caused by the lack of interest from donors but also by the decline in personnel capacity at the NPA.

Of the total decline of about 300 staff, roughly half was due to the handover of the Luena base to INAD, completed in the first half of 2007. In early 2008 some 40 positions were however vacant because of *recruitment difficulties caused by private sector growth* in Angola which caused a loss of skills from mine action. The lower staff numbers during 2007 still does however not explain the entire decline in clearance which was registered for that year. Also clearance *per employee* dropped.

At the same time there was *a virtual exodus of key managerial staff*, resulting in a high rate of turnover in that category. Recruitment of key managerial staff took time and during long periods NPA was left without anybody in key offices.

The report concludes that the loss of valuable staff and drop in areas cleared could have been avoided and presents recommendations to avoid the same kind of problem in the 2008-2010 period.

Appraisal of the 2008-2010 Programme

NPA has submitted a proposed financial plan for the period 2008 – 2010, with a total budget of NOK 53 million, of which the Norwegian Embassy have tentatively proposed to fund NOK 24 million. The other donors *potentially* supporting the programme are: USAID (NOK 16 million), StatoilHydro (NOK 2 million), the Netherlands (NOK 8,1 million) and various other funds from smaller donors calculated at NOK 1,8 million.

The Norwegian Embassy in Luanda stated in 2005 that the Norwegian funding for the NPA Mine Action Programme in Angola would be phased out in 5 years from then, and provided "bridge funding" in 2007 to allow the NPA Mine Action Programme to fall in line with a three year budget plan, allowing for an end to Norwegian funding for Mine Action in 2010.

The *immediate objective* stated for the Programme, as well as the accompanying activities set out in the programme proposal, suggests a strong focus on developing the **Land Release** (LR) concept and the capacity building of CNIDAH for implementation of the Land Release¹ approach.

The cost of running the actual Land Release (survey/clearance) operations by the NPA Combined Teams appears well catered for in the programme budget, but NPA is likely to have disregarded or underestimated the resource inputs required for the adaptation of the LR concept to Angolan circumstances and the capacity building of national institutions (CNIDAH etc). A thorough revision of the document is required to demonstrate the logic and consistency of expected programme inputs, outputs, outcomes and budgets. The Consultants conclude that NPA's Mine Action programme in Angola is *currently not* sufficiently staffed to undertake the capacity building activities planned in the 2008 – 2010 Programme Proposal. The drain of NPA's most experienced, long serving national managers to the UN, national authority/operators and/or commercial companies experienced by NPA over the last years have *considerably exacerbated* the capacity problem.

The skill transfer involved in the move of staff to the private sector and other deminers may be a benefit for national organisations and an indicator of successful capacity building. It has however made the management level of the organisation *shallow*.

In terms of *value added* NPA clearly has a particular position among the NGOs involved in Mine Action in Angola. Interviews with CNIDAH as well as with other NGOs in Angola and with donors bore strong testimony to NPAs edge in working closely with local communities and in being an innovative force in the Mine Action sector in Angola

However the decline in staff numbers has reduced the *capacity of the NPA* for the 2008-2010 programme in three ways: (a) lack of local support staff and operational staff (b) exceedingly high turnover of managerial local and expatriate staff and (c) poor availability of specialist staff locally and internationally.

Particularly important and a major concern is the fact that the *incumbent MA manager will be leaving in September 2008*. She will, by necessity, have to be responsible for the preparation of the 2008 - 2010 programme and - not least - coordination and consultations with donors and national and local authorities. The next MA manager will then have to implement a programme which he might or might not be enthusiastic about.

On the idea of increasing the "*rights based*" character of Mine Action, the report points out the contradiction that if NPA wants to support the development of civil society on its

¹ The term Land Release describes a process by which a Suspect Hazardous Areas (SHAs) are released through the implementation of a process of gathering information and applying criteria, where possible without the use of full clearance. This report will not test the **validity** of the Land Release concept as such. The conceptual description of Land Release is well documented in research from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

own terms, it cannot at the same time work only with ‘rights-based’ civil society organisations. The situation for the 2008-2010 MA Programme is that the main cooperation partner, CNIDAH is not what one could call “rights based”. Still, the capacity building activities and the introduction of the LR concept through CNIDAH could be used to introduce rights based learning and issues with the assistance of the NPA Angola Development Programme (DP).

With regard to the *cooperation between the Mine Action Programme and the DP* it is pointed out that capacity building requires a skill-set, methodology and techniques often more linked with DP than MA, and that it is possible that NPA’s increased focus on capacity building may bring an opportunity for tying closer relations between the two programmes utilising the organisation’s own capacity to developing a realistic capacity building component of the Mine Action programme.

The *crosscutting elements* of the programme seems well known by programme staff and activities promoting gender, HIV/AIDS and environment issues appear to be well integrated in the programme planning although less concretized than they ought to be. The fact that some of the national managers are “starting to really warm to the issues, finding ways to promote for example gender equality among their team on their own” indicates that NPAs effort and training of its staff has had some effect.

The report outlines a number of *risks*: The phase-out of Norwegian funds to mine action may be counterintuitive to rallying enthusiasm for the new Land Release Concept. Also, NPA is exposed to a certain risk related to the accreditation of the LR concept, as well as the possible lack of capacity of the national authority to provide quality assurance needed for the use of the LR the concept.

Recommendations

(Note that the recommendations below are somewhat abbreviated. Complete recommendations are given in section 6.2 page 42 below)

- ✓ The proposed 2008-2010 programme presented by the NPA should not be accepted by the Embassy before a rewrite of the proposal where expected inputs, outputs, outcomes (including monitoring indicators) and budgets are clearly stated and linked.
- ✓ NPA must consider the possibility of strengthening its organisation and require capacity for *both* efficient survey/clearance *and* professional management of the envisaged capacity building.
- ✓ The NPA should urgently return to the planning phase for the Programme Proposal and make sure that the logical consistency of the programme is improved.
- ✓ NPA must communicate immediately with CNIDAH to establish the basic framework and execution plan for the successful collaboration.

- ✓ NPA should, indicate a budget and cost of the whole operation in the country, including the different donor's contribution towards this.
- ✓ The Norwegian Embassy requires a programme and implementation which is in line with the NORAD Development Cooperation Manual. The NPA is recommended to familiarize with the manual.
- ✓ NPA must establish a clear understanding with CNIDAH on the kind of cooperation to be undertaken related to the development of the Land Release Concept.
- ✓ NPA should include the introduction of rights based approaches when working with the National Authority.
- ✓ The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs /Luanda Embassy should extract a guarantee from the NPA headquarters in Oslo that NPA will take strong steps to prevent a high turnover of the managerial staff in the Mine Action programme in Angola during the 2008-2010 period.
- ✓ Present capacity and expertise in the NPA Mine Action Programme are **not** at level required to reach the objectives envisaged in the Programme.
- ✓ NPA Angola's organisation will have to be streamlined. In this, NPA HQ in Oslo and NPAs overall management in Luanda must play a main role.
- ✓ NPA should compile and analyse existing relevant labour market information and build a strategy to handle likely changes in the labour market 2008-2010.
- ✓ The proposal for 2008 -2010 ought to contain ample scope for using specialist consultants drawn from GICHD and elsewhere.
- ✓ The Consultants recommend that (if at all possible) the next MA Programme Manager be drawn into the work of completing the 2008-2010 programme and that a firm undertaking be given that her/his tour will last until the end of 2010.
- ✓ The Proposal 2008 – 2010 should identify what National Institutions NPA intends to capacity build.
- ✓ NPA should look into utilising its in-house (DP) expertise to develop a coherent MA capacity building programme for Angola.
- ✓ Collaboration between the Development- and Mine Action Programme needs a realistic, time bound plan and outline of respective responsibilities, checks and balances between the two programmes allowing for monitoring of progress and achievements.

- ✓ The Mine Action now carries a major part of the overhead costs of NPA's entire Angola operation. The coverage of overhead cost between the Development Programme and the Mine Action programme should be balanced more in accordance with the present relative sizes of the two programmes.

2. Introduction

2.1. A note of thanks

The authors of this report would like to extend their gratitude to all those who have supported and assisted them. The NPA Resident Representative, Åge Skagestad, and Programme Manager, Rebecca ("Becky") Thomsen and the rest of the NPA team facilitated a very interesting visit to the NPA Mine Action Central Office and Field Office in Malanje, spent long hours with us in interviews and provided important documents and information. The NPA Combined Team members received us with great hospitality in the minefields in *Kingla* and *Capemba de Cima*.

At the Norwegian Embassy Luanda, Lise Stensrud provided invaluable insights in the deliberations and intricacies of the Norwegian funding mechanisms at the Embassy and in Oslo, and Åsa Bergman Amadio was essential in arranging the programme and meeting schedule for the mission. Both "Embassy Ladies" were great travel companions during the trip to Malanje. Carlos, the Embassy's eminent *Chauffeur*, brought us safely from Luanda to Malanje and back again, despite the *confusão* on the Angolan roads and in the Luanda traffic. Without expertise of CMI's driver *Estevao* considerable valuable consultancy time would have been lost in the Luanda traffic.

The evaluators would also like to thank Tim Lardner and Ted Paterson who were telephone interviewed from the "Geneva Centre" (GICHD) for willingly sharing of their vast, cutting edge knowledge of mine action issues and land release as well as their experience of the mine action sector in Angola.

2.2. Purpose of Review

The Terms of Reference for this review has been agreed between the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda and the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Bergen, Norway.

The purpose of the assignment is to provide the Embassy with a basis for a decision on continued support to NPA. The TOR stipulates

- (a) A *review* of the (2004-2007) programme, including assessments of results, sustainability of capacities built and main lessons from the implementation of the programme.

(b) An *appraisal* of the proposal for 2008-2010. This would include *in general* an appraisal of the proposal including work plan and budget. In *particular* the appraisal would comprise assessments of and proposal for changes of the following: The NPA Mine Action Programme's targets in relation to NPA's capacity; consistency between objectives, outputs, activities and indicators; risks and risk response; ways of strengthening the rights based perspective; the cooperation and interface between the mine action programme and the development programme; NPA's strategic plan and exit strategy; the land release concept, adoption of the concept by the Angolan authorities as well as NPA's implementation of the concept; how the proposed programme deals with the crosscutting issues such as HIV/Aids, gender and the environment.

For the sake of simplicity this report generally refers to the exercise of review *and* appraisal as "the review". For the complete TOR, see **Annex A** to this report.

2.3. Mission, Methodology and Limitations

This review was conducted by Jan Isaksen, Senior Research Fellow at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Bergen, Norway, and Christian Larssen, Consultant, Luanda, Angola.

During late June 2008 the team studied existing documentation and Mr. Larssen participated with Embassy staff in a field trip to one of NPAs main project areas, Malange. This gave the team insight into the results and challenges faced during the implementation of NPA's Mine Action Programme and, in particular, an introduction to the new Land Release concept. The field trip also provided an opportunity to meet with the NPA Mine Action managers, specialists and employees, as well as with other NPA partners and stakeholders, such as the Provincial Government and CNIDAH (provincial).

During the second part of the mission the team joined forces in Angola, completing the first draft report. The report is based on documentation, individual and collective interviews, other field observations and meetings with Norwegian Embassy and NPA staff, as well as meetings with other stakeholders such as National and Provincial Authorities and other donors to the NPA programme². Feedback on the presentation of a draft report to the NPA, the Norwegian Ambassador and the Embassy staff gave rise to a number of improvements and built consensus around the conclusions.

A major limitation for this review has been the general time squeeze which arose due to factors such as a busy travel schedules and other work commitments. This was further exacerbated by the very late arrival of essential documents, such as the Programme Proposal for 2008 – 2010 and reporting from the previous period, from NPA.

² The full list of "Meetings Held and People interviewed and consulted" is attached as Annex B at the back of this report.

3. Angola – Context

3.1. Independence, war, economic growth, peace and elections

The anti-colonial war in Angola started in 1961 and the struggle lasted until November 11, 1975. After the proclamation of independence, UNITA maintained a guerrilla war in the South, with the military support of South Africa and others. This war created extremely severe disruptions to the economy.

The war caused a demise of the rural economy and a subsequent sharp rise in urbanization due to rural refugees moving into urban areas. More than one million lost their lives during the civil war, three million fled to the cities and 400,000 crossed the borders into neighboring countries. Upwards of 45% of the population became concentrated in urban areas, with more than half of them in Luanda. Furthermore, the current population growth at 2.9% per annum has almost doubled the population since 1980, which is now estimated variously between 18 and 14 million. Infrastructure deteriorated in the cities, partly through warfare and partly because inefficiencies in most parastatal companies and price control policies which depressed public utility revenues, failing to recover costs of most services.

The considerable natural resources (oil and diamonds) and as well as major international interventions created the basis for feeding the war machines on both sides and contributed to the widespread use of heavy and modern armaments, important among them landmines. The intermittent type of war and its guerilla character led to a pattern of mining that did not conform with the orthodox military methods. Land mines came to be used less for military purposes and more to create torment and desperation among the civilian population.

Since 2002, Angola's economy has grown by leaps and bounds and the country has a world record position in economic growth. The previously high inflation has been brought under control and strong economic growth, spurred by the oil sector, is expected in the medium term.

The country now invests heavily in infrastructure and this will last for several years to come. Poverty is however still a problem and Angola ranks lowly on the human welfare indicators. There is also a democratic deficit which ought to be somewhat corrected by the parliamentary elections to be held early September 2008.

3.2. Ottawa Treaty

The Ottawa Treaty or the Mine Ban Treaty, formally the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, bans completely all anti-personnel landmines (AP-mines). As of 2007, it has

been signed/accessioned by 158 countries. Thirty-seven states, including the People's Republic of China, India, Russia and the United States, are not party to the Convention.

Besides stopping the production and development of anti-personnel mines, a party to the treaty must destroy all the anti-personnel mines in its possession within four years. Just a small number of mines are allowed to remain for training (mine-clearance, -detection, etc.). Within ten years after signing the treaty, the country should have cleared all of its mined areas. This is a difficult task for many countries, but countries that consider it impossible to attain the primary aim may request an extension of the deadline and various types of support to succeed. Only anti-personnel mines are covered. Mixed mines, anti-tank mines, remote controlled claymore mines, anti-handling devices (booby-traps) and other "static" explosive devices against persons are not within the treaty.

Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 5 July 2002 and became a State Party on 1 January 2003. Angola has not formally reported any legal measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. In May 2006 the coordinator of the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH), reported to the "Landmine Monitor" that draft legislation to implement the treaty domestically had been sent to the national parliament. No further progress has been reported, and the draft legislation is not mentioned in Angola's most recent implementation report (the "Article 7 report"). Angola submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report, which is undated but covers April 2006 to March 2007. Its previous report, covering January 2005 to March 2006, was submitted three months late on 3 August 2006.

Angola attended the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006 and the inter-sessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006 and April 2007 in Geneva. At each meeting it made statements on mine clearance, victim assistance and stockpile destruction. Angola has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3, and the issues related to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, anti vehicle mines with sensitive fuses or anti-handling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training. It is particularly notable that Angola has not spoken on these issues, given its history of mine use and participation in joint operations. Angola is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

3.3. Mine Action Coordination

There are two main national institutions for mine action in Angola:

1. CNIDAH, the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance, created in 2001, is the national mine action authority with overall responsibility for strategic planning, coordination and supervision of demining, mine risk education and victim assistance.

2. The Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), established in December 2005, coordinates and manages the three national mine action operators: the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD), the Angolan Armed Forces and the National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN). The CED is composed of representatives from these three operators, reports to the President of Angola, and is managed by the Minister of Assistance and Social Reintegration. It functions exclusively at the operational level and participates in the planning process with the same status as other mine action operators.

In 2006, 18 CNIDAH provincial operations rooms were established to consolidate and coordinate programming. In April 2007 CNIDAH reported that with European Commission (EC) funding it would initiate in July 2007 the consolidation of its institutional capacities, to be completed in 2008. Although CNIDAH installed the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in 2004 to consolidate LIS data, it reported in April 2007 that IMSMA was not used fully for tasking of clearance and other operations.

UNDP has provided technical advisory support to CNIDAH and field advisors to support CNIDAH regionally, through an EC-funded project due to end in December 2006 but later extended to 2007 and 2008. The extended project intends to implement Angola's strategic mine action plan, collect, analyze and disseminate information to mine action operators, and strengthen national coordination and management capacity.

Angola took part in a Great Lakes Region project which highlighted Angola's border areas with Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo for regional mine action coordination and programming. The project seeks to increase mine detection, road and area verification capacities and mine action capacities of Great Lakes country's training.

CEDs strategic plan included legislation to define the roles and responsibilities of the various mine action bodies; no such legislation had been adopted as of June 2007. Since 2004, a comprehensive set of national mine action standards has been in preparation, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). As of April 2007, 26 standards had been produced and/or distributed, including five new standards promulgated in 2006.

CNIDAH is financed over the regular State Budget (Orçamento Geral de Estado) and was invited to share budgetary information for this report. As this is written, in July 2008, the information was not available to the Consultants. The CED does not have a fixed budget for Mine Action, but "spend what it deems necessary to get the job done".

4. Review of NPA Mine Action Programme 2004 - 2007

4.1 Background

Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) started its involvement in the Demining sector (later: Mine Action Sector) in Cambodia in the late 1980s, and later established programmes in Mozambique in 1992 and Iraq in 2003. In 1994, as UN forces were deployed in the UNAVEM III³ mission in Angola as a consequence of the Lusaka Peace Accord between the warring factions in Angola's (at this time) 20 years of civil war, NPA was requested by the UN to provide a capacity to remove landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The NPA operations commenced in 1995 with mine clearance along the Luanda – Malange route, establishing its operational base in Malange, the capital city of the province of the same name.

From the start of operations in 1995 to the end of 1998, NPA saw rapid growth in the Angola Mine Action Programme, both in terms of actual clearance capacity and of clearance capabilities. Many of the technologies and techniques (such as survey, mechanical mine clearance, mine dogs and the “tool-box concept”) that are in use today, worldwide, were conceived and/or developed in the NPA programme in Angola during this time. NPA also fronted a number of conceptual developments during this period, many of which were developed, and subsequently implemented in Angola. Whereas Mine Action in its early days was looked upon as a para-military activity with a limited objective of removing mines and ERWs, NPA took a broader view to the problem, for example linking mine clearance with the *use* of land and the broader social and economic impact of the cleared land for the beneficiaries. NPA was also among the practitioners supporting and advocating for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) that received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 and later the successful ratification of the so-called Ottawa Treaty⁴ in 1999. Internationally, NPA remains in an advocacy role within the mine action community and towards decision makers and donors.

In 1998, the political and security situation in Angola deteriorated and by the end of the year, the country was back into full civil war between the ruling party, MPLA, and the opposition UNITA. At the return to conflict, many of the international donors supporting mine action programmes withdrew or suspended funding of projects in the period from 1999 until 2002.

From 2002, with the peace accord in Angola and with the tidying up of administrative problems and arrival of new key personnel in NPA, the square-metre output rose appreciably. The output level has seen rapid growth up to 2004 as the cost efficiency has improved, and was likely to be maintained for 2005.

NPA's Mine Action programme in Angola now concentrates on three types of activities: humanitarian demining; surveys, mapping and marking; and mine-risk education (MRE).

³ United Nations Angola Verification Mission number III

⁴ International Treaty Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

The two first are the main foci: NPA has built considerable clearing capacity, as well as cutting-edge expertise in surveying the landmine problem. With regard to MRE, NPA considers this activity to be important but has opted to 'contract it out'. In most cases this is done through working closely with and assisting specialist organisations, ranging from local NGOs to e.g. UNICEF, that do MRE in areas where NPA demining teams are working.

NPA mine action is conducted in a number of Angolan provinces. In 2005 it ran projects and operations in Huíla, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Luanda, Malanje, and Uíge. Bases are kept in two of these provinces: Kwanza Sul and Malanje.

4.2 Objectives of the 2004 - 2007 programme

The overall strategic statement for Angola NPA for the period reads as follows: "The rural poor, including communities previously affected by landmines, have enhanced their secure and equitable access to land and other productive resources and are practising economically and ecologically sound resource management."⁵ This is a joint statement for NPA Angola **overall**, comprising both the Development and the Mine Action programmes.⁶ A more specific statement for the Mine Action programme, called "an immediate objective" is: "*People living in areas affected by landmines can work, live and contribute without the fear of being affected by landmines*".

