

Review of Christian Relief Network

and Projects supported through Christian Relief Network financed by Norway in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda



Review carried out for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in March and April 2002

Field Mission:

Paul George
Heine Steinkopf
Inger K. Stoll

Desk Study:

Centre for Health and Social Development (HESO):
Anne Hertzberg
Ingvar Theo Olsen

INTRODUCTION

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have supported projects through Christian Relief Network (CRN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda since 1997. NORAD and MFA have called for a review for the following purposes:

- To review the capacity, competence and knowledge of CRN and its collaborating partners concerning demobilisation and reintegration; children's psychosocial needs as well as on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
- Regular control of recipients of funds.
- Input for the consideration of further funding.
- Learning in MFA, NORAD and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kampala (RNEK)

The Review is presented in three parts.

Part 1 includes information gathered in the course of the field mission to DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, conducted in the period April 15-29 2002, by Paul George, Heine Steinkopf and Inger K. Stoll, and recommendations from the Team. The field mission followed from a previous desk study conducted in the period March-April 2002 in Oslo by Ingvar Theo Olsen and Anne Hertzberg at the Centre for Health and Social Development (HeSo).

The HeSo study is presented as Part 2 of this report. The HeSo study reviewed the CRN Programme and placed special emphasis on administrative, managerial and organisational issues. It provided an assessment of the efficiency of CRN and its partner organisations, an overview and discussion of CRN as an implementing organisation, as well as a detailed summary of all projects and programmes.

The field mission report and the HeSo study complement each other and should be read together to gain a full picture of CRN's operational environment and relations with its partners. Some of the major findings of both reports overlap and are presented in the appropriate section on findings in Part 1. Other findings specific to the HeSo report are presented in that study. An executive summary of Part 1 and Part 2 are presented in the beginning of the report.

Part 3 presents a background study of the political and social situation of displaced children in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda was prepared by one Team member prior to the mission.

Key words: Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Assistance, Peacebuilding, Democratic republic of Congo, Uganda, Christian Relief Network, Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale, Give Me A Chance

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADEPR	Association des Églises de Pentecôte du Rwanda
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance
CEPAC	Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRN	Christian Relief Network
CRN/CEPAC	Christian Relief Network/Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR	Forces Armées du Rwanda
GMAC	Give Me A Chance
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Auto-Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HRA	Human Rights Assessment
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
MFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OKS	Oslo Kristne Senter
PYM	Pinsevennenes Ytremisjon
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RCD-Goma	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
RNEK	Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kampala
RNEL	Royal Norwegian Embassy in Luanda
RPA	Rwandese Patriotic Army
SCF	Save the Children Fund
TPD	Tous pour le Développement
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRF II	Uganda National Rescue Front II
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have supported projects through Christian Relief Network (CRN) in Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1997. The CRN implementing partners reviewed in the context of the study were: Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale (CEPAC), Goma, DRC; and “Give Me A Chance” (GMAC), Uganda.

Part 1– field mission report

Christian Relief Network:

- The Review Team concludes that the overall impact of the CRN programme has been positive. CRN’s achievements are impressive and its outputs compare favourably with the norms for humanitarian aid in general. It has proven to be a reliable channel of cooperation and funding between the NORAD and the MFA, local governments in the Great Lakes and the implementing partners.
- The projects visited are highly relevant to the commitment of Norwegian development cooperation to contribute to the improvement of economic, social and political conditions with particular emphasis on human rights. The welfare issues of children should be clearly articulated in all related projects.
- Nevertheless, some shortcomings in the management structure and operational “culture” of CRN and its partners have been noted. These draw into question the sustainability of programmes and the ability of the three organisations to enhance the impact of their efforts.
- In particular, neither CRN nor its partners seek to coordinate their efforts adequately with other agencies nor to cooperate with them in a structured way. Their interventions would also gain from a more integrated approach to service delivery (for instance to provide sanitary facilities when rehabilitating social infrastructure).
- Second, there is an overemphasis on individuals as lead actors in programme development and project management. Little effort is being made to build up the capacity of support staff to provide back up should the present leadership leave or be incapacitated. As a result, CRN, and particularly GMAC, are vulnerable to sudden changes in circumstances and the sustainability of the programme must be considered fragile.
- All of the CEPAC and GMAC projects concentrate on short-term results. CRN explains this in terms of seeing its role as a “temporary” catalyst contributing to a broader stakeholder effort to produce lasting change. However, the Review Team feels that CRN’s partners miss important opportunities to enhance their value by the lack of coordination and cooperation with other agencies working in the same fields. There seems to be little effort to build on successful activities to develop more substantive, longer-term development oriented projects.
- CRN and its partners need to develop the capacity to monitor and report on the full range of effects stemming from their interventions in order to learn from their experiences and modify their strategic approach to project development.
- CRN communicates well with the public and its funders through an updated website.

Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale (CEPAC):

- CEPAC is an efficient and effective project organisation with a committed and visionary leadership and competent staff. The organisation represents a solid basis for developing longer term projects.
- The projects deliver impressive immediate results but have not focused on developing a longer-term sustainable impact. This is understandable as funds from Norway are given on an *ad hoc* basis for short term projects for humanitarian assistance.
- CEPAC could build on its strong relationship with the authorities to help other agencies gain entry to the North Kivu region and make additional contributions to peace building and recovery that would benefit a much wider community.
- To improve their impact, CEPAC's interventions should be closely coordinated with activities by other support agents in the region such as NGOs, churches, UN agencies and local authorities. The Review Team recognise that such coordination has been difficult in recent years as international NGOs have not maintained a consistent presence in the region. CRN should play a proactive role in reaching out to the NGO community to identify opportunities for greater cooperation.
- Little is being done to address the hiv/aids epidemic.
- Malaria is a very serious problem in the area. CEPAC should liaise with other organisations in the region to file an application to Geneva for funds from the Global Fund For Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria and to try and access Roll Back Malaria funds.
- Rehabilitation of infrastructure should include latrines and hand washing facilities.
- There is a need for a structured approach to teaching adults about the value of education for girls. Consideration should also be given to finding donors to provide bursaries to enable children from the most impoverished families to attend school.
- Projects should deal proactively with discrimination against the girl child.
- Child rights, and especially their right to participation and their right to expression, should be clearly articulated in all projects dealing with education.
- CEPAC could build on its religious foundations to provide more effective and relevant support to trauma victims in the community.
- The community reintegration programmes need to be supplemented by integrated income generating projects to provide employment for the returnees.
- There is a low level of reporting from CEPAC to CRN of non-financial issues, and little emphasis on results and longer-term effects of the projects. CRN argues that an extensive level of verbal reporting, which was not revealed to the Review Team, provides a solid foundation of information on the local situation. Recipients of humanitarian funds should change their reporting procedures to include outcome assessments.

Give Me A Chance (GMAC):

- GMAC has committed leadership and competent staff. Its projects meet well-targeted needs and achieve their objectives. However, GMAC concentrates on short-term results and has not tried to develop the kind of long-term programmes that could have a broader impact
- Without a strategic, long-term, perspective the projects risk becoming less relevant and achieving lower sustainability than could have been the case had GMAC been more concerned with establishing strategic alliances with relevant partners and advocating for

institutional changes.

- *The Kyanjuki transit centre* should not be given further Norwegian funding. The dwindling number of people coming in from the bush does not justify sustaining this operation in its present form.
- GMAC should consider moving its experienced counselling staff to other areas of Uganda where their skills might soon be in demand, for example to the West Nile region.
- Other arrangements to treat returning rebels and abductees could be explored, for example, developing mobile counselling groups to visit and treat returnees in their communities.
- *The child resettlement and prison babies project* is doing valuable work in helping detained juveniles return to their families and addressing the needs of babies in prison. However, the project is mainly treating the symptoms of a much deeper rooted social problem and is probably not making a sustainable impact.
- GMAC should develop an integrated approach to the issues that underlie the phenomenon of children in conflict with the law.
- In keeping with the goal of meeting the “best interest of the child”, projects should emphasise children’s right to participate in decisions that affect their lives and their right to expression.
- NORAD should continue to fund the child resettlement and prison babies project for an interim period of one year. If GMAC fails to demonstrate that the project is more than a social welfare project, then NORAD should consider whether support is appropriate and relevant.
- The prison babies project component is not sustainable as a NORAD funded project. GMAC should seek the support of local church groups to continue its work with babies in prison.

Part 2 – desk study

The *administrative capacity* of CRN and its local partners seems satisfactory; innovative computer systems for follow up are developed. Although not fully assessed, the CRN organisation and its partners seem cost-effective. The relatively low share administrative costs, particularly in Norway, may serve as an indication of this. Long-term effects have not been assessed, but short-term effects are reported quantitatively and qualitatively from each project. There is little doubt that a high number of people have received humanitarian support, but the costs vary greatly from project to project.

The *financial accountability* on the Norwegian side seems to be in order. Most of the expenses are accounted for and audited locally, although the audits are carried out by the local branch of an international auditing firm, and are thus accepted by MFA and NORAD. No indications of irregularities have been found from this limited review.

The criteria for *results, achievements and effectiveness* in projects as described in documents and interviews appear to be highly quantitative, but with a sensitivity for more qualitative aspects. According to the criteria defined by CRN many of the projects have achieved more than 100% goal attainment. When this is not obtained the obstacles are well documented. A key prerequisite for success may be the strong commitment by the CRN leadership and their partners, but also the size of the organisation, which enables it to act on short notice and have

a solid overview of activities. Another factor may be a focus on projects as short time events that do not allow the construction of permanent organisation infrastructures.

The *strength of the CRN Director* is his strong vision, his orientation towards results and his political insight, not to mention his genuine engagement for the people he wants to reach. The *weakness* may be that it is difficult for others to follow up the work if he were to end his work. However, it is also stressed that others could follow his principles of working.

A *weakness* of CRN and partners seem to be the strong dependency on a few individuals, which makes the small organisations vulnerable and may give difficulties for others to follow up key tasks if needed. There are few relationships with other international agencies. Viewed from the outside, the special knowledge and experiences of other key organisations working with assistance to children and youth in difficult circumstances are not explicitly integrated into these projects.

The organisation and the projects may benefit from closer *technical collaboration* with other international agencies, particularly in areas where their own capacity or competence is more limited. Although this has not been assessed in details it could include areas like children, children's rights, re-integration of abducted children, but also refugee related issues and general development aid issues. An area of concern to be followed up is the popular base both in Uganda, but maybe even more importantly in DRC.

There are a number of *lessons* to be drawn from the work of CRN and its partners, particularly the focus on short term achievements; the benefits of a small organisation, which can operate projects that actually have an end; the ability to use IT technology for efficient management; just to mention a few.

PART 1 - FIELD MISSION REPORT

Review of Christian Relief Network and projects financed by
Norway and supported through Christian Relief Network in
The Democratic Republic of Congo,
Uganda and Rwanda

Paul George
Heine Steinkopf
Inger K. Stoll

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1. MANDATE AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Review Mandate and Team

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have supported projects through Christian Relief Network (CRN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda since 1997. NORAD and MFA have called for this review for the following purposes:

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- Regular control of recipients of funds.
- Input for the consideration of further funding.
- Learning in MFA, NORAD and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kampala (RNEK)

The Review Team consisted of the following:

- Inger K. Stoll, Senior Adviser, NORAD. Team Leader with particular responsibility for Norwegian policy aspects, guiding principles for the meetings and outline of the report.
- Paul George, consultant. Focusing on human rights issues and political and qualitative aspects of demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Responsible for writing the mission report.
- Heine Steinkopf, consultant, with particular focus on psychology and trauma affected people.

The Terms of Reference for the assignment are attached as Annex 1.

1.2 Methodology and Approach

The Review is built on assessments of documents from CRN, NORAD and MFA, interviews and direct observation. Because of lack of knowledge in NORAD and MFA about the Great Lakes area in general, and the work of CRN and its partners in particular, the interviews and the fieldwork have been invaluable to information collection and assessment. The interviews involved representatives of CRN and its partner organisations, representatives of local and national authorities, UNHCR, UNICEF, NGOs and beneficiaries. Particular care was taken to speak with beneficiaries and many hours were spent in their communities or in different centres. In this report, CRN "Programme" refers to the totality of CRN-supported activities in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda; CRN "project" refers to individual projects (with an allotted project number).

The Terms of Reference determined four regions for project visits: DRC, Rwanda, Uganda/Kasese and Uganda/Kampala: three of them involving humanitarian assistance and the last one long-term development cooperation. The review focuses on CRN's operations in DRC and Uganda. The mission was unable to spend the necessary time in Rwanda to fully assess CRN-funded projects there. The projects are *inter alia* reviewed according to the objectives of the Norwegian budget votes for humanitarian assistance and long-term cooperation respectively, the project objectives and their relevance. Annex 2 presents the Team's itinerary and the people met.

In line with the Terms of Reference, the Programme has been reviewed according to the OECD/DAC approach for reviews/evaluations. In addition, some of the criteria developed by the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ALNAP) for assessment of conflict management and peace building, were used: appropriateness and timeliness, internal and external coherence, coordination, connectedness, cost-effectiveness and location of responsibilities. A recent evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross, as well as NORAD's Handbook in Human Rights Assessment, also provided valuable input to the Review Team's work.

CRN and its partners operate in a complex environment where the potential for conflict is inter-linked with the pressing demands for development. Assessing the effectiveness of the CRN Programme is therefore a challenge and requires several layers of analysis. Although CRN's projects have clearly stated goals and objectives, which provide a quantitative means for determining strengths and weaknesses of individual elements, it is essential to recognise that statistics alone are not sufficient to capture the overall impact of the programme. The full effects of CRN supported activities can only be appreciated by considering aspects that cannot be measured in quantitative terms. Individual projects are established to meet specific targets in unique country, or community, contexts. Qualitative analysis is therefore required to complete a comprehensive picture of Programme performance, including a determination of the impact CRN and its partners have made. The field studies were particularly useful in helping the evaluators learn how well CRN and its partners have responded to the practical challenges of the operational environment in the Great Lakes region and with what specific results.

2. DESCRIPTION OF CHRISTIAN RELIEF NETWORK - CRN

CRN is a humanitarian non-profit foundation established in 1993 and registered with the Brønnøysund registrar in Norway. The director of CRN is Mr. Bent Rønsen and its headquarters are located in Oslo. CRN's mandate is to provide humanitarian assistance around the world regardless of the race, nationality, political or religious affiliation of its partners. CRN's primary role is to provide effective, flexible and rapid responses to the challenges brought about by poverty, man-made conflicts and natural disasters. Its target groups are formerly internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, children affected by conflict (former child combatants, abductees and IDPs), former guerrilla fighters and imprisoned youth and children. CRN is currently active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. Previous operations have been conducted in Mozambique, Angola, Bosnia and Croatia. CRN's trademarks are its low overhead and strong local capacity through co-operation with well-established partners in affected countries. Apart from a part-time employee and a small warehouse in Goma, CRN has no physical presence in the partner countries and therefore works entirely through local organisations. However, CRN's Norway-based director pays frequent visits to the region and has played a catalytic role on several occasions.

2.1 Strategic elements of CRN's programme

- *Development and coordination of projects* - CRN supports projects with clearly defined objectives. Local partners implement the projects in the field and CRN's role becomes less visible. Implementing partners are bound to CRN only through project agreements.
- *Promotion and information* - CRN brings information about activities and results to the various stakeholders in the project and the Norwegian public, as well as organising fund raising activities. CRN maintains a constantly updated web site.
- *Capacity building* - CRN provides implementing partners with the necessary rules and tools for successful project management.
- *Networking* - CRN creates and sustains relations among the various partners in the network (individuals and organisations), and ensures that knowledge and experience are shared with all partners involved.

2.2 Activities funded or supported

- *Construction/building*: Health centres and schools as well as road rehabilitation.
- *Distribution*: Start-packages (farming implements, seed, roof sheets, etc.) to beneficiaries and therapeutic feeding.
- *Repatriation of refugees*: Assistance to returning refugees and operation of transit centres.
- *Demobilisation & Resettlement of ex-combatants*: Negotiation with rebel groups, operation of rehabilitation centres, resettlement and follow-up.
- *Children behind bars*: Resettlement and follow-up of children released from prisons and remand homes.
- The attached report by HeSo (Part 2) gives an overview of CRN projects financed by NORAD and MFA. NORAD has given NOK 7,7 million to support a project in Uganda concerning the rehabilitation of child and juvenile prisoners. MFA has allocated approximately NOK 54 million for humanitarian assistance in Western Uganda, DRC and Rwanda, in addition to the provision of emergency assistance and support towards peace and reconciliation in the same area through CRN. These projects deal with the demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of war and conflicted-affected people.

2.3 Partners

Funding Partners: NORAD, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CRN has also recently received funds from the Department for International Development (DFID), U.K.

Implementing Partners: "Give Me A Chance" (GMAC), Uganda; Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale (CEPAC), DRC; Association des Églises de Pentecôte du Rwanda (ADEPR), Rwanda; Ministry of Agriculture, Rwanda.

3. RELEVANCE/APPROPRIATENESS

The CRN Programme, in meeting needs in the communities involved, is considered relevant to global priorities, donors' policies and host countries' priorities.

3.1 Global priorities and needs and priorities in the countries

The Great Lakes region is affected by wars and internal armed conflicts. The instability of the region also has consequences for its neighbouring countries. The situation is of great concern to the international community, including the United Nations. Political and diplomatic processes, including negotiations, are being carried out on several fronts involving local, national and international actors, presently with mixed results. Major challenges in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda are the issues of disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, repatriation/resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR), as well as alleviating poverty through various development interventions. All CRN projects are perceived by the Review Team as being relevant to these challenges and meet the needs of their beneficiaries. All projects have tangible results for the beneficiaries.

3.2 Donors' priorities

3.2.1 MFA funded projects

All projects, except for the Give Me A Chance Child Resettlement and Prison Babies programme (CRN-4), have been financed by MFA under the vote for humanitarian assistance. The objectives of this vote are to contribute to protection, timely, efficient and qualitatively good humanitarian assistance as well as to peace, reconciliation, democracy and respect and fulfilment of human rights.

The CRN projects funded through MFA are consistent with several of these objectives. Through ADEPR in Rwanda, CEPAC in DRC and GMAC in Uganda, and in cooperation with others, results have been achieved to demobilise, rehabilitate and resettle refugees, internally displaced persons, abducted and ex-rebels, adults and children. CRN and its local partners, especially GMAC, have further contributed to peace and reconciliation, acting as catalysts in some highly political and sensitive processes in Western Uganda, establishing relations between actors in conflict, and thereafter engaging in activities to resettle the beneficiaries. In DRC, CRN/CEPAC have contributed to the restoration of facilities in primary health and education, road rehabilitation and the provision of inputs to beneficiaries' productive activities, thereby bridging the gap between war and conflict and peace and development.

It is the strength of CRN that the director has knowledge and understanding of the political dynamics of the region and has a special ability to establish relations between various actors, including those in opposition to each other.

The Team is of the opinion that in the event of future Norwegian support to similar projects in the region, these would also be consistent with the objectives of the new vote for bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation. Support through CRN to the Great Lakes region would also be consistent with the gap-vote's intention not to build up a direct Norwegian bilateral engagement in this area as CRN does not have a presence in the countries concerned but works through local organisations.

3.2.2 The NORAD funded project

NORAD funds the Child Resettlement and Prison Babies Programme of GMAC (CRN-4) under the development cooperation vote for civil society development through NGOs. New guidelines for the grant schemes for humanitarian assistance and development cooperation by Norwegian and international voluntary actors were issued in 2001. Support through NGOs is primarily aimed at strengthening civil society as a driving force and agent for change in achieving development goals such as poverty reduction, promotion of human rights and children's rights, the empowerment of poor and vulnerable groups and serving as a voice of the poor.

The Child Resettlement and Prison Babies Programme focuses on these same objectives and is thus consistent with Norwegian priorities. However, the implementation of the project seems to lack a strategy for the promotion of social change and strengthening of responsible institutions' capacity and ownership. The project is presently aimed at improving the lives of individuals and their families and as such it fills an important need. However, it is more a social welfare project than geared towards development for change.

3.3 Appropriateness and flexibility

The key question with regard to appropriateness is the degree to which CRN and its partners understand the conflict dynamics and local situation and how fitting their activities are to the circumstances. They have shown a remarkable ability to understand their operational environment. CRN knows the leading actors and has high level and grassroots connections throughout the region. CRN is able to contact influential persons at the right time and in the right place to bring together parties in conflict. Due to good political connections, both in Norway and in the Great Lakes region, communication has been quick in many situations and has thereby given CRN the ability to act as a catalyst for resolving certain immediate crises. Accordingly, the CRN Programme is perceived as appropriate to the circumstances.

3.4 The International Bill of Human Rights

Poverty, internal conflicts and war reduce the ability of the three states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including the rights of children. There are also limited possibilities for people to take care of their own economic, social and cultural rights. In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the Team applied NORAD's Handbook in Human Rights Assessment (HRA) in its review of the CEPAC projects in DRC, on the Resettlement project in Western Uganda and on the Child Resettlement Project (NORAD funded) in Kampala. The HRA form from the Handbook was filled in together with the implementing organisations in DRC and Uganda and as such it proved a useful tool for communication. The Team found that the form has limitations for the assessment of human rights projects. It was developed for assessing the human rights aspects in all development cooperation (the integrated approach) and is probably more suitable for that purpose. Nevertheless, the HRA form enabled the Team to determine that all projects had positive impacts on human rights.

The CRN Programme is of itself a human rights programme. Each project respects and protects people's human rights. Where the beneficiaries' social and economic rights are sought to be improved, the project provides a start package for welfare and/or productive activities to individuals and their families. Or, as in Eastern DRC where the state is almost absent, it makes provision for the development of suitable infrastructure to improve people's lives.

