Norad

OCTOBER 2026

RESULTS REPORT

Civilian support during wartime

Results from the Nansen Support Programme



Norad
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

Author
Department for the Nansen Suppport Programme for Ukraine

ISBN: 978-82-8369-231-0
Published: 22 October 2026

www.norad.no
postmottak@norad.no

Cover photo: Power outages during Russia's war against Ukraine. People walk past emergency tents set up to provide a place to warm up in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Wednesday, 21 January 2026, after repeated Russian air strikes on the country's energy system left residents without electricity, water and heating. | Photo: Efrem Lukatsky, AP Photo/NTB

→ Andrij is a deminer with Norwegian People's Aid in Ukraine's Mykolaiv region. | Photo: Ida Kroksæter, Norwegian People's Aid

Contents

1. Introduction 4
- Foreword by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 4
- Summary 6
- About the report 13
- The Nansen Programme in figures 14

2. Ukraine 2023-2025: War and society under pressure 16
- The impact of the war on Moldova 19

3. The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine 20

4. Result area: Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security 29
- Emergency energy support to maintain critical services 30
- Reducing vulnerability in the energy sector through decentralised solutions 32
- Green reconstruction and energy efficiency 33
- Governance, reform and integrity in the energy sector 34

5. Result area: Fiscal stability and critical societal functions have been maintained 38
- Access to basic services was largely maintained 40
- State budget financing secured 41

6. Result area: Lives have been saved and people have received essential protection in accordance with humanitarian principles 44
- From emergency aid to more sustainable solutions 46
- Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights 53

7. Result area: Lasting, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full employment and decent work for all have been promoted 60
- Growth in private sector employment and economic activity 64
- Improved framework conditions for the private sector 66
- People have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines 69

8. Result area: Governance has improved, in line with the requirements for EU candidate countries 75
- Public institutions have strengthened their capacity 78
- Civil society has strengthened its capacity 86

9. The way forward 89

Annexes 92
- 1. Overview of support 93
- 2. Partners (overview) 94
- 3. Glossary 98
- 4. Theory of change 100

Foreword by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is an attack on freedom, sovereignty and international law. The Ukrainian people are fighting for the right to live in a free country and to choose their own future. Russia's war of aggression challenges European security and the fundamental principle that borders must not be changed by force. This concerns both the core principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter and, ultimately, our own security.

Through the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, Norway's support has broad backing in the Storting. Ukraine's own needs and priorities form the basis for the support. The combination of a long-term approach and flexibility provides predictability as well as room for manoeuvre to adapt to developments on the ground. Norway's support aims to strengthen Ukraine's ability to withstand Russia's war of aggression, both militarily and as a society.

Civilian support is essential to protect people and enable critical public functions to be maintained throughout the war. When energy systems are attacked, health services are placed under pressure and public institutions are subjected to severe strain, it is crucial that the international community helps to ensure that the state and society can continue to function. This is also fundamental for future reconstruction.

The effects of the war reach beyond Ukraine's borders. Civilian support therefore also includes neighbouring Moldova, which has been severely affected by the war.

This report provides an overview of what has been achieved through the civilian support administered by The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) in the period 2023–2025. It presents results, as well as dilemmas and constraints when supporting a country at war. Ukraine has a history of major corruption challenges, and needs can change rapidly. This places stringent demands on both the speed and accountability with which the support is managed.

The need to accept a higher level of risk than is normally associated with Norwegian development assistance has been acknowledged since the launch of the Nansen Support Programme, and the Storting has endorsed this approach in view of the need to provide Ukraine with the necessary support rapidly. The Office of the Auditor General of Norway has also recognised this in its reviews. The Government's assessment is that Norway would run an even greater risk by not supporting Ukraine in its fight to defend itself against Russian aggression.

We will work systematically to reduce risk, ensure that funds are used for the purposes agreed, and make adjustments as needs change. We will seek to gain as much knowledge as possible about the results achieved. We will learn from what works, be open about what does not work well enough, and use this knowledge to improve Norway's efforts.

The results belong first and foremost to the Ukrainian people. It is they who, in the midst of a brutal war of attrition, are keeping society running, defending their country and building for the future. Norway's responsibility is to ensure that the support we provide for their efforts is relevant, coordinated and of high quality.



Espen Barth Eide,
Minister of Foreign Affairs



Fire and rescue crews, hospital staff and volunteers clear rubble and search for people trapped beneath it following an attack on Okhmatdyt Hospital in Kyiv, Ukraine's largest children's hospital, on 8 July 2024. | Photo: Oleksii Fili, UNICEF

Summary

Since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has withstood a war that is increasingly targeting society's ability to function. Attacks on energy infrastructure, housing and other civilian infrastructure, pressure on the country's economy and state budget, the loss of people and expertise and a protracted humanitarian crisis have placed institutions, local communities, businesses and households under extraordinary pressure.

Nevertheless, throughout 2023-2026, Ukraine has continued to function as both a state and a society. Public services have been maintained, the economy and financial system have continued to function, damaged infrastructure has been repaired, often several times, and, at the same time, the country has continued to pursue reforms along its chosen path towards EU membership.

This in itself is an extraordinary achievement and Ukrainians themselves have borne the weight of this effort. Government agencies, local authorities, public sector employees, businesses, civil society, local communities and households have kept services and production running, repaired infrastructure, mobilised their own resources and developed new ways of working. At the same time, extensive international support from many countries has given the state and society greater capacity to respond to these pressures. Norway has been one of these countries. Through the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, established by the Storting in 2023, Norway has provided both military and civilian support.

Norwegian support to Ukraine totals NOK 219 billion for the period 2022-2026. Of this, NOK 52 billion is civilian support. The support is based on a political



→ Workers repair damaged railway tracks next to a crater caused by a missile explosion after a shelling in Kharkiv, on May 14, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. | Photo: Sergey Bobok, AFP/NTB

agreement from February 2023 and the 2024 Report to the Storting on the Nansen Programme[1]. The Report to the Storting sets out in greater detail the rationale for the support, the programme's objectives and key guidelines. The overarching objective is for Ukraine to be able to determine its own future. A key principle is that the support should be based on Ukraine's needs.

This report presents the results from the civilian support administered by Norad in 2023-2025. Norwegian civilian support to Ukraine and Moldova totalled NOK 31.1 billion over the period.[2]

In wartime, the fact that something does not collapse can in itself be a critical achievement. That the power comes back on after an attack. That the state can continue to fund essential services. That local authorities continue to carry out their functions. That people receive protection and can continue with their lives. That more people can remain in their homes. That institutions retain expertise that might otherwise have been lost. That reforms continue even as the war draws capacity and attention elsewhere. That free media can continue to provide independent reporting on the war to the Ukrainian public. That a strong civil society can contribute to resilience. An achievement can also lie in preventing damage from having wider consequences: for example, when backup power keeps a water treatment plant operational, preventing a local community from losing its water supply, emergency health services and the ability to sustain economic activity. At an overarching level, it is about ensuring that Ukrainians continue to have genuine opportunities to shape the kind of state and society Ukraine will be.

