



Review and Synthesis of Lessons
Learned from Institutional
Cooperation and Capacity Building
in the Environmental Sector in
Norwegian Development Cooperation

Norad
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

P.O. Box 8034 Dep, NO-0030 OSLO
Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway
Phone: +47 22 24 20 30 Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

ISBN 978-82-7548-283-7
ISSN 1502-2528

Review and Synthesis of Lessons
Learned from Institutional
Cooperation and Capacity Building
in the Environmental Sector in
Norwegian Development Cooperation

FINAL REPORT

Oslo, March 2008

Stein Hansen and Tore Laugerud, NCG Norway

NORDIC CONSULTING GROUP **NCG**
O S L O • S T O C K H O L M • C O P E N H A G E N

opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond with those of Norad.

PREFACE

The “Norwegian Action Plan for Environment in Development Cooperation” gives priority to efforts aimed at increasing partner countries’ capacity to view environmental concerns in a long-term perspective and fulfil their international obligations. A key tool is to support institutional cooperation as an important element in competence building.

The implementation of the action plan will require increased environmental competence in all parts of the development cooperation. Over the years Norway has supported a number of capacity building efforts in developing countries and institutional cooperation between Norwegian institutions and similar institutions in partner countries has been a key element in increasing environmental competence. Several of these institutional cooperation projects and programs have been subject to reviews and evaluations, however, the lessons learned have not been compiled and systematized.

As a basis for strengthening the analytical foundation for future institutional cooperation Norad has initiate a study of lessons learned. The main purpose of the study was to review and compile lessons learned from Norwegian-supported projects/programmes with significant components of capacity building and/or institutional cooperation within the environmental sector. The report thus focuses on “historic events” as described in documents and to some degree on interviews with key institutional staff. The report will be used as basis for the further work in Norad with concretising and operationalising the Action Plan for Environmental Cooperation.

The report in hand covers the Final Report of the assignment: ***Review and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from Institutional Cooperation and Capacity Building in the Environmental Sector in Norwegian Development Cooperation.***

The desk study was largely undertaken during the period March - August 2007 in Norway by two senior consultants from Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) Norway: Stein Hansen and Tore Laugerud (jointly referred to as “the Consultant”).

The first Draft Report was submitted ultimo August 2007, and the second Draft was submitted ultimo September following some immediate comments from the responsible Norad officer. In a meeting in Norad 20 December 2007, where the main conclusions of the report were presented, key institutions and individuals cooperating with Norad within the environmental sector gave feedback to the report and discussed some of the implications of the conclusions therein. A couple of the institutions also gave written comments to the report (enclosed in a separate appendix to this Final Report). Taking the relevant comments into account, the Final Report is submitted mid-March 2008.

We want to thank the consultants and institutions that have contributed for their constructive and open contribution during the study.

Oslo, March 2008

*Hans Olav Ibrekk
Project Manager Environmental Action Plan*

The conclusions and recommendations in this report are clearly those of the Consultant, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Norad or the persons and institutions consulted (unless quoted), and are thus not binding for Norad.

LIST OF ACCRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BP	- Business Plan
CAS	- Country Assistance Strategy
CMI	- Christian Michelsen's Institute
DEAT	- Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (South Africa)
DNA	- The Water Directorate, Angola
DN	- Directorate for Nature Management
ECZ	- Environmental Council of Zambia
ECP	- Environmental Cooperation Programme (South Africa)
EIA	- Environmental Impact Assessment
ERA	- Electricity Regulating Authority (Uganda)
FAO	- Food and Agriculture Organisation (United Nations)
GEF	- Global Environmental Facility
ICH	- International Centre for Hydropower
IC and CB	- Institutional Cooperation and Capacity Building
ILO	- International Labour Organisation
IMPACTS	- Integrated Monitoring Programme of Acidification of Chinese Terrestrial System
IPPP	- Industrial Pollution Prevention Programme
LFA	- Logical Framework Approach
LGA	- Local Government Agency
LH	- State Ministry for Environment, Indonesia (<i>Lingkungan Hidup</i>)
LRA	- Long-term Resident Advisor
LTA	- Long-term Advisor
LTRA	- Long-term Resident Advisor
MDG	- Millennium Development Goals
MEA	- Multilateral Environment Agreement
MFA	- Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("Utenriksdepartementet – UD")
MIE	- The Dept. of Environment, Infrastructure and Energy in Norad
MoE	- Ministry of Environment ("Miljøverndepartementet – MD")
NAWASMA	- National water Sector Management Project (Angola)
NCA	- Norwegian Church Aid
NCG	- Nordic Consulting Group
NEAP	- National Environmental Action Plan
NGO	- Non-governmental Organisation
NIBR	- Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research
NINA	- Norwegian Institute for Air Research
NILU	- Norwegian Institute for Air Research
NIVA	- Norwegian Institute for Water research
NVE	- Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate
NOK	- Norwegian currency (Kroner)
Norad	- Norwegian Agency for Development Assistance
OECD	- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED	- Operations Evaluation Department (of the World Bank)
PD	- Project Document
PDR	- People's Democratic Republic
PIU	- Project Implementation Unit
PRSP	- Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PWA	- Palestinian Water Authority
QA	- Quality assurance
SFT	- Norwegian Pollution Control Authority
SUM	- Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo
TA	- Technical assistance
ToR	- Terms of Reference
UiB	- University of Bergen
UiO	- University of Oslo

UIP	- Uganda Industrial Programme
UMB	- Norwegian University of Life Sciences (“Universitetet for miljø- og biovitenskap” at Ås)
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNEP	- United Nations Environmental Programme
UNIDO	- United National Industrial Development Organisation
WHO	- World Health Organisation
WS&S	- Water supply and sanitation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Background

- The document review was initiated to feed into the process of formulating realistic and practical cooperation interventions under “Regjeringens Handlingsplan for miljørettet utviklingsarbeid”. The report is mainly looking back on lessons learned in previous projects, with some recommendation for future cooperation.
- The Consultant (NCG Norway) undertook the study, collecting written material from several companies and public/research institutions, and conducted interviews with key partners (MFA, NVE, SFT, DN, NINA, NIBR).

2. Lessons Learned

2.1 Introduction.

- Institutional development can cover three levels: the institution’s structure and organisation; the institution’s human resources; and the hardware resources.
- Institutional cooperation between partners in developing and developed countries includes capacity building as a key element.
- Institutional *building* is understood to be similar to institutional *development*. Technical Assistance (TA) normally refers to assistance through provision of experts to undertake certain defined limited tasks (“punktinnsats”).

2.2 Why Support Environmental Institutional Building?

- Capacity building in weak environment institutions appears as a logical focal area of development cooperation directed at facilitating achievement of the MDGs.

2.3 Project Initiation. Which Norwegian Partner? Management.

- Whether to start an IC and CB project at all must be carefully considered with regards to: project complexity; Norwegian comparative advantage, institutional capacity and capability; and recipient institutional ownership.
- Some projects notably started on the wrong footing due to sub-standard pre-project considerations, but a few success examples are identified.
- Often, the request for support is prepared in

close cooperation with the Norwegian institution proposed as partner, sometimes being the result of successful long-term cooperating in other projects.

- There are few examples of *other* institutions than the one identifying the project, taking the project lead. Some public institutions were not prepared or rigged to take on the tasks in the 90s, having a too narrow professional scope. This has improved significantly later.
- The most suitable Norwegian institution could in some cases preferably have been identified through open tendering. The institutions must clearly focus their support to what they are good at in Norway (their normal core business).

2.4 Project Preparations, Planning and Duration.

- The planning phase lays the foundation for success or failure in all projects, and the limited capacity and/or capability of the developing country’s institution must be the entry point.
- Some projects would benefit from a postponed start-up, due to inadequate staffing in place and in view of the “recipient responsibility” modality.
- Being too eager to get started with grant support with no or few covenants, runs the risk of delaying much required restructuring reforms in the recipient institution, and such assistance could therefore prove costly to the recipient and be counterproductive.
- There was a change in the mid 90s during the launch of “Norgesaksen”, where public institutions were introduced to development cooperation projects, in reality (although not directly intended) taking over some roles from private consulting companies.
- The public institutions were allowed to “trial and error” to build internal capacity and capability to serve as a resource base for the government, without being properly accountable like private actors (political decision), and with little knowledge transfer from experienced private partners.
- The success of any project depends almost completely on the motivation, capabilities and capacities of the *individual* staff working in the projects, whether these are from public institutions or private companies.
- The Consultant has experienced that

Norad's archives on projects from the 80s and 90s have big holes.

- There is no clear evidence to prove that the changing of policy from more involvement of public institutions on account of private companies has led to better institutional memory and continuity in the projects.
- Public and research institutions *traditionally* have not prepared as good planning/steering documents as the consulting companies (not organised to be project managers; came late into development cooperation; lack of planning expertise and training; not "sharpened" during tenderings). Today, this situation is different, as some institutions prepare high quality documents.
- It took time before the Norwegian institutions realised the importance of having a consistent project formulation (using LFA defining objectives, outputs and activities).
- A general observation in most projects is that the planning is too ambitious (too far-out objectives, too many activities/development aspects, too comprehensive design).
- NVE has started using a pre-project assessment checklist, being a commendable initiative that preferably could be used by others.
- Planning necessarily has to take the required time, and not be rushed.
- There are examples of the local institutions not being properly involved in the planning.
- In many cases, the roles and responsibilities of the project partners are not properly defined and discussed, creating confusion and reluctance during implementation.
- Some IC projects did not have the required duration, which could be around 10 years (not less than 5 years), including a proper exit phase where the local institution is gradually taking over the activities with own resources. But, the capacity and capability of the counterpart institution is decisive for the duration of the cooperation.

2.5 Resident or Visiting Advisors? Home Office Follow-up.

- Throughout the 70s and 80s, Norwegian development cooperation was characterised by long-term resident experts working in the local institution to develop this, or in PIUs

operating in parallel with the local institution. This modality was phased out in the beginning of the 90s.

- Long-term resident advisors tend to *themselves* execute the tasks that the local counterparts should do, and this is a very expensive arrangement.
- Long-term non-resident visiting advisors have proved more effective, forcing the local staff to work alone in-between visits, in their own pace.
- Physical office proximity between the international and local counterparts is essential.
- Some Norwegian institutions have proved impatient, "pushing" the local development.
- Demand-driven approach is the accepted development modality. A longer project period is therefore often required. PIUs must be avoided.
- The highest managerial level on both sides should be involved in the projects from the beginning.

2.6 Project Reporting and Monitoring

- Internal project monitoring, including on personal performance, has been neglected in some cases, and such monitoring is not easy (management directly involved in project; personal friendship; inadequate details in the reporting; fear of personal criticism).
- Project field reviews by Norad officers might easily "oversee" the problems at stake, so independent external evaluators should do this.
- Project progress reporting should follow a fixed norm, and Norad must guide on this at project start-up. Coordination of various donor-reporting requirements is needed, not to burden the local institution unduly.

2.7 Other Aspects of Failures and Successes

- The under-paid and under-motivated local staff is often a challenge to the Norwegian institution and an obstacle to progress, and direct monetary salary topping-up incentives can not be paid to the local staff from Norwegian project funds. "Moonlighting" is common in many countries.
- Local working morale can be enhanced by acceptable incentives like: covering accommodation at cost on field visits; study tours abroad (for relevant staff, not too early

in the project); and careful use of “sitting allowances” in meetings, workshops, etc.

- All IC projects normally comprise a limited and reasonable budget item of hardware procurement, and this practice should continue.
- In a few projects the lack of proper language proficiency amongst both Norwegian and local staff has prevailed. Project implementation could be postponed until adequate proficiency has been reached to facilitate an effective communication.
- Individual training does not necessarily lead to institutional development (trained staff quitting for other jobs; trained staff are not able to utilise their newly acquired knowledge due to several shortcomings (institution not set-up to take onboard skills increase; no career path established; trained staff being a threat to superiors).
- Lack of transparent operational procedures, openness and delegation often hampers the institutional development (generic problem in developing countries).
- Norwegian institutions (SFT, NVE, DN) having frame agreements with Norad on institutional support in development projects, have all experienced a decreased number of requests for assistance, without having been communicated exactly why.

2.8 Relevant Lessons Learned from Other Institutions' Development Assistance.

- UNEP has entered into Framework Agreements with Norway (2006-2009), Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Sweden, largely based on trust funds.
- The NEAPs prepared following the Rio Conference in 1992, to a large degree has “ended up in shelves”, largely since there was no provision for the World Bank to keep up the time-consuming institutional dialogue and capacity building required to provide for sustainable environment resources management. As a result, the Bank's evaluations in 2001 showed that environmental mainstreaming had not yet taken full effect in bank policies, programs and operations.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

A well-established ownership of and commitment to the complex content of the IC & CB development cooperation components is required, based on patience from the donor.

The challenges and topics to be covered should define which institution/experts on the Norwegian side should participate. Rather than a broad scale focus when so required, some projects have resulted in a too myopic focus, missing the intended broader scope, partly due to lack of experts with sufficient insight and relevant experience. IC & CB has thus only partly been successful on a broad scale, with only a few cases giving the recipient institution the needed and intended holistic “lift”.

A list of 27 detailed specific points have been summarised, of which the most important ones are:

- Norad should critically assess which institution is the most suitable for managing the IC and CB efforts, and undertake a tendering for this if in doubt.
- With limited capacity and capability in the local institution, a postponement of the project should be considered, with a pre-project phase of staff capacity building only.
- The Norwegian institution must critically assess own human resources to undertake the institutional cooperation.
- In some cases, dropping a project altogether should be seriously and professionally considered.
- However capable the public or private institution, the success of any project depends almost completely on the motivation, capabilities and capacities of the *individual staff* working in the projects.
- The skills of preparing consistent planning documents following LFA still has a potential for improvement, especially with the public institutions.
- Project planning is the most critical activity, so it is advised against rushing the planning, the required time must be allocated.
- Project planning is often too ambitious, and must be scaled down to meet the capacity and capability of the local institutions. Limit the number of success criteria!
- Analyse the risks and success factors properly before project start-up (NVE has developed a useful format for this).
- Involve the local institution fully in the project planning.
- Roles and responsibilities of all the project partners on both sides must be clearly identified.

- Around 10 years could be the starting point the duration of projects involving a broader institutional development and capacity building, including a proper time for joint planning of the project and an exit phase.
- The preferred cooperation modality in most cases is short-term follow-up visits by Norwegian advisors, having a long-term commitment throughout the project duration, securing continuity.
- The institutional cooperation process must be clearly demand-driven, and the Norwegian institution should “hold their horses”, however frustrating this might feel.
- Norad must never allow topping-up of salaries, but should be realistic as to payment of actual travel costs (and allowances abroad) and “sitting allowances” commonly used in the country.
- Individual training does not always lead to institutional building. Transparency and openness must be enhanced through the project in the local institutions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. BACKGROUND.....	1
1.1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.2 THE CONSULTANT’S MANDATE AND APPROACH	1
2. LESSONS LEARNED.....	2
2.1 INTRODUCTION	2
2.2 WHY SUPPORT ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING?.....	3
2.3 PROJECT INITIATION. WHICH NORWEGIAN PARTNER? MANAGEMENT.	4
2.3.1 Project Initiation. Who is the Driving Force?	4
2.3.2 “Tied Aid” or Tendering?.....	7
2.4 PROJECT PREPARATIONS, PLANNING AND DURATION.	9
2.4.1 Is Time Ripe to Start the Project?	9
2.4.2 Actors and Institutional Memories.....	11
2.4.3 The Planning Process	14
2.4.4 TTT - Things Take Time!.....	18
2.5 RESIDENT OR VISITING ADVISORS? HOME OFFICE FOLLOW-UP.....	20
2.5.1 Short- or Long-Term, Resident or Not?	20
2.5.2 Home Office Management Support. A Pro-active or an Awaiting Attitude?	23
2.6 PROJECT REPORTING AND MONITORING	25
2.7 OTHER ASPECTS OF FAILURES AND SUCCESSES.....	28
2.7.1 Underpaid Counterpart Staff. Working Incentives.....	28
2.7.2 Sweetening the Bitter Pill with Hardware.....	30
2.7.3 Language and Culture, Hindrance and Opener.....	30
2.7.4 Individual Training and Institutional Building. Transparency and Delegation.....	31
2.7.5 The Under-Use of Capable Norwegian Institutions.....	32
2.8 RELEVANT LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER INSTITUTIONS’ DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE	34
3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	36

APPENDICES:

Appendix 1: Figures and tables

Appendix 2: Highlights from and synopsis of the reviewed documents

Appendix 3: List of persons met and contacted

Appendix 4: List of documents collected and reviewed

Appendix 5: The Consultant’s Terms of Reference

Appendix 6: Comments to the Draft Report

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

In June 2006, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) launched the Norwegian Government's Action Plan for Development Cooperation in the Environmental Sector ("Regjeringens handlingsplan for miljørettet utviklingssamarbeid"), being an important policy document as basis for fighting poverty and improving living conditions in developing countries, through enhancing environmental and natural resources conditions. Subsequently, Norad wanted to make a more detailed review of the experience and lessons learned from past projects containing capacity building and institutional cooperation/strengthening, to feed into the future process of tailoring realistic and useful cooperation interventions. Norad wanted the lessons learned to result in practical recommendations on how such cooperation could be undertaken and organised.

In this process, experience and lessons learned during the last 10 years should be reviewed and systematised, and state-of-the-art implementation modalities would be identified, forming *Phase 1* of the efforts. *Phase 2* would be the formulation of practical operational recommendations for Norad to follow, where contributions and input from a broad range of actors and stakeholders will be an important element.

1.2 The Consultant's Mandate and Approach

Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) Norway ("the Consultant"), having long-term experience with reviews and evaluation of institutional cooperation (IC) and capacity building (CB) projects, and projects in the environmental sector in general, was asked to undertake the desk study and compile the lessons learned. The Terms of Reference (ToR) is enclosed in *Appendix 5* to this report. As the ToR for the review is fairly general, it was broadly left to the Consultant to formulate the content of the report based on what he found most important related to the Norad tasks at stake.

As a first step of the study, the Consultant contacted the following institutions by email, presenting the ToR and requesting written input to the study (from reviews and evaluations, and experience in general):

- Consulting companies: COWI AS; Heso; Norconsult AS; Norplan AS; Scanteam AS; Statskonsult.
- Various other institutions: Christian Michelsen's Institute (CMI); Directorate for Nature Management (DN); Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA); Norwegian Institute for Water research (NIVA); International Centre for Hydropower (ICH); Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE); Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT); Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB)/Noragric; Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM)/University of Oslo (UiO); University of Bergen (UiB), and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration.

After several reminders by email and telephone, almost all the institutions/companies responded¹. Some made references to documents on their websites, some sent hard copies of report synopsis and brochures, and some sent reports in electronic form (WORD or PDF).

In addition to the collected written material, the Consultant had meetings with a few selected key actors, who had long-term experience from IC and CB projects, namely: MFA; NVE; SFT; DN (telephone conference); and NINA, in addition to Arne Dalfelt from NIBR, whom the Consultant was specifically

¹ Notably, NIVA was the only institutions that never responded to the query, but this is assumed merely to be an unfortunate coincidence of staff unavailability than anything else.

asked to contact in the ToR, as he was working with related topics for Norad.

The persons with whom the Consultant communicated during the study, either by email, telephone or meetings, are listed in *Appendix 3*.

Following the submission of the Draft Report 24 September 2007, Norad arranged a meeting 20 December 2007 where key institutions and professionals cooperating with Norad within the environmental sector were invited. In this meeting the Consultant presented the findings, and the meeting participants gave constructive verbal comments to the report. Also useful and more general input was given by the participants to the key issues at stake, to be taken onboard by Norad in the further work with formulation of practical operational recommendations. Prior to the meeting DN gave some comments by email, and following the meeting NVE sent their written comments. Both these sets of comments are enclosed to this Final Report in *Appendix 6*.

Based on the written and verbal comments to the report, the Consultant has corrected factual errors and misunderstandings. However, the conclusions and recommendations, being the ones of the Consultant, are largely kept as presented in the Draft Report. In this context, it should be emphasised that the Consultant has, to his best ability, tried to cover all easily identifiable arguments connected to the key topics at stake. It is hoped that the input, together with other actors' input, will be useful for Norad in the further work.

Highlights and synopsis from the documents reviewed are enclosed in *Appendix 2*, and the list of documents reviewed is enclosed in *Appendix 4*.

2. LESSONS LEARNED

2.1 Introduction


The Consultant has reviewed all the documents collected, some in more detail than others depending on the relevance to the topics in question. It is emphasised that the Consultant has not dealt with the material in a systematic "scientific" manner, but merely reviewed the documents with an experienced subjective eye, identifying useful lessons learned that *could* lead to practical solutions steering the future IC and CB efforts of Norad. The Consultant has thus made some choices regarding development elements that are considered *more* important than others, reflected in this report's headings. During the meetings with the key actors, these topics were taken up in all of them in order to focus the experience around the same thematic basis.

In the text below, references are sometimes made to specific reports (by using the reference number given in the listing in *Appendix 4*), or a specific institution is mentioned by name where relevant. Sometimes, the Consultant is presenting views that are generic and widely agreed to amongst the stakeholders, without listing these stakeholders in detail. Several quotes from reports are deliberately included to get the broadest possible impression of the document contents and to illustrate how various consultants/institutions are wording their statements. By these quotations, the risk of presenting a misinterpreted meaning of the statements is minimised. Quotes in Norwegian language are not translated into English in order to keep the original meaning of the statements. It is understood and fully appreciated that other consultants would have presented the topics differently and may be would have emphasised other topics.

As an introduction to the below sections, the main terminology used should be explained for a common understanding and backdrop. Obviously, "capacity building" and "institutional cooperation" are not synonymous terms, as the latter contains a much wider selection of actions and interventions. Nevertheless, the two terms are very closely related in development cooperation.

Already in Parliamentary Appropriation Document Nr. 51 (1992-92), institutional development was split

in three levels: the institution's structure and organisation; the institution's human resources; and the hardware resources:



Obviously, in this setting capacity building refers *mostly* to the training and awareness raising of the human resources (the individuals) of the institution, being the employees, to make these people able to undertake their mandated duties in the best way and thus jointly to enable the institution to set and achieve objectives, solve problems, and perform functions sustainably. Capacity components can include skills, systems, structures, processes, values, resources and powers. Institutional cooperation between institutions in developing and developed countries will always include capacity building as a key element to obtain sustainable operations, as shortcomings in human resources (either quality or quantity) normally is the main limiting factor for development.

It is noted that the term "institutional building" is also used in some reports understood to be similar to "institutional development" in a context where the building-up of a fairly young institution in its start-up stages is at stake, and where capacity building of the human resources is a key element. The term "Technical Assistance" (TA) is used in several connections in literature, without referring to any consistent definition. The Consultant construes this term to be rather *general* in nature, meaning any kind of advisory services or assistance in any form to any parts of an institution. TA normally however, refers to assistance through provision of experts to undertake certain defined limited tasks ("punktinnsats"), which could typically in a project include tasks like i.e. preparation of a Project Document (PD); formulation of action plans; preparation of job descriptions; preparation of training programmes; improvement of pollution monitoring efforts; assistance in procurement, etc. TA might as such encompass both elements of capacity building and institutional cooperation, either as separate assignments/contracts or "piggy-backed" to investment projects as support to facilitate cooperation towards timely and successful project completion.

Box 1: Institutional Development

"Satsingen på institusjonsutvikling er begrunnet ut fra målsettingen om at norsk bistand skal bidra til å styrke samarbeidslandenes institusjoner, slik at de i et noe lengre perspektiv settes i stand til å fylle sine funksjoner uavhengig av utenlandsk støtte. ... Institusjonssamarbeid kan innholdsmessig være et bredt sammensatt virkemiddel, hvor samarbeidet kan omfatte alt fra lederutvikling og bygging av en organisasjon til faglig bistand innenfor mottakerinstitusjonens forvaltningsområde ...".

Fra "Forvaltning av institusjonssamarbeid, Statskonsult 1998 (No. 30)

It should also be mentioned that the notion "institution" in the following could mean any organised operation, being governmental/public institutions (ministries, agencies, departments, universities, research organisations, directorates), semi-governmental research organisations, and private institutions (consulting companies, NGO, foundations) that cooperates with similar institutions in developing countries.

2.2 Why Support Environmental Institutional Building?

It is established in development economic research that policies increasing the asset base of the poor

have a good chance of encouraging income growth both nationally and among the poor². Such research has also established that the dominating explanation behind differences in growth and levels of economic and social achievements among countries is the creation and maintenance of human, institutional and social capital, and that good national performance in achieving these latter increases the scope for expansion and more sustainable management of a country's environment and natural resource base. *Table 2.1 in Appendix 1* shows the composition of per capita wealth by categories of countries aggregated by income group, and the composition of natural wealth for the same country categories.

The table shows a striking contrast in the *relative role* of different forms of capital between country income categories. Human and institutional/social capital dominates across all three country categories, but while its share is 59% of overall per capita wealth in low-income countries, it increases to 80% of the total for the high-income OECD countries. More strikingly, the table shows that while per capita environmental capital increases 5-fold between low-income and high-income countries, human, institutional and social capital increases 80-fold! While all forms of per capita wealth are many times higher in high- than in low-income countries, the ratio is extremely high for human and social capital.

The table further shows that the environmental wealth matters 13 times more in percentage share terms to low-income countries than to high-income OECD countries (26% of total wealth, versus 2% in the rich countries), and renewable resources are also relatively more important in terms of its share of total natural wealth (83%) in low-income countries compared to that of the rich countries (60%).

The table thus clearly shows that the poor depend disproportionately on environmental assets. The much larger share of natural resources in total wealth and the composition of these resources make strong argument for the role of environmental resources in reducing poverty, fighting hunger and reducing child mortality. It suggests that when addressing poverty one has to focus carefully on the management and enhancement of environmental wealth.

These findings combine to identify environment institutions at national, provincial and local levels as being of particular importance to the development achievements of poor countries, and capacity building in weak environment institutions appears as a logical focal area of development cooperation directed at facilitating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The importance of institutional strengthening is also clearly realised in some large institution's policy, notably UNEP (No. 21): *"UNEP places great faith in the power of awareness-raising and institutional strengthening to bring about lasting change"*.

2.3 Project Initiation. Which Norwegian Partner? Management.

2.3.1 Project Initiation. Who is the Driving Force?

When the issue of possible projects with institutional cooperation and capacity building arises the first time, the idea must be carefully considered by all parties. There are examples of projects that really should not have been initiated the way they were, due to various reasons:

- The complexity of the topics and matters at stake;
- Norway does not really have the comparative advantage of supporting the project;
- the Norwegian institution does not have the capability or capacity to undertake the support;
- Norad/MFA have not committed sufficient in-house staff resources to secure proper monitoring;
- the recipient government/national institution has yet to take ownership of the project and the process;
- the country is not a main development cooperation country for Norway;
- etc.

² Stein Hansen (2007), "The Economic Case for Investing in Environment. - A Review of Policies, Practice and Impacts of relevance to Norwegian Partner Countries", Norad, Norway.

A prime example evaluated in 2004 is the support for capacity- and institution building in the Middle Eastern conflict area focusing on mapping, monitoring, technology transfer, legislation and management of the dwindling water resources (see the main conclusions and findings in Reference No. 13 in *Appendix 2*). In this case Norway should have refrained from spending the close to NOK 90 million on such high risk aid for all the first five reasons listed above. In spite of some impressive achievements, considering the volatile and unpredictable working conditions, the overall outcome was far behind the planned ones, and Norway's position as a key player in the Middle East peace and reconciliation processes was not strengthened. Major equipment investments also turned out to be wasted.

Another example is the INS-0008 project in Indonesia (No. 14) where the client did have strong ties with a pre-identified Norwegian institution (DN), which had been delegated the coordination responsibility by Norwegian Ministry of Environment (MoE), without any prior objective analysis of the suitability of this institution to implement this project abroad, but merely embarking on a blueprint of advisory roles in Norway. (In this case also the thematic content of project was firmly pre-determined by MoE, with no flexibility to be adjusted during the appraisal phase, which was detrimental to the project implementation later on).

Additional examples include:

- National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12): *"The delay in the execution of ... is partly reported to be due to capacity problems at both DNA and NVE ..."*.
- NPL-024, Regulating and Monitoring Capacity Building for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of Hydropower Project in Nepal (No. 17):
 - *"It is doubtful whether DN was the appropriate management counterpart institution in Norway, as it seemingly was lacking the required experience from planning and implementing similar projects in developing countries"*
 - *"...again raises the Review Team's suspicion whether DN had the required experience and procedures for managing such international operations, and whether the institution was "ready" to be the Norwegian counterpart of the Project"*.
- Norwegian Support to the Energy Sector in Uganda (1997-2005) (No. 23):
 - *"The institutional support with a cooperation arrangement with NVE continued beyond the required timeframe, apparently driven more by a desire to maintain the arrangement than actual needs for assistance"*
 - *"The assistance provided for institutional support has also been managed as tied aid with no competition for the main service provider (NVE) and limited competition for some of the consultancy contracts. When comparing actual costs of these inputs ... with the main tangible outputs such as ... it compares unfavourably with a process of tendering services with clearly defined tasks"*.
 - *"While NVE played a key role in facilitation of the process of establishing a legal and institutional framework, a continued process of promoting a "twinning arrangement" beyond the initial support did not prove to be effective and efficient"*.
- Norway-Angola Electricity Sector Cooperation 2002-06 (No. 29): *"... it appears that the project design did not sufficiently consider the capacity and capability of institutions such as NVE to contribute and to deploy the best and most relevant competencies and personnel when required ..."*.

Institutional cooperation projects are basically initiated in two ways: Norad/MFA/an Embassy is identifying the new project as a natural and integral part of its political and/or development agenda, or the project is coming up as an add-on to other planned, ongoing or completed interventions, proposed by the recipient country or by the Norwegian project partner. In the first case, it is believed that the project is well considered and is relevant in all aspects (the No. 17 in Nepal being a good example). However,

real-world practice is often a different matter, as experienced in several projects suggested by the recipient country, for precisely some or all of the first five reasons listed above, have encountered severe problems.

Some examples of projects seemingly “starting on a wrong footing”, and at least partly failing to correct the course during implementation include several aspects of the institutional support are: the Palestinian Water Authority (Nos. 1, 5 and 16), the National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No.12), NPL-024-Regulating and Monitoring Capacity Building for EIA of Hydropower Project in Nepal (No. 17), important parts of the institutional support and capacity building of the energy sector in Uganda 1997-2006 (No. 23), and the Norwegian support to the non-petroleum energy sector in Angola 2002-2006 (No. 29). In a couple of these projects, there might have been some assistance from the Norwegian partner in the identification phase, which is not necessarily all that wrong if done with openness and sensitiveness. (Notably, in the Nepal project (No. 17), the Norwegian partner suggested in the Project Document was NVE, but following analysis and discussion on the Norwegian side, DN was suggested as the main partner). Project ideas might in some cases be the result of long-term cooperation between the partners on other projects or initiatives, and is a result of a natural and inevident ripening process. The project identified could therefore be the next natural development step in order to bring the institutional system to the desired level (the NVE support to the Energy sector in Uganda being a good example).

Also Phase III of environmental cooperation between South Africa and Norway (ECP III), appraised by NCG in 2005 (No. 19) should be mentioned. Building on successful achievements in the previous phases, the appraisal of the proposed ECP III concluded that: *“Before the process of formulation, selection and prioritisation of the projects to be funded under the framework agreement (Draft Business Plan), a decision is required on which of the two objectives is considered the primary and achievable objective of the programme; i.e. (i) to build capacity for DEAT and in areas of relevance use Norwegian partners as means of achieving it, or (ii) to develop of sustained cooperation between RSA and Norwegian partners in areas of mutual interest The above mentioned objectives may in some circumstances be complementary, but in some cases mutually exclusive objectives. This “dilemma” should be resolved through a clearer and simpler formulation of the ECP objective which also has impact on the modality of cooperation and selection of projects”*.

However, there are also successful reviewed projects that have started in this way, notably the IPPP (Industrial Pollution Prevention Project) in Zambia (ZAM-063, Nos. 2 and 7). Here, the capacity building needs had been identified through two previous projects supported by Norway, and SFT was asked by Norad (and MoE) to manage and coordinate the Norwegian support to the local institution (Environmental Council of Zambia – ECZ).

There are several examples where the development country institution requests Norway for support through its proper national central channels (i.e. Ministry of Finance), which is the agreed and correct procedural modality today. Along the lines of Norwegian development cooperation policy, where the recipient country has the main responsibility of the cooperation, it is normally in good will also expected that the request is relevant and fully in line with the overall development strategy of the country. Reality could nevertheless prove differently, especially since there often is a wide gap between the ambitions of a plan and strategy on the one hand, and the budget commitments and institutional capacity to implement the listed activities on the other³.

Project proposals are often prepared by the local institution together with (or with assistance from) the Norwegian institution, based on a history of successful cooperation in other projects, or simply as a result of “coincidence” (people meeting during seminars or study tours, in training courses, through website search, etc.). In these cases, it could, in addition to the noble task of contributing to development, also be an element of own interest of the Norwegian institution to be involved in the project and may be even a “driving force” to keep own employed staff busy on paid work. In some cases,

³ See e.g. S. Hansen (2007), op.cit...

there might be suspicions that appropriate “lobbying” and personal connections with the central authorities responsible for prioritising the interventions requested for foreign support in the recipient country, has been decisive, and not necessarily an “objective” assessment of what benefits the country strategically at large. This does *not* necessarily mean that the project is not beneficial to development, and in some cases such pro-active role of the Norwegian partners might be the only way of initiating a needed project.

Typical examples of the latter we find in PR China, where some Norwegian institutions have been very active through many years (NILU, NIVA, SINTEF and COWI, to mention a few) and NVE in several African and Asian countries.

2.3.2 “Tied Aid” or Tendering?

The above examples are the cases where Norad and MFA critically should analyse the project ideas/proposals and make sure that all development elements are incorporated properly (through appraisals, internal or external). Here also, Norad/MFA should critically assess whether the Norwegian institution suggested to be the partner in the proposal *really* is the right partner to coordinate and supply the Norwegian input. There are few examples only, to the Consultant’s knowledge, where Norwegian authorities have chosen another partner than the one suggested in the request (the Nepal project of DN, No. 17, being one). It is realised that going against the recommendations in the proposal and possible recommendations from the Norwegian key sector institutions (even having a framework agreement with Norad), also will create unnecessary stir-up and the officers taking such decisions in Norad must have solid professional backing to do so. It is also an unwritten rule that the one that “finds the gold – keeps it”, meaning that the institutions which may be spending “own” money identifying a project and undertaking costly acquisition work, shall also have the “benefit” from it later.

Norad’s increased use of Norwegian public institutions (and NGOs) in IC and CB activities in development cooperation during the 1990s evolved as a process where such institutions were given 3-5 year contracts, usually with a budget not exceeding NOK 15 million, without tendering to secure the best of quality at a competitive price (notably assuming that there were public and private institutions that had overlapping interests and spheres of profession). It is interesting to note that this happened at the same time as an increasing awareness arose for use of international and national tendering of much smaller contracts to private sector participants on the development cooperation “market”. While contracts of this magnitude would be considered large by most private consultants, and therefore be taken very seriously in the planning and staffing preparations, Statskonsult (1998) in its *“Kartlegging og analyse av forvatningsmessige sider ved bruk av norske direktorater i institusjonelt samarbeid.”* (No. 30) viewed these contracts as minor relative to the overall budgets of the public institutions taking on such IC and CB contracts, and relative to the country frames for development cooperation, and therefore did not think of this as much of an issue.

Handing out such IC and CB contracts based on rather superficial applications as opposed to a carefully prepared tendering procedure for multi-million, multi-year assignments was apparently not an issue on the aid-political agenda. Protection of Norwegian institutions with tied aid, and not even a national tendering process, stood in contrast to what Norwegian aid authorities preached as the rule to be followed in international forums, e.g. related to the use of mixed credits. It is difficult to avoid the impression that political pressure to provide Norwegian public institutions with new tasks overseas, perhaps as a means to retain or attract valuable staff members, could have played a role when this approach to IC and CB was adopted. Having said this, it is realised that some Norwegian sector public institutions had (has) clearly defined tasks and responsibilities in Norway not being covered to same degree by private actors, and in such cases tendering could be wasteful.

Ideally, when Norad is in doubt (or *should be* in doubt) whether the Norwegian institution (public or private) proposed is the appropriate one, a transparent tendering should take place amongst suitable candidates. In such tendering not only the key tasks of the Norwegian institution should as close as possible match the recipient country institution’s, but the human resources ability to communicate

(language and cultural knowledge), internal professional capabilities, and management skills must be considered (ref. No. 33). In some cases, it has clearly been questioned to leave the management and coordination, including the task of coordinating external resources where own internal competence is limited, to public directorates (generally taken up in No. 33, and in No. 5 with reference to NVE). May be having a consulting company, being (presumably) professional in project management, to lead the project would be beneficial. The lead company could then involve public institutional human resources to cover professional tasks as and when required, of which there are several good examples. Is a consulting company then more able to see the project in a holistic view than the professional view of a public- or research institution? Not necessarily, but some examples in the independent review and evaluation literature where such questions are touched upon were given in *Section 2.3.1* above, in addition to:

- TAN-0092. Management of Natural Resources (No. 25): *“As regards TAWIRI-NINA collaboration, the main criticism to date has concerned the research bias towards ‘natural science’ approaches to NRM. The team feels that it is not easy for research institutes to change their disciplinary orientation”.*

The “marked based approach” (where demand for expertise is supplied by the most qualified suppliers regardless of a specific field), is mentioned explicitly in a couple of reports:

- Review of Sino-Norwegian Environmental Cooperation 1996-2005 (No. 28): *“The approach in developing partnerships could be adjusted along the lines of other bilateral cooperation arrangements between China and other countries. It may include more frequent use of tendering processes in Norway, or at least more open invitations to relevant commercial and non-commercial institutions”.*
- The ECP III appraisal of Environment Cooperation between Norway and South Africa in 2005, (No. 19): *“Since it is in some cases “procurement of services” (private suppliers) there is a need to clarify what procurement procedures are to be applied for commercial supplies. If MoE is to supply the services from Norwegian commercial partners then it would be Norwegian procurement rules that should apply. If it is DEAT that is to contract Norwegian commercial suppliers, DEAT procurement rules should apply. Regardless of procedure, a competitive process will reduce costs i.e. improve efficiency which was one of the concerns of the 2003 review of the programme.”*

On the other hand, there are a few examples where public institutions have been commended for their contribution in project implementation, notwithstanding the above criticism of the choice of selection procedures, notably in:

- Norad Support to the Palestinian Water Authority (No.1):
 - *“...NVE has provided valuable assistance in the formulation of terms of reference, contract negotiations, monitoring service providers and as a general adviser in the day-to-day operations of PWA ...”*, although the same report states that:
 - *“NVE’s core role could be to act as a focal point identifying relevant technical assistance personnel... An extension of the contract should ensure more flexibility in allowing PWA to utilise relevant expertise also outside the NVE/SFT/NIVA triangle”.*
- Environmental Cooperation Programme with South Africa (No. 9): *“ Officials ... expressed great satisfaction with the opportunity to work with NILU and SFT. The level of technical competence and the approach to solving the identified problems is greatly appreciated and praised”.*

Statskonsult has in its review of the Institutional Cooperation Management (No. 33) passed some doubts as to public institutions being coordinator on such projects, as this does not comply with their normal role in operations in Norway: *“..... stiller seg derimot tvilende til om et norsk direktorat kan ta ansvaret for å koordinere tjenester fra andre leverandører. Da beveger direktoratet seg et godt stykke på veg mot en bistandsforvalterrolle. En underliggende premiss både fra NORAD og fra overordnet fagdepartement*

er at direktoratene skal gjøre det samme i samarbeidslandet som de har ansvar for i Norge. Det medfører at en slik koordinatorrolle kan være i uoverensstemmelse med forutsetningene”.

Nevertheless, one person interviewed by the Consultant believed that SFT is doing a good job in their institutional cooperation (partly due to the fact that they have a constant pressure from the media and must deliver “quality”). NVE on their side believed that they should have the coordinating and managerial role on the Norwegian side in projects suitable to their mandate, whereas NINA feels more comfortable with a sub-consultancy role in projects, and DN believes they are indeed active in using outside resources where own resources are not capable enough. The Consultant concludes that the various institutions’ subjective views on this issue simply reflect different experience, policy and staffing available. Based on the document reviews in this study, and from which the above quotes have been taken, the previously quoted conclusions of Statskonsult do thus still not appear as unreasonable. One conclusive key term could however be “cooperation” between various institutions, public and private alike, where the various roles of the partners are properly analysed and discussed up-front leading to the “optimal” solution. The Norwegian partner should contribute with what they are good at and what their normal core activities are. It is nevertheless understood that this ideal solution is difficult to implement in reality.

2.4 Project Preparations, Planning and Duration.

2.4.1 Is Time Ripe to Start the Project?

Recipient ownership to and responsibility for aid financed cooperation activities has become a key premise of Norwegian development cooperation. In the field of environment policy, planning and management such ownership has yet to be properly established with most cooperating developing partner countries. This is the “youngest” field of development cooperation. Its complex cross-cutting nature, in most cases with responsibility for implementation and monitoring given to a rather powerless new ministry or agency, along with the fact that cost and benefits until recently have been of a non-quantified and often controversial nature, has made it difficult for governments of poor countries to have environment issues match the conventional easily identifiable needs in infrastructure and social sectors in terms of priority setting. A development cooperation dialogue of considerable patience and maturing of attitudes and acceptance of the environment as a crosscutting basic needs area of crucial importance to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) must reach a certain level of recipient acceptance before one may say that the time is ripe to start a concrete project.

Once the most appropriate coordinating and participating Norwegian institutions are identified, the planning of the project will start, hopefully “on the right footing”. In the Consultant’s opinion, this is the most important phase of any project, where extensive experience from previous projects and relevant tasks, and excellent planning abilities are required, as a starting point. The mere nature of IC and CB projects must decide the level of ambition here, as it is the limited capacity and/or capability of the developing country’s institution that always has “initiated” the project in the first place. This is in fact regardless of whether the project *in reality* has been initiated by the recipient country’s authorities or by a Norwegian partner. The activities, even those of purely capacity building or TA nature, must be adapted to the real on-ground situation, and the proper needs of the recipient institution.

In case the recipient institution has manned key positions with staff *not* having the required formal education or background, the basis for undertaking institutional cooperation might simply not yet be present. In such cases the IC project start-up should preferably wait and/or a “pre-project phase” be introduced, concentrating on required basic capacity building of the existing human resource base (formal training in the region or the country, or scholarships abroad, paid partly or fully by Norway).

In case key positions on the recipient side are not staffed *at all*, the local institution should get a chance to staff these first, in order simply to give the Norwegian institution someone to build the institution with! Again, formal training of such staff prior to the main project activities could be an incentive to draw dedicated staff to the institution in the first place, but then clearly with an obligation to work there

after completion of the training.

In case, of whatever reason, the formal basis for starting implementing the IC is not there, the Norwegian institutions and/or Norad should be self-critical enough to stop the preparations and “take one step back”, analysing the situation. May be an outside independent party can see this more clearly than the institution that is “parent to the baby” or having been involved in the project preparations, as part of a pre-appraisal or even an “informal” pre-assessment? A couple of the institutions interviewed by the Consultant pointed out that it is imperative that IC is based on cooperation between “equal” partners, and not so much on teacher-pupil relations. In other words: as various managerial, operational and organisational issues normally are at stake as part of IC, the developing country institution must be able to properly comprehend and operationalise the concepts and modalities agreed to and consequently introduced. Such aspects are different from purely technical aspects (under TA), where the totality and holistic views are necessarily not so important.