However, the human rights dimension of CRN's work is not always apparent. There is room for CRN to better articulate beneficiaries' human rights in the project implementation process.

3.5 The Convention on the Rights of the Child

Children's rights are particularly vulnerable to the challenges posed by war and poverty in the Great Lakes region. The Team found that CRN's projects address some of the fundamental tenets of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In particular, they promote family reunification and the survival and development of children emerging from the traumatic experience of war. However, this is an outcome of the nature of the projects supported by CRN. It is not evident that support for the Convention is a driving force behind the choice of projects. There is a need for child-related projects to emphasise the "best interest of the child" and to integrate child rights more firmly into project implementation.

3.6 Meeting Psychosocial Needs

The situation in North Kivu clearly highlights the importance of the issue of psychosocial trauma. A very high percentage of the population has been exposed to extreme atrocities through actions of war or terrorism, as well as by the dramatic volcanic eruption of January 2002. At a basic level, the Review Team feels that the CRN projects address the psychosocial needs arising from such events. A climate of comfort and safety has been created whereby victims of stress are given protection, provided with shelter and food and clothing. However, there is clearly a need for a more integrated approach to reach larger segments of the population suffering from traumatic experiences. CEPAC is in the best position to address this issue because of its credibility and presence throughout the region. Pastors need to be sensitised to the issue of trauma and how to use traditional church practices to alleviate psychosocial problems.

4. EFFECTIVENESS

The HeSo report (page 24) provides useful details on the quantifiable and qualitative aspects of CRN's work. CRN has developed a unique niche as an NGO practised in supporting risky initiatives in unstable or insecure environments. Because of its light formal management structure, the organisation also has the flexibility and capacity to react quickly to unforeseen events and emerging crises. Although an immediate goal is to alleviate the suffering of the victims of war through, for example, the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and abducted children, CRN's support for infrastructural development projects have a much broader impact in preparing communities for the longer-term objective of building a lasting foundation for peace. The restoration of damaged health and educational facilities plays a significant role in helping conflict-affected societies establish the minimal conditions by which to implement social, political and economic development and thereby consolidate peace. Similarly, the organisation's assistance to children in conflict with the law has positive implications for the future development of socially responsible and productive citizens.

Based on the projects observed in the course of the mission, the Team feels that the overall impact of the CRN Programme has been generally positive. All the projects visited showed a high level of correspondence between the targets and the timely achievement of outputs. Because the outputs and outcomes of individual projects vary with the country and specific circumstances of the target group, the following assessment of the effectiveness of CRN-supported projects is presented under separate country headings.

4.1 Democratic Republic of Congo

CRN's implementing partner in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale (CEPAC). CEPAC is a parish-based association of local churches with representation throughout the DRC (See HeSo report, page 14). Its headquarters is located in Bukavu. The organisation is mainly involved with evangelisation but is also engaged in education, health, social work and community development. CEPAC's ordinary budget is in the range of USD 200,000 annually. Other external contributions are in the range of USD 7-10 million per year, varying from year to year. CEPAC's principal external donor has been Swedish SIDA, through Pingstmissionens U-landshjelp (PMU). The latest project funded from this source was the Panzi General Hospital, Bukavu (SEK 15 million). Other donors are the Lepira Mission of Holland and a German donor supporting the CEPAC university. Accordingly, the contribution from CRN to CEPAC is a relatively small part of the overall financial resources available. CEPAC is not primarily a development organisation; the various projects managed from donations are organised on a flexible, *ad hoc*, basis with staff being assigned specific tasks to handle their implementation for the time necessary. CRN's local representative in North Kivu is Dan Andersson, a Swedish citizen and life-long resident of the region; he is also a CEPAC missionary and engineer. Often, Mr. Andersson acts as the project leader for CRN funded projects implemented by CEPAC.

CEPAC's leadership gives the impression of being visionary, strategic, committed and of high integrity. The Review Team considers the organisation as an invaluable actor in the complex environment that prevails in North Kivu. If further funding is to be provided by Norway to this part of DRC, the CRN/CEPAC channel is highly recommended.

A variety of projects aimed at securing sustainable peace and stability in North Kivu are supported through the CRN allocation. These include the rehabilitation of health centres and schools, resettlement aid to IDPs, assistance to returning refugees, distribution of seeds and farming implements and employment generation through road construction. In addition, support is provided for "pastors' seminars" to promote peace and reconciliation between different branches of the CEPAC association. The Review Team visited a number of these projects and followed up with interviews with local stakeholders, including beneficiaries, to better assess the impact of the CRN/CEPAC effort in the province. The team visited projects funded under CRN project numbers 8, 9,13,14,16 near Goma in the Masisi Mountains and at Vichumbi on Lake Edward, northeast of Goma.

Project Visits

School and Health Centre Rehabilitation (CRN-8, 9,13,14,16).

Outputs. Under the Programme, 48 health clinics (CRN-8, 31 clinics; CRN-13, 17 clinics) and 6 primary schools have been rebuilt/rehabilitated in the Masisi Mountains of North Kivu. The target groups are some 470,000 returning refugees/IDPs (CRN-08: 330,000 and CRN-13: 140,000) and some 5,000 pupils. CEPAC identified communities where health and education facilities had existed before the conflict but which had been destroyed or pillaged during rebel activity. They then reconstructed or repaired existing buildings. No new buildings were constructed, thereby keeping costs to a minimum. The restored facilities were provided with basic furnishings including school desks, blackboards, hospital beds and special equipment

such as microscopes. In addition, the health centres received a package of basic medicines. Subsequent supplies of medicine come from CEPAC's central purchasing and storage unit in Bukavu. This operation is based on the health units' ability to pay for the goods, although medical donations are also fed through this supply line because of its efficiency. More sporadic medical donations are provided by organisations such as UNICEF, WHO and other international NGOs. Most of the health centres rebuilt/rehabilitated by CEPAC have participated in vaccination campaigns coordinated by UNICEF but external agencies do not influence the organisation's work.

Attention was being paid to securing the investment in the rehabilitated facilities, for example, blackboards were permanently attached to walls and microscopes were kept in the custody of a health centre employee at night. Access to the facilities is not free: parents have to pay school fees and patients pay for visits to the health centres.. These, in effect, are the salaries of the staff who have been working without regular pay from the government for years in some cases. At the health centres routine vaccinations are free. Both teachers and health centre staff are formally employed by the government of DRC, but not paid. It may be mentioned that staff are frequently paid in kind by parents or patients.

Outcomes. The projects have been designed to restore a level of service in the community that had existed before the conflict. They meet the clearly identifiable practical need of improving the lives of the people. Investments in health and education have an added value in that they also directly impact on endemic problems such as malnutrition. Although a secure food supply is also essential, without access to good education awareness of the means to combat malnutrition cannot be developed. Improving women's education and giving them correct information about nutrition is particularly important in reducing malnutrition. It is evident that the restoration of basic health and education services has had a far broader impact in terms of the consolidation of peace and security in the areas visited. The schools and health centres serve as a focus of village life, attract people to return to their homes and encourage long-term development of the community. These projects are cost-effective and highly relevant to the goal of reintegrating war-affected people and rehabilitating war-ravaged communities.

Problem areas. The Team observed some weak points in the health and education rehabilitation projects and subsequently brought these to the attention of CRN/CEPAC:

- The rehabilitation of school buildings and health centres did not include construction of latrines and there was no clearly accessible water supply for basic hygiene.
- The fact that there was a school fee excluded a significant number of children from attending classes. This would appear to be a potential source of friction or resentment in the community.
- Girls were poorly represented in the schools and there were high dropout rates for female pupils after the first or second primary classes. This was attributed to resource constraints at the individual family level and to cultural traditions whereby boys normally would be favoured if a choice had to be made about which child to send to school.
- Although most of the patients in the health centres were suffering from malaria, there were no mosquito nets in the facilities either for the invalids or the staff who slept at the clinics.
- Preventative treatment for malaria is not provided free of charge. Due to the unavailability of drugs, the health centres are often not able to treat the disease.

- The lack of collaboration with other NGOs working in the same areas had led to duplication of effort in some cases and may have weakened the potential impact of the CRN/CEPAC Programme (see below for further discussion of the NGO coordination issue).

The comparative advantage of CEPAC. North Kivu is controlled by several groups; parts of it by the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), some of it by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and other areas by Interehamwe, Mai-Mai and similar guerrilla groups. It is unquestionably a difficult and dangerous operational environment. The conflict situation in the region has worsened an already weak health and education system.

CEPAC has high credibility in DRC. As an example, a representative of the organisation was chosen as the spokesperson for civil society in the recent Inter-Congolese Dialogue, aimed at resolving the conflict in DRC, held in Sun City, South Africa. Because it is permanently present with churches throughout the region, CEPAC has been able to respond quickly to emerging opportunities to rebuild the basic infrastructure. It is CEPAC's strategy to penetrate into areas where few, or no, development interventions are being carried out. Thus, their presence represents hope for many communities who feel abandoned.

Dan Andersson, as a CEPAC missionary, and as the CRN representative in the region, provides credibility in terms of financial dealings and plays a key role in building the confidence of the local people in the reintegration and reconstruction process. School and health centre rehabilitation has often been undertaken in active war zones and there have been setbacks and new destruction to contend with. Nevertheless, CRN/CEPAC has been able to sustain its programme and provide essential services as people return to their communities. A case to note is the response to the recent volcanic eruption in Goma. This created an urgent need for emergency medical help, safe water supplies and shelter. CRN/CEPAC maintains a stockpile of clothing, medical supplies and other emergency materials in a warehouse in Goma and was able to initiate a rapid and spontaneous response to this crisis. It provided crucial assistance to those displaced by the lava pending the arrival of international humanitarian agencies.

Support for refugees

Tutsi refugees returning from Rwanda (CRN-16) and Hutu refugees returning to Rwanda (CRN-14).

Outputs. CRN/CEPAC assists refugees from both sides of the Rwanda conflict who are either in DRC and want to return to Rwanda (Hutus), or who have returned to DRC from Rwanda (Tutsis). The Hutu project is centred on five transit camps where the refugees are processed, usually over a three-day period, before being transported home to Rwanda through the offices of UNHCR. According to CRN/CEPAC, the Hutu refugees are handed over to another NGO, Tous Pour Le Développement (TPD), who then transport them to the UNHCR transit camp in Gisenyi, Rwanda. However, at a meeting with the head of the UNHCR office in Goma, Mr. Abdellahi Ould El Bah, the review mission was told that there is no relationship between CRN/CEPAC and UNHCR in this context. Bent Rønsen confirms that CRN/CEPAC has no formal agreement with UNHCR. UNHCR funds go to the Governors Office, which then provides support to TPD. According to UNHCR data, 10,267 Hutus were repatriated in 1999, 16,540 in 2000 and 9,146 in 2001. The programme was interrupted as a result of the volcanic eruption and only 565 were processed in January-February 2002.

CRN's figures give the following information: 15,193 refugees were repatriated in 2000, 15,091 in 2001, 756 in Jan. 2002, 1045 in Feb. 2002, 1332 in March 2002, 1507 in April 2002 - primarily because many Hutus who reach and register at the CRN/CEPAC reception centres, have chosen, for various reasons, not to go through the UNHCR process.

The Team visited two Hutu reception centres (at Mweso and Kitarama/Kalengara). The refugees receive health care, food and clothing. The Tutsi refugees visited by the Team were housed in a semi-permanent village-type environment at Mushaki where there was a church, health centre and school.

Outcomes. A weakness of the Hutu refugee return programme identified by the Team is the lack of follow-up by CRN/CEPAC. Once the refugees are handed over to TPD, CNR/CEPAC makes no effort to monitor their progress or to assess the success of their reintegration in Rwanda. This illustrates a feature of CRN/CEPAC's work that was evident throughout the review - the usual focus of their interventions is on the immediate, short-term, outputs. There is insufficient effort to build on these successful activities to develop a longer-term development perspective. When questioned on this matter, Bent Rønsen consistently argued that the repatriation and follow-up of refugees is a UNHCR responsibility. He acknowledges that CRN does have the capacity, through its Rwandan network to follow-up in this regard.

Human Rights Perspectives. The review team used the Human Rights Assessment form (HRA), adapted below from the NORAD publication "Handbook on Human Rights Assessment".

HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT		
Projects of CEPAC, Democratic Republic of Congo		
Degree of Impact:	Score	
1. What is the programme's assumed/actual impact on equality and non-discrimination?	AWARENESS	POSITIVE IMPACT
2. Has the population directly affected been informed about the programme?		POSITIVE IMPACT
3. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected everyone's right to seek, and impart information relevant to its implementation?		POSITIVE IMPACT
4. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected the right to express views freely in the preparation and implementation of the programme?	EMPOWERMENT	POSITIVE IMPACT
5. Does the programme promote/has the programme promoted participation in decision making of groups affected?		POSITIVE IMPACT
6. Does the programme uphold/has the programme upheld the right to organize?		POSITIVE IMPACT
7. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected the right to just and favourable conditions of work?		NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
8. Does the programme affect/has the programme affected the fulfilment of the right to an adequate standard of living for target groups and other people affected, including access to adequate food and continuous improvement of living conditions?		POSITIVE IMPACT
9. Does the programme affect/has the programme affected the opportunity of people for self provision in terms of income generating activities?		POSITIVE IMPACT
10. Does the programme address the right to compensation for those negatively affected?		NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE

Problem Areas. The Tutsi refugees are in a difficult situation because they are located in an area where the local population is hostile to their presence. They are also not wanted back in Rwanda, probably because of Rwandan government political objectives in the context of the wider regional conflict. This group is provided with full-time military protection by a

Rwandan army detachment barracked near by. CRN/CEPAC is seeking funds to move these Tutsi refugees to safer areas further into DRC.

Findings and Recommendations

CEPAC is an efficient and effective project organisation. It is highly regarded in the community and builds on the extensive church network of the CEPAC association, and the personal experience and local knowledge of its staff, including Mr. Andersson, to establish strong teams of specialists to work on projects of relevance to the war-affected communities in North Kivu province. The projects deliver impressive immediate results but have not focused on developing a longer-term sustainable impact. The Team feels that this is unfortunate. CEPAC could build on its extensive experience and high project delivery success rate to multiply its impact in the region.

Moreover, CRN/CEPAC has generally not cooperated with other NGOs, nor the UN system, in programme development and project delivery. The Team appreciates that this reflects the reluctance - particularly of Mr. Rønsen - to become entangled in any relationships that might restrict CRN/CEPAC's ability to respond quickly and with flexibility to emerging opportunities or otherwise limit its options. However, in the opinion of the Team, this is a short-sighted position that fails to take account of the value that could be added to CRN/CEPAC's programme through the sharing of information and experiences with other like-minded NGOs. More importantly, CRN/CEPAC could build on its strong relationship with the regional authorities to help other agencies gain entry to the North Kivu region and make additional contributions to peacebuilding and recovery that would benefit a much wider community. As a case in point, the mission was shown a health centre project that had been built by another agency and yet which was standing unused because it had failed to gain the proper government authorisation. This represents a serious lost opportunity to provide medical assistance to a community that has urgent priorities at every level of social development. It seems that this particular effort could have been salvaged had there been coordination and cooperation between the respective agencies.

Other specific findings include:

- The CEPAC development interventions are relevant and valuable to the needs of the beneficiaries. However, to improve their impact, they should be closely coordinated with activities by other support agents in the region such as NGOs, churches, UN agencies and local authorities to ensure an integrated approach to community development. CEPAC should bring its strong competence and local knowledge to the local coordination meetings that do exist in Goma. This is not being done today and seems to be a missed opportunity.
- Little is being done to address the hiv/aids epidemic. Sexual education is touched on in counselling sessions but there is reluctance to promote the use of condoms or to get involved with condom distribution.
- Malaria is a very serious problem in the area. CEPAC should liaise with other organisations in the region to file an application to Geneva for funds from the Global Fund For Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria and to try and access Roll Back Malaria funds.
- Rehabilitation of infrastructure should include latrines and hand washing facilities. Other community work should go hand-in-hand with efforts by other actors engaged in health and hygiene.

- In education, there is a need for a structured approach to teaching adults about the value of education for girls. Consideration should also be given to finding donors to provide bursaries to enable children from the most impoverished families to attend school.
- CEPAC could build on its religious foundations to provide more effective and relevant support to trauma victims in the community. Traditional prayer groups, or discussion sessions led by pastors at the community level, could provide a cost-effective and meaningful way to complement professional programmes to deal with this problem. Specific methods targeting children could be used, for example simple methods for expressing bad memories.
- The community reintegration programmes need to be supplemented by integrated income generating projects to provide employment for the returnees.
- It appears that there is a low level of reporting from CEPAC to CRN of non-financial issues, and little emphasis on results and longer-term effects of the projects. Eventually, the Norwegian government will need to request that recipients of humanitarian funds change their reporting procedures, primarily to include outcome assessments. This is particularly relevant for CRN projects where many of them continue over several years.
- CRN and its partners need to develop the capacity to monitor and report on the full range of effects stemming from their interventions. Only then will they be able to learn from their experiences and modify their strategic approach to project development. An example would be that, in order to sustain public support for the projects in Norway, there needs to be follow-up and reporting on the state of returnees after transfer to their homes.

4.2 Rwanda

CRN's implementing partner in Rwanda is the Association des Églises de Pentecôte du Rwanda (ADEPR). The Team only had a brief opportunity to meet with Pasteur Jean Sibomana of ADEPR but were impressed with what seems to be an effective and efficient organisation. The Team feels that ADEPR would be an appropriate vehicle by which to send Norwegian funds should it be considered desirable to afford assistance to Rwanda.

4.3 Uganda

CRN's implementing partner in Uganda is Give Me A Chance (GMAC), a Christian NGO based in Kampala that started operations in 1997 (See HeSo report, page 13). The Director of GMAC is the Reverend Kenneth Kamese. The organization began its activities by working on the resettlement of children in conflict with the law (the GMAC project proposal refers to "child offenders". However, only about one-in-five detained children are ever convicted of a crime so the Review Team, in consultation with GMAC, have adopted "in conflict with the law" as a more appropriate description of their situation). Subsequently, GMAC began operations in the area of "Civil Peace Activities", helping to demobilize and resettle former rebels who surrendered under the Government of Uganda's amnesty programme. The organisation's mission is to address human rights and conflict resolution issues through two ongoing projects:

Civil Peace Project - dealing with the resettlement of former rebels (CRN project numbers 11,12, 17, 19);

Juvenile Resettlement and Prison Babies Project - focusing on the release of incarcerated children and addressing the plight of babies imprisoned with their mothers (CRN-4).

The Civil Peace Programme focuses on the north-western and western districts of the country. The review examined this project in the Kasese area of Uganda. The Child Resettlement and Prison Babies project reviewed operates around Kampala where the Team visited a remand home, women's prison and children reunited with their families. The projects are highly relevant, meet the needs of the target groups and they produce the intended results.

4.3.1 Uganda/Kasese

The Director of CRN, in cooperation with a few other actors, contributed to peace in the Kasese area at the end of the 1990s by bringing the local king back from exile to Uganda. The return of their king led many Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels to come in from the bush. As a follow up to this political interaction, GMAC started to operate a transit centre, the Kyanjuki Rehabilitation Centre, at Kilembi in the Kasese District of southwest Uganda, to receive returning rebels (CRN-19). The Centre is supported by the MFA contribution to CRN. The Kyanjuki Centre is located in a complex of buildings constituting a primary school, a vocational training centre, some residential units and a military barracks manned by a small security detachment of the UPDF. The outward impression of the Centre is that it provides a safe and relaxing environment in which to receive and process "reporters", i.e., returnees. The children, in particular, benefit from the social interaction they can enjoy with resident local children and the access they have to the school.

Outputs. The project has attained a high level of the objectives stated in the proposal and achieved these in a timely manner. The project aimed at resettling 700 ex-fighters in the period October 2000-December 2001. By the end of August 2001, 455 ex-fighters had been demobilised. Each ex-fighter was given a "surrender kit" consisting of legal protection, a 6-week rehabilitation course, medical treatment, access to education, building materials and a stipend for income-generating purposes. The project was conceived for the resettlement of adults but children also arrived with the ex-fighters, these were either former abductees or children born into the guerrilla group in the bush. The project demonstrated strong implementation capacity and adaptability in establishing reintegration and resettlement activities for adult and child returnees.

Outcomes. As in other projects supported by CRN and noted in this review, GMAC has not given adequate attention to outcomes that go beyond the immediate, short-term, objective - in this case, resettling returnees. The returnees are followed up by GMAC one year after their return to the communities. Thereafter, local social workers follow up. Tracing studies, for instance carried out by university students, would have been an interesting means of checking up on the longer-term effects of the resettlements.

Human Rights Perspectives. From the adapted HRA chart below, it can be seen that the project has largely responded to human rights imperatives in its work to reintegrate former rebels:

HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT		
Project: Give Me A Chance, Kyanjuki Rehabilitation Centre		
Degree of Impact:	Score	
1. What is the programme's assumed/actual impact on equality and non-discrimination?	AWAR ENESS	POSITIVE IMPACT
2. Has the population directly affected been informed about the programme?		POSITIVE IMPACT

3. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected everyone's right to seek, and impart information relevant to its implementation?		POSITIVE IMPACT
4. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected the right to express views freely in the preparation and implementation of the programme?	EMPOWERMENT	POSITIVE IMPACT
5. Does the programme promote/has the programme promoted participation in decision making of groups affected?		POSITIVE IMPACT
6. Does the programme uphold/has the programme upheld the right to organize?		POSITIVE IMPACT
7. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected the right to just and favourable conditions of work?		NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
8. Does the programme affect/has the programme affected the fulfilment of the right to an adequate standard of living for target groups and other people affected, including access to adequate food and continuous improvement of living conditions?		POSITIVE IMPACT
9. Does the programme affect/has the programme affected the opportunity of people for self provision in terms of income generating activities?		POSITIVE IMPACT
10. Does the programme address the right to compensation for those negatively affected?		NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE

Serious questions have been raised by various agencies in the past - and were brought to the attention of the Team - about children and adults being kept together at the Kyanjuki centre. Save the Children, in particular, has expressed its conviction that “best practices” dictate that children and adults should not be kept in the same facility in such situations. Similarly, a report from UNICEF was critical of GMAC’s operational strategy. The Team paid careful attention to this issue and felt that circumstances had changed at the Centre since the critical reports were issued. Careful consideration is being made of children’s rights and GMAC states its full agreement that all future child arrivals should be delivered to the Save the Children centre in Kasese. However, this has not been formalised in writing. The Review team recommends that a formal agreement be entered into to avoid future misunderstandings. Being aware of the highly sensitive situation between GMAC and some local institutions, it is also recommended that GMAC work more closely with the relevant local authorities when integrating previous reporters in their local communities.