This goes to the heart of the Storting's rationale for the Nansen Programme. The objective that Ukraine should be able to determine its own future sits above the more specific objectives for civilian support. This means that the country retains sufficient sovereignty, fiscal and institutional capacity, a society capable of effective action and the room to shape its own development, despite Russia's attempts to impede that development by force.

To understand the results of the support, interventions must be assessed both individually and in terms of what they help to sustain in a wartime context. The value of restoring the energy supply lies not only in the number of megawatts brought back online. Electricity makes other achievements possible: Hospitals can treat patients, schools and businesses can continue to operate, government agencies can communicate and people can remain in their homes. The value of funding the state budget lies not only in the expenditure it covers, but in that it enables the state to maintain the capacity and services on which other parts of society depend. Similarly, an institution that retains expertise and the capacity to govern during the war can both perform more effectively today and reduce future losses and costs.

This means that what is preserved – and what is not lost – is also relevant when assessing resources against results. The counterfactual is uncertain. Nevertheless, the assessment must also capture the value of critical societal functions continuing to operate, enabling other parts of society, in turn, to function.

Overall results

1. Lives have been saved and people have received essential protection in accordance with humanitarian principles

A large number of people received food, cash assistance, healthcare, water, shelter and winter assistance through partners. The World Food Programme provided 1.1 million people in Ukraine with food and cash assistance in 2025. The Ukraine Humanitarian Fund reached around 1.4 million people in 2024 and approximately 660,000 in 2025. These are results achieved by partners and funds to which Norwegian funding contributed.[3]

Protection has become more specialised and rights-based. In 2025, Norwegian-supported partners provided legal assistance to at least 147,000 people. UNICEF provided individual case management to more than 65,000 children, while Save the Children provided follow-up support to over 900 children at particularly high risk. Since 2023, the Red Cross movement has helped more than 17,400 families establish the fate of missing relatives.



2. Fiscal stability and critical societal functions have been maintained

Ukraine has maintained a functioning state and essential public services under severe financial and physical pressure. Financing the defence effort, together with a significant fall in GDP in 2022, has placed considerable pressure on state resources. Throughout the full-scale war, Ukraine has run a state budget deficit of just under 20 per cent of GDP. Although Ukraine has increased tax collection, this does not cover the rise in defence expenditure. In 2025, Ukrainian government revenue was roughly equivalent to its defence expenditure. Ukraine therefore depends on external financing to maintain the state's civilian functions and service delivery. This enables the state to avoid placing an additional financial burden on a population already bearing the costs of war, or undermining economic activity and, consequently, the tax base. Norway had channelled NOK 10.6 billion through the World Bank by the end of 2025, primarily through the multi-donor Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF). Together with Ukrainian revenues and substantially larger-scale international financing, this has contributed to funding salaries, pensions, social benefits, healthcare, education and investment. World Bank programmes report,

← Distribution of hygiene kits in Odesa. | Photo: Danil Pavlov, Norwegian Church Aid

among other results, support for salary payments to approximately two million public sector employees and healthcare services to around 13 million people. These are results from jointly financed programmes and are not attributable to Norwegian support alone.

Taken together, several URTF programmes have helped reduce pressure on the state budget by financing expenditure and investments that would otherwise have had to be funded by the state. This included, among other things, healthcare services and education-related expenditure, government-supported schemes for agriculture and business, compensation for damage to housing and investments through state-owned entities responsible for critical infrastructure.

3. Governance has improved, in line with the requirements for EU candidate countries.

The war has not brought the reform process to a halt. In line with its own political objective of EU membership, Ukraine has adopted or implemented a number of regulatory and institutional reforms as part of the accession process and its dialogue with the EU. These have included legislation on lobbying, public consultation, administrative procedures, the remuneration system in the civil service and the governance of state-owned enterprises. The fact that reform efforts have continued under such intense pressure demonstrates both Ukraine's commitment to reform and the importance of EU membership as a driving force for the country. Norwegian-supported partners can document their contributions to several of these processes through analysis, advisory support, training and dialogue.

Norwegian-supported stakeholders have contributed to specific reforms and milestones on the path towards EU membership. The OECD has, among other things, provided technical input to reforms and new regulations in the areas of public administration and the governance of state-owned enterprises. The Council of Europe has contributed to reform efforts in areas including decentralisation and local governance, in line with European standards. These examples illustrate how Norwegian support, channelled through various partners, has provided technical expertise and advisory support in specific areas of Ukraine's reform agenda.

Reforms have increasingly been translated into new systems and institutional practices. Norwegian-supported partners have helped public institutions adopt new working methods, strategies, protocols and coordination mechanisms. Among other results, civil society organisations supported through ISAR Ednannia contributed to 24 documented changes in policies, legislation or institutional frameworks. Similarly, the International Renaissance Foundation has documented that civil society initiatives have strengthened local governance and local authorities' planning for reconstruction.

Public institutions have strengthened their capacity to implement reform and maintain services during the war. Norwegian support has contributed to stronger capacity for reform and more systematic, evidence-based and professional public administration in areas including health, statistics, local government and electoral preparations. Norwegian supported partners have, among other things, helped embed human rights-based investigative interviewing practices and establish standards and digital solutions for managing missing persons cases and identifying those missing. They have also improved quality and risk management in the state statistical service and strengthened the electoral commission's organisational readiness. Through the Council of Europe alone, more than 110,000 representatives of national and local institutions received training in 2025 through over 600 programmes across Ukraine. In several cases, capacity-building support has also led to tangible changes in institutions' working methods and service delivery, including through new organisational structures, permanent training arrangements, improved digital preparedness and greater expertise in European and international standards.

4. Lasting, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full employment and decent work for all have been promoted

The support helped keep parts of the economy functioning, but did not normalise the investment

climate. Fiscal stability helped sustain demand and services, while energy support, credit guarantees and insurance eased some of the constraints faced by businesses. Together with other donors, Norway has helped develop the market for risk mitigation through support to the World Bank Group's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the EBRD's Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Guarantee Facility (URGF). Through MIGA, guarantees totalling USD 453 million had been issued as of June 2025 since the full-scale invasion; donor contributions of USD 103 million formed part of this and around 35,000 small and medium-sized enterprises had benefited from increased lending capacity.

The World Bank's URTF helped sustain agricultural production and access to finance during the war. By the end of 2025, financing through the programme had helped keep 13.4 million hectares of agricultural land in production. Nearly 70,000 farmers gained access to financing, almost half of them women, and USD 3.2 billion in private capital was mobilised for the sector.

Mine clearance linked protection with livelihoods and local recovery. Norwegian-supported stakeholders released more than 3,000 hectares of land for safe use. A broader programme result, achieved in cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities and several donors, estimates that more than 15,000 hectares were brought back into agricultural production – an area equivalent to approximately 21,000 football pitches.

The greatest remaining constraint is the war itself. As long as the war continues, the risk of further destruction limits the scope for scaling up investment and mobilising private capital, particularly in vulnerable parts of the country. Several interventions therefore remain at the pilot stage or are still under development and private capital cannot yet be expected to finance reconstruction on a large scale. The results over the period are limited, but significant: The support helped sustain operations, investment and the productive use of agricultural land in parts of the economy, while also helping to establish financing mechanisms for future scaling-up.