Amongst the material reviewed by the Consultant, there are no examples where significant parts of a project have been entirely postponed in the start-up phase in the wait for the recipient government to take on ownership and commit itself by making sure the cooperating environment institution get sufficient staff in-house so capacity building at all could be undertaken. However, there are several cases where individual activities have been postponed during the course of the project, e.g. as result of overall consideration in Annual Meetings where shortcomings are revealed after a while. In some cases, waiting would have benefited the cause:

- National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12):
 - *“In 2003 the spending has been quite a bit lower than budgeted, ... probably due to lack of available, qualified staff to train”,*
 - *“... progress is slow due to lack of sufficient legal resources and capacity”,*
 - *“... capacity building has limited value until more permanent staff is in place”.*
- IMPACTS, PR China (No. 15): *“... the Project in general is hinged on too few trained staff, ...”.*
- NCA’s WS&S Programme in Decan, Kosovo (No. 20), where NCA established its own organisation with own paid staff in parallel with the existing, highly under-staffed and under-resourced water company. (It is noted that this project was defined and got funding as an *emergency* project from MFA, although the review of the project clearly shows that it was a developing project more than anything else).
- ENSIS Projects in PR China (No. 22), regarding Project CHN-014: *“It is however noted that the sustainability is very much hinged on one person who has been participating from the start, and is thus very vulnerable”.*
- TAN-0092, Management of Natural Resources Programme (No. 25):
 - *“... handing over responsibility for programme activities to underfinanced and understaffed local governments is proving problematic”,*
 - *“A general constraint on effectiveness is the personnel available to the Programme”.*

In some cases, the local institution has problems retaining the staff during the project, thus undermining the continuity and sustainability of the efforts (see also *Section 2.7.1*). No doubt, trained staff with experience from donor-funded projects are attractive to other external development projects or other positions within the same organisation:

- Environmental Cooperation Programme with South Africa (No. 9): *“... and Norway has provided considerable exposure and training by inviting individuals for work visits to Norway. In view of high staff turnover however, it is questionable to what degree this could have contributed sustainably to institutional capacity building”*

- NPL-024. Regulation and Monitoring Capacity Building for EIA for Hydropower Projects in Nepal (No. 17): *“The Nepalese institutions involved did not have the required capacity to completely fulfil their part of the project input. High staff turnover at managerial level in MoPE has hampered project continuity”*
- Bistandsrapport 2006, DN, re. Indonesia Project (No. 40): *“Oppfølgingsforpliktelser og aktiviteter har også blitt noe hemmet av hyppig skifte av personell i distriktene og delvis sentralt”*.

As discussed in a later section, the Consultant considers it important that the Norwegian institution does not fall into the trap of posting a Long-term Resident Advisor (LRA) in the recipient institution because of lack of local qualified personnel, just to boost the activities anticipated and planned for. Wait for the relevant local resources to be in place for proper IC!

In cases where the institution is not ready to properly absorb the capacity building or comprehend and implement the IC activities, the best might simply be to wait with the support, or reformulate the project. The Consultant has an impression, following the review of documents, that some projects would have benefited from being postponed, and would have liked to see this decision taken more frequently in the future based on critical analysis. Being too lenient and willing to get started with grant support with no or few covenants, runs the risk of delaying much required restructuring reforms in the recipient institution, or even in its public sector as a whole, and such assistance could therefore prove costly to the recipient and be counterproductive. In risk assessment, being part of the LFA planning modality (see later section), such a decisive factor to stop the project is called a “killing factor”, notably very rarely revealed or realised in the project planning period, as such is seen more clearly when the partners start to “know each other”. Of the institutions interviewed, SFT seems to have a clear focus on the importance of critical review of the project in the pre-planning phase. The staff interviewed realised that the poorest institutions would normally fall outside IC projects because the recipient could simply not receive and absorb the new knowledge. It is better “to come back in 10 years” than rush the efforts today!

There might also be other factors that could lead to postponement or not embarking on a project at all. Having moved on from a development cooperation era of strong conditionalities attached to aid-financed government restructuring reforms in the 1980s, to replacing conditionality with “recipient responsibility” and “recipient ownership”, implies placing much more emphasis in the planning and preparation stage prior to a “go ahead” decision on the donor, to secure that genuine recipient ownership is in place and will remain so. Whether securing such agreement with the cooperating partner government is labelled conditionally, or something more digestible in today’s policy jargon, is of minor importance, as compared to *the real need* to secure such conducive cooperation agreement as a basis for successful project implementation and cooperation in the necessary facilitating reforms:

- Water Supply and Sanitation Project. Capacity Building for the Water Supply Sector, Lao PDR (No. 38): *“WASA started functioning as the regulator before its legal base was in place and it has not yet been able to employ qualified staff on a permanent basis ..., since the legal base is still not in place”*. (This Final Report made by the executive consultant COWI, does not analyse whether it would be better to postpone some of the activities until the frame conditions were in place, which ideally should have been part of the risk assessment).

2.4.2 Actors and Institutional Memories

a) The History of Private and Public Sector Involvement in Development Cooperation

When looking at the history of involvement of public and private actors in the Norwegian development cooperation (Box 2 illustrates the water sector, being an important part of the environmental portfolio), it is understandable that some public institutions some time back were *not* the best suited to take overall responsibility and management in such projects. The institutional memory in development cooperation in the environmental sector to a large extent sat with the private companies up to early-90s. At that time the development cooperation policy changed to involve public institutions more in the projects (assumed to

be purely based on political priorities), see the discussion in *Section 2.3.2* above.

This change of policy was initiated with the launching of “Norgesaksen” defined by Norad at the time to represent both large and small institutions such as private companies, public directorates, foundations and NGOs. In practice, increased aid towards IC and CB was operationalised through entering into long-term (3-5 year) agreements with Norwegian directorates and foundations. This was done with a clear and stated purpose of taking this opportunity to develop competence and experience in these Norwegian institutions, so that they could become a resource base for use as IC and CB were becoming increasingly important aid instruments. It is understood that the issues of increased continuity in the processes and maintenance of institutional memory were focused in this changed modality. For some of the larger amongst such institutions this conveniently coincided with a “drying up of tasks” for some of their senior staff at home.

However, it seemed that nobody really at this time was proactive to tap from the experience base in the private consulting companies and make use of it in the public sector, and there was no “organised” transfer of knowledge instigated by Norad (who was the one implementing the change in policy). The result was that public institutions and NGOs got the chance to “trial and error” on this arena throughout the decade, making some of the same mistakes as the consulting companies had made earlier⁴. This was paid by public funds, and clearly with a lower accountability than a private company. Unfair? Undoubtedly, but this is what happened whether one likes it or not, and subsequently it did not lead to optimal development cooperation projects during this period. Now, some of the most prominent public institutions have “learned their lessons”, and are today no doubt suitable development partners (i.e. NIVA, SFT, NVE). Some of the public institutions also gradually took on board experts that had served in consulting companies earlier, giving boost to the activities.

Box 2: A Brief Reflection on the Norwegian Water Development Assistance's History

Reference to *Figure 2.1* in *Appendix 1*, prepared by the Consultant, in principle showing the changes in Norwegian international water development assistance over the last decades. During the 70s and the first half of the 80s, Norway was involved in large water and sanitation interventions in developing countries, mostly run by Norwegian consulting companies (Norconsult, Norplan and Interconsult), and by individual experts having been recruited directly by Norad (based on advertisement and interviews). During this period, the NGOs and the research institutions were not involved in such major technical interventions. The former group was in some programs taking care of the soft components of hygiene education and community awareness raising/participation (notably NCA).

During the second half of the 80s, the involvement of consultants and individual experts seconded to ministries and projects were significantly reduced, and by the beginning of the 90s, there were hardly any experts left (comparatively), and only a few programs still run by consulting companies.

From the mid-90s, the Norwegian Government's policy was largely to base the development technical assistance on cooperation between institutions in Norway and the recipient country (mostly state and para-state), due to the belief that this would secure a better continuity and sustainability than the approach used in the 70s and 80s. The result was that the NGOs and research institutions gained momentum on activities internationally, and notably did some of the same mistakes that the consultants and individual experts had done a couple of decades earlier, because they had not learned properly from the lessons from that time.

The Water Decade (1981-91) did not achieve the ambitious goals set, but a lot of lessons were learned, and some of these formed the basis for the Dublin and Rio processes in the beginning of the 90s. The actors that became dominant in the water development funded by Norway in the 90s, were notably *not* the ones that had learned the hard way in the 80s, so the memory of that period was partly lost, or non-existent with the new actors.

Tore Laugerud, the Consultant

In the case of tendering for management of such projects, what kind of criteria should be used to select the right partner, political or professional? The Consultant will not elaborate this issue in length, as it is finally the politics that decide and overrule any professional criteria that might lead to choosing differently. We have to live with this uncertainty, although the Consultant strongly would in general urge that professional criteria formed the basis for selecting the Norwegian partners in IC and CB projects.

b) The Use of Institutional Memories, but based on Individuals

⁴ A notable exception is the NCA involvement in Iraq before and early during the war, where advisors from Interconsult were hired to implement the water supply programmes there.

All institutions, private and public alike, seem to have an in-built “protection” mechanism, where project ideas are not readily discussed with other potential competitive institutions (there being some exceptions mentioned above). They may be too proud to seek advice; they are afraid of such services costing too much; they are afraid that knowledge of the project will make others “steal” it or parts of it; etc. In case they go alone for a project, they would better have the appropriate knowledge and experience from similar projects at the start-up phase, so the planning is optimised and they can avoid making the same mistakes as others have done. After the change in development policy explained above, the initial inexperienced public institutions and NGOs (i.e. NCA) had to learn-from-doing themselves.

Later on, it seemed that the most active institutions maintained an institutional memory and utilised this when new project opportunities came up, i.e.:

- Norad Support to PWA, Phase II (No. 5): *“The Norwegian funding for PWA is directed at building capacity to undertake the core role of PWA, focussing on the key areas of operation that will be prevailing once the peace is implemented and the sector restructured”*, whereas Phase I clearly was not so focused.
- CHN-0030: IMPACTS, PR China (No. 15): *“NILU firmly claimed that they had arranged internal seminars at project start-up, where for example cultural differences and communication features were discussed with colleagues that had been working in China since 1995/96. Although NIVA (during 1997-1999) seldom arranged formal internal meetings where experiences from earlier/ongoing Sino-Norwegian projects were exchanged, there was seemingly good communication between colleagues. At the same time, realising that the IMPACTS project was much more complex than other projects, the NIVA project management deliberately wanted to avoid being too heavily influenced by other projects or having preset ideas on how to cooperate with the Chinese counterparts. It is also noted the China experience from a couple of non-NIVA staff in the IMPACTS team that was highly valuable”*.

Still today, there are examples of institutions that could improve their performance by seeking outside advice for their services:

- NCA WS&S Programme in Decan, Kosovo (No. 20): *“NCA should establish a long-term relationship with an institution/company that has extensive experience in w&s development program formulation and implementation”*.

The main experience documentation base for environmental sector development projects should ideally sit with Norad in Oslo. The Consultant has however experienced that Norad’s archives on projects from the 80s and 90s, have big holes⁵. It is realised that many of the submitted project documents have disappeared with individual staff leaving the institution or in the process of reorganisation and physical moving around. From 2004, the archives system is considerably improved, where all documents today are scanned into an electronic archive.

However things are turned: the main institutional capital is the individual human brains, working separately or jointly. Experience of the Consultant clearly shows that the success of any project depends almost completely on the motivation, capabilities and capacities of the individual staff working in the projects, whether these are from public institutions or private companies. The recruitment of staff, internally or externally must therefore be seriously considered. Projects in developing countries must never be used as a buffer to engage people that are idling due to slack in home office activities. There are however as mentioned e.g. many examples where individuals have been “trained” in project management skills in private companies, and later on does an excellent job when working in public

⁵ Recent experience from working on the projects: *“Fictions and Facts – An Analysis of Norway’s Assistance to the Water Supply and Sanitation Sectors in selected Countries – A Basis for Future Sector Support”* and *“End review of Projects in PR China Financed through Mixed Credits from Norway”*.

institutions (examples of several Norconsult-Norad staff in the 70s and 80s).

It is believed that if the public institutions are not able to attract and sustain a staff of experienced employees, the institutional memory will suffer accordingly. There is thus no clear evidence produced so far, to the knowledge of the Consultant, to prove that the changing of policy from private companies to public institutions involvement, has led to better institutional memory and better continuity in the projects. Having said that, the institutional memory in both private companies and public institutions also to a large degree will have to be built on proper filing and archives systems. It is understood that most of the public institutions in Norway now have installed the same system, Doculive, which will facilitate the preservation and upkeep of institutional memories.

2.4.3 The Planning Process

a) Planning Competence

When the human resources formally are in place in the recipient institution, and/or once Norad and the selected Norwegian lead institution(s) have decided to embark on a project, detailed planning can start. The Consultant's experience and the document review show that public and research institutions traditionally have not prepared as high quality planning documents as the consulting companies. This is a natural outcome of being given contracts based on applications versus responding to an invitation by submitting a proposal/tender that has to be a winner. In addition, there have been a few other reasons for this difference:

- These institutions were not (and partly are not) organised to be project managers, and thus do not have the required experience in how a proper project is planned and which elements are required in order to make a Project Document (PD) useful and operational. Their core businesses have traditionally been in other areas.
- These institutions came into development projects in the 90s (see *Box 2*), when traditional sources of financing (home market) partly started to dry up and other financial sources had to be found to occupy the staff, also with Norad's policy changing in the favour of more use of public institutions in order to build this capacity base.
- Because of the late market entry, the institutions did not participate in the momentum and focus on planning in 1990-92, when Norad introduced Logical Framework Approach (LFA) as basis for all their projects. At that time, all the consulting companies who wanted to play a role in the development cooperation efforts, clearly had to go through a 1-week course in LFA (at Kringsjå), to "qualify" for further work with Norad. The public institutions and NGOs largely missed this opportunity, and were not given the same chance later when they entered the arena in the mid 90s. Proper guidance from Norad in project planning were also obviously lacking during this period, but the gap in planning capacity and competence of aid-relevant public institutions has for the most part been closed by now..

b) Planning Format

This resulted in the quality of the PDs, from the mid-90s onwards (almost the next 10 years), gradually deteriorating with the gradual introduction of institutions and staff not used to prepare such documents in the required format. This especially concerned the formulation of objectives (goal and purpose); realistic outputs with activities; indicators; risk assessments; and project organisation and management. In some instances, the Norwegian institutions have not realised the importance of having a consistent project formulation, where the same wording and modalities are set and repeated in all steering documents. This has notably been commented directly in a few of the reports reviewed:

- Various Norad-supported Environmental Projects in PR China (No. 4): *"... in all the projects, there are certain shortcomings as to the project design. In specific, there seems to have been a total confusion in the formulation of the project objectives (goal and purpose), and in defining the project outputs and the activities"*.

- Africa 2009. (No. 6):
 - “The program lacks a consistent design. If the main objective is capacity building some of the program components needs to be adjusted to ensure an outcome consistent with the objective”,
 - “... lack of clearly defined indicators to monitor progress ...”.
- National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12): “...the incongruity between the defined Goal and Scope in the Contract between MINEA and NVE”.
- Review of IMPACTS (CHN-0030) (No. 15): “The Review Team is a bit surprised that NORAD did not guide the project management earlier in the LFA design formulation”.
- Statskonsult (1998) “Forvaltning av institusjonssamarbeid” (No. 30):
 - “Våre intervjuer viser imidlertid at direktoratene og Norad ikke har en felles og enhetlig forståelse av hvilke mål institusjonssamarbeid forventes å innfri, hvilke typer aktiviteter institusjonssamarbeid skal inneholde eller hvilke krav og forutsetninger som bør legges til grunn for slikt samarbeid”
 - “....direktoratene ikke alltid er bevisste på hvilken rolle de har i institusjonssamarbeidsprosjektene”
 - “.... og at på slutten av 1990-tallet ...Norad vurderer direktoratsmedarbeidernes evne til å formidle egen fagkompetanse på en pedagogisk måte på et fremmed språk i en bistandsfaglig kontekst, som mangelfull” .

Having said this, it is also obvious that some consultants undertaking reviews and evaluations obviously put more focus on the formulation of an LFA structure of the PDs than others, for various reasons. Probably widely known by this time, the Consultant of the study in hand is among the ones that believes following an LFA modality in the planning is very useful (se Box 3).

Box 3: LFA

The widely spread and accepted LFA methodology, also known under other names in various countries and institutions, is an analytical tool for objective-oriented planning and management, which gives a good overview of the various project elements and how they are connected. By using this method in the project planning, the planners are “forced” to build the project elements on a rational sequencing, one building on the other. It also makes the later project monitoring easier for the management, and not the least, it makes reviews and evaluations much easier. The project objectives (goal and purpose) are formulated once and for all in the start-up stage of the project, together with the outputs, and the indicators. The main activities are also formulated, but with flexibility to adjust these underway in the annual work plans, as changing frame conditions require. An important part of the LFA planning modality is the assessment of risks, being factors outside the control of the project management that can influence on the project activities or outputs.

Tore Laugerud, the Consultant

c) Too Ambitious Planning. Success Factors and Risks

Notwithstanding the *format* of the PDs, a general characteristic in the reviewed documents is that the activities planned for are far too ambitious. There might be various reasons for this, ranging from the recipient institutions’ expectations of quick development, to the impatience of the Norwegian institutions to “show prompt tangible results” and to justify their money earned. There are numerous examples where planning has not been optimal:

- Norad Support to PWA, Phase I (No. 1):
 - “... has led to a situation were too many tasks are being addressed simultaneously when considering the limited capacity of PWA ...”,
 - “The work plan should list tasks with clearly defined outputs, estimated duration and costs”.
- Norwegian Support to the PWA (Phase II) (No. 5): “... too ambitious project design with too many activities to be implemented in too short period”.

- ZAM-063, IPPP, Phase II (No. 7): *“... the overall progress has been somewhat slower than expected, but that is assumed to be merely due to over-ambitious planning_at the start-up of the phase.”*
- National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12): *“the budgeting is unrealistic high and does not reflect the available resources in the institutional cooperation”*.
- INS-0008. Norway – Indonesia. Cooperation in Sustainable Development (No. 14): *“... an overly ambitious PD used as a road-map has created the situation whereby the projects initiated under the programme have only a limited chance of success judged against the defined objectives, outputs and indicators”*.
- PWA Budget Support Programme Phase III (2003-2005) (No. 16): *“The programme is very ambitious, in certain areas possibly too ambitious, e.g. related to capacity building results”*.
- NPL-024 regulating and Monitoring Capacity Building for EIA of Hydropower Projects in Nepal (No. 17): *“The activities are far too ambitious and unrealistic, as compared to local implementation capacity and capabilities”*.
- NCA WS&S Programme in Decan, Kosovo (No. 20):
 - *“Planning was done in a hurry and not according to any LFA modality being common for Norwegian development programs since the early 90s (NCA not known to this modality and no guidance given by MFA)”*,
 - *“... planning has been patchy without an overall holistic implementation plan from the start”*.
- Framework Agreement between Norway and UNEP (No. 21): *“The recently adopted Bali Strategic Plan is very ambitious. It takes UNEP into areas of responsibility outside its original mandate, where responsibility may be hotly contested by other powerful implementing agencies. The Plan gives the impression of “wanting to do everything” with limited resources and competence”*.
- Four ENSIS Projects in PR China (No. 22): *“The ambitions and expectations of the projects during the planning stage, especially CHN 014, CHN 0040 and CHN 2070, have been too high”*.
- Management of Natural resources Programme, Tanzania (No. 25): *“Yet the large number of projects in the MNRP portfolio and the huge areas they cover make it unlikely that most projects will achieve high levels of effectiveness, even with long-term commitments”*.
- Norway-Angola Electivity Sector Cooperation 2002-2006 (No. 29):
 - *“... progress and achievements fell below expectations due to a variety of factors”*,
 - *“it appears that the project design did not sufficiently consider the capacity and capability of institutions such as NVE to contribute and to deploy the best and most relevant competencies and personnel when required”*.

Deriving from the above, it is advisable not to focus on too many development aspects at the same time, but concentrate on a few core activities under the mandate of the institution to develop, which consequently will help the institution to improve its basic performance. A few key success factors, measured by well-defined indicators for the activity outputs and subsequent project purpose (which is the state that are likely to prevail when the outputs are delivered as planned) will increase the probability of a project success. In this connection it is also required, as part of the LFA process, to critically assess all the possible risks to the projects (notably assumptions, frame conditions and actions which are clearly outside the control of the project management).

A commendable system of project assessment prior to embarking on the actual implementation has been introduced in NVE, as part of the normal project planning. A matrix, shown in *Appendix I (Figure 2.2)*

contains a checklist of elements that are important to consider, namely the critical success factors and assessment of risks. This matrix is used to adjust the project design and take remedial measures to try moving the plotting on the probability-consequence matrix from the red towards the green area. The Consultant recommends other institutions also to develop similar matrices suitable to their development activities.

d) Local Involvement

It is obvious from the statements of the actors with whom the Consultant met, the review of the documents, and the Consultant's own experience, that planning necessarily has to take the "required" time, and not be rushed. It is imperative to involve the local stakeholders in the planning, in order to gain their agreement and cooperation so as to prepare a realistic work plan related to the local institutional socio-economic and cultural setting:

- Various Norad-Supported Environmental Projects in PR China (No. 4):
 - *"At least in a couple of projects, the Chinese counterparts expressed views which by the Review Team was interpreted as the Norwegian partners having involved the Chinese too little in the planning and design of the projects",*
 - *"... the Norwegian partners were obviously (for natural reasons) not adequately acquainted with Chinese culture, way of thinking, institutional set-ups and mode of planning and administrative practices when they started, Some of the project designs have been too ambitious in this respect, and too much based on experience from elsewhere in the world".*
- PWA Budget Support Programme Phase III (2003-2005) (No. 16): *"More involvement of the PWA staff in project preparation and implementation should be focused during the remaining Phase III period".*
- Capacity Building for the Water Supply Sector, Laos (No. 38): *"It is recommended that extensive consultations be conducted with the end users and key stakeholders during preparation of ToR for new institutional development projects".*

This aspect is also clearly stated in the "Veileder for institusjonssamarbeid. Norad 2001": *"... partene får tid til å forhandle seg i mellom og bygge opp gjensidig tillit som grunnlag for samarbeidet".*

It is also important that proper pre-appraisals and appraisals are undertaken by independent eyes, not being part-and-parcel of the planning team. The planning must also in this respect comprise a critical assessment of the human resources available both on the Norwegian and developing country's side to implement the project.

e) Roles and Responsibilities

Another factor is to clearly discuss the expectations of the various actors related to the outcome of the project and to formulate the roles and responsibilities of the main actors, with adjacent organisation and managerial set-up, notably mentioned as shortcomings in a few of the reviewed document:

- Gjennomgang av MoU på Miljøfeltet. Rapport 1999:23, Statskonsult (No. 3): *"Gjennomgangen viser også at det er uklarheter i ansvars- og rollefordelingen mellom MD, UD, NORAD og de ulike miljødirektoratene. Dette forplanter seg igjen til organiseringen på gjennomføringsplan".*
- Africa 2009 (No. 6): *"The current program organisation appears to need some clarification concerning roles and responsibilities".*
- Norwegian Environmental Cooperation Programme with South Africa (No. 9):
 - *"It appears that the roles of key personnel in DEAT and the Norwegian team were not clear",*
 - *"It appears that difficulties in taking ownership of the programme quickly and effectively were experienced",*

- *“it appears that no senior DEAT person was assigned the responsibility and given the time for the management of the programme”.*
- National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12): *“...not realistically designed, as the progress of some of the activities in fact are out of the hands of the NAWASMA staff”.*
- INS-0008 Norway-Indonesia. Cooperation in Sustainable Environmental Management (No.14):
 - *“Expert technical assistance (Indonesian and Norwegian) seems to have been rather ad hoc with no clearly apparent management direction, ...”.*
 - *“Project C ... is under-resourced and operates without a clear set of guidelines and in effect performs more of a secretarial role”.*
 - *“LH does not issue specific TOR or personnel specifications for staff to work on the programme”.*
 - *“The model of co-operation between the partners seems to be only partially successful”.*
- NCA WS&S Programme in Decan, Kosovo (No. 20): *“... there was no appropriate professional management set-up in NCA centrally to give guidance and steer the Program in one agreed direction ...”.*
- Norwegian Support to the Energy Sector in Uganda (1997-2005) (No. 23): *“Rather than being a supplier of services to projects which also require strong programme management skills, the Norwegian aid administration should instead focus on utilising NVE’s comparative advantage, as a trusted and skilled technical advisor assisting in appraisal, monitoring and reviews of projects in the energy sector and as a partner in the sector dialogue”.*
- The Case of Awash Conservation and Development Projects, CARE, Ethiopia (No. 32): *“The project also sponsored meetings and management training for the Steering Committee. the Committee badly needs a well defined role and terms of reference”.*
- Bistandsrapport 2006, DN (No. 40). DEAT South Africa: *“Det er også viktig at DN’s innsats settes inn i en større sammenheng i forhold til de land og de sektorer det skal samarbeides med, og at det gjøres en god jobb med å avklare roller og forventninger”.*
- Forvaltning av institusjonssamarbeid (No.30): *“Intervjuene i direktoratene og i NORAD viser at direktoratene ikke alltid er bevisste på hvilken rolle de har i institusjonssamarbeidsprosjektene ... direktoratene har hatt problemer med å se sin rolle i forhold til NORAD. De påpeker bl a at direktoratene ikke alltid er tydelige med hensyn til på hvilken ”side av bordet” de sitter i det årlige møtet som samarbeidspartneren i Sør har med NORAD”.*

2.4.4 TTT - Things Take Time!

Another important point to consider is the duration of the IC interventions, and several reports take up this point, especially related to when results from the cooperation are materialising:

- Various Norad-supported Environmental Projects in PR China (No. 4):
 - *“... the visible fruit of such seeds will evidently not come overnight, as this is working on people’s mentality to a large extent still working in a centralised “plan-economy” system and centralised decision-making structures”.*
 - *“... most of the visible long-term effects (for example environmental impacts in quantitative terms) of the inputs will come after the completion of the projects, as time is simply needed for the institutions to fully adopt the concepts”.*
- Norwegian Environmental Cooperation Programme with South Africa (No. 9): *“... significant concrete benefits could not be identified at the present stage of the programme. The reason may simply be that it is too early for this to become evident”.*

- National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12): “... is a too short period for a project like NAWASMA to show lasting results or impacts. In the water resources sector it is required to have long-term perspectives and long-term interventions”.
- CHN-0030: IMPACTS, PR China (No. 15): “It is however fair to conclude that there is a long way from the project activities to the tangible reduction of pollution and to visible poverty alleviations”.
- TAN-0092. Management of Natural Resources Programme (No. 25): “In relation to the first collaborative effort, the mid-term review found that the ‘ideas behind this cooperation seem plausible, but the results are still at an early stage for assessment”.
- Sino-Norwegian Environmental Cooperation 1996-2005 (No. 29): “One characteristic of the cooperation is that in most cases the projects and partnerships established have been too short term. This finding follows our analysis of the project portfolio and the fact that ongoing projects have not been granted support beyond the initial phase of 3-4 years, when in fact it is after this initial phase that the benefits will be produced. ... Building trust and efficient partnerships takes considerable time and patience in P.R. China, and to fully reap the benefit requires many years of sustained cooperation beyond the 3-4 years each project is allocated funding”.

“Everybody” agrees that building and developing an institution, and changing people’s mentality and procedures of operation, takes time and any project must therefore have a long-term perspective. This has also been a mutually agreed statement in Norad during the last 30 years of development cooperation efforts, although in practical terms this noble intention has not always been followed, mainly due to political reasons. What is then meant by *long-term* in this context? Some examples of statements:

- Forvaltning av institusjonssamarbeidet (No. 30): “Med hensyn til varigheten på prosjektene, kan det stilles spørsmål ved om en periode på tre til fem år er et tilstrekkelig langsiktig perspektiv for et institusjonssamarbeid som skal skape en levedyktig mottakerinstitusjon. Faren for at et institusjonssamarbeid får preg av en punktinnsett (teknisk bistand) må ses i sammenheng med rammene for prosjektet, dvs både budsjett og varighet”.
- Veileder for institusjonssamarbeid. Norad 2001. (No. 33): “.... gjerne med en tidshorison på fem til ti år”.
- Water Supply and Sanitation Project, Laos. (No. 38): “In general it is difficult to assess non-tangible outputs and effects of capacity building and institutional development projects, as there are many factors (also outside the control of a particular project) that may contribute to improved efficiency, capability and capacity of assisted institutions and staff”.

Needless to say, the capacity and capability of the counterpart institution is decisive for the duration of the cooperation. It is seen that institutional cooperation must be tailored according to the development stage reached:

- South Africa (No. 9): “Several Norwegian stakeholders expressed the view that environmental activities in South Africa are generally of a considerably higher professional standard as compared to other African countries. Therefore, the need for institutional cooperation appeared to be less”;
- In Uganda (No. 23) the institution ERA obviously employed qualified staff from the very beginning (i.e. attractive salaries), who eventually reached a level of self-sustainability even before the institutional cooperation contract had expired, being an exception really, as Uganda is amongst the poorest countries.

- PR China (No. 28): *“That to the fact that the partnership has been between professional parties with highly qualified managers with Chinese partners being “professional buyers of services”;*

The Consultant agrees that around 10 years could be the starting point for planning the duration of projects involving a broader institutional development and building, and where the institution in question is in its infancy state of being, which normally environmental institutions are in developing countries. In some cases, where only limited TA or capacity building efforts are at stake, a shorter period could be considered. However, a shorter period than 5 years is not normally realistic, although very common, when allowing for proper time for joint planning of the project and a *donor exit phase*.

The latter issue is very rarely taken into consideration in the planning phase of projects, simply because experience shows that projects normally (and automatically) get an extension, or a Phase II and even a Phase III. Needless to say, it is in “everybody’s” interest to continue the cooperation as long as possible, in order to provide the most successful outcomes of the efforts. There is a profound in-built resistance to end cooperation between partners that have gained confidence and close relationships through cooperation. It is also a fact that the institutional staff in the developing country have a *personal interest* in continuing the cooperation as there are always fringe benefits following the cooperation (study tours, per diems, sitting allowances, transport support, professional upgrading, etc.). All parties must however be prepared for the gradual phasing out of support and consequently plan accordingly, say over at least a 2-year period. Examples of document statements:

- CHN-0030: IMPACTS, PR China (No. 15):
 - *“The Project staff have shown no real intentions to step down the project activities during the last year of IMPACTS, although knowing that the Norwegian financing will cease. On the contrary, all staff talks about extending the Project by introducing new monitoring sites “in the next phase””,*
 - *“... proposes an extension of the Project, with the clear view of bringing the activities down to a financial level where the Chinese side can sustain the relevant operations. Such NORAD Exit Phase could last for two or three years, ...”.*
- Management of Natural Resources Programme, Tanzania (No. 25): *“The project phasing-out process is frequently fraught with problems. Well-funded projects routinely fail the sustainability test when they are handed over to under-funded, understaffed, and poorly motivated LGAs. The handing-over process may be perfunctory or rushed. A key concern is LGA’s capacity to take over responsibility for completed MNRP projects”.*
- The Case of Awash Conservation and Development Project. CARE, Ethiopia (No. 32): *“..... phase-out strategies should be carefully considered in advance”, and “phase-out strategies should be built at the design stage and be carried out consistently through the development and implementation phases”.*

Norad must accept a long-term approach in institutional development, without re-directing the main course underway just because of shifts in political agenda in Norway. The project partners must be allowed to follow a planned project through without having this risk as a threat, giving much more prediction and a better stability in the implementation modality.

2.5 Resident or Visiting Advisors? Home Office Follow-up.

2.5.1 Short- or Long-Term, Resident or Not?

Throughout the 70s and 80s, Norwegian development cooperation was characterised by long-term resident experts working in the local institution to develop this. The rationale behind this idea was to give the institution a boost in the start-up phase (especially after independence of African countries) simply by providing skilled labour to implement the in-line functions until the local staff could take over.

Another common modality was to support individual projects, where separate project organisations (Project Implementation Units - PIUs) with foreign staff (expats) and local staff (hired for the project only with a higher salary than that offered by the responsible institution), were managing the activities. These cooperation models were largely phased out by Norad during the second half of the 80s and beginning of the 90s, and today hardly exist (with a few exceptions), whereas some other donors still work through PIUs (also often preferred by the local counterparts).

Important exceptions are still NGOs that get their finances from MFA and implement the interventions as *emergency projects*, and thus setting up their own project organisation. The WS&S Programme i Decan, Kosovo by NCA is one such example, where the interventions in reality were *development* (not emergency), and where integration into the local water company should have taken place at a much earlier stage.

Having a policy of the institutional cooperation being of a long-term nature, it is also important to secure that the same staff from the Norwegian side is following the project through to secure continuity, meaning that the advisors must be Long-term Advisors. A completely different question is whether the advisors should be *resident* or only *visiting at frequent intervals*.

Some documents reviewed are positive to long-term resident advisors:

- Norad-Support to PWA. Phase I (No. 1): *“The resident NVE coordinator has played an important role as a management adviser for PWA, a role which should be included in the terms of reference and taken into consideration in the future”*.
- National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12): *“Institutional development should be given more focus, by hiring an Institutional Adviser full time”*. (Notably, a Norwegian long-time resident advisor was present almost throughout the project period).
- Norway-Indonesia. Cooperation in Sustainable Environmental Management (No. 14): *“LH has several other project and programmes running with bilateral donors ... and in each of these cases full time support in the shape of at least one permanent technical adviser/project management expert is provided. This affords the necessary management capacity to LH and ensures project continuity and momentum”*.
- PWA Budget Support Programme Phase III (2003-2005) (No. 16): *“From PWA’s perspective, the PMA should be available on a permanent basis and with full opportunity to equal focus on both PWA offices”*.
- Norway-Angola Electricity Sector Cooperation 2002-2006 (No. 29):
 - *“... EDEL considers NORPLAN assistance to have been relatively successful. It is also generally agreed that the impact of the support to EDEL could have been improved through more continuous and sustained presence in Luanda by the Norwegian service provider”*,
 - *“It is noted that the 2001 review recommendations were only implemented to a limited extent, particularly concerning the inadequacy of support through infrequent short visits by NVE and/or its contracted consultants”*,
 - *“NVE’s programme administration role has been despatched reasonably well, but would have benefited from more frequent and longer visits to Angola by NVE personnel”*.
 - *“This could include the deployment of a long-term advisor to the UIR, complemented with certain focused and targeted interventions in areas where Norway has specific competencies and experience to contribute to capacity building in energy management in Angola”*. (A long-term resident advisor never was located in Angola, due to Norway’s change in development assistance priorities).

Other documents highlight the importance of frequent short-term visits by long-term non-resident

advisors:

- ZAM-063. IPPP, Zambia (No. 2): *“This means that one does fall into the trap of a resident expert (well paid and highly motivated) being the overall “driving force” and partly de facto the executive officer, rather than an advisor letting the national staff do the work”.*
- Norad-Support to PWA. Phase II (No. 5):
 - *“It is recommended that the TA to be contracted are not only used to initiate tasks and prepare specific outputs but to continue working with PWA to follow up the developments in a longer term perspective by frequent visits at regular intervals”,*
 - *“... when the present resident Long-term Advisor expires This arrangement has, ... not been cost-effective as means of providing the required support, probably most of all due to the costs associated with the issue of being resident in an area”.*
- NPL-024. Regulating and Monitoring Capacity Building for EIA of Hydropower Projects in Nepal (No. 17):
 - *“Efficiency is unsatisfactory, mostly due to the long term resident advisor-modality instead, of a short-term external advisory model”,*
 - *“A short-term advisor would have been preferred to the LTA, giving more time for local professionals to implement the Project themselves at their own pace, creating a better project ownership”,*
 - *“The LTA has made significant efforts in delivering the project outputs, but has operated as “a state within the state”.*

Another aspect is clearly taken up in the Mid-term Review of the PWA Budget Support Programme, Phase III (No. 16): *“The international TA consultants should be required to enter into cooperation with local consultants, both for professional capacity building but also for better bridging of the gaps when the international consultant at time may not be able to physically reach PWA”.* A good point indeed, although it is realised that in several countries the competence and capabilities of the local consultants are not sufficient to take on such a role (Palestine being a notable exception), and there might be strong scepticism from the recipient institution’s side to accept advice from their “equal” countrymen.

The review of the NPL-024 project (No. 17), also points at another decisive element: *“Lack of close physical location of LTA’s offices to his counterparts has hampered integration of activities into the EIA Section’s daily work, and subsequently weakened the local project ownership”.* Surely, whether the advisor is long-term resident or only frequently visiting the institution, physical proximity to the counterpart staff is imperative, in order to be able to work properly integrated and to gain full effect of the on-the-job-training.

One project (Support to the Energy Sector in Uganda 1997-2005, No. 23) had resident long-term advisors working with the institution, but in the last part of the project period these were not properly and fully utilised in the daily operations by their local counterparts. This was nevertheless a “sound” sign, as it probably meant that the institution considered itself capable of handling the matters alone (also by use of other external consultants identified and hired by themselves). Still NVE continued the resident advisor modality, and the review team wrote:

- *“The institutional support with a cooperation arrangement with NVE continued beyond the required timeframe, apparently driven more by a desire to maintain the arrangement than actual needs for assistance”,*
- *“... a continued process of promoting a “twinning arrangement” beyond the initial support did not prove to be effective and efficient”.*

It is important therefore to maintain a “fingertip feeling” of which operational model is most effective, and be able and willing to change when time is ripe.

There is no final answer to the question of long-term resident advisors versus visiting advisors, but the Consultant dares to conclude that long-term resident advisors (LTRAs) should be avoided. There are basically two main reasons for this:

- i. the arrangement is too expensive and will therefore hardly be cost-efficient; and
- ii. the advisor will most likely fall into the trap of acting as an executive officer in the institution, where he/she is concentrating on fulfilling the work plan under the project, rather than letting the local staff implement the project and accept a lower degree of progress (and consequently “success”). There are nevertheless several examples where the local institutional management are happy to have a foreign advisor on board to push the implementation of the tasks that they have no resources to undertake themselves, but have agreed to in a moment of initial enthusiasm and positive mood to the “free” assistance offered.

In “Veileder for institusjonssamarbeid” (No. 33) it is clearly stated: “...norsk institusjon avpasser sin bistand i forhold til samarbeidsinstitusjonens kapasitet og ressurser”. This implies that giving an institution “artificial breathing help” will not benefit the institution in the long-term, because when the LTRA leaves, the situation often returns to what it was before the advisor came. Some might argue that unless we provide a LTRA the institution will not develop, or it will take too long to develop it. The Consultant says: So be it! It is better to wait with the project and to take the time required to build up an institution to become self-sustained by use of own resources, supported by frequently visiting foreign advisors. This will definitely enhance the ownership of the interventions supported under the project. Things *must* take time!

Having said this, it is also important to plan for short-term visits of a certain duration and frequency. Normal duration of an advisor’s stay should be more than 1 week and there could be in the magnitude of i.e. 3-5 follow-up visits per year (depending on the activities to be undertaken). This will allow the local staff ample time to undertake their tasks in “peace and quiet” and work independently in-between the visits, without having the foreign advisors pushing unduly. On the other hand “nordmarksyndromet” should be avoided, as this might create more irritation than useful cooperation (see Box 4).

Box 4: “Nordmarksyndromet” in Estonia.

In the 1993, Norconsult won the tendering for the Small Municipalities Environmental Project in Estonia, financed by the Norwegian Government through the EBRD. After the planning phase and the start-up of the institutional capacity building stage started by the consultant, Oslo Water and Sewage Company (OVA) should continue the cooperation with Estonian Water Works into the operational phase. OVA had few staff with experience from foreign projects and started out with a visiting modality of 1-week duration per visit. The advisors came down to Tallinn mid-day Monday, and left mid-day Friday, in order to be home well before the weekend started. This procedure of having 4 days effective working week only was rightly criticised by the local counterpart (that had been used to the consultant’ staff working as long as it took to complete the work). (After a while OVA recruited long-term residential advisors to work with the local institution, and this proved more successful).

Tore Laugerud, the Consultant

2.5.2 Home Office Management Support. A Pro-active or an Awaiting Attitude?

The Norwegian institutions participating in IC and CB projects are, no wonder, eager to see tangible results of their efforts. If the outputs planned for are not delivered, they might get a reputation for not doing a satisfactory job, which could be totally unfair. It is therefore easy to fall into the trap of being “too pushy”, and as indicated in “Forvaltning av institusjonssamarbeid, Statskonsult” (No. 30). “*Inntrykk fra intervjuene i direktoratene tyder på at direktoratene tar på seg et større ansvar enn det de formelt har i samarbeidet. Direktoratene har selv sagt en klar egeninteresse i at samarbeidet blir vellykket. Det kan derfor være fristende å overta en større del av gjennomføringen. Noen av direktoratene synes det er behov for å være forsiktig pådriver i samarbeidet. Disse står i en fare for å gå over på samarbeidspartnerens ansvarsområde, ettersom mottakeransvaret tilsier at det er mottakeren som har ansvaret for bestillingen (faglig innhold), framdriften og gjennomføringen*”. This quote briefly put the finger at the key points, as according to the development policy, the Norwegian side should *not* push development (supply-driven).

To follow the demand-driven approach, as opposed to the supply-driven approach (which was prevalent

earlier when more long-term experts were residents), is easier said than done. A Project Document is the main document steering activities and progress of the project, with annual work plans and budget deriving therefrom. In the case the progress is lagging behind, it is legitimate for the Norwegian partner to ask *why* and to offer support in case this is within his mandate. May be the local institution does not have any idea at all of what sort of support they need related to the prevalent challenges, and in such cases, Norwegian institutions could suggest advisory services to assist solving the issues. In some cases, may be national or regional advisory support is more preferential, and cheaper. The danger is then that the Norwegian institution does not have the full overview of what is available in the market and then readily uses its own staff, maybe not fully competent for the task at hand.

This is a delicate question where there is no definite answer. If the activities are lagging behind due to lack of counterpart funds or available local resources, there is little else to do than sit back and wait until the local partner has sorted out his problems in his own way and pace. In such cases normally the planning has been too ambitious, and activities should be adjusted, may be also the duration of the project should be extended, within the same budget. Norad should allow for such reasonable flexibility. Another way is to introduce incentives for the local institution in the project, and to tie Norwegian payments to certain mutually agreed milestones along the project route, with easily detectable outputs and indicators.

Here follows some examples from the reviewed documents where this issue is taken up:

- Norad-Support to PWA. Phase I (No. 1): *“The demand based approach ... has led to a situation where too many tasks are being addressed simultaneously when considering the limited capacity of PWA and the demand on PWA to participate in monitoring and supervision of numerous emerging tasks and projects”.*
- Norwegian Support to PWA, Phase II (No. 5):
 - *“... the fact that available resources for TA throughout has been under-utilised, a resource which could have increased capacity significantly and enabled many of the planned outputs to be produced on time”*
 - *“The less than planned expenditure under respective activities may accordingly be partly explained by the significant lower cost for local/regional TA compared to the Norwegian TA”,*
 - *“The difference in TA procurement between the two project phases can also be explained by the change from "supply push" to "demand driven" approach in use of TA”.*
- ZAM-063. IPPP, Zambia (No. 7): *“The Review Team appreciates that SFT feels that progress is somewhat slower than expected, and this is more the rule than the exception in any development assistance programmes. ... the recipient's responsibility is that the pace of the development process must follow the local needs and abilities to be part of the processes, and there is no basis for the Review Team to say that this has not been the case in the IPPP. However, the overall progress has been somewhat slower than expected, but that is assumed to be merely due to over-ambitious planning at the start-up of the phase”.*
- Norway-Indonesia. Cooperation in Sustainable Environmental Management (No. 14):
 - *“It seems that DN is required to act to identify suitable co-operating institutions and then make agreements with them for work on the programme. However, DN has no role in writing TORs or in management or quality control; its function is simply one of sourcing expertise and disbursement of funds”.*
 - *“The lack of a permanent anchor-person for the project, either with LH or from NORAD in the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta further makes project progress difficult”.*
- NPL-024. Regulating and Monitoring Capacity Building for EIA in NEPAL (No. 17):
 - *“In order to speed up the delayed implementation (due to lack of Client's resources), some tasks have been contracted out to a private institution. This might eventually reduce the local*

- ownership to the outputs, and subsequently the outcome of the activities”,*
- *.. and the dilemma of having a resident advisor being “too eager” to deliver the outputs: “With the LTA only concerned with the project activities, not interfering in the daily EIA in-line routines (which also was the intention), he has also been “pushing” the activities in order to obtain success through delivering the outputs (however unrealistic), at all costs. In order to speed up implementation, consultants and additional expertise have been purchased towards the end of the Project in order to complete the activities at any cost”.*
 - *“In a way, DN has been unintentionally “overtaken by events” and its involvement has been subject to the (lack of) felt needs of the LTA. This modality was not thought out well enough during the project planning, and it weakens a possible institutional cooperation beyond the project period after the LTA has left, and thus the sustainability of the Project”.*
- NCA WS&S Programme in Decan, Kosovo (No. 20):
 - *“The coordinators had different experience and interests, and operated without centralised strong professional management guidance, resulting in ever-changing program course (being an “old-fashioned” and outdated development modality)”.*
 - *“... there was no appropriate professional management set-up in NCA centrally to give guidance and steer the Program in one agreed direction even with changing freelance staff, the Program was clearly suffering”.*

The role of the home-office management is clearly to ensure that sufficient and qualified human resources are provided the project, and a couple of the key actors interviewed by the Consultant admitted that this is challenging and could in fact be improved in their projects. An important aspect hereunder is *“When selecting technical assistance personnel more emphasis should be put on overseas management experience”* (Norad Support to PWA, Phase I, Document No. 1). In case the advisors are not competent, there are normally few operational mechanisms to discover this, as it is the advisors that report back to the home office in the first place. The only way to discover and rectify such shortcomings is through independent reviews/evaluations or through a dialogue with the recipient institution built on confidence between the high-level managers, being part of the monitoring and QA of the project (see later section). It is therefore important at an early stage in any project to involve and expose this managerial level. Such involvement is normally covered by the institution’s overhead and should be an integral part of the project. Annual consultations are also arenas where problems are taken up, but then solving the problem could at this time be long overdue.