Related to this objective the strategy document makes mention of three aims which in a log frame sense may be said to be *outputs*.

Output 1: 'Communities in six provinces have been surveyed with regard to the socio-economic impact of landmines.'

Output 2: 'Communities in selected areas of operation have received mine-risk education.'

Output 3: 'Roads, bridges and arable land [are] cleared for land mines and UXOs in order to improve access and facilitate rural development and rehabilitation of social infrastructure.'

4.3 Results of the 2004 - 2007 programme

Apart from mine clearance statistics there is a lack of data and analysis from NPA indicating to what extent the objectives have been reached. The team unfortunately had little or no time for data collection and had to concentrate on the appraisal rather than the

⁵ Strategic document for NPA Angola 2004-2007 Luanda: Norwegian People's Aid Angola.

⁶ The background for this and the following analysis is elaborated in "Mid Term Review of the Angola Programme of Norwegian Peoples Aid, Isaksen, Samset, Pacheco, CMI 2006. P18 and 19

review. Data and other evidence for goal attainment during the 2004-2007 period ought to be presented in the 2008-2010 Proposal and our recommendation is that NPA gathers and analyses available data and if possible includes it in the 2008-2010 proposal. For some of the specific outputs mentioned in 4.2 above it is however not too difficult to pass judgement.

Output 1, which basically concerns the NPA work on the ALIS, has been *completed*. The work in Provinces to be covered by NPA has been concluded. The ALIS data base has been assembled and is in use. The analysis of the ALIS does however points out certain deficiencies: The Mine Action community in Luanda are clearly of the opinion that NPAs handling of the criteria for determining whether or not areas would be classified as Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs) came to include unnecessarily large areas of land. Although it could be argued that this was based on a strong concern for safety, it would of course increase the time and work involved in area reduction.

The completion of *Output 2* on Mine Risk Education (MRE) is difficult to determine for lack of a clear objective and quantifiable indicators. The information at the time of the MTR in 2005 indicated that NPA only conducted MRE in specific areas where clearance was undertaken and that a considerable potential for involving local NGOs in MRE work was largely untapped. The MRE objective is likely to have been reached only in a formal sense.

Output 3 (Roads, bridges and arable land [are] cleared for land mines and UXOs in order to improve access and facilitate rural development and rehabilitation of social infrastructure) is the main “clearance objective”. The MTR holds that “With gains in cost efficiency, NPA Angola is certainly on track towards realising the goal of clearing roads, bridges and land for mines and UXOs.”

Fig. 1





Fig. 2



Even though data were rough and hastily gathered and analysed during the mission it seems very clear from the graphs (Fig. 1 and 2) above that whereas areas cleared and cost per sq. m. were roughly stable during the years 2004 – 2006, 2007 saw a definite drop in activity and an increase in cost per sq. m. This indicates that the last year of the period experienced a shortfall on goal attainment. However, the mission’s estimate for what may be achieved in 2008 (based on the first five months of data) indicates that there is likely to be turnaround and movement towards a “normal” situation.

We now turn to the reasons for the apparent 2007 collapse were and consider what lessons may be extracted from this.

4.4 Lessons from 2004 - 2007

From the relatively high levels of funding in 2004 -2006, the financial basis for the NPA MA programme declined by some NOK 20 million in 2007. (see Fig. 3). This was related partly to a generally declining interest for MA from the main donors. The Swedish contribution of some NOK 6 million disappeared as Sida closed its representation office in Luanda 2006 and Swedish aid to Angola was considerably reduced. Also, smaller declines were registered from other donors. Although the Norwegian contribution increased considerably from the low of 2006 the UN contribution to the NPAs work on ALIS meant a budget reduction of some NOK 20 million.




Fig. 3

The shortfall compared to earlier years was not only caused by the lack of

interest from donors but also by the contraction of HR capacity at the NPA

The reduction in staff numbers during the period was, in large measure, a result of the handover of the Luena base with some 160 staff at the end of 2006. Statistics from 2005, a preliminary set of data for early 2008 and guesses for the intervening years however indicate that the decline in staff also was due to other factors and might indeed have been at the root of the problems occurring around 2007.

Fig. 4




Fig. 5




Fig. 4 indicates that total staff numbers declined from 553 at the end of 2005 to 248 at the beginning of 2008. The down-scaling started in December 2006 with NPA completing the handover of staff to INAD, and closing of the Luena Operations Base. The remaining down-scaling was completed in the first half of 2007. At the request of staff, compensation was paid to all. Staff was able to apply to positions within the new structure.

NPA restructuring was completed for the Gabela Base at the end of April, Malange at the end of May and Luanda at the end of June. In early 2008, however some 40 positions were vacant. The lower staff numbers during in 2007 still do not explain the entire decline in clearance since also clearance *per employee* dropped.(see Fig. 5). The loss of staff beyond the closing of Luena was connected to the growth of the economy and the ability of the private sector to pay more for trained labour than Mine Action NGOs.

Evidence received in our discussions with the present NPA Management throws some light over what happened around 2007. It seems that after successful years in 2005 and 2006, objectives for 2007 were vastly exaggerated and the loss of staff exacerbated the difficulties of meeting objectives and fulfilling contracts.

In addition to the loss of deminers, the loss of staff particularly affected support categories such as paramedics, mechanics, and drivers, i.e. staff having skills that could easily be adapted to the requirements of the private sector and government labour market. At the same time there was a virtual exodus of key managerial staff, leading to a high rate

of turnover in that category of personnel. Recruitment of key managerial staff took time and long periods were left without managerial staff in key positions.

To meet the targets set the pressure on core operational staff increased. At the same time, the lack of managerial capacity and support capacity affected core staff morale and productivity leading to more staff leaving a continuation of the vicious cycle.

At the time of the mission in mid 2008 it however seemed clear that the bottom concerning morale and productivity had been passed. The organisation gave a definite impression of being “on its way up”. This turnaround has not come about fortuitously but as a result of a definite focus on the problem by the current management. This focus had the drawback that less time could be allotted to other administrative tasks.

In conclusion, not for the sake of contemplating “water under the bridge” or apportioning blame, we ask a few questions which it may be useful for both the Angola NPA and the Oslo NPA headquarters as well donors to consider.

- ✓ Were there, at the outset, over inflated expectations as to what could be achieved with available personnel, demining assets and financial resources? If there was, the lesson to be learnt would turn on the importance of considering carefully the “aims versus means” when programme objectives are set and budgets prepared. It is clearly important to ensure a clear relation between the aims that are articulated and the means available to realise them. Also, keeping an eye on indicators and producing annual plans will in some cases detect deviations from plans in advance so that measures for correction may be taken.
- ✓ Could the exodus of personnel beyond the closure of the Luena base be foreseen? Although the answer to this is probably in the negative, the question arises as to how fast one could react and find out why staff started to leave and either attempt to prevent the staff exodus or re-program operations?
- ✓ What role should the Angola NPA management play vis-à-vis developments in the two sub-programmes (DP and MAP)? What responsibility or means of intervention does overall management of NPA-Angola have towards the two sub programmes? Also, to what extent is the *Oslo HQ* responsible for helping out any country programme in a difficult situation? What types of reporting to country management and to Oslo HQ takes place to discover and diagnose problems at an early stage?
- ✓ The Angola NPA had (proudly) nearly nationalised its operations. Yet it appears that a gap between the exit of an expatriate manager and arrival of the next left the office *empty*. Was the management structure too *shallow*? Did for example a manager and a deputy not multitask so as to have a good grasp of the work in the other person’s position?

5. Project Appraisal, 2008-2010 programme

5.1. Description of proposal

Assess the NPA proposal for the mine action programme for 2008-2010. The Embassy has indicated NOK 24 mill as its level for support as its level for the phase out period 2008-2010 against the project proposal for the same period. Other donors have similarly indicated and/or signed agreements with NPA for support in the same period. The consultants shall based on the programme proposal assess the realism of the programme in relation to the financial support provided by all donors, and suggest any recommendations for necessary changes in programme design.

5.1.1 Land Release

IMAS 08.20⁷ - Land Release (draft)

The term Land Release is used to describe the generic process by which a SHA (Suspect Hazardous Area) is released through the implementation of some form of general survey, technical survey and/or clearance process.

Land Release is based on several interlinked elements and is a process of gathering information and applying land release criteria, where possible, to release land with or without the use of full clearance.

The process includes: a) information gathering, b) information analysis, c) defining clear acceptance criteria and d) mitigating the problem in the most efficient manner.

Land Release will involve one or more of the following: 1. General Survey, 2. Technical Survey and/or 3. Full Clearance.

This report will not test the **validity** of the Land Release concept. The conceptual description of Land Release is well documented in research from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining⁸ (GICHD), who has assisted and developed the Land Release Concept in the Angolan context in collaboration with NPA. The international framework for technical application of Land Release is described, although not yet approved, through the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS⁹).

⁷ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 13 May 2008

⁸ Land Release: A guide for Mine and ERW Affected Countries (GICHD, November 2007), Publication number 53

⁹ IMAS 08.20 Land Release, IMAS 08.21 General Survey and IMAS 08.22 Technical Survey.

The authority over Land Release (in the sense that land is released for use when cleared for mines) lies normally with the national authority of the mine affected country, who under normal conditions “own” the land and is thus the right authority to “release it” if and when it is confident of the processes leading up to the “release”. Internationally, the GICHD has worked with questions related to Land Release/Area Reduction for several years. In Angola, instead of taking a top-down approach to the development of a national framework and methodology for Land Release, the GICHD found it appropriate, given the Angolan context, to work with a “reputable NGO” to develop the right instruments/tools for the concept.

The national authority, CNIDAH, has endorsed NPA as a partner for developing the Land Release Concept in Angola.

The national authorities and counterparts have in principle agreed to Land Release/Area Reduction¹⁰ techniques to be implemented in the country, and are working with several partner operators, such as MAG, Halo Trust and Norwegian Peoples Aid to develop a national framework for accepting liabilities and issuing National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) that allow for the accreditation and quality assurance of the concepts. In a meeting with the management of CNIDAH 1 July 2008, it was confirmed that NPA is welcome to play a central role working with CNIDAH to develop the national Land Release framework, including capacity building activities for the national/provincial authorities. Currently, CNIDAH confirms that NPA have a “verbal agreement” with regard to the implementation of the Land Release Concept (see **annex E** to this report – Land Release: Process of dialogue with CNIDAH), and that CNIDAH is awaiting a report outlining the experiences of the LRC trials, and a “plan of execution” for the further development of the concept. With regard to the latter, CNIDAH indicated that they were awaiting inputs on the initiative from NPA.

- ✓ It is recommended that NPA communicate immediately with CNIDAH to establish the basic framework and execution plan for the successful collaboration in developing the Land Release Concept into a national policy framework that can be agreed with all operators.

5.1.2. Financial framework

The requirement of the Terms of Reference are that the consultancy team *assess the realism of the programme in relation to the financial support provided by all donors, and suggest any recommendations for necessary changes in programme design.*

It has been hard to substantiate the total current national and international investment/spending in the mine action sector in Angola for the purpose of this report. The “expert opinion” among mine action operators in Angola, is that although funding in

¹⁰ Various organizations use different terminology, for example Halo Trust: Area Reduction and MAG: Community Liaison. Although with differences, the concepts are in general designed according to the Land Release principles.

total have increased over the last 2-3 years¹¹, funds available from the international donor community to the mine action sector has decreased in the same period since it saw its peak in 2006/2007. The Norwegian Embassy in Luanda have stated in meetings with the Consultants that, in the context of the Angolan Government now in a position to do so, the national government is allocating more State Budget resources towards the mine action sector and national operators. The Norwegian Embassy have since two years ago indicated to NPA that it wants to take a more strategic approach to the role of NPA, and have strengthened this approach through establishing a Strategic Partnership Agreement with NPA in Angola.

A meeting with some of the other donors to the NPA Mine Action Programme in Angola, corroborated the Consultants feeling that funding for support to international mine action operators for pure “service delivery” programmes has become scarce and that funds are likely to decrease further over the next few years.

For the appraisal of the 2008-2010 Mine Action Programme Proposal, NPA has submitted a document indicating two scenarios for financial support until 2010 and until 2015. While the 2010 scenario considers a reduction in financial support from the donors in line with the phase out of Norwegian funds, the 2015 scenario assumes that the other donors to the programme will continue their support at par with today’s level. Interviews with NPA Managers in Angola established that the NPA Headquarters in Norway only “realised” that the Norwegian funds would be phased out over the next period some three weeks prior to this appraisal and that NPA would only consider a phase out of the project if another, substantial donor could not be found. The Consultants found that neither the long term, 2015 scenario, nor the prospect of finding other donors who would be able to pick up the phase out of the Programme’s current donor base were very realistic. Although change in Angola currently is rapid, and it is difficult to make anything like a financial forecast for NPA in the next three years, disregarding the strong indications of a declining donor base is hazardous and wrong strategy for NPA. NPA, both the Angola programme and the Oslo headquarter must face the strategic challenges that results from a refocusing and change of priorities among the international donors in Angola, and decide on the implications for the implementation of the Angola Programme.

NPA has submitted a proposed financial plan for the period 2008 – 2010, with a total budget of approximately NOK 53 million, of which the Norwegian Embassy have tentatively proposed to fund NOK 24 million (just over 45%). The other donors potentially supporting the programme are: USAID (NOK 16 million), StatoilHydro (NOK 2 million), the Netherlands (NOK 8,1 million) and various other funds from smaller donors calculated at NOK 1,8 million.

¹¹ Undocumented suggestions from persons close to the mine action ‘community’ suggest that the Governemt of Angola spend as much as USD 100 million/year for 2008 for mine action related activities through the State Budget to CNIDAH and from the National Reconstruction Office, through the Executive Commission for Demining, to national and commercial operators.

Financial Plan:

<i>Donor</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>Total¹²</i>	<i>%¹³</i>
Norway	8	8	8	24	45,28
USAID	6,5	6,5	3	16	
StatoilHydro	1	1		2	
Netherlands	2,753	2,7	2,7	8,1	
Other	0,868	1,0		1,8	
Total			13,7	51,9	100

Since the start of the Mine Action Programme in 1994/1995, NPA has received funding at the level of NOK 180 million, making the total Norwegian contribution towards the programme NOK 204 million when one includes the NOK 24 million proposed for the 2008 – 2010 period.

In the 2008 – 2010 Programme Proposal the NPA Angola indicates that it will need until 2015 to reach its defined end state of the Mine Action Programme. The donor community may, however, have other foci and priorities and therefore not continue to support the Programme until then. The Norwegian Embassy in Luanda stated in 2005 that the Norwegian funding for the NPA Mine Action Programme in Angola would be phased out in what was five years from then, and provided “bridge funding” in 2007 to allow the NPA Mine Action Programme to fall in sync with the 3 year budget plan, and an end to Norwegian funding for Mine Action in 2010. Over the same period, NORAD and the Norwegian Embassy have strengthened their support for the NPA Development Programme through a Strategic Partnership agreement, and the current funding of NPA Angola will actually see an overall *increase* in total support over the next three years.

- ✓ NPA should, for the sake of transparency and accountability to all donors to the Angola programmes, produce an indication of the budget for its operation in the country, including the different donor’s contribution towards this.

5.2. Internal Consistency of the Programme

The consultants have been asked to *analyze the logical consistency of the planned objectives, outputs, activities and indicators and suggest necessary changes; Assess the Land Release concept and NPA’s implementation of the concept into operations and to what extent the concept is supported by the Angolan authorities and integrated into national plans.*

Whereas the Consultants find that the logic and relevance of the Land Release Concept is undisputable, as discussed in the first paragraph of this chapter and the concept is well supported by the national authorities as stated by the President of CNIDAH in a meeting with the Consultants during the appraisal mission, it is hard to determine the logic of NPAs intervention from the submitted NPA programme proposal. The NPA Long Term

¹² This is total of pledged amounts towards the total budget – approx NOK 1,1 million less than budgeted.

¹³ This is % of total proposed budget – NOK 53 million

Objective of the project ‘*Mines and other explosive remnants of war are no longer an obstacle to economic, social and political development in Angola*’ is well within the Angolan Government’s stated strategy¹⁴ (the Consultants will not pass any judgement on the correctness of the strategy, or the degree of adherence by the National Authority to its own strategy) Although it is considered that the NPA intervention, as indicated in the programme documents will contribute towards the achievement of both NPAs own stated Long Term Objective and that of the Angolan Government’s strategy, the internal logic of NPA’s Logical Framework Approach (LFA) fail to describe how the programme will do so applying, for example, an IF-THEN¹⁵ logic and SMART¹⁶ indicators.

The challenge for NPA is further underscored when introducing the Immediate Development Objective in the programme proposal: ‘*CNIDAH use updated reports about the impact of suspect hazard areas to elaborate annual provincial plans that reflect community priorities and use task dossiers that record land release procedures for quality management of the process*’. The immediate objective, as well as the accompanying activities set out in the programme proposal; suggest a strong focus on developing the Land Release concept and the capacity building of CNIDAH to use the concept. The programme budget accompanying the proposal is quite coherent in presenting the cost of running the actual Land Release (survey/clearance) *operations* of the NPA Combined Teams. There is however a suspicion that NPA have disregarded or underestimated the resource inputs required for an efficient *capacity building* operation. In the opinion of the Consultants, the budget for the proposal is focused on ongoing operations whereas both activities for the introduction of the Land Release Concept and Capacity Building for implementation, which seems to be by far the most important when one reads the document, appears clearly under budgeted.

For example: With reference to the Immediate Development Objective in the NPA Logical Framework (see **Annex D** at the back of this report for the full Logical Framework), a number of Activities are listed: *Land Release – National Policy for Land Release, - Tools elaborated for non-technical and technical survey, etc.* Further down in the Logical Framework, NPA have proposed several Specific Objectives, among them: *CNIDAH agree a National Policy for Land Release during 2008 that provides a framework for the training of National Institutions in the Land Release Concept from 2009.* The proposed activity by NPA is: Land Release Concept of NPA shared with CNIDAH. The proposed input from NPA: deployment of assets, and from the Central Mine Action Office: Land Release Manager. In short, the logic of this intervention, as it is described, does not convince the Consultants firstly, that NPA have approached the Capacity Building inputs with comprehensive planning, and secondly, that NPA will provide the right inputs ensuring some degree of success in achieving the Objective(s).

¹⁴ Mine Action in Angola: 2006 -2011 Strategic Plan. The Government of Angola (GOA) multi-year strategic plan for the mine action sector. The National Strategic Plan was approved by the Council of Ministers in September 2006.

¹⁵ IF-THEN is the internal logic of a Logical Framework Approach: If inputs are provided then activities will happen, if activities happens then immediate objectives will be reached, if the immediate objective are reached then the overall objective will be reached, etc.

¹⁶ SMART = Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Reliable and Time Bound indicators. Logical Framework Approach (LFA) talk!

In summary, the Consultants find that a thorough revision of the document is required to demonstrate the clarity, logic and consistency of expected programme inputs, outputs, outcomes and budgets. SMART monitoring indicators must be developed for all parts, or components, of the Programme Proposal, including an agreement for monitoring, reporting and reassessment of plans and budgets during the implementation period. With regard to the latter, the Norwegian Embassy uses a practical regime in line with the NORAD Development Cooperation Manual. Bearing in mind NPAs recent record in submitting reports and documentation in accordance with the agreed frameworks/contracts, the Consultants suggest that benchmarks are agreed for the annual work plans so that funds are released based on NPA meeting its activity and reporting obligations.

- ✓ The internal consistency is hard to assess because it builds on a new concept of Land Release, which the programme will develop for the Angolan context. The steps of the development process including benchmarks for monitoring purposes need to be prepared and clarified in the proposal.
- ✓ While the objectives of the programme is described although with some inconsistencies in linking the objectives to the budget, outputs/results do not seem relevant with regard to NPAs capacity building ambitions.
- ✓ The land release concept is internationally accepted and in principle accepted by the government.
- ✓ The overall objective of the programme is in line with Government's declared overall objectives for MA.

5.3. Capacity of NPA versus the proposed programme

Terms of Reference: Assess to what extent NPAs mine action programme corresponds with NPAs present capacity, expertise and added value, especially in terms of management capacity and NPAs institutional memory when there is a turnover of staff.

The success of NPAs programme for 2008 – 2010 will depend on two “tracks”, one being the deployment of its survey/clearance assets in accordance with the Land Release Concept, and the other the capacity building of “National Institutions” as these institutions will gradually be involved in taking over NPAs capacity and introducing Land Release as the basis for their operations.