Moldova represents a smaller, but relevant, part of the overall results picture. The country has been affected by the economic, energy-related and political repercussions of the war, while also hosting refugees and continuing its European integration process. Norwegian support contributed to energy security, assistance for vulnerable households, refugee inclusion and more resilient public systems. In 2025, nearly 150,000 households received heating assistance through the country's own Energy Vulnerability Fund. At the same time, the use and further development of national systems made the scheme more transparent and accountable, while strengthening state capacity. However, the transition from emergency aid to sustainable solutions was constrained by declining humanitarian funding and limited fiscal space.

Moldova's democratic institutions have been strengthened in the face of a challenging threat environment. Norwegian support has contributed to improved electoral preparedness, stronger oversight of political financing and reforms to the electoral framework and the rule of law in line with European

This report shows what Ukrainians have been able to accomplish under extraordinary circumstances, and what Norway's support has helped make possible. Civilian support in wartime is first and foremost about saving lives and keeping the society functioning – from securing energy supplies and jobs to supporting those who defend human rights, expose corruption and hold those in power accountable. Through the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, Norway is contributing to meeting the Ukrainians urgent needs and supporting them in building their own future.

GUNN JORID ROSET – DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NORAD

Dog handler Maria Radchenko and mine detection dog Zmaj in a minefield in Ukraine's Mykolaiv region. | Photo: Ida Kroksæter, Norwegian People's Aid

standards. This contributed to Moldova's ability to hold two elections and an EU referendum in 2024-2025, which international observers assessed as legitimate, despite extensive Russian influence operations. At the same time, support for independent media and civil society helped counter disinformation, document influence operations and ensure access to fact-based information.

What the results show overall

The results at intervention, sector and societal levels must be considered together. They complement and reinforce one another, meaning that the overall impact can be greater than the sum of the individual results. Fiscal stability enables the delivery of public services and the defence effort. Public service delivery helps enable people to live and work. Energy makes both possible. Local authorities and government institutions translate resources into services and respond to new crises. Civil society and the media contribute to oversight, access to information and participation. Humanitarian aid protects people and preserves capacity that might otherwise be lost. Business generates income, jobs and tax revenues, which in turn strengthen the sustainability of society. Through the Nansen Programme, Norway contributes across all these areas. Progress in one area can reinforce results in another, while setbacks in one area can have repercussions across other parts of society.

Some interventions produce directly observable results. Others safeguard the conditions that enable Ukrainians to achieve results themselves. Fragmentation can be costly, even when each individual project is well managed. A large number of small-scale funding arrangements can place a considerable reporting and coordination burden on institutions that are already short of staff and time. Rapid support can be highly valuable during wartime, while the need for speed can make risk management and oversight more challenging. Predictability can itself create value by enabling institutions to plan ahead. Delays can lead to losses that are far more costly to reverse later.

There is no simple trade-off between rapid results and long-term capacity, or between Ukrainian ownership and Norwegian oversight. These considerations must be balanced: speed and oversight, flexibility and predictability, Norwegian accountability for the funds and Ukrainian ownership, immediate needs and institutional strengthening. An intervention can be well implemented and still fit poorly within the broader picture. Conversely, an intervention that appears costly when considered in isolation may be highly valuable if it sustains a function on which many other results depend.

A consistent lesson is that flexible financing and established partnerships have made it possible to adapt interventions as needs and operating conditions have changed. At the same time, the report identifies areas in which results are limited, preliminary or supported by uncertain evidence and where further follow-up, adaptation and learning are needed.

The overall results picture as of the end of 2025 is mixed. Ukraine has suffered enormous human and material losses, pressure on society and institutions continues and several of the results achieved could still be lost. At the same time, the Ukrainian state and society have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to function, adapt and evolve during the war. That achievement belongs to the Ukrainian people. International partners, including Norway, have helped provide them with the resources and operational flexibility to do so.

The most compelling overall finding is that civilian support has formed part of a broader effort. This effort has helped Ukrainians maintain the functioning of the state and society, protect people and sustain reforms and economic activity under extraordinary pressure, thereby also enabling them to continue their resistance. The support cannot be said to have secured Ukraine's future and many of the results remain fragile. Even after several years of war, it is not the war alone that is shaping Ukraine's future. It continues to be shaped every day by Ukrainian authorities, institutions, local communities, businesses, organisations and citizens and by their considerable resilience.

About the report

Purpose

The report assesses what the civilian support under the Nansen Programme administered by Norad achieved and contributed to in Ukraine and Moldova in 2023-2025. The main emphasis is on results – changes for people and society – rather than a detailed account of activities.

Report structure and analytical framework

The Nansen Programme is intended to contribute to achieving the objectives set by the Storting[4] through a broad portfolio of partners with different mandates, expertise and instruments. The programme is based on the principle that interventions complement and, where possible, reinforce one another. This is reflected in the programme's theory of change, which describes plausible pathways from interventions and outputs to immediate results and longer-term societal change, as well as the assumptions underpinning these relationships. The report is based on this theory of change.

The theory of change does not set out a linear or definite pathway to results. Developments in the war entail considerable uncertainty and can rapidly change the needs, priorities and operating conditions for the interventions. The theory of change must therefore be understood as a dynamic framework in which assumptions and expected relationships are assessed in light of developments and adjusted as new evidence emerges.

Results are achieved primarily through the efforts of Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities, institutions, civil society, businesses and citizens, working together with international partners and donors. Norway is one of several international partners and interventions are often jointly financed. The report therefore assesses whether and how Norwegian support has contributed to observed results, rather than attributing those results to Norway alone. Where the evidence allows, the report distinguishes between partners' overall results, results from Norwegian-funded interventions and broader changes to which the support may have contributed.

Knowledge platform and quality assurance

The report draws on four main types of sources: partners' progress and final reports, including associated results data, evaluations and reviews relating to the follow-up of individual agreements, four external evaluations and reviews commissioned by Norad, as well as relevant statistics, research and analysis from national and international sources. The evaluations and reviews commissioned by Norad[5] strengthen the knowledge platform at the individual agreement level. They analyse key result areas across the programme's theory of change and assess both the results and the strength of the knowledge platform. Parts of an early draft of the report were also shared with external experts and specialist institutions for comment.[6] Information has, as far as possible, been triangulated across different types of sources, with emphasis on consistency in results, definitions, methods and time periods. Uncertainty in the knowledge platform is made explicit through clarifications and caveats.

Limitations

The strength of the knowledge platform varies across intervention areas and result areas. The war constrains data collection and may introduce bias in what can be documented. At the same time, these results are being achieved in a highly dynamic context, where developments in the war, reconstruction efforts, reform processes and the activities of other stakeholders influence both the overall trajectory and the ability to isolate the effects of Norwegian support. Moreover, several longer-term results can only be assessed at a later stage.