There are a couple of positive achievements in institutional cooperation projects where the local institution itself has realised that the cooperation had no more value: the TA arrangement between NVE and PWA in Palestine; the cooperation between NVE and ERA in Uganda, where the latter unfortunately did not take this up directly but just let the cooperation gradually fade out by itself; and the use of TA under the environmental cooperation with South Africa, where the potential for use of Norwegian TA was not utilised⁶.

2.6 Project Reporting and Monitoring

Monitoring of projects has briefly been mentioned earlier, and this is especially important in an institutional cooperation setting. It is important that the function of monitoring is clearly defined in the PD, specifying the role and obligations of each party in this respect. The monitoring must take place both at project level and at overall development policy level. Continuous internal project monitoring is a normal management responsibility in any project, based on progress reporting, frequent meetings with project staff, own reviews and project visits. The project is mainly monitored against the agreed and approved work plans and budgets, decided upon annually, which is not so difficult.

⁶ *“Several Norwegian stakeholders expressed the view that environmental activities in South Africa are generally of a considerably higher professional standard as compared to other African countries. Therefore, the need for institutional cooperation appeared to be less”.*

Also the personnel performance must be monitored internally, but this is not an easy task:

- Firstly, it is not easy to undertake independent and unbiased monitoring because the project management could be deeply and directly involved in implementation of the various project tasks; be part of or the cause of the problems themselves; or the management is too much “buddies” with and loyal to the project staff, often coming from the same institution as themselves.
- Secondly, the reporting from the project activities could be sub-standard or not be as detailed and comprehensive as need be, so the management is not able to discover the need for adjustments or support.
- Thirdly, the project staff might have various reasons to disguise or minimise any problems or challenges in the fear of themselves being blamed, or simply by having a vested interest in “business as usual”. Almost without exception, whistle-blowers get punished, regardless of how justified the whistle-blowing is, also when appropriate procedures have been followed.

The overall monitoring must be undertaken by Norad (MFA or similar), where the project elements are measured against the prevalent development policy and relevance at any time. Here, proper and transparent reporting is required, inspection visits by the Norad project officers or assistance by outside independent consultants. The latter is often compulsory in projects, where consultants are undertaking mid-term reviews and sometimes end evaluations. The challenge with Norad’s own staff inspecting projects is that any project manager will tend to show the sunny side of the projects to the “hand that feeds”. It could therefore be difficult to readily detect any discrepancies or problems, simply because they are (intentionally or unintentionally) disguised or not visible for an inexperienced eye. The fact that the Norad officer also have a stake in the project, might also blind a clear vision. External independent experienced consultants normally have a better ability to critically and constructively analyse the project elements with unbiased eyes.

In any case, the project progress reporting is the starting point for any external overall project monitoring and review. The format of the progress reporting should ideally comply with the format of the annual work plans and the PD, in order to ease the monitoring. Both financial and technical reporting must as a minimum relate to the same elements as listed in the steering documents, and Norad should give clear guidance to the project partners during the offset of any project as to the required format of reporting, in case the existing reporting is not adequately meeting the needs for monitoring. The most common and main reporting is the Annual Report, being prepared by the project owner and being discussed in the Annual Meeting, where also Norad is present. Agreed minutes are taken from these meetings and give a good guidance for further work, but are normally not very detailed.

However, there are many examples where several donors with various internal reporting requirements are supporting different activities in the same institution, all aiming at strengthening and building the institution. In such cases, it is important not to burden the institution with repetitive reporting in various formats, and therefore the institution should standardise the reporting format, which can be submitted to all the donors and finance institutions. In such cases, Norad should be flexible and forthcoming to deviate from its normal reporting modality, as notably other donors are *not* known to be that very flexible, e.g. the World Bank. In cases where the institution is not strong enough to develop its own reporting format and resist the donor requirements to follow their several formats, Norad should take the initiative to bring this issue to the joint table of the donors and the institution, with a view to coordinate and harmonise the reporting modality.

Reporting in some projects is directly related to the establishment and use of a Management Information System (MIS) with a proper database and library operations. Basis for monitoring will also be other documentation produced by the project, i.e. workshop findings, reports from study tours and training sessions, various professional studies on different topics, etc.

Several documents reviewed highlight the issue of reporting/project documentation, and monitoring, the two often closely linked:

- Norad-Support to PWA, Phase I (No. 1): *“Progress reporting by service providers should follow the format of the work plan to enable improved monitoring of performance by PWA... NVE needs to establish a monitoring, budgeting and accounting system which allow PWA to monitor NVE technical assistance inputs by tasks and according to agreed work plan”.*
- Various Norad-Supported Environmental Projects in PR China (No. 4): *“It is noted that the reporting characteristics vary a lot between the reviewed projects. ... it is complicated to, from the financial reporting, easily see how much has actually been spent on the different individual activities under the projects, as compared to the originally planned ones. This is in the Team’s opinion a general shortcoming that makes monitoring difficult and proper evaluation at the end of the projects almost impossible”.*
- National water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12):
 - *“Written documentation within NAWASMA should be improved beyond that of progress reporting. This relates to assessments, training material, planning tools, work completion reports, minutes of meetings, etc.”,*
 - *“.. it is extremely important to document the work and to keep manuals and guidelines for later use. When most information is communicated verbally it is only available for those present at the moment”.*
- INS-0008. Norway-Indonesia. Cooperation in Sustainable Environmental Management (No. 14):
 - *“Quality control and assurance is another weak point of the programme thus far. Formal, systematic quality assurance procedures are not built into the projects at this time”,*
 - *“The availability, type and quality of documentation pertaining to the programme as made available to the mid-term review team was unsatisfactory”,*
 - *“... documentation that explains and records the proceedings of these workshops was not made available”,*
 - *“... should be accompanied by a written manual or compilation of presentational materials. A brief report back document should also be produced at the end of each session detailing subjects covered, strengths and weaknesses and lessons learned”.*
- CHN-0030, IMPACTS, PR China (No. 15): *“The Review Team concludes that there has been a lack of proper guidance ... as to how the financial reporting should be undertaken. This has resulted in a financial reporting that is inconsistent and largely incomparable with the information in the project documents”.*
- PWA Budget Support Programme Phase III (No. 16):
 - *“PWA should prepare its own ideal reporting formats, and submit these for the donors’ comments and suggestions before finalizing them. Such reporting formats should then be adopted for use in the dialogue with all donors. Acceptance of this approach would greatly facilitate donor coordination, and relieve PWA and other recipients of much burdensome office work of questionable development value”,*
 - *“PWA should be more pro-active in developing, promoting and getting the donors to accept and apply common PA-standards and procedures”.*
- TAN-092: Management of Natural Resources Programme III (No. 18): *“The Mid-term Review recommends that any future support should also include thorough and detailed baseline studies and carefully designed monitoring and reporting mechanisms that would enable more objective assessments of impact. This has been seriously lacking in the past, and although monitoring of individual projects has collected some information, results have not been properly systematised or made available to managers”.*
- NCA WS&S Programme in Decan, Kosovo (No. 20): *“The reporting on development programs*

being implemented over several years should have the form of proper progress reporting, giving much more details than in the standard presently used “Final Report” format from MFA. (Editor’s comment: It should be noted that the MFA reporting modality has an orderly pre-set structure only asking for the overall progress, in what is termed “Final Report”, although the project duration is several years. The reporting modality is simply not prepared with long-term development projects in mind).

The system of mid-term reviews is, according to the set procedures, compulsory in all Norad-supported IC and CB and other projects alike. The reviews are undertaken by independent outside consultants who have no stake in the project. Largely, the review missions assess whether the projects are “on course” to meet its objectives and whether the activity plan and budget is complied with. The review reports normally contain a lot of structural (and often critical) remarks to the project design and have several recommendations on how to improve the project performance. To which degree are these recommendations taken on-board the project and the course adjusted accordingly, and again referred to in any next review or final evaluation that might be undertaken?

The statistics on this is non-existent, but a few documents highlight clear references to previous reviews/appraisals/evaluations, examples are:

- ZAM-063. IPPP, Zambia (No. 7): *“The Mid-term Review Team of Phase II finds with satisfaction that the bulk of recommendations from the Phase I review have been taken into account in the design of the Phase II programme. In addition, the recommendations (with a few exceptions) from the appraisal mission have been incorporated into the Final Project Document”*.
- External Review of IUCN (No. 11): *“IUCN has thus worked proactively over the last four years to tackle the major issues identified by the 1999 External Review”*.
- TAN-0092. Management of Natural Resources Programme, where the Final Evaluation (No. 25) states: *“There is little to suggest that project implementers were ‘learning by doing’ or changing course when problems occurred. Nor were external reviews used as opportunities to identify and probe emerging problem areas. Instead, review missions have generally been satisfied with guided tours of show-case project activities rather than looking for wider impacts and constraints or evidence that innovations had taken root”*.

2.7 Other Aspects of Failures and Successes

Below are listed some aspects of IC and CB that are not properly covered in the previous sections. The issues mentioned are may be not so widely considered in the documents reviewed, but are important to individual projects and should therefore nevertheless be mentioned.

2.7.1 Underpaid Counterpart Staff. Working Incentives.

- IPPP, Zambia (No. 2): *“The present package of salaries, subsistence and other incentives was a never-ending discussion theme between the Team and the employees of ECZ during the mission. ... the Team appreciates that this issue really has a significant bearing on the performance of the employees of ECZ”*.

A dilemma in institutional cooperation projects in developing countries is the issue of highly motivated Norwegian advisors working with less motivated and underpaid staff in a local institution. Such lack of incentives for the local staff to wholeheartedly participate in the cooperation is well known, and might be a serious obstacle to a fully successful outcome of a project. Previously in the report, we have urged that the planning and design of the project must clearly reflect the capacity and capability of the local institution, and the duration of the interventions accordingly, but this problem is difficult to solve without “breaking the rules”.

Clearly, it is against the Norwegian development policy to pay monetary incentives directly to local counterparts or to top up their salaries. This was not uncommon in the 70s and 80s, with the PIUs working alongside the public systems, but is no longer prevalent within Norwegian development cooperation. One recent example was however found in Uganda during a review of the project UGA-2855 in 2006, financed by Norway and managed by UNIDO under the Uganda Industrial Programme (UIP). The mid-term review team states that: *“The topping up of governmental officer’s salaries as National Experts is not a sustainable system and is in conflict with Norwegian development assistance policy”*. This system was introduced in order to make the counterpart staff, fully employed by public institutions, “go an extra mile” and “motivate” them for the project, meaning participating in meetings, also outside working hours, writing memos, etc. It was also clear that the work these staff undertook was completely within their *normal* scope of work as civil servants. There is no problem understanding the rationale behind this system being introduced, but still it is not acceptable. The topping-up of salaries and paying of monetary incentives will clearly undermine the sustainability of the project by destroying the local work market and inflating the salary expectations beyond a sound local level. Having said this, it is still known that other donors have a much more sloppy attitude towards this issue than Norad, the World Bank being one.

Another example of local “creativity” in introducing incentives is project “NPL-024. Regulating and Monitoring Capacity Building for EIA of Hydropower Project in Nepal” (No. 17). Here, governmental staff working in the project also worked as freelancer sub-consultants with a consulting company, undertaking contracted projects tasks (writing chapters in reports, being “unofficial” advisors, etc.) that the staff claimed they had no capacity to undertake during *normal* working hours. The payments were disguised as workshop/meeting allowances and thus the trade is not considered “illegal”. A similar system was practiced on the “Water Supply and Sewerage Rehabilitation project in Burrel, Albania”, financed by MFA. Here, the plumbers from the water enterprise were working for building contractors under the project, at the same time as being employees with the water enterprise (being the local client). Notable, the World Bank and most countries have rules against such “moonlighting”.

Another method of “topping up” local salaries is paying higher subsistence allowance than the government rate when local staff is on fieldwork in own country. Although such subsistence in principle should be paid by the counterpart funds, it must be accepted that a limited amount of the donor funds also are set-aside for this. The policy should however be that the normal governmental rates are paid, in order not to discriminate between staff and encourage unnecessary fieldwork and money wasted (see Box 5). What then if the governmental rate is too small for the local staff to live in a decent guesthouse or to stay together with their counterparts who have generous subsistence allowances following Norwegian government rates? One answer could be to remunerate the accommodation at cost and pay a small per diem in addition for food.

Box 5: The Constant Sample-Taker.

Under the LVEMP 1 (Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project) managed by the World Bank, a demonstration plant for municipal wastewater tertiary treatment in natural wetlands were set up in Kirinya wetlands at Jinja in 2002. This became a good showcase in close to full-scale; giving valuable lessons learned on natural wetlands treatment capability with many visiting scholars and the results presented at scientific conferences. In 2005 the testing stopped, as enough data had been collected to prove the effect of the treatment. Still during almost two years, the laboratory technician from the water company came twice a week from Kampala to take samples of the water and analyse them in the laboratory. This was a totally useless exercise, as nobody asked for or used the data anymore, but the technician silently maintained his stable source of income through a generous subsistence established by the LVEMP project being higher than the governmental rates. This situation was discovered by the ICR (Implementation Completion Report) team visiting the site first half of 2006, and consequently came to an abrupt stop.

Tore Laugerud, the Consultant

Nevertheless, the problem of unmotivated counterparts, that can not/will not participate fully in the projects, normally prevails. There are however a few grips that can be taken to remediate the situation, and the most common is introducing the carrot of study tours abroad for the ones that have deserved it and can directly benefit from it. Such study tour(s) should not come too early in the project, in order for

the counterparts to show their eagerness and dedication beforehand. The challenge (being generic everywhere) is to prevent that too many high-ranking political figures and “free-lunchers” take up the seats of the real needing and deserving staff. Normally, generous subsistence allowances are paid on such tours, leaving an attractive surplus to take home.

Another example is the introduction of “sitting allowances” or “meeting allowances”, which is very common all around the world. This includes a certain sum paid directly to meeting and workshop participants simply for participating. In principle, the allowance should cover travel to/from, and other direct expenses connected to the meeting (which are virtually none, of course). Such “refunding” of expenses is not directly in conflict with Norwegian development policy, although doubtful in nature, and Norad is wisely enough “turning the blind eye” here, as the total money involved is rather small. As such allowance is paid by all other donors, it is impossible for Norwegian-funded project not to do the same, otherwise the needed people will not participate in meetings, and the overall noble cause of the project will suffer.

Apart from the mentioned incentive connected to money, other non-costly factors could also improve the working conditions and serve as a motivation factors to the local employees: create good physical working conditions; give positive feedback; give the local institution credit for improvements, reports, implementation of activities, etc and not the Norwegian institution; instigate daily fringe benefits like free professional literature/a good library, seminars, joint lunch breaks, etc.; inform about and explain the rationale behind the Norwegian advisors being there; and in general create confidence.

2.7.2 Sweetening the Bitter Pill with Hardware

Another challenge faced in all projects is the local demand for hardware supplies in the project budgets, where the Consultant has experienced the Chinese counterparts to be the toughest ones. In principle, the Norwegian funds should be spent for capacity building tasks, meaning workshops and training sessions, study tours and training locally and abroad, and basically to cover the travel and consultancy costs of the Norwegian institution participating. Sometime it is clearly commented by the locals that “all” the Norwegian funds are thus going back to Norway, and that the Norwegian advisors have hilariously high salaries. This might be hard to accept for an underpaid civil servant in a developing country, and in order to create a sound basis for mutual cooperation environment on equal terms and enhance the team-building efforts with the local counterparts, a “fair” amount of the budget simply should be used for project hardware. This normally comprises: computers with software; a limited number of vehicles; laboratory instruments and equipment; etc. The Consultant believes this is fully acceptable within reasonable limits (varying from country to country) and will pay off in the end in the form of creating a good cooperation mood. This practice should therefore continue.

2.7.3 Language and Culture, Hindrance and Opener

The issue of language competence with the foreign project partner, but especially the local staff, is a never-ending story in some countries. Notably, the issue of foreign staff’s language competence seems to have been hotter earlier than at present, as through learning-by-doing, most of the institutional staff participation in IC&CB projects have reached the required proficiency in communication in a foreign language, notably English being the most used. The issue of language and communication at large, has however been mentioned in some of the documents reviewed:

- INS-0008: Norway-Indonesia. Cooperation in Sustainable Environmental Management (No. 14): *“Communication in all forms poses a challenge to the programme. As the Norwegian institutions do not have Bahasa Indonesia as a working language there is necessarily a translation delay concerning their input and conversely their comment on Indonesian input”.*
- CHN-0030: IMPACTS, PR China (No. 15): *“The lack of English language capabilities on the Chinese side obviously created some problems and misunderstandings to start with in a couple of the locations”.*

- Norway-Angola Electricity Sector Cooperation 2002-2006 (No. 29): *“A further aspect that could have received more consideration is that language is a constraint and reduces the impact of the institutional support work, as well as slowing down work due to the need for translators/translation of outputs”*.
- Forvaltning av institusjonssamarbeid (No. 30):
 - *“NORAD vurderer direktoratsmedarbeidernes evne til å formidle egen fagkompetanse på en pedagogisk måte på et fremmed språk i en bistandsfaglig kontekst, som mangelfull”*,
 - *“... mottakerinstitusjoner er særlig opptatt av at norske fagpersoner må beherske engelsk godt nok til å kunne undervise, og det blir påpekt at språkkunnskapene i enkelte tilfeller har vært meget svake blant norske direktorats medarbeidere.. Både NORAD og mottakerlandet vurderer dette som viktigere enn tidligere bistandserfaring”, and “Ledere i samarbeidsinstitusjoner må ha ferdigheter i tverrkulturell kommunikasjon og språk, bistandsfaglig metode og kvalitetssikring, herunder målstyring og bærekraftsvurderinger”*.
- AWASH Conservation and Development Project CARE, Ethiopia (No. 32): *“The Steering Committee did not work because:; the number of languages used in the meetings,... “*.
- Northern and Central Regions WS& S Sector Project, Laos (No. 39): *“English language skills training started on 9 January 2006. Courses will be two hours three times a week after working hours to cater for learners with full-time jobs”*.

It is also known that communication is much more than only language, but it is nevertheless an important element. Document No. 29 summarises this in terms that can be generic to all projects: *“English language training undertaken is viewed by all parties as a key area for building improved sustainability of the Angolan electricity sector on a broader basis”*. Courses for local staff in the working language (e.g. English) should be seriously considered by the start-up of any project, and project implementation could be postponed until adequate proficiency has been reached to facilitate an effective communication.

Also the Norwegian staff's knowledge of, and sensitivity to, the local socio-cultural setting should be secured through pre-project awareness raising and a soft start of the project. The Consultant have seen some examples where the Norwegian staff should have “held their horses” and been sensitive to their counterparts' background and cultural environment. PR China is a country where Norwegians most often act like “elephants in glassware shops”, but mostly get away with it due to the Chinese culture of trying not to “loose face”. The following quotes indicates this:

- Various Norad-supported Environmental Projects in PR China (No. 4):
 - *“... that the Norwegian partners, due to lack of working experience from China, to some extent underestimated the cultural differences and the obvious complications concerning communication in the initial stage”*,
 - *“... the Norwegian partners were obviously (of natural reasons) not adequately acquainted with Chinese culture, way of thinking, institutional set-ups and mode of planning and administrative practices when they started, Some of the project designs have been too ambitious in this respect, and too much based on experience from elsewhere in the world”*.

2.7.4 Individual Training and Institutional Building. Transparency and Delegation

A couple of the reviewed documents analyse whether individual training of staff might have an effect on institutional building. In the introductory section to this report, this issue has slightly been touched upon. Notably, Document No. 9 (Norwegian Environmental Cooperation Programme with South Africa) takes this up:

- *“.... the ECP appears not to have contributed significantly to capacity building within DEAT and related institutions, in the sense that a specific management tool was learned by individuals and adopted as the standard in the institution. Only the latter would signify institutional capacity*

building as opposed to individual training”,

- *“There appears to be no common understanding amongst the Norwegian partners or their role in capacity building within the ECP, other than on defined tasks agreed to in the BP. Considerable individual exposure and training has been imparted through visits to Norway. In view of relatively high staff turnover in DEAT, the effectiveness of this with regard to institutional capacity building is questionable”.*

There might thus be several reasons why individual training and awareness raising are not resulting in the institutional strengthening that was intended from the very start:

- The trained staff are, because of their capability increase, suddenly attractive for other jobs, either in the same institution, or simply in other projects (including such driven and supported by other donors).
- The administrative and managerial system, within which the newly trained staff will work, is not set-up to take onboard the newly adopted skills, as the system is too rigid to adjust operational procedures accordingly. The new skills will therefore remain unused, and operations are continuing as “business as usual”.
- The institutional system lacks a proper path of the employees to make carrier, where upgrading of skills is one criteria for climbing, and may be consequently higher salary.
- The management level will not allow the staff to reveal or practice their newly acquired skills, simple because they feel threatened by this. They might be afraid of their own lack of knowledge being exposed, that other persons than themselves are getting focus (envy) or simply because their positions within the organisation could be challenged. Also ethnic and tribal reasons might be prevalent. Such management could be identified through a general lack of transparency and delegation in internal procedures in the institution, especially on personnel development aspects, salary issues, employment conditions, and criteria for promotion within the system.

The last point of institutional transparency and openness is a critical issue to address, as many institutions in developing countries are built on the top-down modality where the head is expected to have not only the overall management and decisions, but also is expected to take all kinds of petty decisions, and as a result, delegation of responsibilities is very rare. In fact, this is one of the main characteristics of developing countries institutions, with lack of proper governance based on widely accepted and transparent and accountability criteria:

- IPPP, Zambia (No. 2):
 - *“... the Team wants to express concern as to lack of transparent administrative procedures and atmosphere of openness in any organisation of this kind. It is evident from experience all around the world that a sustainable institution where all the employees are contributing with their maximum capability, is built on mutual trust and transparency”,*
 - *“... a felt lack of delegation from the top management, and not sufficient atmosphere for discussing freely new ideas and suggestions in the organisation”.*
- Management of Natural Resources Programme, Tanzania (No. 25): *“More transparency and accountability could have improved performance by allowing the principal actors to deal with problems as they emerged”.*

Such aspects must be critically assessed by the start-up of any project as risk factors, which through a well-prepared project design are minimised.

2.7.5 The Under-Use of Capable Norwegian Institutions

Some of the Government institutions interviewed expressed surprise and confusion at the gradual loss of

contact with and requests from Norad for support in recent years. Following the policy change in the early 1990s, when “Norgesaksen” was introduced as a major initiative for mobilising Norwegian institutions as long-term capacity building partners in the development cooperation strategy, these institutions took upon themselves to prepare for a long-term cooperation with Norad and organised their in-house activities so as to be prepared to release experienced staff members with relevant experience for IC and CB tasks. Such initiative was “rewarded” with 3-5 years framework agreements with budget frames of several million NOK per year, and often with rather general/superficial mandates, much of a retainer nature that very much facilitated staff planning and management for these institutions.

Large government institutions such as NVE and SFT obviously do not depend on development cooperation contracts, but in order to be prepared to respond to requests from Norad they have to be properly organised while at the same time they cannot retain their senior staff idle. NVE has always been the regulator in charge of Norwegian water resources legislation, and because of this, NVE has a considerable capacity and competence in the fields of environment and social impact assessments of water resources related projects. NVE is of the opinion that Norad is largely unaware of this EIA capacity of NVE. With the gradual reduction of the retainer flexibility of the framework agreements it becomes increasingly difficult to mobilise on short notice. However, NVE has in recent years expanded its competence and capacity to prepare project ToRs and manage projects, and have hired and employed private sector consultants with extensive developing country experience for this purpose. Norad, on the other hand, apparently has reduced the amount of in-house time to cooperate on such matters

While such assignments were never meant to take on other than a marginal share of the overall activities of such institutions, this open door to overseas challenges was an important incentive for staff and important for accumulating overseas project experience in institutional strengthening and capacity building that hitherto primarily had been gained among private consultants.

SFT and DN expressed similar experience. Neither of these institutions knows why, but one possible explanation might have been the overall downsizing of environment activities in development cooperation with the Bondevik cabinet ruling until the autumn of 2005, and that environment initiative proclaimed by the “Red-Green” Government that has taken over office has yet to materialise in the form of a major return to more regular, larger and more predictable Norad requests. Another reason could be the reorganisation of Norad and its new areas of operation and responsibilities. Many traditional Norad activities have been outsourced to the embassies, but the embassies seldom have environment specialists that can initiate and assess environment projects. And a third reason might simply be that, as in so many other cases, initiatives and activity levels depend more on the *individual* staff member being assigned the responsibility than on the position and organisation structure as such. Perhaps those individuals in Norad who took initiatives and secured attractive framework agreements, have moved to other positions.

When the “Norgesaksen” initiative was fresh in the 1990s, Norad took the initiatives and requested expertise from the institutions, but today SFT and DN have to take the initiatives themselves and ask Norad if they can be of service. Obviously, planning of staff use is different in this situation than what it was when the “Norgesaksen” was enthusiastically started.

Another modality of the Norwegian Government’s use of resources in external institutions is the framework agreement between the Government of Norway and UN institutions, notably UNEP in the environmental field. The evaluation of this agreement in 2005 (No. 21), of Norway’s use of UNEP as a channel for providing IC and CB, did a thorough analysis of the Framework Agreement portfolio of 24 projects. It was undertaken by way of study of reports, analysis of questionnaires and personal interviews in Paris, Geneva and Nairobi. The evaluation team reached the following conclusions regarding UNEP as an institution providing IC and CB for developing member country institutions by means of Norwegian aid funds:

- *It is very difficult to establish a focus and then evaluate impacts and results because of the very wide and diverse range of outputs and objectives to be accomplished in UNEP projects.*

- *Monitoring of impact of UNEP projects is virtually impossible since no counterfactual benchmarks have been attempted established, and indicators of progress are not systematically established from the time when projects are designed and started,*
- *Many projects have complicated institutional arrangements so that it is difficult to identify the impact of Norwegian support. Fungibility of funds adds to the difficulty.*
- *There is a widespread danger of duplication between divisions within UNEP and between UNEP and other agencies, although UNEP is aware of this. This is partly because UNEP has become very ambitious and gone into areas which may be outside its original remit.*
- *MFA needs to more actively monitor what sort of environment-oriented programmes and projects are supported via other Framework Agreements with e.g. WHO, FAO, UNESCO and UNIDO, as well as through trust funds in the multilateral development banks so as to create complementarity and synergy rather than costly duplication.*
- *The Framework Agreement supports projects which seek to mainstream environmental considerations into poverty reduction strategies in separate UNEP Divisions. Better internal coordination in the selection of programmes to be supported should minimise internal duplication and overlap.*
- *There is a strong case for focusing Norwegian support in areas where UNEP has frontier comparative advantage/expertise/competence e.g. environmental monitoring/remote sensing and warning systems, awareness raising and training of e.g. journalists, customs officers and lawyers/judges towards effective implementation of the many multilateral environmental conventions, and the regulations regarding trade and depositing of waste and chemicals, cleaner production, etc.*
- *Norwegian UNEP support has been useful and effective in assisting small countries, especially in Africa, to meet their obligations under a variety of Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs).*
- *The recent Bali Strategic Plan seeks to improve UNEP's technology support and capacity-building activities. However, the Evaluation Team is of the opinion that the Plan is over-ambitious in relation to available expertise and resources and risks "turf wars" with other competing agencies which have been established from the outset to be operational. It does, however, provide for coordination mechanisms with UNDP and the GEF.*

Norway also operates Framework Agreements with seven other UN agencies i.e. UN-Habitat, FAO, WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP and ILO. These are administered by MFA's UN Section in contrast to the UNEP Framework Agreement which is administered by the Section for the Environment and Sustainable Development. Measures are being taken to introduce a "two stage" UNEP Framework Agreement where time-limited Programme Agreements (UNEP's programme periods are two years) are subordinated to a general, overall UNEP Framework Agreement without a time limit. This will simplify and speed up the procedures and process of finalising revised agreements,

2.8 Relevant Lessons Learned from Other Institutions' Development Assistance

In order to live up to the expectations of the international community with regard to the MDGs, UNEP and donor countries are making joint efforts to strengthen collaboration and streamline the provision of additional earmarked support to UNEP through utilisation of arrangements that can be described as "partnership agreements". While these can take different forms, they tend to share the following common features:

- Providing a framework for intensified policy dialogue and functional collaboration between UNEP and the donor government.
- Providing for improved planning, implementation monitoring, and reporting within UNEP as a result of the partnerships being of a multi-year nature focusing on a limited number of programme areas rather than on numerous scattered projects.
- Providing a mechanism for strategic and coherent support to UNEP's core priority activities that are not sufficiently funded by the Environment Fund.
- Providing for timely and clearly defined financial reporting routines and for support in a predictable manner.
- Providing for a simplified standard results-focused reporting format.
- Providing for reduced administrative costs (from 13% to 8% in case of the Netherlands Framework Agreement) as a result of switching to programme funding, as compared with the administrative burden associated with numerous donor-funded projects, consequently freeing up more resources for programme activities.

So far, UNEP has entered into four framework agreements, in addition to the one with Norway, notably with Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden. They vary in focus and in size, but operate largely as Trust Funds. Their content and focus suggest some complementarity, but perhaps equally so that UNEP seeks framework agreements to cover as wide a topical area as possible with such agreements. In order to have a wide basis for comparison of performance and for suggesting the design of the new Norwegian Framework Agreement for 2006-2009, the Evaluation Team collected more detailed and in-depth information on the framework agreements with Belgium, Netherlands and Sweden⁷. The nature and functioning of these agreements are presented in Annex 7 in reference document No. 21.

In the preparation for, and then follow-up to the Rio Conference in 1992, the World Bank initiated a programme of having National Environment Action Plans (NEAPs) prepared by the developing member countries. A former director of the Bank's Africa Environment Division revealed great frustration with the strict time constraints imposed on the Bank by the US State Department to have the individual country NEAPs for Africa finalised and approved by a given deadline, regardless of what awareness, ownership of and commitment to the findings, conclusions and recommendations had been achieved with the recipient governments. Unsurprisingly, these NEAPs in large parts ended up with dust on bookshelves, since the Bank had not been given the opportunity by its Board of Directors to undertake the time-consuming institutional dialogue and capacity building required to provide for sustainable environment resources management. A lesson from this is that international finance institutions are rather budget constrained by unrealistic time frames set by impatient board members with limited field or "real world" experience, and that bilateral aid agencies appear to have more flexibility to adjust their IC and CB assistance to the situation on the ground.

In the World Bank's OED's (Operations Evaluation Department) 2001 review of the Bank's performance on the environment, it was found that environmental mainstreaming has not yet taken full effect in bank policies, programs and operations, but some progress had been made. The Power Sector Review (No. 26) established that only 35% of the Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) produced in 2001, and only half of the final PRSPs (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) produced so far, had included discussion of energy and environment issues. The review further established that demand for full-scale energy and environment reviews is lower than originally expected under the "Fuel For Thought" strategy, with clients preferring more focused analytical and advisory work. The analysis of active Bank lending operations showed a growing proportion with at least one environment objective, growing from

⁷ The Irish authorities that also have a framework agreement were not available.

9% in 1990 via 10% in 1997 to 69% in 2001. This shows unsurprisingly that as new environmental guidelines and directives are introduced, lending operations take these actively into account and environmental considerations and issues are gradually mainstreamed into project designs.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The complexities of IC and CB development cooperation have often been underestimated. This can have serious consequences for successful and timely implementation of reforms upon which a sustainable development agenda depends. First of all, for IC and CB to succeed, and result in lasting improvements, there has to be well-established ownership of and commitment to the content of the IC and CB development cooperation components. This requires considerable patience from the donor, and it has not always been easy to have this challenges fully acknowledged when IC and CB programs/projects are designed and agreed with the recipient. Such institution-based ownership of the IC and CB process becomes particularly critical when the IC and CB support is designed to be comprehensive in outreach to large and complex institutions, and the experts hired to conduct such HRD tasks and IC building tasks need to be well-versed in both the sector specific aspects as such, and have a good knowledge of the local cultural dimensions that often turn up as barriers to successful and timely implementation.

Rather than first selecting the Norwegian institution to receive the contract, the challenges and topics to be covered should have defined which institution and what experts on the Norwegian side should participate in the “twinning”, and this would not always mean the “sister origination” in Norway. Rather than a broad scale focus when so required, some such projects have resulted in a too myopic focus and missing the intended broader scope. This has in part been due to lack of sufficient insight and relevant experience of the experts supplied. The overall conclusion is therefore that IC and CB only partly has been successful on a *broad* scale, and that only in some few cases the whole recipient institution has got the needed and intended “lift”.

The below more detailed conclusions and recommendations to Norad in operationalising of the Action Plan for Environmental Cooperation could be listed:

- 1) Capacity building in weak environment institutions appears as a logical focal area of development cooperation directed at facilitating achievements of the DMGs.
- 2) Norad should critically assess which institution is the most suitable for managing the IC and CB efforts, and undertake a tendering for this if in doubt.
- 3) With limiting capacity and capability on the local institution, a postponement of the project should be considered, with a pre-project phase of staff capacity building only. Use of independent assessors could be useful here and in possible reformulation of the project design.
- 4) The Norwegian institution must critically assess own human resources to undertake the institutional cooperation.
- 5) In some cases dropping a project altogether should be seriously and professionally considered.
- 6) Although the public institutions have gained experience from development cooperation projects the last 10 years, some still do not in all aspects have the same competence as the private consulting companies, notably in project management, and are not fully organised to undertake such duties.
- 7) However good the public or private institution, the success of any project depends almost completely on the motivation, capabilities and capacities of the individual staff working in the projects. Competent people must be put on the projects (not idling ones).

- 8) The skills of preparing consistent planning documents following LFA still has a potential for improvement, especially with the public institutions.
- 9) Project planning is the most critical activity, so it is important not to rush the planning, but take the required time.
- 10) Project planning is often too ambitious, and must be scaled down to meet the capacity and capability of the local institutions.
- 11) It is important to limit the success criteria and outputs to a few realistically achievable ones.
- 12) The risks and success factors must be properly analysed before project start-up (as e.g. NVE has developed a format for this).
- 13) The local institution must be fully involved in the project planning.
- 14) Roles and responsibilities of all the project partners on both sides must be clearly identified.
- 15) The capacity and capability of the counterpart institution is decisive for the duration of the cooperation. Around 10 years could be the starting point for planning the duration of projects involving a broader institutional development and capacity building, including a proper time for joint planning of the project and an *exit phase*.
- 16) Norad must accept a long-term approach in institutional development, without re-directing the main course underway just because of shifts in political agendas in Norway.
- 17) The preferred cooperation modality in most cases is based on short-term follow-up visits by Norwegian advisors, who have a long-term commitment throughout the project duration, securing continuity. Long-term resident advisors should, if required, be used with great caution.
- 18) Physical office proximity between the partners is a must.
- 19) Critical assessment of the value and modality of the arrangement as project proceed and round it off in time is important, before it gets pathetic.
- 20) The frequency and duration of each follow-up visit must be adequate to the issues at stake (minimum 2 weeks and 3-5 visits per year as a starting point?).
- 21) The institutional cooperation process must be clearly demand-driven, and the Norwegian institution should “hold their horses”, however frustrating this might feel.
- 22) The managerial level of the institutions must be involved in the process from the start, and this will facilitate the processes during implementation.
- 23) Progress reporting must follow a pre-set format (Norad guidance required), complying with the elements of the steering project documents. Norad should encourage and facilitate common reporting to donors.
- 24) Norad must never allow topping-up of salaries, but should be realistic as to payment of travel accommodation costs, and “sitting allowances” commonly used in the country.
- 25) Each project should contain a reasonable and fair amount for purchasing hardware to the local institution in order to facilitate their daily work. A budget for operation and maintenance is also often required since counterpart funding often fail to accommodate such crucial expenses, and this can impact severely on progress.

- 26) Language capabilities of both expats and local staff must reach certain proficiency before the project can start. Local language training should be paid by the project.
- 27) Individual training does not always lead to institutional building. Transparency and openness must be enhanced through the project in the local institutions.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: **Figures and tables**

Table 2.1: The composition of per capita wealth by country group, 2000 (\$2000)

Country group by per capita income level	(1) Man-made or "produced" wealth	(2) Residual (social- and human capital, etc) wealth	(3) Environ-ment or "natural" wealth	(4) Total per capita wealth	(5) Environ-ment wealth as % of total wealth	(6) Renewable resources as % of environment wealth
Low income	1,174	4,433	1,925	7,532	26%	83%
Middle income	5,347	18,773	3,496	27,616	13%	69%
High income OECD	76,193	353,339	9,531	439,063	2%	60%

Source: The World Bank (2006), op.cit. tables 1.1 and 1.2





Figure 2.1: Principle figure showing relative degree of various actors' involvement in the Norwegian water sector development assistance (the blue area shows the International Water Decade)

Figure 2.2: Risk assessment matrix used by NVE



Appendix 2:

Highlights from and synopses of the reviewed documents

(The numbers refer to the listing of reviewed documents in Appendix 4 of the report)

No. 1 MID-TERM REVIEW OF NORAD SUPPORT TO THE PALESTINIAN WATER AUTHORITY. Final Report 31. October 1997. Erik Whist, Scanteam International, Dan Lundquist, Glommen & Laagen Brukseier Forening, Jens Claussen, Nordic Consulting Group

- Within the framework of the NVE - PWA contract technical assistance services have been provided in the following three areas: Administrative tools and infrastructure; PWA Water Management Tools; Water Sector Organisation.
- The PWA - NVE contract is an effort to contribute to institutional development of PWA and to create institutional co-operation between PWA and NVE with associated institutions. The contract was developed jointly with the participation of the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) and the Norwegian Institute for Water Research (NIVA).
- The demand based approach and the organisational state of PWA has led to a situation where too many tasks are being addressed simultaneously when considering the limited capacity of PWA and the demand on PWA to participate in monitoring and supervision of numerous emerging tasks and projects.
- This review has shown that NVE has provided valuable assistance in the formulation of terms of reference, contract negotiations, monitoring service providers and as a general adviser in the day-to-day operations of PWA (the NVE core team and resident coordinator).
- Technical assistance should be guided by a more detailed work plan than what has been the case to date. The work plan should list tasks with clearly defined outputs, estimated duration and costs. Progress reporting by service providers should follow the format of the work plan to enable improved monitoring of performance by PWA. This implies that NVE needs to establish a monitoring, budgeting and accounting system which allow PWA to monitor NVE technical assistance inputs by tasks and according to agreed work plan.
- NVE's core role could be to act as a focal point identifying relevant technical assistance personnel, assist in drafting terms of references, participate in contract negotiations and monitoring of implementation. An extension of the contract should ensure more flexibility in allowing PWA to utilise relevant expertise also outside the NVE/SFT/NIVA triangle.
- The resident NVE coordinator has played an important role as a management adviser for PWA, a role which should be included in the terms of reference and taken into consideration in the future.
- The procedure for implementation of the contract should take into consideration the administrative cost of maintaining a co-ordination function both in Palestine and in Oslo. It is a scope to improve cost effectiveness and lines of communication between NVE and PWA if co-ordination, identification of TA personnel, assistance in drafting terms of reference and contract negotiations was transferred as the tasks for the resident NVE coordinator. The role of the coordinator and the "core team" in Oslo would then be to support the PWA and NVE resident coordinator if and when required.
- When selecting technical assistance personnel more emphasis should be put on overseas management experience.
- The identification of technical assistance should as a general procedure be based on competitive bids to maintain cost of services at an acceptable level.

No. 2 MID-TERM REVIEW OF ZAM 063 INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION PREVENTION PROGRAMME (IPPP), 1999. Tore Laugerud (Norconsult), Jon Jerre (DHV), Glasswell K. Nkonde (University of Zambia)

- This means that most of the visible effects of the input could come towards the end of the project, or even *after* the end of a project, as this is the time needed for the institution to fully adopt the concepts.
- The Review Team, however, will argue that as the main part of the IPPP being aimed at *institutional building* (leave alone part of the CP activities) really meaning putting ECZ in better position to operate efficiently in the future, the concerns of IPPP are the concerns of ECZ, and visa versa.

- SFT (Norwegian Pollution Control Authority) is the main advisory body on the Norwegian side for the institutional strengthening component, but has pulled in other Norwegian institutions and companies to assist on specific topics during the Programme.
- The present package of salaries, subsistence and other incentives was a never-ending discussion theme between the Team and the employees of ECZ during the mission. ... the Team appreciates that this issue really has a significant bearing on the performance of the employees of ECZ.
- In the Agreement between ECZ and SFT, it is explicitly stated that such personnel trained under the programme must stay with the programme for the following three years. This is however difficult to enforce legally by taking the employee to court. It is lengthy and costly affair, especially for ECZ, and in any case ECZ can not physically force anyone to stay against his/hers will.
- In addition to the above factors influencing the motivation, some of the interviewed persons touched upon the aspects of shortcomings in the management procedures of the Council, namely a felt lack of delegation from the top management, and not sufficient atmosphere for discussing freely new ideas and suggestions in the organisation.
- *In general*, the Team wants to express concern as to lack of transparent administrative procedures and atmosphere of openness *in any organisation* of this kind. It is evident from experience all around the world that a sustainable institution where all the employees are contributing with their maximum capability, is built on mutual trust and transparency.
- Several said that the way NORAD is channelling its assistance, through the receiver and integrated in the normal budgeting (and partly reporting) procedures, has been conceived as working well.
- There is a wish from ECZ to receive the allocation in NOK, or to get an opportunity to exchange the ZK allocation into NOK in order to reduce the "loss". One way around this could be to give the allocation to cover TA in NOK and the rest in ZK.
- The Team notes that the Norwegian and Canadian programmes, although having some of the same ultimate goals of strengthening ECZ and its performance, have completely different management set-ups, reflecting the two donor governments' policies and priorities.
- The CIDA programme.... The activities were once decided upon in the bilateral agreement, and these have not been changed to meet new conditions, especially after the IPPP inevitably have influenced the overall performance and activities in ECZ.
- Another feature noticed, is that the CIDA project has no allocation for supporting subsistence allowance and travel costs of ECZ staff outside Lusaka. This has inevitably created some distance to the ECZ staff, and might hamper an efficient integration of the CIDA-supported projects in ECZ.
- As the two programmes have so different managerial set-ups, inevitably more positive response will be given to the programme which gives more of the responsibility and freedom to act with ECZ.
- it leaves ECZ with the responsibility of implementing the Programme and develop its own organisation. This means that one does fall into the trap of a resident expert (well paid and highly motivated) being the overall "driving force" and partly de facto the executive officer, rather than an advisor letting the national staff do the work.
- Several of the involved staff in the IPPP (both on Norwegian and Zambian side) have complained about the failing technical communication facilities between ECZ and Norway. There are only two PCs connected to the Internet.... The problem of lines and availability is assumed to be a general constraint in Zambia, not only with the ECZ, meaning that by planning the mode of TA operation this constraint must be taken into account.
- CP: However, for a possible Phase II of the IPPP, it is recommended to look into other arrangements for TA, mainly from the region, as an alternative or supplement to the present set-up, in order to cut costs on this activity.
- The TA from Norway should be intensified ... The water group needs more frequent visits from experienced TA experts than the other projects, and these experts should participate on industry visits in order to assist the water staff in building confidence with the industry (similar to air). The TA must be as concrete and direct target oriented as possible.

No. 3 STATSKONSULT AS: RAPPORT 1999:23

GJENNOMGANG AV MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) PÅ MILJØFELTET

2.1. Bakgrunnen for MoU Samarbeidet

MoU er et politisk dokument som fastlegger policy og overordnede rammer for samarbeid mellom Norge og et annet land, herunder overordnede betingelser og hvilke områder samarbeidet skal gjelde for. De bilaterale miljøavtalene består av et hoveddokument (MoU) supplert av arbeidsprogrammer. Til sammen danner disse dokumentene premissene for samarbeidet. Den samlede økonomiske rammen for miljø-MoUene var i 1999 på ca. 15 millioner kroner.

I tillegg til MoU-avtaler underskrevet av UD og NORAD, finnes det en rekke MoU-avtaler som ulike departementer har inngått med forskjellige land. UD har ikke noen formalisert rolle i forhold til undertegning av MoUer. De færreste slike eksterne MoU-avtaler medfører imidlertid bindinger til bruk av bistandsmidler.