In the Programme Proposal 2008 – 2010, NPA have identified CNIDAH, INAD and the rather general “National Institutions” as its counterpart for capacity building. CNIDAH is the national authority, providing the national regulatory framework for mine action, and as such will have to approve the NPA Land Release Concept for accreditation and provide a national framework for Land Release allowing for the fulfilment of its national authority obligations. NPA is proposing an ambitious capacity building component with CNIDAH for the development of a national policy for Land Release and monitoring of the concept through training of CNIDAHs QA/QC teams. INAD, who already has mechanical assets deployed in the country, is indicated in the NPA programme proposal

as the appropriate partner and recipient for the NPA mechanical and manual clearance assets, should NPA phase out with handover of its existing capacities.

The new dual approach of focusing on both operations and capacity building within the same project creates some new challenges for NPA in the next programme period. The Human Resource requirements, experience and skill set for - on the one hand - operational implementation and – on the other - capacity building are of different types. It is questionable, based on the (insufficient) resource input planning for the capacity building component in the programme proposal, that NPA Angola has the required experience and skill sets to realistically meet this challenge with its current staff. The Consultants conclude that NPA currently is not sufficiently staffed to undertake the capacity building activities planned in the 2008 – 2010 Programme Proposal.

A key risk to the NPA programme plan for 2008 – 2010 is whether NPA will manage to retain its human resource base for the implementation period. NPA is already experiencing a drain of staff to commercial operators, who are able to offer better salaries than NPA. It is costly and time consuming to recruit and train staff to operate safely and efficiently in potentially dangerous environment such as a minefield, and it drains resources from the operations and results side of the equation.

It has been mentioned in both the 2004 programme review (Lark and Bach, 2004) and the 2005 MTR (CMI, 2006) that NPA apparently have had success in training its own managers, increasingly occupying senior positions in the organisation and thus allowing for a reduction in (costly) international staff. The observation of how the organisation has performed over the last 2-3 years, since the mid-term review, indicates that NPA will have a human resource problem if key staff at the national management level, are not offered conditions that allow them to stay with NPA during the next programme implementation period. Another problem is that NPA, over the last years, has experienced a drain of its most experienced, long serving national managers to the UN, national authority/operators and/or commercial companies. Although clearly a benefit for national organisation and an indicator of successful capacity building, this has made the manager level of the organisation *shallow*, meaning that the “next” level of staff, when managers are absent for various reasons, are not ready to step in replacing essential positions. This will obviously also have repercussions down through the organisation. One could say, if NPA were to lose 3-4 of its most senior national staff in the next year or two that it is questionable whether NPA have the managerial capacity to reach its two pronged, ambitious, objectives for the programme.

- ✓ Present capacity and expertise are **not** at a level that will suffice to reach the objectives envisaged in the programme.
- ✓ NPAs expertise, experience and networks internationally and at the HQ in Norway make for a considerable gain in added value in its operations.
- ✓ Staff turnover, loss and lack of institutional memory have probably been the weakest points in NPA Angola’s work. The organisation will have to be streamlined and in this HQ and Luanda overall management must play a main role. Use of consultants in programme implementation may be necessary.

5.3.1 NPA value added

NPA clearly has a particular position among the NGOs involved in Mine Action in Angola. Interviews with CNIDAH as well as with other NGOs in Angola and with donors bore strong testimony to NPAs edge in working closely with local communities and in being an innovative force in the Mine Action sector in Angola. Partly, this position stems from NPAs international standing as a Mine Action NGO. Telephone interviews with key GICHD staff in Geneva emphasised this and also pointed out clearly that GICHD saw the NPA MA programme in Angola as an appropriate cooperation partner for developing and implementing the Land Release concept for Angola.

5.3.2 NPA management, personnel and staff turnover

It has been argued, in chapter 4 above, that a major cause for NPAs rather lacklustre performance in 2006 and 2007 was the virtual “round robin” of management staff with a very high turnover of managerial local and expatriate staff and the “shallow” management staff levels of the programme.

A key risk to the NPA project plan for 2008 – 2010 has been identified as the human resource base for the implementation period. There are several aspects to this: first of all, NPA will need strong *management* to take leadership, during a time when NPA will have to face major challenges for the organisation. The provision of a programme management is a “deliverable” from NPA under the contractual obligations for the proposed Norwegian funds. It is essential that NPA delivers the management services it promises and that NPA headquarters provides the Norwegian Embassy a commitment to do so. The Norwegian Embassy ought to obtain a guarantee from the NPA Headquarters that it is in a position to deliver proposed human resource inputs in accordance with the agreement for the disbursement of funds. It is probable if NPA were to lose 3-4 of its key national managers in the next three years; it will have difficulties in achieving its programme results and outcomes, and should thus make considerations, in budgets and plans, towards offering particular subsidies to obtain their services in the remaining programme period.

In the near term a looming problem is the imminent departure of the incumbent MA manager leaving in September 2008. She will by necessity have to be responsible for the preparation of the 2008 - 2010 programme introducing new concepts and developing new strategies for the future and - not least -coordination and consultations with donors and national and local authorities. The next MA manager will then have to implement a programme which he might or might not be enthusiastic about. At least the incoming person will face a steep learning curve, having to establish relationships with national authorities and counterparts. We would recommend that if at all possible the next incumbent be drawn into the work of completing the 2008-2010 programme proposal and that a firm undertaking be given that his tour will last until the end of the phase-out in 2010. Overall, the replacement will not only be the manager but a three-person strong

team brought in from a decommissioned programme in Sri-Lanka. While one can hope that the incoming team will stay for the next programme period, implementing Land Release and capacity building initiatives with the national counterparts, they should take part in the programme articulation and definition at this time, to make impact on plans and develop an ownership of the planned activities

In terms of *operational and support staff* the problem hinges on whether in fact the pressures in the labour market are as strong as what seems to be the prevailing view and, in connection with that, what measures are available to recruit and retain staff to fill vacant positions. Not least, it is the question whether NPA can withstand the pressure from, first and foremost, the commercial demining companies, but also the national institutions and the UN, who are recruiting heavily from the NPA staff base. It can be argued that NPA has fulfilled previous capacity building ambitions by the fact that its staff is able to successfully compete for other jobs in the sector, but some personnel categories, such as paramedics and deminers, could be increasingly difficult to replace throughout the programme period. At the present time it seems that little is known about the labour market situation

- ✓ It is recommended that NPA consider the developments in the Angolan labour market, and adjust/make allowance for change to maintain the “critical mass” of staff to ensure implementation of the programme until 2010.

The consultants are also concerned that NPA will be “thin on the ground” in human resources with regard to *specialist tasks* connected with the introduction of the LRC. The support from GICHD will help but there are strict financial limits to the extent of this support. It is suggested that the proposal for 2008 2010 contains ample scope for using specialist consultants drawn from GICHD and elsewhere.

An integrated part of the NPA Monitoring and Evaluation routine is the Mobile Monitoring Teams that from their base at NPA HQ in Norway regularly visit various programmes worldwide. The role of the Monitoring Teams is clear, but it is questionable if the Teams during their short missions have acquired sufficient information to understand changes in the Angolan environment and to offer practical advice. Lessons from the review of the previous implementation period (Chapter 4 of this report) indicate that the Angola Programme experienced some serious problems, and the Consultants have been surprised that the Monitoring Teams that visited the programme were not in a position to observe these problems and propose action. The question should be raised whether the NPA’s monitoring of programme implementation has been sufficient. NPA ought to make an assessment of its capacity at headquarter level, to understand and monitor the Angola Programme in its right context.

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5.4. Rights based approach

The Terms of reference ask the Consultants to *discuss opportunities to strengthen the rights based perspective of the NPA mine action program.*

The MTR 2005 argued that there may be contradictions between the partnership and the rights-based approaches. The RBA motivates NPA to select so-called ‘rights-based’ organisations to serve as its partner organisations, but the partnership approach implies that NPA should support civil society more in general. Yet in Angola many civil society organisations have not adopted human rights as a ‘credo’ for their work. If NPA wants to support the development of civil society on its own terms, how can it then at the same time say that it only wants to work with ‘rights-based’ civil society organisations? ODI already has helped NPA to address this in general and the recommendations from the Lutrell and Piron study for NPA from 2005 still seem valid in this respect.

For the mine action programme, the situation for the 2008-2010 programme is that the main cooperation partner CNIDAH is not what one could call “rights based” and MA does not have the kind of partnership focus as the DP (except for perhaps in the MRE field). Still, the capacity building activities and the introduction of the LR concept through CNIDAH should be used to introduce rights based learning and issues. Also, it is possible to focus on rights based organisations as partners in the NGO / MRE sector and, for the present partners, attempt (with the assistance of the DP) to develop rights based identities.

It was suggested by the NPA Development Programme Manager that NPA could use its relationship with CNIDAH to strengthen, or advocate for, rights based approaches with the National Authority. It is mentioned elsewhere that the Consultants have found that the Overall Development Objective of NPAs Mine Action Programme 2008 – 2010 is within and supportive of the stated national objectives in the National Strategic Plan for the Mine Action sector. The Angolan Government is currently funding a lot of mine action activities through its national organisations, FAA and INAD, as well as national commercial operators for reconstruction and infrastructure projects, which is within the National Strategic Plan. However, the national coordination appears to leave out some strategic priorities related to threats posed by mines for communities, land rights/use and other high impacted areas identified by the Landmine Impact Survey. With its history and background in focusing on social aspects of demining, and the opportunities that arises from the new approach of capacity building of-, and working closely with-, the National Authority, it is proposed that NPA include opportunities for rights based approaches in its Exit Strategy.

5.5. Development and Demining

Assess the cooperation and interface between the demining program and the development program and the use of common support services such as logistics between the two programs.

The terminology used in the programme document is slightly confusing. Within the NPA Angola Country Programme, the Development Programme is consequently named the “Long Term Programme”¹⁷. There may be historical explanations for this misnomer, such as a lack of terminology back in 1994, when NPA had to relate to a new giant “baby” – the Mine Action Programme – in the midst of its organisation.

The relationship between the Development- and Mine Action Programme has never been easy within NPA, although NPA Managers have offered some solace, stating that the ambience and co-operation between the two programmes are much better now, than it has been during some of the times past. While the Development Programme, perhaps, has been felt as more “right” or “true” to NPAs origins as an organisation, the Mine Action Programme was always bigger in terms of personnel and financial strength. At the time of the Mid Term Review in 2005, the Mine Action Programme generated approximately 80% of NPA Angola’s financial turnover, while in 2008 as this report is written; the same programme contributes about 1/3. This change in relative size of the two programmes is not singularly caused by a reduction in the Mine Action programme, but also by an increase in the Development programme, indicating both a turn in donor’s priorities and a strategic change within NPA Angola.

In the project documents submitted for this appraisal (see Annex D), NPA indicates “links” to the Development Programme which are mostly related to “Cross Cutting Issues”¹⁸. There is however very little proposed collaboration towards further linking the two programmes together. By introducing the Land Release Concept, the NPA Mine Action Programme has based a major part of the project’s intended result and outcomes on the capacity building of national institutions. Capacity Building, at least in its more advanced stages of changing organisational behaviour (as opposed to e.g. training a deminer in individual skills), requires a skill-set, methodology and techniques often more linked with Development, and it is possible that NPAs increased focus on capacity building may propose an opportunity for tying closer relations between the two programmes utilising the organisation’s own capacity to developing a realistic Capacity Building component of the Mine Action programme. Unfortunately, as is repeatedly underscored in this appraisal, neither the human resources nor financial resources appear to have been sufficiently allocated in the proposed project to efficiently justify the input-activity-output logic of the Capacity Building component.

- ✓ The 2005 Mid Term Review (MTR) gave directions for strengthening the relations between Development and Mine Action, but not much progress has been achieved in the period since, possibly due to the management problems and operational difficulties in the Mine Action programme in 2006 and onwards.
- ✓ With a larger Development Programme, the outlook for 2008-2010 should be **better** for the increased influence/involvement of the Development Programme in the Mine Action Programme, but one should not expect major breakthroughs during the phase-out period.

¹⁷ If applying this logic consequently: what is the Mine Action Programme? “The Not-so-Long-Term Programme”, or the “Very Long Term Programme”?

¹⁸ The Mid Term Review (CMI, 2005, p.73 paragraph 7.2.) seem to confirm this statement

- ✓ Increased focus on strategic Capacity Building may provide an opportunity, and NPA should look into utilising its in-house expertise developing a coherent Capacity Building programme for Angola.
- ✓ A strengthened collaboration between the Development- and Mine Action Programme should be accompanied by a realistic, time bound plan, as well as an agreement/document that outline the responsibilities, checks and balances between the two programmes allowing for monitoring of progress and achievements.

The Mine Action programme is by nature more logistics heavy than the Development programme. During the 2006 downsizing of Mine Action, NPA moved all its equipment and logistics management to the Mine Action Central Office in Malange save for a small logistics unit that remained in Luanda. With the recent introduction of the “Agresso” finance system also to the field based units, such as Malange, the Mine Action Programme’s dependency on the NPA Luanda office is shrinking. Although no concerns was raised with regard to the logistics and administrative set-up during the field visit and discussions with NPA staff for this report, it is problematic that the Mine Action programme continues to support the “central structure” of NPA in Angola with a relatively high “overhead” of the programme’s budget. While the Mine Action programme has to include its expenses towards its operating budget, the Development programme can presumably survive with a much smaller structure, both in terms of logistic-, administrative- and financial management support.

It is difficult, based on the present data and information, to establish a baseline for the correct level of contribution towards the central structures of NPA in Angola and NPA HQ – whether this should be based on a set percentage of the budget size, or based on a pro-rata cost of using services at the central level.

- ✓ As overheads and payments to central structures and HQ according to the current budget is regarded too high, it is proposed that NPA include the cost of central structures in an analysis of consequences of reduced funds to the Mine Action programme. This cost element should be balanced between the Development programme and Mine Action programme in accordance with the relative sizes of the two programmes.

Recent restructuring of the organisation at NPA HQ in Oslo created one International Department and one Mine Action Department. This means that the NPA Angola Resident Representative now reports to “two heads” at home. Interviews, observations and comments from NPA staff indicate that this situation appears to be based on the current good relationship between the Development and Mine Action departments and not so much from NPA policies. Recognising the difficult balancing act posed to the Angola Resident Representative, it is important to recognise the importance of anchoring the relationship on more than personal relationships among the programme’s staff. While it is beyond the scope of this appraisal to comment on NPAs internal structuring at the HQ level, the lack of support from NPA HQ towards Angola has contributed significantly

to the current state of the NPA Angola programme, and the Consultants therefore find it appropriate to make mention of such issues.

5.6. Cross cutting issues

Terms of Reference: Assess and provide recommendations on to what extent the programme proposal takes into consideration cross cutting issues such as gender HIV/Aids and environment.

NPA have in the 2008 – 2010 project documents included a chapter and a separate LFA and work plan for Cross Cutting Issues related to the Mine Action Programme. The consultants find that the focus on gender and HIV/AIDS issues is within the Mine Action and Development Programme Strategy 2008 – 2010, and additionally, in the case of awareness and measures related to the environmental impact of mine action operations, find that NPA is in the forefront of international developments.

It is a positive aspect of the programme that NPA and programme staff seem well aware and knowledgeable of the issues involved, and that activities promoting gender, HIV/AIDS and environment issues appear to be well integrated in the programme planning. It is furthermore positive that NPA in Angola appears to draw on synergy effects between the Development programme and Mine Action programme. As commented by one of the NPA Angola managers, some of the national managers are “starting to really warm to the issues, finding ways to promote for example gender equality among their team on their own”, indicating that NPAs effort and training of its staff has had some effect.

In terms of the actual proposal, although cross cutting issues have been adequately addressed, the details indicating how focus will be set on these issues are to some degree missing. Terms such as “link in” to processes are not very concrete. “Aiming” to develop tools and studies are not very binding for the project, and outputs/results of these activities difficult to monitor. Also, inputs to cross cutting processes, for example expenses related to seminars and training courses, have not been budgeted for and are not included in the project documentation.

- ✓ The programme appears to be aware of the crosscutting issues but the activities to promote such objectives are not detailed in a concrete way.

5.7. Exit Strategy

The Consultants will assess the NPA exit strategy and strategic plan in relation to the proposal programme for 2008-2010 particularly in regards to the capacity of partners and national/ provincial authorities.

5.7.1 NPA's role in Capacity building

Although easier said than done, most if not all international, humanitarian mine action organisations (NGO's) today express some kind of commitment to building or strengthening local/national capacities through their programmes. Internationally, NPA have in many instances been a forerunner in the development of concepts and methodologies linking traditional (and groundbreaking) development thinking with the operational requirements of mine action. There is not one commonly accepted definition of capacity building among practitioners, development organisations or in the literature. While there seems to be some uncertainty to the NPA definition, the NPA Mine Action Programme's capacity building strategy must contain some considerations in line with the following aspects, generally accepted as key to capacity building success:

- a. **Ownership:** While the donor's role in capacity building is to play a supportive role, i.e. providing funds, the ownership of the capacity building process lies primarily with the implementing partner and the organisation being capacity built, in this case NPA and the partner/institution.
- b. **Context:** There are very few, if any, quick fix solutions related to capacity building. NPA must establish a comprehensive understanding of the political, economic and social context of the environment where capacity building is planned to take place. It is furthermore of high importance that this understanding of the context is established in collaboration with the partner/institution, and that the context is equally understood among NPA and the partners/institutions.
- c. **Clear Objectives:** NPA is building capacity for what purpose? Is the aim of the capacity building for the partner/stakeholder to undertake a specific task, such as Technical Survey or driving an Aardvark Flail machine, or is the aim to strengthen the partner/institution to undertake independent thought and action, for example prioritization and coordination of the Land Release Concept and maintenance of mechanical survey/clearance tools? While it is usually accepted that training skills and providing information is less time consuming and costly, changing attitudes of individuals and organisations takes longer time and require more resources, such as personnel and financial inputs.

The case of *Capemba de Cima* Minefield – Malanje Province

To further accentuate the points made above, the evaluators would like to draw on some observations and experiences related to the *Capemba de Cima* Minefield located in the close vicinity of an *Aldeia* (village) by the same name. The minefield was visited during the field trip to Malanje in June 2008. The Minefield is identified by NPA as a "Pilot case" for the Land Release Concept (LRC) used as a practice field for the Malanje teams to gain experience, confidence and learn lessons for the implementation of the concept. The regional Quality Assurance Team from CNIDAH (based in Malanje) is accompanying the process, with the same motivation.

The information gathered in advance of starting the task indicate that the Suspected Hazard Area (SHA) is an FAA military position from the last period of conflict, and that

the mines are located in relation with a trench system behind the *Aldeia*. The land is required for food/agriculture purposes, and the clearance was requested by the traditional- and local authorities through the provincial coordination process.

NPA approached the task using the methodologies developed for the LRC, dividing the layout of the task in various sectors where different assets are deployed applying the “Confidence Criteria” matrix. Lessons Learned from the minefield is collected by the NPA Training Coordinator¹⁹ from the central programme management unit, and will be systematically disseminated to other programme units during regular re-training sessions and seminars. Preliminary assessments by the NPA responsible managers indicate that the time spent to complete the task by applying the LRC is approximately 4 months compared to 13 months if “traditional”, full scale mine clearance capabilities were deployed.

In a series of meetings that was held between the evaluator, Norwegian Embassy representatives, CNIDAH (provincial), the Provincial Vice Governor and NPA managers, a number of issues related to the coordination for the task were discussed. The importance and impact of releasing the land blocked by the suspected hazardous area was raised, particularly from a provincial coordination point of view. The minefield, being an old military position with trenches should conceptually be a task for the army’s own “Demining brigades” to handle. Yet, NPA was tasked (and agreed) to undertake the release of this land. The problem with this coordination is further accentuated by the fact that “the other” coordination mechanism (GRN/Executive Commission for Mine Action) have tasked FAA to undertake clearance and preparation of land that will be used for the railroad and/or commercial purposes. There is nothing wrong in this, in and by itself, although it gives an impression that the country’s own capacity is used to undertake important, national infrastructure priorities, while NPA as an NGO is given less important tasks, for example to “clean up the mess” after the army. In a meeting, the Vice Governor, who is the representative of CNIDAH in the province, indicated that that he would agree this coordination could be improved.