4.3.2. Uganda/Kampala

The juvenile resettlement and prison babies project

Two detention facilities which have support from GMAC were visited in Kampala: the Naguru Remand Home and the Luzira Women’s Prison. In addition, some children from the Naguru home who had been reunited with their families were also interviewed.

Naguru Remand Home (CRN-04).

GMAC has worked with the Naguru Remand Home since 1997. Naguru is a detention centre for young offenders, runaways and street children. Juveniles charged with capital offences can be remanded for up to 6 months whereas those charged with non-capital crimes are detained for up to 3 months before they appear in court. About 1,000 children, with ages ranging from 12-18, pass through Naguru every year. It is a very overcrowded institution; at the time of the Review Team’s visit, Naguru housed some 134 inmates, including 6 girls, in a facility designed for 45 children. Staff levels also do not meet Ugandan government standards. There are only 5 paid employees (including 2 security guards) and about 8 unpaid staff who get

allowances for fieldwork from GMAC. According to the rules governing such institutions in Uganda, there should be one staff member for every five children. In effect, by not providing the appropriate level of staffing, the Government of Uganda violates the human rights of the children in its care.

Most of the children are innocent of any criminal activity with only about 20% actually being convicted and jailed once they appear before the court. These are then transferred to the National Rehabilitation Centre to serve their sentences, or are transferred to the adult prison system if they have reached 18 years of age. The remaining 80% are released when found innocent. Once they are released from custody, GMAC takes responsibility for resettling some of the children with their families.

Outputs. The project aimed at resettling 1,500 children between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2001. According to information presented to the Review Team by GMAC and the Warden at the Naguru Remand Home, some 1481 children had been resettled in this period. 102 of these children subsequently “escaped” again and returned to life on the street. Nevertheless, it is an impressive result. Each resettled child receives an individual package of support including follow-up visits from GMAC social workers, school fees and a uniform. Each family also receives assistance to establish an income-generating activity (in some cases money has been provided for skills training for the returnee in lieu of a family project).

Outcomes. The Naguru project is more like a social welfare operation than it is a long-term effort to alleviate the problem of street children and child detainees. It addresses an immediate and important need - reuniting children with their families. However, there is no greater effort being undertaken to address the roots of the problem of children in conflict with the law, nor is any attempt being made to improve the efficiency of the process by which these children are detained, given a legal hearing and released.

The comparative advantage of GMAC. GMAC has developed unique expertise in dealing with child reunification. It achieves its objectives in a very cost-effective manner. The Team estimate that the cost of resettling one child is in the order of 4,480 NOK.

Human Rights Perspectives. GMAC’s activities in the juvenile resettlement project are in keeping with Norway’s overall objectives in Human Rights and adhere to the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT		
Project: Give Me A Chance, Juvenile Resettlement and Prison Babies Project		
Degree of Impact:	Score	
1. What is the programme's assumed/actual impact on equality and non-discrimination?	AWARENESS	NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE
2. Has the population directly affected been informed about the programme?		POSITIVE IMPACT
3. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected everyone's right to seek, and impart information relevant to its implementation?		POSITIVE IMPACT
4. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected the right to express views freely in the preparation and implementation of the programme?	EMPOWERMENT	POSITIVE IMPACT
5. Does the programme promote/has the programme promoted participation in decision making of groups affected?		POSITIVE IMPACT
6. Does the programme uphold/has the programme upheld the right to organize?		NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE
7. Does the programme respect/has the programme respected the right to just and favourable conditions of work?		NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE
8. Does the programme affect/has the programme affected the fulfilment of the right to an adequate standard of living for target groups and other people affected, including access to adequate food and continuous improvement of living conditions?		POSITIVE IMPACT
9. Does the programme affect/has the programme affected the opportunity of people for self provision in terms of income generating activities?		POSITIVE IMPACT
10. Does the programme address the right to compensation for those negatively affected?		NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE

Problem areas. A major problem identified by the evaluators is the lack of a systematic effort to properly identify children when they are detained by the police. There have been many instances where released children have not been promptly resettled because of inaccurate information about their families or the communities from which they come. This is attributed by GMAC to the fact that many children give false names to the authorities and lie about their origins. However, even when the child's identity is known there seems to be no system in place to inform the parents that the child is safe and in custody. The evaluators met one resettled girl who claimed that she had given her correct name to the police when she was detained and also to the Naguru home when she arrived there. Yet, according to her father, no effort was made to contact her family during the two years she was in detention. When she was released and returned to her family by GMAC the parents had no idea that she had been found and was coming home. This clearly runs counter to the obligations of states to serve the child's best interests as the Convention on the Rights of the Child directs.

A second problem noted - the absence of any preparatory work by GMAC to properly establish the optimum conditions for returning a child to its family - is related to the lack of a clear methodology for identifying and recording the presence of a child in detention. It is evident that some children do lie to the authorities and try to conceal their identities. Others may be too psychologically disturbed to be able to explain where they come from. In all such cases, the result is that GMAC social workers waste time and resources trying to resettle their charges. The task is made more difficult by the short notice GMAC receives that a child has been released from custody. The law states that a child can no longer be detained once his or her innocence has been established. As a result, GMAC must move immediately to place the child and there is no time to coordinate arrangements or to make a preparatory visit to assess

the family situation. It would be valuable for GMAC to be able to undertake an assessment of the child's home environment, needs and problem areas likely to be encountered before proceeding with the resettlement effort. Children are sometimes rejected by their families, perhaps because of the lack of time to prepare for their arrival. This is notable shortcoming of the programme and, understandably, can have a devastating effect on the parties involved. Moreover, it impacts negatively on the capacity of GMAC to perform its resettlement activities effectively and efficiently.

There is clearly a need for the police to take the responsibility of confirming a child's identity before passing the juvenile on to the Naguru Remand Home. There is also an obligation for the police and the remand home to notify the family that the child is in custody. This would allow the family to take a more active part in the resettlement process as well as help to ensure that the legal rights of the child are taken care of.

Luzira Women's Prison.

At the Luzira prison GMAC provides support for infants and young children whose mothers are imprisoned for various crimes. Luzira is one of 8 facilities housing women prisoners in Uganda. It has the largest female offenders' population in the country. Like the Naguru Remand Home, Luzira prison is vastly overcrowded. The facility was designed for 78 inmates but currently holds 214. The Luzira Prison seems, however, well organised. At the time of the Review Team's visit to Luzira prison there were 29 children - ranging in age from newborns to toddlers of 2-3 years old - "serving time" with their mothers. GMAC and the prison authorities try to place the babies with other family members and move the children out of the prison before they reach three years of age. GMAC also facilitates the transfer of children in prison to relatives outside.

Outputs. Since the project began in 1997 some 426 babies have been assisted. This is in excess of the original project plan of 252 babies. GMAC's primary role in this project is to provide basic health and sanitary assistance to the mothers and babies. Items provided include bedding, disinfectant soap, nappies, sanitary towels and food.

Outcomes. There is no government help available for prison babies and GMAC is one of few NGOs helping this category of children. Prior to its intervention, mothers with children in prison were entirely dependent on relatives for support. GMAC's assistance makes an important difference to their lives. However, the prospects for sustaining this program under its current NORAD funding arrangement are poor. There is no evidence that GMAC has tried to build on its expertise to enhance the support for babies in prison and to seek additional assistance through, for example, local church groups or to bring pressure on the Government.

Child Rights Perspectives. The situation with respect to the babies in prison in the Luzira Women's facility is complex and there is no easy way to judge what is the most appropriate treatment for these children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically opposes the imprisonment of children, except in conformity with the law (Article 37. b). However, Article 9.1 of the Convention also states that a child "shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will ...". As many of the mothers are breast feeding their children and are the primary care-givers, it would seem to be in the best interests of the children that they remain with them in prison. At the same time, the prison authorities, and GMAC, do make every effort to place the babies with other family members during the time of the mother's incarceration and at the latest before the child reaches 3 years of age. Clearly, the Government of Uganda should be doing more to make it unnecessary for these children to be kept in these

circumstances. Pending that unlikely eventuality, GMAC is providing an invaluable service to those children who must stay in prison with their mothers. By providing basic sustenance to children who have, in most cases, no other means of support GMAC is operating fully in the spirit of the Convention.

Findings and Recommendations

GMAC has committed leadership and competent staff. Its projects meet well-targeted needs and achieve their objectives. However, like CRN/CEPAC, GMAC concentrates on short-term results and has not tried to develop the kind of long-term programmes that could have a broader impact on the population it supports. Similarly, from what the Review Team observed, GMAC does not seek other partners to work with. (Mr. Rønsen subsequently informed the Review Team that there was an extensive cooperative relationship between GMAC and other partners and that the Team had not been properly informed about this. It has therefore not been possible to assess the significance of these connections from field observations). A lack of formal working relations with other partners would naturally limit the range of projects that could be developed especially because, unlike CEPAC, there is no institutional backstop to GMAC. It is, essentially, a very small operation run by one individual. This means that GMAC's sustainability is vulnerable should the Reverend Kamese be indisposed or leave the organisation. In general, GMAC has worked at the individual or family level, if they are to become engaged in broader development work they need to become involved at the institutional or organisational level, including the justice, law and order sector programme of Uganda. GMAC should work hard to build bridges with its potential partners if its projects are to develop to their full potential. They are advised to link up with the National Psycho-social Core Team and other such fora for the coordination and exchange of professional experience.

Other specific recommendations include:

- Without a strategic, long-term, perspective the projects risk becoming less relevant and achieving lower sustainability than could have been the case had GMAC been more concerned with establishing strategic alliances with relevant partners and advocating for institutional changes.
- *The Kyanjuki transit centre* should not be given further Norwegian funding. The dwindling number of people coming in from the bush does not justify sustaining this operation in its present form.
- Moreover, now that there is the prospect of an agreement with Save the Children that juvenile returnees will be delivered to their centre, there is no need to maintain special programmes for children at Kyanjuki.
- Other arrangements to treat returning rebels and abductees could be explored, for example, developing mobile counselling groups to visit and treat returnees in their communities.
- GMAC should consider moving its experienced counselling staff to other areas of Uganda where their skills might soon be in demand, for example to the West Nile region. Two ministers met by the Team requested Norwegian funding for GMAC interventions at the community level in areas where former rebels are settling down, notably in Aringa in Yube district.
- *The child resettlement and prison babies project* is doing valuable work in helping detained juveniles return to their families. However, the project is mainly treating the symptoms of a much deeper rooted social problem and is probably not making a

sustainable impact at the community level, nor at the more structural or institutional levels of the justice, law and order sector.

- GMAC should develop an integrated approach to the issues that underlie the phenomenon of children in conflict with the law, e.g. poverty, the need for reconciliation and support for traditional social structures, local economic development requirements, trauma counselling, etc.
- NORAD should continue to fund the child resettlement project for an interim period of one year during which time GMAC should broaden its approach as outlined above. If GMAC fails to demonstrate a more strategic approach for contribution to change, NORAD should consider whether support to GMAC as a social welfare organisation is appropriate and relevant.
- Although much appreciated, the prison babies project is not sustainable as a NORAD funded project in its present form. GMAC should seek the support of local church groups to continue its work with babies in prison.

4.4 Coherence and Connectedness of CEPAC and GMAC Projects

Coherence. All of the CEPAC and GMAC projects reviewed in DRC and Uganda miss important opportunities to enhance their value by the lack of coordination and cooperation with other agencies working in the same fields. The projects function well of themselves, they are flexible and they can provide rapid responses when necessary. However, there is little mutually beneficial sharing of experiences and lessons learned with similar projects. The overall impact of the projects is therefore reduced. This was seen in the CEPAC school and health centre rehabilitations where, the Team feels, more could have been achieved through an integrated approach with other agencies. In the case of the Kyanjuki Centre, the difficult relationship between the many actors involved has limited the potential outreach to needy children. Similarly, GMAC has taken a passive approach in developing a productive relationship with UNICEF, the Ministry of Gender and the Ministry of Justice and professional networks.

The child resettlement project (Naguru Remand Home) is a unique effort to address a clearly identified need in the juvenile detention system in Uganda. GMAC is delivering a valuable service to a vulnerable target group. However, it is working with few connections to other agencies or organisations. There is not, therefore, a coherent approach to the problem of child detainees that could be developed into a sustainable programme of change to address this issue. The danger of this with respect to the delivery of the prime objective - the number of children resettled - is evident. The Team was told that funding limitations had forced GMAC to reduce the number of children it resettled each year from 400 to about 250. In practical terms this means that of the approximately 800 children released from custody each year, some 550 are not resettled and their progress is not monitored. About 10% of the children not supported by GMAC subsequently re-offend and are returned to Naguru. Inevitably, a proportion of these will become hardened criminals.

An additional weakness, arising out of this situation, is that children selected for resettlement assistance are chosen on the arbitrary basis of where they come from. GMAC does not have the resources to service resettlement efforts in outlying areas of the country so the majority of children supported are from Kampala or surrounding areas. This suggests that it would be valuable - and beneficial to more children - for GMAC to work closely with various social welfare workers in the communities where the youth are returned. It would also be productive to link up with other organisations able to support the same kinds of resettlement

interventions in other parts of Uganda, as well as with local authorities in regions that it cannot reach.

As at Naguru, the prison babies project operates more as a charitable intervention than in any way that could lead to a sustainable change in the conditions under which these children live. GMAC is addressing an immediate and important task - to provide basic care to innocent children trapped in prison with their mothers. However, it appears that there is no broader strategy for influencing the approach of government towards these children. In particular, the government should be pressured to provide the care and attention needed by babies with mothers in prison.

Connectedness. External coherence is a key element in the effective development of sustainable projects and CRN/CEPAC and GMAC are missing both the chance to share their experiences with other actors, as well as to learn about new opportunities and approaches from them.

The success of the projects reviewed in the North Kivu region was clearly the result of the strength and capacity of CEPAC. With its presence throughout the region, and because of CEPAC's ability to draw on a wide range of competent people to undertake its work, it is clear that the projects could continue without any further technical input from CRN. Nevertheless, maintaining the level of external support to meet the rehabilitation and reconstruction priorities in the region would probably be difficult for CEPAC without the active engagement of CRN and Dan Andersson. Therefore, whereas it could be argued that the project is sustainable at the level of local capacity, and it could address the essential long-term development requirements of the region, it seems unlikely that the project would be durable in its present form without the continued support from CRN and the Norwegian funds.

GMAC has not applied itself to developing other avenues to build on its skills and expertise as situations change and its target groups diminish. In particular, the absence of an exit strategy for the Kyunjaki project is noted. This, in conjunction with the fact that there has been little exchange of lessons learned with other agencies, raises the possibility that the knowledge GMAC has gained, and the overall "memory" of this project, might easily be lost.

The funding issue, and the already stretched resources of GMAC with respect to the resettlement project for children in conflict with the law, does not provide convincing evidence that this project is sustainable in any long-term development context. The project could enhance its impact by entering into local partnerships with like-minded agencies but there is no evidence that GMAC has an interest in pursuing this approach. It gives the impression of being a well meaning, but *ad hoc*, response to an urgent crisis - but not an organisation that looks beyond its short-term objectives, to build on the lessons learned, and make a meaningful difference to the lives of the majority of the children passing through the Naguru Remand Home. GMAC must recognise that it is only part of a chain interlinked with a broader system of support for these children. It needs to work with these other actors to produce meaningful change in the system.

The Child Resettlement and Prison Babies initiatives are consistent with Norwegian priorities. However, the implementation of the project seems to lack a strategy for the promotion of social change and strengthening of responsible institutions' capacity and ownership. Although

the project is geared at improving the lives of individuals and their families, and as such it fills a gap, it is more a social welfare operation than a development project for change.

5. EFFICIENCY

The operational efficiency of CRN, and the financial control measures in place to monitor project disbursements, are covered in detail in the HeSo desk study, “Review of Projects Financed by Norway and Supported through Christian Relief Network (CRN) In DRC, Rwanda and Uganda” (see HeSo, page 24), and do not require repeating here. The Review Team confirms a key finding of the HeSo study, which builds on an earlier assessment of the organisation prepared by Diakonhjennets Internasjonale Senter (DiS) in 1996: CRN seems to have high competence in project management and collection of funds. CRN does not have professional development expertise in its organisation. This may be considered as a comparative advantage as it keeps administrative costs low, and also supports CRN’s strategy to rely on local expertise.

The following specific observations are noted:

- **Agreements.** CRN has entered into an agreement with GMAC concerning the implementation of projects funded by CRN. It is recommended that the agreement should include obligations concerning reporting on results at output and outcome levels (see the section on Reporting below.)
- CRN has entered into an intentional agreement with CEPAC headquarters in Bukavu. In addition, separate project agreements are entered into for the implementation of each project. These agreements are signed by the provincial representative in Goma on behalf of CEPAC and by the Director of CRN on the other. The agreement is between CRN and CRN/CEPAC. This is formally not correct as CRN/CEPAC is not a legal body in DRC. It is therefore suggested that agreements be entered into between CEPAC and CRN, and that CEPAC is the formal recipient of funds and the formal implementing agency. Mr. Rønsen confirms that past practices have not been legally correct, nor binding, and has assured the Team that all future Project Agreements will adhere to legal requirements. This does not hinder CEPAC in establishing a project organisation for the implementation of individual projects where a representative of CRN (Mr. Andersson) is a member of the project. But it must be clear when Mr. Andersson represents CEPAC, and when he represents CRN. It must also be clear whether funds are managed by CRN or CEPAC, or through a system where both organisations are signatories.
- **Financial controls.** The Review Team has no reason to question the HeSo finding that CEPAC’s and GMAC’s financial affairs are conducted in a transparent and appropriate manner. Because of time constraints, it was not possible to review the audited accounts of GMAC in Kampala, or to examine the use and management of funds at the local level. The Team suggests that NORAD follows up on these matters.
- **Administrative Capacity.** CRN/CEPAC and GMAC staff are competent and committed, they are engaged at every level in project planning and development. They have demonstrated the capacity to follow standard administrative procedures and reporting requirements.
- **Project Autonomy.** Much of the CRN relationship with CEPAC and GMAC is based on trust and personal connections. This greatly increases the efficiency of project transactions and allows for considerable autonomy at the project level, both in the choice of areas for intervention as well as in day-to-day operational matters.

Reporting. The HeSo desk study highlights the quantitative nature of project reporting. Reports from CRN, GMAC and CEPAC are good when it comes to facts and figures and recording short-term results. Standard formulas have been developed for measuring progress in relation to quantitative goals, where time, cost and performance may be followed monthly. However, little information beyond raw data is available. It is important to note that “success” cannot be defined by statistics alone in the types of projects funded through CRN. What is needed is a broader reporting approach that includes an assessment of project delivery in political and socio-economic terms. Only then can the true impact of a project be determined. Valuable information and lessons learned are lost through the short-term reporting perspective. More attention to outcomes could improve the long-term sustainability of the interventions and their relevance. Such reporting will ensure that a project will be “remembered” and that this “memory” can be used as a learning tool. The contracts between CRN and its partners do not stipulate that results should be reported. This should be a requirement.

- **Institutional Analysis.** The Review Team views CEPAC as being a visionary and strategically oriented organisation. It has strong leadership, competent staff and a solid presence on the ground. CEPAC would have enough institutional depth to continue its work if the leadership changed and could operate at a meaningful level if external support ended. GMAC is less innovative and pursues a more conservative approach in its work. It is more traditional in outlook, acting responsively as a deliverer of social welfare rather than being a forward-looking development organisation. The leadership of GMAC is competent but does not appear to be geared adequately towards change. The GMAC Board has representatives from public, private and civil sectors. But the organisational structure appears to be weak with GMAC essentially running as a one-man operation under the leadership of the Reverend Kamese. Although he has recruited competent staff who deal effectively with their case loads, there is no supporting management structure to ensure the organisations survival should Reverend Kamese depart.

6. VALUE AS A CHANNEL OF ASSISTANCE

CRN’s achievements are impressive and its outputs compare favourably with the norms for humanitarian aid in general. It is providing a valuable service to its recipients and has proven to be a reliable channel of cooperation and funding between the NORAD and the MFA, local actors in the Great Lakes and the implementing partners.

CRN provides cost-effective assistance to clearly defined beneficiaries and achieves a high degree of its stated objectives. It has been able to develop its room for manoeuvre because the CRN Director has selected a solid core of partners with demonstrated commitment and competence. However, CRN has not moved beyond its focus on short-term results or built relationships with other organisations in the field. As a result, its potential achievements will remain constrained by its small human resource base. CRN’s unwillingness to broaden its base of collaborators will also restrict its capacity to absorb and disburse larger slices of funds and to develop into a full programming agency. This will present problems for CRN as NORAD emphasises longer programming time frames and gives greater priority to the continuum between humanitarian and development aid. It is clear that much more value could be added to the Norwegian investment if the organisation was more willing to participate with other like-minded groups. In particular, CRN fails to encourage its partners to build on their experiences, share lessons with others and explore opportunities for interaction beyond their immediate objectives. For these reasons, CRN has not lived up to its full potential.