MoUene er på initiativ fra Statsministerens kontor inngått mellom Miljøverndepartementet (MD) og miljøvernmyndighetene i samarbeidslandene. De konkrete samarbeidsprosjektene under miljø-MoUene finansieres over bistandsbudsjettet og NORAD har forvaltningsansvaret for prosjektene. Finansieringsformen gjør at både Utenriksdepartementets (UD), MD og NORADs ansvarsområder berøres. Rapporten er basert på dokumentstudier og intervjuer med involverte aktører på norsk side.

Forvaltningsmessig er gjennomføringen av arbeidsprogrammene organisert på ulike måter under de tre MoUene. MD og samarbeidspartner er ansvarlig for forvaltning og samordning av avtalene på et overordnet nivå. I Indonesia og Sør-Afrika innehar henholdsvis Direktoratet for naturforvaltning og Riksantikvaren en koordinerende og rådgivende rolle i forhold til samarbeidslandet, mens MD i praksis innehar tilsvarende rolle i Kina. Erfaringene med disse forvaltningsmodellene er varierende. Organiseringen synes å være i ferd med å falle på plass i forhold til Sør-Afrika og Indonesia.

2.2. Konklusjoner om roller og ansvar

Gjennomgangen viser at det er uklarhet omkring formålet og målsettingene med MoUene. Det synes å være en viss motsetning mellom det bistandspolitiske prinsippet om mottakeransvar og MoU-prinsippet om samarbeid mellom likestilte parter. Det synes også å være behov for en avklaring i forhold til oppfølging av klimakonvensjonen.

Gjennomgangen viser også at det er uklarheter i ansvars- og rollefordelingen mellom MD, UD, NORAD og de ulike miljødirektoratene. Dette forplanter seg igjen til organiseringen på gjennomføringsplan. I forhold til ansvars- og rollefordeling mellom de norske aktørene er det bl.a. uklarhet knyttet til hvorvidt det er mulig og hensiktsmessig å skille mellom henholdsvis miljøpolitisk og miljøfaglig ansvar (MD) og utviklingspolitisk og utviklingsfaglig ansvar (UD) i forbindelse med miljø-MoUene. NORADs ansvar og rolle i samarbeidet oppfattes også som uklar, særlig i forbindelse med utarbeiding og fastsetting av arbeidsprogrammene.

Dette forsterkes av at MoU-avtalene er politiske dokumenter som ofte bærer preg av å være laget på relativt kort varsel og i en helt spesiell forbindelse (jf statsministerens besøk i Kina og Sør-Afrika). Statsministerens kontor har hatt stor innvirkning på valg av MoU-land. Forvaltning og oppfølging av avtalen er sjelden avgjort i forkant.

Videre følger uklare rolle- og ansvarsforhold av kombinasjonen av ulike overordnede mål og én felles bevilgning. Til bruken av bistandsbevilgningen er det knyttet en rekke ulike og til dels motstridende mål.

For det tredje er MoUene vanskelig å håndtere rent prinsipielt fordi det dreier seg om styring og instruksjon fra ett departement til et direktorat underlagt et annet departement. Det er uklare retningslinjer for hvem som instruerer hvem og hva som skal gjelde for NORADs rolle. Dette er bl.a. komplisert fordi et departement har en annen rolle enn et direktorat. Et departement skal bl.a. være et politisk sekretariat

med en målsetting å profilere ”det norske”.

For det fjerde gis det uttrykk for at styringskultur i forhold til underliggende virksomheter i MD er svært forskjellig fra tilsvarende styringskultur i UD. Dette innebærer at MD følger opp NORAD tettere i forhold til prosjektene under miljø-MoUene enn det UD gjør i forhold til andre bistandsprosjekter.

Etter Statskonsults oppfatning gir NORADs forvaltningsansvar NORAD en rolle med å vurdere arbeidsprogram og prosjekter i forhold til helheten i bistandsarbeidet i MoU-landet. Motsatt gir ikke det faglige ansvaret MD enerett til fastsetting av arbeidsprogram og prosjekter. MD har ingen formell instruksjonsrett over NORAD og kan ikke overstyre NORAD på innhold i programmene. Ved å gi ”grønt lys” for finansiering har NORAD de facto også vurdert prosjektene å være i samsvar med de retningslinjer som gjelder for disponering av bistandsmidler. Ut fra at arbeidsprogrammer under MoUene iverksettes, må det også antas at innholdet i siste instans er omforent mellom MD og NORAD. I utgangspunktet har UD delegert ansvaret for oppfølging av MoUene til NORAD og har relativt liten befatning med MoUene. UD er involvert i de overordnede rammene for MoUene, herunder godkjenning av arbeidsprogrammer.

Forvaltningsmessig er gjennomføringen av arbeidsprogrammene organisert på ulike måter under de tre MoUene. For alle MoUene er MD og samarbeidspartnere ansvarlig for forvaltning og samordning av avtalene på et overordnet nivå. Det er imidlertid valgt ulike løsninger for koordinering av arbeidet på gjennomføringsnivå. Dette bidrar også til klarheter i ansvar - og rollefordeling. Organiseringen følger i grove trekk tre modeller:

1. I Kina innehar MD ved Internasjonal avdeling i praksis rollen som koordinator og rådgiver i forhold til SEPA. MD er både implementerende og styrende ved at MD deltar i hele prosessen fra miljøpolicy til prosjektutvikling, godkjenning og gjennomføring.
2. I Indonesia innehar Direktoratet for naturforvaltning rollen som ”lead agency” med rapporteringsansvar til MD. Direktoratet er også faglig implementerende. Direktoratene samarbeider med NORAD og anmoder NORAD om å utbetale regninger. MD deltar på årlige møter med samarbeidspartner.
3. I Sør-Afrika ble det i utgangspunktet valgt tilsvarende modell som for Indonesia med Riksantikvaren som ”lead agency”. Denne modellen er i dag endret ved at ambassaden, som også er bistandsforvalter, er trukket sterkere inn i forvaltningen av MoUen. Man er blitt enige om å benytte NORADs forvaltningsrutiner slik at ambassaden/NORAD er trukket inn i arbeidet med fastsetting av arbeidsprogrammer. Ambassaden representerer både MD og NORAD i årlige møter og i forhandlinger med samarbeidspartner.

Etter Statskonsults oppfatning er dagens modell i Sør-Afrika den mest ryddige og effektive organiseringen. Statskonsults mener også at ”lead agency”- modellen som er valgt i Indonesia kan være hensiktsmessig, men det er viktig å få til godt samarbeid mellom de norske aktørene.

Modellen som er valgt for organisering av MoUen med Kina er etter Statskonsult vurdering den modellen hvor ansvarsforholdene blir mest uryddige og sammenblandingen av roller størst. MD bør etter vår oppfatning konsentrere seg om politisk dialog, prioritering og utforming av rammer for samarbeid på overordnet faglig nivå. Etter Statskonsults vurdering bør ikke MD selv inneha rollen som ”lead agency”, men overlate koordineringsansvar og oppfølging på prosjektnivå til et av sine underliggende direktorater. MDs styrings- og oppfølgingsbehov kan ivaretas gjennom tildelingsbrev til underliggende etat.

2.3. Effektivitet

Bistandssiden og miljøsidene har gjennomgående forskjellig syn på nytten av og behovet for egne MoUer på miljøfeltet. De har også gjennomgående ulikt syn på hvordan samarbeidet og forvaltningen fungerer. MD er gjennomgående svært fornøyd med MoU-samarbeidet og ser ingen store problemer knyttet til dette. Primært ønsker man avtaler med noen strategisk viktige land i forhold til implementering av globale miljøkonvensjoner og -avtaler, jf MDs syn på miljø-MoUen med Kina. Bistands- og miljøsidene synes å være grunnleggende uenig i forhold til om klimatiltak kan og bør finansieres med bistandsmidler

eller ikke. Ifølge informantene er det viktig å skille mellom oppfølging av biodiversitetskonvensjonen og ørkenkonvensjonen som defineres som miljøbistand og oppfølging av klimakonvensjonen som *ikke* defineres som miljøbistand. NORAD er generelt kritisk til å finansiere klimatiltak og klimaprojekter med bistandsmidler.

NORAD gir uttrykk for at etter deres oppfatning har MoUene ikke vært et nødvendig redskap for miljøsamarbeid med de tre aktuelle landene. De viser til andre land (f.eks. Tanzania) hvor miljøsamarbeidet etter deres oppfatning har fungert svært bra uten en egen miljø-MoU. I noen tilfeller mener NORAD at prosjektene under miljø-MoUen representerer dårlig bistand. I forhold til Kina stiller NORAD for øvrig spørsmål ved i hvilken grad miljø-MoUene bidrar til integrering av miljø i den store helheten. NORAD stiller særlig spørsmål ved egne miljø-MoUer i forhold til land hvor den politiske kontakten er liten slik den f.eks. har vært i forhold til Indonesia de senere årene. NORAD mener MD kunne markert seg og bygget allianser uten en egen miljø-MoU slik det f.eks. ble gjort i Sør-Afrika, hvor Agreed Minutes ble underskrevet av miljøvernministrene i landene. I slike tilfeller ville det ifølge NORAD være mer ryddig å inkorporere miljøsamarbeid i UD og NORADs MoUer, eventuelt innføre andre former for avtaler, f.eks. *Agreed minutes*.

UDs syn på miljø-MoUene varierer i noen grad avhengig av avdelingstilknytning. Bilateral avdeling er på linje med NORAD og mener miljø-MoUene ikke er nødvendige. Ressurs- og miljøavdelingen er på noen områder mer på linje med MD. De mener det fremste målet med egne miljø-MoUer er å sikre ulandenes deltakelse i internasjonale prosesser. Dette vil også bidra til kunnskapsoppbygging. Ressurs- og miljøavdelingen er imidlertid usikre på om det er behov for egne MoUer for å sikre dette.

MoU-rapporteringen sier bl.a. lite om hva som konkret er oppnådd i de enkelte prosjektene. Problemet med å dokumentere resultater kan forklares med at de fleste prosjektene har pågått i relativt kort tid og at det er for tidlig å aggregere resultater på prosjektnivå. En annen forklaring kan ligge i forholdet mellom prosjektenes ambisjonsnivå, antall prosjekter, tidsperspektivet for gjennomføring og økonomien i prosjektene.

Det er et overordnet mål å unngå unødvendige administrative kostnader knyttet til bistandsformidling og bistandsforvaltning. I forhold til Indonesia går ifølge NORAD og Asiadesken i UD en stor del av de fire millionene som er satt av til å følge opp miljø-MoUen med til å dekke administrative kostnader. Dette følger av at samarbeidet omfatter mange små prosjekter med mange ulike institusjoner/aktører. Ifølge Direktoratet for naturforvaltning er det i dag liten prinsipiell forskjell mellom prosjekter under miljø-MoUen og annet bistandsarbeid.

Miljø-MoUen med Kina er en del av Asia-planen. Fra MDs ståsted fungerer MoUen som en "døråpner" i forhold til den kinesiske miljøvernadministrasjonen. Etter at avtalen med NEPA ble inngått har det ifølge MD jevnlig vært ført bilaterale samtaler der aktuelle internasjonale prosesser har vært sentrale på dagsorden. MD mener også at avtalen og den politiske oppfølgingen av denne, har bidratt til at den kinesiske miljøvernmyndigheten, NEPA, har fått departementsstatus. I forhold til Kina ligger det en utfordring i at UD/NORAD har undertegnet en MoU med én instans mens MD har undertegnet en MoU med en annen instans. Dette kan ifølge NORAD medføre at det blir vanskelig å få til en helhetlig miljøetsatsing. Dersom egne miljø-MoUer avleder fra en slik helhetlig miljøetsatsing, kan det ifølge NORAD i verste fall føre til at effekten av samlet norsk miljøbistand blir mindre totalt sett. Ifølge NORAD er prosjektene under den kinesiske miljø-MoUen så "like" de andre miljøprosjektene i NORADs prosjektportefølje at det ikke synes hensiktsmessig å plassere dem under en egen MoU. De bærer dessuten preg av å være forprosjekter. Dette skaper lett samrøre, parallellkjøring og bindinger i forhold til NORADs ordinære bistandsprosjekter (som i all hovedsak er miljørelaterte prosjekter) og NORADs interne prioriteringer.

MoUen med Sør Afrika representerer, ifølge MD, en samarbeidsform som dekker et strategisk behov for kontakt med Sør-Afrika som er et sentralt land i forhold til meningsdannelsen om globale miljøspørsmål i denne regionen. MD ser det som en viktig gevinst at det er etablert kontakter på høyt politisk nivå i

samarbeids - landene, og mener kontakten på politisk nivå fungerer som forutsatt. Samtidig mener MD at den overordnede politiske dialogen, gjennom MoUen, har gitt seg utslag i miljøpolitiske prioriteringer i Sør-Afrika, både ved at miljøforvaltningen har fått større anerkjennelse i det sørafrikanske forvaltningssystemet og bidratt til kapasitetsbygging i forvaltningsapparatet. De fleste prosjektene kan ses i sammenheng med oppfølging av ulike konvensjoner. Riksantikvaren mener resultatene fra første fase av miljøprogrammet har vært bra. Ifølge Riksantikvaren har DEAT fra starten av vært interessert i samarbeid omkring oppfølging av internasjonale miljøkonvensjoner. De ønsket å markere seg regionalt og internasjonalt og var avhengig av å bygge opp kompetanse omkring konvensjonsarbeid. Slik Riksantikvaren ser det har prosjektporteføljen vært utarbeidet i tråd med mottakers ønsker og prioriteringer, og miljøprogrammet har god sammenheng med sør-afrikanske prioriteringer på miljøfeltet. Riksantikvaren kan ikke se at et fokus på bl.a. oppfølging av klimakonvensjonen står i motsetning til øvrig miljøbistand, eller at miljø-MoUen svekker øvrige bistandspolitiske mål for samarbeid med Sør - Afrika.

NORAD gir imidlertid uttrykk for at det er vanskelig å vurdere oppnådde resultater; målsettingene er generelle og det er uklart hva som er resultatindikatorer. NORAD synes også det er vanskelig å vurdere hvilken effekt samarbeidet under miljø-MoUen har hatt for styrking av institusjonell kapasitet. Riksantikvaren derimot mener samarbeidet har bidratt til styrking av institusjonell kapasitet på miljøfeltet. Tatt i betraktning at det allerede forelå en avtale om utviklingssamarbeid med Sør-Afrika, mener NORAD det ikke var behov for en egen miljø-MoU. NORAD mener at dagens forvaltningsmodell er god.

Etter Statskonsults vurdering er det også behov for utforming av klarere resultatmål og indikatorer for prosjektene, en oppgave som er en del av NORADs forvaltningsansvar.

2.4. Statskonsults anbefalinger

MD og UD bør vurdere om det er behov for egne miljø-MoUer når innretning, implementering og forvaltning av prosjektene under miljø-MoUen er svært lik det som gjelder for ordinære bistandsprosjekter, jf prosjektene under miljø-MoUene med Sør-Afrika og Indonesia.

MD og UD bør samarbeide om å trekke opp et tydeligere og mer omforent skille mellom miljøbistand og annet internasjonalt miljøsamarbeid enn det man har i dag.

I forhold til Kina bør MD vurdere å overlate koordineringsansvar og oppfølging på prosjektnivå til NORAD, eventuelt en av sine underliggende virksomheter, jf Direktoratet for naturforvaltnings rolle i Indonesia. Det synes ikke å være behov for større endringer i forhold til dagens rolle – og ansvarsdeling for Sør-Afrika og Indonesia.

I forhold til Kina og Indonesia må MD ta ansvar for at NORAD trekkes inn på et tidligere tidspunkt i planleggingen av nye arbeidsprogrammer og prosjekter.

Generelt mener Statskonsult at man i forhold til miljø-MoUene har lagt opp til en så krevende rolle- og ansvarsdeling at det er behov for at UD trekkes inn og involverer seg mer.

I forhold til eventuelle nye miljø-MoUer mener Statskonsult man bør velge mellom følgende to alternativer:

1. MD gis delegerte fullmakter fra UD for bruk av de midler som er bevilget til miljø-MoUer over bistandsbudsjettet. MD får dermed et faglig og forvaltningsmessig ansvar vis-a-vis UD og Stortinget.
2. MD undertegner miljø-MoUen, men prosjektsamarbeidet kanaliseres i sin helhet gjennom NORAD og underlegges NORADs ordinære prosedyrer.

Det bør utformes mer konkrete resultatmål og -indikatorer for prosjektene under miljø-MoUene.

Antall prosjekter under den enkelte MoU og avtaleperioden for arbeidsprogrammer bør vurderes nærmere i forhold til hensiktsmessighet og muligheter for resultatoppnåelse.

No. 4 PROJECT REVIEW OF VARIOUS NORAD-SUPPORTED ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS IN PR CHINA. FINAL COMMON REPORT Aug. 2000. Tor Johannesen (SFT), Rune Vistad (SFT), Monika Thowsen (freelance), Tore Laugerud (Norconsult)

- This means that most of the visible long-term effects (for example environmental impacts in quantitative terms) of the inputs will come after the completion of the projects, as time is simply needed for the institutions to fully adopt the concepts.

- The Team appreciates the partly passionate comments of the Norwegian project partners, which proves that they feel dedicated and have a true ownership to the projects.
- In general, the Norwegian partners had not been working in the respective geographical project areas before, and most of them not in China at all, Interconsult in Shanghai (CHN 020) being an exception. Several of them had however experience from projects in other developing countries. This lack of experience from China, and partly assumed lack of planning background from projects of similar nature, has to a certain degree resulted in too ambitious schedules as regards time and resources input to achieve the results.
- It is however the impression of the Team, that where the research institutions have been in charge, emphasis seems to have been put on the establishment of the monitoring/research tool, and not so much on the use of the results deriving from the tool as an integrated part of the overall environmental management⁸. There seems nevertheless to be “natural” explanations for this, as the installation/testing/training etc. in connection with establishing the ENSIS system has taken more time and efforts than planned for. The Team in specific observes that the training efforts in the projects, especially directed towards the operators’ and technicians’ level, have indeed been extensive and valuable.
- In addition, the Chinese partners have, to a much larger degree than their Norwegian counterparts, been focusing on procurement and installation of the equipment and the hardware, and the direct daily use of this.
- It is noted that in all the projects, there are certain shortcomings as to the project design. In specific, there seems to have been a total confusion in the formulation of the project objectives (*goal* and *purpose*), and in defining the project *outputs* and the *activities*.
- In a couple of cases, the *purposes* and *activities* have been changed during the project, without clear indications that this has been discussed and agreed in the annual meetings.
- The Team will give credit to NORAD’s showing flexibility in such projects where institutional building in new cultures is an important component, and where several unexpected topics arising during the implementation require adjustments.
- It is noted that the reporting characteristics vary a lot between the reviewed projects. In other words, it is complicated to, from the financial reporting, easily see how much has actually been spent on the different individual activities under the projects, as compared to the originally planned ones. This is in the Team’s opinion a general shortcoming that makes monitoring difficult and proper evaluation at the end of the projects almost impossible.
- It is the Team’s *impression* that the training has mostly been on technical, operational and research aspects (as this is the obvious strength of some of the Norwegian institutions), and not so much on the managerial aspects, e.g. on improved planning and management methodologies at a higher level.
- Although important input has been made on planning and managerial issues, the *visible* fruit of such seeds will evidently not come overnight, as this is working on people’s mentality to a large extent still working in a centralised “plan-economy” system and centralised decision-making structures.
- In general, the Norwegian partners were obviously (of natural reasons) not adequately acquainted with Chinese culture, way of thinking, institutional set-ups and mode of planning and administrative practices when they started, (although some Norwegian staff members made appreciable efforts in reading about Chinese culture, politics etc. prior to and during the projects). Some of the project designs have been too ambitious in this respect, and too much based on experience from elsewhere in the world.
- At least in a couple of projects, the Chinese counterparts expressed views which by the Review Team was interpreted as the Norwegian partners having involved the Chinese too little in the planning and design of the projects.
- One universal problem in the projects was the difference in how the Norwegians and Chinese construed a signed contract. The Norwegians took the signed contract for given, almost word by word, as the Chinese side took the signed contract more as an *intention to cooperate*, and the signing merely represented the starting point for further detailed negotiations.

- ... that the Norwegian partners, due to lack of working experience from China, to some extent underestimated the cultural differences and the obvious complications concerning communication in the initial stage.
- The Team assumes that some of the Norwegian consultants in the beginning, to some degree, took it for "granted" that as long as they provided a new, and presumably better planning and management system, this system would be welcomed and quickly adopted by the Chinese counterpart. In future projects, the Team will advise the Norwegian partners to carefully examine the existing planning and management system in an early phase, and investigate how the proposed new system can be adopted in the existing one. A precondition for success is in any case that the decision-makers on the recipient side have a "felt need" for improving their system.

No. 5 REVIEW OF NORWEGIAN SUPPORT TO THE PALESTINIAN WATER AUTHORITY (PHASE II). Final Report 14 June 2001. Tore Laugerud (Norconsult), Jens Claussen (NCG)

- The Norwegian funding for PWA is *directed at building capacity to undertake the core role of PWA*, focussing on the key areas of operation that will be prevailing once the peace is implemented and the sector restructured. The flexible approach to funding by NORAD significantly *reduces transaction costs* for PWA and enables PWA to manage tasks as a regular institution.
- The support by Norway has been labelled as "institution building" through a modality of budget support including technical assistance through "institutional cooperation". A more appropriate term might be to call it support for "*institutional development*" since in all aspects the institution has been successfully built ...
- The above observation stands in contrast to the fact that available resources for TA throughout has been under-utilised, a resource which could have increased capacity significantly and enabled many of the planned outputs to be produced on time.
- International TA has been procured for the audit of the performance contracts for the regional utilities, the Water Rules (NVE consultants) and the NVE resident Long-term Advisor. This represents a significant change from Phase I with large volumes of Norwegian TA coordinated by NVE utilising internal personnel and personnel from their other two Norwegian partner institutions under the contract. The less than planned expenditure under respective activities may accordingly be partly explained by the significant lower cost for local/regional TA compared to the Norwegian TA. It may also be explained by a too *ambitious project design* with too many activities to be implemented in too short period.
- The difference in TA procurement between the two project phases can also be explained by the *change from "supply push" to "demand driven"* approach in use of TA

Recommendations:

- The support ensures flexibility for PWA in using the funds as deemed necessary to undertake the core activities of the institution. Accordingly, the funds should *not be tied* to a specified component or TA requirement.
- ... specify in more detail the activities that are remaining with *clearly defined outputs* to be monitored according to a given timeframe.
- A list of possible TA providers (national and international consultants, institutions and individual advisors) with whom PWA has successfully cooperated and wants to use again, must be prepared matching the activities, and these advisors subsequently contacted for discussion of timing and availability of the specific TA.
- It is recommended that the TA to be contracted are not only used to initiate tasks and prepare specific outputs but to continue working with PWA to follow up the developments in a *longer term perspective* by frequent visits at regular intervals i.e. as long-term advisors rather than short-term.
- The question of a *future institutional cooperation arrangement* has been discussed. Rather than "tying" the cooperation to one institution supplying all the TA needs it is proposed that PWA should source the required TA more openly. PWA has through the cooperation with NVE gradually been introduced to a number of advisors which they have the opportunity to contract directly and in addition have widened their network of TA suppliers significantly to service their needs. Accordingly, it does not seem to be a need for a continuation of the current arrangement with NVE (which appears to be a view shared by both parties).

- Following the above, there is also a limited need for continuing the contract with NVE when the present resident Long-term Advisor expires (September 2001). This arrangement has, as mentioned under Section 4.1, not been cost-effective as means of providing the required support, probably most of all due to the costs associated with the issue of being resident in an area with frequent constraints related to security and mobility. The key words for cooperation between PWA and TA advisors are “confidence” and “continuation”. This means that a long-term commitment from the advisors must be encouraged, and PWA should keep up a continuous dialogue with them to keep them updated on the PWA development. The contract with such advisors should be flexible and specified services will be requested and activated when needed by PWA according to the programme.

No. 6 REVIEW OF AFRICA 2009. Final Report, 15 October 2001

7.1. Main Objective and Scope

The main objective of the Africa 2009 program is to increase the capacity for management and conservation of immovable cultural heritage for nations in Sub-Sahara Africa. This agenda is translated into a programme focussing on *training* as the main tool to achieve the objective through regional training courses and seminars offered to professionals in all nations in the region as well as through a selection of national projet situès supporting the same. It was introduced by a partnership of the UNESCO World Heritage Centre (WHC), ICCROM, CRATERre-EAG, and African Cultural Heritage Organisations.

The programme started implementation in 1998/99 as a pilot programme (phase I) to be completed by end 2001. The programme consists of two main categories of activities, regional activities (project cadre) mainly in the form of training and seminars open to participation from all countries in Sub-Sahara Africa and national projects with management, conservation and training support at specific sites (projet situès).

The main purpose of the review has been to assess the outcomes from the pilot phase of the Programme and to propose recommendations for the next phase.

7.2 Main findings

The methodology applied with regional courses combined with projet situès has been innovative and proven as a valuable approach in making the training more relevant and improved overall quality.

The structure for implementation and the programme organisation, especially the Directors seminars have functioned as quality assurance and opportunity to further assess training needs and requirements of the training provided. It has given an opportunity by representatives of all participating countries to give overall direction to the program. In this respect the program has ensured a participatory approach to implementation.

Based on the information provided the cost per participant in the regional courses and seminars compares well with similar opportunities overseas. Considering that the programme is still in its pilot phase it is assumed that in the next phase it will scale up the level of activity even further improving overall efficiency.

The programme appears to have been implemented by a highly motivated management and support staff from all the various institutions participating.

In terms of the three specific “objectives” as defined by the current program framework; contribute to development of national policy and legal framework, building national capacities and networking, the following observations are made:

- ☐ The objective to develop policy and legal frameworks of participating countries has only partially been met. So far the main output has been through training of participants in the regional courses (included as course modules)
- ☐ In terms of capacity building, 42 participants from 33 countries have been trained in the regional courses as of June 2001. Some of them also received additional training in projet situès.
- ☐ The training provided has gradually used expertise in the region as substitution of international expertise and also used previous participants as contributors and resource persons to the courses ensuring even further regional ownership to the program.
- ☐ The quality of the training provided appears to meet the needs judging from course evaluations. The selection process of participants for training and the design of the programme have, however, not

taken into account that the capacity and training needs differ substantially between the countries.

The projet situès has created national awareness on the importance of heritage conservation in general and in the countries where they are located in particular. The use of projet situès as opportunities for additional training for participants could, however, be further explored with the opportunity they give for field experience across countries and different types of conservation work.

Networking has been established through procedures for exchange of information supported by installation of some computer hardware in institutions in need as well as through the development of a homepage for exchange of information and general promotion. However, networking could also be developed through use of resources across countries facilitating even closer cooperation between national institutions in the region, as means of supporting awareness, as a cost efficient avenue for implementing national conservation projects and as means of promoting additional training.

As indicated above the program has made a number of important achievements. However, the program *lacks a consistent design*. If the main objective is *capacity building* some of the *program components needs to be adjusted* to ensure an outcome consistent with the objective. This issue needs in our view to be addressed in terms of two components in the programme; developing national policy and legal frameworks (listed as an objective) and in the selection and use of projet situès as a tool for training.

The weaknesses in program design are also reflected in the *lack of clearly defined indicators* to monitor progress for some of the components and lack of basic program information and/or procedures to collect and analyse them to assess outcome. The current *program organisation* appears to need some clarification concerning roles and responsibilities;

The programme is totally dependent on external funding with only limited contributions from host Governments to some components. For a programme of this nature it is difficult to find other options for ensuring finance in the short to medium term. This issue is also linked to the issue of sustainability in institutional terms as well as ownership. If the programme activities are to be sustained by the beneficiary countries themselves, the programme would need to gradually build capacity in the region to take on more responsibility for planning, management and implementation of the programme components.

7.3 Main Recommendations

The programme has proved to meet the basic requirements for training as means of capacity building for conservation and management of immovable cultural heritage in Africa. It is accordingly recommended that the program should be granted the full support for continuation, however with some proposed adjustments for the next phase in accordance with the recommendations elaborated below.

It is recommended that a survey is carried out to ensure that the program has made an impact for capacity building in the participating countries. Such a survey would require that a questionnaire is submitted to all 44 previous participants and the 33 national institutions from which they were employed in addition to in-depth assessment of changes that may be associated to the program through interviews/visits to a sample selection of 6 – 8 national institutions/countries.

The first output could be *national awareness* as means of promoting stronger political and financial commitment by national governments, first and foremost in those countries with the weakest capacity and thus fewest eligible participants for training.

The main activities would be awareness seminars in concerned countries by the use of resource persons from countries with higher capacities presenting their country as case studies.

The second output could continue to be *trained national professionals* in the participating countries through regional training courses, seminars and projet situès, however with the some specific recommended adjustments.

The current institutional framework for implementation appears to need some clarification concerning

roles and responsibilities. Judging from the minutes from the director's seminars and comments from some directors, the various roles of the different "units" in the "organisation" needs to be more clearly defined.

For a program of this size and complexity there is a need to consider strengthening the programme management capacity, especially if it is to increase level of activity to improve cost efficiency and outreach.

It is recommended to increase the number of staff in programme management to at least 3 – 4 persons; one with the overall program management and monitoring responsibility, one responsible for regional courses in English and French, one for developing and coordinating projet situèes and one for maintaining information networks, develop and facilitate cross border collaboration of professionals.

Following the above recommendations it is the teams sincere view that Africa 2009 needs increased support to implement its ambitious agenda. However, for continued and increased support through phase II of the programme the issue of *sustainability* by elaborating a plan for gradual transition of management and implementation responsibilities of core programme activities to institutions in the region. It would need to take into account the implication for the future organisational structure of the programme.

No. 7 MID-TERM REVIEW OF ZAM 063 INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION PREVENTION PROGRAMME (IPPP), Phase II. 2002. Tore Laugerud (Norconsult), Patrick Chipungu (Denams Consultants).

- The 1999 review team presented several recommendations to remedy the shortcomings and improve the programme performance in Phase II Amongst others, it was emphasised that: ECZ staff must get more knowledge of the industrial processes; ...; an assessment of ECZ potential for future financial sustainability should be undertaken; and ECZ should review and revise internal management procedures.
- The Mid-term Review Team of Phase II finds with satisfaction that the bulk of recommendations from the Phase I review have been taken into account in the design of the Phase II programme. In addition, the recommendations (with a few exceptions) from the appraisal mission have been incorporated into the Final Project Document, dated 14 March 2000.
- Another important assumption for *institutional* sustainability is that ECZ can *retain staff* that has already been trained in
- The NORAD support is based on the principle of the receiving institution maintaining responsibility of its own development, without any pushing from the donor or in principle from the TA partners. Consequently, the overall success of the IPPP must be measured against the success and sustainability of ECZ as a whole, subsequently working without donor support in the foreseeable future.
- DNV has a lump sum contract with ZACCI, where the total cost of the activities are invoiced fully up to the budget sum, without any breakdown of hours spent, cost of travels etc., whereas SFT is invoicing according to actual man-hours spent and costs incurred. The latter modality is the most customary in NORAD-supported projects, as it gives full transparency of the costs involved for all parties.
- Having said this, the TA from Norway is by all parties construed as very good and efficient. Good personal relationships seem to have been developed during the course of the IPPP, and there is today definitely a mutual trust against one another in the Programme. The Team has nevertheless detected some smaller "impatience" from the SFT staff regarding postponed (or partly lack of) request for follow-up visits. The Review Team appreciates that SFT feels that progress is somewhat slower than expected, and this is more the rule than the exception in any development assistance programmes. Nevertheless, part of the recipient's responsibility is that the pace of the development process must follow the local needs and abilities to be part of the processes (steered by whatever reasons), and there is no basis for the Review Team to say that this has not been the case in the IPPP. However, the overall progress has been somewhat slower than expected, but that is assumed to be merely due to over-ambitious planning at the start-up of the phase.

- The project management training undertaken by a consultant from DNV has been received very favourably amongst the ECZ staff participating,
- The inspectors receive good training in ECZ, not least thanks to the NORAD support to IPPP. As ECZ is the only institution in Zambia where staff can get practical environmental management and pollution control training, the staff is very attractive on the open market. Most of the staff quitting is taking up positions in the private sector receiving much more favourable packages (salaries, allowances, housing support, using of vehicles, etc.).

No. 8 PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA: PHASE II. Report from a business team. Report January 2003. Torbjørn Damhaug (Water Reflection), Frank Grønsund (Frank Grønsund Agentur AS), Einar Risa (Management and Finance AS), Morten Snaprud (Statkraft/Grøner AS), Kjartan Stigen (Norfund), Vidar Lindefjeld (NHO).

Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the suggestions put forward, the team has identified 24 specific projects for further consideration. We believe them to be particularly beneficial to the development of the Ugandan private sector and to partnerships with Norwegian actors. The projects relate to different sectors, and they vary in scope as well as in costs and complexity.....

Group 3: Educating and training Ugandans in Norway (10)

- Objective: To support PSD in Uganda by establishing an integrated system of education and professional training of young Ugandans in Norway supplemented by financial schemes to assist them when they go back to Uganda to set up their own business.

Building on the examples of NOREMA and NORPLAN, a co-ordinated approach is needed, involving i. a. NHO, NORAD, Staten Lånekasse, Makerere University, Fredskorpset as well as individual Norwegian companies. The scheme should comprise:

- theoretical studies in Norway at university/business school level (Lånekassen)
- exchange of trainees in Norwegian and Ugandan companies (Fredskorpset)
- loans or grants to finance the setting up of small businesses in Uganda for Ugandans participating in the scheme (Norfund)
- professional follow-up and support by consultants in Uganda

..... Based on these observations, the team has identified three levels of business engagement in Uganda, requiring different approaches from NORAD and Norwegian funding institutions as far as incentives are concerned:

Level three: Projects characterised by their high content of longer term development co-operation rather than by direct commercial viability. Despite the low degree of immediate commercial viability such targeted co-operation initiatives may have immense impacts on future private sector development in Uganda. An example of this is the proposed training of talented business creators through exchange programmes involving universities and private companies.

Consequently, the team suggests that the following elements be included, wherever appropriate, in tenders/contracts funded by NORAD/Norfund, regardless of the size of the contract:

- ...
- obligation to provide transfer of technology and know-how to local partner
- establish comprehensive training schemes for local staff

The team suggests that NORAD apply certain principles of a practical nature when considering PSD projects in Uganda:

- Partnerships involving the exchange of personnel between the Ugandan and Norwegian company will probably enhance the quality of the co-operation. Professional training and skills development,

acquiring business experience as well as cultural insight are just a few of the advantages to be achieved

(The report does not contain useful analysis of issues that are directly relevant to the study, as the starting point is commercial cooperation, and not institutional development per se).

No. 9 MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION PROGRAMME WITH SOUTH AFRICA, Final Report June 2003. Ulrich Meier (Scanteam), Dave MacDevette (EASD)

- Capacity building, initially thought to be of major concern, turned out not to be the issue that it was thought to be. The Department did not prioritise institutional capacity building in any systematic way under the programme, except in the areas where project activities were explicitly with the purpose of capacity building (such as Climate Change).
- On the other hand and on an individual level, “learning-by-doing” has of course taken place and Norway has provided considerable exposure and training by inviting individuals for work visits to Norway. In view of high staff turnover however, it is questionable to what degree this could have contributed sustainably to institutional capacity building.
- Norwegian cooperation partners do not have an appropriate platform within the Department to discuss new approaches and ideas that address value adding dimensions and the strengthening of the focus. This resulted in non-use of additional inputs that are potentially available from the Norwegian partners.
- It appears that the roles of key personnel in DEAT and the Norwegian team were not clear.
- Significant senior staff changes took place on both sides at a critical point in the programme, ... It appears that difficulties in taking ownership of the programme quickly and effectively were experienced.
- a senior DEAT technical manager (Deputy Director) had to work for eighty percent of her time to manage a programme one third of the size of the current ECP. In the current ECP it appears that no senior DEAT person was assigned the responsibility and given the time for the management of the programme.
- It also appears that the focus of the Norwegian interaction and advice was at the project level and insufficient attempts were made to provide support to DEAT in the strategic management of the programme.
- It appears that the important aspect of capacity building in project planning in DEAT and in certain implementing agents was not formally programmed. Nor was adequate support, training, coaching and supervision of the project planning and management process provided for the ECP.
- The institutions in question are the Ministry of Environment (MOE), the Directorate for Cultural Heritage (NDCH) in two roles, a) providing the Technical Coordinator for the programme and b) on institutional cooperation under theme 3, the Directorate for Nature Management (NDNM), the Norwegian Meteorological Department, the Pollution Control Authority (SFT), the Norwegian Air Research Institute (NILU), GRID Arendal, Norway Statistics and the Nordic World Heritage Foundation. ECON, which is not an institution but a consultancy, should also be mentioned.
- Judging from interviews with Norwegian stakeholders, the role of the Technical Coordinator in the task of coordination of the Norwegian participants in the programme, is greatly appreciated. Regular meetings are being held and these have been useful, and have contributed to a boarder understanding of the issues involved. Strategic thinking and debates take place frequently. It is the review’s understanding that this contributes greatly to the identification of synergy potentials and linkages between projects.
- Officials of the South Durban Basin AQMP and the eThekweni project expressed great satisfaction with the opportunity to work with NILU and SFT. The level of technical competence and the approach to solving the identified problems is greatly appreciated and praised.
- The view was expressed that the exchange of experiences with the Norwegian Meteorological Department was useful to the Weather Service. No substantial collaboration developed from this exchange because the services that the Weather Service required could be sourced in South Africa.

- it was felt by the NDNM that it could not contribute substantially to the knowledge regarding wetland inventory available in South Africa.
- The cooperation with GRID Arendal, especially on State of Environment reporting is greatly valued by personnel responsible for the respective activities. Similarly, the information exchange with Statistics Norway was found useful, but no closer cooperation materialised in this case, despite the fact that proposals and budgets were prepared from the Norwegian side.
- Several Norwegian stakeholders expressed the view that environmental activities in South Africa are generally of a considerably higher professional standard as compared to other African countries. Therefore, the need for institutional cooperation appeared to be less.
- In general terms, all stakeholders expressed the view that the cooperation is of mutual benefit. However, significant concrete benefits could not be identified at the present stage of the programme. The reason may simply be that it is too early for this to become evident. The projects with the most intensive cooperation have just recently really started.
- The review's opinion is that, if South Africa will have to bear the full cost of cooperation, it may choose other partners that would incur lower costs, even at the expense of quality and the scope of service. Also, it is felt to be unrealistic to expect continuing cooperation "cooking on a small flame" in the longer term.
- If it is not possible to identify concrete areas of cooperation with defined objectives and intended results, mutual cooperation in the long term will not be realistic.
- Future cooperation between Norwegian institutions and South African institutions will most likely not be feasible in the absence of donor funding and without project activities. The concept that mutual interest as a driving force would result in long-term cooperation is idealistic rather than realistic.
- Therefore, the ECP appears not to have contributed significantly to capacity building within DEAT and related institutions, in the sense that a specific management tool was learned by individuals and adopted as the standard in the institution. Only the latter would signify institutional capacity building as opposed to individual training.
- There appears to be no common understanding amongst the Norwegian partners or their role in capacity building within the ECP, other than on defined tasks agreed to in the BP. Considerable individual exposure and training has been imparted through visits to Norway. In view of relatively high staff turnover in DEAT, the effectiveness of this with regard to institutional capacity building is questionable.
- The management concept of the eThekweni institutional cooperation project includes a Steering Committee. Its role is not clear. In the perception of the review it should play a strictly supervisory and advisory role to project management but it is foreseen to be assigned with the role of secretariat and reporting. To be the secretariat it would need to be permanently staffed and reporting is normally the task of the joint project management.
- Capacity building at the project level has generally taken place to a variable extent, depending on the specific project activity. Learning-by-doing has probably been of importance in terms of individual capacity. It is not possible to measure this and the assumption that this would have resulted in improved institutional capacity within DEAT is questionable.

NO. 10 LEARNING FROM THE PAST, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: NORAGRIC/NLH'S PARTNERSHIPS WITH UNIVERSITIES IN AFRICA. By Joanna A.A. Boddens-Hosang (Ed.)
Noragric Report No. 15 ; August 2003, Noragric, Agricultural University of Norway

8.1. Background and Objective

During the 30-odd years of Noragric/NLH's institutional collaboration with the African agricultural universities reviewed in this report, the changes within the framework of the collaboration have differed for each of the partnerships. The older partnerships, such as those with Makerere and Sokoine universities, were established during a time when education programmes were of a traditional nature, with a relatively one-way flow of capacity building from North to South. Upon graduation, students from these African universities were almost assured of jobs in the public sector after leaving the university.

However, the political, social and economic changes on the African continent also led to a need for

different skills and know-how to meet the new demands from society. In addition, positions in the public domain became scarce, bright young graduates in some cases left the country to find jobs elsewhere and self-employment has increasingly become a necessity. Universities were faced with the consequences of these changes for their graduates and an increased scrutiny of the curricula followed. The results were mixed. The universities who were able to meet the new challenges have shifted their role and taken on the responsibility of adapting their curricula to better educate students, the potential “leaders of tomorrow’s world”.

Has Noragric/NLH facilitated in making higher education with our African partners pertinent to graduates in order to meet their society’s needs? Has the collaboration indeed been relevant in the past, and is it today?

8.2. Capacity and institution building findings

The response to these questions varies. In the case of Sokoine University, for example, the changes of focus in the partnership from capacity building to cooperation for mutual interest, joint research that helps towards reducing poverty, and joint decision-making turned out to be essential for allowing the partnership to remain relevant and grow. This strong institution-to-institution collaboration, backed by government commitment, has also been a strong factor in the partnership with Awassa College in Ethiopia. Although difficult to pin-point exact Norwegian impact on the partnership, the author notes visible progress over the course of the years, where the quality of education has increased, teachers have received relevant experience relating to local contexts, which has led to better graduates. Indeed, the profile of the Ethiopian and Eritrean graduates has shown that none of the graduates are unemployed and that those interviewed classified their training as highly relevant.

While the partnership with Makerere University seems to have some flaws – among others, weak on collaborative activities, insufficient contribution from NLH in developing curricula for self-employment – the recent development of moving towards regionalising the interdisciplinary education activities under the MSc programmes is seen as a positive step. Regarding Bunda College (Malawi), the author notes that NLH’s possibility to influence the attainability of higher education has been rather restricted, to a large extent due to a lack of sufficient funds. Some areas for improvement are the need for more practical skills, outreach and quality management.

In conclusion, whilst Noragric/NLH’s partnerships in general can be seen as having been mutually supportive, in some cases adapting to the changes needed in higher education, there is still room for improvement. The increased need for graduates to fulfil employers’ needs in broader areas such as communication, management skills and business administration, as well as entrepreneurial skills, will require a learning process that is demand-driven, practical and problem-solution oriented. The shift from purely one-sided scientific knowledge transfer to integrating practical skills into the curricula and conducting relevant, applied research will become increasingly important in the future in order for graduates to be better equipped to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

No. 11 EXTERNAL REVIEW OF IUCN. October 2003. Gabor Bruszt; Tania Ammour; Jens Claussen; Zenda Ofir; N.C. Saxena; Stephen Turner

Since 1993, the Union and its major donors have commissioned periodic External Reviews for an overall analysis of its condition and performance. The most recent ER, in 1999, took place at a difficult time in the Union’s history. It identified three areas of urgent concern. One was the then IUCN Programme and the way a new one was being prepared for submission to the 2000 World Conservation Congress. The ER found that the 1997-1999 Programme, and the planning process, were seriously flawed. We find in 2003 that the current Programme, and the consultative processes to prepare its successor, are a major strength of the Union. A second area of concern was the coherence and quality of IUCN’s knowledge management, and the role of the Commissions in that process. We find four years later that some progress has been made with regard to knowledge management, although IUCN acknowledges that more needs to be done. Positive steps have been taken with regard to Commissions’ role in the Programme, as well as their governance. The overall governance of the Union was the third major problem area identified in

1999, and the problems became more apparent at the World Congress in 2000. IUCN reacted in 2001 with a Governance Task Force. This ER finds that the Task Force has made several sound recommendations that now await approval by Council and the Congress.

IUCN has thus worked proactively over the last four years to tackle the major issues identified by the 1999 ER, as well as the many other challenges with which it is constantly confronted.

Examples in recent years include ... the way it builds capacity through its Membership, Commissions and many partnerships; and the way it builds awareness and action, as through its strong performance at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development.

... the Union needs a long term logic that builds Member capacity and leads ultimately to a more supportive, background role for the Secretariat.

It is not possible for us to determine how effective IUCN's knowledge dissemination systems have been. According to responses to question 20 in our survey (Annex 2), by far the most common mechanism for promoting the use of the knowledge generated is meetings and workshops – verbal dissemination, in other words, as opposed to the written form.