The *Capemba de Cima* minefield is not in the provincial mine action plan for 2008. It was explained by CNIDAH (provincial) and NPA that the task was originally listed in the previous, 2007 provincial plan but that the 2008 plan was not updated to reflect that there were still unfinished tasks from the previous year. For 2008, through the annual, provincial coordination, NPA has been tasked to do road-clearance on a number of routes in the province, presumably in support of the government’s effort to secure access and safe travel for people with regard to the elections due in September 2008. NPA is currently not engaged in any of the tasks that was agreed in the coordination efforts leading up to the 2008 provincial mine action plan, and has (while discussing the introduction of the LRC) stated that road clearance is no longer a prioritised effort or capacity, by the introduction of the LRC. The issue arising from this example is also related to coordination. They are however as much related to NPAs capacity to do things strategically as to the government’s (CNIDAHs) ability to respond coherently.

¹⁹ The NPA Training Coordinator was on leave during the field visit

5.7.2 An NPA exit strategy

The term 'Exit Strategy' is often linked with military- ("getting out of a quagmire") or business terminology ("liquidating one's investment"). In a humanitarian/development project cycle, the term often refers to realising the "job is done, but before we head off to a new start, let's make a smart finish". The way a project is ended, or phased out, often speaks a lot about how the organisation values its work, beneficiaries and its own reputation. Either way, an exit strategy works best if it is planned as early as possible in the campaign/venture/cycle, preferably at a predefined time/event, not at a time when the organisation is forced to by external forces or events.

In the programme documents, NPA has defined its work as completed by 2015, while the National Strategic Plan has defined an end-state linked with the Landmine Impact Survey data by the end of 2011. The main donor to NPAs Mine Action Programme, the Norwegian Embassy/NORAD, has tentatively proposed to support the programme, financially, in a three-year period, until the end of 2010. The Consultants are aware of the problem this causes for NPA: on one hand, the organisation wants to attract other donors than the Norwegian Embassy/NORAD beyond the 2010 timeframe indicated by the Norwegian donor, for example until 2011 or 2015, but on the other hand, the proposed Norwegian funds come with the caveat that NPA be able to demonstrate responsible use of the funds, also with regard to how NPA will continue to operate or end the Angola programme at the phase out the Norwegian funds.

The proposed NPA Exit Strategy is twofold: (a) *related to the introduction of the Land Release Concept*, to provide capacity building inputs to the national authority, CNIDAH, establishing a national framework and policy for Land Release, and (b), *related to its operational capacity*, to hand this over to the main national operator, INAD. Based on its previous international experiences and good relationship with the national counterparts, NPA should be in a good position to change from providing capacity building at the technical level to build capacities at the strategic/policy level. This is a strategic change in direction for the NPA Angola programme, and assuming this is the intention, the Programme Proposal for 2008 -2010 submitted by NPA is not a complete document.

- ✓ The exit strategy in terms of introducing Land Release, Capacity Building and cooperation with CNIDAH and INAD is in principle right. NPA is likely, as previous experiences indicate, to work well with local authorities.

The Appraisal Team recommend that NPA (urgently) return to the planning phase for the capacity building components in the Programme Proposal. The reason is simple: the project logic depends on the successful implementation of the capacity building, both to achieve its intended objectives, and for the Exit Strategy to be realistic. Capacity Building is both difficult and time consuming, and for the NPA programme to reach its intended outcome in this regard, a thorough contextual analysis must be conducted together with the partners (CNIDAH and INAD). The analysis will have to establish the **purpose** of the capacity building, and hence adjust the ambitions, time frames, activities,

budgets, etc. As mentioned above, the exit strategy must be formulated at the very beginning of the project or implementation period, and contain considerations of the following key issues:

- ✓ Ownership: CNIDAH and INAD must take part in the definition of key elements to the Capacity Building (Exit Strategy). For the Capacity Building to be efficient NPA must obtain the commitment from its partners to actually participate in capacity building, and to define what capacity building they actually *want*.
- ✓ The role of CNIDAH and INAD must be clear. This also relates to the two institutions' own policies and strategies, and those of the Government, Executive Commission and/or other relevant authorities/governing bodies.
- ✓ The emphasis of the Capacity Building/Exit Strategy is transfer of knowledge and skills to those persons who will be implementing, for example, the Land Release policies in the long run. It is necessary that NPA ensures a commitment from CNIDAH and INAD that these persons will be available for the agreed activities.
- ✓ NPA must identify and engage the managerial and technical competencies and skills it needs to successfully implement the Exit Strategy. The implication of high turnover of staff must be considered.
- ✓ NPA must emphasise the development of a proper budget for the Exit Strategy, to ensure funds are available for the capacity building activities throughout the programme period.

The available Programme Documents from NPA makes it apparent that NPA, perhaps without being thoroughly aware, are making strategic changes to its intervention in Angola. A move away from entirely focusing on operations in capacity building, also moves away from delivering mine action services, to being involved in strategic thinking and policy making. It is quite essential that NPA is aware of this, internally, and that strategic changes are anchored in all levels of the organisation.

The line of thought behind the existing Programme Proposal is good, and it is clear that more work is needed to make the present draft a useful document. This cannot be the sole responsibility of the NPA management in Angola. If and when NPA makes strategic changes in the direction of one of its programmes, the planning involved and the consequence for the programme *and* organisation must be based on dialogue and shared information throughout the organisation. There is a lingering feeling among the two consultants that NPA HQ have been out of 'sync' with the country level of the programme, and thus has been unable to pick up the signals and changes that has taken place in the country over the last couple of years. When NPA have gone from "excellence" in 2006, to a situation in 2008 with massive dissatisfaction in the staff and inability to report and prepare essential documentation, it should be seen as a responsibility of the whole organisation (i.e. the whole of NPA) including the Angola programme, the country office and the Oslo HQ.

5.8. Risks

Terms of Reference: *Identify and analyse the main risks to the program, and give recommendation on risk response.*

Project Risks: NPA has been asked by its biggest donor, the Norwegian Embassy/NORAD, to present strategies for a phase-out of Norwegian funds to the project. While this is a difficult task, and counterintuitive to rallying enthusiasm for the new Land Release Concept, to phase out and/or build down the programme at the same time, NPA must face some tough decisions in its planning for the next three years. In the Programme Proposal, NPA appear reasonably aware of external risks to the programme, although mitigating strategies are not apparently present in any forceful way, the internal risks (personnel, commitment, funding) has not been addressed.

Risks related to the Land Release Concept: While working in companionship with the GICHD and the expressed positive attitude towards developing the concept of CNIDAH have put NPA in a good position to become a preferred partner in developing the national policy on Land Release, good intentions does not ensure success. NPA is exposed to a certain risk related to the accreditation of the concept, as well as the usefulness of the concept if Released Land as a matter of fact is not released to the communities due to the lack of confidence in the concept and/or the lack of capacity of the national authority to provide Quality Assurance of the concept (a precondition for releasing the land back to the communities).

Risks related to the operational concept: NPA is running some inherent risks related to the proposed programme. The successful deployment of survey/clearance assets is to a large degree depending on the ability to insert various types of capabilities efficiently using the Combined Teams, which is a **tactical/operational competence**, and the capacity to keep **mechanical capabilities operational** throughout the programme period. NPA has proposed to hand over operational capabilities, gradually, to INAD. This is, at least as a proposal, a good idea, but will not work in practice if INAD is not brought into the planning early: INAD may not want to receive the NPA capabilities, which indeed may be the case, according to the UNDP-INAD CTA, who has strongly recommended that any hand over of equipment and capabilities must not be a “dumping” of worn-out equipment, but also accompanied with realistic training and maintenance.

In the opinion of the Consultancy Team, NPA, at both HQ and Country level, are in danger of major negligence if proper risk mitigating policies are not implemented in the planning of this project. *Assuming* that existing donors will continue supporting NPA, that new donors will be found replacing existing donors and/or that funding level to the project will remain at its current level until and beyond 2010, is not a coherent strategy for planning. The budget, as it stands in July 2008, is already running a financial deficit, while the Consultants find that not enough consideration has been made towards resource planning for, among other, costs and liabilities related to a downscaling of operations and staff rosters and capacity building inputs for developing the Land Release Concept with

CNIDAH. It has been argued elsewhere in this report that NPA is depending on its operational capacity, as well as its capacity building inputs to reach the full intended outcome of the project. Operational Capacity and Capacity Building are two different capabilities, for example with regard to staff competencies, and neither is fully catered for in the existing project proposal.

- ✓ A successful implementation requires political will to reach the intended, overall objective of the project.
- ✓ Shallow staffing makes operations vulnerable to staff turnover and temporary absence. Avoiding the attendant risks depends on better support from HQ and more multitasking.
- ✓ CNIDAH's capacity and will to cooperate is a key requirement for a successful implementation. It is necessary to get a clear commitment from CNIDAH and work with CNIDAH to establish a concrete programme.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

The appraisal of the NPA Mine Action Programme 2008 – 2010 has not been an easy task, and some of the Lessons Learned from this exercise has been difficult to articulate in writing. It was said during one of the meetings held for this appraisal that “in 2006 everything with the programme was hunky-dory and on rails” which cannot be said for the current state of affairs. We hope that our conclusions and recommendation can help in continuing the upward trend that has now began and make sure that 13 years of steadfast NPA Mine Action in Angola can be brought to a successful conclusion.

6.1 Key Conclusions

- ✓ In essence, the consultants find the NPA proposal for the implementation of a Land Release Concept coherent and relevant, generally in line with the organisations own expressed strategies and policies. The Exit Strategy is however nearly non-existent and the NPA strategy for linking the Mine Action with other development related activities is weak.
- ✓ Whereas the Consultants find the logic and relevance of the Land Release Concept undisputable and the concept well supported by the national authorities, it is hard to understand the logic of NPAs intervention by reading the submitted NPA programme proposal.
- ✓ We emphasise that disregarding the strong indications of a declining donor base is hazardous and wrong strategy for NPA. Also, NPA in Angola and at the Oslo headquarters must face the strategic challenges that results from a possible refocus and changing priorities among the international donors in Angola, and indicate how consequences following from this may have implications for the implementation of the Angola Programme.

- ✓ The logic of the planned intervention, as it is described, does not convince the Consultants that NPA have approached the Capacity Building inputs with comprehensive planning, and that NPA will provide the right inputs to ensure success in achieving the objective(s).
- ✓ It is likely that NPA has disregarded or underestimated the resource inputs required for an efficient capacity building operation.
- ✓ The Consultants find that a thorough revision of the document is required to demonstrate the logic and consistency of expected programme inputs, outputs, outcomes and budgets, and that they are clearly stated and linked. SMART monitoring indicators must be developed for all parts, or components, of the Programme Proposal, including an agreement for monitoring, reporting and reassessment of plans and budgets during the implementation period
- ✓ The internal consistency is hard to assess because it builds on a new concept of Land Release, which the programme will develop for the Angolan context. The steps of the development process including benchmarks for monitoring purposes need to be prepared and clarified in the proposal.
- ✓ While the objectives of the programme is described, although with some inconsistencies linking the objectives to the budget, outputs/results are not relevant with regard to NPAs capacity building ambitions.
- ✓ The land release concept is internationally accepted and in principle accepted by the government.
- ✓ The overall objective of the programme is in line with Government's declared overall objectives for MA.
- ✓ The Consultants conclude that NPA currently are not sufficiently staffed to undertake the capacity building activities planned in the 2008 – 2010 Programme Proposal.
- ✓ Management, overall in NPA, has impacted and deteriorated relations to Embassy and also temporarily operations.
- ✓ The Oslo HQ support to the MA programme in Angola has not been forthcoming to the extent necessary to prevent or halt the decline in MA results since 2006.
- ✓ The Oslo HQ has initially been against a phase out. It took a long time to start the dialogue on exit within the organisation and with the Norwegian Embassy and this left the programme "in limbo" for considerable time.
- ✓ The system for institutional memory does not work well.

- ✓ Loss of staff might have been foreseen but when the situation materialized little was done to deal with the problem.
- ✓ The 2005 Mid Term Review (MTR) gave directions for strengthening the relations between Development and Mine Action, but not much progress has been achieved in the period since, possibly due to the management problems and operational difficulties in the Mine Action programme in 2006 and onwards.
- ✓ With a bigger size Development Programme, the outlook for 2008-2010 should be **better** for the increased influence/involvement of the Development Programme in the Mine Action Programme, but one should not expect major breakthroughs during the phase-out period.
- ✓ The draft programme appears to be aware of the crosscutting issues but the activities to promote such objectives are not detailed in a concrete way.
- ✓ In terms of Programme Proposal, although Cross Cutting issues have been adequately addressed, as such, the details indicating how focus on for example gender, HIV/AIDS and environmental issues will be addressed are to some degree missing.
- ✓ The exit strategy in terms of introducing Land Release, Capacity Building and cooperation with CNIDAH and INAD is in principle right. NPA is likely, as previous experiences indicate, to work well with local authorities.
- ✓ The Exit Strategy must be formulated at the very beginning of the project or implementation period, and (at least) contain considerations towards the following key issues:
 - Ownership: CNIDAH and INAD must take part in the definition of key elements to the Capacity Building (Exit Strategy). For the Capacity Building to be efficient NPA must obtain the commitment from its partners to actually participate in capacity building, and to define what capacity building they actually *want*.
 - The role of CNIDAH and INAD must be clear. This also relates to the two institutions own policies and strategies, and those of the Government, Executive Commission and/or other relevant authority/governing body.
 - The emphasis of the Capacity Building/Exit Strategy is transfer of knowledge and skills to those persons who will be implementing, for example, the Land Release policies in the long run. It is necessary that NPA have the commitment from CNIDAH and INAD that these persons will be available for the agreed activities.
 - NPA must identify and engage the managerial and technical competencies and skills it needs to successfully implement the Exit Strategy. The implication of high turnover of staff must be considered.

- NPA must emphasise the development of a proper budget for the Exit Strategy, to ensure funds are available for the capacity building activities throughout the programme period.
- ✓ Political will is needed to reach the intended, overall objective of the project.
- ✓ Shallow staffing makes operations vulnerable to staff turnover and temporary absence. Better support from HQ and more multitasking are needed.
- ✓ The greatest risk is perhaps CNIDAHs capacity and will to cooperate. It is necessary to get clear commitment from CNIDAH and work with CNIDAH to establish a concrete programme.

6.2 *Summary of Recommendations*

- ✓ We recommend that the 2008-2010 programme presented by the NPA not be accepted by the Embassy before a rewrite of the proposal where expected inputs, outputs, outcomes (including monitoring indicators) and budgets are clearly stated and linked.
- ✓ NPA has to consider its own capacity to undertake both efficient operations and at the same time focus on capacity building. The NPA Programme Proposal is ambitious, and for NPA to reach the intended result (outcome) described in the proposal it must consider the possibility of strengthening its organisation in both areas; NPA will require both capacity which can secure efficient survey/clearance and professional management of the capacity building objectives of the Mine Action Programme.
- ✓ The Appraisal Team recommends that NPA (urgently) return to the planning phase for the Programme Proposal; the project logic depends on the successful implementation of the capacity building, both to achieve its intended objectives, and for the Exit Strategy to be realistic.
- ✓ It is recommended that NPA communicate immediately with CNIDAH to establish the basic framework and execution plan for the successful collaboration in developing the Land Release Concept into a national policy framework that can be agreed with all operators.
- ✓ NPA should indicate a budget and cost of the whole operation in the country, including the different donor's contribution towards this.
- ✓ The Norwegian Embassy requires a programme and implementation which is in line with the NORAD Development Cooperation Manual including benchmarks agreed for the annual work plans and release of funding based on NPA meeting its

activity and reporting obligations. The NPA is recommended to make itself familiar with the manual.

- ✓ NPA must establish a clear understanding with CNIDAH on the kind of cooperation to be undertaken related to the development of the Land Release Concept.
- ✓ With its history and background in focusing on social aspects of mine action it is proposed that NPA include opportunities for rights based approaches working with the National Authority in NPA's Exit Strategy.
- ✓ The Consultants believe that the Embassy should extract a guarantee from the NPA headquarters in Oslo that the office would take strong steps to prevent a high turn over of managerial staff.
- ✓ Present capacity and expertise are **not** at a level that will suffice to reach the objectives envisaged in the programme.
- ✓ Staff turnover, loss and lack of institutional memory have probably been the weakest points in NPA Angola's work. The organisation will have to be streamlined and in this HQ and Luanda overall management must play a main role. Use of consultants is recommended.
- ✓ It is recommended that NPA compiles and analyses existing relevant labour market information and builds a strategy to handle likely changes in the labour market 2008-2010.
- ✓ It is suggested that the proposal for 2008 2010 contains ample scope for using specialist consultants drawn from GICHD and elsewhere.
- ✓ The Consultants recommend that (if at all possible) the next MA Programme Manager be drawn into the work of completing the 2008-2010 programme and that a firm undertaking be given that her/his tour will last until the end of the phase out in 2010.
- ✓ The Proposal 2008 – 2010 should identify what National Institutions it intend to capacity build (ref. proposal paragraph: Plan of Action), and furthermore, in line with relevant methodology for capacity building (CB), indicate the (*who*) positions to focus with capacity building, *what* particular issues the CB intervention should aim at, *how* CB should be done as well as the (*when*) time lines for the interventions.
- ✓ NPAs expertise, experience and networks internationally and at the HQ in Norway make for a considerable gain in added value in its operations.

- ✓ Increased focus on strategic Capacity Building may provide an opportunity for using the potential synergies which may be released from closer cooperation between the Mine Action Programme (MA) and the Development Programme (DP). NPA should look into utilising its in-house expertise from DP in developing a coherent Capacity Building programme for Angola.
- ✓ A strengthened collaboration between the Development- and Mine Action Programme should be accompanied by a realistic, time bound plan, as well as an agreement/document that outline the responsibilities, checks and balances between the two programmes allowing for monitoring of progress and achievements.
- ✓ The Mine Action now carries a major part of the overhead costs of NPA's entire Angola operation. We feel that it is necessary to balance the coverage of overhead cost between the Development programme and the Mine Action programme more in accordance with the present relative sizes of the two programmes.

Annexures

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
A) A REVIEW OF NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID'S (NPA)
MINE ACTION PROGRAM IN ANGOLA, AND
B) AN APPRAISAL OF NPA'S MINE ACTION PROGRAM
FOR 2008-2010

1. BACKGROUND

Norway has financed demining activities through NPA since 1994, and has disbursed NOK 184 million to NPA in the period up to 2007. The support has been in an arrangement using the Strategic Partnership model, thus NPA has received a 100% financing from the Embassy. When the "Retningslinjer for samarbeid mellom Angola og Norge" was approved by the Minister of Development Cooperation late 2006, it was decided to scale down the Norwegian support to demining, and phase out the support by end 2010. NPA received a bridg support for 2007 in order for the new financial agreement to accompany the same period as the NPA strategy. Hence the Embassy requested NPA to elaborate a program proposal covering the period 2008-2010.

Angola is one of the countries in the world with the heaviest contamination of land mines and UXOs. In an attempt to map out the extent, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted between 2004 and 2007. The survey, which was partly financed by the Norwegian funds, identified 1,968 communities in the 18 provinces as impacted by landmines. There are 3,266 suspected hazard areas associated with the impacted communities. The LIS estimates that 2,367,779 people are living in the impacted communities. This represents between 15-20 percent of the people in Angola. Using information from the LIS, CNIDAH, the national mine action authority elaborated a strategic plan for Mine Action from 2006 through 2011. The plan states that by the end of 2011 all suspect areas in high impacted communities will have been cleared as well as half of the suspect areas in medium impacted communities. Another objective is that suspect areas recorded in low impact communities will have been re-surveyed and all confirmed dangerous areas marked.

NPA plans to contribute to achieving the agreed goal by supporting national and provincial authorities to realise the 2006-2011 strategic plan through advocacy, continued operations (combining survey and clearance) and capacity building of national authorities and other partners.

NPA has been operational in Angola since 1994. It was a request from UN that initiated NPA's mine action engagement and the first task was to survey the coastal provinces and areas designated for demobilisation camps and to clear the main road link between Luanda and Malange.

NPA's mine action activities in Angola are coordinated from the mine action office in Malange. Mine action operations are supported by one field office in Malange for the Provinces of Kwanza Norte and Malange and by one in Gabela for the Province of Kwanza Sul. The mine action office in Moxico province was closed in December 2006. During 2008 NPA will operate in the provinces of Kwanza Sul, Malange and Kwanza Norte with the re-survey of recorded suspect areas and the re-survey for Uige and Zaire province is planned for 2009.