The Nansen Support Programme in figures

Total

344.5

billion NOK

committed in civilian and military support 2022–2030

Total civilian support

52.0

billion NOK

2022-2026


The programme provided

31.1

billion NOK

in civilian support 2023–2025


Breakdown of civilian and military support




24%

civilian support

Sectors



NOK million



Ukrainians crowd under a destroyed bridge as they try to flee by crossing the Irpin River on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, March 5, 2022. | Photo: Emilio Morenatti, AP Photo/NTB



2. Ukraine 2023-2025: War and society under pressure

← A man recovers items from a shop that caught fire from a Russian attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Friday, March 25, 2022. | Photo: Felipe Dana, AP Photo/NTB

Ukraine 2023-2025: War and society under pressure

Throughout 2023-2025, Ukrainians faced an increasingly challenging wartime situation, marked by Russia's continued and escalating aggression. The war affected lives, health, housing and critical infrastructure, while the population, civil society, businesses and public institutions continued to maintain services, adapt to the situation and rebuild what had been destroyed.

Russian air strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure recurred each winter and escalated sharply in 2025. In the first seven months of 2025 alone, 1,206 incidents of damage to energy infrastructure were recorded, almost as many as during the whole of 2024.[7] At the same time, the intensity of the attacks increased significantly: In June 2025, Russia launched more than ten times as many missiles and long-range drones as in June 2024, with attacks routinely carried out in waves of several hundred drones in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences.[8] This trend continued into the winter of 2025-2026, described as the harshest winter of the war to date.[9] Repeated attacks on energy and heating infrastructure caused widespread disruption to electricity and heating supplies, also affecting water and sanitation services and other essential public services.

The scale of damage increased throughout the period. The total value of direct damage caused by the war since February 2022 was estimated at approximately USD 152 billion at the end of 2023 and USD 176 billion at the end of 2024, reaching USD 195.1 billion by the end of 2025.[10] Estimated reconstruction needs over the coming decade increased accordingly, from USD 486 billion to USD 524 billion and subsequently to USD 587.7 billion, nearly three times Ukraine's GDP in 2025.[11] Housing, transport and energy remained the sectors most severely affected, with Russian missile and drone attacks affecting large parts of the country: 14 per cent of the housing stock had been damaged or destroyed, affecting more than three million households, compared with 13 per cent in 2023. More than 80 per cent of the damage was concentrated along the front line.[12]

Russia intensified its attacks on civilians. The UN Human Rights Office verified 1,974 civilian deaths in 2023, 2,088 in 2024 and 2,514 in 2025, making 2025 the deadliest year since 2022. In addition, 12,142 people were injured, an increase of 31 per cent from 2024. In the deadliest single attack in 2025, Russian long-range weapons struck the western Ukrainian city of Ternopil on 19 November, killing at least 38 civilians, including eight children.[13] The healthcare sector was severely affected. The World Health Organization (WHO) documented nearly 20 per cent more attacks on health services than in 2024 and had verified at least 2,881 such attacks since February 2022.[14]

For 2025, the UN estimated that 12.7 million people in Ukraine, approximately one in three, would require humanitarian aid. Around 3.7 million people remained internally displaced throughout the year. At the end of the year, approximately 5.3 million Ukrainian refugees remained abroad. The needs were both extensive and protracted.[15]

At the same time, the war exacerbated demographic trends that had begun long before 2022. Ukraine's population has declined by approximately 10 million since 2014.[16] War-related deaths, mass displacement and emigration have compounded the effects of an already ageing population and low birth rates. This has

resulted in labour and skills shortages and will pose a long-term challenge to the economy, public services and the country's reconstruction.

Economic developments reflected a combination of adaptation and mounting pressure. The war continued to impose substantial economic costs on Ukraine through the destruction of production equipment and infrastructure, disruption to energy and transportation networks, labour losses and displacement and persistent uncertainty affecting investment and trade. Economic growth slowed from 5.5 per cent in 2023 to 3.2 per cent in 2024 and 1.8 per cent in 2025.[17] This represented continued economic growth, albeit from a significantly lower level of output than before the full-scale invasion. Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises have been particularly important to Ukraine's economic resilience. Before the war, they accounted for virtually all registered businesses in Ukraine, approximately three quarters of employment and nearly two thirds of value creation. These businesses continue to face significant challenges in maintaining operations and recovering from the impacts of the war. Only 17 per cent of the businesses surveyed assessed their financial situation as good or very good.[18]

Ukraine has a strong civil society. This has proven important to the country's resilience and ability to survive. The number of civil society organisations has increased by approximately 10 per cent, while the number of charitable organisations has increased by 57 per cent compared with the pre-war period.[19] Many civil society organisations quickly assumed a central role following the start of the full-scale invasion, helping to maintain essential services and the humanitarian response and supporting internally displaced people. At the same time, other organisations continued their work to promote democratic participation and reforms.

At the same time, reform efforts relating to Ukraine's EU accession continued. Accession negotiations were formally opened in June 2024 and the bilateral screening of Ukrainian legislation against the EU acquis was completed in September 2025.[20] However, the reform process was not without setbacks. In July 2025, legislative amendments were adopted that reduced the independence of the anti-corruption bodies NABU and SAPO. Following the largest protests since the start of the full-scale invasion, the amendments were reversed by the parliament a few days later. The incident highlighted the importance of an active civil society and public mobilisation as drivers of reform and accountability.

This civilian resilience is closely linked to the country's military resilience. Security is a prerequisite for a functioning society, while functioning institutions, public services, businesses and local communities



→ People stand near a train during an evacuation drill organised by Ukraine's railway company Ukrzaliznytsia in Kyiv on 9 April 2026. The drill follows repeated Russian drone attacks on the railway. | Photo: Thomas Peter, Reuters/NTB

underpin the country's overall resilience in the war.

During the period 2023-2025, financial support to Ukraine was increasingly channelled through EU institutions, while the country remained heavily dependent on substantial external financing to maintain essential state functions.[21] External financing of the Ukrainian state budget remained substantial throughout the period: USD 42.6 billion in 2023, USD 41.7 billion in 2024 and USD 52.4 billion in 2025.[22] This helped maintain essential state functions, while also highlighting Ukraine's dependence on sufficient and timely external financing.

The trends for humanitarian aid and some of the more project-based civilian support were different. The United States had been the largest single contributor to the humanitarian response plan for Ukraine, accounting for 36 per cent of funding received in 2023 and 28 per cent in 2024. The suspension of US-funded humanitarian aid from January 2025 contributed to a sharp decline in available funding.[23] Resources were prioritised for people living near the front line, evacuation and newly displaced people, emergency response following attacks and particularly vulnerable people at risk of falling outside existing support schemes.

By the end of the period, the overall picture was therefore not one of a general decline in international civilian support, but rather of growing disparities between funding channels: Large-scale budget support was increasingly consolidated through multi-year EU and multilateral mechanisms, while humanitarian aid and some bilateral project funding were more exposed to cuts and shifts in political priorities.[24]

The gap between needs and available funding is illustrated by the 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan: Of the 12.7 million people in need of humanitarian aid, the number prioritised for aid was reduced first to 6 million and subsequently to 4.8 million, with particularly significant reductions in mine clearance (66 per cent), education (56 per cent) and protection (46 per cent).[25] Developments into 2026 also showed that the pressure on Ukrainian authorities, civil society and the population had not eased by the end of the reporting period, with humanitarian needs remaining high, intensified pressure on critical infrastructure and more limited resources for parts of the international response. This continued and reinforced a key feature of the 2023-2025 period: Ukrainian authorities, local communities and civil society had to maintain services, implement reforms and build resilience while the pressures of the war and funding constraints continued.