Ways should be explored to make space for reflection and learning as core functions of any Programme activity, generating synthesised knowledge – for example, on best practice – for both external and internal use. The challenge is to interpret raw information and aggregate this where possible across activities and component programmes, further deepening understanding of the key issues that the Union seeks to address. Further means to stimulate knowledge transfer and learning across thematic and component programme boundaries will have to be found.

The M&E system remains better at analysing the Union's operations than measuring or understanding their outcomes. There is still much confusion in the formulation and differentiation of activities, outputs and outcomes – which makes meaningful evaluation and learning difficult.

We believe that the strategic role of the Human Resources Unit at headquarters should be emphasised and strengthened. In particular, the evolving content of the Programme and its implementation arrangements require review of qualifications and recruitment policies; a thorough performance management system; and facilities for the professional development of existing staff, including management skills.

IUCN must gradually turn from its 'project execution culture' towards a culture more in the spirit of its new Programme. Its professional staff must be more competent in understanding the situations and processes of learning and the management of knowledge, more sensitive to and skilful in capacity building and empowerment, and better in policy research, influence and communication between global, national and regional levels.

(The 110-pages report does not contain useful analysis of issues that are directly relevant to the study, as the theme focuses on the head offices of the institution and only to a limited degree on the support to development countries institutions).

No. 12 MID-TERM REVIEW. NATIONAL WATER SECTOR MANAGEMENT PROJECT (MAWASMA), ANGOLA. Final Report, January 2004. Oddwin Skaiaa (Tranor) and Manuel Quintino.

From Summary:

1. Main objectives: A strengthened institutional capability and capacity of DNA through an institutional cooperation with NVE; Improved Water Sector legal and institutional framework; A strengthened DNA in the regional cooperation on water resources.
2. In 2003 the spending has been quite a bit lower than budgeted, overall only 42 %, and the training component is down to 22 %. The latter is probably due to lack of available, qualified staff to train. This should be taken as an indication that the work input has not been in conformity with the intentions in the budgets, or that the budgeting is unrealistic high and does not reflect the available resources in the institutional cooperation.

3. The objectives proposed by the project were perhaps not realistically designed, as the progress of some of the activities in fact are out of the hands of the NAWASMA staff.
4. The review team believes that the reason for a weak institutional approach not only is due to lack of sufficient permanent staff within DNA/DRH, but may also be found in the incongruity between the defined Goal and Scope in the Contract between MINEA and NVE.
5. ... progress is slow due to lack of sufficient legal resources and capacity.
6. a more pro-active role from the side of NVE, would better secure the programme's success.
7. Institutional development should be given more focus, by hiring an Institutional Adviser full time;
8. Written documentation within NAWASMA should be improved beyond that of progress reporting. This relates to assessments, training material, planning tools, work completion reports, minutes of meetings, etc.
9. A realistic Personnel Development Plan must be prepared by MINEA as basis for re-planning and adjusting the NAWASMA more in line with the project goals.
10. Little more than one year is a too short period for a project like NAWASMA to show lasting results or impacts. In the water resources sector it is required to have long-term perspectives and long-term interventions.

From main report:

- The Water Sector Development Strategy, not yet approved by the Angolan cabinet, states that the WRS has an institutional structure still fragile.
- Generally it may be observed that work related to physical output like e.g. rehabilitation of hydrometric stations is followed up as planned, while work related to the development of institutional and legal framework is quite a bit delayed. The review team feels that this has been an unnecessary neglected line of work so far in the institutional cooperation between DNA and NVE. It is understood that capacity building has limited value until more permanent staff is in place, and delays in various training areas are therefore understandable. However, a corresponding delay in development of the institutional and legal framework does not seem justifiable.
- Unless a good coordination is revealed among MINEA/DNA and the Provincial Governments, the institutional impact of the water sector management will be insignificant.
- The insufficient availability of human resources is the main weakness for the water sector. According to the Water Sector Development Strategy, the lack of human resources at all levels for the maintenance and exploration of water supply system was always one of the main limitations of the Water Sector.
- The delay in the execution of ... is partly reported to be due to capacity problems at both DNA and NVE and partly due to the wish to wait until completion of the quality assurance of the existing data. Either way time is lost which could have saved if the request for proposals had been prepared in good time.
- An important issue is DNA's institutional capability to cooperate with the consultant doing the rapid assessment. The review team would have liked to see plans for institutionalising this activity rather than having the consultants producing a report on their own. The statement in the invitation that "the Client intends to assist with staff to be assigned part time to the project" is very weak, it would have been a more satisfactory situation if a Personnel Development Plan had been approved for DNA, as a background support for the various planned activities.
- .. it is extremely important to document the work and to keep manuals and guidelines for later use. When most information is communicated verbally it is only available for those present at the moment.
- A curiosity on the project management side is that the Norwegian long-term Hydrological Adviser has not yet obtained his work permit for Angola. This is in breach with the Bilateral Agreement, ...
- Value added from Inst. Coop.: .. continued institutional cooperation between Angola and Norway on the water supply and sanitation sector, provided optimum designed and carried out, ref. Chapter 4.3.1 v, is of potential high value to Angola.
- A serious constraint for the sustainable development of NAWASMA project activities is the lack of specialised Human Resources at various levels.
- The level of ambition at MINEA/DNA appears to be very high, although the leadership of the Water Sector is aware that such an ambition may not reflect the reality on the ground.

- Needless to say, human resources are crucial for the development of the national Water Sector. DNA is understaffed. The same happens with the Provincial Directorates of Energy, Water and Sanitation. A national training programme should be put in place envisaging the training of staff to be recruited and re-training of the existing few staff in a way to render the Water Sector more sustainable from the human resources point of view.
- It was also felt that in the provinces the level of ownership of the project is very low.
- The institutional cooperation between NVE and MINEA/DNA is not being used envisaging the institutional strengthening of MINEA/DNA. Presumably mostly owing to the insufficient staffing situation focus has been put on the pilot project and less on institutional development. However, more could have been done on institutional development, specifically in the planning aspect, in the anticipation for the staffing situation to improve. This can only be achieved provided a second successful phase is completed.
- .. Therefore, the project is on the right track, but there is still a long way to go.
- Some attempts have been made to involve the provincial levels in the NAWASMA project, however, the ideal solution has not yet been found. There is a need to solve the issues of shared priorities, remuneration, etc. a solution to increased involvement of the provincial level seems pertinent.
- A project related to improved management of water resources, in Angola's post-war situation, can obviously not be concluded in two years. Having in mind that the rehabilitation of the Water Sector in Angola will go around the NAWASMA project, its extension should be pondered cautiously, and the review team therefore recommends that a second phase be planned, possibly with financial contributions also from other donors.
- NVE as institutional partner to DNA should be more actively involved in the institutional and legal aspects of the cooperation and should take a more pro-active role. For example, NVE should be more involved in the support to be given to MINEA/DNA towards the conclusion of the draft regulations to the new Water Law.

NO. 13 EVALUATION REPORT 3/2004: EVALUATION OF CESAR'S ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST FUNDED BY NORWAY. A report by Nordic Consulting Group AS.

11.1 Background and Purpose

This report presents the outcome of an evaluation of activities in the Middle East by the centre for Environmental Studies and Resource Management (CESAR). The evaluation has been commissioned by the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. The evaluation has been undertaken by Nordic Consulting Group with a team consisting of Norwegian and regional experts. The main purposes of the evaluation have been:

- To assess the relevance of CESAR's work as part of Norwegian efforts to facilitate the peace process in the Middle East through projects promoting regional cooperation on joint water resources.
 - To provide an overview of and assess the projects to support the above process funded by the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway (MFA) and the Norwegian Agency for development Cooperation (NORAD) and implemented by CESAR.
 - To make recommendations concerning future Norwegian involvement in the region concerning water issues, including the role of CESAR. In the Middle East CESAR has played and/or attempted to play a role related to three sets of water problems;
-
- The first involves the Jordan and Yarmuk River system, as well as the West Bank and Gaza aquifers. Countries involved include Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories.
 - The second involves the Tigris and Euphrates River systems, which includes Syria, Turkey and Iraq.
 - The third involves the Litani River Basin in Lebanon, which is indirectly related to the Jordan River Basin.

The main projects of CESAR subject to this evaluation have been;

- Projects under the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Water (MWGW) established in 1992 following the Madrid Conference in 1991. These projects were undertaken with participation from

and focus on Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Jordan, and with continued attempts to bring Syria and Lebanon into the process. The projects under this heading are Water Resource Data for Decision Making in the Middle East (Atlas I), the Regional Comparative Study on Water Laws, Water Institutions and Water Economics with separate regional studies covering Israel, PA and Jordan (Vol. I), and Syria and Lebanon (Vol. II), Waternet which currently involves Israel, PA and Jordan, and the Regional Waternet and Research Centre which is under development based in Amman under an agreement between the three “Core Parties” Israel, PA and Jordan.

- A separate initiative related to Lebanon.
- A project to establish an Early Warning System for Jordan following a specific request related to problems of water supply to Amman through the King Abdullah Canal in 1998.
- Initiatives to open a dialogue with Syria – partly as an attempt to bring Syria closer to the work of the MWGW and partly engaging in a process to promote dialogue between Turkey, Syria and Iraq on the Tigris and Euphrates River systems. This included the Water Resource Management project for the Tigris and Euphrates River systems (Atlas II), the supply of a Water Monitoring System for Syria (Atlas IIb) and a study to assist Syria in developing its water management system.

The activities have been assessed in the light of the many political developments in the region since the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the fact that activities have been undertaken in an environment characterised by frequent and unpredictable political changes.

The main issue for this evaluation has been to assess how the parties have benefited from the contribution CESAR and MFA have made to the process they intended to support. The projects undertaken have been assessed focussing on their relevance in supporting these processes, the efficiency in implementing them and actual quantity and quality of outputs produced.

It is important to keep in mind the political and historic context in which the above has been implemented. The processes facilitated and projects implemented have been continuously affected by a very difficult and unpredictable political environment with requirements for frequent changes in approach to overcome constraints in implementation. Even to maintain the required dialogue between the parties in order to proceed with various activities has often posed a challenge far beyond what could be initially foreseen. This is a feature which has characterised all externally supported processes in this region attempting to promote dialogue among the various parties. It may serve to explain why real “success stories” are few and far between, and few attempts to facilitate transboundary cooperation in the region can show outcomes as initially planned.

11.2. Key findings

Since CESAR was established in 1995 until 2002, it has received 75.4 million NOK from MFA and 3.7 million NOK from NORAD for the above projects. MFA has been the main promoter and financial partner for CESAR. This does not include funding of 8.1 million NOK from MFA to the World Foundation for Environment and Development (WFED), the foundation CESAR evolved from, and which used some of the funding for projects subsequently transferred to CESAR.

In summary, the assessment of the projects and the wider process CESAR has been engaged in indicate that CESAR has played an important role as a facilitator, and even sometimes as a mediator. In the context of the MWGW and associated projects, CESAR has acted as a facilitator and moderator in such a manner that it has generated trust and confidence among the Core Parties to proceed with the joint activities initiated.

The role CESAR has played in this context has created an environment which has promoted continued cooperation among the parties even during times when the political environment has been non-conducive. In this respect CESAR has made significant contributions to promoting and maintaining a dialogue among the parties.

CESAR has on several occasions, through some of the projects, attempted to bring Syria and Lebanon

into the MWGW, but due to the political climate in the region this has never materialised. However, through this process, CESAR opened the door for a wider cooperation with Syria and gradually attempted to establish a tripartite process to include Turkey and Iraq. These achievements notwithstanding, the actual outcomes of the projects vary significantly.

Water Atlas I produced a publication which was neither widely distributed nor used. The publication presented and contained references to publicly available data but with limited new information. Despite the shortcomings of the output, the project proved to be instrumental in introducing CESAR to the MWGW as a facilitator for subsequent projects.

The Regional Comparative Studies were the first of CESAR's projects formally adopted under the framework of the MWGW. This project led to a closer cooperation among the parties and created an environment for confidence building among them. On one occasion it even led to the first (and only) meeting among all five parties.

It also served to promote a tangible output promoted by Norway, namely the Declaration of Principles for Cooperation on Water-related Matters and New and Additional Water Resources (DOP) among the three Core Parties in 1996. The DOP paved the way for longer term cooperation (like the Waternet and establishing the Regional Waternet and Research Centre).

The *Waternet* project was intended to establish a computerised library system connected through a network to share water related information among the three Core Parties. The regional network has so far not functioned. It has, to a very limited extent, been institutionalised among the parties to maintain its operation. These are issues that need to be addressed if the Waternet is to be reactivated and fully implemented.

The Regional Water Centre has yet to be fully established and subsequently it is too early to draw any conclusion as to its effectiveness and impact. It will however require financial commitments from the parties to be sustained. With its engagement in the comparative studies,

CESAR was requested to provide assistance for the development of a *Palestinian Water Law*. The initial draft was used for elaborating a Palestinian water law although through a process that did not fully engage relevant Palestinian institutions in the process. This may serve to explain the substantial deviation between the initial drafts and the final outcome.

The *Early Warning System* supplied by CESAR to Jordan may be claimed to have had an adverse impact since the initial problem it was supposed to resolve still remains unresolved. The cost of the project so far is almost three times the cost of similar projects implemented by others in Jordan during the same period. There is a need to conduct an external diagnostic study to identify possible actions to successfully implement it.

Water Atlas II has produced a comprehensive and well founded set of water related information. It has been shared by the parties; Turkey, Syria and Iraq and served to initiate a dialogue on possible cooperation. It remains to be seen if it can subsequently lead to real dialogue and cooperation among the parties, a process which also has been significantly affected by the situation in Iraq.

Atlas Iib in Syria has many of the same technical characteristics as the Early Warning System in Jordan, and suffers many of the same technical problems. It will require much of the same process proposed for the Early Warning System in Jordan to be successfully implemented.

The *pilot study in Lebanon* had the potential to facilitate a dialogue in the context of the intended full scale Litani project by being founded on a scientific methodology. Changes in the political scene in Lebanon and a political decision from Norway to not prioritise Lebanon in the portfolio led to its discontinuation. However, a water treatment plant recommended in the pilot study was recently

established.

In conclusion, it may be claimed that all projects served to initiate a dialogue with the various parties and served to promote cooperation despite being implemented in a complex and very difficult political environment. Actual outcomes of the projects and the process they were intended to support, however, have been less than planned and many of the projects have been implemented at a high cost, especially the more investment oriented projects like the Water Monitoring Systems in Jordan and Syria, and Waternet. These projects have received 60 percent of total funding from MFA.

There are many factors that may serve to explain why project outcomes of some projects have been far less than planned. One factor is that activities have been undertaken in an unpredictable and changing political environment. This makes the risk of not achieving intended outputs within the planned time frame very high. Another factor is that MFA reduced funding for them awaiting the outcome of this evaluation.

It may also be explained by CESAR assuming a too ambitious role by attempting to play initiator, facilitator and manager of technical assistance and investment related projects at the same time as being a facilitator, moderator and sometimes mediator in adjoining political processes. This finding is supported by the following observations:

- The larger-scale projects with high cost and significant investment components like Waternet, and water monitoring systems in Jordan and Syria, have not been successfully implemented. Although this can partly be associated with the fact that funding from MFA was significantly reduced or terminated, the projects also suffered significantly because of the lack of an agreed legal framework for their implementation with the beneficiaries.
- These projects are also constrained by a number of technical problems which have still not been resolved despite the high volume of technical assistance from CESAR and their subcontracted consultants. This may be due to the fact that the complexity and size of the projects requires a different management and technical capacity than what can be found in a small research foundation. From the above, it may be claimed that CESAR has exceeded its level of comparative advantage and core competencies when taking on an additional role as a management company for larger scale investment related projects.

CESAR's ambition, when designing the larger scale projects, may have been too high not taking into sufficient account the political climate in the region and its own capacity to implement them. MFA and CESAR have been the "contracting parties" with limited transparency for the main beneficiaries (the parties in the processes) of what legal and financial framework has been guiding the cooperation. CESAR has been conceived by the parties as someone acting on behalf of the MFA. This is however not unique to MFA's relationship with CESAR. A review of MFA procedures seems to suggest that it is a common procedure also applied when supporting some of the other Norwegian NGOs/consultants working in the region. CESAR, as a facilitator, would itself have benefited from more openness and transparency in its operations.

Another issue is the attempt to facilitate two interlinked processes simultaneously (MWGW and Turkey, Syria and Iraq) without disclosing information between the parties in each process. It has restricted CESAR's ability to conduct its activities in full openness among the parties. This has created a risk of losing the confidence to CESAR by some of the parties. MFA has been constrained by limited capacity to appraise adequately project proposals submitted for funding, and had limited resources and inadequate procedures to monitor their progress and review their outcomes. As indicated by the parties in the region, they would welcome it if MFA played a more prominent role in the process to ensure projects were implemented as planned and that anticipated outcomes were realised. In its approach to funding, MFA has provided annual commitments based on annual applications. This has made it difficult to monitor total resource use per project and maintain an overview of total resource use in the processes it intended to

support. It has created an uncertain and difficult environment for CESAR adding to the constraints posed by an unstable political environment. There is a need to have a longer term perspective rather than only a one year perspective.

In terms of CESAR's projects, MFA has to a large extent played the role of financial partner. The strategic vision of what to achieve through its funding, appears to have been first and foremost to maintain a relatively high level of support to the peace process in the aftermath of the Oslo agreement. The "Norwegian Model" is based on the rationale that Norway as a small nation needs to mobilise NGOs and the private sector to complement its efforts at political level. It appears however that in many cases these NGOs/consultants have ended up in the "driver's seat" of the processes rather than being used as tools for continued engagement in the region. This may be due to limited direction by the MFA and a lack of clarity in the mandate for the NGOs/consultants. It may also be due to the limited capacity in MFA to monitor the activities and take full advantage of the opportunities created in opening doors to the region through an alternative channel.

The above constraints appear to have been gradually recognised by the MFA. From 1999 onwards more effort by MFA was given to improve reporting, communication and coordination between embassies and MFA. In 2002 a first draft strategy was elaborated to guide Norwegian engagement in water conflict areas and to promote regional cooperation. Further development of these processes may serve to address some of the above mentioned issues.

No. 14 INS-0008: NORWAY-INDONESIA. COOPERATION IN SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT. Mid-term Review, June 2004. Kevin Burton (Norconsult).

From executive Summary:

- ... an overly ambitious PD used as a road-map has created the situation whereby the projects initiated under the programme have only a limited chance of success judged against the defined objectives, outputs and indicators.
- Training has been carried out under the auspices of the programme but it is often difficult to determine the rationale behind the training courses given.
- The level of training and capacity building geared towards enabling the actors to produce strategy and action plans appears to have been inadequate to date.
- Expert technical assistance (Indonesian and Norwegian) seems to have been rather *ad hoc* with no clearly apparent management direction, follow-up or quality control.
- Future activities should concentrate on building upon LH's potential strengths according to its' mandate; focusing on such areas as environmental policy development, environmental advocacy, inter-agency co-ordination of environmental affairs, promotion and facilitation of integrated planning initiatives and technical advice/materials concerning environmental issues.

From main chapters:

- Project C which should help to co-ordinate management is under-resourced and operates without a clear set of guidelines and in effect performs more of a secretarial role. LH itself is well aware of most of the management problems and recognises the need for specialist assistance in technical project management and administration.
- For Indonesian experts utilised on Project A LH draws up a terms of reference and sources the individual from a relevant Indonesian institution and makes disbursement directly.
- The issue of employment and remuneration for LH staff making direct technical inputs to the programme also seems to be unresolved (though the guidelines from NORAD appear to be clear on this).
- LH does not issue specific TOR or personnel specifications for staff to work on the programme. It seems that DN is required to act to identify suitable co-operating institutions and then make agreements with them for work on the programme. However, DN has no role in writing TORs or in management or quality control; its function is simply one of sourcing expertise and disbursement of funds.

- A major weakness of the programme is that the Norwegian Institutions are not working to a standard contract that includes a terms of reference specifying deliverables and dates.
- LH has several other project and programmes running with bilateral donors (e.g. JICA, CIDA, GTZ) and in each of these cases full time support in the shape of at least one permanent technical adviser/project management expert is provided. This affords the necessary management capacity to LH and ensures project continuity and momentum. Contracting, monitoring, quality control and follow-up are also internalised to a much greater degree.
- Quality control and assurance is another weak point of the programme thus far. Formal, systematic quality assurance procedures are not built into the projects at this time.
- The availability, type and quality of documentation pertaining to the programme as made available to the mid-term review team was unsatisfactory. This is mainly a function of weak project management in terms of planning, contracting, monitoring and quality control and also weak specifications in the PD.
- Communication in all forms poses a challenge to the programme. As the Norwegian institutions do not have Bahasa Indonesia as a working language there is necessarily a translation delay concerning their input and conversely their comment on Indonesian input.
- ... documentation that explains and records the proceedings of these workshops was not made available to the mid-term review team.
- Study tours As a way of creating an enabling environment for bi-lateral co-operation and allowing exchange of cultural experience and professional ideas they are a valuable tool. However, without a clear rationale or management direction their usefulness can be diluted.
- The model of co-operation between the partners seems to be only partially successful. While the intention is to involve Norwegian institutions in the project to foster the links between environmental management agencies in Norway and Indonesia and facilitate greater co-operation, in practice this creates some tensions.
- The project is extremely complex in its formulation and thus requires extensive project management expertise combined with technical expertise that is geographically and socio-culturally relevant. By limiting international input exclusively to Norwegian institutions potentially important contributions from other sources are disqualified.
- The lack of a permanent anchor-person for the project, either with LH or from NORAD in the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta further makes project progress difficult.
- Among the contributors to the strategy and action plans called for under this programme there appears to be no understanding of, or application of, the technical skills required to find an appropriate balance between use and conservation, and no significant hiring of such expertise. It reflects a further limitation of the capacity building efforts under this programme that it has not been able to instil such understanding, and to make participants aware when such expertise needs to be called upon.
- The programme and its composite projects should be integrated with the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan.
- To the extent that this programme can play a role in poverty alleviation it can do so by strengthening the capacity of LH to promote sound environmental policy, advocate for better conservation of natural resources, and coordinate and facilitate better implementation of conservation measures by other agencies.
- Capacity building in LH would take the form of learning by doing, with the advice and tutelage of the Senior Technical Advisor plus additional technical expertise hired in as required.
- LH in discussion with DN should decide on the type of technical input required. Having done so DN should attempt to source this expertise from relevant Norwegian institutions based on personnel specifications and outline TOR jointly agreed between LH and DN.
- To ensure sustainability and to contribute towards holistic capacity building all training activities should be accompanied by a written manual or compilation of presentational materials. A brief report back document should also be produced at the end of each session detailing subjects covered, strengths and weaknesses and lessons learned.

No. 15 MID-TERM REVIEW OF IMPACTS (CHN-0030). FINAL COMMON REPORT JULY 2004. Tor Johannesen (SFT), Torgrim Asphjell (SFT), Tore Laugerud (NCG)

- The Review Team is a bit surprised that NORAD did not guide the project management earlier in the LFA design formulation, as by 1999 the LFA design should have been compulsory for most projects financed by NORAD (indeed from the early 1990s). Whether initially planned for or not, the Team believes that the LFA elements should be recognised, in one way or another, in the project design, as they are crucial to *any* project. In the following sections, the main elements of the project design are reviewed.
- It is however fair to conclude that there is a long way from the project activities to the tangible reduction of pollution and to visible poverty alleviations.
- So far, the transfer of knowledge to and training of the participating staff seem to have been good, and the staff demonstrated adequate skills and knowledge to the Team on how to operate the various instruments, taking the samples, handling the data, etc.
- The Team believes that the Project in general is hinged on too few trained staff, especially in the provinces.
- The Review Team concludes that there has been a lack of proper guidance from the project management as to how the financial reporting should be undertaken. This has resulted in a financial reporting that is inconsistent and largely incomparable with the information in the project documents. Additional information provided by the project management has also notably been of limited help to clarify this.
- In the opinion of the Review Team, these two websites could maybe be developed and used more widely than today for dissemination of results and for information to for example the authorities and the science communities
- This transfer of knowledge has, in the Team's opinion been successful. ... In a couple of places, the Team had the impression that too much of the capacity building hinged on a few individuals.
- It was also noted with satisfaction that the Project very actively involved students in the project work.
- The lack of English language capabilities on the Chinese side obviously created some problems and misunderstandings to start with in a couple of the locations.
- NIVA would have preferred more people to be trained in China.
- The Project staff have shown no real intentions to step down the project activities during the last year of IMPACTS, although knowing that the Norwegian financing will cease. On the contrary, all staff talks about extending the Project by introducing new monitoring sites "in the next phase".
- The Team therefore proposes an extension of the Project, with the clear view of bringing the activities down to a financial level where the Chinese side can sustain the relevant operations. Such NORAD Exit Phase could last for two or three years, and the Team suggests the latter.

No. 16 PALESTINIAN WATER AUTHORITY (PWA) BUDGET SUPPORT PROGRAMME PHASE III (2003 – 2005), MID-TERM REVIEW, Final Report, 2004. Prepared by: Tranor International Norway and Nordic Consulting Group Norway

9.1. Program design building on Phase II:

Findings: In terms of activities we may conclude that Phase III has picked up the ones with high relevance and needing further work and attention. The PWA management shall be commended for its choice of focus and identifying priorities. In terms of approach and methodology we conclude that previous felt constraints and difficulties have not been adequately addressed in Phase III, but to a great extent simply brought forward. E.g. Phase II was regarded too ambitious in relation to implementation capacity and capacity building absorption.

Recommendation: Inadequate implementation capacity and capacity building absorption is still very much the case and must be addressed during the remaining period of Phase III; reorganisation of PWA Gaza, project work into PMUs, more ownership and PWA staff participation in TA work, replanning of remaining TA, broader focus on PWA's complete work portfolio, not only regulatory work, less ambition on capacity building and more on physical institution building in this phase, more autonomy to PWA as long as NWC is not functioning.

9.2. Achievements of Scheduled activities:

Findings: We feel that it was a little abnormal to introduce a “transition phase” between the Phases II and III. Straightening out the bonus controversy took some time and the mid-term achievements are not too encouraging. Trying to push expected results on an organisation which is not quite ready for it, or where the external circumstances create difficulties, is like fighting windmills. It is also difficult, but a prerequisite for improvements, to distinguish between intifada-induced problems/delays and internal/management issues.

Recommendation: We propose a re-planning workshop in order to address the observed internal and external weaknesses and adjust the TA for the remaining period for better conformity with what may actually be achieved, as well as more clearly identify and distinguish between externally-induced problems and internal problems. You need to know the real nature of a problem before trying to rectify it. This would bring the programme into a more positive atmosphere, and management, staff and consultants closer together, giving all a share of ownership in real felt day by day progress.

9. 3. End of project expectations: LFA workshop: The 8 programme components:

Findings: We find that most of the subjects are very relevant to the situation facing PWA. The programme is very ambitious, in certain areas possibly too ambitious, e.g. related to capacity building results. A lot of ground work is still needed. There is a lot that PWA can do in terms of organisation and management improvements independent of the water right conflict. Obviously, and unfortunately, the ongoing intifada at times brings progress to a halt.

Recommendation: In this situation it is imperative for PWA to prepare for its future role as regulator rather than to try to act as regulator. Phase III should strongly assist PWA in this preparation phase, because the environment for regulation is not quite there yet. One of the biggest challenges for PWA today seems to be the communication aspect, both as and organisation; within itself and between Gaza and the West Bank, and outside itself; between PWA as regulator and its constituency – sector stakeholders, utilities and big and small service providers.

9. 4 The use of TA:

Findings: While the TAs seem mostly important and relevant, the reporting on activities is a bit confusing in terms of original targets, budgets, actors, expected results, and benchmarks on which to monitor progress.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the Programme Manager develops a matrix starting with the LFA matrix and assigns the TA to each of the issues, in order to demonstrate where it belongs and how it will contribute to achievement of goals. Give each activity a budget, benchmarks, a time schedule and find a transparent and easy way of reporting and monitoring progress. This could be done during the proposed re-planning workshop. The international TA consultants should be required to enter into cooperation with local consultants, both for professional capacity building but also for better bridging of the gaps when the international consultant at time may not be able to physically reach PWA. This is what we mean by a revised approach and methodology for the international consultants.

9. 5 Likelihood of achievements during remaining period of Phase III:

Findings: We cannot see that the expectations expressed in the LFA matrix from the October 11, 2003 workshop will be fulfilled.

Recommendation: Some activities need to be re-arranged, expectations adjusted and TA approaches and methodologies improved along these lines; more presence, more ownership, more staff participation. Always under the assumption that the intifada does not ground the TA work completely.

9. 6 Implementing actions needed to achieve the Water Law objectives:

Findings: The water law is young and it will take time before regulatory functions become embedded in the Palestinian culture. There is an immediate need for creating a more favourable environment for PWA as a regulator to gain the trust of the water stakeholders in Gaza and the West Bank.

Recommendation: PWA should prepare and disseminate to all user groups easily understandable material on why such regulatory services are a public good (see 6.4). PWA should also prepare an annual “Year Book” describing its activities as a regulator including statistics of its operation, water resource information, wells, licensing, etc. This could be an issue for a possible Phase IV.

9. 7 Making the National Water Council function:

Findings: The Review Team believes that the long delay in establishing the NWC is in itself proof that the time is not yet right.

Recommendation: For PWA to better execute its functions under the present transition period it would seem more efficient to upgrade PWA's mandate to handle all issues mentioned in Article 9 of the Water Law and to put the NWC on hold until the environment for its existence becomes more favourable.

9. 8 Tackling the 2003-04 budget deficit:

Findings: The PWA top management has introduced vigorous measures to cope with the budget deficit; staff's salary transfer to PA, salary harmonisation, no bonus payments, re-scheduling TA activities, reduction of operational budgets, etc. This has been successful and PWA should be commended for this. The result is encouraging and will hopefully be on track by the end of this year.

Recommendation: There are still some budget overruns this year which are unacceptable and need to be looked into. PWA needs, in communication with its Department Heads, to prepare mutually agreed and realistic budgets for 2005 reflecting the special tasks, responsibilities and area specific (Gaza versus West Bank) characteristics, and to implement a strict budget discipline and control, by e.g. more involvement of the Department Heads in the regular expenditure control system.

9.9 Staff's salary transfer and harmonisation plan:

Findings:: The salary transfer is ahead of schedule; 87 % are now on PA payroll. Salary harmonisation is done for Phase III project staff. There is some dissatisfaction with the salary harmonisation process, indicating unjustified individual differences.

Recommendation: Since the salary harmonisation was requested by the donors, we recommend that the donors open a dialogue with PWA on this issue in order to establish if the harmonisation process has been fair for all involved staff.

9. 10 Reorganising PWA programme management:

Findings: It is the view of the Review Team that the new Programme Management position works well. Information is easily available and accessible. However, PWA staff has expressed their worry that they now have less contact with the projects than during the previous phases, in particular West Bank staff.

Recommendation: More involvement of the PWA staff in project preparation and implementation should be focused during the remaining Phase III period. The Programme Management Adviser arrangement is working well, but with greater satisfaction in Gaza than in the West Bank. From PWA's perspective, the PMA should be available on a permanent basis and with full opportunity to equal focus on both PWA offices. The Review Team recommends that the PMA at least should spend more time in the field than in the past and that more emphasis should be put on the TOR requirement: *"The PMA shall assist the Head, Deputy Head and the Directors in the overall Management"*. The donors see this requirement as important as it would imply that the PMA spends more of his time with those persons than in the past.

9. 11 Adapting coordinating mechanism and new routines for dealing with the dual donor arrangement:

Findings: The two donors have harmonised their activities for a common approach, perceived by PWA to be quite a bit "stricter" now than during the previous phases, and stricter than should be expected from a budget support programme. Presumably, the incident with the bonus payments did trigger the need for a tighter follow-up from the donor side.

Recommendation: PWA should prepare its own ideal reporting formats, and submit these for the donors' comments and suggestions before finalizing them. Such reporting formats should then be adopted for use in the dialogue with all donors. Acceptance of this approach would greatly facilitate donor coordination, and relieve PWA and other recipients of much burdensome office work of questionable development value.

9. 12 Cooperation with donors:

Conclusion: The TA consultant DHV Water BV has recently studied donor coordination for PWA. Such coordination takes base in part through meetings of the Sector Working Group on Water/Wastewater in Gaza and the West Bank. Key problems are overlapping meetings, issues and actions, projects put on hold for security reasons, restricted access, direct funding to NGOs, etc. Weak donor coordination is not unique for PWA/PA and can be found in many donor-dependant countries.

Recommendation: While it is appreciated that PA/PWA is attempting to create better multi-donor coordination and also basket funding arrangements, PWA should be more pro-active in developing, promoting and getting the donors to accept and apply common PA-standards and procedures. The National Water Plan must be accepted and respected as the prioritising tool for the water sector. There is a need for PWA to intensify the work on donor coordination in order to provide greater transparency and to avoid overlapping activities. Until the next meeting between PWA and NeRO/NoRO PWA should provide a complete list of other sector donors, with a description of the nature, magnitude and time frame of their support.

9.13 Transforming service providers into utilities; PWA streamlining its role as regulator:

Findings: A number of transitional arrangements are affecting the water utility reforms, many of them originating from Article 40 of the Oslo 2 agreement. While these arrangements are partly outside PWA's control, PWA addresses its responsibility towards a more sustainable water sector in the capacity as the main water resource management authority and regulator of bulk water utility development and the regional utilities

Recommendation: Within this context, it would seem important that PWA's advocacy towards smaller service providers need particular attention in the time to come.

9. 14 Restructure PWA organisation and staff into the role of a WSS sector regulator:

Findings: While the project functions and regulatory functions in the PWA West bank office are divided, they are very much integrated in the Gaza office. This significantly reduces the regulatory focus in Gaza and also the capacity to absorb training on regulation issues.

Recommendation: PWA Gaza needs to separate its project functions into PMUs as has been done in the West Bank. The organisational set-up with four departments seems, under the prevailing conditions, adequate in short and medium term if it can be relieved of project work and concentrate exclusively on regulation. It is recommended to integrate a training function in a more visible manner in the organisation due to heavy involvement through the GTZ sponsored project. It is also recommended to strengthen PWA's communication function, internally and externally. Future changes should be based on task analyses and needs assessments. The immediate reorganisation of PWA Gaza, separating project work/staff and regulatory work/staff is one activity which could bring rapid improvement also during Phase III. If it is not done now it would most likely continue to delay the capacity building impact also in a possible future Phase IV.

9. 15 Water Rights Negotiations

Findings: After a long period, almost four years, of weak dialogue between PWA and NAD, this has now been resolved and common ground for communication established.

Recommendation: TA from NAD is available on request. It remains for PWA to strike the right balance between use of TA-services from NAD and from PWA's own resource base and to maintain the momentum in the dialogue.

9. 16 Gender issues

Findings: No progress on this issue under Phase III. PA has a Minister for Women's Affairs, indicating that there is a need to take gender issues seriously.

Recommendation: It is important to combine gender issues on the WSS sector with gender issues on other sectors – through a National Gender Policy. A study on gender issues is planned for PWA. It would be required to involve the PWA offices in both Gaza and the West Bank in finalising the TOR, in order to speed up the work and to give the study institutional ownership, and finally to embed the gender policy in the WSS sector policy.

No. 17 REVIEW OF NPL-024, REGULATING AND MONITORING CAPACITY BUILDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) OF HYDROPOWER PROJECTS IN NEPAL. Final Report December 2004. Balam Pradhan (freelance), Tore Laugerud (NCG)

- The Project started in October 2002 with the arrival of the Long-term Advisor (LTA) from DN in Norway.
- The *activities* are well formulated to a large degree of detail, and with separate outputs, which is commendable. They are however, far too ambitious and unrealistic, as compared to local implementation capacity and capabilities.
- The *Inception Phase* of the Project was exceptionally long (5 months), as no preparation had been made prior to the LTA's arrival in Kathmandu.
- The fulfilment of individual activity objectives/outputs widely varies, with the *training* being the most successful part of the Project.
- In order to speed up the delayed implementation (due to lack of Client's resources), some tasks have been contracted out to a private institution (SchEMS). This might eventually reduce the local ownership to the outputs, and subsequently the outcome of the activities.
- Efficiency is unsatisfactory, mostly due to the LTA-modality instead of a short-term external advisory model.
- Training, giving increased personnel skills and staff being more attractive, might lead to increased (negative) staff turnover.
- The institutional cooperation model has clearly not been a success. A short-term advisor would have been preferred to the LTA, giving more time for local professionals to implement the Project themselves at their own pace, creating a better project ownership. It is doubtful whether DN was the appropriate management counterpart institution in Norway, as it seemingly was lacking the required experience from planning and implementing similar projects in developing countries.
- SchEMS's use of project governmental staff as paid "private consultants" (through meeting/workshop allowances) is an interesting and presumably "normal" modality in Nepal, leaving the staff with monetary incentives. It might however undermine the initial intention of official counterparts taking an active project responsibility and involvement.
- Lack of close physical location of LTA's offices to his counterparts has hampered integration of activities into the EIA Section's daily work, and subsequently weakened the local project ownership.
- DN refusing the LTA an introductory visit to Nepal prior to long-term residency was a major mistake, which created significant delays in project start-up.
- The LTA has made significant efforts in delivering the project outputs, but has operated as "a state within the state".
- The Nepalese institutions involved did not have the required capacity to completely fulfil their part of the project input. High staff turnover at managerial level in MoPE has hampered project continuity.
- A general impression is that the planning of the activities was *too ambitious and unrealistic*, considering the limited capacity and capability of the main local partner, ... although the limited capacity of this institution was the main rationale behind the capacity building project focus, even prior to the fact-finding mission in 1997. It is therefore highly surprising that, during the lengthy planning of the activities and especially during the Inception Phase, the number of activities and level of ambition were not reduced to match the host institution's capacity and capability.
- The result is that the LTA had to undertake some of the activities himself, and several were delayed and eventually undertaken by consultants. The learning-by-doing effect has therefore partly been lost in the Project ...
- A much more efficient use of the available funds would have been to maintain a part time advisor from Norway, visiting the Project for a few weeks say 3-4 times per year, giving the local staff ample time to develop the project activities in addition to their normal daily work, in a pace that suited them.
- Obviously, the technical assistance set-up was not an optimal one for capacity building in an institution with initial limited capacity and capability.

- Generally, experience from several countries show that sustainability is not obtained through creating institutions outside or in parallel to the existing governmental systems. This is giving “artificial respiration aid” instead of rectifying the real causes of the problems.
- The boosted activity level created by the NORAD support will however not be continued, and activities not directly in line with normal day-to-day procedures will most likely not be undertaken without outside support, either monetary or personnel wise. MoPE today does not seem to have the financial capability to continue a boosted activity level without external assistance.
- The planned establishment of “*a self-contained small secretariat with the necessary equipment and personnel*” (quote from the Contract) illustrates this point. It is a bit strange that such institutional set-up, being prevalent in several development assistance projects during the 70s and 80s, still was suggested in the late 90s. The lack of institutional sustainability with such arrangements had been evident for several years already when the Project was designed.
- With the LTA only concerned with the project activities, not interfering in the daily EIA in-line routines (which also was the intention), he has also been “pushing” the activities in order to obtain success through delivering the outputs (however unrealistic), at all costs. In order to speed up implementation, consultants and additional expertise have been purchased towards the end of the Project in order to complete the activities at any cost.
- ... lack of proper internal handling procedures for these kind of payments in DN again raises the Review Team’s suspicion whether DN had the required experience and procedures for managing such international operations, and whether the institution was “ready” to be the Norwegian counterpart of the Project.
- As the LTA has been the key expert with hands-on management of the Project, no short-term advisors have been needed from DN or other Norwegian institutions, as such expertise has been found in Nepal. This is encouraging, but at the same time the “twinning” effect mentioned will not materialise.
- In a way, DN has been unintentionally “overtaken by events” and its involvement has been subject to the (lack of) felt needs of the LTA. This modality was not thought out well enough during the project planning, and it weakens a possible institutional cooperation *beyond* the project period after the LTA has left, and thus the sustainability of the Project.
- Another question is whether DN was the right Norwegian main partner in the first place. ..., as this institution had very limited experience from planning of similar projects and direct project operations in developing countries, and in Asian countries (including Nepal) in particular. The Review Team therefore believes that, although the intention of institutional cooperation was noble, this part of the Project has not met the expectations and that a Norwegian consulting company with wide experience from Nepal would have been a better management partner in this case.
- ... all the shifted project staff in MoWR, MoFSC, DoED and NEA have moved to other relevant positions in the same institutions. In MoPE however, 40% of the shifted managerial staff have been moved to positions said to be irrelevant to the main topics at stake in the Project and EIA handling in general. This means that some of the newly acquired local knowledge resulting from the Project *might* be lost.

No. 18. MID-TERM REVIEW OF TAN-092: MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAMME III, TANZANIA

4.1. The National Setting

The natural resources sector is an important productive sector of central relevance to rural poverty reduction. Sustainable harvesting or uses of natural resources are in their turn a basic pre-condition for sustainable environmental management. With three quarters of the population of Tanzania based in the rural areas and with an incidence of poverty of near 40 per cent, the natural resources and their sustainable management stand out as crucial to livelihood improvements and poverty reduction.

Natural resource management (NRM) objectives have evolved rapidly in recent years. Community empowerment has replaced conservation as the major focus of NRM. Aid agencies have moved from projects to budget support. Local government reform emphasises participatory planning and fiscal decentralisation. The government and development partners now acknowledge ‘private sector

development' as a key component of efforts to increase economic growth and poverty reduction.

4.2. Norway's Possible Roles in supporting Tanzania in the Management of Natural Resources beyond the Programmes Phase III ending in 2006

4.2.1. How to fund management in the natural resources sector

Norway should thus consider continuing to support the natural resource sector in the future, but rather than through concrete projects and programmes, budgetary support should be given to support SWAp's that are related to natural resources and the environment. Such SWAp's can ensure better planning and coordination of natural resource and environmental activities and interlinkages. A SWAp may help coordinating all the inputs into the sector under a common umbrella which may enhance efficiency in service delivery, create improved national capacity, provide more equal access to services for users, make planning, budgeting and reporting easier and as well increase the national ownership of the programme.

Such a SWAp has several advantages, but it is not ideal, because it is too narrow to integrate processes or crosscutting issues that straddle between and across sub-sectors and sectors in important ways. But the learning process around the FBD's SWAp is important for learning lessons in order to widen the SWAp to encompass "Natural Resources" in the next round.

The FBD process around SWAp, if it is to lead to long term improvement and sustainability, need to be closely tied to the local government reform process. Through the local government reform process, forest management will be decentralised to district level. The responsibilities of District Councils are linked with the management of forest on general land, village and private forests in the district, forest reserves (except CFR) and to the promotion of good management practices of such lands.

So the point is that the activities of the MNRP in the future should be supported through the SWAp mechanism aiming at the same time to enhance coordination and capacity to manage the environment and natural resources at district level. The experiences in the MNRP and other natural resources related activities, e.g. LAMP etc, have shown promising outcome. The processes that have unfolded in relation to natural resource management could thus, if replicated, contribute to the future strengthening of local government reform process

The funding to the sector by central government should also become an integral part of the Local Government Reform process. The funding from central government in relation to natural resources and the environment must, however, be designed such that coordination and cooperation becomes a central feature a district level, e.g. between catchment forest officers, district forest officials and natural resource officials.

The Mid-term Review recommends that any future support should also include thorough and detailed baseline studies and carefully designed monitoring and reporting mechanisms that would enable more objective assessments of impact. This has been seriously lacking in the past, and although monitoring of individual projects has collected some information, results have not been properly systematised or made available to managers.

It finally recommend that the Norwegian Embassy continue to take an active role vis-à-vis openly expressing its concern over controversial issues involving misuse of natural resources, especially where corruption and other malpractices are implicated. Support to investigative journalism, independent and critical research and to tracking studies all lend towards strengthening the role of civil society in assuring greater transparency and accountability. Support to NGOs and CBOs addressing issues of Environment and Natural Resources are an important dimension of democratisation. These are legitimate concerns for a partner in development and it would be desirable that the Embassy considers playing a more active role in these respects.

4.2.2. Assessment of Competence- and Capacity Building Support

As to the pre-conditions of the programme, they can be stated to be conducive for project processes and attainment of project objectives. One reason for this is that the programme has now been in operation for ten years, some projects are building on initiatives that started in the 1980s. Problems related to pre-conditions have therefore already been addressed through modifications and adjustments and infrastructure investments have most often been concluded. Pre-conditions may thus be seen to have become increasingly tuned to the objectives set in the programme (except where new structural threats are emerging).

Attainment of programme objectives is seen by the review team to be related to the emergence of a constructive and participatory process related to the overall programme. Competence building, training and dialogues have led to a sense of community participation in the programme that reflects the changing policy context. As such pre-conditions are being linked to objectives through a participatory process. This is seen as a key to explaining the overall positive outcome of the programme. This development has also been conditioned by a rather good interconnections and interplay between experiences “on the ground” in projects and activities, and the policy and laws in the natural resources sector.