The support from international donors for demining has decreased during the last years as the Angolan Government has increased its own funding over the State Budget (OGE). The demining activities should be taken over by Angolan actors like CNIDAH, INAD, FAA, national NGOs as well as international and national commercial companies.

2. PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW AND THE APPRAISAL

The purpose of the assignment is to provide the Embassy with a basis for a decision on continued support to NPA, through a review of the present program and an appraisal of the proposal for 2008-2010.

Norad's Evaluation Department is planning to carry out an evaluation of NPA's mine action programme internationally, starting in June 2008. The NPA mine action programme in Angola would benefit from the conclusions drawn on the common features of all NPA mine action programmes and the findings from the evaluation could therefore be applied on NPA Angola's present mine action programme. General issues concerning the present mine action programme should therefore be given less attention in this assignment and the focus of this review should therefore be on section B, the Appraisal of the programme 2008-2010.

The intended users of the review are the Norwegian Embassy and NPA, however the review will also be shared with other interested donors.

The last review of NPA demining activities was carried out by CMI in October 2005 as a part of the Mid-Term Review of the Angola Programme of Norwegian People's Aid for the programme period 2004-2007.

An end review of the NPA mine action programme is planned for 2010. In the end review the *efficiency* of the program shall be further assessed, including whether resources have been used in an efficient way and an assessment of the administrative budget relative to the overall program shall be made.

3. SCOPE OF WORK – THE REVIEW

The work shall comprise, but not necessarily be limited to, the following issues:

1. Assess the results achieved in relation to stated objectives;

2. Assess the sustainability of the results obtained especially with regard to capacity building of relevant Angolan authorities;
3. Summarise main lessons learned from the implementation of the programme.

4. SCOPE OF WORK – THE APPRAISAL

The work shall comprise, but not necessarily be limited to, the following issues:

1. Assess the NPA proposal for the mine action programme for 2008-2010. The Embassy has indicated NOK 24 mill as its level for support for the phase out period 2008-2010 against the program proposal for the same period. Other donors have similarly indicated and/or signed agreements with NPA for support in the same period. The consultants shall, based on the program proposal, assess the realism of the program in relation to the financial support provided by all donors, and suggest any recommendations for necessary changes in programme design. The work plan and budget should be assessed as well as the overall NPA financing plan 2008-2010 in relation to the Angolan government's own contribution to demining activities.
2. Assess to what extent NPA's mine action programme corresponds with NPA's present capacity, expertise and added value, especially in terms of management capacity and NPA's institutional memory when there is a turnover of staff.
3. Analyse the logical consistency of the planned objectives, outputs, activities and indicators and suggest necessary changes;
4. Identify and analyse the main risks to the program, and give recommendation on risk response;
5. Discuss opportunities to strengthen the rights based perspective of the NPA mine action program;
6. Assess the cooperation and interface between the demining program and the development program and the use of common support services such as logistics between the two programs;
7. Assess the NPA strategic plan and the exit strategy in relation to the proposal program for 2008-2010, particularly in regards to the capacity of partners and national/provincial authorities;
8. Assess the Land Release concept and NPA's implementation of the concept into operations, and to what extent the concept is supported by the Angolan authorities and integrated into national plans;
9. Assess and provide recommendations on to what extent the program proposal takes into consideration cross cutting issues such as gender, HIV/Aids and environment

5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVIEW

The review shall be carried out by a team of 2 consultants.

Team leader:

- Relevant experience with managing and leading reviews,
- Experience in review principles and standards in the context of humanitarian responses.

The team as a whole will represent a balance of skills and experience, including:

- Competence in demining and experience in evaluation of such programmes
- Expertise on global humanitarian architecture, working principles and instruments
- Good knowledge of international development policies and processes, in particular within demining
- Experience with analysis of gender and equity issues
- Languages: English and Portuguese (at least one team member must be Portuguese speaking)

The team will be given access to all documentation at both the Embassy and NPA's country office relevant to the study (previous programme documents, contracts, reports, financial statements, audits, internal memos etc). The team should study NPA's Mine Action Strategy 2008-2011 document and the NPA Mine Action Proposal for 2008-2010. The team should also familiarise itself with relevant MFA strategy documents as well as the Angolan National Demining Plan from CNIDAH.

The team shall meet with representatives of NPA, the Norwegian Embassy, other donors supporting demining in general and NPA in particular, CNIDAH and relevant authorities on central and provincial level.

The team shall debrief NPA and the Embassy on the preliminary findings and conclusions at the end of the field work in Luanda, at 7 July 2008. A draft report shall be submitted no later than one week after. The parties should be given one week to comment. The final report shall be ready by 21 July 2008.

Consultant One will be given 5 days for preparatory work in Norway, and 5 days of field work in Angola. Consultant Two will be given 20 days of field work. Estimated time for the review will be June/July 2008.

6. REPORTING

The report's format should consist of an Executive Summary, Methodology used; Major findings and assessments, Conclusions and Recommendations.

The report shall be in English and include an executive summary. The report should not exceed 20 pages (not including the annexes).

The final draft of the report, consisting of 5 bounded copies, one unbounded master copy and 2 copies submitted/sent by e-mail in formats: Word and Adobe Acrobat Reader.

7. INDICATIVE BUDGET (to be agreed between Norad and CMI)

Consultant One: Up to 1 weeks in field + 1 at desk = 2 weeks

Consultant Two (local): Up to 4 weeks in field

Daily rate is planned at $\text{NOK } 800 * 7.5 = 6.000$

Total Remuneration is 30 working days x 6.000 = NOK 180.000

Consultant One, per diem = $1.520 + 800 = 2.320 \times 5 =$ NOK 11.600

Consultant One Travel Expenses: NOK 30.000

Consultant Two Travel Expenses: NOK 15.000

Total Indicative Budget = NOK 236.600

12. June 2008

Annex B - Activities, Meetings Held and People interviewed and consulted

Date	Activity/Meeting	Location	Participants
11/6	Norwegian Embassy, Christian Michelsen Institute, Consultant	Norwegian Embassy	Lise Stensrud, Åsa Bergman Amadio, Steinar Hegre, Guri Stegali
17/6	Norwegian Embassy, NPA Managers, Consultant	NPA Malange	Lise Stensrud, Åsa Bergman Amadio, Rebecca Thomsen, Manuel João, Graça Monteiro, Alberto Teixeira, Pedro N'gunza, Timotio Tchiningui, Tony Muhongo
17/6	Kingla School and Kingla I and II minefields	Aldeia Kingla	Same as above
18/6	Capemba de Cima Minefield	Aldeia Capemba de Cima	Members from NPA Mine Action Team, Malanje, and as above
18/6	CNIDAH – Malanje Province	CNIDAH, “Sala Operativa”	Carvalho Gaspar, Sérgio Simão, Paulino Fransisco, Sérgio Samuel N'gunza
19/6	Provincial Government of Malanje/ CNIDAH Representative in Malanje, Norwegian Embassy, Consultant	Provincial Administration Building	Gaspar Neto, Lise Stensrud, Åsa Bergman Amadio, Carvalho Gaspar, Sérgio Simão
26/6	UNDP, Norwegian Embassy, Consultant	Norwegian Embassy	Luke Atkinson, Åsa Bergman Amadio
26/6	US Embassy, the Netherlands Embassy, Norwegian Embassy, Consultant	US Embassy	Doreen Bailey, Dimitri Vogelaar, Åsa Bergman Amadio
30/6	Dinner Meeting, UNDP (INAD) and Consultants	Luanda	Luke Atkinson
1/7	NPA Angola Management and Consultant	Luanda	Åge Skagestad, Helena Zefanias, Nina Pedersen, Rebecka Thomson
1/7	UNDP CNIDAH CTA	CNIDAH	Mohammad Qasim

1/7	CNIDAH, Consultants	Presidential Palace, Luanda	Gen. Santana André Pitra “Petroff”, Balbina da Silva, Brig. Roque de Oliveira
2/7	Telephone conference – GICHD, Consultants	Norwegian Embassy, Luanda	Tim Lardner and Ted Paterson (on telephone)
3/7	Working Lunch, UNDP (CNIDAH) and Consultants	Ilha de Luanda	Mohammad Qasim
7/7	Debrief/Presentation to Embassy and NPA: draft review/appraisal report, discussion on conclusions and recommendation	Norwegian Embassy, Luanda	Lise Stensrud, Åsa Bergman Amadio, Åge Skagestad, Rebecca Thomsen, Helena Zefanias, Consultants

Date	Name	Function, organisation	Where
11/6	Lise Stensrud	Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy	Luanda
11/6	Åsa Bergman Amadio	Programme Officer, Norwegian Embassy	Luanda
17/6	Rebecca Thomson	Programme Manager, NPA	Malanje
17/6	Manuel João	Deputy Programme Manager, NPA	Malanje
17/6	Graça Monteiro	Mechanical Coordinator, NPA	Malanje
17/6	Alberto Teixeira	Quality Assurance Officer, NPA	Malanje
17/6	Pedro N’gunza	Combined Team Leader, NPA	Malanje
17/6	Timotio Tchiningui	Mechanical Coordinator, NPA	Malanje
17/6	Tony Muhongo	Combined Team Leader, NPA	Malanje
18/6	Simão Mateus	Quality Assurance Officer, CNIDAH – Province of Malanje	Malanje
18/6	Pedro António Faria	Demining Team Leader, NPA	Capemba de Cima
18/6	Victor Vicente	Demining Team Leader, NPA	Capemba de Cima
18/6	Carvalho Gaspar	Liaison Officer, CNIDAH	Malanje
18/6	Sérgio Simão	QA/QC Team Leader, CNIDAH	Malanje
18/6	Paulino Fransisco	QA/QC Officer, CNIDAH	Malanje
18/6	Sérgio Samuel N’gunza	QA/QC Officer, CNIDAH	Malanje
19/6	Gaspar Neto	Vice Governor, Malanje Province	Malanje
26/6	Luke Atkinson	CTA INAD Project, UNDP	Luanda
26/6	Dimitri Vogelaar	Second Secretary, Netherlands	Luanda

		Embassy	
26/6	Doreen Bailey	Political Secretary, US Embassy	Luanda
1/7	Åge Skagestad	Resident Representative, NPA	Luanda
1/7	Helena Zefanias	Development Programme Manager, NPA	Luanda
1/7	Nina Pedersen	Organisation Development Officer, NPA	Luanda
1/7	Mohammad Qasim	CTA (Acting) CNIDAH Project, UNDP	Luanda
1/7	Gen. Santana André Pitra “Petroff”	President, CNIDAH	Luanda
1/7	Balbina da Silva	Programme Manager, CNIDAH	Luanda
1/7	Brig. Roque de Oliveira	Head, TEchnical Department, CNIDAH	Luanda
2/7	Jon Veia	Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy	Luanda
3/7	Tim Lardner	GICHD	Geneve/Luanda
3/7	Ted Paterson	GICHD	Geneve/Luanda

Some of the persons met on the list, above, took part in the dialogue and process of this appraisal more than once, in which case their names are listed on the date they first met with the Consultants.

Annex C - Literature and Documents consulted for the assessment

- Development Cooperation Manual, NORAD, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2005
- Looking back, Moving forward, SIDA Evaluation Manual, SIDA 2004
- Mine Action in Angola, 2006-2011 Strategic Plan, CNIDAH on behalf of the Government of Angola
- Plano Provincial Operacional de Acção Contra Minas 2008, Governo da Província de Malanje/CNIDAH, October 2007
- Mine Action in Angola 2008 Program Proposal, NPA May 2008
- Land Release, Implementing Land Release in Angola, Proposal – MAP 2008-2010 (“Proposal for Discussion”), NPA June 2008
- Land Release, Implementing Land Release in Angola, Proposal – MAP 2008-2010, NPA July 2008
- Platform for Dialogue, Project AGO-0018 NPA Angola, Agreement AGO-07/042 NPA Mine Action Programme, Norwegian Embassy, Luanda, June 2008
- Notes from meeting 10 June 2008 with NPA, Norwegian Embassy, Luanda, June 2008
- Mid Term Review of the Angola Programme of Norwegian Peoples Aid, Isaksen, Samset, Pacheco/CMI 2006
- IMAS 08.20 Land Release
- IMAS 08.21 General Survey
- IMAS 08.22 Technical Survey
- Land Release – A guide for Mine and ERW affected countries (GICHD, November 2007), Publication no. 53
- “What works and What Lasts” – SRSA Bridge Building projects in Angola 2003 - 2007, Robust Consult/Lars Peter Nissen, March 2008.



Norwegian People's Aid
Solidarity in Action

LAND RELEASE

Implementing Land Release in Angola

Norwegian People's Aid Mine Action Program 2008 – 2010

The Republic of Angola ratified the Mine Ban Convention in 2002 and provided information on the destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines on 1st January 2007. Under Article V, Angola is obliged to clear all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction as soon as possible but no later than 1 January, 2013. A formidable task even if a National Policy is adopted that supports the implementing of a Land Release or Area Reduction Concept.

Land Release aims to resolve the actual landmine problem by focusing on survey rather than full clearance of reported suspect hazard areas. Implementing a Land Release Concept reduces the cost involved and time needed to eliminate the mine problem. Land Release focuses on the collecting of information through non-technical and technical survey to ascertain if the suspect area can be released or full clearance required. Non-technical survey is an investigation into the presence and type of mines and other explosive remnants of war and where possible the physical location of them: non-technical survey is a hazard identification process. Technical survey involves the use of demining assets for the technical investigation of the area that remains upon conclusion of the non-technical survey. Although demining assets are used the purpose is to investigate sections to conclude which areas require full clearance and which areas can be released.

Norwegian People's Aid has developed a Land Release Concept applicable to the context of Angola. This proposal details the plans to develop tools to support decision making so that the Land Release Process is applied over the long-term. With training complete and quality assurance procedures in place NPA will evaluate the need to provide continued technical assistance to National Institutions.

SUMMARY: IMPLEMENTING LAND RELEASE IN ANGOLA

Norwegian People's Aid has elaborated a Land Release Concept specific to the context of Angola which will allow a more efficient return of suspect land for community use. Tools to support the implementing of the Land Release Concept will be piloted in cooperation with National Institutions and a program elaborated for the training of national demining brigades.

Training of National Institutions in the Land Release Concept requires that NPA maintain an operational capacity so that the practical use of tools developed for Land Release can be observed. Norwegian People's Aid proposes to assess if the capacity building of National Institutions may include the handover of mechanical demining assets and experienced staff at a later stage.

To ensure an efficient use of demining assets Norwegian People's Aid will prepare clearance plans for confirmed mined areas through the re-survey of suspect areas recorded during the Landmine Impact Survey.

With the training of National Institutions complete, Norwegian People's Aid will look at the need for a continued role to provide technical assistance.

The main emphasis of Norwegian People's Aid from 2008 to 2010 will be the implementation of Land Release including the training of National Institutions. With the evaluation that National Institutions will be able to address the remaining mine problem Norwegian People's Aid will exit from implementing mine action activities in Angola.

The annual budget for 2008 is NOK 21 million. For the period 2008-2001 NPA hope to secure a total of NOK 65. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is asked to contribute 24 million NOK.

ABBREVIATIONS: relevance to context in Angola

ALIS: *Angola Landmine Impact Survey*

Completed in June 2007, the ALIS provides information on the impact that suspect hazardous areas have on communities and specific groups at risk. The ALIS data lists the number of suspect areas impacting each community, the location of these in relation to the community and the socio-economic blockage. Information collected during the Landmine Impact Survey serves as the desk analysis prior to re-visits of impacted communities.

LIS: *Landmine Impact Survey*

The Landmine Impact Survey and protocols of this were designed to document the scope and impact of a landmine problem. The Landmine Impact Survey in Angola was initiated in 2004 with lessons learnt incorporated to ongoing surveys in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The key lesson learnt was to ensure the applying of polygon maps to recorded suspect areas in order to facilitate planning and follow up.

CNIDAH: *Inter-Sectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance*

In July 2001, the Government of Angola set up CNIDAH to take over the role of the regulator and coordinator of humanitarian mine action in Angola. Under Angolan Law a commission can function for a period of five years. In 2007, CNIDAH provided statutes to the Council of Ministers requesting CNIDAH to

function as a National Mine Action Authority rather than an Inter-Sectoral Commission: the statutes are still to be adopted.

CED: *Executive Commission for Demining*

Established by Presidential Decree in October 2005, the CED is coordinates demining activities of brigades established under INAD (National Institute for Demining), the FAA (Angolan Armed Forces) and the GRN (National Cabinet for Reconstruction). The brigades of the CED prioritise clearance in support of reconstruction and national development. Detailed in the statutes is the additional role of INAD who work in conjunction with international operators to clear areas impacting communities to facilitate rural development and economic recovery.

ERW: *Explosive Remnants of War*

With the concluding of Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in December 2003 specific to Explosive Remnants of War the term ERW has been applied used in preference to UXO (unexploded ordnance). The primary reason being that ERW has a legal definition which can be applied in dialogue with authorities: Angola has not signed the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons nor any of the additional protocols.

IMAS: *International Mine Action Standards*

Created in response to the increasing number of actors undertaking humanitarian mine action the International Mine Action Standards provide guidelines from which national standards can be adopted. The Standards Committee reviews and updates the international standards with the GICHD supporting national mine

action authorities to prepare standards that are consistent with the IMAS. CNIDAH are aware that national standards adopted for Angola need to be revised as they are a 'cut and paste' of the international standards and do not reflect the specific context of Angola. The GICHD have offered to support CNIDAH to review the national standards – a process that is on hold until specific IMAS for Land Release have been agreed by the Standards Committee.

IMSMA: *Information Management System for Mine Action*

First trialled in Kosovo in 1999, IMSMA is now installed as the National Data Base in all countries implementing mine action activities. Norwegian People's Aid has IMSMA installed at the Mine Action Central Office which supports the sharing of information with the National Data Base and ensures that the National Data Base holds records of all activities undertaken to eliminate the mine problem.

LAND RELEASE: THE CONCEPT

The focus of Land Release²⁰ is to remove the claim that an area is suspected to be mined. The claim that an area is suspect is given by the community. This can either be a quantified claim as they were present at the time that mines were laid or information given by others. The claim that an area is suspected to be mined is recorded during General Survey and/or a Landmine Impact Survey. The Land Release process seeks to quantify this claim. Information is collected through non-technical²¹ and technical²² survey to determine if the suspect area can be released or if full clearance is required. Survey first identifies and then through the analysis of information separates those areas with an evidence of mines from those with no evidence, with the aim of releasing the latter. The criteria used in the process to remove suspicion of land being mined differ between non-technical and technical survey and full clearance. The information requirements allowing a recommendation that there is no evidence of mines in an area and that it should be released without any mine clearance, remain the same. Land can only be released when it is deemed safe to use by society upon completion of a credible and well documented investigation.

Land Release is a change in approach to address the mine problem. Traditionally an area reported as suspect has been treated as a mine field with full clearance procedures applied to the whole area: The result being that too large areas have been demined. Globally the efficiency of deploying demining assets to undertake full clearance of a suspect area is under review. Decision-making systems need to be introduced to promote more appropriate use of demining resources. By analysing data from completed tasks Norwegian People's Aid concluded that greater emphasis needed to be placed on the collecting and subsequent cross-checking of information. This would ensure that valuable demining assets are deployed to clear areas where the evidence of mines being present is confirmed.

The fact that land is perceived as suspect and therefore not used is often based on everything from accidents to rumours. In the survey process, there is a tendency to over-report on the size of suspect areas. Areas are over reported when information is not available or sufficient to determine if an area is mined or not. In conclusion, impacted communities need to be consulted: Land Release places the community at the forefront of the process. To confirm the claim that an area is suspect, information has to also be gathered from other sources, particularly from those who laid mines in the area that information is being gathered on. This ensures that demining assets are not deployed to clear land where there is no evidence of mines having been laid.

The NPA Land Release concept developed and implemented in Angola should be introduced as a national reference following a trial period, and may also be a reference for other mine affected countries. In addition is the benefit for Norwegian People's Aid who can share the tools developed for Angola with other country programs.

²⁰ Land Release: Land Release is a generic term and although more commonly in its use the term area reduction implies the same working principles and methodologies.