The impact of the war on Moldova

At the same time, the war had direct and long-lasting consequences for neighbouring Moldova. Since February 2022, more than 1.2 million refugees from Ukraine have entered the country. Most travelled onwards to the EU, but, at the end of 2025, around 140,000 Ukrainian refugees remained in Moldova, equivalent to 4-5 per cent of the country's population.[26] Many of those who have remained have specific needs, including older people, persons with disabilities and children.

At the same time, Moldova intensified its efforts towards EU integration during this period, but its European trajectory was challenged by the repercussions of the war and Russian interference. The war continued to place pressure on an already vulnerable country hosting a large number of Ukrainian refugees. At the same time, high housing costs, a weak labour market and pressure on health and social services made long-term integration difficult. When the agreement on the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine expired at the beginning of 2025, Moldova was hit by a new energy crisis, which was particularly severe in the Transnistrian region, while rising energy prices placed further pressure on household finances. At the same time, the EU accession process continued at a rapid pace and the pro-European governing party retained its majority in the parliamentary elections. However, the elections took place amid significant pressure from Russian FIMI (foreign information manipulation and interference) operations, including disinformation, covert political financing and coordinated social media campaigns.[27] These developments demonstrated both Moldova's democratic resilience and the country's continued vulnerability to the consequences of the war and Russian interference. At the same time, they highlighted security risks extending far beyond Moldova's borders.



3.
The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine

← A woman visits the makeshift memorial for fallen Ukrainian and foreign soldiers during the Independence Day of Ukraine, on Independence Square in Kyiv on August 24, 2026, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. | Photo: Roman Pilipey, AFP/NTB

The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine

Norway has provided aid to Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. From February 2023, the support was established as a dedicated long-term programme, the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine.

The programme encompasses both military and civilian support. The two components must be considered together: The military support is intended to help protect the population, territorial integrity, sovereignty and the functioning of society, while the civilian support is intended to help sustain institutions, services and economic activity that are important to Ukraine's overall resilience. The civilian component of the programme, which is the focus of this results report, addresses Ukraine's humanitarian and societal needs by helping to maintain essential societal functions and lay the foundations for reconstruction, reforms and lasting stability. The programme also includes support to the Republic of Moldova, which has been affected by the consequences of the war, including refugee arrivals and Russian interference.



↑ State Emergency Service employees outside a government-run aid centre during a blackout following Russian strikes in Kyiv, 25 January 2026. Residents can warm up, charge devices and receive hot drinks and psychological support here. | Photo: Valentyn Ogirenko, Reuters/NTB

About Report to the Storting, no. 8 (2023-2024)

Report to the Storting no. 8 (2023-2024), on the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, is a key framework for Norway's support to Ukraine. It can be seen as a long-term framework and guide for Norway's efforts, based on the broad political consensus reached in the Storting in 2023. The report was presented on 2 February 2024 and approved by the Council of State on the same day.

The report covers both military and civilian support and sets out the background to the programme and its overall approach in greater detail. It describes the areas that Norwegian support is intended to address, how risks are to be managed and the long-term implications of the Nansen Programme for other Norwegian aid. The report sets out the overarching objectives and principles for the support.

For civilian support, the report highlights areas including reconstruction, energy, humanitarian aid, nuclear safety, health, the environment, democratisation, the private sector, civil society, cultural heritage and support to neighbouring Moldova.

Report to the Storting no. 8 (2023–2024) - regjeringen.no



↑ Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visits the Norwegian Parliament on 15 April 2026. | Photo: Morten Brakestad, Stortinget

In the initial phase following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Norwegian aid focused primarily on life-saving humanitarian assistance, including support for internally displaced people and refugees, protection, health, food, water and sanitation services. The aid also included other measures, such as budgetary support and support for gas purchases. Over nearly five years of full-scale war, the programme has gradually expanded in response to Ukraine's changing needs and priorities. Emergency aid remains essential, but attacks on energy systems, housing, schools, healthcare facilities and transport infrastructure have made it necessary to support measures that keep essential societal functions and public administration operating. Ukraine must be able to withstand and manage the war while simultaneously pursuing reform and innovation. The support must reflect these complex challenges. The civilian component of the Nansen Programme is designed to achieve both short-term and long-term results: We must save lives and reduce suffering through humanitarian support, preserve the state's capacity to deliver public services and help sustain economic activity. We must also support the reconstruction that is already under way and prepare for reconstruction on a larger scale when conditions allow.

Energy is a key focus of the civilian support. Russia's systematic attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure have disrupted the population's access to electricity, heating and water while also undermining the conditions necessary for businesses, healthcare and other public services to function. Norwegian support aims to strengthen Ukraine's energy security by helping to secure sufficient gas supplies, repair and protect critical infrastructure and develop a more resilient and future-oriented energy sector.

The programme also emphasises good governance, the rule of law, democracy and anti-corruption. Ukraine's reform efforts are crucial to the country's resilience during the war, to effective and credible reconstruction and to its further integration with the EU. In line with the guidance set out in Report to the Storting no. 8, Norway's support should, to the extent possible, align with Ukrainian priorities and national systems, while the risks of corruption and misuse are addressed through rigorous monitoring, audits, control mechanisms and cooperation with established international stakeholders.

Norad administers the majority of funding for the civilian component of the Nansen Programme on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA), the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), the Norwegian Directorate for Higher Education and Skills (HK-dir) and Norfund also administer funding under the programme. The work is carried out in close cooperation with the Ministry and the Norwegian embassies in Ukraine and Moldova.

→ Fridtjof Nansen is welcomed at the railway station in Kharkiv on 28 January 1923 during a visit to the Nansen Mission. | Photo: National Library of Norway

Why is it called the Nansen Programme?

The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine is named after Fridtjof Nansen (1861–1930), a Norwegian polar explorer, diplomat, philanthropist, humanitarian and scientist. After the First World War, Nansen devoted much of his life to helping prisoners of war, refugees and victims of famine in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine. He did so both as a representative of the League of Nations and on his own initiative. From 1920 to 1930, he served as the League of Nations' first High Commissioner for Refugees. Fridtjof Nansen was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1922 for his humanitarian efforts and work to promote peace.



Norad's role and risk management in the Nansen Programme

Norad (the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) is responsible for administering a large share of Norwegian aid on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Norad assumed responsibility for administering a large share of civilian support to Ukraine in 2023 and currently administers 90 per cent of all civilian support provided through the Nansen Programme. Norad staff do not work directly on projects, but work with partners that implement the activities, such as:

- international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
- UN agencies
- The World Bank and other development banks
- research institutions
- private companies
- government authorities in partner countries

Norad provides technical advice to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian embassies and the Ministry of Climate and Environment. We also monitor and verify that funds are used for their intended purpose, ensuring that the interventions deliver results.