However, these interconnections have not attained a coherence that can guarantee continued positive programme outcomes. There is reason for concern that rules and regulations linked with benefit sharing between communities and the government in many programme activities, are not yet in place. This may imply that positive outcomes to some extent still rely on external assistance for their generation. This situation may, if not resolved, hinder the sustaining the positive outcomes into the future. For strategic national resources, such as the catchment and mangrove forests, the possibility of arriving at benefit sharing mechanisms that can be accepted by communities, is particularly problematic, unless formulas for sustainable use and exploitation of these resources can be identified, that can be enforced by the communities and the authorities jointly.

Some of the sub-components have attained very positive outcomes, but their activities need to be consolidated or scaled up in order to secure the possibility for long-term sustainability of the project successes. The programme and its development has been aided by a positive change in a number of government policies in direction of decentralisation, local participation and empowerment, but many decades of “top-down” approaches are not transformed easily or quickly, but signs of increased villagers’ participation and empowerment are encouraging in these cases.

However, the financial sustainability of the Programme itself may be questioned, but this must be seen in the broader context of donor dependency in Tanzania in general.

Capacity building has been supported in many projects and as well in other organisations and institutions. The capacity building within the projects appears to be proceeding well. It emerges from the evaluation that capacity building has been supported by the projects at village level, including village government and committees, as well as at district level in the training of people to identify and undertake other income-earning activities, training to engage in small businesses etc. In some cases staff or participants in some projects have been taken to other projects in order to learn from their experiences. Some project managers have also been trained within other projects within the programme

Overall the effectiveness of the programme appears good or satisfactory. Objectives aimed at are attained to a large degree, although a few sub-components fall short of portraying satisfactory performance.

No. 19. PRE-APPRAISAL OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION PROGRAMME BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND NORWAY

Final Report, 28 April 2005, by Jens Claussen, Nordic Consulting Group AS

ECP constitutes one of the main programmes in Norwegian Development Cooperation with RSA. However, as with external assistance to RSA in general, ECP is a small share in financial terms and in volume of activity compared to DEAT’s overall budget and portfolio of projects.

Before the process of formulation, selection and prioritisation of the projects to be funded under the framework agreement (Draft Business Plan), a decision is required on which of the two objectives is considered the primary and achievable objective of the programme; i.e. to build capacity for DEAT and in areas of relevance use Norwegian partners as means of achieving it to develop of sustained cooperation between RSA and Norwegian partners in areas of mutual interest. The above mentioned objectives may in some circumstances be complementary, but in some cases mutually exclusive objectives. This “dilemma” should be resolved through a clearer and simpler formulation of the ECP objective which also has impact on the modality of cooperation and selection of projects.

The first objective may, at one extreme, be achieved without any Norwegian participation. The latter will exclude projects without relevance to cooperation with Norway.

In the former case DEAT will be fully and solely defining the programme as a recipient of regular development assistance common in low income partner countries of Norway. In the latter case, it will be a joint formulation and decision making process between to bilateral partners, a common procedure in conventional bilateral cooperation agreements.

The latter objective is what has been stated as the overall objective of Norwegian cooperation with South Africa by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the two countries i.e. not reflecting a traditional “aid relationship”. This observation is further supported by the fact that external assistance to RSA in the form of aid only has limited justification from conventional aid policy perspective (closing financing gaps, increasing spending capacity of the country). In the case of DEAT, external assistance constitute less than 4.5 percent of their budget and will constitute an even smaller share in the future as confirmed by the projected resource allocation stated in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

Finally, DEAT and MoE have signed a MOU which clearly states that the governments of respective countries through DEAT and MoE are to promote cooperation between the countries in areas of mutual interest. This MOU is the overall framework for cooperation in the field of environment and which is to serve as the framework for cooperation after financing in the form of bilateral assistance is phased out.

As regards selection of Norwegian partners - Since it is in some cases “procurement of services” (private suppliers) there is a need to clarify what procurement procedures are to be applied for commercial supplies. If MoE is to supply the services from Norwegian commercial partners then it would be Norwegian procurement rules that should apply. If it is DEAT that is to contract Norwegian commercial suppliers, DEAT procurement rules should apply. Regardless of procedure, a competitive process will reduce costs i.e. improve efficiency which was one of the concerns of the 2003 review of the programme.

As regards the role of coordinators - Observations from the review as well as from this appraisal suggest that there is a need to change the conceptual understanding of what functions needs to be performed and who is best placed to undertake them.

No. 20 EVALUATION OF THE NCA WATER AND SANITATION PROGRAMME IN DECAN MUNICIPALITY, KOSOVO, 1999-2005. Final Report August 2005. Tore Laugerud (NCG) and Violeta Selimi (Organisation for Development Activities - ODA).

From Summary:

11. Planning was done in a hurry and not according to any LFA modality being common for Norwegian development programs since the early 90s (NCA not known to this modality and no guidance given by MFA)
12. The program planning has been patchy without an overall holistic implementation plan from the start (also largely influenced by individual Program Coordinators).
13. Capacity building in the DWC started too late in the Program, but gaining proper momentum towards the end.
14. The coordinators had different experience and interests, and operated without centralised strong

- professional management guidance, resulting in ever-changing program course (being an “old-fashioned” and outdated development modality).
15. NCA established its own implementation structure parallel to the DWC, but with good communication between the two.
 16. Integration into the DWC came around two years too late, and gained proper momentum in September 2003.
 17. Procurement has been done professionally through NCA’s own system, but the local capacity building in this field is lacking.
 18. The program design of long-term development interventions must be professionally prepared. Appropriate capacity building in NCA on the logframe (LFA) method is recommended. Proper objectives must be formulated at the start-up, with realistic indicators making monitoring and evaluation easy. NCA should establish a long-term relationship with an institution/company that has extensive experience in w&s development program formulation and implementation.
 19. Proper long-term plans must be prepared at the beginning of any water *development* intervention, seen in an *integral* and *holistic* perspective. Criteria for prioritisation of interventions must be discussed and concluded with local authorities and key stakeholders, and the plans must be followed regardless of changing of personnel having different preferences.
 20. NCA must be able to manage comprehensive long-term water sector programs (maintaining capable in-house resources centrally or long-term cooperation with competent outside part-time actors).
 21. The reporting on development programs being implemented over several years should have the form of proper progress reporting, giving much more details than in the standard presently used “Final Report” format from MFA.
 22. When receiving an application for emergency interventions, MFA must consult proper expertise (notably NORAD) to establish the true nature (emergency of development) of the interventions for which support is requested.
 23. MFA should make sure that water development programs of identical/similar nature in the same region follow the same modality for planning and implementation, regardless of the kind of institutions implementing the programs.

From main chapters:

- Very much of the “direction” of the Program was therefore left to the decisions and interest of the individual Coordinators to form and decide upon, which also has characterised the Program.
- ... there was no appropriate professional management set-up in NCA centrally to give guidance and steer the Program in one agreed direction even with changing freelance staff, the Program was clearly suffering (even without the local staff realising this).
- When NCA arrived Decan in June under the ACT umbrella, all the local institutions in Decan were in a state of re-initiating their activities after the war. NCA therefore established themselves with own offices and quickly employed several local staff from the “open marked” to assist in the rehabilitation activities.
- There was however very little direct cooperation and interaction in the field to start with.
- the low salary among the DWC staff, they were less motivated than the highly paid NCA staff.
- ... Whatever the reasons were, the fact is that NCA and the DWC operated as *two separate parallel water development institutions* for the next four years

NO. 21 EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY AND THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP). By Stein Hansen and Mike Fergus, Nordic Consulting Group AS (NCG), 20 September 2005

10.1. The Background

Since 2002 Norway has been developing a “two stage” framework agreement model, designed to apply to the seven UN agencies with which Norway has such agreements. This will consist of a relatively general but agency-specific framework agreement governing the cooperation with each of the UN agencies. These agreements have no fixed deadline, with a multi-year (most likely for two years) framework cooperation agreement (i.e. a programme agreement) governing the explicit cooperation with the

individual agency. This evaluation regards this development as a great stride forward which will tackle many of the problems identified in this report. The process should be encouraged and expanded.

10.2. Conclusions and Main Findings

The UNEP framework agreement is administered by the MFA's Trade Policy, Resources and Environment Section whilst all other frameworks agreements with UN agencies are administered by the MFA's UN Section. This would appear anomalous if UNEP were to expand into operative areas traditionally handled by UNDP and multilateral development banks, for example, with the Bali Strategic Plan. However, remaining where it is located would appear rational provided UNEP concentrates future framework activities on normative issues that are supportive of the multilateral environmental conventions.

There has been a marked shift in the nature of UNEP's funding in recent years. Core funding (to fund the agency's day-to-day operational requirements) now comes from the Environment Fund (contributed by over 100 donor countries) whereas it came originally from the UN Budget. This has also changed towards more dedicated trust funds where donor countries can exert greater leverage on the agency's programme.

The growing dependence of UNEP on earmarked donor funds has had a number of effects. It has reduced the UNEP administrative charge, and increased predictability. On the other hand, there is a concern that earmarking with conditions is tending to wrest control of the UNEP programme from the Governing Council towards the donors.

An examination of the progress and completion reports on projects supported by the UNEP-Norway framework agreement reveals the following:

- UNEP places great faith in the power of awareness-raising and institutional strengthening to bring about lasting change. However, authority and power in recipient institutions may in fact be very weak.
- It is very difficult to establish a focus and then evaluate impacts and results because of the very wide and diverse range of outputs and objectives to be accomplished.
- Monitoring of impact is virtually impossible since no counterfactual benchmarks have been established, and indicators of progress are not systematically established from the time when projects are designed and started.
- Many projects have complicated institutional arrangements so that it is difficult to identify the impact of Norwegian support. Fungibility of funds adds to the difficulty.
- There is a danger of duplication between divisions within UNEP and between UNEP and other agencies, although the UNEP management is aware of this. This is partly because UNEP has become very ambitious and moved into areas which may be outside its original remit. The framework agreement supports projects in separate UNEP Divisions which seek to mainstream environmental considerations into poverty reduction strategies. MFA needs to more actively monitor what sort of environment-oriented programmes and projects are supported via framework agreements with e.g. WHO, FAO, UNESCO and UNIDO, as well as through trust funds in the multilateral development banks so as to create complementarity and synergy rather than costly duplication.
- There is a strong case for focusing Norwegian support in areas where UNEP has frontier comparative advantage/expertise/competence e.g. environmental monitoring/remote sensing and warning systems, awareness raising and training of e.g. journalists, customs officers and lawyers/judges towards effective implementation of the many multilateral environmental conventions, and the regulations regarding trade and depositing of waste and chemicals, cleaner production etc.
- Norwegian support through UNEP has been useful and effective in assisting small countries, especially

in Africa, to meet their obligations under a variety of multilateral environment agreements (MEAs).

- There is a clear need to register results and impacts of programmes in future reporting by UNEP. A detailed assessment of the 24 projects comprising the UNEP-Norway framework agreement portfolio shows that:

- ☐ Virtually all projects can be described so as to meet any of the detailed requirements of Norwegian development assistance policy.
- ☐ There is a great deal of professional overlap between UNEP's Divisions which is bound to lead to duplication of activities and of funding.
- ☐ Many projects are over-ambitious or contradictory in their objectives. This is because of their dependence on donor-funding since they are often tailor-made to meet the perceived requirements of the potential donor.
- ☐ The portfolio gives the appearance of being an uncoordinated "hotch-potch" rather than the result of a coherent plan of action. This may also be the result of competition between divisions for funding.

Four other countries namely Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden have partnership agreements with UNEP, similar to the UNEP-Norway framework agreement. These function in a roughly similar way, but with different priorities and funding mechanisms.

The recently adopted Bali Strategic Plan is very ambitious. It takes UNEP into areas of responsibility outside its original mandate, where responsibility may be hotly contested by other powerful implementing agencies. The Plan gives the impression of "wanting to do everything" with limited resources and competence. This attitude has spilled over in to the ambitions of the individual divisions which are also seeking to expand their mandates. It is, however, noted that there is an increasing tendency for **all** agencies to seek to expand their remits. This inevitably leads to conflicts on areas of operation.

10.3 Recommendations

Four strategic options for a new programme cooperation agreement have been analysed. What Norway needs is a programme which is cost-efficient and easy to manage, a programme which is internally consistent, a programme which reduces the dangers of duplication and a programme where it is easy to trace funds.

The evaluation concludes that a single Norwegian multi-year trust fund would be the best mechanism to meet the above requirements. There are numerous advantages including improved harmonisation, greater accounting transparency, and better earmarking. All of which should contribute towards smooth and efficient decision making.

It is *recommended* that:

1. Framework agreement with UNEP be brought into line with the other UN agreements, and that it is accommodated within the "two-stage" agreement system discussed above.

2. It may seem logical for responsibility for the framework agreement within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be transferred from the section for the Environment and Sustainable Development to the UN section, where all the other UN framework agreements are located. However, it is *recommended* that it remains located in the section for the Environment and Sustainable Development, provided the focus of the agreement is on UNEP's normative activities. These activities are closely related to the multilateral environment conventions that this section manages within the MFA. Retaining this arrangement requires that the present good communication with the UN section on environmental activities addressed under framework agreements with other UN agencies be secured (e.g. through regular meetings of MFA's internal environment team) so as to secure avoidance of duplication and ineffective use of UN framework agreement funds.

It is further recommended that:

3. The new framework agreement be formulated in the form of a multi-year Norwegian trust fund.
4. The projects being funded under the present framework agreement continue until completed.
5. New proposals for framework agreement inclusion and approval should be in the form of General Council prioritized sub-programmes compatible with Norwegian UNEP collaboration goals.
6. The number of UNEP programmes/sub-programme areas be reduced in order to improve overview and transparency so as to obtain better targeting and to avoid duplication.
7. The new framework agreement provides that all communication leading towards the programme compositions go through UNEP's programme coordination management unit which is charged with internal coordination of activities. This will avoid individual task managers approaching the MFA officer directly to pave the way for "pet projects".
8. MFA regularly meet with UNEP and the other countries with framework agreements and/or large sub-programme allocations in similar fields as those focused on by Norway. This will facilitate greater harmonization, effectiveness and efficiency of fund allocation while in keeping with UNEP's overall policies and requirements.
9. The framework agreement enables UNEP to acquire comparative advantage in key crosscutting areas not properly addressed and covered in activities of other multilateral agencies.
10. Under this new framework agreement model, there will be a proper, realistic baseline from the outset for the following activities: UNEP's regular monitoring as part of the project/programme management; regular reviews of all projects/programmes as needed; in-depth evaluations of selected activities as well as thematic evaluations. The framework agreements must clarify requirements for supervisory mechanisms, reviews, evaluations and reporting. Reporting should include assessments of results and impacts of programmes.
11. The agreement specifies that the volume of Norwegian support will depend on the quality of UNEP's performance as documented by achieved results. Such monitoring, review and evaluation activities cannot be meaningfully undertaken without agreement on the sort of indicators and data to be regularly collected and processed in order to make it possible to compare activity impacts (not only output and outcome) to a "without activity" baseline.
12. A natural UNEP-role, following from its mandate to undertake and implement activities that "*inspire, inform and enable nations...*", would be to develop and have in place indicators to monitor the extent to which the activities achieve such results compared to baselines without such UNEP actions. UNEP should systematically develop and enforce a system of establishing monitorable performance indicators developed from counterfactual benchmarks for each project.

No. 22 END REVIEW OF FOUR ENSIS PROJECTS IN PR CHINA. FINAL REPORT May 2006.
Roar Gammelsæter (SFT), Tore Laugerud (NCG)

- The decisive factor for sustainability is the interest of the authorities in continuing and extending the trend scenario analysis. The future interest in ENSIS Water is assumed relatively more vulnerable than ENSIS AirQuis, where the latter must respond to daily reporting requirements from the authorities.
- CHN 014: It is however noted that the sustainability is very much hinged on one person who has been participating from the start, and is thus very vulnerable. If this person leaves his position, the main driving force will be gone and the sustainability is at stake.
- CHN 040: The Norwegian project partners seem to be doubtful as to the willingness of the provincial authorities to put sufficient resources into increasing the working capacity around the use of the tool.

- The ambitions and expectations of the projects during the planning stage, especially CHN 014, CHN 0040 and CHN 2070, have been too high.

No. 23 REVIEW OF THE NORWEGIAN SUPPORT TO THE ENERGY SECTOR IN UGANDA (1997-2005). FINAL REPORT 27 MAY 2006. Jens Claussen, Bjørn Gildestad, Tore Laugerud (all NCG) and Ueli Meier (Scanteam)

- With NVE in a role as procurement advisor, it assisted the Ministry of Energy and Minerals Development (MEMD) as well as the new regulator, Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA), with access to Norwegian and other international consultants in support of i.e. developing a tariff model and giving transaction advice related to new private investors applying for generation and distribution licences.
- The institutional support has contributed to establishing ERA as an institution with the capacity to sustain its operations and undertake its mandate. The cooperation with NVE has gradually been phased out and even sourcing of external technical assistance taken over by ERA itself. This may serve as an indicator of project outcomes being sustained.
- The institutional support with a cooperation arrangement with NVE continued beyond the required timeframe, apparently driven more by a desire to maintain the arrangement than actual needs for assistance. This is evident by the fact that the arrangement is formally still in operation despite limited requests for assistance from ERA and the rationale for repeated offers of assistance from Norway has several times been challenged by the Ugandan partner.
- For other assistance than the legal advisors inputs to the process of elaborating the Electricity Act and the regulations, limited visible outcome could be identified during the review, in particular for some of the other NVE long- and short-term advisors. The support to ERA notably showed gradually less outcome from the beginning of 2004.
- The generous amount of time, number of travels and relatively high cost for coordination and management (22% of total costs) of the NVE cooperation cannot be easily justified when compared to the actual direct contribution made to Ugandan institutions.
- The assistance provided for institutional support has also been managed as tied aid with no competition for the main service provider (NVE) and limited competition for some of the consultancy contracts. When comparing actual costs of these inputs (approximately NOK 16.5 million worth of inputs from NVE and Norwegian consulting companies) with the main tangible outputs such as support to the process of developing a legal framework, i.e. tariff model and transaction advice, it compares unfavourably with a process of tendering services with clearly defined tasks.

Recommendations:

- The issue of value for money related to “tied aid” also applies to the institutional support even when this is promoted under a label of “institutional cooperation” or “twinning arrangement”. Project tied aid should be considered the last option, not the first choice when applying an aid instrument.
- While NVE played a key role in facilitation of the process of establishing a legal and institutional framework, a continued process of promoting a “twinning arrangement” beyond the initial support did not prove to be effective and efficient. Rather than being a supplier of services to projects which also require strong programme management skills, the Norwegian aid administration should instead focus on utilising NVE’s comparative advantage, as a trusted and skilled technical advisor assisting in appraisal, monitoring and reviews of projects in the energy sector and as a partner in the sector dialogue. In this role NVE can provide the required additional monitoring capacity and serve to improve the “institutional memory” for the aid administration.

No. 24 MID-TERM REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF PROJECTS IN THE NORWEGIAN PROGRAMME FOR SUSTAINABLE USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA (CATIE). Final Report June 2006. Åsbjørn Skaaland (NCG); Gunn Paulsen (DN); Michael Angstreich (Noragric, UMB); David Oliver Bradford Wilson (local), Ricardo Trejos (local).

From Summary and Recommendations:

- The competence and capacity to implement the projects seems satisfactory and it has been difficult to pinpoint significant areas for potential improvement of the project processes.

- The weakest aspect generally observed is the slow implementation of training and to some extent limited publication of findings and hence lack of promulgation.
- Compared to the price/income-levels in the region the costs of the projects are generally found to be on the high side, affecting the efficiency of the undertaking. Much of this is due to acceptance of high rates during the project preparation and approval phase and cannot be mitigated at a later stage.
- The mission believes that local empowerment and capacity building are important elements of poverty alleviation, but these local policies and initiatives have to be met by appropriate incentives and policies from the national and regional level.
- CATIE Core: It is scientific accomplishment through research that provides added value to the teaching and outreach functions of an institution such as CATIE. While foreign assistance cannot be expected to support indefinitely that which Latin American countries should be supporting, development donors need to take this balancing act into consideration.
- Proposal CCAD: Having the appropriate environmental standards, regulations and frameworks in place for sustainable use of natural resources is important for all parts of society, including the poor.

From the main chapters:

- All the projects visited during the mission are seen to build capacity locally, nationally and regionally. In some cases, capacity building activities create fear of excessive insight into partner resources and this is limiting cooperation.
- the strength of these programs is that they have highly professional counterparts with a deep understanding of the agro-socio-environmental problems of the region.

(The 140-pages report is at large not directly useful to the key topics at stake in the study).

NO. 25. MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAMME, TANZANIA TAN-0092 – FINAL EVALUATION, AUGUST 2006

5.1]. Overall Conclusions

Following the findings of the Mid-Term Review, the final evaluation team considers that it has proved difficult for the MNRP and MNRT to adjust to the rapidly evolving policy and strategic context, with the result that NR conservation has remained the main focus of programme activities, and top-down management practices have generally continued to characterise project management's relations with local communities and the private sector. Despite enabling legislation, joint management and benefit sharing principles have not been mainstreamed. Consequently, handing over responsibility for programme activities to underfinanced and understaffed local governments is proving problematic, undermining the prospects for programme sustainability.

The project phasing-out process is frequently fraught with problems. Well-funded projects routinely fail the sustainability test when they are handed over to under-funded, understaffed, and poorly motivated LGAs. The handing-over process may be perfunctory or rushed. Under the LGRP, local authorities are supposed to become more autonomous of the central government, more accountable to citizens, and more responsible for project implementation. A key concern is LGA's capacity to take over responsibility for completed MNRP projects.

MNRP can claim numerous successes in terms of increased income generation and poverty reduction among community members in project areas. At the community level, income earned from various project activities, including tourism royalties, meat sales, and taxes on forest products, have financed investments in social infrastructure. These achievements reflect positively on Norwegian-Tanzanian collaboration over a range of natural resources and their management, and on the capacity of the MNRT to put external funds to good use.

In general, however, *project benefits are frequently limited to a relatively small number of communities and households*. There is evidence that the taxes, royalties and fees collected from NRM-related activities accrue to central and local governments in that order, with insignificant amounts left for village communities. These revenues are typically used for social infrastructure projects, which may (or may not) translate into collective future benefits. In many projects, the team feels that benefits are limited to a

fortunate few, often the better-off members of the community, while the poor majority do not enjoy significant individual, household or collective benefits. In the worst cases, local people derive few benefits compared to the costs they incur, while the benefits that accrue to government agents, private operators and middlemen far exceed the costs these groups incur. Furthermore, projects supported through MNRP have sometimes achieved their conservation objectives at the expense of, or with unforeseen negative consequences for, local populations. How costs and benefits are allocated is largely a governance issue.

Consequently, the team has major concerns over the *extent and distribution of environmental and socio-economic* derived from the programme and therefore over the *efficiency* and long-term *effectiveness* and *sustainability* of NRMP interventions.

Project support is intended to reduce the usual outreach constraints on effectiveness faced by government agencies, lack of transport and fuel in particular. Yet the large number of projects in the MNRP portfolio and the huge areas they cover make it unlikely that most projects will achieve high levels of effectiveness, even with long-term commitments. A general constraint on effectiveness is the personnel available to the Programme. The 11 MNRP projects have 426 staff, excluding drivers and office attendants, or less than 40 staff per project. The 2006 Annual Review claims that ‘the number of qualified staff in natural resources and tourism ... remains the main challenge to the government’ at both national and district level.

The MNRT has the mandate and the resources to own and manage the MNRP as a public initiative. Ownership of land and natural resources lies with the state. Although the law allows for joint management and benefit-sharing arrangements in wildlife and forestry, district councils have been reluctant to enter into agreements with villages to allow this to take place. With some exceptions, MNRP does not seem to have used its influence to advance the cause of community ownership of programme operations. Norway has consistently stressed national ownership and responsibility for programme implementation. This implies that programme implementers should be accountable to those in whose interests projects under MNRP are implemented. Yet neither the Norwegian nor the Tanzanian authorities appear to have raised the issue of downward accountability for programme funding and activities. Despite an increasing programme concern with stakeholder participation, most projects have been implemented in a traditional top-down ‘service delivery’ rather than participatory mode

The MNRP management and accounting structures were critiqued and consequently improved in 2004. Problems included the complex relationships between the programme and government structures regarding recruitment, employment conditions, and reporting arrangements. The evaluation team raises *serious concerns with governance*, both within the MNRP and in the wider environment influencing programme impact and sustainability. This concern is not new. The last Mid-Term Review (January 2005) cautioned ‘against taking governance, transparency and accountability issues lightly in relation to development assistance in general and as regards the MNRP in particular.’ The team’s review of programme documentation over the years suggests that governance weaknesses may have contributed in fundamental ways to some of the problems we note in this evaluation. More transparency and accountability could have improved performance by allowing the principal actors to deal with problems as they emerged. There is little to suggest that project implementers were ‘learning by doing’ or changing course when problems occurred. Nor were external reviews used as opportunities to identify and probe emerging problem areas. Instead, review missions have generally been satisfied with guided tours of show-case project activities rather than looking for wider impacts and constraints or evidence that innovations had taken root. The main area where the GON requested major procedural changes from the GOT during the MNRP concerned financial reporting, and these changes took years to effect.

Although laws and policies are in place to establish community ownership and management responsibilities over NR, in line with current national policies and international development thinking, implementation and enforcement are inadequate, reflecting lack of GOT commitment to the principles of active community agency and benefit-sharing.

This leads to the issue of sustainability which is the ultimate test of the programme's success. The MNRT implements the MNRP directly, with Norwegian funds transferred via the Treasury. Projects under the MNRP do not employ Norwegian personnel, so the issue of the withdrawal of TA does not apply in this case. Yet there are major concerns with the effects that project termination will have on both conservation and livelihoods.

5.2 Collaboration with Norwegian institutions

The evaluation deals with the issue of collaboration between Norwegian and Tanzanian institutions in the review of the relevant projects. The mid-term review examined relations between MNRT and the Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management, TAWIRI and the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA) and between NAFRAC and Toten Ecomuseum.

In relation to the first collaborative effort, the mid-term review found that the 'ideas behind this cooperation seem plausible, but the results are still at an early stage for assessment.' With no insights into this cooperation, the team reserves its judgement, though we would have expected some concrete results by now.

As regards TAWIRI-NINA collaboration, the main criticism to date has concerned the research bias towards 'natural science' approaches to NRM. The team feels that it is not easy for research institutes to change their disciplinary orientation. A rapid review of research topics and reports produced found that, while both institutions had a strong natural science bias, the studies undertaken under the collaborative research programme have combined both natural science and 'socio-economic' issues. However, the review suggests that the mix of natural science and socio-economics has been relatively constant over time rather than there being a trend away from the first towards the second.

The evaluation findings summarised above suggest that a systematic rethinking of the nature of the Norwegian-Tanzanian aid interface concerning achieving sustainable NRM and improved livelihoods is in order.

5.3. Challenges facing the design of Norwegian Support

Future collaboration between the governments of Norway and Tanzania in NRM must address the following challenges:

- Governance shortcomings on both the Norwegian and Tanzanian sides that serve to undermine community empowerment and the implementation of participatory NRM policies;
- Multiple donors and weak internal and external aid coordination capacities;
- Weak policy implementation and service delivery capacity at the local level;
- Failure to integrate NRM into government and aid-supported macro-economic, fiscal, budgetary, and poverty reduction policies.
- Cooperation between development agency projects targeting the same or partly the same groups is less common than mutual distrust, competition or simply ignoring each other. This needs rectifying.

5.4. Recommendations

1. The long-term *goal* of NRM support should be *to make the GOT financially independent of donor aid by valuing and taxing natural resources effectively and enforcing NRM laws and regulations.*

2. Enhanced accountability or popular 'voice', the rule of law, the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, and corruption control are all critical for improved NRM. To signal the importance of these issues we propose a new objective for future Norwegian support to NRM, namely: *'improved governance in NRM-related institutions in national and local government, communities, and the private sector.'*

3. Rather than being considered semi-autonomous 'sectors', marine, forest, and wildlife hunting and tourism need to be integrated into the mainstream of economic planning, taxation and regulation, and the team recommends that *Norway take a more pro-active role in furthering this process among development*

partners.

4. The importance of addressing the *aid coordination issue* and confronting the moral hazards attached to targeted aid for these sectors needs to be stressed.

5 GON must decide on its comparative advantage in relation to the various NR sub-sectors, in particular, wildlife management for tourism and hunting, freshwater and ocean fisheries, and forestry. *The desirability of supporting the forestry SWAP, and the modalities of such support, will emerge as a result of these processes.*

5.5 Future collaboration between the governments of Norway and Tanzania in NRM must address the following:

- Non-transparent and unaccountable governance;
- Multiple donors and implementing agencies with varying operational and incentive structures;
- Weak internal and external aid coordination capacities;
- Weak implementation capacity at the local level;
- Failure to integrate NRM into government and aid-supported macro-economic, fiscal, budgetary, and social (poverty reduction) policies.

No. 27 MID-TERM REVIEW OF UGA-2855, THE NORWEGIAN ASSISTANCE TO FOUR COMPONENTS (of UIP, Uganda, Phase II), Final Report November 2006. Per Schønberg (NCG), Alex Nakajjo (Uganda), Tore Laugerud (NCG)

- The topping up of governmental officer's salaries as National experts is not a sustainable system and is in conflict with Norwegian development assistance policy.

(The Review Report is at large not so relevant to the study).

NO. 28. REVIEW OF THE SINO-NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 1996-2005, FINAL REPORT, AUGUST 2006. Wu Xiaofu, Central South Forestry University, China, and Jens Claussen and Stein Hansen, Nordic Consulting Group.

12.1. Key Findings

The important issue for the cooperation with China has not been the financial contribution Norway has made in resolving environmental problems but the access to *knowledge and technology from Norway* that the arrangement has facilitated (Norway's financial contribution to China constitutes only 0.45% of total official development assistance and 0.004% of China's public revenue). Thus the cooperation with China should not be considered from a traditional aid management perspective, but from the perspective of fostering regular bilateral cooperation as with any other country (like other OECD countries or countries in Eastern Europe).

Findings from this review suggest that in most cases and for most projects *the objectives have been successfully achieved*. This is evident from the sample of projects subject for a more detailed review as well as for the portfolio in general when consulting project-specific review reports. Comparing this finding with other similar arrangements with other countries, the success can to a large extent be attributed to the fact that the partnership has been between professional parties with highly qualified managers with Chinese partners being "professional buyers of services". In countries with less skills and resources for effective management of projects and cooperation in general, the outcomes are usually more mixed.

The projects have *responded to demands for knowledge-sharing and expertise* in resolving critical environmental problems. They have to a large degree responded to demands from various partners in China who initially elaborated proposals for consideration by Norway. In response, Norway has in several cases funded project preparation/appraisal processes which have brought the proposals forward to qualify for funding and serving as guidance for the partnerships in implementation. Thus the projects have largely been identified and implemented by partners through a demand driven process in which several Chinese

(e.g. MOFCOM and SEPA) and Norwegian authorities (e.g. MoE and the Norwegian Embassy) have served as facilitators for promoting partnerships with relevant Norwegian companies and institutions.

The Norwegian contribution has first and foremost been visible and made an impact through the *project outcomes* while the general policy dialogue under the framework of the MoUs has had limited impact. The MoUs have also only to a limited extent served as effective tools in guiding the cooperation. Changes in content of the cooperation have instead partly been due to reduced funding (in which some thematic areas like cultural heritage were discontinued) and promoting Norwegian state institutions as partners, to some extent by discontinuation of existing partnerships with Norwegian research- and consultancy companies/institutions.

The management arrangement for the cooperation was in the initial years highly fragmented, in particular on the Norwegian side with different institutions, and departments within them, involved separately in the dialogue surrounding different MoUs, in different parts of the cooperation and different sources of funding from the aid budget. Since 2004 this has *significantly improved with the Embassy in Beijing serving as the focal point* for the cooperation.

While the portfolio of projects has been diversified and changing over time, there is no clear trend related to a particular field or form of cooperation (commercial, institutional, research cooperation). The classification applied also reflects first and foremost *which budget line in the Norwegian aid administration that has been used as a source of finance* rather than the actual content and form of cooperation. This is evident by the fact that some of *the same institutions and consultants have been suppliers to projects in all categories* even for the same services and projects with similar content; sometimes been funded as commercial cooperation and sometimes as institutional cooperation.

One characteristic of the cooperation is that in most cases the projects and partnerships established have been *too short term*. This finding follows our analysis of the project portfolio and the fact that ongoing projects have not been granted support beyond the initial phase of 3-4 years, when in fact it is after this initial phase that the benefits will be produced. In fact, successfully established partnerships with e.g. Norwegian consultants/researchers appear to be substituted with new partnerships, increasingly with Norwegian state institutions, with the risk of losing the value invested in the initial partnerships which have contributed to an overall successful outcome of ten years of cooperation. Shifting of partnerships may create a risk that new partnerships become less successful. Building trust and efficient partnerships takes considerable time and patience in P.R. China, and to fully reap the benefit requires many years of sustained cooperation beyond the 3-4 years each project is allocated funding.

In recent years *more efforts have been put into the promotion of a wider and longer term cooperation* taking the opportunity of past successful partnerships already established. This will however require time and funding to be sustained in the longer run. One major constraint in this respect is the funding and linked to this the approach in managing the cooperation by Norway. While Norway has throughout the study period relied on one source of funding for the cooperation, namely the aid budget, other countries use a variety of instruments in promoting their cooperation. *The Norwegian cooperation has accordingly been subject to a narrow aid agenda with shifting objectives, strategies and priorities due to frequent and unpredictable changes in Norwegian aid policies and management, while other countries have managed the cooperation with a much broader, predictable and consistent framework.*

In the early 1990 with the Labour Governments, an Asia strategy for wide and long-term cooperation and transfer of Norwegian environment friendly technology, to a large extent aid financed, was launched, and (non-committing) MoUs for cooperation with China in the field of environment were signed. This was abruptly reversed by the following Governments which had other geographic and thematic priorities. Then with the new labour Government in place since 2005, the scope has again changed, and environment cooperation with China has again become important.

Norway has first and foremost *managed the cooperation as “development assistance”* to China, as

reflected by the fact that the Norwegian aid administration has been given a prominent role in decision making, and the funding has entirely been sourced from the aid budget. In contrast, other countries have predominantly used regular state funding for cross border cooperation (both commercial and institutional cooperation) which applies to bilateral cooperation in general. This funding has to a large extent also been funded by grants but not constrained by criteria to be classified as Official Development Assistance (ODA). The above may serve to explain the excessive time it takes on the Norwegian side from project design to approval for funding since various issues that are only relevant in a conventional development policy context had also to be addressed despite that it is of less relevance for the cooperation.

In the case of institutional cooperation projects it has almost entirely been an arrangement made through a joint design process between Chinese and Norwegian partners. The contractual arrangement has been made through a direct negotiation process. None of the projects have been subject to a *competitive process among potential partners*. This stands in contrast to the approach used by other donor countries that jointly identify projects with the Chinese authorities, and subsequently apply a national tendering process for the selection of the external technical partner for the Chinese project executing agency.

While most of the projects under the Norwegian cooperation have been subject to appraisals as input to decision making, they have rarely been subject to a *full assessment of cost efficiency*, often because the budgets and accounts for the projects have in most cases not been presented in a way enabling assessment of efficiency. This is an important issue in particular for projects not subject to any competitive selection of partners/suppliers. This may serve to explain why the projects sometimes appear to have been designed with a generous volume of Norwegian inputs when comparing total cost with actual outcomes.

The critical *need for establishing cross-sector and province-to-Central Government* communication is a lesson learned from the large and complex technology projects at an early stage of the cooperation. This has now been taken into account in the design of the new Cement Kiln Project for destruction of hazardous waste with SINTEF and the Mercury measurement and monitoring project with NIVA. Here it has been agreed that from 2006 there shall be bi-monthly progress reports conveyed to the stakeholders and the Central Government, shall explain why they want a certain standard and how a project meets SEPA priorities.

12.2. Recommendations

Based on the findings from this review the following main recommendations can be made;

The focus of the cooperation should be on promoting bilateral cooperation in a regular sense, *not guided by the traditional aid agenda*. The main issue is not aid for financing development, but finance for promotion of knowledge sharing and technology transfer regardless of whether it takes place through non-commercial or commercial cooperation. Frequent shifts in the development policy agenda may not be compatible with a desire to promote long term cooperation on environmental issues.

While a major step has been taken with the Norwegian Embassy acting as the focal point on the Norwegian side for the above, it remains constrained by the fact that Norway up to now appears to only have considered funding of the cooperation under the framework of aid. Thus either the aid administration needs to manage funding in a much wider and consistent approach serving the needs of the partners (similar to other countries cooperation with China, and Norwegian funding of cooperation with Eastern European countries), or *Norway would need to consider allocating resources which can be applied without the rules and regulations guiding the aid budget* constraining the application of funding. The Government should revisit the present setting for environment cooperation with China against the findings of this review including the alternative approaches established by some other donor countries.

It is the project outcomes that have served to influence the environment agenda in China, not the policy dialogue surrounding the annual discussion of the MoUs. The *MoUs have not served as tools in guiding the cooperation* and MoUs with different institutions in Norway related to the same issue have only served to reflect the fragmented management approach by Norway in the initial years of the cooperation. Accordingly, Norway and China should consider establishing future MoUs with clear long term vision for the cooperation and with guidelines which can be operationalized.

The above may serve to protect the agenda against *unpredictable shift due to frequent shift in the*

development agenda. The aid budget and other sources of funding are only to serve as tools for promoting the cooperation, not as instruments to determine content and objective for the cooperation. Accordingly, there should be no requirement for a specific MoU related to development cooperation in general.

The cooperation has been determined more by different Chinese demands for which they could find highly qualified technical partners from Norway as suppliers, rather than a process in which the MoUs has had strong influence on what projects to be developed. It has only been when Norway has indicated limitations in funding and changes in priorities that funding for some existing successful partnerships has been substituted by new projects with Norwegian public sector institutions. The former has proven a successful approach and should be continued (“market based approach” in which demand for expertise are supplied by the most qualified suppliers regardless of a specific field) rather than trying to enforce a specific field of cooperation and partnership due to shifting political preferences (a “regulated or planned approach”).

Many of the projects supported should *be considered in a longer term* than 3-4 years, and be used more proactively as a point of departure for wider cooperation with other partners in Norway with relevant expertise and technology. The initial investment in the partnership will then create benefits for a much longer term than what has been the case so far. It means allocating even more time and resources to the work already initiated by the parties for this promotional work.

On the Norwegian side, it means to apply *one management approach to foster cooperation jointly*, be it commercial or non-commercial. The form of cooperation should be determined on the basis of what serves the project identified in the best way, not on the basis of which agency or department in Norway is involved or which source of funding is being used. It means for the Embassy to work as a joint entity promoting all approaches to cooperation in one comprehensive approach.

The approach in developing partnerships could be adjusted *along the lines of other bilateral cooperation arrangements between China and other countries*. It may include more frequent use of tendering processes in Norway, or at least more open invitations to relevant commercial and non-commercial institutions.

In cases of “direct contracting” - the approach only applied so far - it should as a minimum be subject to a *more comprehensive assessment of cost efficiency*. This will in turn require presentation of budget and accounts in a more comprehensive way than what has been required so far.

This review faced several challenges in documenting ten years of cooperation due to the fact that the institutional arrangement has changed several times during the period with loss of institutional memory. More importantly, the cooperation could have benefited from external reviews in deciding on changes. Accordingly, it is recommended to conduct overall reviews of the cooperation more frequently (e.g. every 3 – 5 years) partly to inform the decision makers on options for the future, partly because the policy agenda changes frequently and partially because China is a fast developing country with new national plans every five year also setting the priorities in the field of environment.

NO. 29 SAD-ELEC APPRAISAL: NORWAY – ANGOLA ELECTRICITY SECTOR COOPERATION 2002-2006, FINAL REPORT

6.1 Assessment of Achievements: 2002-2006

This review finds that the combination of institutional support and physical (infrastructure) rehabilitation support in the Norwegian support programme is generally viewed as very important and meaningful at a time when the rest of the Angolan economy was in a very difficult situation. However, both parties acknowledge that progress and achievements fell below expectations due to a variety of factors.

The combination of Norway’s 2004 development assistance policy change and the concurrent changes in Angolan priorities have caused the Norwegian programme to have become marginal’ to both parties. Capacity constraints in MINEA/DNE also constrained the closer monitoring and control of implementation that could have resulted in more timely delivery, less budget under-spend and more coordination of effort for achievement of results.

In general, NORAD recognises that ‘institutional cooperation’ is in itself difficult, and this is compounded when the focus is on transfer of key principles and their application, as was the intention of

the design for the Norwegian support programme to the Angolan non-petroleum energy sector. NVE was not actively involved in the formative stage, and it appears that the project design did not sufficiently consider the capacity and capability of institutions such as NVE to contribute and to deploy the best and most relevant competencies and personnel when required – this has not been the case over the past few years.

The view that the resourcing approach could have been different (i.e. more and longer-term Norwegian presence in Luanda) is shared by MINEA/DNE and NORPLAN, the latter with particular reference to the institutional support provided to EDEL. Similarly, the difficulties encountered due to limitations on available Angolan counterparty human resources were also under-estimated, particularly for the MINEA/DNE components of the programme. This is considered to have been a key impediment, and the work plan for the NESMA sub-project has been implemented only to a very limited degree. This key risk could have been mitigated – at least in part – by sustained in-country support.

It is noted that the 2001 review recommendations were only implemented to a limited extent, particularly concerning the inadequacy of support through infrequent short visits by NVE and/or its contracted consultants. NVE appears to see itself generally as a custodian to safeguard adherence to agreed principles set out in country and project agreements. Moreover, as NVE appears not to be well informed about ongoing and more recent Angolan developments, little or no modification and closer alignment of the programme to the rapidly changing environment in Angola appears to have taken place.

The current review re-emphasises the need for sustained facilitator presence and on-the-ground support to MINEA/DNE senior personnel – but within the context of the rapidly changing environment, e.g. less emphasis on institutional capacity building, but more on project development.

There is consensus that the MIS component has struggled throughout the programme, and there appears to be a fundamental mismatch of expectations by the two parties concerned: NVE and its contracted consultants had envisaged and planned for the provision of advisory services, whereas MINEA/DNE may have expected a populated and functioning MIS. The establishment of a functioning MIS system is still considered important by MINEA/DNE, but it is questionable if this initiative will be sustainable: while consultants can provide guidance, it is MINEA/DNE who has to assume ‘ownership’ of the content of the database and the outputs required of it. MINEA/DNE will also need to get ‘buy-in’ by sector stakeholders for the MIS to become a truly functioning tool to assist policy making and sector development in the future.

Despite difficulties and set-backs, EDEL considers NORPLAN assistance to have been relatively successful. It is also generally agreed that the impact of the support to EDEL could have been improved through more continuous and sustained presence in Luanda by the Norwegian service provider. It was also noted that EDEL appears to be more satisfied with the support received at sub-project level, particularly support of a more ‘technical’ nature.

A further aspect that could have received more consideration is that language is a constraint and reduces the impact of the institutional support work, as well as slowing down work due to the need for translators/translation of outputs. A somewhat broader base is seen for sustainability in EDEL with positive impact in terms of asset management, network planning, and language capabilities. NORPLAN also believes that the establishment of contact and ‘partnership’ with Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM) will assist to reinforce the improvements achieved to date in EDEL, and that this will serve to support sustainability. English language training undertaken is viewed by all parties as a key area for building improved sustainability of the Angolan electricity sector on a broader basis.

In summary, questions can be raised about how well the outputs of the programme and its various components have been ‘institutionalised’ in the Angolan counter-part institutions. While this is always a challenging aspect of institutional co-operation, the particular Angolan situation and difficult operating environment during the period under review have certainly not assisted in this regard. To this extent,

sustainability of results may be limited to a handful of key individuals that have had extensive exposure to the Norwegian support programme.

In general, NVE's programme administration role has been despatched reasonably well, but *would have benefited from more frequent and longer visits to Angola by NVE personnel*. There were also shortcomings in communication and project monitoring by the Norwegian entities involved. NORAD is generally of the view that there is no need for the Embassy in Luanda to have in-house professional competence on each sector when the necessary technical and competency inputs are to be provided by the Norwegian partner - in this case NVE. However, as it appears that NVE did not have much engagement with the Embassy during the course of the support programme, and there was limited professional input and involvement by both NVE and NORAD, the appropriateness of limited Embassy involvement is questionable. NORPLAN's working relationship was also with NVE and not direct with NORAD, and NORPLAN had only limited contact with the Embassy. In hindsight, it is now generally agreed that closer interaction may have been beneficial, particularly as communication with MINEA/DNE was a key problem.