²¹ Information gathering without the application of technical clearance assets to physically investigate the ground,

²² Information gathering by the process of a detailed technical intervention by use of clearance or verification assets during an investigation process

LAND RELEASE: NPA AS A LEADING RESOURCE ON LAND RELEASE

Since the inception of Humanitarian Demining, mine clearance methods have been constantly under review with new techniques included to the demining tool box. Less focus was placed on revising and strengthening the mine action process; in particular decision making to agree on the area where demining assets need to be deployed. The question about impact from areas cleared has been integrated to decision making for the past ten years. Norwegian People's Aid was at the forefront with the Task Impact Assessment methodology. Over the past five years mine action actors and national authorities have looked at how to make the mine action process more efficient. Land Release was a conclusion from the discussions with ongoing initiatives documented in the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) lead study "Land Release: a guide for mine and ERW affected countries".

In 2006, the Mine Action Unit of Norwegian People's Aid elaborated a Land Release Concept Paper for further dialogue with the global mine action sector. Updated in 2007, the Concept Paper provides a framework for contexts where NPA is implementing mine action programs. At a country level the Mine Action Program can draw on experiences and lessons learnt from the Development Program through their experience of working with national organisations to mobilise the rural population. Literacy projects have focused on community issues to encourage discussion for decision-making on subjects that affect the community. Dialogue with communities and involved vulnerable groups show that this resulted in the implementing of risk reduction initiatives where mines and other explosive remnants of war impact daily tasks and seasonal activities. This is also an indication that community initiatives and community involvement to resolve the mine problem will be sustained over the long term. Significant for Land Release as communities can continue the information gathering process and document decisions about areas to be released. Available to the Mine Action Program in Angola are the local partners of the NPA Development Program. Local partners of the Development Program can support interaction with impacted communities as well as provide information in support of the Land Release Process. This provides a resource not necessarily available or valued by other mine action operators.

CHALLENGES OF ADOPTING A LAND RELEASE CONCEPT

Introducing a Land Release Concept presents many challenges which are compounded by the specificities of the context in which the Land Release Policy is to be implemented. Specific to Land Release is the question concerning liability which links to the credibility of the Land Release Concept.

LIABILITY: Already accepted by the International Community and accredited by CNIDAH through Standard Operating Procedures of an operating organisation is the fact that full clearance is not a 100% guarantee that an area will be completely mine free. Land Release requires that the same acceptance is given to areas released through non-technical and technical survey. The question of liability if a mine is found on land released through non-technical or technical survey needs to be addressed in the National Policy and be compliant with National Law. CNIDAH have as reference the National Law adopted in Cambodia and held meetings with both the National Mine Action Authority and Legislative Council when visiting Cambodia in 2006. Ongoing interventions including the writing of an International Standard for Land Release will provide additional reference material. On the political agenda is the review of the Angolan Penal Code, which will include the adopting of national law compliant with the

Mine Ban Treaty. This process will provide a forum for dialogue in order to address the question of liability.

CREDIBILITY: Introducing a change in approach will take time to be accepted by those involved; identified as stakeholders are the authorities, communities and deminers. The Land Release Concept has been shared with the National Authorities with CNIDAH involved to the analysis and decision making of the pilot projects. Pilot projects to field test tools elaborated for non-technical and technical survey have allowed deminers and Team Leaders to contribute to the changes in the Standard Operating Procedures. The pilot projects allow NPA to prepare guidelines and support tools to explain decision making in order to release the suspect area. NPA has worked with the GICHD to elaborate the tools for Land Release to ensure that the concept and tools presented are reliable and compliant with IMAS.

COMMITMENT: Although the National Authorities have stated that a National Policy for Land Release will be adopted there has been no commitment to provide funds for the training of National Institutions. NPA presented a proposal to CNIDAH to fund demining operations in 2007: a positive answer was received although no commitment could be given until the budget presented by CNIDAH was adopted by the Council of Ministers. To secure funds a strategy needs to be agreed between donors and presented to the national authorities to ensure that both training and demining operations continue.

COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: The majority of commercial contracts are financed according to the number of square metres cleared. Thus the traditional approach of applying full clearance throughout the area is followed. Commercial contracts are primarily awarded for the clearance of infrastructure which to date has not included any of the suspect areas impacting communities as recorded during the LIS. Thus in dialogue with the authorities, many of whom are on the board of the commercial demining companies, it is explained that the Land Release Concept is of particular relevance to the areas recorded during the LIS. These are the areas directly referred to in the National Strategic Plan for Mine Action 2006 – 2011.

LAND RELEASE: ADDRESSING THE MINE PROBLEM IN ANGOLA

Mines and other explosive remnants of war continue to hamper economic recovery as well as impede rural development in large areas of Angola. Commercial contracts for reconstruction include a demining component which is partially addressing the wider issue of economic recovery. Demining Brigades of National Institutions are focusing on clearance in support of national reconstruction priorities, including roads, and does therefore not have the capacity to prioritise clearance in support of rural development initiatives, including those of impacted communities and vulnerable groups. As the scope of the mine problem in Angola is still very large, there will therefore still be a need for the presence of international operators in addition to national institutions, in order for the problem in Angola to be solved. Planned expansion of agricultural areas within impacted communities needs to be documented and clearance prioritised. The decentralised planning of clearance activities initiated for the 2005 calendar year provides an opportunity to include 'new' priorities identified by impacted communities. Although established, the planning process to agree the Provincial Clearance Plan remains weak due to a lack of systems to collect and analyse data to ensure that demining resources are deployed to priority areas.

With the adoption of the "National Strategic Plan: Mine Action 2006 – 2011" by the Council of Ministers in September 2006 the Government of Angola outlined its commitment to eliminating the mine problem. Clearance objectives aim to clear high and medium impacted areas recorded during the LIS by the end of 2011. Other areas, concluded as mined will be marked for subsequent follow-up by national resources. This strategy highlights the relevance of the Land Release Concept as mined areas will be confirmed through non-technical survey with technical survey used to prepare a detailed clearance plan for future follow up.

CNIDAH which is responsible for coordinating and regulating mine action activities in Angola, agree that procedures for Land Release need to be adopted. A national workshop to share Land Release initiatives of operators held in February of 2008 and the outcome is significant in that CNIDAH agreed to develop a National Policy for Land Release. This provides a framework for dialogue and interaction as NPA elaborates tools and procedures for the non-technical and technical survey components of the Land Release process.

Supporting the decision to adopt a National Policy for Land Release is the analysis of the mine problem in Angola, in particular the study of completion reports. Norwegian People's Aid made an analysis of completion reports in order to explain the reasoning behind the land release process to Team Leaders and Section Leaders. The analysis indicated that the mined area found and the area contaminated with unexploded ordnance is a relatively small part of the total area cleared. In addition there are areas that have been cleared where no mines or unexploded ordnance have been found. This conclusion supports the introduction of a Land Release Concept.

UNDERSTANDING THE MINE PROBLEM IN ANGOLA

Completed in June 2007, the Landmine Impact Survey, recorded 1'968 impacted localities and documented 3,266 suspect hazard areas which affect communities. Norwegian People's Aid completed the survey in five provinces. Based on the socio-economic impact from landmines the LIS categorized 40 (2%) of communities with High

impact, 455 (23%) as Medium impacted and 1,473 (75%) as Low. The “National Strategic Plan; Mine Action 2006 – 2011” states that high and medium impacted communities are the priority for clearance.

Of the five provinces surveyed by Norwegian People's Aid, Malange Province has the largest percentage of impacted communities when high and medium impacted communities are combined. Twenty-three percent of impacted communities in Kwanza Sul Province are categorised as high or medium. Although only 64 impacted communities were recorded in Kwanza Norte Province, more people are affected per community than in any other province. Data recorded for Uige Province show that 83% of the 171 impacted communities in Uige Province are of low impact as alternatives were available at the time of the LIS. Sixty-six impacted communities were recorded in Zaire Province. 969 suspect hazard areas remain although a third of Malange Province was unable to be visited during the LIS due to suspect roads. Planning to address the problem requires that additional information is collected as the suspect areas recorded during the LIS are an estimated size as physical features were used to delineate the boundary.

A LIS normally focuses on impact and does not establish polygons of the suspect hazardous areas. By re-surveying all areas using a more accurate non-technical survey approach followed by a technical survey, the hazardous areas will be reduced and be on average 60% smaller than what was recorded during the LIS. With the re-survey of recorded suspect hazardous areas and the updating of information the number and size of suspect areas will decrease the residual mine problem and allow the Government to submit a more realistic plan and timeframe for when Angola can meet the obligations of Article V of the Mine Ban Convention²³.

It is of key importance to establish decision-making tools to also support the planning of rural development initiatives. Although data exists for the location of suspect areas this is not systematically provided nor used to decide the location for rural development projects. In the Province of Kwanza Norte an area earmarked for the resettlement of returnees was subsequently found to be a mine field one people had already returned. A different area would have been chosen if data about the location of suspect areas and confirmed mine fields was integrated to the decision making process as to the use and distribution of land. NPA is involved to a pilot project in the Province of Kwanza Sul to elaborate tools for decision makers and to agree systems for the dissemination of information about recorded suspect areas. Included to the pilot project is a routine to update the impact scoring registered during the Landmine Impact Survey so that changed community priorities are incorporated to the Provincial Clearance Plan. The Clearance Plan is a planning reference for all mine action actors: three demining operators have been working in Kwanza Sul Province working from the Clearance Plan and updating the Plan following assessment and the completion of non-technical survey.

The fact that a considerable quantity of mines laid were lifted when an area no longer had a strategic purpose underlines the need to work with the former factions to the conflict. Although it will take time to locate those with accurate information the cost in comparison with the deployment of demining assets is much less.

²³ Article V; paragraph 3 of the Convention states: *If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines within the time period, it may submit a request ... for an extension of the deadline....*

Suspect areas including confirmed mine fields recorded on the National Data Base are known by those living in proximity to the suspect area. What is not known or able to be recorded is the location of items of unexploded ordnance. For decades, farmers and others will continue to find unexploded ordnance. It is still to be decided which National Institution will have the long term responsibility to respond to items of unexploded ordnance found but in order to do so structures need to be in place for the reporting of new items found.

Accidents are seen as both a planning tool and an indicator. Initial analysis of data from 2006 and 2007 indicates a decrease in the number of mine related accidents with an increase of those from other explosive remnants of war. A concern is the increase in the number of accidents while people are collecting firewood. With over eighty percent of the rural population selling charcoal as their primary source of income this is likely to be an increasing trend. Clearance is the ultimate answer and the national strategy needs to reflect this but other solutions can be implemented to reduce the risk until the area is released.

A conclusion from the Community Participation Project undertaken by NPA in 2007 was the need to support risk reduction initiatives proposed by impacted communities. In the majority of impacted communities the location of suspect areas is known and alternative areas for farming and settlement identified. Of concern for communities is that children and visitors do not know the location of suspect areas. Other than the request for clearance, communities asked for paint to be provided to indicate the location of suspect areas and for messages of advice to be given to farmers and others identified as being at risk.

ADDRESSING THE MINE PROBLEM: ROLE OF NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID

Norwegian People's Aid acknowledges that the significant financial commitment for national demining from the Government of Angola requires a change in focus of international operators. Establishing a joint process to remove suspect hazard areas will allow capacity building of national institutions so they have the knowledge and skills to deal with the remaining problem in an efficient way. NPA set the long-term development objective: *Mines and other explosive remnants of war are no longer an obstacle to economic, social and political development in Angola.*

This requires that systems are in place to update information about how mines and other explosive remnants of war impede development and a strategy for eliminating the problem. With mine action activities prioritised according to socio-economic indicators as well as from the ongoing analysis of areas where accidents are likely to occur. The need to remove suspect hazard areas in support of rural development initiatives justifies a continued presence of international operators over the next three years. Although INAD is the National Institution responsible for clearance of areas impacting rural communities they are tasked to undertake clearance in support of national priorities and roads. It is expected that INAD will focus on suspect areas impacting communities within the next three years and are thus the primary partner for capacity building. Planned initiatives can be realised if a Land Release Concept is implemented to operations of all actors. Thus the emphasis needs to be on the capacity building and training of national institutions.

The key to the success of a Land Release Concept in Angola, including the capacity building of national institutions, is the relationship that NPA has with CNIDAH and the confidence to work with INAD to undertake trials to agree how demining assets can be better used for technical survey. It is recognised by international demining operators that NPA has a different access to the middle-management of CNIDAH at a National level. This is primarily due to the fact that a significant number of CNIDAH employees moved from NPA to CNIDAH. In 2007 two senior staff from NPA joined CNIDAH to establish Quality Assurance and Control mechanisms while seven staff joined the Regional Quality Assurance and Control Teams. At a Provincial Level, NPA has been proactive in working with the Vice-Governor and the CNIDAH Operations Room when established in 2005.

Land Release places the community at the forefront of the information gathering process. The Land Rights Project of the NPA Development Program had developed an approach to involve the community in decision making related to the distribution of land. AAEEA²⁴, a partner of the Development Program, worked with the Mine Action Program to develop guidelines for using community mapping to collect information. Through Forum Terra²⁵, CHOFA²⁶ provided instructions on the report form to be completed when communities inform about items of unexploded ordnance or mines found. NPA plans to partner with ADRA in Malange Province to share the reporting structure with other organisations working with the Land Rights issue. In Malange Province, ADRA have created 42 village committees to document the distribution of Communal Land. These existing structures can support the Land Release process, most specifically to explain to the community the reason behind decisions taken about areas to be released. Development Workshop, a Strategic Partner of NPA through the Norwegian Embassy, is the reference for the Land Rights issue in Angola. Studies, undertaken by Development Workshop, document proven methodologies for involving communities to a decision making process. The methodologies explained have been invaluable during discussions within the Mine Action Program to agree participatory tools for collecting information.

²⁴ AAEEA: Angola Association for the Education of Adults

²⁵ Forum Terra, Kwanza Sul Province: Coordination Body for Land Rights Education and Participatory Community Land Demarcation

²⁶ CHOFA: Agricultural Cooperative for Amboim Municipality

LAND RELEASE: DEVELOPING A LAND RELEASE CONCEPT 2008 – 2010

Norwegian People's Aid is aware that the Land Release methodology is a significant change to the traditional approach of applying full clearance to the reported suspect hazard area. As seen within NPA, it takes time for people to be confident with the approach. Lessons learnt from pilot projects show that a considerable amount of training is required as well as tools to support decision making. For Land Release to be successful tools need to be developed for the consecutive stages of the Land Release process.

Although Land Release is a different methodology than the traditional approach of applying full clearance to a suspect area, demining techniques used are the same as those applied for full clearance. To be agreed through pilot projects is the use of assets for technical survey, including the total area to which demining assets will be applied to have information for decision making purposes. Needing to confirm or discredit the claim that an area is suspect the information gathering process has been revised. Participatory techniques for the collecting and cross-checking of information are being added to the process which allows a complete area to be discredited or an area identified for technical survey or full clearance where evidence of mines is confirmed.

Previously demining assets had been deployed to work on individual tasks in different Municipalities in a number of Provinces. From the end of the conflict in 2002 through 2006 clearance tasks were prioritised in support of resettlement. With the majority of priority areas cleared it is possible for demining activities to be focused within a Municipality. The decision to work consecutively Municipality by Municipality will ensure more timely logistics support thus making the work more efficient. NPA has also made the decision to apply the Land Release Concept to suspect areas rather than to continue to work on both areas and roads. This decision is linked to the fact that commercial contracts for demining are included to the road reconstruction plans and the fact that the re-supply of teams working along roads places an additional burden on logistics. Linked to the decision is that the areas recorded on the National Data Base which is the reference for Article VII²⁷ reporting are those identified during General Survey and the LIS. These surveys entailed community visits and therefore did not include the comprehensive documenting of suspect roads or suspect areas affecting infrastructure.

Applying the Land Release Concept, NPA will work Municipality by Municipality to complete the non-technical survey and technical survey. Demining assets will be deployed to those areas determined as high impact by the community or in relation to planned rural development projects first, but will also be deployed to subsequently complete all suspect hazardous areas in the province. The need to distinguish between high, medium and low impact tasks are no longer as important as previous. This is partly due to the fact that resettlement is more or less completed. Our aim over the period 2008-2010 is to concentrate on the two provinces (Malange and Kwanza Sul) most affected of the five provinces covered by the LIS. This will mean that when NPA leaves these provinces, there will be no residual mine problem for national institutions to deal with – other than eventual tasks related to infrastructure development and roads.

²⁷ Article VII: Transparency Measures which includes an annual update on the status of the mine problem and the measures taken to resolve this.

LAND RELEASE: ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION

The starting point for the Land Release Process is the analysis of documented information. Data recorded during the LIS and ongoing General Survey of suspect hazard areas records the location of the area with the General Survey Report providing additional information about the perceived threat and the LIS documenting the impact. In addition to compile a picture of the problem reports of spot tasks²⁸ undertaken in or around the community are cross-checked with the community. Information on spot tasks supports the mapping of the conflict allowing conclusions to be made on the areas where mines were laid and the reason for the mines being placed. The community map and suspect area map prepared with the overlaying of data recorded from the General Survey and LIS provides NPA with a map to facilitate dialogue with the community. The map also allows discussion as to the reason why the area is 'perceived' to be suspect; this is the first step towards substantiating the claim that the area is a mined area that requires further investigation or that the area requires battle area clearance to be undertaken as the only threat is unexploded ordnance.

A form to record information from the analysis of available data includes a section on the key informants. Key informants who provided information during previous visits to impacted communities to complete the General Survey or LIS are listed on the reports. Other informants or potential informants will be listed following the completion of the conflict mapping with the community.

To ensure that available information is analysed prior to undertaking non-technical survey, NPA is in the process of preparing community dossiers. Filed in the community dossiers are the General Survey reports for the community and suspect areas impacting the community, the LIS reports and reports of any interventions undertaken in the community. This is being completed in liaison with CNIDAH at a national level and in conjunction with the CNIDAH Provincial Operation Rooms. To ensure that additional information collected about impacted communities is updated on the National Data Base and provided through the Provincial Operations Room to Ministerial Departments to support the planning of rural development initiatives.

LAND RELEASE: NON-TECHNCIAL SURVEY

Non-technical survey is an investigation into the presence and type of mines and other explosive remnants of war and where possible the physical location of them: non-technical survey is a hazard identification process.

Participatory methodologies used by the NPA Development Program to discuss the Land Rights issue with rural communities have been adapted to facilitate dialogue about the mine problem. A criteria table to support decision making has been developed which will be tested in five pilot projects to agree the tools for Land Release. The criteria table records information about the suspect area given by the community and other informants and ranks the information according to credibility. The analysis of the information supports the planning of technical survey.

²⁸ Spot tasks: carried out in response to a request from the community or other informant a spot task usually involves the removal of unexploded ordnance. Less frequent is the removal of mines but on the occasion that mines are removed the area needs to be reevaluated to determine if the area is a mine field.

TECHNICAL SURVEY

Technical survey involves the use of demining assets for the technical investigation of the area that remains upon conclusion of the non-technical survey. Although demining assets are used the purpose is to investigate sections to conclude which areas require full clearance and which areas can be released.

The analysis of information collected during the non-technical survey supports the planning for technical survey. The analysis allows the suspect area to be divided into sectors with demining assets deployed to collect additional information to confirm the area requiring full clearance. NPA has developed a technical survey methodology which determines the percentage of the area to be investigated according to both the demining assets used as well as the type of technical survey to be undertaken. NPA has categorised technical survey as limited, normal, increased and extensive. These categories and the percentage area to be investigated will be tested through five pilot projects.

LAND RELEASE: CAPACITY BUILDING OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Capacity building of National Institutions will be continuous as NPA develops tools for Land Release. CNIDAH as the coordinating body for mine action in Angola need to endorse the Concept and agree on eventual changes in the Standard Operating Procedures. Responsible to regulate mine action activities, CNIDAH will be the main partner involved in developing management tools formats for quality assurance and quality control. With the Land Release Concept signed off by CNIDAH, which is expected in the fourth quarter of 2008, a detailed work plan will be agreed and put in annex to the Memorandum of Understanding signed between CNIDAH and NPA.