The CRN director is a valuable resource in terms of raising the profile of the CRN/CEPAC organisation. He single-handedly sustains public and political interest for the programme in Norway. He is an effective fundraiser and runs a very tight administration in Oslo with low overheads. It is less clear what his role should be at the field level. His zeal for independence contributes to the difficulty CEPAC and GMAC have had in developing effective cooperation with local partners.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Recommendations to CRN

- Enhance coverage of outcomes in project reporting.
- In project development, draw out the linkages between humanitarian assistance and follow-on development activities such as human rights, gender and children's issues, hiv/aids.
- Develop a systematic learning process to ensure that "memory" of projects and lessons learned is not lost.
- Identify and develop opportunities for multiple phase projects. Move beyond short-term interventions into sustainable long-term initiatives.
- Participate more actively in NGO groups and meetings.

7.2 Recommendations To CRN's Partner Organizations

7.2.1 Specific Recommendations For CEPAC:

- Seek to develop projects with clear, long-term, sustainable impacts.
- Through its religious contacts in Rwanda, CEPAC should follow-up and report on the fate of Hutu refugees returned to that country.
- Regularize the legal arrangement between CRN and CEPAC. CRN and CEPAC are the legitimate legal entities who should sign all agreements; CRN/CEPAC could be recognised as a task oriented project set up for the implementation of individual projects under CEPAC.
- Include a focus on health and sanitation issues in project development, e.g. build latrines when rehabilitating health centres and schools, emphasise preventative measures to combat malaria, incorporate HIV/AIDS awareness into project delivery.
- Sensitise parents and teachers about the need for girls to be educated as well as boys.
- Participate in coordination efforts to help other NGOs operate in the Kivu area.
- Develop church-based and traditional counselling methods to deal with psycho-social trauma.
- Seek funding for and develop small income-generating projects as part of their community development programme, if appropriate for CEPAC.

7.2.2 Specific Recommendations For GMAC:

- Collaborate with Save the Children to separate child victims of the conflict from adults. Refer all returning juveniles to Save the Children's Kasese Centre.
- Close the Kyanjuki Rehabilitation Centre. Prepare to divert resources to emerging areas of need, e.g. West Nile region.

- If work continues in the Kasese area, establish mobile trauma counselling groups to deliver assistance at the community level.
- Harmonise relations with Save the Children, UNICEF and local district authorities.
- Develop closer relations with government ministries, e.g. Ministry of Gender.
- Share experiences and exchange ideas and knowledge with others in the NGO community.
- Cooperate with local authorities and agencies in follow-up support.
- Seek partners throughout Uganda to help in the resettlement of children leaving detention.
- Develop the human and financial capacity to make preparatory assessment visits to families prior to trying to resettle children.
- Seek the support of local church groups to continue working with babies in prison.

7.3 Recommendations to NORAD and MFA

- The Government should continue to use CRN as a channel of funding for humanitarian operations in the Great Lakes region.
- The Government should require that CRN reporting also cover outcome assessments. Without this focus the projects risk becoming less relevant and achieving a much lower quality/cost ratio.
- The Government should establish criteria for monitoring and reporting on humanitarian assistance and the new gap-vote.
- Norwegian funding should be ended for the Kyanjuki Rehabilitation Centre.
- If the Government of Uganda requests funding through GMAC/CRN for community development in Western Uganda where rebels are settling, this may be considered favourable as GMAC has a proven record in this field.
- Funding should continue for one more year for the Juvenile Resettlement and Prison Babies Project pending review of GMAC's approach to the involvement of other possible partners.
- The Norwegian Embassy in Kampala should build on the lessons learned from the GMAC prison project and feed this into their ongoing work in the Justice, Law and Order sector programme.
- CRN's plans for additional engagement in Rwanda through ARDEP seem relevant and appropriate.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE
REVIEW OF PROJECTS FINANCED BY NORWAY AND SUPPORTED THROUGH
CHRISTIAN RELIEF NETWORK IN
UGANDA, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND RWANDA**

Background

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have supported project activities through Christian Relief Network (CRN) in Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1997.

NORAD has supported one project in Uganda concerning the rehabilitation of child- and juvenile prisoners.

MFA has supported various short-term projects in Western Uganda, DRC and Rwanda regarding the demobilisation, reintegration, and rehabilitation of "rebels" of various ages. In addition MFA has provided emergency assistance and support towards peace and reconciliation negotiations in the same areas through CRN.

The immediate recipient of funds is CRN; a Norwegian NGO, organised as a trust based in Oslo.

In Uganda the funds are handled by one local partner, Give Me a Chance (GMAC). Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale (CEPAC) is the partner in DRC, whereas in Rwanda the local partner has been Association des Eglises de Pentecôte du Rwanda (ADEPR).

CRN has received approx. NOK 8,2 mill. from NORAD and approx. NOK 534 mill. from MFA since 1997.

All the above CRN supported activities focus on providing assistance to children and youth affected by war, conflicts and violations of human rights.

The conditions for imprisoned children, demobilised (children/juvenile/adult) soldiers and (internal) refugees in this area are often very harsh and demeaning. It is important that the conditions are sought to be improved. CRN is one of several international actors working in this field. For a brief introduction to CRN, see the attached annex.

Purposes of the review

The donors have as yet not reviewed the Norwegian support through CRN. NORAD and MFA have together decided that it would be appropriate at this point in time to undertake a review. The review will be joint, and cover both MFA and NORAD supported activities

through CRN to its partners in Uganda and DRC. The activities funded through CRN in Rwanda will be included if time allows.

The review will be carried out for the following purposes:

- to review the capacity, competence and knowledge concerning demobilisation and re-integration; children's psychosocial needs as well as on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in CRN and its collaborating partners
- regular control of recipients of funds
- input for the consideration of further funding.
- learning in MFA, NORAD and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kampala (RNEK)

Focus

Issues to be covered by the review are (by country/project):

- ◆ Background on CRN and total project. This is mainly covered by the pre-review carried out by the Centre for Health and Social development (HeSo) team. The HeSo report will be finalised after the completed review in Africa, and form a second part to the field review report.
- ◆ Description of project components, target groups activities and partners. The above mentioned HeSo report is relevant as input.
- ◆ Assessment of relevance in relation to needs and priorities in host countries and to donor organisation's priorities, hereunder the states' obligations as parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict. National strategies and actions plans targeting human rights and children, as for example the Norwegian Governments Plan of Action for Human Rights, as well as its Strategy on development assistance to children, will be relevant for the assessment.
- ◆ Assessment of project effectiveness, focussing on the technical sides of :
 - 1) demobilisation and re-integration;
 - 2) children's psychosocial needs. This includes assessing the impact and sustainability of the efforts to reintegrate and rehabilitate the target groups in the local communities, hereunder a description and assessment of the objectives, outputs, and strategies, working methods. Furthermore the mode and quality of collaboration with authorities and other organisations/institutions, and the comparative strength of the organisations (partners) to undertake this type of work. The recommendations and points for follow-up of the HeSo report will form part of focus for the review
- ◆ The human rights perspectives of the projects, and to what extent and way the human rights instruments (such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol) have been applied in CRNs and its partners' work

- ◆ The team will apply NORADs Handbook in Human, Rights Assessment and include a comment on the applicability of this in the final report
- ◆ Assessment of project efficiency:
- ◆ Issues like progress and resource use in project, Means and quality of internal planning, follow-up and monitoring and financial management is largely covered by the HeSo report. Any other findings or comments should only complement the HeSo report.
- ◆ Recommendations to CRN and partner-organisations.
- Recommendations to NORAD and the MFA for the consideration of future funding of CRN and other programmes for the re-integration of war-affected children.

The review team should meet and discuss with other actors and organisations working with similar target groups. Strategies, degree of cooperation, similarities, contrasts and overlap should be described.

Team Composition and Timing

The team will consist of the following.

- Inger Stoll, Senior Adviser, NORAD. Team Leader, Particular responsibility for Norwegian Policy aspects, guiding principles for the meetings and outline of the report.
- Paul George, consultant, with particular focus on human rights issues and political and qualitative aspects of de-mobilisation re-integration programmes. Responsible for writing report.
- Heine Steinkopf, consultant with particular focus on psychology and war trauma affected children
- Janne Knutrud, , RNEK, observer will partly participate as an observer in the review in DRC.

The review will be carried out in Rwanda, Uganda and DRC.

Method of work

A work program for the review team will be made.

Phase I – Oslo

The pre-team (Centre for Health and Social Development) in Oslo has completed the review of CRN's organisation in Norway as well as documentation from the files in NORAD and MFA, including discussions with representatives from CRN, NORAD and MFA. The draft report forms part of reference material for the review in Africa, and will be completed and annexed to the report of the field review team

Phase II – two – two and a half weeks in Uganda, Rwanda and DRC (week 16,17 and possibly 18, starting Monday 15 April in Kigali). Field work – discussions with stakeholders

The team will have meetings with local partners, local and national authorities, other relevant donors and actors.

The RNEK will be the team's base while in Kampala.

Phase III de-briefing, writing up report, presentation of report

A summing-up de-briefing will take place at the RNEK to present and discuss the team's preliminary findings with the Embassy.

A draft report in English shall be presented to NORAD by e-mail in Word format one week after completed mission. NORAD will distribute the draft to the RNEK and MFA for comments. Comments should be given within one week after receipt of draft report. Final report shall be completed and sent to NORAD one week after receipt of comments.

When the report is finalised, a seminar will be arranged in Oslo for a presentation of the report, and discussion of main findings and conclusions. The seminar will be open to a wider participation, for the purpose of learning and follow-up.

Relevant Background Documents

See reference list

Oslo,

Else Berit Eikeland
Deputy Director General
Department for Civil Society and Private Sector Development
NORAD

ANNEX 2 - ITINERARY AND PEOPLE MET

15 - 29 April 2002

15 April, Rwanda

- 12.00 Kigali: Meeting with Geir Ommundsen, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).
- 13.00 Kigali: Meeting with Bent Rønsen, Director, Christian Relief Network (CRN) and Dan Andersson CRN/CEPAC.
- 14.00 Kigali: Meeting with Pasteur Jean Sibomana, Association des Eglises de Pentecôte du Rwanda (ADEPR).
- 16.30 Ruhengeri: Meeting with Director Raphaël Rurangwa, Services Agricultures.
- 18.00 Arrival Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

16 -19 April, DRC

Accompanied during field visits by representatives of CEPAC and CRN.

16 April

- 09.00 Courtesy visit to Communauté des Églises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale (CEPAC). Day visit to:
Minova primary school (CRN 13),
Kimuka/Saké health clinic (CRN 8),
Mushaki: health clinic, Tutsi refugees (IDP) (CRN 9, 13, 16).
Transit camp near Goma for victims of volcanic eruption in 2002 (co-ordinated by World Vision).
CRN's warehouse in Goma.
- 17.00 Meeting with CEPAC: Mushunganya Menhe, Représentant Légal and Banyene Bulere, Délégué Provincial, 8th CEPAC, Nord-Kivu.

17 April

Day visit to:
Kishanga: school, health centre (CRN 13). Accompanied by Dr. Mihuhi, CEPAC.
Mweso: church, health clinic (CRN 8), school (CRN 13), reception centre for Hutu refugees returning to Rwanda (CRN 14). Reception centre run by Tous pour le Développement (TPD).
Burungu: health clinic (CRN 8).

18 April

- Day visit to:
Vichumbi: school (CRN 13)
Rutshuru: church, school, dispensary (CRN 13).
Kitarama/Kalengera: Reception centre for Hutu refugees returning to Rwanda (CRN 14).
- 17.00 Meeting with Dr. Kininga, Ministère de la Santé, Rassemblement Congolais Démocratique (RCD).

19 April

Meeting with Moïse Nyarugabo, Ministère de la Justice, Président Intérimaire, Secrétaire Général Intérimaire du RCD.

Meeting with M. Serufuli, Gouverneur Provincial.
Courtesy visit to Salumu Muhima, Vice-Gouverneur Provincial.

11.00 Meeting with UNHCR, Mr. Abdellahi Ould El Bah, Chef de Bureau.

Meeting with Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Tormod Ravneberg and Kristian Rakvaag.

15.00 Debriefing with CEPAC and CRN: Banyene Bulere, Délégué Provincial, M. Tsuba, Révérend Pasteur, Bahati Lubao, Dan Andersson.

20 April Travel by car to Mweya, Uganda.

20-29 April Uganda

21 April Worked on report.

22 April

Steinkopf spent the day with Give Me A Chance (GMAC) Kyanjuki transit centre, Kasese, meeting with Rose Nyakato, Project supervising manager and social worker; Ngulesi Masika, Nurse; Paul Kasule, Centre Manager. Interviews were conducted with a woman of 31 and a girl of 15. George and Stoll visited the centre in the afternoon (CRN 19).

George and Stoll, accompanied by the Rev. Kenneth Kamese (Give Me A Chance) and Bent Rønsen (CRN) visited the Kasese Local Council Office and the Resident District Commissioner in the morning. Kamese and Rønsen were present for the introductions but then left the meetings.

09.00-11.00

Meeting with members of Local Council V, Kasese: Bihande Yohasi, Chairman, Joseph Kule, Vice-Chairman; Ngene Eseri, Chief Administration Officer; Thembo Zarubaberi, Probation Officer.

11.30 Meeting with Musa Echeweru, Resident District Commissioner, Moses Tumwebaze, District Internal Security Officer
Wilson Isingoma, Deputy Resident District Commissioner (Headquarters)

13.15 George and Stoll joined up with Steinkopf for lunch at Kyanjuki Rehabilitation Centre, Kilembi/Kasese District. Accompanied by Rev. Kamese and Bent Rønsen. Met with Rose Nyakato, Social Worker.

15.15 Visit to Musasa Primary School to meet and interview an abducted girl, Elisa, who had been returned to her community. Accompanied by Rose Nyakato.

17.00 Visit to Mukumyi village to interview Mutzele Dezi, a male returnee shopkeeper supported by GMAC.

17.30 Visit to Kahlehe Village to meet boy reunited with his family.

23 April

Steinkopf spent the morning at Kyanjuki Rehabilitation Centre, met with Rose Nyakato, Charles Begumisa and Gloria Ankunda, Social Workers. Interview with man of 29; followed up with girl interviewed the previous day.

George and Stoll:

08.45 Visit to Save the Children/UK, Kasese Children's Transit Centre - Rukoki/Kasese. Met with Charles Kashungwa, Project Officer; Baruku Sezi, Social Worker.

10:30 Meeting with Lt. Col. Mawa Muhindo, Brigade Commander, UPDF, Kasese District.

13.00 Team left Kasese by car for Kampala, arrived 19.00.

24 April

Steinkopf spent the day in the field. Met with Barbara Mulindwa and Priscilla Ayesiga, Social Workers. Visited one resettled boy in Luranga Village, Urakiso District and one girl in Masooh village, Mpigi District.

George and Stoll:

09.00 Meeting with Human Rights and Democratisation Programme (DANIDA/EU). Met with Kennedy Tumutegyerize, Programme Coordinator.

11.00 Scheduled meeting with former ADF Army Commander cancelled, worked on report at hotel.

14:00 Field trip to Naguru Remand Home. Met with Mr. Asiku Nyakutar, Warden.

25 April

08.00 Meeting with Minister of State for Security, Hon Muluri Mukasa.

Meeting with former RDC, Kasese, Mr. Karo Kora.

11.00 Meeting at Save the Children, UK. Met with Hussein Mursal, Acting Director; PT. Kakama, Programme Manager, Social Protection; Charles Kashungwa, Project Officer, Psycho-social support programme, Kasese. Also present: Geoffrey Oyat, Programme Coordinator - Protection of Children in Armed Conflict, SC, Norway-Uganda; Richard Young, Country Representative, SC, Denmark.

Afternoon, Steinkopf visited one boy, 19, in Busega Village, Kampala District and one boy, 19, in Kabura Village, Kampala District..

19.00 Dinner, Hosted by Harald Karlsnes, Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Kampala.

26 April

Steinkopf and Stoll:

09.00 Meeting at UNICEF with Kari Egge.

10.00 Meeting with Minister of Gender, Labour & Social Development, Hon. Bakook Bakur.

11.00 Full evaluation team debriefing with the Director, Give Me A Chance, Rev. Kenneth Kamese and GMAC social workers Barbara Mulindwa and Priscilla Ayesiga.

George and Steinkopf, accompanied by Rev. Kamese and Priscilla Ayesiga, visited a girl reunited with her family in Bulenga, Kikaaya Wakiso District.

27 April

Worked on report.

28 April

Morning: Evaluation team meeting and debriefing prior to Steinkopf's departure.

29 April

08.30 George and Stoll visited Luzira Women's Prison, accompanied by Rev. Kamese and Rita Naava, Social Worker (GMAC). Met with Elizabeth Nanfulca, Officer in Charge, and several prisoners.

11.00 Debriefing at Royal Norwegian Embassy, Kampala.
George departed Kampala.

30 April Stoll departed Kampala.

PART 2 - REPORT FROM DESK STUDY AND INTERVIEWS IN NORWAY

Review of Projects Financed by Norway and Supported through Christian Relief Network
(CRN)
In DRC, Rwanda and Uganda

Final Report
24 April 2002

By Ingvar Theo Olsen and Anne Hertzberg

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Executive Summary

Project portfolio

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) have since 1997 financed projects through Christian Relief Network (CRN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda. The projects support demobilisation, reintegration, rehabilitation, emergency assistance, peace and reconciliation. Up to March 2002 CRN has received NOK 7.7 mill. from NORAD and NOK 54.08 mill. from MFA¹.

Objectives of review

MFA and NORAD have decided to carry out a review of the projects for the purposes of control, learning and as input for the consideration of further funding. The review will be carried out for three purposes:

- Regular control of recipients of funds
- Input for the consideration of further funding.
- Learning in MFA, NORAD and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kampala (RNEK)

The review has two stages, a desk study and a field trip to the project areas.

Report from the desk study

This report covers the desk study of relevant documents related to the CRN projects in Norway as found in MFA, NORAD and the CRN office, as well as information from stakeholders in Norway and from representatives from other Norwegian NGOs working in related geographical areas and/or with similar project issues. On this basis the report gives an overview and discussion of CRN as an implementing organisation of humanitarian and development aid and a detailed overview of all the projects and programmes. At this stage of the review there is not an in depth discussion of findings, but what appears as key points at this stage is mentioned.

The projects cover humanitarian aid for resettlement and reintegration of groups that are in very difficult situations, where many aid organisations find it difficult to give appropriate assistance.

The projects are implemented in a context of recent natural disasters, political instability and armed groups that are active and often counteract efforts of consolidation and reconciliation. The local partners appear as small and extremely task oriented project organisations, based on individuals who have good credibility across local interests. The project managers and workers are recruited through local churches but do not represent them as such. Similar characteristics may be attributed to the Norwegian partner, CRN.

The projects are based on “balanced networking” between groups of opposing and very different (political) interests. The political contacts in Uganda and DRC may lead to conclusions of CRN and its partners as not only being humanitarian, but a political agency as well. This is however strongly opposed by the CRN leadership who emphasises the importance of not being a political actor or mediator.

CRN has also been able to *lobby and access contact with relevant Norwegian politicians*. The leader of the organisation has close connections with political leaders, including MPs and top

¹ [According to information from CRN](#)

leaders in the Norwegian Government. However, from this review there are no indications that the organisation has received special treatment due to this, or that any positions have been abused.

The *administrative capacity* of CRN and its local partners seems satisfactory; innovative computer systems for follow up are developed. Although not fully assessed, the CRN organisation and its partners seem cost-effective. The relatively low share administrative costs, particularly in Norway, may serve as an indication of this. Long-term effects have not been assessed, but short-term effects are reported quantitatively and qualitatively from each project. There is little doubt that a high number of people have received humanitarian support, but the costs vary greatly from project to project.

The *financial accountability* on the Norwegian side seems to be in order. Most of the expenses are accounted for and audited locally, although the audits are carried out by the local branch of an international auditing firm, and are thus accepted by MFA and NORAD. No indications of irregularities have been found from this limited review.

The criteria for *results, achievements and effectiveness* in projects as described in documents and interviews appear to be highly quantitative, but with a sensitivity for more qualitative aspects. According to the criteria defined by CRN many of the projects have achieved more than 100% goal attainment. When this is not obtained the obstacles are well documented. A key prerequisite for success may be the strong commitment by the CRN leadership and their partners, but also the size of the organisation, which enables it to act on short notice and have a solid overview of activities. Another factor may be a focus on projects as short time events that do not allow the construction of permanent organisation infrastructures.

The *strength of the CRN Director* is his strong vision, his orientation towards results and his political insight, not to mention his genuine engagement for the people he wants to reach. The *weakness* may be that it is difficult for others to follow up the work if he were to end his work. However, it is also stressed that others could follow his principles of working.

A *weakness* of CRN and partners seem to be the strong dependency on a few individuals, which makes the small organisations vulnerable and may give difficulties for others to follow up key tasks if needed. There are few relationships with other international agencies. Viewed from the outside, the special knowledge and experiences of other key organisations working with assistance to children and youth in difficult circumstances are not explicitly integrated into these projects.

The organisation and the projects may benefit from closer *technical collaboration* with other international agencies, particularly in areas where their own capacity or competence is more limited. Although this has not been assessed in details it could include areas like children, children's rights, re-integration of abducted children, but also refugee related issues and general development aid issues. An area of concern to be followed up is the popular base both in Uganda, but maybe even more importantly in DRC.

There are a number of *lessons* to be drawn from the work of CRN and its partners, particularly the focus on short term achievements; the benefits of a small organisation, which can operate projects that actually have an end; the ability to use IT technology for efficient management; just to mention a few.

Introduction

Background

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have financed/supported project activities through Christian Relief Network (CRN) in Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1997.