In Report to the Storting no. 8 (2023-2024), the Government emphasised that the Nansen Programme may entail a higher level of acceptable risk than would normally be the case, but that this does not imply lower standards in grant administration. Risk is addressed along three lines:

Firstly, Norway takes a preventive approach by supporting Ukraine's own efforts to combat corruption. Support is provided for anti-corruption efforts and reform processes, with an emphasis on transparency, institution-building and strengthening anti-corruption authorities. Norway also supports stakeholders that hold the authorities accountable across sectors, including investigative journalists, civil society, whistleblowers and oversight bodies. Although Ukraine continues to face significant challenges relating to corruption, the country has implemented important reforms and is making progress in its efforts to combat corruption.

Secondly, the capacity for administering the Nansen Programme has been strengthened through dedicated resources in a risk team comprising controllers, an anti-corruption adviser and a legal adviser. The team supports Norad's grant management with risk assessments and through regular follow-up of partners. The use of funds is closely monitored, including through spot checks of partners in Ukraine and Moldova. The risk team quality-assures risk management, disbursements to recipients, financial reporting and external audit reports. In addition, the Office of the Auditor General closely monitors the quality of the administration and published two reviews of the civilian component of the support in spring 2026.

Thirdly, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad have a well-established whistleblowing system. All grant recipients are required to report irregularities and breaches of grant conditions. In cases of non-compliance, funding may be suspended, recovered or reallocated. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established an anti-corruption network across ministries and government agencies to facilitate coordination and the exchange of experiences and information.


↓ Norad Director General Gunn Jorid Roset visits a memorial wall honouring fallen Ukrainian soldiers during a visit to Kyiv in November 2025. | Photo: Ida Wullum-Lindberg, Norad



The programme was originally approved with an overall funding framework of NOK 75 billion for civilian and military support for the period 2023-2027. When the Report to the Storting on the Nansen Programme was considered, a unanimous Storting emphasised early on the need for long-term, predictable and flexible Norwegian support.[28] Through subsequent decisions with broad political support, the level of ambition has been significantly increased and the programme's overall funding framework now stands at NOK 275 billion for the period 2023-2030. Norwegian civilian support totalled NOK 37.3 billion during the period 2022-2025 (see Figure 1[29]).

The civilian component of the Nansen Programme is funded through annual appropriations by the Storting, within the programme's overall political framework. The multi-year framework is intended to provide Ukraine and its partners with predictability. At the same time, the programme is deliberately designed to be flexible: Funding can be reallocated when developments in the war or new attacks create urgent needs. This combination of a long-term approach and flexibility is essential to ensuring that the support remains relevant in a context characterised by considerable uncertainty.

FIGURE 1
Civilian support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries (2022-2026), by sector



Source: regjeringen.no

At the railway station in Khmelnytskyi, trains arrive almost every day carrying people evacuated from areas close to the fighting. They are fleeing westwards within Ukraine in search of safer places, further from the front line. Red Cross volunteers meet them at the train station and accompany them to a reception centre, where they get information, a hot drink, the opportunity to rest and find clothing if needed. A Red Cross psychosocial support team is also present to help children and adults who need support. Ukraine, November 2023. | Photo: Olav A. Saltbones, Norwegian Red Cross

Norway does not implement projects directly, but channels its aid through partner organisations. The partner portfolio includes Ukrainian authorities, UN agencies, international financial institutions, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Norwegian and international civil society organisations, research and knowledge institutions and local stakeholders.

In line with the Storting's guidance, support should primarily be channelled through a limited number of agreements with established organisations that have a proven track record of delivery, strong capacity and robust control systems. Cooperation with major multilateral partners is therefore particularly important. They have extensive expertise and capacity, which strengthens the potential for effective coordination. This is essential for implementing large-scale, complex interventions in areas such as energy supply, municipal services, social protection and support for reform.

Norway also works with Norwegian and other non-governmental organisations, as well as private sector stakeholders. Particular emphasis is placed on direct cooperation with Ukrainian institutions and civil society, which is crucial to ensuring local relevance, ownership and sustainability.

The need for international coordination is substantial. Norway works closely with the EU, G7 countries, the Nordic countries and other international donors. As a major financial contributor, Norway participates in the Ukraine Donor Platform (UDP), a coordination mechanism established by the G7 countries in December 2022. The EU, the United States and several other major donor countries also participate. The UDP is the main high-level forum for coordinating civilian aid to Ukraine. Ukraine's needs far exceed what any single donor can meet. Norwegian support therefore seeks to complement the efforts of other stakeholders, mobilise relevant expertise and contribute in areas where Norway has particular strengths. Coordination with Ukrainian authorities and international partners is essential in order to avoid duplication, ensure geographical and sectoral balance and maximise the impact of the combined resources.

↓ Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre visits the Lukianivska district of Kyiv, which was recently hit by Russian attacks. 23 August 2026. | Photo: Javad Parsa, NTB



Norad manages the majority of the civilian support under the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working to ensure that this support is relevant and delivers results. Ukraine's needs must guide everything we do, and close cooperation with our partners enables us to respond to urgent needs while also helping to strengthen the country over time. This requires a rapid response combined with a long-term perspective, flexibility and a willingness to learn and adapt our efforts along the way.

JORUN NOSSUM - DIRECTOR OF THE NANSEN SUPPORT PROGRAMME AT NORAD

Norwegian support in an international context – Ukraine Support Tracker

Shortly after the full-scale invasion in 2022, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy established the Ukraine Support Tracker database. The database tracks and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian support provided to Ukraine by the governments of different countries accumulated since February 2022 and covers 41 countries: EU Member States, the other G7 members, as well as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, China, Taiwan, India and Iceland. The purpose is to provide an up-to-date and comparable overview of support to Ukraine. In recent years, the database has become an authoritative source of information on support to Ukraine.


The Ukraine Support Tracker is updated every two months. It distinguishes between support commitments and support that has actually been allocated and received, referred to as allocated support. The entire NOK 274.5 billion Nansen Programme funding package through 2030 is reflected in the Kiel Institute's data on commitments. This makes Norway the fifth-largest donor globally, behind the EU, the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. While the United States was the largest donor until January 2025, the Kiel Institute's data records no further US support to Ukraine after that date. As a result, the EU has emerged as the largest donor to Ukraine.

Norway's high ranking should be seen in the context of the substantial long-term commitments made through the Nansen Programme. Measured by support actually allocated by the end of 2025, Norway therefore ranks somewhat lower. Norway therefore ranks ninth in absolute terms and fourth when measured as a share of GDP. By category, at the end of 2025, Norway ranked as the largest donor of humanitarian aid as a share of GDP and the second-largest donor of other financial support as a share of GDP. Measured in euros, Norway was the fifth-largest donor in 2025, after Germany, the EU, the United Kingdom and Canada.

Among the major European economies, the Nordic countries stand out as a consistent and increasingly important group of donors. By the end of 2025, the Nordic countries collectively had provided substantially more support than any of Europe's five largest economies, measured over the period from the start of the war to the end of 2025.