LAND RELEASE: CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

GENDER: Gender impacts the likelihood of becoming a victim of landmines, accessing medical care, reintegrating into society after being injured, and accessing mine risk education²⁹. Discussions with communities has revealed a large proportion of female headed house-holds who are often not consulted or included to the information gathering to prioritise areas for clearance. Thus gender awareness within the mine action program has been included to the Terms of Reference of the Gender Advisor contracted by the NPA Development Program. Tools that promote community participation in the mine action process will be revised to ensure that the needs of both men and women are discussed and analysed within the decision making process. This should have the added impact of increasing gender awareness at a community level. In the development programme, NPA and partner organisations aim to develop competences and strategies to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). The Mine Action Program will link to initiatives of the Development Program to increase gender awareness.

Discussions of the Gender Advisor with Mine Action staff concluded that a study be undertaken to document the impact on communities when semi-permanent camps are established at the village for the duration of a clearance task. The study will be undertaken within the framework of the Women's Participation Project of the

²⁹ Gender and Landmines: from concept to practice. Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines

Development Program with the participation of mine action staff. Senior staff concluded that recommendations of the study would not be implemented if the Mine Action Program was not involved to the field work and analysis. Conclusions of the study will be relevant for the planning of HIV/AIDS education programs and community projects. Raised during discussions with the Gender Advisor was free time of deminers once the working day is complete. A proposal given was for deminers to use this time on community projects such as the creating of a football field or play area for children. The study would also be relevant for other organisations as well as for NPA in general.

Of the 186 operational staff 11 are female. With the foreseen reduction it was decided not to prioritise recruitment of females as vacancies will be included to the restructuring plan. Agreed is to empower female staff already under contract with NPA using the 'Women Can Do It' approach developed in partnership between the Women's Group of the Labour Party of Norway and NPA. Discussions about the visible gender imbalance when visiting a clearance task concluded that females have not been discriminated during the recruitment process: Fewer females apply for vacancies as the nature of the work takes a person away from their homes which is not easily accepted by the husband. To be noted is that the eleven female operational staff are all single. Previous female employees left the organisation or asked for a change in position when they got married.

HIV/AIDS: Linked to gender is the question of HIV/AIDS. Recognising that deminers, due to their regular mobility, are amongst the most at risk NPA organised a 'HIV/AIDS and gender' training for men. Working with a local organisation involved to the HIV/AIDS Education Project, Gabela Field Office organised regular meetings for staff. NPA hopes to continue and extend the witnessed change in behaviour through a peer education project entitled 'Men and Masculinity'. The Institutional HIV/AIDS Workplace Policy provides the framework for support to staff who are HIV positive.

ENVIRONMENT: The Mine Action Community recognises that demining activities, including the establishing of semi-permanent camps next to villages can have a negative impact on the environment. The United Nations Mine Action Service and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining have been involved in the development of an International Standard on the Protection of the Environment. An International Standard provides a guideline for National Mine Action Authorities and operators. NPA will inform CNIDAH about discussions around the Standard stating concrete examples as to why the International Standard should be adapted to the context of Angola and adopted as a mandatory National Standard. NPA acknowledges that the Aardvark Flail machine removes a large number of new trees and their roots. The consequence in some areas of Angola is soil erosion. Communities first provided the idea to plant trees in areas where trees had been removed. It is expected that Provincial or Municipal Authorities will support an initiative to provide sapling trees where trees were destroyed.

LAND RELEASE: PLAN OF ACTION 2008 – 2010

The primary focus of the NPA Mine Action Program from 2008 through 2010 will be to develop practical tools to implement and quality assure the Land Release Concept. This will ensure that land is released for community use and Land Release integrated to the Standard Operating Procedures. NPA will deploy both mechanical demining assets and manual demining teams during 2008 to field test and agree tools and procedures for Land Release. Manual demining teams would continue to undertake full clearance of areas confirmed as mined during non-technical or technical survey. Downscaling of demining teams would continue to be assessed according to dialogue with National Institutions. The number of Combined Teams would increase from four to six from the end of June 2009 in order to complete the re-survey of all suspect areas recorded by NPA during the LIS by mid 2010. Monitoring of Land Release as implemented by national institutions and analysis from the re-survey of suspect areas will allow NPA and the national authorities to identify areas where continued technical assistance would be of relevance.

The immediate objective for the period 2008 – 2010 is that *CNIDAH use updated reports about the impact of suspect hazard areas to elaborate provincial plans that incorporate community priorities and use task dossiers that record the land release procedures for quality management of the process.* Specific for NPA is the developing of tools for Land Release and the training of National Institutions in the use of these tools following internal tests and a trial period. NPA will work with CNIDAH to develop a National Policy for Land Release. Continued demining operations of NPA will allow capacity building of National Institutions as well as support the implementing of rural development initiatives which includes community plans for the expansion of agricultural areas.

LAND RELEASE 2008

During 2008 the Land Release Concept will be implemented to NPA operations. With the aim to release as much land as possible with the minimum use of demining resources. Tools to support Land Release will be developed in conjunction with National Authorities: NPA will work with CNIDAH to elaborate a National Land Release Policy and with INAD to agree tools for non-technical and technical survey. A Memorandum of Cooperation was agreed with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining to develop Guidelines and tools for Land Release specific to the context of Angola.

Three Land Release Workshops will be facilitated by the GICHD. In the first workshop a Land Release Concept and a framework for Non-Technical and Technical Survey was agreed. Survey tools elaborated were piloted with the initial analysis providing the outline for the second workshop. The third workshop will agree Standard Operating Procedures for Land Release which will be based on the results of the five actual pilot projects. The five pilot projects are planned to be initiated in May with completion by mid-August with the Team Leaders responsible for the pilots drafting the 'How To' Guideline for Non-Technical Survey and Technical Survey. Representatives from the Technical Commission of CNIDAH and the Regional Quality Assurance and Quality Control Teams created by CNIDAH at the end of 2007 have participated at the workshops. This allows CNIDAH to participate to the elaborating of the NPA Land Release Concept. INAD as well as the CNIDAH QA/QC teams will be invited to join the pilot projects, in particular to the planned meetings to evaluate the pilot projects.

The five pilot projects will contribute to the planned operational output of demining assets in 2008: Release 1'000'000 square metres of suspect land. In addition the field testing of tools to support non-technical survey will allow the Combined Teams to work with 120 impacted communities and to have completed the reduction of 150 suspect areas. Allowing the size of suspect areas recorded on the National Data Base to be updated as well as providing information to support the decision making for the areas prioritised in the Provincial Clearance Plan. Working with impacted communities to document the conflict history as well as future plans for expansion of community areas the Combined Teams will remove items found by the community. Based on the number of requests responded to in 2007, 250 spot tasks are planned thus removing items that have the potential to cause an accident.

Linked to the capacity building initiatives for Land Release, NPA will work with CNIDAH to identify tools to update a reporting template to update information about community priorities. This is a joint initiative of the Provincial CNIDAH Operations Room and NPA that is being undertaken with the National Planning Department of CNIDAH. The expected outcome is a series of reports to update the impact scoring given during the LIS and to the preparing of Provincial Clearance Plans.

A separate concern, which impacts decision making on areas prioritised for clearance, is the increasing distribution of communal³⁰ land to private individuals or commercial enterprises. NPA will document information about the ownership of land for further follow up by local partners engaged through the NPA Development Program. NPA will also advocate that ownership of land released by demining operators is recorded so that clearance does not result in land being distributed for 'private' ownership. The NPA Development Program supports a land rights project in Kwanza Sul Province and it is planned to undertake a study in 2008 to document the impact of suspect areas on community's access to land. The study will allow NPA and other actors to prepare a strategy for dialogue with Provincial and National authorities as well as a template for the documenting of community requests by non-mine action operators and land issues by mine action operators.

LAND RELEASE: time frame for release of suspect areas

The five pilot projects for Land Release to test the tools developed for non-technical and technical survey will allow a formula to be agreed to determine the time frame for the release of suspect areas in the five provinces where NPA completed the LIS. The conclusions in terms of resources required and realistic time frame will be presented in a proposal to donors mid-2009. The Government of Angola is seen as one of the principle donors to provide the finances for the release of the suspect areas to declare the five provinces mine free³¹.

³⁰ Communal Land: Land is divided into three categories; communal, public and private. Communal land is provided to villagers by the village leader ensuring that even the most vulnerable have land for shelter and agricultural purposes.

³¹ Mine free: the use of the terminology mine free refers to the suspect areas as recorded on the National Data Base. It does not include individual mines that could subsequently be found by farmers or others or

LAND RELEASE 2009

With tools for non-technical and technical Survey detailed in a 'How To' Guide by the end of 2008 the focus of Land Release during 2009 will be to prepare management tools and continued implementation of the concept in the NPA area of operations. Specifically formats for the quality assurance and quality control of the Land Release Process. Direct demining operations of NPA will continue in order to provide a context to develop and test QA/QC procedures. The preparing of QA/QC procedures will be included to a Memorandum of Understanding signed between NPA and CNIDAH when a National Policy for Land Release is adopted. This will ensure that QA/QC procedures are elaborated with the Technical Commission of CNIDAH and the Regional QA/QC Teams.

Consolidating the Technical Survey component of the Land Release process emphasis during the first half of the 2009 will be on the training of INAD. Included to the agreement with INAD will be the training of staff; operators and Team Leaders for flail machines and Casspir as well as the mechanics trained in the service and maintenance of the machines. NPA will continue to assess possibilities of a future handover of assets to INAD.

From July 2009, to complete the update of the National Data Base the program will be restructured with two additional Combined Teams deployed. Impacted communities recorded during the LIS in the five provinces that were completed by NPA will be revisited by mid-2010. Including technical assessment of the suspect area to identify hot spots to the non-technical survey process clearance plans of confirmed mined areas will be produced. An asset for both NPA manual demining teams and demining brigades of National Institutions the clearance plans will be available from CNIDAH Operation Rooms in the five provinces.

During 2009, 250 impacted communities will be revisited with risk reduction plans agreed and clearance plans elaborated. The Combined Teams will continue to remove items reported by the community. The number of spot tasks completed will be more than 300. Deploying four Aardvarks and four Casspirs in 2009 as well as four manual demining teams throughout the year over 1'000'000 square metres of land will be released for community use.

LAND RELEASE 2010

Clearance plans for the suspect areas that impact those communities not revisited in 2009 will be completed by mid-2010. This will allow CNIDAH to have accurate information on any remaining mine problem in the five provinces of Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Malange, Uige and Zaire. The clearance plans produced will allow CNIDAH to prepare a work plan for the five provinces to be annexed to their request for an extension of the ten year deadline of Article V of the Mine Ban Treaty. Combined Teams will continue to work with impacted communities re-visiting the risk reduction plans agreed to evaluate the implementation of these. The evaluation of risk reduction plans will be documented to provide a resource for other actors and the NPA Mine Action Unit in Oslo.

new suspect areas that could be found as people expand their agricultural areas outside of the present community boundaries.

Norwegian People's Aid will continue to deploy manual demining teams throughout 2010. Depending on the funding situation which relies on the fact that the Government of Angola will fund demining operations of international actors NPA will either continue to deploy manual demining teams or ensure that deminers are integrated to the demining brigades of national institutions if possible.

LAND RELEASE: CONTINUED ROLE FOR NPA FROM 2011

SURVEY: The need for continued survey of suspect areas to update the National Data Base as well as clearance plans prepared will remain. NPA aims to continue to implement the Land Release Concept in the remaining three provinces of the LIS (Uige, Kuanza Norte and Zaire) to remove the mine problem also in these provinces. This decision would be taken following an evaluation of the context with the financial commitment of the Government of Angola agreed in a Letter of Understanding.

LAND RELEASE CONCEPT 2008 – 2010: MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring is defined as the process to assess program developments towards the achievement of outputs illustrated by indicators previously set. The indicators as defined for the objectives will form the basis for the monitoring plan elaborated and subsequently updated during NPA Operations Meetings. Monitoring will be carried out in conjunction with CNIDAH and INAD so that they also assess their achievements and weaknesses. Norwegian People's Aid recognises that the process for the monitoring and evaluation of objectives and activities undertaken is weak. Emphasis needs to be placed on this area if Norwegian People's Aid is to provide credible capacity building to national institutions.

The review of the NPA Mine Action Program in Angola by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 2008 will provide some direction. The Monitoring Mission³² of the Mine Action Unit to evaluate where NPA Angola is in relation to the objectives set will support in elaborating an action plan for the monitoring and evaluation of objectives. In addition the Mine Action Program will take advantage of the training in Monitoring and Evaluation planned for the Strategic Partners of the NPA Development Program. The Organisational Development Advisor for the Development Program will work with the QA/QC Department of the Mine Action Central Office to elaborate tools for monitoring and evaluation.

The QA/QC Department were created to address the issue concerning the variances of internal quality control and quality assurance. The discussion to create the department originated from the findings of the NPA investigation into the accident at Cachoeiras Task in June 2007 as well as the subsequent recommendations from CNIDAH. The QA/QC Department have a definite monitoring and evaluation role outside of actual operations which needs to be further detailed. It is planned that the QA/QC Coordinator visit the NPA Program in Bosnia Herzegovina to learn from the monitoring procedures implemented; if possible a representative from CNIDAH or INAD would participate to the visit.

³² NPA Mine Action Unit Monitoring Mission: An internal quality assurance and support instrument for the programme and the Head Office with focus on exchange of best practices between NPA programmes. The monitoring visits confirm that NPA Angola works in line with IMAS, identify weaknesses in the current programme and recommends the implementation of best practices proven successful from other programmes as well as identify strengths in the current programme that has the potential to become "best practice" and be introduced in other programmes.

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK: LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE PROGRAM

NPA MINE ACTION

SITUATION ANALYSIS: Landmine impact survey recorded 1'968 impacted communities; ninety-six accidents were recorded in 2006 the majority involving anti-personnel landmines. The Government of Angola aims to clear suspect areas in all high impact communities and half the suspect areas in medium impacted communities by the end of 2011. A formidable <i>but</i> achievable task if a National Policy is adopted that supports the implementing of a Land Release or Area Reduction Concept. Thus demining brigades of national institutions and international organisations need to work together sharing knowledge and expertise gained.			
Objective	Indicators	Means of verification	Risks
Long term development objective: Mines and other explosive remnants of war are no longer an obstacle to economic, social and political development in Angola.	Zero mine accidents	NDB*: accident data and analysis of accident data. Monitoring of how accident data is used for planning and risk reduction initiatives.	Accurate reporting of mine accidents: no comprehensive system for the reporting of mine accidents. <i>ICRC working with CNIDAH to develop and implement system for collecting and recording of accident data.</i>
	Dangerous areas known by the local community and authorities.	NDB: dangerous areas recorded and information disseminated to concerned actors. Survey monitoring: confirm that community members and groups at risk know location of areas. Marking: record of permanent marking and community marking.	Reporting system for new suspect areas: information is reported by local communities to the police but this is not always acted upon. <i>Police need to be included to mine action planning and be supported to act on information received.</i>
	Use of cleared land for development activities	Provincial clearance plan: overview of development plan with data from NDB to agree priority areas for clearance. TIA* Phase III: report of how the land is used following clearance.	Sharing of data from NDB: CNIDAH need to see themselves as the 'provider' of data rather than a source of data. <i>Potential for success through the disseminating of the final report of the LIS.</i>

* NDB: National Data Base held by CNIDAH

* TIA: Task Impact Assessment – NPA methodology used to ascertain relevance for clearance of the area. Phase I and II of the TIA methodology have been integrated to the Non-Technical and Technical Survey. Phase III continues as an impact evaluation to confirm how the land is being used.

	Mine action included to national development plans	National Development Plan; Poverty Reduction Plan; Achieving the Millennium Development Goals.	Risk matrix and priority setting: perception of the threat from mines and UXO and actual situation with more deaths from malaria.
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NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID: MINE ACTION PROGRAM 2008 – 2010 Target groups: communities affected by mines and UXO; provincial and traditional authorities responsible for planning		
<p>LONG TERM OBJECTIVE: Mines and other explosive remnants of war are no longer an obstacle to economic, social and political development in Angola.</p> <p>INDICATORS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zero mine accidents • Dangerous areas know by the local community and authorities • Use of cleared land for development activities • Mine Action included in National Development Plans 		
<p>IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE 2008-2010: CNIDAH use updated reports about the impact of suspect hazard areas to elaborate annual provincial plans that reflect community priorities <i>and</i> use task dossiers that record land release procedures for quality management of the process.</p> <p>ACTIVITIES:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land Release – National policy for Land Release • Land Release – tools elaborated for non-technical technical survey • Land Release – training of national institutions • Land Release – procedures for quality assurance and quality control • Planning – updated information about impact from confirmed mined areas • Planning – clearance plans for the release for confirmed mined areas 		
Indicators	Means of verification	Risks

Clearance Plan for SHA: Land Release Concept	National Database: Clearance plans available from the NDB at a provincial and national level	Land Release Process not agreed by CNIDAH
Provincial Clearance Plans	Survey monitoring: documentation of community priorities	Reconstruction priorities for National and Provincial tasks supersede community priorities
NPA accredited to implement Land Release	National Policy: Land release How to: Non-Technical Survey How to: Technical Survey NPA Land Release SOP	CNIDAH: lack of QA/QC procedures.
MINE ACTION PROGRAM 2008 – 2010 The primary focus is to introduce a Land Release Concept to operations of both NPA and National Institutions to ensure a more efficient return of land for community use. National Institutions will be trained in non-technical survey and technical survey methodologies ensuring that the Government of Angola has the means to resolve the mine problem within an agreed time frame.		
<i>Specific Objectives</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Activities and input</i>
NPA implement during 2008 a Land Release Concept to operations providing mine impacted communities with access to land for agricultural expansion and document the pilot projects completed in 2008 to show the impact of Land Release in view of Article V obligations to be presented to CNIDAH at the beginning of 2009.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land Release Concept: Agreed Land Release Concept known by NPA staff and CNIDAH Land Release: Team Leaders apply the HOW TO for non-technical and technical survey Land Release: Updated Standard Operating Procedures detailing Land Release Concept Achieving Article V: Document that detail results by applying Land Release Agricultural expansion: Square metres released and area under cultivation 	Five pilot projects to agree tools for the non-technical and technical component of the Land Release Process allowing update of SOP and the preparing of HOW TO Manuals. NPA deployment of assets: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central Mine Action Office; QA/QC Department Malange Field Office: Deploy two manual demining teams, two Aardvarks and two Casspurs from January 2008 to December 2009 Gabela Field Office: Deploy two manual demining teams, two Aardvarks and two Casspurs from January 2008 to December 2009
CNIDAH agree a National Policy for	National Policy for Land Release / Area	Land Release Concept of NPA shared with

Land Release during 2008 that provides a framework for the training of National Institutions in the Land Release Concept from 2009.	Reduction agreed and disseminated	CNIDAH. NPA deployment of assets: Central MA Office: Land Release Manager
NPA train National Institutions in the Land Release Concept: specifically non-technical and technical survey methodologies.	SOP of National Institutions reflect the Land Release Concept	Memorandum of Understanding signed between NPA and INAD: training of INAD Teams. Letter of Understanding: handover of mechanical assets. NPA: deployment of assets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central MA Office: Mechanical Coordinator • Central MA Office: Land Release Manager • Central MA Office: Head of Operations
CNIDAH at a National and Provincial level update information about suspect areas; discrediting those that are in use and revising the impact score of those areas confirmed as mined, to have a baseline for preparing the extension request outlined in Article V (4) in the third quarter of 2010.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reporting template to update information to the NDB agreed and distributed with Guidelines by CNIDAH. • National Data Base updated and shared with the CNIDAH Provincial Operations Rooms. 	Project 2008: Developing reporting template to update information about suspect areas for distribution by CNIDAH from 2009. (CNIDAH: Planning Department, CNIDAH; Kwanza Sul Operations Room, NPA) NPA: deployment of assets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central MA Office: Information Management Dept • Malange Field Office: deploy two Combined Teams from January 2008 to June 2009 and three Combined Teams from July 2009 to December 2010. • Gabela Field Office: deploy two Combined Teams from January 2008 to June 2009 and three Combined Teams from July 2009 to December 2010.
LAND RIGHTS: With an increasing amount of land given for private ownership the consequences for impacted communities can be		

that they are forced to venture into suspect areas as they have no feasible alternative agricultural area.		
Impacted communities voice their needs and concerns about access to land for expansion of agricultural areas and the issue of the demarcation of communal land to ensure owners rights.	Plan of action agreed from recommendations given in the study to document the impact of the distribution of communal land for private ownership. Communication strategy for dialogue with the Government supported by Civil Society and donors.	With the Development Program complete a study which documents the impact of distribution of communal land for private ownership and the potential increase in the number of mine related accidents.
ASSUMPTIONS: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CNIDAH adopt a Land Release / Area Reduction Policy during 2008 that provides a framework for the implementation of the LR Concept to NPA operations and the subsequent training of National Institutions. • The Government of Angola provide funds to support NPA to undertake the training of National Institutions and to realise capacity building initiatives that would allow the Government of Angola to submit a valid request for extension of Article V of the MBT. • Funding available for planned operations and capacity building initiatives. 		