6.2. Future institutional support needs

With an envisaged unbundling of ENE and the possible creation of a national transmission company (based on ENE's current transmission business), combined with the prospects of major new hydropower developments with involvement by the private sector, Angola will need to develop a framework for transmission access and pricing of transmission services that will be conducive to support expected future sector developments. This is an area where Norway has particularly strong competencies and experience to offer. A development such as the proposed Norsk Hydro aluminium and hydropower development would definitely require a well-defined framework for transmission access and pricing to be put in place, as an example.

Another area where Norwegian competence and experience could be brought to bear is the introduction of effective planning frameworks and tools to support major rehabilitation and expansion required of the Angolan power networks, not least to cater for the very rapid growth of the networks in and around Luanda, particularly in Luanda South, where numerous mini-grid developments are taking place in parallel under both ENE and EDEL auspices, as well as driven by private third party players.

Given Angola's improved financial situation, the justification for traditional development assistance to the electricity sector is not strong, and Norwegian development co-operation with Angola may be phased out over the period 2007-2010. In this light, it may not be prudent or possible to engage in any new support programmes requiring longer-term sustained presence. However, Norwegian comparative advantage in the energy sector may open the way to limited Norwegian donor support to facilitate private Norwegian investments and public-private-partnerships.

However, a key impediment to the realisation of any of the above potential is Angola's dire shortage of human resources capacity for effective energy sector management, with extensive dependence on a few individuals. While the current institutional support programme has benefited from having a very competent Angolan counterpart in overall charge of the programme, severe capacity constraints exist at the levels below. A broadening of the skills base and focused training of energy sector managers are critical activities for a more sustainable future. Hence, any potential continued Norwegian support may have to be built around shorter-term and focused interventions on the one hand, e.g. related to support for the development and implementation of hydropower concession frameworks and best practice environmental management, combined with support for longer-term capacity building in the country, e.g. through support to the tertiary education system in developing targeted programmes and initiatives aimed at sustainable energy sector development, including the active involvement of the local private sector.

In these areas there seems to be scope for co-operation with other financing institutions and ongoing and planned energy sector programmes and initiatives. The most interesting ones from a Norwegian perspective appear to be the SIDA support programme and NORAD regional support to RERA developments. Collaboration with USAID may also be useful to maximise capacity building in energy

economics, currently supported by USAID through the Catholic University in Luanda.

In summary, Norwegian development assistance should not be ruled out, but should be carefully considered against Norway's longer-term strategic intent in Angola. Any potential support and interventions should preferably make a contribution to developing investment, regulatory and operational frameworks that could incentivise the Norwegian private sector to engage with Angolan energy sector developments. Any continuation of Norwegian support to Angolan energy sector entities should not be based on the traditional institutional cooperation model, but should adopt a more pragmatic approach. This could include the deployment of a long-term advisor to the UIR, complemented with certain focused and targeted interventions in areas where Norway has specific competencies and experience to contribute to capacity building in energy management in Angola. Furthermore, successful development of the Angolan energy sector will depend on building appropriate and sustainable regulatory capacity. Hence, including Angola in already existing Norwegian support to RERA would also appear meaningful, e.g. through development of certain RERA initiatives of particular relevance to the Angolan reality.

No. 30 STATSKONSULT: (1998) FORVALTNING AV INSTITUSJONSSAMARBEID

3.1 Bakgrunn

Institusjonssamarbeid er et av flere viktige virkemidler som bidra til institusjonsutvikling i samarbeidslandene. Satsingen på institusjonsutvikling er begrunnet ut fra målsettingen om at norsk bistand skal bidra til å styrke samarbeidslandenes institusjoner, slik at de i et noe lengre perspektiv settes I stand til å fylle sine funksjoner uavhengig av utenlandsk støtte. Prinsippet om mottakeransvar er også et vesentlig moment som ligger bak satsingen på institusjonsutvikling og institusjonssamarbeid. Mottakeransvar innebærer at mottaker tar ansvaret for planlegging, gjennomføring og oppfølging av bistandsprosjekter.

NORADs strategi gir ingen nærmere definisjon av begrepet institusjonssamarbeid eller institusjonsutvikling. St meld nr 51 (1991–92) gjør et forsøk på presisering og splitter tiltak for institusjonsutvikling i tre nivåer,

- .institusjonens struktur og oppbygning
- .institusjonens menneskelige ressurser
- .de materielle ressursene.

Disse policydokumentene angir i ulik detaljeringsgrad de overordnede rammene og målsettinger for institusjonsutvikling og institusjonssamarbeid. Men de bidrar ikke til en nærmere begrepsavklaring – forstått som en etablering av et felles referansepunkt for en praktisk og operasjonaliserbar forståelse av begrepene.

Statskonsult har på oppdrag fra NORAD gjennomført en kartlegging og analyse av forvaltningsmessige sider ved bruk av norske direktorater i institusjonelt samarbeid, med særlig vekt på hvordan erfaringene oppleves fra norsk side. Formålet med oppdraget er å bedre NORADs grunnlag for å videreutvikle konseptet om institusjonssamarbeid, og for å følge opp direktoratene faglig og administrativt. Vi har også vurdert muligheter for å bruke departementer I institusjonelt samarbeid.

Institusjonssamarbeid forstås som et samarbeid mellom en norsk institusjon og en tilsvarende institusjon i et samarbeidsland. Samarbeidet skal være regulert I en formell kontrakt og ha en varighet på minst to år. Direktoratene som har inngått samarbeidskontrakter med institusjoner i samarbeidslandene, har I tillegg en kontrakt med NORAD om rammer for institusjons-samarbeidet og andre tjenester til NORAD. Institusjonssamarbeid kan innholdsmessig være et bredt sammensatt virkemiddel, hvor samarbeidet kan omfatte alt fra lederutvikling og bygging av en organisasjon til faglig bistand innenfor mottakerinstitusjonens forvaltningsområde – hver for seg eller kombinert.

Med utgangspunkt i tiltakssyklusmanualen og prinsippene for norsk bistand har Statskonsult forstått rollefordelingen mellom de to samarbeidspartene og NORAD slik:

·Samarbeidspartneren er kjøper av konkrete tjenester for å løse definerte problemer, og har en kjøper- eller oppdragsgiverrolle overfor det norske direktoratet. Partneren har i tillegg en mottakerrolle i forhold til NORAD.

·Direktoratet er leverandør av avtalte tjenester overfor samarbeidspartneren i Sør. Direktoratet har først og fremst en rådgiverfunksjon innenfor sitt forvaltningsområde. Direktoratet skal bare ta på seg oppgaver ute som de har kompetanse til å gjøre i Norge.

·NORAD forvalter og setter i verk den bilaterale bistandspolitikken. Det innebærer blant annet å legge til rette for institusjonssamarbeid og forvalte bistandsmidlene i samsvar med norsk bistandspolitikkk – herunder sikre at kontrakten om institusjonelt samarbeid samsvarer med bevilgningsgrunnlaget og prosjektavtalen – og følge opp samarbeidet.

3.2. Hovedfunn i kartleggingen

Direktoratene og NORAD har ikke en felles og enhetlig forståelse av hvilke mål institusjonssamarbeid forventes å innfri, hvilke typer aktiviteter institusjonssamarbeid skal inneholde eller hvilke krav og forutsetninger som bør legges til grunn for slikt samarbeid. Særlig er forholdet mellom institusjonssamarbeid og institusjonsutvikling uklart.

I de fleste prosjektene går samarbeidet godt, sett fra direktoratenes side. Dette tyder på at direktoratene har maktet å balansere sin rolle i forhold til å være rådgiver og leverandør av faglige bidrag i henhold til en kontrakt.

Inntrykk fra intervjuene i direktoratene tyder på at direktoratene tar på seg et større ansvar enn det de formelt har i samarbeidet. Direktoratene har selvsagt en klar egeninteresse i at samarbeidet blir vellykket. Det kan derfor være fristende å overta en større del av gjennomføringen. Noen av direktoratene synes det er behov for å være forsiktig pådriver i samarbeidet. Disse står i en fare for å gå over på samarbeidspartnerens ansvarsområde, ettersom mottakeransvaret tilsier at det er mottakeren som har ansvaret for bestillingen (faglig innhold), framdriften og gjennomføringen.

NORAD kritiserer direktoratene for at de ikke i tilstrekkelig grad ivaretar helhetshensyn i sin rolle. Det påpekes at direktoratene bare involverer seg i det konkrete fagområdet som direktoratet dekker, men ser i mindre grad andre behov som kan bidra til å utvikle institusjonen og dermed også bidra til faglig framgang. NORAD kritiserer også direktoratene for at de ikke alltid er like flink til å ta hensyn til detaljer som er avtalt med samarbeidslandet på et høyere avtalenivå (f.eks. landprogramavtalen).

NORADs har reist spørsmål om direktoratene kan ivareta en koordinerende rolle i tillegg til leverandørrollen for egne tjenester. Mottakeren kan ha behov for tjenester som ligger litt på siden av det direktoratet kan bidra med. Det ville da sannsynligvis være hensiktsmessig – både ut fra mottakers synspunkt og fra NORADs som forvalter – å slippe å få flere partnere å forholde seg til.

Statskonsult stiller seg derimot tvilende til om et norsk direktorat kan ta ansvaret for å koordinere tjenester fra andre leverandører. Da beveger direktoratet seg et godt stykke på veg mot en bistandsforvalterrolle. *En underliggende premiss både fra NORAD og fra overordnet fagdepartement er at direktoratene skal gjøre det samme i samarbeidslandet som de har ansvar for i Norge.* Det medfører at en slik koordinatørrolle kan være i uoverensstemmelse med forutsetningene.

Derimot er det etter Statskonsult's vurdering ingen konflikt i at direktoratet påtar seg oppgaver knyttet til besøkstjeneste, foredrags- og undervisningsvirksomhet, informasjonsspredning m.m. Dette vil også være en del av direktoratets ordinære oppgave innenfor sitt forvaltningsområde. I et institusjonssamarbeid bør direktoratet også kunne trekke inn og formidle rådgivning om faglige spørsmål, administrative prosedyrer, organisasjons- og ledelsesutvikling osv, som kan bidra til at direktoratets fagrådgivning settes inn i en mer helhetlig sammenheng. Dette er funksjoner som et direktorat har ansvar for innenfor sine områder også i Norge, men det kan være vanskelig å ha kompetanse og kapasitet til å avgi slike ressurser til institusjonssamarbeid. Det blir opp til det enkelte direktorat å vurdere om de kan tilby slike tjenester

eller engasjere eksterne fagmiljøer til denne typen oppgaver.

Samlet var norske direktorater involvert i 47 institusjonssamarbeidsprosjekter i 1998. De fleste prosjektene har et budsjett på under 15 mill kroner – fordelt over tre til fem år. Arbeidet utgjør en liten del av direktoratenes totale produksjon. Kartleggingen viser at hovedinnholdet i prosjektene er faglig rådgivning og kunnskapsoverføring på individnivå i mottakerinstitusjonen. Det er få eksempler på prosjekter der organisasjons- og lederutvikling eller mottakerinstitusjonens legitimitet i samfunnet har vært fokusert i særlig grad.

Intervjuene i direktoratene og i NORAD viser at direktoratene ikke alltid er bevisste på hvilken rolle de har i institusjonssamarbeidsprosjektene. NORAD bidrar til dagens klarhet ved at omtale av rammer for direktoratenes institusjonssamarbeid er totalt integrert i samarbeidsavtalen mellom NORAD og direktoratene, og ved at NORAD ber om rapportering fra direktoratene om status på institusjonssamarbeidsprosjektene.

Flere av informantene i NORAD gir uttrykk for at direktoratene har hatt problemer med å se sin rolle i forhold til NORAD. De påpeker bl a at direktoratene ikke alltid er tydelige med hensyn til på hvilken "side av bordet" de sitter i det årlige møtet som samarbeidspartneren i Sør har med NORAD. Som rådgivere representerer direktoratene samarbeidspartneren i møtene med NORAD. Flere forhold tyder også på at relasjonen mellom direktorat og NORAD ikke er tydelig.

Bistandsarbeidet er godt forankret i direktoratene, både i interne styringsdokumenter, ved ledelsens involvering og gjennom en hensiktsmessig organisering. Omtale av institusjonssamarbeid i tildelingsbrevet fra overordnet departement og rapportering tilbake til departementet varierer derimot betydelig. Dagens rapporteringsordning bidrar, etter Statskonsult oppfatning, til at ansvarsforholdene blir utydelige. All rapportering om ressursbruk, framdrift, status og resultater for enkeltprosjekter bør gå gjennom mottakerinstitusjonen. Som følge av at NORAD har gitt mange institusjoner en garanti for minimumsbruk av deres personalressurser til bistandsarbeid, trenger NORAD rapportering fra direktoratene i forhold til om minimumsgarantien utløses. Etter vår oppfatning, er en slik garanti nokså unik. Garantien har formodentlig vært nødvendig i forbindelsen med etableringen av samarbeidet med direktoratene. Nå har både NORAD og direktoratene en del erfaring med hvor mye ressurser som brukes til bistandsarbeidet. Behovet for en minimumsgaranti skulle derfor være mindre i dag enn i starten. Det kan etter vår oppfatning også stilles spørsmål ved om garantiordningen går på tvers av bevilgningsreglementet og liknende.

Direktoratene bruker erfarne medarbeidere som vurderes å ha god fagkunnskap og forvaltningskompetanse, i tillegg til tidligere bistandserfaring. NORAD vurderer direktoratsmedarbeidernes evne til å formidle egen fagkompetanse på en pedagogisk måte på et fremmed språk i en bistandsfaglig kontekst, som mangelfull. Det pekes også på at kjennskap til den helhetlige bistandskonteksten, som et institusjonssamarbeid er en del av, er mangelfull i direktoratene. NORAD-informanter påpeker at en av de største svakhetene i direktoratenes kompetanse er erfaring med og evne til å overføre kunnskap – forstått som evne til å integrere egen fagkompetanse i en bistandsfaglig kontekst og formidle dette på en pedagogisk måte på et fremmed språk. Representanter for enkelte mottakerinstitusjoner er særlig opptatt av at norske fagpersoner må beherske engelsk godt nok til å kunne undervise, og det blir påpekt at språkkunnskapene i enkelte tilfeller har vært meget svake blant norske direktoraters medarbeidere. Både NORAD og mottakerlandet vurderer dette som viktigere enn tidligere bistandserfaring. Direktoratene etterspør kortvarige kurs eller seminarer som holder et høyt faglig nivå og som er mer målrettet mot behovet enn dagens kurs som arrangeres av Utenrikstjenestens kompetansesenter/NORAD. Det er opp til direktoratene selv å sikre at disse grunnpremissene oppfylles ved rekruttering av personell til bistandsarbeid og ved kompetanseutvikling.

Samtlige direktorater vi har intervjuet, mener det er god sammenheng mellom direktoratets kjerneoppgaver og innsatsen innenfor institusjonssamarbeid. I hovedsak ytes det bistand innenfor de kjerneområdene som direktoratene forvalter nasjonalt. Innholdet i samarbeidet varierer betydelig mellom

mottakerlandene og -institusjonene, og informantene påpeker at innholdet i bistandsarbeidet har endret seg mye de senere årene. De fleste samarbeidsprosjektene retter seg mot teknisk/faglig bistand på et område – kombinert med kompetanseutvikling.

Det er stor enighet blant informantene om at hovedvekten i samarbeidet ligger på kunnskapsoverføring, der siktemålet kan være utvikling av verktøy, regelverksarbeid, utforming av kravspesifikasjoner i forbindelse med anskaffelser, datalagring, informasjonsspredning, policyutvikling, mm. Flertallet peker på at institusjonsutvikling kommer som en indirekte effekt av kunnskapsoverføring og rådgivning.

I arbeidet med å bistå i utforming av lov- og regelverk legges det vekt på praktisk opplæring i prosjektarbeid (prosjektledelse, -gjennomføring og -organisering), og det påpekes at det ofte ikke finnes noen organisasjon i utgangspunktet, slik at den må bygges opp fra bunnen av, og at dette innebærer organisasjonsutvikling. Men enkelte peker også på at direktoratet aldri har trukket inn folk fra administrasjonsavdelingen hjemme i dette arbeidet. Flere av informantene i NORAD oppfatter denne profilen på institusjonssamarbeid som en svakhet. Informantene viser til at direktoratene ikke er flinke nok til å se breddebehov hos mottakeren, men i for stor grad er opptatt av å ivareta sin egen institusjons fagområde, og at siktemålet primært ikke er å styrke institusjonen som organisasjon, men å løse et faglig problem. De påpeker at direktoratene i enkelte institusjonssamarbeidsprosjekter i større grad bør bringe inn annen kompetanse enn den rent faglige.

Det er imidlertid vårt inntrykk at det bare er unntaksvis at institusjonssamarbeid fungerer som tradisjonell ekspertbistand med sikte på å løse avgrensede faglige problemer/oppgaver hos mottaker. På den andre siden er det også bare unntaksvis at institusjonssamarbeid eksplisitt skal bidra til institusjonsutvikling med sikte på å bedre mottakerinstitusjonens struktur og oppbygging (dvs ledelse, administrative linjer, beslutningssystem, planleggingsapparat, rammevilkår osv).

Hovedsiktemålet i direktoratenes institusjonssamarbeid er kunnskapsoverføring. Ut fra intervjuene er det en tendens til å se et motsetningsforhold mellom kunnskapsoverføring og institusjonsutvikling, som igjen har sammenheng med at mange likestiller institusjonsutvikling med organisasjonsutvikling. Dette bekrefter igjen behovet for definering og klargjøring av begreper i bistandsarbeidet.

Etter vår vurdering vil kunnskapsoverføring, som det sentrale virkemidlet i direktoratenes institusjonssamarbeid, være et viktig bidrag til institusjonsutvikling – også i de tilfellene den er rettet mot det som kan kalles institusjonens materielle ressurser (eksempelvis infrastruktur, utstyr, vedlikehold, transport osv). Men det er viktig å understreke at institusjonssamarbeid som avgrenses til og stopper med kunnskapsoverføring omkring materielle ressurser, lett vil få preg av å være en punktinnsett, som ikke vil være kvalitativt forskjellig fra teknisk bistand. I slike tilfeller vil det være nødvendig å følge opp med et gradvis bredere anlagt institusjonssamarbeid, dersom siktemålet skal være å skape levedyktige institusjoner i samarbeidslandene.

Bare en sjettedel av prosjektene har et samlet budsjett for hele prosjektperioden på mer enn 15 mill kroner. Om lag halvparten av prosjektene har et samlet budsjett på under 5 mill kroner. Denne summen inneholder – i tillegg til refusjon for arbeid utført av direktoratet – reiseutgifter, kjøp av konsulenttenester og eventuelle investeringskomponenter. Når denne summen fordeles på hele prosjektperioden, som er på tre til fem år for de fleste prosjektene, blir det årlige budsjettet pr prosjekt relativt beskjedent etter Statskonsults vurdering.

Gjennomgående involverer direktoratene flere personer i prosjektene enn det norske offentlige institusjoner gjør samlet sett i institusjonssamarbeid. Om lag 50 prosent av prosjektene involverer mer enn seks personer i direktoratet. Dette tallet sier ikke noe om arbeidsmengden som legges ned, men om bredden i engasjementet.

Om lag 98 prosent av alle prosjektene i direktoratene har en total varighet på seks år eller mindre. Direktoratene er nokså samstemte i behovet for langsiktighet i institusjonssamarbeid. Noen av

direktoratene ønsker lengre avtaleperioder med NORAD enn to-tre år som er det vanlige nå. NORAD er enig i at det er nødvendig med et langsiktig perspektiv, men har motforestillinger mot å øke avtaleperioden.

Det er Statskonsult's hovedinntrykk at bistandsarbeidet ikke går på bekostning av kjerneoppgavene eller utgjør et kapasitets- og konkurranseproblem. Direktoratene med stort bistandsengasjement løser dette også kapasitetsmessig.

3.3 Anbefalinger

Statskonsult mener at det er behov for å utvikle en helhetlig strategi for institusjonssamarbeid og institusjonsutvikling, hvor operasjonaliserbare mål, retningslinjer og kriterier klargjøres. Det bør være et mål å etablere en felles forståelse innad i NORAD, gjøre begrepene anvendbare for direktoratene i deres praktiske arbeid og vedlikeholde en kontinuerlig debatt om temaet. Statskonsult anbefaler NORAD å klargjøre aktørenes ulike roller og ansvar. Vi foreslår følgende rolle- og ansvarsfordeling:

- Samarbeidsinstitusjonen i samarbeidslandet har et hovedansvar for gjennomføringen av prosjektet og har en oppdragsgiver- eller kjøperrolle overfor direktoratet og en mottakerrolle overfor NORAD.
- Direktoratet har en leverandør- og rådgiverrolle overfor samarbeidsinstitusjonen i Sør og har det faglige ansvaret for sitt bidrag.
- NORAD har en forvalterrolle og et tilhørende ansvar for at bistandsmidlene forvaltes i overensstemmelse med Stortingets forutsetninger.
- Bistandsministeren er konstitusjonelt og parlamentarisk ansvarlig for bistandspolitiske strategier og forvaltningen av bistandsmidlene.
- Fagstatsråden er konstitusjonelt og parlamentarisk ansvarlig for det faglige innholdet i institusjonssamarbeidet.

NORAD bør klargjøre hva de skal konsentrere seg om i sin forvalterrolle og se etter muligheter for å effektivisere saksbehandlingen i NORAD. Direktoratene bør være mer bevisst på hvem de representerer i ulike sammenhenger. Det bør utarbeides maler for kontrakter om institusjonelt samarbeid samtidig som direktoratene bør trekke på sin egen juridiske kompetanse ved utforming av avtalene. Det vil fortsatt være behov for pragmatisme og tilpasning til behovene i de forskjellige samarbeidslandene. NORAD bør tilby veiledning og informere tidlig i prosessen om hvilke vurderinger som gjøres ved godkjenning av kontrakten.

Med hensyn til varigheten på prosjektene, kan det stilles spørsmål ved om en periode på tre til fem år er et tilstrekkelig langsiktig perspektiv for et institusjonssamarbeid som skal skape en levedyktig mottakerinstitusjon. Faren for at et institusjonssamarbeid får preg av en punktinnsett (teknisk bistand) må ses i sammenheng med rammene for prosjektet, dvs både budsjett og varighet. Direktoratene involverer relativt mange medarbeidere direkte i hvert enkelt samarbeidsprosjekt. I mer enn halvparten av prosjektene er mer enn seks personer i direktoratet involvert. Etter Statskonsults vurdering, viser dette at direktoratene i stor grad trekker på sin samlede ekspertise, som igjen samsvarer med institusjonssamarbeidskonseptet i bistanden.

Vår anbefaling er at NORAD vurderer å fastsette en nedre grense for varighet og budsjetttramme for et institusjonssamarbeid. Tatt i betraktning de ressurser som brukes i direktoratene og i NORAD i etablering av en avtale om institusjonssamarbeid, synes en grensedracting hensiktsmessig.

Et krav om minimumsvolum på bistandsarbeidet i hvert direktorat bør også vurderes i forhold til en klargjøring av krav og kriterier for institusjonssamarbeid, målsettingen om å bidra til levedyktige mottakerinstitusjoner og koplingen til (langsiktig) institusjonsutvikling for å nå denne målsettingen. Dersom omfanget blir for lite, er det vanskelig å vedlikeholde kompetansen på området.

Prosjekter om institusjonssamarbeid er ofte mindre enn 10 millioner kroner over to til tre år. I lys av at slike oppdrag tildeles uten anbudskonkurranse er det viktig å bruke tilstrekkelig med ressurser på

prosjektgjennomganger og forvaltningsgjennomganger med spesielt fokus på institusjonssamarbeid. Statkonsults anbefaler at slike virkemidler benyttes i noen større grad i tiden framover for å få bedre kjennskap til hvordan virkemiddelet fungerer i praksis i NORAD og hos mottakeren. Både NORAD og partene i institusjonssamarbeid har behov for å lære om erfaringer fra samarbeidet. NORAD bør derfor prioritere å foreta noen gjennomganger der hovedfokus er institusjonssamarbeid.

Direktoratet har etter vår oppfatning et eget ansvar for å rekruttere og utvikle den kompetansen som kreves i institusjonssamarbeidet. For å ivareta NORADs og direktoratenes behov for erfaringsutveksling, bør NORAD arrangere faglige seminarer, der utvalgte problemstillinger tas opp og drøftes.

På bakgrunn av fagstatsrådets konstitusjonelle og parlamentariske ansvar, bør departementene ha en klarere rolle i styringen av direktoratenes bistandsinnsats. Det kan gjøres ved at tildelingsbrevene brukes for å sette rammer for direktoratenes bistandsengasjement, og ved at direktoratene rapporterer tilbake om omfang og innhold i arbeidet og hovedproblemer som direktoratene opplever i samarbeidsprosjektene.

Vi anbefaler at institusjonelt samarbeid skilles klart ut i NORADs samarbeidsavtale med direktoratene og behandles i egne punkter. Det bør komme fram at ansvarsforhold, krav til rapportering osv, er forskjellig i de to typene av oppdrag (rådgivning til NORAD og institusjonssamarbeid). Dagens garanti om en minimumsbruk av direktoratet bør erstattes av en intensjonsavtale om samlet ressursbruk.

For å ivareta NORADs og direktoratenes behov for erfaringsutveksling, bør NORAD arrangere faglige seminarer der utvalgte problemstillinger tas opp og drøftes. Dette bør gjøres på et aggregert nivå, uten at enkeltprosjekter skal rapporteres til NORAD. Direktoratene må videre bli mer bevisste på mangler i medarbeidernes bistandsfaglige kompetanse og etterspørre tiltak fra NORAD. Direktoratene må sikre at medarbeideres språkkunnskaper og formidlingskunnskap er på et slikt nivå at de kan fungere tilfredsstillende i en samarbeidssituasjon.

3.4. Bruk av departementer i bistandsarbeid

Vi ser ingen formelle hindringer for at departementer kan inngå institusjonssamarbeidsavtaler, men ser at det kan oppstå en del praktiske komplikasjoner som departementene må finne løsninger på. Etter vår oppfatning, bør departementene primært være aktuelle i prosjekter rettet inn mot forberedelse og gjennomføring av sektorpolitikk i samarbeidslandet. En bør være tilbakeholden med å trekke departementer inn i prosjekter som mer sikter mot samarbeidslandets løpende forvaltning.

Vi anbefaler at Utenriksdepartementet avklarer hvilket mandat fagdepartementene har i forhold til inngåelse av bistandsavtaler med andre land.

No. 32 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PHASING OF THE NORWEGIAN INVOLVEMENT. THE CASE OF AWASH CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, CARE, ETHIOPIA. March 1999. Aregay Waktola and Demissie G. Michael (Dryland Coordination Group).

From Executive Summary:

- The project's support to Awash National Park (ANP) has not been significant in terms of capacity building and smoothing the relationship of the park with the communities. Many households have yet to develop positive attitudes towards the park. This is to a large extent because they have no involvement in the Park's management
- Field investigation has shown that WATSAN is very much active primarily because it is functionally engaged in daily operational activities important to the communities i.e. managing and maintaining the cisterns. However, the CDCs, on the contrary, seemed not very functional at present due to lack of activities which they could responsibly handle in the service of their communities.
- Working with local Government offices in both Woredas proved to be rather difficult for the project. This came about largely because of a combination of factors including the lack of experience of newly established Woreda administrations, capacity problem of Line Departments (LDs), uncertainty

- of Government policy on NGOs, ...
- Another important additional factor has been the failure of project management in establishing a formalised institutional relationship with counterparts or concerning project activities.
- There has not been significant project input to help strengthening the capacity of local government structures. ... inputs like training, provision of essential equipment improving infrastructure and the like would help to strengthen local capacity.
- The experience in the project area seems to suggest that the important conditions for a successful project transfer include the following:
 - phase out strategies should be built at the design stage and be carried out consistently through the development and implementation phases;
 - all stockholders, especially beneficiary groups and local administrations, should be fully aware of the phase out strategy and time frame;
 - well focused and time-bound effort should be made to build the capacity of counterparts including community organisations through training and provision of essential equipment;
 - plan should be made and agreement reached among the key players early in the project life on project's exit strategy;

From Main chapter:

- Staff turnover and conflict, and general administrative turmoil prevailed. Furthermore, two key staff members left for long term training leaving the project very much understaffed. Thus, the situation did not provide a conducive working condition for project implementation and co-ordination with counterparts.
- The project also sponsored meetings and management training for the Steering Committee. The training session dealt with such topics as communication techniques, nature and types of meetings, decision making procedures and ethics in meeting places.
- the Committee badly needs a well defined role and terms of reference. Implementation of project activities through such an amorphous group was proving rather unwieldy and not very efficient. By the end of 1997, the committee was not functional any more.
- The Steering Committee did not work because: The ToR of the Committee was too ambitious considering the group mix; much more orientation and educational effort than has been done hitherto was needed; many of the members had serious difficulty clearly in understanding their role and responsibilities; the selection of members from the three communities was not actually representative; the number of languages used in the meetings, the large size of the committee, and numerous meetings held in each year; the meetings experienced high turnover and absence of participants; internal management crises within CARE-Awash; unnecessary interest on the part of the members of the Steering Committee to interfere in management operation of the project; there was lack of participation of other potentially supportive entities such as the state farms and NGOs operating in the area; and lack of legal status for the Steering Committee to get involved in management issues.
- ... the project did not manage to develop a well articulated and agreed upon plan for training the staff of these institutions. The failure of this oversight is very much evident in the case of the Afar area which has a relatively new administrative structure.
- ... a pilot phase was undertaken to serve as a basis for the planning of the project. It was formulated after essential information was secured through background and baseline studies. This is a good way of starting a project.
- Phase-out implies a gradual handing over of management responsibilities and recurrent costs for externally funded activities to government, NGO, and/or community organisations. The capacity of the recipient organisation or groups is very critical in transferring activities or projects of long term nature.
- It is of paramount importance to see the issue of phase out in relation to institution building and the coping capacity of local institutions. Phase-out strategy should proceed gradually as the partner's capacity increases.
- phase-out strategies should be carefully considered in advance.

No. 33 VEILEDER FOR INSTITUSJONSSAMARBEID. Norad 2001 (signert Juni 2000).

- Prinsippet om mottakeransvar innebærer at det reelle ansvaret og styringen av aktivitetene skal ligge hos lokale partnere. Mottaker må derfor ha en reell mulighet til å velge norsk partner.
- ... partene får tid til å forhandle seg i mellom og bygge opp gjensidig tillit som grunnlag for samarbeidet,
-samarbeidet blir drevet fram gjennom initiativ fra partneren i samarbeidslandet
- ...det er etablert klare, langsiktige utviklingsmål, og når mer avgrensede og kortvarige aktiviteter og resultatmål til enhver tid blir sett i forhold til disse,
- ...norsk institusjon avpasser sin bistand i forhold til samarbeidsinstitusjonens kapasitet og ressurser,
- ...samarbeidet med den norske institusjonen er komplementær til andre former for samarbeid/allianser institusjonen måtte ha lokalt eller regionalt,
- gjerne med en tidshorisont på fem til ti år.
- NORAD har et ansvar for å bidra til at spesielt relevante norske institusjoner vil være kvalifiserte for et institusjonelt samarbeid, noe som bl a vil kreve at de får opplæring og erfaring fra et minimum av samarbeidsrelasjoner
- Norske institusjoner har en rolle når de er engasjert som fagsenter eller rådgiver for NORAD, men de har en annen rolle som er grunnleggende og prinsipielt forskjellig når de inngår i institusjonelt samarbeid med partner institusjoner i utviklingsland.
- Tjenestene skal primært være av rådgivende art.
- Ledere i samarbeidsinstitusjoner må ha ferdigheter i tverrkulturell kommunikasjon og språk, bistandsfaglig metode og kvalitetssikring, herunder målstyring og bærekraftsvurderinger.

No. 35 WATER AND DEVELOPMENT – APPROACHES FROM NORWEGIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS, Jordforsk (NIVA, NLH) brochure, 2003 (?).

- Norwegian research institutions have a tradition for co-operating with developing countries within the water sector. This co-operation focuses on the following:, Capacity building (to ensure the sustainability).
- Key components in the development of a well-functioning WRM system are: Water resources policies and strategies; Legal framework and enforcement mechanisms; Institutional arrangements, roles and responsibilities; Capacity, coordination and resource-sharing, Administrative and economic instruments and incentives,, procedural aspects, e.g. stakeholder and public participation , ...Surveillance, monitoring, information and research.
- The public sector needs to be educated about their roles, responsibilities and opportunities to organize community solutions to water supply and sanitation.
- The actual capabilities of local experts are often underestimated, and they are not given adequate opportunities for further development. Norwegian experts have taken a strictly advisory role to cover planning, monitoring and quality assurance, while most of the work is carried out by local experts and organisations.
- ... requires patience, careful planning and continuous dialogue...

No. 36 VISION OF EQUITY. ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN NORWAY 1980-2000. Report no. 9/03, June 2003. Hilde Ibsen (ProSus, SUM, University of Oslo).

(This 123-pages report does not contain information or views that are directly related to the topics at stake in the study).

No. 37 STATKONSULT AS: REVIDERT MILJØSTRATEGI OG HANDLINGSPLAN OPPSUMMERING AV SPØRREUNDERSØKELSE TIL BISTANDSAMBASSADENE, Juni 2005 1.1. Miljørelatert kapasitetsbygging generelt

De fleste mottakerlandene har egne prioriteringer for kapasitetsbygging på miljøområdet – i større eller mindre grad

Det varierer imidlertid betydelig på hvilken måte og i hvilke sammenhenger disse prioriteringene er nedfelt. (Det varierer nok dessuten hvordan de ulike ambassadene har tolket spørsmålet).

Relativt mange land har et departement (Ministry) hvor ordet ”miljø” inngår i departementsnavnet. Mange land omtaler også miljø og/eller miljørelaterte problemstillinger i ulike sammenhenger. I noen land inngår miljø som et (tverrgående, ev. overgripende) område i nasjonale femårsplaner. Enkelte land har også laget – eller holder på å lage egne miljøstrategier. Svært mange ambassader gir imidlertid uttrykk for at selv om miljø omtales og beskrives i nasjonale planer, strategier og prioriteringer, er det svært sjelden at dette gir seg utslag i budsjettprioriteringer.

Norske prioriteringer mhp. kapasitetsbygging på miljøområdet har i relativt liten grad latt seg innpasse i overordnede reformer i mottakerlandet

Et flertall av ambassadene sier at kapasitetsbygging på miljøområdet i liten grad har latt seg innpasse i overordnede reformer. Her varierer det imidlertid. I fire-fem land har dette i større grad vært mulig. I Etiopia for eksempel, er Norge ”Chef de file” for forøkningskonvensjonen (UNCCD) og har i forbindelse med dette fått mye gjennomslag for sine synspunkter/vurderinger. Mange ambassader peker imidlertid på at siden miljø ikke er noe (hoved)satsningsområde, er det ikke naturlig med stor innflytelse på dette området.

Miljørelatert kapasitetsbygging er relativt sterkt knyttet til norske samarbeidspartnere eller norskstøttede program

I svarene gis det imidlertid uttrykk for at dette først og fremst skjer gjennom prosjektsamarbeid – og at dette samarbeidet avhenger av i hvilken grad miljø er et satsningsområde (noen ser dette som en betingelse for miljørelatert kapasitetsbygging). Flere viser til tidligere prosjekter.

Norsk miljøkompetanse er ønsket – dersom den er god og relevant

Det er få ambassader som gir uttrykk for at norsk miljøkompetanse (norske samarbeidspartnere på miljøområdet) er etterspurt, men miljøbistand i form av kompetanse og samarbeidspartnere er ønsket og velkommen når den tilbys. I hvilken grad norsk kompetanse på dette området etterspørres avhenger primært av hvor høyt miljø og kapasitetsoppbygging prioriteres av det enkelte mottakerland. Land som ”ligner” på Norge ressursmessig er mer interessert enn andre.

14 av 15 ambassader tror samarbeid med beslektede miljøinstitusjoner er en god strategi for institusjonsutvikling

Av de 15 ambassadene som har svart på dette spørsmålet er det kun Eritrea som er uttalt tvilende til en slik strategi (fordi eritreisk politikk p.t. er isolasjonistisk). En ambassade advarer mot useriøse (norske) samarbeidspartnere. Noen gir også uttrykk for at de bare har erfaringer fra nord-sør samarbeidsrelasjoner og at svaret må tolkes i lys av dette.

Samarbeid nord-sør eller sør-sør kan best fremmes gjennom målrettet – og langsiktig – satsning på miljø og kapasitetsbygging

Mange ambassader er opptatt av at miljø i større grad må settes på dagsorden. Det pekes også på at det er viktig med aktøranalyse i forkant – slik at et ev. samarbeid innledes med de strategisk tyngste miljøene i mottakerlandet. Videre pekes det på at samarbeidet trenger finansiering – det er vanskelig å utløse budsjettmidler til miljøsatninger i de fleste mottakerlandene – samtidig med at begge parter opplever å ha eierskap til arbeidet. Det gis også på ulike måter uttrykk for at samarbeidet bør være av faglig art, men at et viktig mål skal være kapasitetsoppbygging.

Viktig med en grundig vurdering av samarbeidspartnere

Det pekes på at valg av samarbeidspartner/-aktør avhenger av hovedformålet med samarbeidet. Relativt mange trekker fram NGO og lokale myndigheter som viktige samarbeidspartnere. De fleste forholder seg først og fremst til myndigheter på departementsnivå, men noen stiller spørsmål ved om dette alltid er det ”riktige” nivået. For øvrig peker relativt mange på at det ikke er like lett å kople fattigdomsbekjempelse og fremming av miljø, f.eks. vil ikke miljøinstitusjoner primære mål være å bekjempe fattigdom.

1.2. Kapasitetsbygging for internasjonale konvensjoner

Et stort flertall av ambassadene har ikke gitt støtte i forbindelse med forhandlinger/drøftinger av internasjonale miljøavtaler og konvensjoner

Noen har gjort det tidligere, men ettersom miljø nå lenger ikke er et (hoved-) satsningsområde, er det ikke naturlig verken for mottakerlandet å be om det eller for Norge å tilby det. Ambassaden i Etiopia har gitt støtte i forbindelse med forørkningskonvensjonen (UNCCD) og ambassaden i Nicaragua har gitt støtte i forbindelse med hvalfangstkonvensjonen.

Et enda større flertall er enig i at gjennomføring av internasjonale miljøkonvensjoner i mottakerlandet er avhengig av kompetanseoverføring og bistand

Selv om enkelte mottakerland har noe kompetanse selv, gis det uttrykk for at behovet på dette området er stort. Det vises til at andre giverland har miljø som satsningsområde og at disse gir/bør gi denne type kompetanseoverføring.

Det varierer i hvilken grad miljøkonvensjonene utgjør en felles referanse for Norges samarbeid med mottakerlandet om miljørelatert bistand

Inntrykket fra spørreskjemaene er at miljøkonvensjonene kan være viktig innenfor enkeltprosjekter, men at det generelt er begrenset hvor førende miljøkonvensjonene er. I den grad Norge støtter miljørelaterte prosjekter, styres det først og fremst av hvilke hovedsatsningsområder som er avtalt med/gjelder for det enkelte mottaksland. Mange ambassader understreker likevel at miljøkonvensjonene er ”kjempe å ha”.

Norge kan fremme gjennomføring og etterlevelse av miljøkonvensjonen gjennom kapasitetsoppbygging, etablering av egne prosjekter, gjennomføring av miljørevisjoner, ansvarliggjøring av nasjonale myndigheter m.m.

Det er ulike synspunkter på hva som bør gjøres fra norsk side for å fremme gjennomføring og etterlevelse av miljøkonvensjonene. Mange understreker at integrering av miljø i andre samarbeidsområder er viktig for å få dette til, men det finnes ulike ”oppskrifter”. Tanzania har et eget miljøprogram og viser til at prosjektene innenfor dette bidrar til å nå mål i henhold til mange miljøkonvensjoner.

No. 38 WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION PROJECT. CAPACITY BUILDING FOR THE WATER SUPPLY SECTOR (CBWSS). Final Report April 2005. COWI AS

From the Summary:

- The Main Project is designed to support Lao PDR to decentralise the water supply sector.
- the objectives of the CBWSS Project were to strengthen the capacity of the PMU, PNPs, and the regulatory framework and build the institutional and professional capacity of WASA.
- The purposes of Component B I were to: i) strengthen the PMU to be able to perform its responsibilities regarding planning, financial management, budgeting, project management, co-ordination, procurement, monitoring and reporting;
- The purposes of Component B II were to: i) determine the qualifications and needs for training of all categories of personnel of the participating institutions; ii) establish the best possible modes of training for groups of staff and individuals; iii) develop and establish a consolidated Training Program; and after the extension was approved in May 2004: iv) plan and implement a new training program.
- Component B III comprised capacity building activities for the Project PNPs (finally 13) with the purposes to: i) review the present financial management operations of the PNPs and their staff and equipment; ii) similarly review the present technical management operations, their staff and facilities and propose measures to establish functional operational systems for technical management, including O&M manuals and training of staff; iii) develop and incorporate corporate planning in the PNP management; iv) develop and establish practical financial management information systems with functional procedures for financial management, and efficient systems for billing, revenue collection and meter reading, accounting and cash management, and to help PNPs to create, utilise and maintain an IT/IS infrastructure environment; v) develop a format and establish computerised databases on provincial water supplies and establish procedural standards for inspections and maintenance; ...
- The purposes of Component IV were to: i) provide advice and assistance to WASA to enable it to be

established as the regulatory authority for urban water supply service providers in Lao PDR;; and iv) assist in developing WASA into a functional organisation in accordance with its established position and role.

- Due to the lengthy, but participatory process on the legal base for WASA and the subsequently delays in recruitment of regulatory staff, there will be need for follow on capacity building assistance to WASA for some time to come.

From main chapters:

- A Project Office was tentatively established at the WASA office on the first floor of the MCTPC building from 12 September 2000. From 05 October 2000, the new Project Office refurbished by MCTPC on the 4th floor was occupied.
- Continued implementation of the new training program, including: Study tours for two groups to Vietnam (one week each for a total of 25 participants); visiting three provincial water companies implementing ADB funded WSS projects; course in regulation at WB Washington (the Director of WASA), covered some costs related to a conference in South Africa (Deputy PM of PMU), English training in Australia (2 weeks, Director General of DHUP and Director of WASA); English training in New Zealand (4 weeks) (PM and two Deputy PMs of PMU); sponsored English training in Vientiane for PMU staff.
- Regulations with procedures for customer protection formulated, and instituted. *Achieved*. Follow up required for PNPs to institute and make guidelines operational.
- The capacity of PMU for the WSSS project has been strengthened to the degree that PMU is operating and managing the project to the satisfaction of both the donors and the Government. Some limited intermittent assistance may be required
- In general it is difficult to assess non-tangible outputs and effects of capacity building and institutional development projects, as there are many factors (also outside the control of a particular project) that may contribute to improved efficiency, capability and capacity of assisted institutions and staff. This is particularly so, as is the case with the CBWSS, when there are also other projects involved in capacity building with some, if not all the targeted institutions. However, feedback received is together pointing towards a conclusion that the outputs produced under the CBWSS Project have been giving "value for money".
- Funds for training activities were very limited in the original CBWSS budget, as there originally was set aside funds for training purposes on the ADB Loan budget. (*A JICA funded training program over 3 years took over the comprehensive training program prepared by the Consultant*).
- The CBWSS budget did not include any allocation for translation of key documents, and the training funds were therefore used for this purpose.
- It is recommended that extensive consultations be conducted with the end users and key stakeholders during preparation of ToR for new institutional development projects (as the ToR did not reflect the real needs and aspirations of the PNPs with regard to computerised accounting system, database and stores systems and the human and financial resources allocated in the Project did not sufficiently reflect the described tasks regarding IT/MIS systems development and training in the ToR.).
- It is recommended that more extensive consultations and research be made during preparation of ToR for consultant work that shall result in legal and institutional changes.
- WASA started functioning as the regulator before its legal base was in place and it has not yet been able to employ qualified staff on a permanent basis ..., since the legal base is still not in place. CB assistance to WASA in the form of training could therefore not benefit regulatory professional staff others than the Director, and it would be more appropriate to term the assistance capacity substitution in place of capacity building.

(The report contains the consultant's own listing of the implementation and the outputs delivered, and does of course not critically and objectively analyse the mode of operations etc. There is little critical assessment of all the training's impact on the institutional performance).