FIGURE 2

Cumulative Allocations, January 24, 2022 - June 30, 2026 (billion Euros)



Source: Ukraine Support Tracker – Kiel Institute
Allocated aid refers to aid which, according to the Kiel Institute, has been earmarked for a specific purpose, date and recipient in Ukraine.



4. Result area: Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security

← Electrical engineers from DTEK Grids repair damaged electrical cables in a village near the frontline, outside the town of Pokrovsk, in the eastern Donetsk region on March 20, 2025, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. | Photo: Roman Pilipey, AFP/NTB

Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security

A secure and sustainable energy supply is essential for maintaining critical public services, meeting the population's urgent needs and laying the foundations for economic recovery.

In Ukraine and Moldova, this encompasses both immediate energy security and a gradual transition towards a more efficient, decentralised and resilient energy system, based on renewable energy solutions where appropriate. In Ukraine, support has also included emergency measures such as gas supplies, repairs to energy infrastructure and donations of parts and equipment, in a context in which attacks, shortages and winter conditions make energy both a humanitarian concern and a long-term challenge.

Reliable access to electricity and heating enables hospitals, schools, water supply systems, communications and public administration to continue functioning. It also reduces the risk that disruption to energy supplies will exacerbate humanitarian needs and lead to further displacement. Power outages and unreliable energy supplies result in production losses, higher costs and increased risks for businesses, while a more resilient energy system provides better conditions for business operations and investment. Business surveys show that disruptions to electricity, water and heating are a tangible barrier to businesses in Ukraine.[30] At the same time, energy supply is important for the state's capacity, legitimacy and ability to implement reforms. Transparency in the energy sector can help strengthen trust by holding public authorities and energy companies accountable, reducing information asymmetries and limiting opportunities for corruption and unequal treatment.[31]

Emergency energy support to maintain critical services

Russian attacks on the energy system affect power generation, transmission and distribution, as well as gas facilities, combined heat and power plants and smaller installations such as substations. This creates urgent needs for gas imports, repair equipment, backup capacity, electricity imports and physical protection. Norwegian support helps keep critical public services operational and reduce vulnerability across different seasons. This also includes energy-related measures with a clear humanitarian function, particularly where they help maintain hospitals, schools, water supplies, district heating and other essential services during attacks and shortages. This illustrates a key consideration in the design of energy support to Ukraine. In a context of ongoing war and extensive attacks on energy infrastructure, it may in some cases be necessary to prioritise measures that ensure access to electricity, heating and other essential services in the short term. Such measures may not necessarily represent the most sustainable or climate-optimal solutions in the longer term, but may be essential for maintaining critical public services and limiting the humanitarian consequences of the war.

At the same time, a long-term reconstruction perspective suggests that, wherever possible, emergency investments should be designed to support the development of Ukraine's future energy system. This includes considering how temporary or emergency measures can contribute to greater resilience, energy efficiency and a more decentralised and robust energy supply over time. Balancing short-term needs with long-term objectives is therefore a key consideration in the prioritisation and design of energy support under

the Nansen Programme. At the same time, wherever possible, priority should be given to measures that address both the need for immediate recovery and the long-term development of the energy system.

Following several harsh winters, the attacks during the winter of 2025/2026 were the most extensive against Ukraine's gas infrastructure since the war began in 2022. The attacks came at a time when more than half of Ukraine's energy system had already been fully or partially destroyed, further weakening the country's energy security. This has had serious consequences both for Ukraine's defence capabilities and for the daily lives of millions of civilians.

Through support channelled via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Norway helped finance a total of 1.75 billion cubic metres of gas imported by Ukraine from the international market during the 2022-2025 winter seasons. In 2025, Norwegian support helped finance gas volumes equivalent to around 7 per cent of household demand and 13 per cent of Ukraine's total gas import requirements.

Immediately before the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine had electricity generation capacity of nearly 50 GW. Today, around 15 GW remains operational, while the rest has been destroyed, damaged or is under occupation[32]. Attacks on power generation and other critical energy infrastructure have therefore significantly reduced Ukraine's capacity to generate and supply reliable electricity.


Power generation and access to energy would have been significantly lower without the support. This is a significant overall result of the energy support to Ukraine and Moldova.

Norwegian support to the energy sector, implemented through partners including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Energy Community Secretariat, the EBRD and the EU's Ukraine Investment Framework, has helped address urgent needs in the energy sector and maintain critical services. This includes support for backup power, distributed power generation and equipment that strengthens the resilience of the gas supply. Together with other donors, Norwegian support to UNDP helped maintain and restore energy supplies for more than 6.6 million people. The delivery of critical equipment, including equipment for combined heat and power plants and transformers, strengthened the resilience of the energy system and mitigated the impact of extensive damage to energy infrastructure. Through a programme under the World Bank's URTF, supported by Norway, emergency equipment was supplied to Ukraine's electricity grid across the country. This helped restore electricity supplies to around 3.5 million people.

During the 2025/26 heating season, temperatures in Ukraine fell to minus 20 degrees while Russia continued to attack our gas infrastructure. Norway's support helped us secure the gas that 1.6 million families relied on for cooking food and keeping their homes warm.

SERGII FEDORENKO – ACTING CEO OF NAFTOGAZ

↓ Maintaining vital district heating: Seven heating plants in Mykolaiv are being rehabilitated in 2025 to ensure heating for 16,000 people despite winter conditions and ongoing attacks. | Photo: Olha Onyshchenko, Norwegian Church Aid



The support has aimed to ensure the continued operation of critical societal functions such as heating, water supply, wastewater services and other essential municipal services in areas affected by prolonged power outages and repeated attacks on energy infrastructure.

At the same time, the support illustrates some clear dilemmas. Implementation takes place in a context in which further attacks cause additional damage and shift priorities on the ground. This means that procured equipment cannot always be put into use as quickly as planned. This may be due to factors such as damage to associated infrastructure, the need for further technical assessments, security considerations and limited local capacity for installation and commissioning.

Experience also shows how challenging it is to install energy equipment in a country such as Ukraine, where there is a critical shortage of skilled labour and foreign personnel are available only to a limited extent. Advanced energy equipment requires technical expertise for design, installation, operation and maintenance, which can lead to delays.

Reducing vulnerability in the energy sector through decentralised solutions

Norwegian support has helped strengthen Ukraine's energy security and reduce the vulnerability of its energy supply through small-scale power generation, battery storage and decentralised energy solutions for critical societal functions. This applies in particular to hospitals, schools, water supplies, heating and other municipal services, where local solutions can help maintain services even when centralised systems are disrupted. This is particularly important in an energy system characterised by high energy intensity, low efficiency and vulnerable centralised infrastructure. Such solutions also support the transition towards a more energy-efficient and resilient system in line with EU requirements and standards. A more distributed energy system with local generation, storage and flexibility is less vulnerable to targeted attacks than a system with highly concentrated generation and transmission. At the same time, small-scale solutions cannot fully replace the need for centralised generation and critical system infrastructure. They are therefore most effective as part of a gradual transition in which local energy resilience is strengthened alongside the restoration of national energy system functions.

Through UNDP and NEFCO, support is provided for small-scale energy generation, battery storage and energy-efficiency measures in schools, hospitals, water supply systems and other municipal services. This helps ensure the continuity of critical services during power outages while strengthening local preparedness and energy resilience.