In the period 1997 to March 2002 CRN has received NOK 7.7 mill. from NORAD and NOK 54.08 mill. from MFA. Including NOK 2.5 mill from DFID 2002², the total amount of public funding is NOK 64.28 mill.

All supported activities are rooted in war, conflicts and human rights issues: In Uganda, NORAD supports activities to release children and juveniles from prisons and institutions and resettle them with their (extended) families, whereas the MFA supported activities include demobilisation and resettlement of young soldiers in conflict areas. Activities that are supported in DRC are mainly repatriation of refugees and internal displaced people (IDP). In addition, restoration of health care facilities and primary schools, road construction, agricultural activities, with an overall purpose of promoting peace and reconciliation. In Rwanda, MFA funds have been channelled to support repatriation of refugees.

The donors have as yet not reviewed the Norwegian support through CRN. NORAD and MFA have together decided that it would be appropriate at this point in time to undertake a review. The review will be joint, and cover both MFA and NORAD supported activities through CRN to its partners in Uganda and DRC. The activities funded through CRN in Rwanda will be included if time allows.

Purpose and Focus

The review will be carried out for three purposes:

- Regular control of recipients of funds
- Input for the consideration of further funding.
- Learning in MFA, NORAD and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kampala (RNEK)

Issues to be covered by the review are:

- Background on CRN and total project
- Description of project components, target groups, activities and partners
- Assessment of relevance in relation to needs and priorities in host countries and to donor organisation's priorities
- Assessment of project effectiveness:
 - Objectives, outputs, strategies, working methods
 - Impact of the efforts to reintegrate and rehabilitate the target groups in the local communities
 - Mode and quality of collaboration with authorities and other organisations/institutions
 - The comparative strength of the organisations (partners) to undertake this type of work

² [According to information from CRN](#)

- The human rights perspectives of the projects, and to what extent and way the human rights instruments (such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child) have been applied in CRN's and its partners' work,
- Assessment of project efficiency:
 - Progress and resource use in project. Means and quality of internal planning, follow-up and monitoring
 - Financial management.
 - Organisational capacity and competence
- Recommendations to CRN and partner-organisations
- Recommendations to NORAD and the MFA for the consideration of future funding of CRN and other programmes for the re-integration of war-affected children

The review should be made in two stages, a desk study and a field trip to the project areas. See Appendix for the TOR, with requirements for the background document:

As the first stage of the review HeSo has done the following:

1. Prepared a background document, by compiling and analysing information, and giving recommendations on issues to be further looked into by the review team in the field. This background document has also made a short summary of applications for funds sent to MFA and NORAD for consideration for funding.
2. Provided input to the field trip team's report in terms of:
 - Background on CRN
 - Assessment of efficiency in CRN and partner organisations / projects in view of the above information compiled in Oslo
 - Description of projects: goal, objectives, components, target groups, activities and partnerships

Methodology

The methodology of the preparation of the background document has been to:

- Undertake a desk study to review CRN and projects in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda for which the organisation has received Norwegian funds since 1997.
- Interview staff in CRN in Norway.
- Interview staff in NORAD, MFA and other Norwegian Non-governmental organisations.
- Based on document reviews and interviews analyse and evaluate both ongoing and terminated projects

Representatives of relevant Norwegian agencies have provided input of technical relevance, both with regards to children, children's rights, humanitarian aide, refugees and input regarding relevant Great Lakes context. These organisations are listed in the Annexes.

Findings from Desk Study and Interviews in Norway

Earlier Assessment of Organisational Issues

In relation to the initial CRN proposal for NORAD funding in 1996, an assessment of the organisation was carried out by Diakonhjømmets Internasjonale Senter (DiS). The key points in this assessment may be summarised as:

- CRN seems to have high competence in project management and collection of funds, as well as information.
- The organisation seems to have a solid popular base in its own church/congregation also in terms of donations, and they seem to emphasise increased understanding in the group about problems of low-income countries.
- The organisation gives an impression of wanting to work seriously in aid and they want to be professional.
- CRN wants to go into dialogue with other aide-agencies and professionals
- The fact that the Director is the chairman of the Board is an organisational weakness, as there is insufficient division between Board and administration. Also there is insufficient technical competence about aid in the Board. (Mr. Rønsen has informed the Team that he stepped down as Chairman of the Board effective April 24th, 2001).
- The technical aid competence in the proposal seems weak, particularly to operate complex and financially large projects, and the ambitions seem unrealistic, but with good elements. The organisation should thus seek closer collaboration with other aide-agencies for competence building.

Brief History of CRN

Christian Relief Network (CRN) was established as a trust on the initiative of Mr Bent Rønsen in 1993, who was the Business Administrator at Oslo Kristne Senter (OKS) at that time. Before this he had worked in the Norwegian branch of the American organisation “Feed the hungry” (1990), which was mainly working in Romania, Armenia etc.

The first projects of CRN were in Mozambique in 1993-94, and were mainly restricted to food distribution and simple medical care (e.g. parasites). This was mainly supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which contributed a total of NOK 4 million during the project period.

Up to year 2000 OKS supported CRN by an annual amount NOK 420,000, mainly salary for administration, and in addition arranged six annual collections in the congregation, with an average of NOK 0.5 million per year. During this period OKS had 3 of the 6 members the board (amongst other Pastor Åge Åleskjær). In addition, a number of other smaller churches/congregations supported the work during this period, but none of these were significant donors.

CRN at Present

Today CRN is organised as a trust without formal links to other organisations in Norway. The staff consists of two persons full time, Mr Bent Rønsen (Director), Ms Solbjørg Sjøveian (Business Administrator), Mr. Kjell Nygaard (Office Clerk), 60% position and one in 40% position, Ms Gro Rønsen (IT etc.). In addition there is considerable voluntary work, e.g. by Mr Johs Ensby.

The Board currently consists of three persons, Mr Johs Ensby (Chairman), Ms Tone Ringøen and Bent Rønsen (Board Members), whereas one additional member is to be selected replacing Mr Olav Kjørven, who is currently State Secretary in MFA.

The work of the Board consists of the formalities (approving budgets, plans, accounts, annual reports etc.), discuss progress in projects, approve new projects, and do strategic thinking. The Board meets regularly (4-6 times per year).

CRN Self-description

According to CRN the starting point for the work has been and is the humanitarian situation particularly for the suffering population. It aims at joining good forces both in Norway and in the countries where it works.

Another aim is to let *local solutions to local problems* be a guiding principle. This implies that local partners in collaboration with local communities have a strong input in the planning of projects and priority setting.

The organisation has not allowed itself to take a mediator role and it stresses that it is not a political organisation and tries not to take a stand in political conflicts.

In Uganda CRN has come in a situation where it depends on *trust in two different camps*, both national authorities and the rebels. The importance of having close relations with the regime is stressed, as is the need to abstain from taking part in public debate. As there was a strong resistance against granting general amnesty for the rebels/guerrilla it has been of great importance not to push the armed forces (UPDF) out. This is an example of how CRN and its partner are allowed a role in areas where no other NGOs are allowed in.

Another guiding principle for the work of CRN has been to establish *projects with a start and an end* and not aiming at sustaining the organisation, but the achievements. This is done by establishing smaller project groups and use the local infrastructure and capacity to carry out the tasks. It has been important to CRN not to establish its own structures or organisations, nor buildings and other infrastructure for the organisation as such. After a project period there are thus no visual signs of the organisation as such, but the achievements should be visual.

There have *hardly been any relations between CRN and other international stakeholders*, such as international NGOs and the UN system. This is partly described as a deliberate decision, partly a circumstantial factor. It is deliberate in the sense that the organisation does not wish to operate in the same way and in the same areas as other international NGOs, which are seen not to have sufficient local foundation and where too much of the activities benefit the organisation and its partners more than the target groups. It is a circumstantial factor in the sense that the local partners who are the implementers, are local churches and do not feel they have much in common with international NGOs, not to speak of the UN agencies, for example in workshops and meetings.

CRN does see this both as strength and a weakness. The *strength* is the ability to be different and work under conditions of great conflict without being too noticeable or dangerous to any of the parts in the conflict. The *weakness* is the potential input, particularly technically, these NGOs could have had. CRN also say they feel that sometimes some of the NGOs distrust their way of working or even envy them their position.


CRN also stresses the importance of seeing the long lines in the work in terms of results and impact.

Comments

The *strength of the CRN Director* is his strong vision, his orientation towards results and his political insight, not to mention his genuine engagement for the people he wants to reach. The *weakness* may be that it is difficult for others to follow up the work if he were to end his work. However, it is also stressed that others could follow his principles of working, and in theory other people could work with Mr Andersson and Rev. Kamese.

Action seems to have been taken both by CRN itself and by its implementing partners when there have been signs of critique. An example of this is when there were critical remarks by UNICEF and SC-UK regarding the operation in the Kasese project (CRN 19) and the children in the camp. CRN contacted local partners and interventions were done in line with the critique. Another example is the comments by UNHCR regarding repatriation of refugees in Rwanda and the implications of this work. The project has later been changed in that refugees who manage to get across the border on own initiative are helped and supported by CRN/CEPAC on the DRC side, whereas there is no support on the Rwanda side of the border.

In Uganda organisations like Save the Children and UNICEF have been involved with the same groups of children and youth as CRN and have long experience. CRN and local partners have not asked for cooperation or training in these matters, but some CRN personnel see the need for more training of their implementing personnel.



Relationships

See the figure on the previous page. In the following relationships are mostly explained from what is understood as a CRN point of view.

OKS

The regular annual support from OKS was phased out in financial year 2000. This marked an end to the formal ties between CRN and OKS, and the representation in the Board was thus also phased out. However, the relationship between the two is described as very good, and there is currently an intention agreement to collaborate with OKS, which allows CRN to expose itself in the church/congregation. This may be illustrated by the fact that OKS arranged a Christmas concert in 2001 in support of CRN work, where considerable funds were collected (NOK 200,000). In general CRN emphasises their preference for direct project support from OKS with focus on results abroad, and not a general charity involvement.

Private Individuals

The former more or less direct relations with a number of small churches/congregations and support from these was seen as requiring a lot of time and work, e.g. in terms of visits, meetings etc. Due to this the strategy has changed and currently CRN receives donations from a number of private individuals (approx. 200 people), mainly members of the churches recruited during the earlier phase of the programme. These individuals contribute from NOK 500 to 3000 per month with an annual total around NOK 800,000. The use of Internet to distribute information to the donors and others is reported to have reduced the administrative costs and made the work more efficient. They receive monthly information about the work, and CRN evenings are arranged, where the donors are informed about the progress of the work.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

MFA has been the main donor of the organisation since the start in 1993. As mentioned the total allocations over the period have been more than NOK 54 million. The two main sections in MFA involved are Human Rights and Humanitarian Support (HUM) and Section for African Affairs. With the high degree of political tension in the Great Lakes Region, the political leadership in MFA has been quite regularly informed about parts of the work of the organisation.

The collaboration with MFA is regarded by CRN as close, and the political dialogue has emerged over time. The meeting are held relatively frequently and the Ministry is regarded as “attentive”. CRN also feels that their political insight is regarded as useful.

NORAD

NORAD has allocated funds for one CRN project, i.e. CRN 04 “Give me a chance – Release and rehabilitation of children in custody in Uganda”. The initial project period was 1997-1999, with a total NORAD allocation of NOK 7,7 million, but has later been expanded to 2002. CRN feels that the reporting system and other types of communication with NORAD is insufficient to provide a real picture of how the organisation works, what their pros and cons are as an organisation and what their objectives and achievements are. A more open dialogue both ways is seen as a key to closer collaboration for a common goal.

Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kampala

According to CRN it has been informing the Norwegian Ambassador in Kampala personally from the start of the projects He has thus been regarded by CRN to be the best informed

person regarding their operations in the entire region. Although responsibility for Norwegian work in DRC formally lies under the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, the Kampala Embassy was also informed about CRN Eastern DRC projects.

From the Embassy's point of view their main task was to secure clearance for the CRN project activities from the Ugandan government, this is important since the projects deal with politically sensitive issues. Besides, normal reporting routines were followed and no specific agreements in these matters were made. In general the former Ambassador has a positive impression of the achievements of the CRN projects. As there has been a change of Ambassador in Kampala, and Mr Arild Øyen is stationed in MFA it is unclear what the situation will be with regards to what position Norwegian Embassy will take in the future.

Royal Norwegian Embassy in Luanda

According to CRN, the Luanda Embassy has not been involved to their knowledge.

Other organisations

CRN does not have any formal nor informal collaboration with other Norwegian NGOs working in the area. Among the relevant NGOs there is a lack of knowledge of the CRN and its work with local partners. Norwegian Redd Barna and Pinsevernenes Ytremisjon are some of the few organisations that have been in touch with CRN or its partners. The two were concerned with the technical competence in certain areas of the work which is discussed below, but also with the popular base in Uganda and even more so in DRC. This has not been further assessed during this desk review. *(Follow up by Review Team)*

From September 2001 the Norwegian Refugee Council – NRC – has been involved in the Masisi area west of Goma and in the Kalema/Moba area near Lake Tanganyika. NRC focus on basic education for IDP and refugee children, some renovation of school buildings and some humanitarian assistance when needed, for example following the recent volcanic eruption at Goma. There was scarce contact with CRN, except some with Dan Andersson, who gave an impression of broad based and valuable knowledge of local conditions. From NRC it is questioned whether support to refugee camps with Tutsis in this area may undermine the situation of the Congolese citizens. In the future NRC can see some useful areas of cooperation with the local CRN projects.

GMAC

Give Me A Chance (GMAC) was registered as an NGO in Uganda in 1997. Their head office is located in Kampala. The organisation was established as a project organisation for the project with the same title (CRN 04: "Give Me A Chance"), and took over after the work of the church related Agape Prisons Foundation Inc. (APF). The board members in APF became more involved when money started coming in, but due to a wish from CRN to separate carefully between the church and the project as such GMAC was registered as an NGO and has later been the implementing partner to CRN in Uganda. GMAC is a small organisation, which establishes project groups for each project, but the organisation as such is accountable to CRN. Plans, budgets, reports and accounts are submitted by GMAC on a regular basis. The Director is Rev. Kenneth Kamese, whereas the Board consists amongst others of representatives of the Ministry of Gender. Other employees vary according to the level of activity, but include 1 accountant, 1 secretary, 1 messenger and 6-10 social workers. The popular base is by CRN reported to be at a more national level through the Ministry and other authorities but also the fact that the local community have found solutions to how to work. The organisation is seen as a peace-promoting organisation.

CRN describes the *strength* of the GMAC to be their local experience and good relationships with key persons, but even more so the political insight, the integrity and trustworthiness of Rev. Kenneth Kamese, who tolerates no dishonesty among the employees. The *weaknesses* include the dependency on one person (Rev. Kamese), the lack of training and refresher courses for employees, which would serve as motivation; computer training is needed, particularly for filing purposes. A need for training in psychosocial issues is also seen by some Norwegian staff.

GMAC is supported both by NORAD and MFA, but for different projects (details are found in overview of projects and programmes). The accounts etc. follow projects, but it is not entirely clear how shared costs are distributed between these. The organisation seems to be more permanent construction than the CRN/CEPAC projects described below.

CEPAC

(CEPAC, formerly CEPZa) is a network of Pentecost churches in DR Congo, mainly the eastern part, but also in other areas of the country. The total number of members is 480.000. The Central Committee appoints three representatives of which one is member of the Committee to be in the leader group of the project organisation CRN/CEPAC. In this way the church network has had influence on project design and implementation. The Committee has also asked pastors and members of the congregations to collaborate with the project organisation and avail volunteers and other resources for the work.

CRN/CEPAC

This is the local project organisation where both CRN and CEPAC are represented. It is situated in Goma. The organisation has been established in a context of an emergency situation. The CRN/CEPAC project organisation has not been formally registered as an NGO nor as a legal body with the authorities in Kinshasa. CRN/CEPAC establishes small and expectedly efficient project groups for each project, drawing on key persons from the entire church network. CRN/CEPAC is responsible for implementation of the projects, i.e. administration of personnel, accounts, procurement, transport, renovation/building, and training of personnel. The project groups are also in continuous dialogue with the authorities in Goma. CRN/CEPAC operates on the sideline of other NGOs in the area. This is partly due to the fact that CEPAC does not feel related to international NGOs, and partly due to the fact that it is not accustomed to cooperation with other NGOs and the UN-system, but also due to strategic choice in CRN/CEPAC. The organisation consists of individuals with especially close contacts with the various stakeholders in the area, and operates under consensus leadership. It is said to secure popular support through the church network. The organisation is said to function well under extraordinary circumstances, but not necessarily in more stable situations. The Director is the Swedish citizen, Mr Dan Andersson.

The *strength* of the organisation is the popular foundation in the church network, and the personal insight of Mr Dan Andersson, whereas this strong dependency on an individual may also be a *weakness*.

ADEPR

This is a network similar to CEPAC in Rwanda. CRN and ADEPR have a similar intention agreement to the one between CRN and CEPAC, but the capacity to fulfil this has proven low.

Representatives of relevant Norwegian agencies have provided input of technical relevance, both with regards to children, children's rights, humanitarian aide, refugees and input regarding relevant Great Lakes context. These organisations are listed in the Annexes.

The most striking finding from these interviews is the lack of knowledge of the organisation (CRN) and the work with its partners. Norwegian Redd Barna and Pinsevennenes Ytremisjon are the only organisations that have been in touch with CRN or its partners. The two were concerned with the technical competence in certain areas of the work which is discussed below, and the popular base in Uganda but even more so in DRC. This has not been further assessed during this desk review.

Financial Issues

Since CRN was established a total of approx **NOK 61.78 million** have been channelled from NORAD/MFA through CRN to the projects. Of these have **NOK 54.08 million** been channelled from MFA and **NOK 7.7 million** from NORAD. The sources of the funds (income) have been the following:

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	Total
MFA	3.340.000	8.370.000	16.770.000	19.500.000	4.950.000	1.150.000	54.080.000
NORAD	1.300.000	1.242.320	1.949.640	1.170.240	1.018.000	1.020.000	7.700.200
Total	4.640.000	9.612.320	18.719.640	20.670.240	5.968.000	2.170.000	61.780.200
Other (own) funds							
MFA projects	200.000	446.185	660.500	312.200	130.000	120.000	1.748.885
NORAD "	393.760	318.890	487.410	276.000	240.000	105.000	1.821.060

OKS has up to 2001 contributed an annual fixed amount of NOK 420,000 mainly for salaries. In addition they have arranged six annual collections in the congregation, with an average of NOK 500,000 per year. Contributions from other churches have been considerably lower. Currently about 200 private individuals contribute from NOK 500 to 3000 per month with an annual total around NOK 800,000.

The overall share of total funds contributed by own sources are 3.2% of the MFA supported projects and 19.1% of the NORAD supported projects.

With regards to expenses, administration is defined as 15% of total budget, but is reported actually to be lower. Of total funds from MFA 5% may be allocated for administration, whereas of the funds from NORAD 6% may be allocated for administration (included in the above figures).

Salary and administration expenses in Norway are considered very low, particularly as the staffs is few in numbers and their salaries are moderate. This is thus not an issue of concern. The salary levels in partner organisations are set according to fixed scales in each partner organisation. Administrative expenses fluctuate, and are to a high degree defined as variable costs according to activity level. These are thus not easily available, but follow project activities.

Much of the bookkeeping in Norway is outsourced from CRN to an accounting company.

The bookkeeping in partner countries is carried out by local partners (GMAC and CRN/CEPAC), which reports to CRN on a regular basis (monthly) on fixed forms. A fluctuating rate of exchange is used.

There is no overall overview of the expenses in relation to the budgets, but this is done for each project annually. In general the project expenses follow the budgets satisfactory.

The audit for the expenses at the home office is carried out by Ernst & Young in Oslo, whereas the local accounts, which are the majority of the expenses, are audited by Ernst & Young in Kampala. The following projects have been audited/not audited (details about dates in Table in Annex 1):

Project	Audited	Not audited	Comments
CRN 04	X		
CRN 06	X		
CRN 08	X		
CRN 09	X		
CRN 10	X		
CRN 11	X		
CRN 12	X		
CRN 13	X		Report submitted to MFA
CRN 14		X	Project in progress
CRN 15		X	Project in progress
CRN 16	X		Report not yet submitted
CRN 19		X	Audited for 2000 and 2001 (85,1% of allocation), Final Report not yet submitted

It should be stressed that from the availability of financial records, accounts and audit reports available in Norway, there are no signs of irregularities, and according to CRN this is also the case with their partners both in DRC and Uganda.

Administrative Capacity

The *administration in Oslo* consists of only two persons in full positions and one in 40%. It has been a key strategy of the organisation not to establish a heavy administration in Oslo, but keep it as small and flexible as possible. The persons employed full time are Mr Bent Røsen (Director), Ms Solbjørg Sjøveian (Business Administrator), Mr. Kjell Nygaard (Office Clerk) 60% position whereas the person in 40% position is Ms Gro Røsen (IT etc.) (married to Mr Bent Røsen). It should also be mentioned that in addition there is considerable voluntary work, e.g. by Mr Johs Ensby.

The capacity and competence to administer projects seems to be in place, and standard routines for planning, reporting, accounting, etc. are in place.

Reporting: Standard formulas have been developed for measuring progress in relation to quantitative goals, where time, cost and performance may be followed monthly. An objective like resettlement of 100 children by the end of a certain year within a given budget restriction, may thus be measured in terms of percentage of costs for each month and the percentage of children for each month. Total performance may thus be 110% if 110 children have been resettled that year. For the qualitative objectives this system has little relevance, and it is acknowledged that achievements in this area should be reported more verbally.

With regards to reporting on project objectives and achievements this is normally done in a very clear and precise way. But for certain projects the objectives seem to be altered from time to time as they evolve. This may be due to rapidly changing environments, like the instability in the area, but could sometimes be attributed to certain weaknesses in clarity of objectives. The time-cost-performance system implies that the objectives are clear from the beginning of the project period. The overall impression is that the system used is well developed and easy to use both for partner and for CRN staff.