**No. 39 NORTHERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION
SECTOR PROJECT, LAOS. Package A consultants. Inception Report February 2006. COWI AS.**

- English language skills training started on 9 January 2006. Courses will be two hours three times a week after working hours to cater for learners with full-time jobs.
- Package A will cover Institutional Strengthening for WASA and WSD of DHUP (Component 1) over 3 years, and Package B will provide Project Implementation Assistance and Capacity Building Programs (Component 5) over 5 years.
- After completion of the CBWSS assistance to WASA, ADB financed continued capacity building by providing TA to WASA in a bridging period until the new Package A Consultant became operational.
- Recognising the clear interdependence between an institution's available financial resources and the efficacy and efficiency in the production of outputs and results by the institution's staff, there is regardless clear indications that a major challenge for the Package A Consultant will relate to transfer of know-how and capabilities, considering the level of competence and capabilities of the staff and people to be involved and the availability of staff with relevant educational background.
- The development of programs and building of capacity will therefore be the most important aspect of the execution of the Project. At the commencement of the Project assessment of capability/ training needs shall be carried out in collaboration with key counterpart staff under the supervision of the Consultant.
- Capacity building (CB) and training activities should be tailored to take advantage of and develop the existing strengths of the involved institutions and their staff.
- The approach to training, transfer of knowledge and building of sustainable capacity and capability will evolve around some key concepts, e.g. that CB and training shall be: i) strategic, ii) relevant, iii) problem solving oriented, iv) action oriented, v) performance related, vi) continuing, and vii) sustainable.
- To maximise efficiency in the provision of training and capacity building, there is a need to ensure adequate coordination and synergy between Project activities and those of other relevant organisations and projects.
- In principle, all Consultant's international and domestic specialists will be considered as on- the-job and in some cases formal trainers, and during their inputs in Lao PDR will be assigned one or more staff from WASA and/or WSD to work with as counterparts on specific tasks.
- *i) Undertake Capability/Training Needs Assessment.* (Capabilities and training needs are to be ascertained by using: i) questionnaires, ii) interviews, and iii) group meetings).
- *ii) Trainers and Institutions* suitable to carry out parts of the training programs should be identified, both locally and in the region.
- *iii) Prepare a Training Program Framework*, (including: a) Identification of categories and names of staffs to be targeted; b) Identification of the CB and training methods to be applied; c) Outline of training guidelines and curricula; d) Identification of potential training institutions and trainers; e) Incorporation of the capacity building activities to be carried out under the Project; f) Time scheduling; and g) Cost estimates).
- *iv) Implementation of the Training Program* will be a continuous process during the lifespan of the Project ... (On-the-job training; Working seminars/meetings; Workshop; Training courses; Study tours and participation in regional/international conferences and seminars; Self-learning, On-line learning).
- *v) Institutional Reforms and Job Descriptions.*

No. 40 BISTANDSOVERSIKT 2006. DN.

- Et sentralt mål for DN's arbeid under fagsenteravtalen med Norad er å bidra til å styrke utviklingslandenes egen kapasitet på naturressursforvaltningsområdet gjennom etablering av langsiktige institusjonelle samarbeid med relevante institusjoner i samarbeidsland..
- Omfanget av arbeidet med Fagsenteravtalen med Norad gikk betydelig ned, ... DN hadde ønsket et noe større omfang på disse aktivitetene, blant annet med sikte på god koordinering og læring.
- DN har lagt vekt på aktivt å bidra til utvikling av nye områder, og som rapporten viser har dette gitt resultater i flere land. DN har imidlertid hatt begrensede ressurser til dette, og har også savnet større forventninger innenfor DN's ansvarsområder.
- Feltet er imidlertid også preget av lite forutsigbarhet og langsiktighet, og dette svekker mulighetene for en god dialog med våre samarbeidspartnere og solid forankring av samarbeidet.

Project Indonesia:

- Norske bidrag har i prinsippet vært gjennomført etter konkrete forespørsler fra KLH, selv om vi har prøvd å påvirke framdrift gjennom å "mase" på bedret kommunikasjon, rapporter, møter og resultater.
- selv om det til tider har vært vanskelig for KLH å holde tidsfrister. Mye skjer i forbindelse med besøk, og det kunne vært en fordel om noe mer ressurser var avsatt til direkte norsk oppfølging spesielt ettersom ambassaden har begrensede ressurser til å gjøre det.
- Norske samarbeidsparter har hatt en del vanskeligheter ved noe manglende informasjon om aktivitetene og mangelfull oversettelse av dokumenter og møteaktivitet til engelsk.
- Oppfølgingsforpliktelser og aktiviteter har også blitt noe hemmet av hyppig skifte av personell i distriktene og delvis sentralt.
- Det kunne imidlertid vært en fordel at KLH hadde brukt noe mer midler til tolking og engasjert eksperter fra indonesiske fagmiljøer tidligere i programmet enn det som ble gjort.

Dongting Lake, China:

- Møtene med Hunan EPB og FECO var i utgangspunktet vanskelige ettersom det fra kinesisk side ble lagt stor vekt på gjennomføring av måleprogrammer med tilhørende ønsker om innkjøp av utstyr og bruk av personell.
- Programmet for 1ste halvår av prosjektet dvs. høsten 2005, inneholdt to betydelige elementer relatert til kapasitetsbygging. Det første var avholdelse av et seminar om biomangfold og Dongting-sjøen og det andre elementet var besøk av en kinesisk delegasjon til Norge i oktober 2006.

Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocational Training (MSTVT), Zambia:

- DN gjennomførte høsten 2002 en "factfinding mission" til Zambia hvor det ble konkludert med at anmodningen fra Zambia var berettiget og at norske institusjoner kunne bidra med den kompetansen som var etterspurt.
- Framdriften så langt må for komponent 1 karakteriseres som tilfredsstillende, mens den for komponent 2 har vært mindre tilfredsstillende. Begge komponentene er influert av at prosesser i offentlige organer krever tid.
- Ombyggingen av laboratoriene er nå gjennomført, men det viste seg anbudsprosessen på zambisk side knyttet til ombyggingen tok vesentlig lengre tid enn forutsatt.
- ... laboratoriet ikke utviklet forutsatt analysekapasitet i løpet av 2006. Verken DN eller Veterinærinstituttet som fagorganet på laboratorieutviklingen har mottatt informasjon eller forespørsler fra NISIR/MSTVT i saken. Situasjonen er at laboratoriet ikke er operativt og at dette dels skyldes mangel på personale og dels at utstyret ikke fungerer som forutsatt.

EIA Hydropower Nepal:

- En prosjektrådgiver fra DN ble utplassert hos MOPE i 25 måneder fra oktober 2002.
- Til sammen har over 130 nepalere deltatt i ulike kurs i Nepal og Norge arrangert av prosjektet, samt et i Sverige og Canada som hvor deltagelsen ble betalt av prosjektet.

Min. of Natural Resources and Tourism, Tanzania:

- Arbeidet med å konkretisere aktiviteter innenfor MoU har tatt lengre tid enn antatt.

Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA):

- I forbindelse med oppholdet i Zambia inviterte DN ZAWA, ved Director General Hapenga M. Kabeta, til et besøk i Norge. Dette ble gjort med tanke på å etablere et langsiktig institusjonelt samarbeid med fokus på kapasitetsbygging for ZAWA.
- Forslaget ble gjennomgått av et appraiserteam i juli 2005 som konkluderte med at prosjektet ikke var støtteverdig i sin nåværende form. Ambassaden sluttet seg til denne konklusjonen.
- I løpet av perioden er en direktør avsatt, det har vært en fungerende direktør og senere er en ny direktør tilsatt. Dette har ført til en viss handlingslammelse i organisasjonen.
- Det har imidlertid vist seg at ambassaden trenger mer tid til å avklare sin posisjon i forhold til dette prosjektet.....

DEAT Sør Afrika:

- DN ønsker å avvente en videre detaljering av samarbeidet på dette feltet inntil institusjonene har hatt en generell og overordnet diskusjon og avklaring av samarbeidet mellom DN og DEAT.
- Det er også viktig at DN's innsats settes inn i en større sammenheng i forhold til de land og de sektorer det skal samarbeides med, og at det gjøres en god jobb med å avklare roller og forventninger.

- For å opprettholde det aktivitetsnivået som er nødvendig for å ivareta og utvikle DN's bistandskompetanse, og som kreves av vår rolle som fagsenter i miljøbistand, har kompetansemidlene under fagsenteravtalen spilt en viktig rolle. Med omlegging av fagsenteravtalen hvor man ønsker en større andel av aktiviteten kanalisert som bestillingsoppdrag og økt bruk av felles kompetansetiltak, er det viktig at dette blir også ivare tatt i fortsettelsen.

Appendix 3:

List of persons met and

contacted

List of persons met and contacted (email, telephones, etc.) by the Consultant:

Institution	Name	Comment
NIBR	Arne Dalfelt	Meeting
UD	Jon Heikki Aas	Meeting
COWI AS	Arne Dahlen	
Heso	Cliff Wang	
Norconsult AS	Erik Helland Hansen	
Norplan AS	Johan Olav Bjerke	
Scanteam AS	Ueli Meier	
CMI	Johan Helland	
Statskonsult	Inger Johanne Sundby	
DN	Frank Eklo, Gunn Paulsen	Telephone conference
NILU	Steinar Larsen	
NINA	Odd Terje Sandlund	Meeting
NIVA	-	No answer
ICH	Pål Mellquist	
NVE	Aud Krogh Skaugen	Meeting
SFT	André Kammerud, Barbro Thomsen	Meeting
UMB/Noragric	Poul Wisborg	
SUM/UiO	Desmond McNeil	
UIB	Jeppe Kolding	
Statens Vegvesen	Kjell Levik, Ola Omenås	

Appendix 4:

List of documents collected and reviewed

List of documents collected and reviewed during the study:

1	Mid-term review of Norad support to the Palestinian Water Authority	Oct-97	Scanteam International (Erik Whist), Glommen & Laagen Brukseier Forening (Dan Lundquist), NCG (Jens)	Electronically (pdf)
2	Mid-term Review of ZAM 063 Industrial Pollution Prevention Programme, Zambia	May-99	Norconsult (Tore Laugerud), DNV (Jon Jerre), University of Zambia (Glasswell Nkonde)	Electronically (WORD)
3	Gjennomgang av Memorandum of Understanding p□ miljæfeltet	Nov-99	Statskonsult (Jon Blaaid)	Electronically (pdf)
4	Project review of Various Norad-supported Environmental Projects in PR China	Aug-00	Norconsult (Tore Laugerud), SFT (Tor Johannessen, Rune Vistad), Monika P. Thowsen	Electronically (WORD)
5	Review of Norwegian support to the Palestinian Water Authority (Phase II)	Jun-01	NCG (Jens Claussen), Norconsult (Tore Laugerud)	Electronically (pdf)
6	Review of Africa 2009	Oct-01	National Heritage Board, Sweden (Birgitta Hoberg), Uganda Museums and Monuments Agency (Ephraim Kamuhangire), NCG, Jens Claussen	Electronically (pdf)
7	Mid-term Review of ZAM-063 Industrial Pollution Prevention Programme, Zambia. Phase II	Jun-02	NCG (Tore Laugerud), Denams Consultants (Patrick Chipungu)	Electronically (WORD)
8	Private sector development in Uganda, Phase II. Report from a business team	Jan-03	Torbjørn Damhaug, Frank Grænsund, Einar Risa, Morten Snarud, Kjartan Stigen, Vidar Lndefjeld	Electronically (WORD)
9	Mid-term Review of the Norwegian Environmental Cooperation with South Africa	Jun-03	Scanteam (Ueli Meier), EASD (Dave MacDevette)	Electronically (pdf)
10	Learning from the past, looking to the future (Noragric's partnerships with universities in Africa)	Aug-03	Noragric(NLH (Joanna A.A. Boddens-Hosang)	Electronically (pdf)
11	External Review of IUCN	Oct-03	Gabor Bruszt, Tania Ammour, Jens Claussen, Zenda Ofir, N.C. Saxena, Stephen Turner	Electronically (WORD)
12	Mid-term Review. National Water Sector Management Project (NAWASMA)	Jan-04	Tranor (Oddwin Skaiaa)	Electronically (pdf)
13	Evaluation of CESAR's activities in the Middle East funded by Norway	Apr-04	NCG (Jens Claussen)	Electronic (pdf)
14	INS 0008: Norway-Indonesia -Cooperation in Sustainable Environmental Management. Mid-term	Jun-04	Norconsult (Kevin Burton) ++	Electronically (WORD)
15	CHN-0030: Integrated Monitoring Programme on Acidification of Chinese Terrestrial System (IMPACTS). Mid-term Review	Jul-04	NCG (Tore Laugerud), SFT (Tore Johannessen, Torgrim Asphjell)	Electronically (WORD)
16	Palestinian Water Authority (PWA). Budget Programme Phase III (2003-2005). Mid-term Review	Oct-04	NCG (Stein Hansen), Tranor (Oddwin Skaiaa)	Electronically (pdf)
17	NPL-024, Regulation and Monitoring Capacity Building for environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for Hydropower Projects in Nepal. Review.	Dec-04	NCG (Tore Laugerud), Balaram Pradham.	Electronically (WORD)
18	Mid-term Review of TAN-092: Management of Natural Resources Programme, Tanzania	Jan-05	Noragric (Ian Bryceson), SLU Sweden (Kjell Havnevik), SUA Tanzania (Aida Isinika), Noragric (Ivar Jærgensen), TANAPA (Lota Melamari), NFH UIT (Signe Sænvisen)	Electronically (WORD)
19	Pre-Appraisal of the environmental cooperation programme between the Republic of South Africa and Norway	Apr-05	NCG (Jens Claussen)	Electronic (pdf)
20	Evaluation of the NCA water and Sanitation Programme in Decan Municipality, Kosovo, 1999-2005	Aug-05	NCG (Tore Laugerud), ODA (Violeta Selimi)	
21	Evaluation of the frame work agreement between the Government of Norway and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	Nov-05	NCG (Stein Hansen, Mike Fergus)	Electronically (pdf)
22	End Review of Four ENSIS projects in China.	May-06	NCG (Tore Laugerud), SFT (Roar Gammels³ter)	Electronically
23	Review of the Norwegian Support to the Energy Sector in Uganda (1997-2005)	May-06	N16CG (Jens Claussen, Tore Laugerud, Bjørn Gildestad), Scanteam (Ueli Meier)	Electronically (pdf)
24	Med-term Review and Appraisal of projects in the Norwegian Programme for Sustainable Use of Natural Resources in Central America (CATIE)	Jun-06	NCG (Asbjørn Skaaland), DN (Gunn Paulsen), Noragric/UMB (Michael Angstreich), David Oliver Bradford Wilson, Ricardo Trejos	Electronically (pdf)
25	TAN-0092. Management of Natural Resources, Final Evaluation.	Aug-06	Dr Brian Cooksey, Mr Leonce Anthony, Dr Jim Egoe, Ms Kate Forrester, Professor George Kajembe, Mr Bakari Mbano, Ms Isabell von Oertzen, Dr Sibylle Riedmiller	Electronically (WORD)
26	State-of-the-art study: The long-term effects of assistance to the power sector	Nov-06	NCG (Stein Hansen)	Electronically (pdf)
27	UNIDO Integrated Programme (UIP), Uganda Phase II. Mid-term Review of UGA-2855, the Norwegian Assistance to Four Components	Nov-06	NCG (Per Schænberg, Tore Laugerud), Alex Nakajjo	Electronically (pdf)
28	Review of Sino-Norwegian Environmental Cooperation 1996-2005 (Draft Report)	Mar-07	NCG (Stein Hansen, Jens Claussen, Wu Xiaofu)	Electronically (pdf)
29	End-review to the Norwegian support to the non-petroleum Energy sector in Angola with focus on 2002-2006 and identification of opportunities for	Mar-07	Sadelec	Electronically (pdf)

Other Documents

30	Kartlegging og analyse av forvaltningmessige sider ved bruk av norske direktorater i institusjonelt	1998	Statskonsult	Electronically (pdf)
31	Taken out			
32	Institutional development and phasing out of the Norwegian involvement (Awash Conservation and Development Project, Ethiopia)	Mar-99	CARE (Waktola Aregay, Micheal G. Demissie)	Electronically (pdf)
33	Veileder for institusjonssamarbeid	2001	NORAD	Electronically (pdf)
34	Assessing Environmental Needs and Priorities in East Timor. Final Report.	May-01	Odd Terje Snadlund, Ian Bryceson, Demetrio de Carcalho, Narva Rio, Joana da Silva, Maria Isabel Silva	Hard copy
35	Water and Development 5 approaches from Norwegian research institutions	2003	NLH, NIVA, Jordforsk	Electronically (pdf)
36	Vision of equity. Environment and Development Cooperation in Norway 1980-2000	2003	SUM, UiO (Hilde Ibsen)	Electronically (pdf)
37	Notat: Revidert miljøstrategi og handlingsplan (Oppsummering av spørreundersøkelse til bistandsambassadene)	Juni 2005	Statskonsult (John Nonseid, Oddbjørg Bakli)	Electronically (WORD)
38	Final Report. Capacity building for the water supply sector. Water Supply and Sanitation project, Laos	Apr-05	COWI	Electronically (WORD)
39	Inception Report. Northern and Central Regions Water supply and sanitation sector project, Package	Feb-06	COWI	Electronically (WORD)
40	Bistandsoversikt 2006	2006	DN	Electronically
41	Miljørettet handlingsplan. Høringsuttalelse til Norad. Brev til NCG, med følgende vedlegg:	04.05.07	Statens Vegvesen (Ola Omenås-Sjefingeniør, Kjell Bjærvik - Ass. Vegdirektør)	Electronically (pdf)
42	Statens vegvesens høringsuttalelse av 6. juni 2006 til Utenriksdepartementet: Regjeringens handlingsplan for miljørettet utviklingsarbeid	Juni-06	Statens Vegvesen	Electronically (pdf)
43	Brev av 31. mars 2006 til Norad: Norads strategi mot 2010; høring.	Mars-06	Statens Vegvesen	Electronically (pdf)
44	Brev av 19.3.04 til Samferdselsdepartementet: EU-utvidelsen - de to EØS-finansieringsordningene og konkrete samarbeidsområder.	Mars-04	Statens Vegvesen	Electronically (pdf)
45	Kronikk i "Bistandsnytt" nr 6/06: Veier til vekst og velstand	2006	Statens Vegvesen (Carl Kristian Gabrielsen og Ola Omenås)	Electronically (pdf)
46	Kronikk i "Vegen og vi" nr 17/06: Transport og utvikling 1 FN's tusenårsmål: Pålitelige transportmidler er ett av flere virkemidler i kampen	2006	Statens Vegvesen (Carl Kristian Gabrielsen og Ola Omenås)	Electronically (pdf)
47	Innlegg i Dagens næringsliv 26.10.06: Tenk nytt om	Oct.-06	Finn Zetterstrøm, Arne Borgersen, Even Kolstad	Electronically (pdf)
48	Artikkel i Våre Veger nr 9/06: Trafikksikkerhet som eksportvare: Vi er blant de fremste i verden. Intervju med Arne Borgersen og Even Kolstad	2006	Statens Vegvesen	Electronically (pdf)
49	Brev til Utviklingsministeren 2.11.07 fra Norconsult/Innovasjon Samferdsel vedr Miljø og Trafikksikkerhet - Norsk kompetanse som bidrag i bistandsarbeidet.	7-Feb	Norconsult og Innovasjon Samferdsel	Electronically (pdf)
50	Kronikk i Dagbladet 17.4.07 Trafikksikkerhet bekjemper fattigdom v/Instituttchef	7-Apr	TÆI (Lasse Fridstrøm)	Electronically (pdf)
51	Mobilising Capacity for Sustainable Development. Discussion with Poverty Environment Partnership 20.06.2007	7-Jun	Poverty Environment Partnership	Electronically (ppt)

Appendix 5:

The Consultant's Terms of

Reference

Oppdragbeskrivelse:

Gjennomgang og sammenstilling av erfaringer fra institusjonssamarbeid/kapasitetsbygging i norsk bistand innenfor miljøområdet.

1. Bakgrunn og formål

Som et ledd i arbeidet med å konkretisere og operasjonalisere regjeringens handlingsplan for miljørettet utviklingssamarbeid ønsker *Avdelingen for miljø, infrastruktur og energi (MIE)* i Norad å se nærmere på hvordan institusjonssamarbeid/kapasitetsbygging innen miljøområdet kan gjennomføres framover med utgangspunkt i oppnådde resultater og erfaringer. Tanken er at dette skal resultere i praktiske anbefalinger for hvordan slikt samarbeid skal gjennomføres og organiseres. Anbefalingene skal i størst mulig grad tuftes på erfaringer høstet i de siste 10 årene gjennom konkrete prosjekter i Norges samarbeidsland. Utarbeidelse av praktiske anbefalinger skal gjøres i to fase: Fase 1 – en studie som systematiserer og sammenfatter ”lessons learned” fra tidligere/pågående prosjekter (en state-of-the-art studie som omfattes av denne oppdragsbeskrivelsen); og en Fase 2 – formulering av praktiske anbefalinger, der innspill fra et bredt tilfang av norske fagmiljøer vil være et viktig element.

Formålet med Fase 1: ”lessons learned” fra norsksstøttede prosjekter/programmer med vesentlige komponenter av institusjonssamarbeid/kapasitetsbygging innen miljøområdet er systematisering og sammenfatting av erfaringer og presentasjon av disse i en rapport.

2. Innhold og gjennomføring

Studien skal foretas i Norge, der følgende aktiviteter kan inngå (men ikke nødvendigvis begrenses til disse). Konsulenten skal:

- konsultere sentrale medarbeidere i Norad (samt evt. UD og andre institusjoner) som har kunnskap om institusjonssamarbeid/kapasitetsbyggingsprosjekter (inkl. evalueringer/ gjennomganger) innen miljøområdet i løpet av de 10 siste år;
- søke i Norad’s (og evt. UD’s) arkiv etter tilgjengelige rapporter fra slike gjennomganger/ evalueringer av kapasitetsbyggingsprosjekter;
- kontakte (pr. e-post eller brev) konsulentfirmaer og institusjoner som kan tenkes å ha deltatt i gjennomganger/evalueringer av slikt institusjonssamarbeid i løpet av de 10 siste år (typisk COWI, Norplan, Norconsult, CMI, etc.), for å få listet disse samt få rapportene gjort tilgjengelig (elektronisk eller i hardkopi);
- kontakte (pr. e-post eller brev) aktuelle institusjoner som har/har hatt rammeavtaler/prosjektavtaler med institusjoner i Norges samarbeidsland der kapasitetsbygging har vært/er en vesentlig komponent (typisk MD, SFT, DN NINA, etc.), for å få del i deres erfaringer (et begrenset antall møter kan være nødvendig), samt tilgang til ulik dokumentasjon om emnet;
- gjennomgå innsamlete rapporter og informasjon samt analysere materialet med henblikk på å trekke ut relevante erfaringer og fellesnevner som kan brukes som innspill til formulering av den nye strategien;
- holde nær kontakt med NIBR (Arne Dalfeldt) som skal se nærmere på internasjonale erfaringer med institusjonssamarbeid;
- utarbeide en rapport som sammenfatter analysene og presenterer ”lessons learned”;
- delta på seminar med Norad og andre relevante norske miljøer der rapportens konklusjoner presenteres og diskuteres.

Reising utenlands anses ikke nødvendig i fm oppdraget, men reiser i Norge for å møte norske institusjoner som har deltatt i institusjonssamarbeid er aktuelt.

3. Tidsplan og rapportering

Studien starter i februar og utkast til rapport skal foreligge innen 25. august 2007.

4. Budsjett

Oppdraget utføres av NCG (Tore Laugerud og Stein Hansen) innenfor en ramme på NOK XXX.XXX,- (YYY timer).

5. Oppdragsgivers kontaktperson

Norads kontaktperson for arbeidet er Hans Olav Ibrek, tlf. 22242137, e-mail: hoi@norad.no

Oslo, 7. februar 2007

Appendix 6:

Comments to the Draft Report

Email comments from DN prior to the meeting where the Draft Report was discussed

Hans Olav,

Jeg vil delta på møtet i morgen fra DN, og ser fram til diskusjoner om rapporten og anbefalinger for vegen videre, og vil her gi noen foreløpige vurderinger og spørsmål fra vår side.

Vi synes rapportutkastet påpeker mange viktige spørsmål og inneholder flere gode anbefalinger for norsk arbeid med kapasitetsutvikling hos viktige (miljø)institusjoner i aktuelle utviklingsland. Dette gjelder ikke minst behovet for langsiktighet, klare og omforente mål, god rollefordeling mellom norske institusjoner og godt forarbeid.

Vi tror også rapporten har identifisert noen svakheter ved overgangen til økt bruk av offentlige etater i miljørettet bistand (dvs etter "Kjørven-Øgrey-utredningen"), men mener at både Norad og de aktuelle etatene har lært av dette og at en rekke forhold er bedre håndtert de siste årene og at dette kunne vært bedre reflektert i rapporten.

Vi synes også rapporten inneholder en del anbefalinger vi ikke kan se oss enige i, og stiller også spørsmål ved mange av de påstandene som fremmes om offentlig forvaltning og vår evne til å bistå bistandsforvaltningen med miljørettet bistand. Fra vårt ståsted mener vi for eksempel det er feil å påstå at offentlige etater (som følge av Norgesaksen – "Kjørven/Øgrey-utredningen") skulle "ta over" rollen til private konsulenter, da vi har forstått at vi skulle supplere disse og komme med vår innsikt og våre nettverk for å utfylle dette.

Vår forståelse er at både norsk bistandsforvaltning og aktuelle institusjoner i samarbeidslandene ønsker et samarbeid med (norske) offentlige etater, og mener at vi kan bidra i dette arbeidet både som rådgiver og langsiktig samtalepartner. Det er imidlertid en del forutsetninger som må være på plass, og det er heller ikke alltid et formelt institusjonssamarbeid som er den beste tilnærmingen. Dette har vi ofte utfordret Norad på de siste årene, jf. også planlagt diskusjon på årlig møte 5. november.

Vi ser videre en del sentrale problemstillinger vi ønsker utdypet på møtet, herunder følgende:

- Det konkluderes med at kapasitetsutvikling (CB) hos svake miljøetater antas å være en god tilnærming, men det sies lite om og eventuelt når institusjonssamarbeid (IC) er en god veg å gå for å få til slik kapasitetsutvikling?
- Det påstås at offentlige etater har flere svakheter i forhold til private konsulenter, men sier lite om de komparative fortrinnene (sett fra bistandsforvaltningen) når det gjelder bruk av offentlige etater vs private konsulenter?
- Det vises til at miljøforvaltningen i mange land fortsatt er ny og ofte svak, og det kunne vært interessant å høre om det finnes gode eksempler og erfaringer fra mer "modne" sektorer, for eksempel veg, helse og utdanning?

Med vennlig hilsen

Finn Katerås

Prosjektleder, internasjonal seksjon

Direktoratet for naturforvaltning (DN)

www.dirnat.no

Comments from NVE following the meeting where the Draft Report was discussed

Notat

Til:	Norad, v/ Hans Olav Ibrek
Fra:	Aud Krogh Skaugen
Ansvarlig:	Kjell Repp, NVE
Dato:	2008-01-17
Kopi:	Stein Hansen og Tore Laugerud, NCG

NVEs kommentarer til NCG rapporten: "Review and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from Institutional Cooperation and Capacity Building in Environmental Sector in Norwegian Development Cooperation"

Generelt

Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat (NVE) har mottatt fra Norad ovennevnte rapport til gjennomlesing og kommentering. Rapporten ble presentert i Norad desember 2007 av konsulentene Stein Hansen og Tore Laugerud.

NVE deltok på presentasjonen og har gjennomgått rapporten, og har med denne bakgrunnen følgende kommentarer som bidrag til det videre arbeidet. Kommentarene er i hovedsak tilleggsopplysninger og oppretting av misforståelser som kan påvirke noen av de endelige konklusjonene. Utkastet og sluttrapporten er konsulentenes egne vurderinger og konklusjoner.

Rapporten er basert på en rekke prosjektgjennomganger pluss andre dokumenter og samtaler med et utvalg av personer. Rapporten viser derfor et godt bilde av samarbeidene som er igangsatt og evaluert, og gir en del råd og vink til videre samarbeidsprosjekter.

På den andre siden gir rapporten lite informasjon om prosessene før et samarbeid blir igangsatt. Det er heller ikke satt av mye plass til beskrivelse av de bistandspolitiske føringer og andre utenforliggende faktorer (eksempelvis borgerkriger) som har påvirket prosjektene i de forskjellige perioder samarbeidsprosjektene har blitt gjennomført. Det har også i varierende grad vært innspill fra både Norad, Ambassadene og utenriksdepartementet i forkant og i gjennomføringsfasen, og resultatene antas å gi utslag i de gjennomgåtte rapportene. Vi antar at dette skyldes begrenset tid og ressurstilgang.

Rapporten presenterer en del utsagn som det er uklart gjelder tidligere eller nå, men går ut fra at de fleste er basert på historien. Vi antar at de forskjellige norske institusjonene har lært mye og utviklet både planlegging og gjennomføring av sine prosjekter de siste årene, basert på egne erfaringer. Men når det gjelder tilretteleggelsen for videre satsing på institusjonsutvikling har vi som nevnt den oppfatning at vurderingene også burde inkludere de ytre rammebetingelsene som tidligere samarbeid har vært utført under, samt innhenting av mer informasjon om prosessene før prosjektstart.

På bakgrunn av dette har vi funnet frem et par tidligere dokumenter som eksempler, og som kan være nyttig i konsulentenes vurderinger. Se vedlegg 1. utdrag fra "Report on fact finding mission", Nepal 1998, et prosjekt som startet opp i 2003 og "Draft Project Document", Angola vann fra 1997 (revidert 2001), som startet opp i 2002.

For ordens skyld vil vi nevne at det i presentasjonen som ble gitt i desember 2007, gjentatte ganger ble gitt inntrykk av at DN (Direktorat for Naturforvaltning) deltok i institusjonelt samarbeid med

vanndirektoratet i Angola (DNA). Dette er feil. Feilen skyldes trolig en trykkfeil der DNA er forvekslet med DN.

Kommentarer til de forskjellige kapitlene

Kap. 2.3.1 – Who is the driving force?

Det er gitt noen eksempler (Angola vann, Nepal EIA, Uganda regulator, Angola energi) av prosjekter for ”starting on a wrong footing” og med følgende mistanke: ”There is a suspicion that some of these projects were initiated with a strong assistance by the Norwegian partner”.

Vi er noe usikre på om konsulentenes gjennomgåtte materiale og kilder har vært tilstrekkelige for denne konklusjonen, men viser bla til vedlegg 1 og våre generelle kommentarer

Kap 2,3,2 – Tied Aid

Norske institusjoner har ansvar for sine fagområder i Norge men finner sjelden flere institusjoner med samme ansvarsområde. Anbud mellom de norske institusjonene kan derfor virke mot sin hensikt. På den andre siden er det samarbeid mellom institusjonene i saksbehandlingen i Norge og dette kan med fordel utnyttes bedre i bistandsprosjekter.

Det finnes flere eksempler på samarbeid (NVE bisto DN i Nepal; SFT, DN og NVE skrev sammen et prosjektdokument for Vietnam innen integrert vann ressursforvaltning, men Vietnam ønsket ikke en slik helhetlig tilnærming.).

Det er i dag et formelt samarbeid mellom de forskjellige direktoratene som har delansvar for vann i Norge. Hensikten er gjensidig informasjon og bedre samarbeid ute. Tilsvarende samarbeid kan man tenke seg også for andre sektorer.

Eksterne faktorer som bunden/ubunden bistand har bidratt til denne debatten

Kap. 2.4.1 – Is Time Ripe to Start the Project?

I alle NVEs avtaler er det innlagt årlige møter mellom ambassaden og samarbeidsinstitusjonen. På disse møtene blir endringer i tidsplaner og aktiviteter diskutert og revidert. Det kan være flere årsaker til at forpliktelsene til eks samarbeidsinstitusjonene ikke oppfylles, og det er et fint forum for slike diskusjoner. I ettertid kan manglende ressurser/personell være beskrevet som årsak til forsinkelser, mens den bakenforliggende årsaken til dette ikke er synliggjort før prosjektoppstart fordi ønske om oppstart er sterkt og bakteppe ”glemt” (eks. ikke juridisk mulig å ansette mer personell før de allerede ansatte er sysselsatt. Dette kan bli vanskelig hvis ingen kvalifiserte, dvs ingen med teknisk bakgrunn er tilgjengelig blant eksisterende personell).

Forsinkelser av prosjektene skyldes vel derfor nettopp at man har tatt ”a step back”

Både et forprosjekt og mer aktiv bruk av årlige møter kan bidra til bedring. Prosjekter som ikke er forankret hos ledelse og fagpersonell kan ha problemer med å oppfølge forpliktelsene og kan foreslås stanset.

Kap 2.4.2 – Actors and Institutional memories

Endringene i utnyttelse av de forskjellige aktørene i bistandsarbeidet er godt presentert i en figur. Vi antar at dette skyldes eksterne forhold, både politisk og organisatorisk forhold i Norad og UD, men kjenner ikke til målet for endringene. En kort orientering om dette har vært tilfelle, ville vært interessant.

Siste setning i kapittelet “There is thus no clear evidence produced so far, to the knowledge of the Consultant, to prove that the changing of policy from private companies to public institutions involvement, has led to better institutional memory and better continuity in the projects.”

Om dette var et mål for omleggingen har vi ingen mening. Men det er grunnlag for å anta at flere av de norske institusjonene i dag har tidligere konsulenter blant sine eksperter.

Når det gjelder institusjonell hukommelse så er dette et problem og ettertiden er alltid avhengig av gode arkivsystem. Det er hyggelig, men i lengden lite pålitelig å bygge dette på personell. De fleste offentlige institusjoner har vel i dag innført samme arkivsystem, Doculive, og problemet for fremtiden burde være mindre.

Kap 2.4.3 og 2.4.4 – Planning og TTT

Tilleggsinformasjonen i vedlegget kan gi noe informasjon om hvordan man jobbet tidligere

Kap. 2.5.1 –Short –or Long –Term, Resident or Not?

Flere steder i rapporten står sitat som omfatter behov for stedlig rådgiver, som eksempelvis her på side 31:

- National Water Sector Management Project, Angola (No. 12): *“Institutional development should be given more focus, by hiring an Institutional Adviser full time”*. (Notably it does not specify whether this is a foreign position) (s. 31)
- Norway-Angola Electricity Sector Cooperation 2002-2006 (No. 29):
 - *“... EDEL considers NORPLAN assistance to have been relatively successful. It is also generally agreed that the impact of the support to EDEL could have been improved through more continuous and sustained presence in Luanda by the Norwegian service provider”*,
 - *“It is noted that the 2001 review recommendations were only implemented to a limited extent, particularly concerning the inadequacy of support through infrequent short visits by NVE and/or its contracted consultants”*,
 - *“NVE’s programme administration role has been despatched reasonably well, but would have benefited from more frequent and longer visits to Angola by NVE personnel”*.
 - *“This could include the deployment of a long-term advisor to the UIR, complemented with certain focused and targeted interventions in areas where Norway has specific competencies and experience to contribute to capacity building in energy management in Angola”*. (s. 31)

Når det gjelder DNA, Angola – vann, prosjektet så var det stedlig rådgiver i Angola fra oppstart og i nesten hele prosjektperioden.

For DNE, Angola – energi, ble stedlig rådgiver engasjert. I begynnelsen av prosjektsamarbeidet var rådgiver fra NVE i Angola fire uker, fire ganger pr år, senere ble det besøk ved behov, definert av partene.

Ambassaden ga i 2004 beskjed om at energi og vannprosjektet skulle stanses grunnet nye prioriteringer fra politisk ledelse i Norge. Stedlig rådgiver for energiprojektet flyttet derfor ikke til Angola, og vannprosjektet ble ikke videreført.

Kap 2.6

Som tidligere nevnt blir det gjennomført årlige møter hvor referat blir skrevet. Disse møtene og nye årsplaner kan brukes mer aktivt og referatene kan ofte brukes mer ved evalueringer.

Det er ellers et poeng at ikke donorer pålegger samarbeidspartnerne mer arbeid som vanskeliggjør deres hverdag og beslaglegger de få ressursene som finnes i institusjonen.

Kap. 2.7.1 – Incentives

Dette er en vanskelig sak, men ofte er det enkle det beste. Hva motiverer oss? (ikke alle i norsk statsfovaltning har tilfredsstillende lønn – dette er et gammelt problem også i Norge)

- Bidra til gode arbeidsforhold
- Gi positive tilbakemeldinger
- Gi institusjonen kreditt for forbedringer, utarbeidelse av rapporter, gjennomføringer av workshop osv – ikke gi kreditten til norske aktører
- Gi små daglige goder som tilgang til faglitteratur, interne småseminarer, felles lunsj, bygge opp et

lite fagbibliotek

- Involver og fortell alle hvorfor norske aktørene er der
- Spre kunnskap på et faglig høyt nivå
- Skap tillit!

Et eksempel kan være vår erfaring fra Øst Timor der småting som å gjøre arbeidsplassen trivelig med mulighet for kaffe- og te-koking, pauserom og hyggelig atmosfære har gjort at de lokale har tatt et tydelig eierskap i prosjektet og jobber aktivt i det daglige.

Vi håper våre kommentarer kan være til nytte, og vi er tilgjengelig hvis mer utfyllende informasjon er ønskelig.

Oslo
2008-01-17
ASK/Sign

Vedlegg 1

Utdrag nr. 1 fra :

“Proposed Norwegian Support to the Ministry of Population and Environment (MOPE) in Nepal”.
“Report from a fact finding mission 10 – 18 June 1998”

Background

His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN) is presently in the process of finalizing consultations with the International Development Association (IDA) for establishing a Power Development Fund (PDF). PDF will be a catalyst for private sector investment and supplement other public financing available for the development of hydropower and electricity supply in Nepal. As a consequence of creating these legal and financial incentives, HMGN is taking steps to strengthen institutional capacity for handling licensing, as well as for monitoring project implementation and operation in an efficient and transparent way. A major aim is to create a licensing framework and process that is efficient and credible to potential investors, and that safeguards sustainable social and natural resources management in connection with power development.

Proponents/investors in future power projects in Nepal that wish to be considered for support through PDF, will need to meet conditions set through HMGN legislation as well as World Bank requirements for Environmental and Social Impact Assessment. For this reason there is developed an EIA Policy Framework and Process Guidance for projects that will be considered for support by PDF. This framework includes guidance for both environmental and social issues associated with projects.

HMGN sent 21 November 1997 a Draft Terms of Reference on the “MOPE Regulator and Monitoring Capacity Building for Environmental Impact Assessment, (EIA)” to the Norwegian Embassy in New Dehli as a basis for request to NORAD for Technical Assistance. The document will in this report be referred to as the Project Document.

In the annual consultations between HMGN and Norway 27-28 January 1998, Norway confirmed positive interest in the project. A mandate for dialogue, which is the first step in the decision process, was 16 April approved by the Embassy in New Dehli.

The main objective of the Technical Assistance as defined in the Project Document will be:

to assist MOPE in attaining and maintaining a high international standard for supervising Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Management. Emphasis will particularly be on MOPE's regulatory role for assuring that power and water resources development projects adequately incorporate environmental and social considerations into the process of selection, design, construction, refurbishment and/or decommissioning, so as to contribute to sustainable development in Nepal.

NORAD considered the project to be in coherence with priorities for the development cooperation between Norway and Nepal, but underlined that several issues needed to be further analysed and described. It was, therefore, decided that a Norwegian team comprising of representatives of possible Norwegian institutional partners to MOPE should visit Nepal. The two potential partners, as identified by NORAD, were:

The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Administration (NVE)
and
The Directorate for Nature Management (DN)

The resulting NVE/DN team to visit Nepal in June 1998 was comprised as follows:

Mr Egil Skofteland, Head, Office of International Cooperation, NVE
Mr Knut Gakkestad, Head, Licensing Section, NVE
Mr Reidar Dahl, Head, Resource Section, DN
Mr Lars Størseth, Senior Executive Officer, DN

The Terms of Reference for the Mission are given in App. VI. During its stay in Kathmandu, the team received valuable assistance by Water Resources Specialist Tor Ziegler from the World Bank who had been actively involved on behalf of IDA in the project preparation.

Potential Norwegian institutional partners

In the Project Document, NVE is proposed to be the Norwegian institution coordinating the Technical Assistance through a contract between NVE and MOPE, and anticipating that NVE will draw on expertise (on subcontracts) from other institutions with relevant environmental and social competence and authority in Norway. NVE was during the preparation of the Project Document informally consulted by IDA, both on the professional content of the Document, and if the institution had the capacity and was willing to take on the proposed coordinating role. NVE responded positively to this, being the reason why NVE appears in the Project Document as the proposed Norwegian institutional partner.

However, in the initial internal discussions of the team, the DN-members expressed strong interest in launching DN as the most appropriate Norwegian institutional partner, thus replacing NVE as proposed in the Project Document. This can be justified by the fact that DN is a directorate under the Ministry of Environment in Norway, and MOPE, the Nepalese institutional partner, is the corresponding Ministry in Nepal. Based on this fact, and the assurances from the DN-members of the team that DN had the required capacity and experience to take on the task, this view was accepted by the NVE-members of the team.

Therefore, the proposal to select DN as the Norwegian institutional partner to MOPE is put forward by the team for NORAD's decision in consultation with MOPE. NVE will then not be part of the institutional contract, but may on request be subcontracted on specific tasks as required.

Since this change in the project may cause confusion for the other parties involved, the team felt that a brief description of the role, responsibilities, and relevant experience of the two Norwegian institutions should be included in this report. Both the Norwegian institutions left more comprehensive written material with MOPE to allow the Ministry to make up its own opinion.

Utdrag Nr.2, fra utkast til prosjektdokument (datert 1997):

“National Water Sector Management (NAWASMA), Angola
- Institutional Cooperation between DNA and NVE”

Background

The main problems in the Angolan water sector today are lack of proper institutional framework and ruined infrastructure. The existing legal framework of water resources management is a heritage from the former Portuguese colonial regime, and much of the infrastructure during almost 20 years of civil war has been lost. As an example, almost all of the 200 hydrometric stations in operation in 1975 are inoperative today.

After the independence in 1975, several attempts have been made to improve the situation. In the early 1980s, a joint Angolan-Bulgarian office for water resources management was established. In the late 1980s, the Italians were involved in several water-related projects, unfortunately with little success. Other organisations involved in the water sector have been UNESCO, the World Bank (WB), and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

In 1991, Angola and Norway signed an agreement regarding assistance in the petroleum, electricity, and water sectors. Later in 1993, SEEA and the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Administration (now

Directorate, NVE) signed another agreement regarding "Assistance in reorganising Water Sector Management in Angola, including Establishment of a new Legal Framework". The only result of this process was a seminar on Water Sector Management organised in October 1994, the NAWASMA-seminar.

In 1995, a programme proposal for the energy and water sectors was formulated with the assistance of Norplan. A final Project Document (PD) covering the energy sector was later produced in March 1996, when also an agreement between SEEA and NVE on institutional cooperation in the energy sector was signed. The water sector part so far has not been carried further. The proposal from 1995 included activities in the following five areas of the water sector:

- i) Programme management in general
- ii) Follow-up on the NAWASMA process
- iii) Hydrometric network and database development
- iv) Technical assistance on preparation of pre-investment studies
- v) Rural water supply and sanitation program

Angola has requested Norway for assistance in updating this programme proposal for the water sector. Following discussions between DNA and NVE, it has been agreed that the proposed institutional cooperation should concentrate on activities connected to ii) *Follow-up on the NAWASMA process* and iii) *Hydrometric network and database development*, to be further explained in the following. It has also been agreed that the activities shall be coordinated with the World Bank funded Water Resources Management (WRM) component of the National Water Sector Development Project. It has recently been confirmed that the World Bank funded component indeed will be carried out. The WRM has the following sub-components (according to the draft WRM project document, dated October 1998, presently under revision):

- 1. National Water Policy
- 2. Legal and Institutional Framework
- 3. Rapid Water Resources Assessment & Water Use
- 4. Hydrological Network, Data and Information Systems
- 5. Stakeholders Participation and Public Awareness
- 6. International Waters & Regional Cooperation
- 7. Cunene Integrated River Basin Management Pilot Project

Of these sub-components, items 3 and 4 will be covered by the NVE assistance. NVE will also undertake assistance in the preparation of regulations to the new Water Law. This will, however, be dependent on the entry into force of the new law or a firm timetable on its final approval. General capacity building will be an important part of the programme through training and purchase of equipment.

The NVE assistance will constitute independent activities that are not dependent on the progress of the more comprehensive WRM project.

Norad

Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation
P.O. Box 8034 Dep. NO-0030 OSLO

Visiting address:
Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Telephone: +47 22 24 20 30
Fax: +47 22 24 20 31
postmottak@norad.no
www.norad.no

March 2008
ISBN 978-82-7548-283-7