NPA MINE ACTION PROGRAM 2008 – 2010: WORK PLAN												
OBJECTIVE: NPA implement during 2008 a Land Release Concept to operations providing mine impacted communities with access to land for agricultural expansion and document the pilot projects completed in 2008 to show the impact of Land Release in view of Article V obligations to be presented to CNIDAH at the beginning of 2009.												
	2008				2009				2010			
	J – M	A – J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A – J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A – J	J – S	O – D
LR: concept												
LR: pilot projects												
LR: SOP												
LR: HOW TO												
LR: Article V												

LR: land released	Land Release through non-technical survey, technical survey and full clearance											
OBJECTIVE: CNIDAH agree a National Policy for Land Release during 2008 that provides a framework for the training of National Institutions in the Land Release Concept from 2009.												
	2008				2009				2010			
	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A – J	J – S	O – D
LR: NPA concept												
LR: workshop												
OBJECTIVE: NPA train National Institutions in the Land Release Concept: specifically non-technical and technical survey methodologies.												
	2008				2009				2010			
	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A – J	J – S	O – D
NI: training			Training: MoU		Training: Technical Survey		Training: Survey Teams					
Study: handover					Study: assess handover							
OBJECTIVE: CNIDAH at a National and Provincial level update information about suspect areas; discrediting those that are in use and revising the impact score of those areas confirmed as mined, to have a baseline for preparing the extension request outlined in Article V (4).												
	2008				2009				2010			
	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A – J	J – S	O – D
Pilot project		Project: Kwanza Sul										
NTS: update info.	Revisit of impacted communities recorded during the LIS: Kwanza Sul, Kwanza Norte, Malange, Uige, Zaire											
OBJECTIVE: Impacted communities voice their needs and concerns about access to land for expansion of agricultural areas and the issue of the demarcation of communal land to ensure owners rights.												
	2008				2009				2010			
	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D

Study											
Plan of action											

NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID: MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES 2008 – 2010
ISSUES

CROSS – CUTTING

Target groups: NPA staff; local partners communities affected by mines and UXO

LONG TERM OBJECTIVE:

<p>Mines and other explosive remnants of war are no longer an obstacle to economic, social and political development in Angola.</p> <p>INDICATORS: ZERO MINE ACCIDENTS DANGEROUS AREAS KNOWN BY THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND AUTHORITIES USE OF CLEARED LAND FOR DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES MINE ACTION INCLUDED TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS</p>		
<p>MINE ACTION PROGRAM: CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES</p> <p><i>Specific cross-cutting issues are gender, the environment and HIV/AIDS. These issues are integrated to the overall NPA program in Angola with a particular relevance to the Mine Action Program. HIV/AIDS is a definite issue due to the fact that semi-permanent camps are established next to impacted communities – the issue of gender and specifically the gender awareness of those working and living with impacted communities is linked to the HIV/AIDS issue. The establishing of semi-permanent camps needs to take into account the impact to the environment as does the clearance of suspect areas.</i></p>		
Specific Objectives	Indicators	Activities and input
<p>HIV/AIDS: Focus on the understanding of the causes of HIV/AIDS and preventative measures through a Peer Education Program. Peer Education Programs have a greater success rate as people can associate with the scenarios used and thus see the relevance of making a change to their behaviour.</p>		
NPA staff, in particular operational personnel, understand the causes of HIV/AIDS and take appropriate measures to reduce infection while in parallel provide information to impacted communities so that they are also aware of the effect.	<p>Knowledge of NPA personnel; causes of HIV/AIDS and preventative measures</p> <p>Knowledge of impacted communities: causes of HIV/AIDS and preventative measures</p>	NPA Peer Education Program for HIV/AIDS: the program will be established using lessons learnt from other organisations implementing a HIV/AIDS Peer Education Program.
National Institutions who are partners of the NPA Mine Action Program agree to introduce a HIV/AIDS Peer Education Program to their staff training program and monitoring mechanisms for this.	Agreement for HIV/AIDS Peer Education Program to be integrated to the training program of National Institutions.	Training program including the materials used and distributed provided to National Institutions with trainers made available for the HIV/AIDS training component integrated to the Training Curriculum.
<p>GENDER: Focus on gender awareness of mine action personnel to ensure that all genders are included to decision making for the Land Release process as well as action plans to negate the negative impact from the establishing of semi-permanent camps next to communities during the demining activity.</p>		
NPA personnel use tools that include all genders to the decision making process for the Land Release process.	Gender awareness and guidelines to ensure the inclusion of women to the Land Release process included to the	Review of existing participatory tools for the collecting of information and dialogue about the mine problem as well as the Land Rights

	HOW TO Manual for Non-Technical and Technical Survey.	issue with gender awareness included to all training programs and to the tasks for follow up by the QA/QC Department.
NPA agree action plans to negate the negative impact from the establishing of semi-permanent camps next to impacted communities.	Action plan from the recommendations of the study: impact of semi-permanent camps on communities.	Study on the impact of semi-permanent camps on communities to determine action plans.
NPA female operational staff use the 'Women Can Do It' methodology to mobilise women in the community in order that women continue to participate to decision making for the Land Release process and provide solutions to mitigate the effect from remaining UXO.	<p>'Women Can Do It' methodology adapted by trained NPA Mine Action staff to mobilise women around the land mine issue.</p> <p>Continued participation of women to the Land Release process and risk reduction initiatives.</p>	Training of female Mine Action staff in the 'Women Can Do It' methodology with the adapting of materials included to the training program and pilot project in four communities.
ENVIRONMENT: Focus on the environmental impact from demining activities that includes the consequences of establishing semi-permanent camps next to communities.		
NPA encourage CNIDAH to adopt a national standard that is in line with the International Mine Action Standard on the Protection of the Environment using NPA standards as an example.	<p>Environmental issues included to NPA SOP</p> <p>National Mine Action Standard on the Protection of the Environment adopted by CNIDAH</p>	Using the research of the GICHD as a basis NPA integrates environmental issues to Standard Operating Procedures with environmental impact included as one of the pre-requisites for task planning.
National and Provincial authorities as well as involved actors provide sapling trees for NPA to plant in areas where demining activities have removed trees that were providing a natural break against soil erosion.	Trees planted by NPA in areas where soil erosion will be an issue due to the removal of trees during demining activities.	Agreement for trees to be provided to NPA
ASSUMPTIONS: NPA supports the initiatives identified by taking a lead role at an international level to address the environmental impact from demining activities as well as supporting an integrated approach of working with impacted communities.		

NOTE: The Study of the Impact of Semi-Permanent Camps on Communities will look at the issue of HIV/AIDS, gender and the environmental impact thus providing recommendations to be integrated to the Peer Education Program for HI/AIDS, the action plan for gender initiatives and the strategy for addressing environmental issues.

NPA MINE ACTION PROGRAM 2008 – 2010: WORK PLAN ISSUES											CROSS-CUTTING		
HIV/AIDS													
	2008				2009				2010				
	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	
PEP ³³ : NPA			PEP: Project planning & training			PEER EDUCATION: component of the NPA Program							
PEP: NI ³⁴						PEP:Project planning & training			PEER EDUCATION: component of NI				
GENDER													
	2008				2009				2010				
	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	
Materials: review		Materials: review = HOW TO											
Study ³⁵	Intial research		Planning; process		STUDY: field research & report			PoA					
WCDI ³⁶			Training: pilot projects			WCDI integrated to NTS process and monitored during TS							
ENVIRONMENT													

³³ PEP: Peer Education Program

³⁴ NI: National Institutions

³⁵ STUDY: Impact of Semi-Permanent Camps on communities

³⁶ WCDI: 'Women Can Do It' methodology

	2008				2009				2010			
	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D	J – M	A - J	J – S	O – D
Strategy: NPA			Strategy	SOP & tools for task planning								
Strategy:CNIDAH				Strategy: National Standard								
Demining impact			Environmental impact: planting of trees with impacted communities									

NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID: MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES 2008

Target groups: communities affected by mines and UXO; provincial and traditional authorities responsible for planning

LONG TERM OBJECTIVE:

Mines and other explosive remnants of war are no longer an obstacle to economic, social and political development in Angola.

INDICATORS: ZERO MINE ACCIDENTS

DANGEROUS AREAS KNOWN BY THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND AUTHORITIES

USE OF CLEARED LAND FOR DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

MINE ACTION INCLUDED TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS

IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE: 2008 – 2010

CNIDAH use updated reports about the impact of suspect hazard areas to elaborate annual provincial plans that reflect community priorities *and* use task dossiers that record land release procedures for quality management of the process.

ACTIVITIES: LAND RELEASE – NATIONAL POLICY FOR LAND RELEASE / AREA REDUCTION

LAND RELEASE – TOOLS ELEBORATED FOR NON-TECHNICAL AND TECHNICAL SURVEY

LAND RELEASE – TRANIING OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

LAND RELEASE – PROCEDURES FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QULAITY CONTROL

PLANNING – UPDATED INFORMATION ABOUT IMPACT FROM CONFIRMED MINED ARES

PLANNING – CLEARANCE PLANS FOR THE RELEASE OF CONFIRMED MINED AREAS

MINE ACTION PROGRAM: 2008

The focus is to introduce an agreed Land Release Concept to demining operations of NPA: specifically to develop tools for non-

<p>technical and technical survey. Outside of the specific tools to implement Land Release is to agree a reporting template to update information about community priorities to support the planning of rural development initiatives. In support of the Land Release Concept and the planning of rural projects a study will be conducted to document the impact from the distribution of communal land for private ownership.</p>		
Specific Objectives	Indicators	Activities and input
NPA implement a Land Release Concept to operations providing mine impacted communities with land for agricultural expansion and document the process to show the impact from Land Release in view of Article V obligations applicable to Angola.	<p>Land Release Concept: agreed Land Release Concept known by NPA staff and CNIDAH</p> <p>Land Release: Team Leaders apply the HOW TO for non-technical and technical survey</p> <p>Land Release: updated Standard Operating Procedures detailing Land Release Concept</p> <p>Achieving Article V: document that details results by applying Land Release</p> <p>Agricultural expansion: square metres released and area under cultivation</p>	<p>Pilot projects to agree tools for Land Release: Four Combined Teams interacting with impacted communities to agree risk reduction plans and remove items found. Combined Teams make area reduction of recorded SHA for technical survey and update National Data Base. Deployment of four manual demining teams to carry out full clearance or to support technical survey. Direction provided by Field Coordinator in accordance with task dossier. Technical survey undertaken by four Aardvark Flail Machines and four Casspurs.</p> <p><i>Risk reduction plans elaborated with 120 impacted communities</i></p> <p><i>250 spot tasks to remove items that have the potential to cause an accident</i></p> <p><i>Area reduction of 150 suspect hazard areas through non-technical survey</i></p> <p><i>Release of 1'000'000 square metres of suspect land by demining assets</i></p>
CNIDAH agree a National Policy for Land Release that provides a framework for the training of National Institutions in the Land Release Concept.	National Policy for Land Release / Area Reduction agreed and disseminated	Land Release Concept of NPA shared with CNIDAH. The Technical Commission of CNIDAH and Regional QA/QC Teams involved to the pilot projects to agree tools for the Land Release Concept.
CNIDAH agree a format to update information about suspect areas which allows areas in use to be discredited and a revised impact score to be given to those areas confirmed as mined.	Reporting template to update information to the NDB agreed and guidelines for end user prepared.	Joint project with CNIDAH National: Planning Department and CNIDAH Operations Room in Kwanza Sul. NPA have the lead role to elaborate the reporting template and field test the template.
Impacted communities voice their needs	Plan of action agreed from	With the Development Program to complete a

and concerns about access to land for expansion of agricultural areas and the issue of the demarcation of communal land to ensure owners rights.	recommendations given in the study to document the impact of the distribution of communal land for private ownership.	study which documents the impact of distribution of communal land for private ownership and the potential increase in the number of mine related accidents.
<p>ASSUMPTIONS:</p> <p>Memorandum of Understanding agreed with CNIDAH Operation Room in Kwansa Sul and Malange: NPA has been requested to support the Operations Room although this needs to be formalised.</p> <p>NPA logistics department can provide requested support: Agreed focus for 2008 on tools to support planning of tasks and logistics systems to initiate re-supply.</p> <p>Land Release Policy adopted by CNIDAH: NPA objective to introduce the Land Release Concept to operations needs to be consistent with National Policies.</p>		

NPA MINE ACTION PROGRAM: 2008 WORK PLAN IMMEDIATE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE: 2008 -2010 CNIDAH use updated reports about the impact of suspect hazard areas to elaborate provincial plans that incorporate community priorities and use task dossiers that record the land release procedures for quality management of the process.												
LAND RELEASE												
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
WORKSHOP												
PILOTPROJECT					Five pilot project: agree tools & procedures					Documenting: LR results		
NTS: field test		Test: tools for decision making										

TS: field test		Test: tools for decision making										
SOP: update								Working Group: update of SOP				
HOW TO								HOW TO : NTS & TS				
Land Study								Land Study: field work			Land Study: report	
LAND RELEASE: capacity building												
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
National Policy												
Impact update												
Planning tools												
LAND RELEASE: cross – cutting issues												
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GENDER: study												
HIV/AIDS							Peer education: elaborating of project and training					
ENVIRONMENT							Strategy: impact from demining					

**NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID: MINE ACTION PROGRAM
2008 - 2010**

	Expatriate Costs			Local Personnel Costs			Investments			Materials			
	2008	2009	2010	2008	2009	2010	2008	2009	2010	2008	2009	2010	
MALANGE FIELD OFFICE													
Management & Support				616 290	750 000	800 000	91 200						
Manual Demining Team				2 067 179	2 431 802	2 635 110	114 000			45 600	75 000	75 000	5
Combined Team				369 873	499 634	554 924	59 850			76 950	50 000	50 000	1
GABELA FIELD OFFICE													
Management & Support				1 107 151	1 150 000	1 175 000	102 600			58 848	50 000	50 000	3
Manual Demining Team				2 067 179	2 431 802	2 635 110	114 000			150 000	75 000	75 000	5
Combined Team				369 873	499 634	554 924	59 850			62 700	50 000	50 000	1
MECHANICAL TEAM													
Aardvark				585 220	641 113		541 500	250 000		513 000	300 000		2
Casspir				470 148	515 770		153 900	75 000		136 800	100 000		2
MINE ACTION CENTRAL OFFICE													
Operations Cell	1 710 000	1 710 000	1 140 000	1 265 788	1 265 788	1 265 788				100 000	100 000	100 000	2
Info. Management		570 000		254 801	267 131	267 131							
Administration/Finance	285 000	285 000		263 021	263 021	263 021							
Phase Out (support)		285 000	1 140 000										
LOGISTICS CENTRAL OFFICE													
Warehouse	570 000	570 000		343 590	402 751	402 751							
Workshop	570 000	570 000		1 128 936	1 227 980	1 227 980				230 745	150 000	150 000	

Annex E - NPA Angola, Land Release: Process of dialogue with CNIDAH

NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID IN ANGOLA

LAND RELEASE: PROCESS OF DIALOGUE WITH CNIDAH

CNIDAH requested Mine Action Operators to participate to a Workshop to share information on area reduction initiatives implemented. The Workshop was originally foreseen for November 2007 but held in February 2008. Norwegian People's Aid presented the Land Release Concept and framework for non-technical survey and technical survey: the presentation given by NPA was requested by CNIDAH as a reference document to prepare a National Policy on Area Reduction³⁷. The result of the Workshop was twofold: the most significant was the agreement that CNIDAH would prepare a National Policy on Area Reduction as well as a consensus reached as to the form of marking for areas confirmed as mined but with a low impact scoring³⁸. (*The report and conclusions from the workshop is not yet distributed by CNIDAH*)

Following the Workshop Norwegian People's Aid wrote to the President of CNIDAH stating that: "Norwegian People's Aid is interested to work with CNIDAH to develop the national policy for the reduction of Suspect Hazardous Areas. NPA is developing tools for non-technical and technical survey in order to provide information to conclude the area of a SHA which can be reduced and the area that requires full clearance..... Norwegian People's Aid proposes to work with the Head of the Technical Commission and the Head of the Sub-Commission for Mine Risk Education to agree on principles for cooperation between NPA and CNIDAH and to elaborate a plan of action."

Although not answered by CNIDAH, NPA continued dialogue with both the Technical Commission and the MRE Sub Commission of CNIDAH. Representatives of the Technical Commission participated to the second³⁹ Land Release Workshop in May 2008. The workshop was organized by NPA and facilitated by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)⁴⁰. Participants included the advisor to the Information Management Department (UNDP project for capacity building project of CNIDAH), QA/QC National Officer and Operations Officer. In addition staff from the Regional QA/QC Team of CNIDAH attended relevant sessions of the workshop. A separate briefing was organized for representatives of CNIDAH by the GICHD and NPA in order to present the Land Release Concept and steps to be taken by a National Authority – the examples of National Policy documented by the GICHD in the resource document 'Land Release: a guide for mine and ERW

³⁷ Area reduction: NPA uses the terminology Land Release in place of Area Reduction. The process of non-technical (general) survey and technical survey remain the same.

³⁸ In accordance with the National Strategic Plan, mined areas with a low impact scoring will be marked until assets are available to complete clearance.

³⁹ The first workshop was an internal workshop to agree the NPA Land Release Concept and to determine strategies for issues identified.

⁴⁰ NPA Angola and the GICHD agreed an Accord of Understanding whereby the GICHD would support NPA to develop a Land Release Concept relevant to the context of Angola and tools to implement the concept.

affected countries' were given as examples. *Documents prepared from the second workshop: Land Release Concept of NPA for the context of Angola, Framework for Non-Technical Survey and Technical Survey, are being translated into Portuguese for submitting to CNIDAH.*

With the Head of the MRE Sub-Commission discussions focused on the method for non-technical survey. During 2006 the MRE Sub-Commission had prepared tools to support community participation to the mine action process. Distributed to operators at the beginning of 2007 these tools provide a reference for methodologies for non-technical survey. Discussions between NPA and the MRE Sub-Commission in February and March focused on the plan of the Sub-Commission to develop tools to support risk reduction and the reporting of community 'area reduction' initiatives. NPA participated to the CNIDAH organized workshop in May to agree the interview format for the KAP (knowledge, attitude and practices) survey that would be undertaken by the MRE Sub-Commission during 2008. NPA was able to ensure that questions about why an area is perceived as suspect were included to the interview format: *Important for the Land Release Concept as this provides a starting point to confirm or remove the claim that an area is mined.*

A Land Release Manager for NPA was appointed in May 2008 combining the responsibilities of the Training Coordinator with the tasks identified for the Land Release Manager. The initial focus for the Land Release Manager will be the planning of the five pilot projects and the preparing of a training program for Team Leaders and Section Leaders. In parallel will be the providing of documents to CNIDAH and the elaborating of a proposal for collaboration between NPA and CNIDAH.

CNIDAH AT A PROVINCIAL LEVEL

The CNIDAH Operation Room in Kwanza Sul Province requested NPA to support the elaborating of tools to update information about mined areas. The Planning Department of CNIDAH was involved to the setting of the project with the aim to disseminate the tools developed to other Provincial Operations Rooms from 2009. NPA would field test an agreed template to update information on recorded suspect areas as well as work with the Liaison Officer to agree procedures for the sharing of information to concerned Ministerial Departments and Provincial Administration structures.

NPA spoke with the Head of the Planning Department of CNIDAH in mid-June to organize a second meeting for the project so that a 'concrete' plan of work can be agreed. NPA will request that CNIDAH provide finances to cover the costs that would be incurred by NPA for the project.

During a meeting between the consultants undertaking a review of the NPA Proposal for the Mine Action Program 2008 – 2010 and the senior management of CNIDAH on the 1st of July, CNIDAH stated that if provided with a proposal by NPA that outlines capacity building initiatives for the Land Release Concept a Memorandum of Understanding would be signed with reference to the proposal.