The *local partners*, GMAC and CRN/CEPAC are reported to be quite capable of following up all administrative routines and are able to handle financial as well as other administrative issues, e.g. personnel. Planning of projects and interventions are reported done jointly between Mr Rønsen and the partners, especially Rev. Kamese and Mr. Andersson.

Rules and tools for local partners are to a certain degree in place. However, there is no fixed set of these available, and some are reported to be under revision.

Political Connections

There is little doubt that CRN already since the beginning has had a strategy where lobbying with politicians has played a more or less prominent role. This may for instance be seen by copies of letters and proposals sent to MPs (e.g. Mr Kjell Magne Bondevik), but also to other politically active people. From the documents reviewed this has happened openly where the correspondence is marked with whom it is copied to.

Current State Secretary Mr Olav Kjørven has as mentioned been member of the RCN board, but withdrew when he came in service. However, personal connections reported still to be good, but no indications of abuse of this have been found during this review. Normal lobbying from CRN to the political leadership, and particularly that of Christian People's Party (KrF), should be expected to occur, as is the case with most organisations. There are also no indications of special treatment of CRN, as all accepted project proposals reviewed have met the formal criteria, as have the reports. However, the low profile of the organisation in the Norwegian development aid environment, but also the lack of collaboration with other and similar agencies and the high dependency on very few persons, may have led to a certain mystery around CRN and also a certain distrust, which could lead to suspicions of special treatment from political leaders.

There is also little doubt that CRN and its partners have established close connections to influential/political people in the countries they work (e.g. President Museveni). The organisation is good at lobbying and collaborating at this level, which may lead to the thinking that the work is political. CRN itself argues strongly that this is not the case, and that it is purely a humanitarian organisation.

Overview of Projects and Programmes

The following provides an overview of projects supported by NORAD and the Norwegian MFA. Many of the projects are continued after the initial project period under a new project number, sometimes with revised objectives. Due to this continuation of work it is sometimes difficult to describe the dynamics and the changes without seeing projects together. The table in Annex 1 provides a more structured overview of the different projects, and many details are thus not repeated in the text.

The following table shows the total public allocations for the projects

Allocations 1996-2002							
MFA Reference:	Date:	Allocation:	Admin.share	Net amount to project	Proposal date:	Proposal amount:	CRN project#
Total:		64 280 201	3 248 945	61 031 256			
<i>DFID (UK)</i>	<i>2002-01-14</i>	<i>2 500 000</i>	<i>125 000</i>	<i>2 375 000</i>	<i>2001-12-01</i>	<i>2 500 000</i>	<i>CRN-26</i>
UGA-1020189	2002-03-04	700 000	35 000	665 000	2002-01-31	700 000	CRN-19
UGA-97/034	2002-02-02	1 020 000	75 000	945 000	2001-09-14	2 382 000	CRN-04
UGA 1011046	2001-12-19	50 000	-	50 000	2001-11-01	500 000	CRN-27
1020126	2002-02-12	450 000	-	450 000	2001-08-20	500 000	CRN-18
UGA 1010056	2001-07-27	1 900 000	95 000	1 805 000	2001-06-25	1 900 000	CRN-19
UGA 1010056	2001-02-21	3 000 000	150 000	2 850 000	2000-10-30	6 300 000	CRN-19
UGAK 97/034	2001-02-12	1 018 000	56 377	961 623	2000-09-08	1 018 000	CRN-04
ZAIRK 0078	2000-03-09	15 000 000	750 000	14 250 000	1999-11-18	18 570 000	CRN-14/15/16
UGAK 0117	2000-04-04	4 500 000	225 000	4 275 000	1999-12-21	4 500 000	CRN-17
UGA 681	2000-01-21	1 170 240	64 808	1 105 432	1999-09-10	1 170 240	CRN-04
UGA 681	1999-12-01	313 000	17 716	295 284	1999-07-27	313 000	CRN-04
RAFK 9352	1999-06-24	7 000 000	350 000	6 650 000	1999-04-11	9 300 000	CRN-13
UGAK 9033	1999-03-12	9 770 000	488 500	9 281 500	981205/990311	10 000 000	CRN-12
UGA 681	1999-01-19	1 636 640	92 640	1 544 000	1998-09-01	1 636 640	CRN-04
UGAK 8794	1998-12-02	1 470 000	70 000	1 400 000	1998-10-20	1 470 000	CRN-11
RAFK 8450	1998-06-30	3 000 000	150 000	2 850 000	1998-06-04	4 500 000	CRN-09/10
ZARK 8025	1998-01-23	3 900 000	195 000	3 705 000	1997-10-30	4 200 000	CRN-08
UGA 681	1997-12-19	1 242 320	70 320	1 172 000	1997-09-01	1 242 320	CRN-04
UGA 681	1997-10-03	414 689	23 472	391 217	1997-07-28	414 689	CRN-04
ZARK 7237	1997-04-07	3 300 000	165 000	3 135 000	970304/970325	3 507 000	CRN-06
UGA 681	1997-01-10	885 312	50 112	835 200	1996-09-01	885 312	CRN-04
ZARK 7013	1997-01-08	40 000	0	40 000	1996-11-08	60 000	CRN-05

Proposals not supported 1997-2000

MFA reference:	Date	Amount:	Proposal date	Proposal amount:
Total:		-		
COG1020157	2002-02-22	-	2002-01-22	1 800 000
BOL 0655	1997-12-19	-	1997-09-10	3 673 536
BOL 0650	1997-01-10	-		
AGO 627	1997-01-10	-		

Vulcano, Goma – humanitarian aid
 Rehabilitation of street children in Cochabamba, Bolivia
 Rehabilitation of young girls in Cochabamba, Bolivia
 Agriculture project, Biopio, Angola

New Proposal 2002-2003

In addition to the allocations mentioned above, at present (March 2002) there is an application from CRN to MFA on **NOK 42.2 mill** for 2002-2003 for the continuation of activities covered by the projects CRN-13, 14, 15, 16. (MFA references ZAIRK 0078 and RAFK 9352). According to CRN there is so far allocated about **NOK 5.5 mill** of the amount applied for.

CRN 04: Give me a chance - Release and rehabilitation of children in custody

Uganda - NORAD

The initial project period was 1997-99, and the objective is to release and rehabilitate children in prisons/custody all over Uganda, but primarily from two institutions close to Kampala. The local partner was Agape Prisons Foundation Inc. with Rev. Kenneth Kamese, but has later been GMAC (for details see Relationships GMAC), which works closely with the Ministry of Gender and Community. The target group during this first period was 1000 children in custody, but has later been expanded to 2000. The achievement by 2001 was 1500 children released and repatriated.

The main activities have been to register all children in custody in Uganda, prepare them for repatriation, have them released and transported back to their home communities where their families are provided with a resettlement package consisting of a blanket and a few cooking utilities, and in kind support for income generating activities, at around Sh. 150 000 (e.g. animals, trading goods etc.). This is linked to the individual child, but provided to the family during the first follow up, which takes place after 2-4 weeks. The families are also followed up after 6 months. The children may in addition be supported with school uniform and school fees.

Around 8-10 social workers have been trained for practical support and counselling in the local community. A guardian is also appointed in the community to be responsible for the well being of the child.

The fact that the children, of whom as many as 50 % may be innocent, are kept in custody is a serious human rights problem, which is the reason for the focus on number of children released. The objective has been that 50% of the children remain at home after one year, whereas the result is reported to be 80-90%. The fact that the families are supported and not only the child is seen as a success factor. This is also in line with the official Uganda politics, which does not favour orphanages or similar arrangements.

In addition the project has a special programme for mothers with small children and infants (0-5 year olds) in custody/prisons. This includes nutrition, mosquito nets, hygiene/soap, but also small income generating activities while in custody.

CRN claims that about 15000 children have been assisted through local solutions and follow up. No new institutions are made. The work has influenced Ugandan politics for this group of children and youngsters, a fact that may be confirmed by staff in Ministry of Gender.

CRN 11: Peace Initiative in Uganda

MFA: MR/HUM UGAK8794

This project was carried out by CRN/GMAC from August to December 1998, and the objective was to re-establish lasting peace by establishing contact between the fighting partners, i.e. Allied Demographic Forces ADF and Uganda Forces (UPDF) around the Rwenzori Mountain in Western Uganda. ADF has two wings, one political with strong Muslim undercurrents, and one tribal wing, fighting for the recognition of the Bakonzo kingdom, with the exile king Mr Charles Mumbere. The strategy was:

1. Talks/negotiations/reconciliation
2. Demobilisation and reintegration of rebel fighters
3. Economic development package

In brief, a delegation of MPs from Uganda, Mr Kamese (GMAC) and Mr Rønsen travelled to Washington DC and met Mr Mumbere, discussed a number of issues and established direct link with President Museveni, who welcomed the king to return to Uganda. November 19th 1998 Mr Rønsen accompanied him to Uganda.

The effect was reported to be felt immediately and rebel fighters started coming out in small numbers. This created the need to plan for Phase II; Demobilisation, rehabilitation and resettlement of ex-rebels. Wrangles between political and local interests in Kasese made it difficult to proceed directly into this phase.

CRN 12: Demobilisation and reintegration of Guerrilla Soldiers

MFA: MR/HUM (UGAK9033)

Parallel to the process in the Rwenzori, representatives of another rebel group in Arua District approached CRN/GMAC, asking about the prospects of support if they surrendered peacefully. The project went on from January 1999 to December 2000. The target group was thus all men and women involved in ADF, but also some Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II) groups. "The composition was mainly that of former officers and soldiers of deposed Government of Iddi Amin Dada, Milton Obote II, Tito Okello, deserters of UPDF, Tliq Moslem sect, unemployed youths who are manipulated and savaged, *and innocent youth and children who are abducted and forced to fight alongside the rebels*" (from final report).

The initial plan was 700 former rebels resettled, whereas the achievements at the end of the project period were 1110. These underwent a two months political, economical and social awareness programme. During this period they received accommodation, food, medical, clothing, bedding and professional counselling. They were transported back to the community and received a resettlement package (blankets, shoes, hoes, clothes, bicycles, sewing machines, oxen, iron sheets etc.), and then followed up (?). The expenditures were mainly for transport, facilitation, working allowances, resettlement packages, and cash (Set off funds).

The consequences for the children summarised only includes dependents of fathers returning from rebel activities. It is, however, mentioned that *rehabilitated children* and community members were received back in communities. It is noted that the target groups are “socially looked at with a bad eye by some community members”, as they receive special treatment although they have been killers and looters. Also rebels who gave up before the programme started have threatened to destabilise it if they were not allowed to join. Other community members and local leaders were bitter about the packages.

The security in the area is seen to have improved. An important lesson is that in future situations the emphasis should be on community-based development, such as schools, health care, roads and income generating projects to provide employment.

CRN 17: Reintegration of rebels/political prisoners

MFA: MR/HUM (UGAK0117)

This project, from January to December 2000, was mainly targeted at 900 rebels imprisoned all over Uganda for subversive and armed rebel activities. These are mainly from the West Nile Bank Front (Arua District). The focus is reconciliation and reintegration of the target group into the local community, and is thus an expansion of CRN 12. While in prison these were followed up by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and upon release CRN/GMAC was asked by ICRN to do work similar to that in Kasese (CRN 19).

A total of 905 former rebels were resettled in their communities (methodology similar to CRN 12). The target group was all men, although women and children have benefited from the programme. Active rebels see the target groups as traitors. Some people in the communities envy them, and ex-prisoners who came back before the programme started have threatened to destabilise it if they were not allowed to join. Project objectives are reported by CRN to be achieved (see table).

CRN 19: Resettlement of ex-rebels, Western Uganda

MFA: MR/HUM (UGA 1010056)

The project was initiated for children starting to come spontaneously to Kasese accompanying more grown up rebels. GMAC started to promote the project to children residing in the mountain area. The local partners wanted a joint centre for children, women and men together, their rationale being that they had survived and co-existed under very harsh circumstances and will function as “transitional persons” for each other. Ex-rebels are also relatively easier to re-integrate with their families than criminal children. The main aim for the project was to meet the local needs, with local solutions, and prevent the vicious circle with new abductions etc. Military personnel from UPDF are teaching at the centre in e.g. human rights issues. There are so-called District Reintegration Officers who are responsible for local follow-up, once the youth have received amnesty certificate from the Amnesty commission.

Sleeping arrangements are in separate quarters according to gender and age. There are different premises for schooling, skills training etc. The centre is neighbouring a camp for Internally Displaced People (IDP). There are no restrictions on contact between the two centres. One reason why the contact is feasible for the IDPs might be that all the ex-rebels have fled from their armed groups.

CRN 06: Distribution of seed, tools, blankets, pots and BP-5 to IDPs in DR Congo

MFA:MR/HUM (ZARK7237)

This project went on from April to December 1997 in North Kivu in Masisi in DR Congo, where the objective was to help IDPs back to their rural areas of origin after continued instability and violence over a long period of time and in spite of assaults by the Interahamwe rebel groups. The IDPs consist of different ethnic groups (Congolese, Hutus, Tutsis). The sub-objectives have been to reduce casualties/damages from malnutrition, among children; reduce the no of people suffering from cold weather; ant to assist families in quickly restoring their own food production. About 6000 families have been assisted, i.e. 80% more than anticipated. This included distribution of BP-5, seeds (beans) and some utilities for cooking etc. The selection was done by local partner (CRN/CEPAC). No negative side effects reported.

CRN 08: Re-establishing primary health care for 350.000 formerly IDP in North Kivu
MFA: MR/HUM (ZARK8025)

The aim of this project, January-June 1999, has been to re-establish PHC for 350 000 former IDPs in North Kivu, through rehabilitation of 30 clinics (and some training of personnel?). A total of 31 buildings were actually rehabilitated, but the rehabilitation was more expensive than anticipated and the total expenses were 20% higher than projected. The ethnic groups targeted were numerous, as they were all victims of “the burnt ground tactic”. Outbreaks of war delayed the work. After the project period a list of 13 additional clinics was added. The health centres are mostly situated in high-risk areas. The Government has asked CEPAC to operate the services. The experiences reported as success factors include:

- The high ability of MFA to act quickly and make decisions
- The strong base in the church network
- The staff willing to risk their own lives
- Project leadership with strong local knowledge
- Contacts on high level.

CRN 09: Assistance to refugees returning to DR Congo from camps in Rwanda
MFA: MR/HUM (RAFK8450)

The project was carried out in the period June – December 1998 and has later been continued in CRN 13 and 15. The aim has been to distribute start packages to 1300 Congolese refugee families (mainly Tutsis) returning from camps in Rwanda. At an early stage UNHCR pointed out that the CRN work in Rwanda could jeopardise their work, but it is not entirely clear how. The project was changed in accordance to this, and it is specifically pointed out that the refugees come across the border on their own initiative and arrive in Goma where they are registered and stay until it is possible to help them, i.e. the CRN/CEPAC work is carried out in Congo only. The refugees received start packages before continuing to one of the two transit camps that have been established in two districts, each with a capacity for 3-4000 persons. These were and still are intended to be stations from which the refugees could explore the potentials of returning to their homes in Masisi. There have later (see CRN 13 and 15) been about 3-4000 refugees in the camps, where clinics are established. A town has later started developing around one of the camps. It is essential to try to end the camps in order for them not to become permanent.

It is reported that UNHCR has earlier not even been allowed to count the refugees. The authorities in Rwanda did not want the Tutsis to leave. A total of 2070 families have been helped during first phase (June – December 1998). The increase from the objective of 1300 families is reported to be attributable to efficiency gains. The start packages are reported to be the determining factor for the refugees to be self-sustained. It is not clear to what extent the families eventually did return to their homes.

CRN 13: D.R.Congo and Rwanda. Health, Education and prevention of conflicts

MFA: MR/HUM (RAFK9352)

This is a continuation of CRN 9 (June 1999 – June 2001), The objective has been distributing start packages to 15 000 persons/families who took the initiative to returning from Rwanda to their home areas in North Kivu in Congo. The project has also become a broad health and education project for 200 000 returned internally displaced people, with an objective of rebuilding 15 health centres and 6 primary schools. The achievements have been rebuilding of 18 health centres and 6 schools, which the church (CEPAC) take over and operate for the Government. In addition 18 seminars for a total of 3500 pastors regarding peace and reconciliation have been held.

CRN 15: Demobilising the Mai-Mai guerrilla in Kivu-province

MFA: MR/HUM (ZARK0078)

The project started after a much-publicised abduction of aid workers by the guerrilla. Contact between key CRN and CRN/CEPAC persons and the guerrilla was established and handing over of arms started. The demobilisation aspect was turned down after trouble with other guerrilla groups, and focus reset on civil employment for 10 000 guerrilla soldiers in Kivu, some medical care, utensils and income generation by road work and forestry. It is not clear who employs and how this is organised. The achievements are that around 5000 former soldiers have been employed and a total of 60 km road has been built. In agreement with NMFA, and in accordance with the tense security situation, the demobilizing aspect was dropped and the project was redefined as *Arbeid blant lokalbefolkningen i Masisi-området. Fellespakker, Skogsarbeid, Veiarbeid*. (see "tildelingsbrev" of 9/3-00).

CRN 14: Repatriating 50 000 displaced Hutus from DR Congo to Rwanda

MFA: MR/HUM (ZARK0078)

The project (March 2000 – December 2001) aims at repatriating 50 000 displaced Hutus from DR Congo to Rwanda. A total of 10 reception stations close to CEPAC churches in the Masisi Mountains have been established. The aim is to get the refugees out from the forests where they are hiding and to the reception stations. Hutu members of the churches try to reach people that are scattered and hiding in the woods and inform about possibilities for return. The project is in collaboration with UNHCR, which transports them from the reception stations to transit stations, to Goma and then to Gisenyi in Rwanda. The project is still in progress and the final report is thus not yet available.

CRN 10: Assistance (seeds, tools) to IDP in Gisenye District in Rwanda

MFA: MR/HUM (RAFK8450)

The objective of the project (June – December 1998) was to contribute to peace in Northwest Rwanda by providing help to 10 000 IDP families trying to break from the extreme forces (Interhamwe) and settle in their own communities. The achievements have been providing seed and tools for 15 000 families of IDPs. It is not clear what happened to these families later on, and whether they managed to resettle in their communities.

CRN 16: Repatriating 35.000 displaced Tutsis from camps in Rwanda to DR Congo

MFA: MR/HUM (ZARK0078)

This project (June – December 1998) is also a continuation of CRN 09, where details of the origin may be found. It is scaled down due to budget restrictions. Transport is provided; short time transit camps in Goma are operated, as well as transit camps in Masisi. From these camps the families may be able to explore possibilities for resettlement. A total of 40 000 persons have been assisted through the projects CRN 9, CRN 13 and CRN 16.

Achievements

As mentioned, some of the projects have revised their objectives due to different contextual factors, but in general the objectives and activities have been the same throughout the project period. The Time-Cost-Performance system used provides a solid base for following the development of each project from month to month, but only for the quantitative objectives, which are measured in %.

Efficiency and effectiveness

For the *quantitative objectives* the achievements have been documented in Annex 1 for each project. *Long-term effects* have not been assessed, but short-term effects are reported quantitatively and qualitatively from each project.

With a few exceptions the achievements have been higher than 100%, actually up to 180%. The projects where the achievements are slightly lower than 100% have documented why this is the case. Also with regards to costs, the projects have generally kept within the budgets, although some additional applications for funds have been submitted to NORAD and MFA respectively. These applications have mainly been tied to additional tasks or expansion of existing tasks, and not to finalise what has been planned for.

With regards to *cost-effectiveness*, the relatively low share administrative costs, particularly in Norway, may serve as an indication. There is little doubt that a high number of people have received humanitarian support, but the costs vary greatly from project to project. As there are few other organisations doing similar work under similar conditions, and the long-term effects are unknown, it is difficult to measure whether the projects have been cost-effective. Also, it is necessary to have a better understanding of the local conditions to validate the projects in these terms.

The table below may be completed with further details during the field trip:

Project number	Target groups	Achievements
CRN 04	Children 5-18 ys in prisons/custody Children 0-5 ys with their mothers in prisons Year 1: 100 Year 2: 400 Year 3: 500	In progress 1000 children after 3 years 1500 children in total
CRN 11	ADF leaders Uganda Authorities King of Rwenzorori	Ended 90% performance End report requested by MFA in July 2000
CRN 12	People who had been involved in subversive or armed rebel activities and/or who had given up these activities (700) (no children)	Ended Achievement: 1100 former rebels resettled in their communities Lira: Smaller rebel groups Nairobi: Political refugees
CRN 17	900 rebels (men) imprisoned for subversive and armed rebel activities	Ended Govt. granted amnesty 905 rebels successfully resettled in respective communities
CRN 19	Rebel soldiers and their commanders/ leaders from ADF 250-300 rebels	Per. December 2001 47 of 219 < 12 ys 60 of 219 = 12-18 ys 320 of 585 > 18 yrs 265 of 585 < 18 yrs

CRN 06	Malnourished children and families who have lost their belongings in the recent war. The poorest of the poor. (?) 30000 families	Ended Achievement: 180% (80% more families than planned) 6000 families assisted
CRN 08	350 000 former IDP.	Ended Achievements: 31 clinics rehabilitated/built serving 320 000 Outbreak of war right after project start. Promise of new funds from MFA through RAFK 9352
CRN 09	1300 Congolese refugee families when returning from Rwanda to North Kivu	Ended Achievements: 2070 families helped (efficiency gains) Transit camps established Did they ever return to their homes?
CRN 10	Former IDPs in Gisenye District 10 000 families	Ended Achievements: 15.000 families received seeds and tools (no blankets and pots)
CRN 13	Re-establish PHC services for 200.000 returned internal refugees, schools for 5000 students. Assist 15 000 refugees back to D.R.Congo	End report soon available 18 clinics and 6 schools 18 seminars for 3500 pastors re peace and reconciliation. Assisted refugees
CRN 14	50 000 displaced Hutus	In progress
CRN 15	10 800 soldiers in Kivu	In progress About 50% of these have been employed in road and forestry work. 60 km road is built
CRN 16	35 000 displaced Tutsis (Scaled down due to budget restrictions)	In progress

Quality

With regards to qualitative objectives the achievements are more difficult to assess, and the only sources of information in this phase have been interviews, plans and reports. However, there seems to be a quite high degree of achievements in relation to the objectives in the plans, although some objectives have been altered due to changing conditions. An example is *CRN 15: Demobilising the Mai-Mai guerrilla in Kivu-province*, which has later become more or less a pure employment project aiming at offering alternatives for young people to be in the guerrilla. It is quite likely that the focus on offering alternatives, and thus the objective of providing employment, is equally effective in demobilising the Mai-Mai, but this is difficult to measure.

Another quality measure is related to humanitarian and psychosocial standards, as discussed below. There is a question whether international standards are followed in some of the projects. This is also in line with the priorities of the organisation, which is to get results quickly, as may be seen by the relatively short time span of the projects.

Impact and Sustainability

In terms of impact it is difficult to measure this on terms related to cause and effect. However, according to reports the very ambitious, and probably in many people's views unrealistic, objectives like "re-establish peace, stability and development" (and not only "contribute towards"), is for some projects claimed to be achieved as a result of the project.

The impact on individuals and families, be it youngsters from prisons or refugees, appears as positive, and in terms of numbers in relation to the funds used this seems to be achieved at a rather low cost. The long-term effect/impact has not yet been assessed for these projects. An

exception is that defined objectives for the project *CRN 04, Give me a chance*, was that 50% of the children are still home after one year. The objective has been more than achieved as 80-90% of the children were found to remain at home after one year.

On the negative side it is reported that from some of the projects there have been negative attitudes and envy from some community members towards the benefits granted for ex-rebels etc. An assessment of the overall positive and negative impacts has not been carried out.

General Discussion

Criteria for assessment

A major question is what criteria should be used to assess the organisation and its work. CRN and its partners are unorthodox in a number of ways, e.g.:

- The organisation is very small in number of people employed whereas the portfolio is relatively large
- CRN and its partners have a strong focus on (immediate) humanitarian results rather than on organisation development
- Their work is carried out in areas where there are few other external support agents involved
- There are few structures in terms of buildings etc. that could be associated with the organisation
- CRN is a young organisation and does not have a long tradition of public base in Norway
- CRN is not well known in Norway and is regarded with some degree of mysticism
- CRN does not have close collaboration with other NGOs in Norway nor international NGOs
- The organisation is seen by some others to be operating with a duality in that it is clearly a humanitarian organisation, but could sometimes be associated with political sensitive issues, and thus political. CRN, however, clearly describes itself as a humanitarian organisation.

Although it may be argued that other organisations also have aspects of the above characteristics, it is the totality of this that makes CRN a special case. The question is thus which criteria should be used to assess the organisation and its work. This may be reduced to the question of whether the *organisational factors* or the *achievements/results* should be assessed.

Organisational capacity factors, such as capacity and competence, ability to collaborate with other external agents, and the sustainability of the organisation in terms of personnel and finances as such, seem not to be what CRN sees as important. It is quite clear that assessing the sustainability of the organisation itself would give a very clear and weak result, dependent as it is of some very few individuals.

Immediate achievements or (short term) results for the beneficiaries has been and is the focus of all the work done, and is clearly one of the very strong objectives in the strategies of CRN. The organisation is very clear in this, and feels strongly that this should be the focus of the assessment, and that it is the results/achievements for the groups of beneficiaries and not the cooperating organisation as such that should be sustained. The long term achievements or impact remains to be seen.

Public base/foundation

One of the key factors highlighted in the first assessment of the organisation when the initial CRN proposal was submitted to NORAD (DiS, 1996), was the public foundation/base in Norway through OKS and other churches. There has been a formal change in this in 2001, as OKS has withdrawn from the board and their direct financial support has ended. However, this is mainly a formal change of arrangement, as the collaboration with OKS still is described as close. The only formal link now is the intention agreement with OKS to allow CRN to represent itself in the church and collect money. The public base is now otherwise linked to 200 private individual donors, mainly recruited from the church.

The public base/foundation in Uganda is described to be GMAC, which is now an organisation without formal ties to churches, but with individuals that are active members of churches. In addition the public base is described to be more through the fact that members of the board are from Ministry of Gender and Community, as well as others, but also through the local communities where projects are implemented.

The public base/foundation in DR Congo is described to be especially the church network, CEPAC. Key persons are drawn from the network for different projects. The Central Committee in CEPAC appoints three representatives of which one is member of the Committee to be in the leader group of the project organisation CRN/CEPAC. Apparently there have been some critics that that the CEPAC representation and public base is weak, and that CRN/CEPAC mainly operates on its own. CRN itself describes the situation somewhat differently, that CRN/CEPAC provides an opportunity to operate under different “identities” according to whom it is in contact with

Dependency on individuals

There is little doubt that the organisation, partners and their work may be characterised as quite dependent on a few individuals, especially Mr Rønsen, Mr Andersson and Rev. Kamese. However, there are also other people involved in the work, and it is difficult to say what would happen if one of these three left the organisations. Administratively there are quite good routines etc., but it is unlikely that the work could continue as before if any of these were replaced. The work could continue in one way or the other. More importantly, is it likely that the achievements or results would be sustained? The organisation should still focus on this issue.

Is there a duality in the organisation?

The duality of the organisation as it is described by some of the interviewees, doing both *political* and *humanitarian* work, makes the organisation difficult to understand and assess. As mentioned, CRN describes itself as non-political and that it is important to remain so in order to achieve what they are aiming at. They say they will not allow themselves to become mediators for any part in the many conflicts they work, as this would result in lack of confidence by the other side. They are, on the other side, quite open with the fact that they have good connections at high political level in both DR Congo, Uganda and also in Norway, which might lead to the conception that they are a political actor in the Great Lakes Region.

Collaboration/coordination with others

CRN does not associate itself with the international NGOs nor with the UN system. (Although as mentioned there are examples on practical cooperation). The CRN project organisations do not participate much in international meetings or in meetings of those in the region. They claim they want to be associated with the target groups, and the local churches, and will neither spend their time nor their money on these types of meetings.

The other side is that this low level of cooperation with external support agents may restrict transfer of useful knowledge into the project implementation. Possible examples are the lack of collaboration with UNICEF and Save the Children Fund (SCF) where obtaining some of their experiences with regards to working in the area of children in prisons, abducted children and child-soldiers and similar issues, could have been a major benefit. Collaboration could also have lead to increased trust in the organisation and its work among other agencies.

Collaboration with local communities and national authorities appears to be much stronger, but it is unclear exactly where the strengths and weaknesses are.

Ability to use the competence of other organisations

In line with the above comments the ability to use the technical competence of other organisations seems weak, both those involved in *refugee questions* and those involved in *humanitarian and long-term assistance*. In the DiS assessment of 1996 the importance of seeking this type of collaboration was highlighted, and also the fact that the organisation intended to do so. The strong local knowledge clearly seems to have been the key to achievements, whereas the lack of collaboration with other external agencies otherwise could have been far more problematic.

Ability to adapt to changing environment

Much of the strength of the organisation and its partners seems to be the ability to adapt to changing environments. This may be attributable to the size of the organisation, the fact that it is very young and does not have long traditions or ties, and last but not least, the personality of the Director.

Do the projects correspond to general human rights, humanitarian and psychosocial standards?

The beneficiaries of the projects are reported as: Children who are abducted to armed groups and children put in custody on indications of criminal acts that are more or less proved or verified; guerrilla soldiers or rebel groups; IDP families and refugee families.

This document review can start a short discussion of the different project activities in the perspective of humanitarian and psychosocial standards, with short checklists as points of departure. These issues should be checked out as far as possible during the fieldwork.

1. *Reintegration of abducted children from armed groups*³. Important principles that are based on the *Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC)*:
2.
 - Prevention of recruitment of new children, or re-recruitment.
 - Interim care in centres should be combined with community based reintegration
 - Participation of the children themselves in the reintegration process

³Definition: "Child soldier means any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms." From paper on "Annotated principles and best practice – on the prevention of recruitment of children into the armed forces and demobilisation and social reintegration of child soldiers in Africa." Principles adopted by a symposium of UNICEF and NGOs, Cape Town, 30 April 1997.

- Special care of girls who have been with armed groups
- Care givers in this process should be well trained
- Reintegration should be a civilian responsibility
- Protection issues must be negotiated and secured in cooperation with local authorities

Prevention of recruitment: The CRN programmes focus on children who have been in armed groups and most often have fled from them. Preventive measures may be the close contact with the government military forces, local authorities and church network that these contacts may provide. This may generate knowledge as to factors relating to recruitment, which can be utilised. The children's families are supported and followed up to a certain extent, which may prevent re-recruitment.

Care centres and reintegration: International experience emphasises that children who have been with armed forces for up to several years have often had multiple traumatic experiences, are wounded and malnourished, need a period of more intensive, sometimes specialised assistance and re-adjustment which may not be available in their communities. At the same time every possible effort needs to be made to trace family members while children are in interim care at centres and utilise maximally resources in the nearby community to help children re-learn the "rules" of normal social interaction. – Two reintegration programmes in Uganda report on training and education in centres, in one a "two months political, economic and social awareness programme", besides food, clothing and medical treatment. One programme reports of government army persons as trainers, which is a debated issue. There are no reports on girls being given special consideration.

Reintegration in the community: The children and youth are transported back to their families and communities once they have been traced and a reunification accepted. The families receive a resettlement package and some follow up visits by social workers.

Protection: The returnees assisted in the projects receive certificates of amnesty and protection from local authorities and government forces, to what extent is not known. It is reported on conflicts between ex-soldiers and other local people.

2. Release and rehabilitation of children in custody

This is often children who are abused at home, are orphans and lack other caregivers, are school dropouts and street children. Some of the principles of reintegration as mentioned above are valid for this group as well. CRC guidelines are very important when this group is looked after. – The CRN projects reports that a large proportion of the children may not really be criminals, this is one main reason for the emphasis on rapid release from detention once they are identified and local reintegration. Some education and skills training are reported during detention. Many of the girls bring their small children into prison. Special care is taken for these children.

3. Humanitarian support to reintegration of refugees, IDPs and ex-rebels

Some of the projects in Uganda and all in DR Congo and Rwanda deal with refugees, IDPs and ex-rebels, common to the situation of these groups seems to be that they are in a situation between acute emergency and the needs for a more stable resettlement. Some general

principles for interventions in projects that are in the transition between humanitarian and development work⁴ may be stated in this way:

1. Strengthening of local, community and national structures to better deliver administrative and other basic services that reinforce systems of governance.
2. Restoration of basic health, water and sanitation services and enhancement of accountable and indigenous cost-recovery schemes.
3. Revival of basic primary education services.
4. Resettlement of family members and support to re-establishing their livelihoods.
5. Restoration of domestic food and agricultural production and marketing systems.
6. Support for income generating entrepreneurial activities complemented by expansion of the private and informal sectors.

The CRN projects in DR Congo and Rwanda seem to function well in accordance to these principles: Emphasis is on safe transport back to local communities where that is possible, start packages with utensils and seed when returned, rebuilding of health centres and schools, some opportunities for paid employment.

Some principles related to psychosocial needs for these groups will most probably be relevant as well: The overall aim of responding to psycho-social needs in complex emergencies (and the time after) as part of the humanitarian response, is to create and maintain a more humane and effective assistance to the affected people through:

- Promoting the restoration of the will and ability to cope
- Protecting peoples dignity, integrity and rights
- Promoting and protecting child development and rights
- Reducing mental suffering and psychosocial stress
- Preventing the accumulation of further trauma and distress”⁵

The practical support as mentioned above in the CRN projects in both Uganda, DR Congo and Rwanda might provide some basis for coping with such needs, but they are not defined as psychosocial projects, which seems fair enough. For example, it might be of interest whether health personnel in the rebuilt ever have the opportunity (or the knowledge) to relate to such needs for visitors of the health facilities.

⁴ From "Relief Work in Complex Emergencies – The Norwegian NGO Experience" MFA Evaluation Report 14.1998

⁵ MFA Report 14.1998.

Summary of Findings

The main findings from this study may be summarised as follows, most of them should be relevant for further assessment and critical discussion during the fieldwork.

- The projects cover humanitarian aid for resettlement and reintegration of groups that are in very difficult situations, which many aid organisations find difficult to assist.
- The implementation of the projects takes place in a context of political instability and armed groups that are active and often counteract efforts of consolidation and reconciliation.
- The projects are based on a sort of “balanced networking” between groups of opposing and very different (political) interests.
- Duality? The political contacts in Uganda and DRC may lead to the conclusions of the organisation not only to be a humanitarian, but also a political agency. This is strongly denied by the leadership, who points out the importance of *not* being a political actor or mediator.
- The ability of the organisation to lobby and have direct contacts with Norwegian politicians, may have given an impression of being “a special case” with special benefits. This has not been observed in the assessment.
- The local cooperation and implementation are based mainly on individuals who have good credibility and trust across local interests, these individuals are recruited through the local churches, but do not represent them as such.
- The local implementing partners are mainly set up as small, very tasks and results oriented project groups.
- The Norwegian partner organisation, CRN, has similar characteristics to the local ones: Small, efficient and results oriented, and although not fully assessed, appears to be cost-effective (low administrative costs). Criteria for results as described in documents appear to be highly quantitative, although there are qualitative aspects as well.
- There have *hardly been any relations between CRN and other international stakeholders*, such as international NGOs and the UN system. This is partly described as a deliberate decision, partly a circumstantial factor.
- CRN has legal status as a trust and is thus not formally an NGO and have no formal links to churches or represent Christian networks as such, although it *originates* in a specific church network, with which it still has some links and informal support.
- Financial documentation, such as budgets, accounts, financial audits and reports appear to be according to requirements. Most of the local expenses are accounted for locally and audited locally by an international audit company (Ernst & Young). No financial irregularities have been reported nor have been found through this exercise.
- Since 1997 a total of approx NOK 62 million have been channelled from NORAD/MFA through CRN to the projects. Of these have NOK 54,08 million been channelled from MFA and NOK 7.7 million from NORAD.
- The administrative capacity seems to be in place, and interesting and innovative computer based systems for follow up are developed.
- According to the criteria defined by CRN most of the projects have achieved very good results, with more than 100% goal attainment. When this is not obtained, the obstacles are well documented. From the documentation the immediate achievements seem quite striking.

- One of the key criteria for success seems to be the very strong commitment of the leadership of CRN and partners, but also the size of the organisation, which makes it able to act on short notice and have a solid overview of activities.
- Another factor is the focus on projects as activities with a beginning and an end, which does not allow building up large permanent organisational structures and infrastructure.
- The *strength of the CRN Director* is his strong vision, his orientation towards results and his political insight, not to mention his genuine engagement for the people he wants to reach.
- The *weakness* may be that it is difficult for others to follow up the work if he was to end his work.
- A major weakness seems to be strong dependency on individuals, and thus vulnerability
- Sustainability of organisations appears not to be the most relevant issue, but the sustainability of achievements, which has not been assessed here.
- The projects appear to be in accordance with general standards and guidelines for humanitarian aid in a period of transition to more stable development.
- The special knowledge and experiences of key organisations working with assistance to various groups of children and youth in special circumstances are not explicitly taken into the projects.
- There are a number of *lessons* to be drawn from the work of CRN and its partners, particularly the focus on short term achievements; the benefits of a small organisation, which can operate projects that actually have an end; the ability to use IT technology for efficient management; just to mention a few.

Annex 1: Table over Projects and Status

Project title	Geogr. concentration	Target groups	Objectives	Main Activities	Local partner and role	Project period and budget	Status Comments
CRN 04 Give me a chance - Release and rehabilitation of children in custody NORAD	Uganda	Children 5-18 ys in prisons/custody Children 0-5 ys with their mothers in prisons Year 1: 100 Year 2: 400 Year 3: 500	Release and rehabilitation of children in prisons and custody • Release of those that have not been sentenced. • Release at the right time after ended sentence • A life in freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment/training of local project administration • Establishment of computerised system for adm. • Employment of 8-10 field workers • Purchase of 4-5 vehicles • Visit all prisons and institutions • Register the first 100 children (under 18) and prepare them for repatriation (1st year) • Legal and practical help at release • Transport, with personal counsellor • Follow up from counsellor • Regular meetings with local NGO and authorities 	Agape Prisons Foundation Inc. (APF) Ministry of Gender and Community Dev.	1997- 2001 NOK 6.680.200 (80%) CRN: 1.716.060 (20%) Additional proposal of 500.000 for 2001 rejected due to budget constraints	In progress 1000 children after 3 years 1500 children in total Audited: 9 May 2001

CRN 04 Give me a chance Application 2002 – 2004 NORAD	Uganda	400 children in custody	Release and rehabilitation of children in prisons and custody	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repatriating 400 children • Initiate 400 micro-projects for the families • Follow-up of all the children repatriated in 2001 • Follow-up of 50 small children (0-2 ys) in prisons with mothers • Phasing in of all micro-finance part 1 	Give Me A Chance	Appl. 2.316.000 2.438.000 <u>2.389.000</u> 7.143.000 CRN: 10%	Application for 2002 – 04 Referred to internal evaluation, but not ready
CRN 11 Peace Initiative in Uganda MFA: MR/HUM UGAK8794	Western Uganda Area around Rwenzori Mountain	ADF leaders Uganda Authorities King of Rwenzori	Re-establish lasting peace	Establish contact between the fighting partners and facilitate a peaceful development	Give Me A Chance President Museveni General Major Salé	Aug. –Dec. 1998 NOK 1.470.000	Ended Audited 2 November 2000 90% performance End report requested by MFA in July 2000
CRN 12 Demobilisation and reintegration of Guerrilla Soldiers MFA: MR/HUM UGAK9033	North-Western Uganda West Nile, Arua	People who had been involved in subversive or armed rebel activities and/or who had given up these activities (700) (no children)	Contribute to peace and prosperity in the West Nile region of Uganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish demobilisation Centre • Demobilise and reintegrate ex-rebels • Provide resettlement package • Follow up 	Give Me A Chance Min. of Security, Min. of Internal Affairs, UPDF	Jan. 1999 – Dec. 2000 MFA: NOK 9.562.000 CRN: NOK 286.000 (3%)	Ended Audited 2 November 2000 Achievement: 1100 former rebels resettled in their communities Lira: Smaller rebel groups Nairobi: Political refugees Funds mainly for resettlement packages
CRN 17 Reintegration of rebels/political prisoners MFA: MR/HUM UGAK0117	Western Uganda West Nile	900 rebels (men) imprisoned for subversive and armed rebel activities	Reconcile and reintegrate former rebels/political prisoners into the community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensitise affected communities in receiving/accepting ex-rebels • Receive, rehabilitate and follow-up ex-rebels • Resettlement package, incl. income generating activity • Cooperation with govt. ministers, distr. commiss. armed forces, sec. pers. local leaders, communities 	Give Me A Chance	Jan – Dec. 2000 NOK 4.362.200 CRN: NOK 87.000	Ended Audited 9 May 2001 Final report available Govt. granted amnesty 905 rebels successfully resettled in respective communities Some negative responses from community members Common packages, e.g. mills

CRN 19 Resettlement of ex-rebels, Western Uganda MFA: MR/HUM 1010056 UGA	Western Uganda Kasese, Kabarole	Rebel soldiers and their commanders/leaders from ADF 250-300 rebels	Re-establish peace, stability and development in Western Uganda, suffering from terror attacks from the rebellion group ADF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Keep contact and cooperation with civil and military authorities for demobilisation and reintegration • Establish and operate transit centres in Kasese • Individual start-packages • Follow-up/ counselling for 6 months 	Give Me A Chance Office of the President Minister in Charge of Security Defence (UPDF) District level civil administration	Oct./Nov. 2000 – Dec. 2001 NOK 4.785.000 CRN: NOK 130.000	Pr. Desember 2001 47 of 219 < 12 ys 60 of 219 = 12-18 ys 320 of 585 > 18 yrs 265 of 585 < 18 yrs Application NOK 700.000, till July 2002
CRN 06 Distribution of seed, tools, blankets, pots and BP-5 to internally displaced MFA: MR/HUM? ZARK7237	DR Congo (Zaire), North Kivu in Masisi	Malnourished children and families who have lost their belongings in the recent war. The poorest of the poor. (?) 30000 families	Help internal refugees back on their feet after continued instability and violence over a long period of time.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce casualties/damages from malnutrition, among children • Reduce the no of people suffering from cold weather • Assist families in quickly restoring own food production 	CEPZa North Kivu (CEPAC) DT Nordic AB Local authorities	April – Dec. 1997 NOK 3.753.600 CRN: 5.7%	Ended Audited 3 February 1999 Achievement: 180% (80% more families than planned) 5,500 families assisted
CRN 08 Re-establishing primary health care for 350.000 formerly IDP in North Kivu MFA: MR/HUM? ZARK8025	DR Congo, North Kivu in Masisi	350.000 former IDP.	Re-establishing primary health care for 300.000 former IDP in North Kivu through rehabilitation and equipping 30 clinics and training of health personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehabilitation and building of new health centres • Training of health personnel (not reported well on?) 	CRN/CEPAC Goma	Jan. 1998- June 1999 NOK 4.295.031 CRN:NOK 298.186	Ended Audited 14 December 1999 Achievements: 31 clinics rehabilitated/built serving 320.000 Outbreak of war right after project start. Promise of new funds from MFA through RAFK 9352 (Continued in CRN 13)

CRN 09 Assistance (start packages) to refugees returning to DR Congo from camps in Rwanda MFA: MR/HUM? RAFK8450	DR Congo, Goma and North Kivu	1300 Congolese refugee families when returning from Rwanda to North Kivu	Assist in repatriation of 1300 Congolese refugee families living in camps in Rwanda by providing "start packages" (clothing, seeds, tools, etc.) when they return to North Kivu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distribution of start packages in Goma to refugees who of own choice are coming back from Rwanda 	CRN/CEPAC Goma	June 1998- Dec. 1998 NOK 625.420 CRN: NOK 88.000 4.3%	Ended Audited 14 December 1999 Achievements: 2070 families helped (efficiency gains) (Transit camps established: "the start packages proved to be a determining factor for the refugees to be self sustained during this period") Approx. 12.000 refugees benefited from the project upon reaching the Transit Camp. The numbers in the Transit Camp fluctuated between 4000 and 8000 people. A minimum of 4000 people reached their homes. (Continued in CRN 13 and CRN 16)
CRN 10 Assistance (seeds, tools) to IDP in Gisenye District in Rwanda MFA: RAFK8450	Rwanda, Gisenyi District	Former IDPs in Gisenye District 10.000 families	Contribute to peace in North-West Rwanda by providing help to IDP trying to break from extreme forces (Interhamwe) and settle in own communities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of seeds, tools, blankets and cooking pots 	CEPAC Originally: ADEPR, but in agreement with the leadership, the agricultural authorities in Gisenyi District lead the distribution	June 1998- Dec. 1998 NOK 1.979.459 CRN: NOK 60.000	Ended Audited 14 December 1999 Achievements: 15.000 families received seeds and tools (no blankets and pots)

CRN 13 D.R.Congo and Rwanda. Health, Education and prevention of conflicts. MFA: RAFK9352	DR Congo, North Kivu in Masisi	Re-establish PHC services for 200.000 returned internal refugees, schools for 5000 students. Assist 15.000 refugees back to D.R.Congo		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rebuild 15 new health centres • Rebuild 6 primary schools • Provide family package to refugees (10 kg of seeds, 2-3 agric. Tools, 3 blankets, pots & pans) • Travel expenses for 2000 pastors • Road improvements 	CEPAC DR Congo ADEPR, Rwanda	June 1999 June 2001 NOK 7.020.500 CRN: NOK 370.500 4.3%	End report soon available Audit soon ready 18 clinics and 6 schools 18 seminars for 3500 pastors re peace and reconciliation Assisted refugees
CRN 14 Repatriating 50.000 displaced Hutus from DR Congo to Rwanda MFA: ZARK0078	Rwanda and DR Congo	50.000 displaced Hutus	Repatriating 50.000 displaced Hutus from DR Congo to Rwanda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 reception stations in churches in Masisi mountains • 2 transit stations in the Masisi Mountains • Transport Masisi – Goma -Gisenyi 	CRN/CEPAC Collaboration with UNHCR	March 2000 –	In progress Not yet audited
CRN 15 Demobilising the Mai-Mai guerrilla in Kivu-province (As stated above, the demobilizing aspect was dropped) MFA: ZARK0078	DR Congo	10.800 soldiers in Kivu	Demobilising the Mai-Mai guerrilla in Kivu-province Now: Employment of former guerrillas in road and forestry work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide road- and forest employment to about 50% of the soldiers (many minors) • Medical care and clothing, cooking pans and a blanket • Saws 	CRN/CEPAC	December 2001 NOK 15.000.000 CRN:NOK 130.000	In progress Not yet audited The project has changed dramatically and is now mainly an employment project for former guerrillas 60 km road is built

CRN 16 Repatriating 35.000 displaced Tutsis from camps in Rwanda to DR Congo MFA: ZARK0078	Rwanda and DR Congo	35.000 displaced Tutsis (Scaled down due to budget restrictions)	Repatriating 35.000 displaced Tutsis from camps in Rwanda to DR Congo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide transport • Establish transit camp in Goma (1-2 days) • Establish a number of transit camps in Masisi, where refugees may be secure while exploring the community. Two health centres to be built 	CRN/CEPAC ADEPR, Rwanda		In progress Not yet audited UNHCR not involved in this
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Annex 2 Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference
for
Consultancy to review
Projects financed by Norway and supported through Christian Relief Network in
The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda

Background

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) have since 1997 financed projects through Christian Relief Network (CRN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda. The projects support demobilisation, reintegration, rehabilitation, emergency assistance, peace and reconciliation.

The immediate recipient of funds from MFA and NORAD is CRN in Norway. CRN works with local partners in Uganda (Give Me a Chance), Communauté des Eglises de Pentecôte en Afrique Centrale (CEPAC) in DRC and Association des Eglises de Pentecôte du Rwanda (ADEPR) in Rwanda.

MFA and NORAD have decided to carry out a review of the projects for the purposes of control, learning and as input for the consideration of further funding. The mode of work will be to

1. review documentation and interview staff in MFA, NORAD and CRN in Norway,
2. interview personnel in other Norwegian Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that have received Norwegian funds for activities in the same geographical area, (i.e. Norwegian Church Aid, The Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian Peoples' Aid and Save the Children Norway),
3. review documentation in the partner organisations,
4. interview staff in partner organisations and other relevant institutions/organisations in the three countries, and
5. carry out site visits and where possible, get an impression of the impact of the projects for the target groups.

These terms of reference apply to work in Oslo related to paras 1 and 2 above.

Engagement

Center for Health and Social Development (HeSo) is engaged to assist in the review. The work will be carried out by

1. Ingvar Theo Olsen
 2. Anne Hertzberg,
- Further referred to as the Consultants.

Assignment

The Consultants shall undertake a desk study to review CRN and projects in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda for which the organisation has received Norwegian funds since 1997.

In addition, the Consultants are to interview staff in CRN in Norway. Interviews are also to be made with staff in NORAD, MFA and other Norwegian Non-governmental organisations. The Consultants shall, based on project applications and documents, agreements, letters of appropriation (tilsagnsbrev), detailed budgets and accounts as well as other relevant documentation regarding project and financial management, and the interviews, analyse and evaluate both ongoing and terminated projects focussing on:

- CRN: membership base, affiliations, strategy, competence and experience, personnel, financial and administrative management;
- Local partners: membership base, income, capacity for fundraising, sustainability, competence and experience, financial and administrative management
- Description of each project: goal, objectives, components, target groups, activities and partnerships,
- degree of achievement of results,
- expenditures in relation to budgets,
- distribution of expenses by items
- use of funds in Norway
- level of salaries and administration costs by local partner
- degree of non-project related expenses

The relevant documentation will be made available in MFA and NORAD as well as in CRN.

The Consultants shall

Prepare a background document, compiling and analysing the above information, and giving recommendations on issues to be further looked into by the review team in the field. This background document should also make a short summary of applications for funds sent to MFA and NORAD for consideration for funding.

Provide input to the review team's report in terms of
Background on CRN .

Assessment of efficiency in CRN and partner organisations / projects in view of the above information compiled in Oslo.

Description of projects: goal, objectives, components, target groups, activities and partnerships.

Time Frame

Heso Report

The Consultants will start their work on 21st January 2002. Input to the main report is to be handed over no later than February 20th. The assignment is shall not exceed 80 hrs and is to be funded under the frame agreement between NORAD and HeSo.

Oslo,.....

Else Berit Eikeland

Deputy Director

Department for Civil Society and Private Sector Development

Annex 3 People interviewed

MFA:

Kristin Lunden
Terje Theodor Nervik
Arthur Fredrik
Arild Øyen

NORAD:

Anne Liv Evensen

NCA:

Odd Halgrim Evjen

NRC:

Marit Backe

Redd Barna:

Elisabeth Jareg

PYM:

Jørgen Hardang

CRN:

Bent Rønsen
Solbjørg Sjøveian
Johs Ensby

PART 3
**The Political and Social Situation of Displaced Children in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda**

Condensed Background Brief
Prepared for the NORAD/Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mission
to Review the Activities of Christian Relief Network

Paul George, Ph.D.

May 11, 2002

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to explore the political and social background underlying the plight of war-affected children in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, to highlight the challenges they face in overcoming the legacy of conflict and to suggest options and strategies to aid in the recovery of their lives. Prolonged conflict has many serious implications for the well being of children.⁶ In short, the rights of children are violated at every level in conflicts over which they have no control.

The Context - Conflicts in the Great Lakes Region

Donors and NGOs face complex challenges in addressing the phenomenon of war-affected children in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The situation is compounded by the sheer number of actors involved and the various interrelated conflicts directly involving Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The following section briefly describes the conflict dynamics in the three countries and sets the stage for the subsequent examination of the ways in which children have been affected by conflict in the region.

The Rwanda Genocide

The impact of the Rwandan genocide on that country has been well documented. It has been estimated that close to a million Tutsi people were massacred by Hutus in 100 days of ethnically driven terror in 1994. The end of the genocide was made possible by the support the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army was given by Uganda. This demonstrates the complex nature of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region and helps explain the broader impact that the events in Rwanda have had on regional peace and security since 1994.

The war that ended the Rwandan genocide led to massive flows of Hutu refugees into the DRC (then known as Zaire). More than a million refugees settled primarily in the border areas of north and south Kivu. Many of the refugees were former members of the *Forces Armées du Rwanda* (FAR) who operated closely with Interahamwe militia, composed of Hutus responsible for the Rwandan genocide.

It is no exaggeration to state that the regional conflict in the Great Lakes directly results from the Rwandan genocide. In particular, the failure to block the escape of the perpetrators of the genocide to Zaire, and their subsequent attempts to reconsolidate their power from their bases in Zaire/Congo, led directly to Rwandan intervention and the present conflict.

War in the DRC

The war in the DRC has gone through several stages since the chaos of the Rwandan genocide. The elimination of the security threat to Rwanda posed by the presence of thousands of *génocidaire* refugees was the primary objective of the First Congo War of 1996-1997. In this, the

⁶ The Convention on the Rights of the Child defines children as “every human being below the age of eighteen years”.

Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), together with a number of Zairian opponents of Mobutu, attacked and closed the refugee camps in the Kivus. The war also aimed to remove Mobutu from power, through support by Rwanda and Uganda for a group of anti-Mobutu exiles under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The various alliances that had formed at the beginning of the campaign to unseat Mobutu then changed dramatically. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi opposed Kabila whereas Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia supported him. Thus began the Second Congo War which, because of its regional dimensions, has become known as the “First World War of Africa,” or “Africa’s First Continental War.” It continues today.

Various mediation attempts, for example by the OAU and SADC, have failed to bring about a conclusive cease-fire let alone a durable peace. There has clearly been an effort by some parties to play for time as numerous corrupt officials have sought to keep the war going in order to secure access to the rich natural resources of the DRC.

Rebels occupied nearly half the country by the time the Lusaka cease-fire/peace agreement was signed between the external participants and their local allies in July 1999. The Lusaka agreement remains to be fully implemented, in particular regarding the failure of Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their forces, and violations of the cease-fire are common. Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001, in as yet unexplained circumstances, and replaced by his son Joseph Kabila.

The end of the genocide may have brought relative peace to Rwanda but the way it ended served to transfer the conflict into the DRC with dire consequences for the entire Great Lakes region. There have been an estimated 2.5 million deaths since the outbreak of the fighting in August 1998. The reality is that there is more incentive for the parties to keep the conflict going than there is for them to actively pursue peace. Uganda and Rwanda both claim that their forces are in DRC to provide security from the rebel groups opposing them. As long as this problem continues and the border areas remain insecure, neither country will withdraw its troops from DRC. At the same time, there is little doubt that the war in DRC is generating a lot of revenue for the parties involved. Individuals and governments are profiting enormously from the pillage of DRC’s resources, including diamonds, timber and coltan.

Conflict in Uganda

Apart from its military intervention in the DRC, Uganda has had to contend with a number of serious internal conflicts and rebel movements in recent years. Some of these are supported closely by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias active in the DRC. There has been extensive insurgent activity in the northern and western sections of the country. In the west, the Allied Democratic Force (ADF), a combination of fundamentalist Muslim rebels and remnants of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), has collaborated with the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militias. Uganda’s major role in the conflict in DRC is linked to an important degree to its need to counter the ADF. Two other groups which operated in the northwest of the country in the late 1990s, the West Nile Bank Front and the Uganda National Rescue Front are now considered defunct but the legacy of their violence continues. By far the most dangerous group opposing the government is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which operates out of bases in southern Sudan and has caused enormous casualties and human suffering across the north of Uganda. The LRA has also linked up on occasion with Interahamwe forces and other groups opposed to the RCD in Congo.

More than 6,000 children were abducted by the LRA during 1998 alone, although many reportedly managed to escape or were released. Estimates are that the LRA still holds some 3,000 children captive. Abducted children are not only terrorized and sexually abused, they are forced into combat and are made to kill other children who attempt to escape.

In the past, the LRA has received military assistance and support from the Islamic government in Sudan (as the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army has also received support from Uganda). However, the relationship between Uganda and Sudan has entered a new cooperative phase and Ugandan forces have been allowed to pursue LRA rebels into southern Sudan and have destroyed some of their bases. It remains to be seen if the LRA will regroup and strike back or if this new Uganda-Sudan understanding signifies a significant development that will lead towards the resolution of this conflict.

Children and Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

As in most wars, women and children have borne a disproportionate burden of suffering in the conflicts in the Great Lakes region. In all cases, child soldiers have been heavily implicated in the fighting and thousands of children have been orphaned, wounded, displaced and otherwise victimized because of the conflict.

Child Soldiers

There is an established international legal framework for safeguarding the rights of children in armed conflict situations. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which entered into force in 1990, states that parties to the convention “shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities” (Article 38/2) and that they “shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces ...” (Article 38/3). All of the countries active in the Great Lakes conflicts have ratified this convention. In addition, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which came into effect in February 2002, establishes eighteen as the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities (Article 1), for compulsory recruitment (Article 2), and states that “Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years” (Article 4/1). Of the parties to the conflicts in the region, only DRC has ratified the Optional Protocol. Several other African initiatives have also addressed the issue of child soldiers. For example, the “Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers” of 1999 called upon “all African States to promote an environment that favours the safe and healthy development of children and to take all necessary measures to ensure that no child under 18 years of age takes part in armed conflict.” Despite such efforts, in reality, children have been widely recruited to fight in conflicts throughout Africa by both governments as well as by opposition forces and militia groups.

Although it is difficult to get accurate figures, and official denials are common, current estimates are that more than 10,000 child soldiers remain enrolled in armies and armed groups in the DRC. Rwanda reportedly recruits thousands of children each year both into the armed forces and into Local Defence Forces. Many of these children are believed to be sent to fight in the DRC. In

Uganda, as noted above, but also in DRC and Rwanda, children are routinely abducted and forced into combat roles by various factions. Reports from the region this year indicate that the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma continues to forcibly recruit child soldiers. Many other children, who have lost their families and homes, simply volunteer to become soldiers because they have no other means to survive.

Street Children

The wars in the Great Lakes region have displaced millions of people and led to thousands of children being separated from their families. Many of these children subsist on the streets of urban centres such as Kampala, Kisingani and Goma where they are visible reminders of the failure of society to provide them with even basic sustenance and shelter. Many others endure their suffering in the rural areas. Street children have no access to education or health care and they survive, usually, through criminal activities and prostitution. In the DRC, more than two million people are internally displaced, including a large number of children. Many of these are separated from their families and are living on the streets. In Uganda, there are some 8000 street children, about half of them living in the capital. Street children are very difficult to rehabilitate owing to their distrust of authority, anti-social behaviour and heavy use of drugs.

Associated with the crisis of street children is another legacy of war and conflict, *“Households Headed by Children”*. The term refers both to situations where children head a dwelling peopled by other children, as well as circumstances where children have no physical roof over their heads but live together with other children in “family” environment. Many children who have lost their parents have taken on the responsibility of looking after their siblings and other unaccompanied minors.

Youth Prisoners

The wars and upheavals described above have not only exposed children to armed conflict they have also led to juveniles being imprisoned for war crimes. Following the Rwandan genocide thousands of children were detained for their alleged complicity in the massacres. Some of these were as young as 8 years of age. Many children are still awaiting trial on genocide charges. In other cases, the sheer number of displaced children and the extent of poverty throughout the Great Lakes region has naturally led to heightened criminal activity and concomitant increases in youth prisoners. Moreover, children are often the victims of unfair punishment and have been jailed for very minor offences or are tried as adults for what would be recognised as juvenile crimes elsewhere. Such children are frequently subjected to physical and sexual abuse and have little or no access to education or health facilities. In addition, many very young children are in prison simply because their mothers have been imprisoned for some offence. The Convention on the Rights of the Child obliges states to hold child offenders separately from adults (Article 37c), yet children are invariably held in the general prison population throughout the region.

Challenges Concerning the Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation of War-Affected Children

The conflict environment in the Great Lakes has affected children in complex ways and there is no simple answer to the challenges that must be overcome if they are to recover some degree of

normalcy in their lives. There are common threads that tie together children affected by conflict. These include: widespread poverty; high degrees of psycho-social trauma; limited access to education, health and other social services; indifferent governments and weak governance; high unemployment levels or non-existent employment skills; inadequate legislative frameworks to protect children's interests; high levels of human-rights violations that impact directly on children; and decision-making processes that ignore the needs of children.

These characteristics suggest areas where external assistance can be applied to help war-affected children rebuild their lives in a post-conflict environment. Priority areas include: demobilization and reintegration of child combatants; resettlement of internally displaced children and repatriation of children from abroad; tracing of families of unaccompanied children; rehabilitation and support of wounded victims, especially those missing limbs; and provision and rehabilitation of medical and educational services. In the case of child combatants, the essential first step is to ensure that adequate measures are taken to ensure their effective disarmament and demobilisation and their eventual reintegration into productive civilian life. Non-combatant war-affected children will likely need repatriation assistance to return them to their homes or communities, especially if they fled the country during the war. They will also need help to reintegrate into society. In all cases - combatant and non-combatant children - there will be high demands for trauma counselling and other social assistance to help the transition from a conflict to a post-conflict environment.

Demobilisation

Particular problems that have been noted with respect to child soldier demobilisation programs include, first, that the various parties to the conflict might not admit that they have child soldiers in their ranks. Therefore, any such children will not necessarily be included in a formal demobilisation program. Second, adult soldiers often receive cash or goods in exchange for their weapons; child soldiers, especially those who have served in non-combatant support roles, may not have any weapons to exchange and therefore miss out on any material incentives for returning to civilian society. Third, demobilising children requires a longer-term, sustainable, commitment than is the case for adults. Long-term assistance will also be required to help many children overcome severe trauma resulting from their wartime experiences. Girls and boys are affected by armed conflict differently from adults, and differently from each other. There are specific challenges with respect to former girl soldiers, particularly those who have small children or who are pregnant, and the disabled or sick who need special attention. It is important that demobilisation programs be inclusive and gender-sensitive. They should reflect the needs and interests of the children themselves.

Although the process should be as short as possible, an intensive period of sensitization to civilian life, and enough time to distance the children from the closed military circle they have been used to, is required. Once the process starts it must be sustained in the interests of the long-term development of the child. In addition, it can take several months before families can be traced and arrangements made to reunite children with their parents. If family reunification is not made a priority there is the risk that the child soldier will return, willingly or unwillingly, to the "security" of the military life with which he or she is most familiar. The timetable for the child's ultimate rehabilitation and full reintegration into society should be looked at in terms of years.

Reintegration

Reintegration refers to a comprehensive effort to provide ex-combatants with the means to pursue a non-military life. In the case of former child soldiers, the greatest need, if possible, is to reunite them with their families. It is essential to avoid the “institutionalization” of family separation and to get families back to “normality” as soon as possible. Only by reintroducing children to their communities and traditional support networks can the process of psychological healing and social reintegration be consolidated.

Children impacted by war need to receive counselling so they can adapt to peacetime society. Only after the child is psychologically established in a caring nurturing environment can full attention be given to educational needs or vocational training. Education and vocational training will help to ensure that they become contributing members of their communities. The actual approach must be fine-tuned to the special needs of the child, for example, older children, or those who have been separated from their traditional community structures the longest, may need more time to adjust to post-military life. Many children have spent their entire childhood in refugee camps or as fighters in the bush. In addition, there may be a need to treat particular health problems before the child can be brought into contact with the community.

Child-rights Perspectives

Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child sets out the fundamental principle guiding the rights-based approach to children and conflict:

All children have the right to life, survival and development.

Yet, the people most vulnerable to the collapse of societal norms in conflict situations - those least able to protect themselves - are children. Children are not only subject to the physical dangers of war and conflict related violence, they face serious risks to their health and development from the unavailability of basic social services. Girls, in particular, suffer gender-based violence in addition to the dangers all children in conflict situations experience. The promotion and protection of children's rights should be among the primary objectives of projects dealing with conflict-affected children.

A rights-based approach recognizes that interventions to help conflict-affected children can occur at many levels and be implemented by various agencies - governmental, the donor community, NGOs and the private sector. A priority, however, is to let conflict-affected children participate in decisions that affect their lives. Children should be fully engaged in the design, implementation, and evaluation of projects aimed at their rehabilitation. Practical measures to reinforce children's rights include the kinds of demobilisation and reintegration efforts described above, as well as more traditional development initiatives to deal with the root causes of conflict such as poverty reduction. Other priorities include trauma counselling, as part of the effort to reintegrate conflict-affected children, educational and health sector development, and support for family reunification.

Options and Strategies for Interventions to Assist the Reintegration of War-Affected Children

It is important that there be an integrated approach to protecting the rights of children affected by armed conflict. Programs to assist war-affected children must be coordinated and sustainable. The primary objective is to fully reintegrate thousands of children into the cultural, social and economic environment that was theirs before the chaos of war. They need to be able to rebuild their lives.