Through support to UNDP, a 50 kW solar power system with 120 kWh of battery storage was installed to support critical functions, while hybrid energy solutions with substantial combined generation and storage capacity were initiated at seven hospitals and four schools. Although 50 kW represents limited capacity in the context of the national energy system, the intervention illustrates the importance of combining larger-scale system measures with smaller, locally targeted solutions. For example, a 120 kWh battery can supply 20 kW for around six hours, providing important backup capacity for critical functions. In addition, ten 1.5 MW cogeneration units have been delivered, installed and put into operation. These units help maintain heating, water supplies and other critical services for around 551,580 people. Of these, around 275,800 people are served by the five Norwegian-funded units. In addition, one Norwegian-funded 3.3 MW unit has been commissioned and is reported to have helped maintain heating and wastewater services during power outages for around 150,000 people. These are good examples of support that has not merely been procured, but has actually been put into operation and is benefiting the population. Taken together, these measures are intended to strengthen the capacity to maintain health, heating and water supply services during power outages. The example also illustrates an important lesson: Small-scale interventions can have significant value when targeted at critical functions, even if their contribution is modest in the context of the national energy system. In a wartime context, even a small-scale installation can be highly valuable if it keeps a hospital, school or water supply system operational during outages.

Green reconstruction and energy efficiency

Reconstruction is not only about replacing destroyed infrastructure, but also about reducing future vulnerability through lower energy consumption, greater efficiency, cleaner technologies and reduced dependence on imports. Both Ukraine and Moldova have high energy intensity and require more energy than EU countries to achieve the same level of output. Energy intensity in the two countries is around two to three times the EU average. This is due in part to energy-inefficient buildings, outdated infrastructure and high energy losses within the systems.

Through support to NEFCO, UNDP, GIZ, the EBRD, E5P and the World Bank, Norway contributes to the rehabilitation and modernisation of critical infrastructure, including buildings, water and wastewater systems, public transport and other green investments. This makes Norwegian support relevant both to restoring critical services, developing a more sustainable and resilient energy sector and advancing the countries' EU integration and compliance with European climate and energy requirements.

In Ukraine, concrete results have been achieved through local investments in green energy and energy efficiency. In Chortkiv, three solar power installations with a combined capacity of 340 kW were completed at municipal water and wastewater facilities. The installations cover around 25 per cent of electricity consumption, generate annual savings of approximately 470 MWh and reduce emissions by around 281 tonnes of CO_2. The initiative has strengthened the continuity of critical services for more than 15,000 residents and reduced vulnerability to power outages.

Norwegian support through GIZ strengthened energy resilience among Ukrainian businesses. The support enabled 150 micro and small enterprises to invest in local energy generation and energy storage, adding a total of 6.82 MW of new capacity. The results show that energy disruption during working hours was reduced by 20 per cent. The investments also contributed to an average reduction in energy consumption of 49 per cent.

In Moldova, energy support has evolved from ensuring security of supply at the system level to combining this with more targeted support for households and longer-term energy-efficiency measures. In 2024, Norwegian support through the EBRD, together with the Bank's other financing, helped cover 73 per cent of Moldova's gas needs. In 2025, these efforts were supplemented by support for households affected by the energy crisis, while energy efficiency and local renewable energy generation were strengthened.

This must be seen in the context of significant pressure on household finances: The World Bank reports that consumer prices increased by 8.2 per cent in the first eight months of 2025, driven in part by energy tariffs and high food prices.[18] In the winter of 2025, when Moldova was again affected by an energy crisis following the expiry of the gas agreement between Russia and Ukraine, nearly 150,000 households received Norwegian support to help cover heating costs through the government's Energy Vulnerability Fund, channelled through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

> We highly value our strong and reliable partnership with Norway and deeply appreciate the continued support for Moldova's efforts to improve energy efficiency and strengthen energy security. This cooperation is instrumental in advancing a more resilient, sustainable, and secure energy future for our country.
>
> DORIN JUNGHIETU – MINISTER OF ENERGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

This contributed to a 13 per cent reduction in energy poverty. When energy prices rise sharply, support for households becomes essential to ensuring that reforms and the energy transition remain politically and socially feasible. This highlights an important interplay between immediate relief and longer-term measures to improve energy efficiency and increase local energy generation.

Norwegian support has also contributed to longer-term energy-efficiency measures. Through GIZ, around 23,000 households received support for energy-efficient household appliances, with estimated annual energy savings of around 5,000 MWh and reductions in electricity costs of approximately EUR 1.1 million. Through the EBRD's E5P Fund, Norway has contributed to concrete energy-efficiency results in both Ukraine and Moldova. Norway has supported the Fund since before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as part of a long-term commitment to energy efficiency and the energy transition in the region. In Ukraine, energy-efficiency projects in public buildings and residential properties have been completed since 2020, achieving combined annual energy savings of 140,640 MWh, annual natural gas savings of around 551,598 m^3 and improved services for approximately 2.13 million people.[33] In Moldova, two E5P-supported projects have been completed since 2022. Together, these projects have achieved annual energy savings of 2,696 MWh, annual natural gas savings of around 8,485 m^3 and improved services for approximately 129,500 people. Through the World Bank's M-GROW programme, Norway has also helped strengthen the regulatory framework for energy efficiency in public buildings through the World Bank and supported the establishment of Moldova's first renewable energy communities through UNDP – local partnerships in which households, businesses and local authorities jointly produce and share renewable energy.

Taken together, the results show that energy efficiency is a key means of strengthening energy security, reducing costs and emissions and laying the foundations for more resilient, sustainable and European-integrated development in both Ukraine and Moldova.

Governance, reform and integrity in the energy sector

Energy security is also a matter of governance. Corruption scandals and weak corporate governance in state-owned energy companies can undermine trust, delay investment and weaken donor support. Norwegian support and dialogue therefore also contribute to improved corporate governance, stronger oversight mechanisms, greater transparency and reforms that strengthen the sector over time. This is particularly important in light of Ukraine's EU integration, the need to maintain investor confidence and reforms in state-owned companies such as Naftogaz, Energoatom and Ukrenergo.

In January 2025, the Ukrainian parliament adopted Law no. 9381, which aims to strengthen the regulatory framework for investment in decentralised and sustainable energy. The law was developed with technical support from UNDP, funded in part by Norway. The law aims to simplify licensing and grid connection procedures, reduce administrative barriers and create

↓ Solar panels are being installed through UNDP's Green Energy Recovery Programme in Ukraine, helping to provide a more reliable and environmentally friendly energy supply. | Photo: UNDP



more favourable conditions for investment in distributed power generation, including renewable energy. This can contribute to the quicker deployment of energy solutions that strengthen Ukraine's energy security and resilience.

The results show that Norwegian support contributes to maintaining critical energy services and strengthening the resilience of local energy systems, while implementation continues to face significant challenges. The projects are implemented in a wartime context and under challenging administrative conditions, resulting in lengthy and unpredictable procurement processes, capacity constraints in municipalities and a need for external project support. Shortages of skilled labour and limited local implementation capacity contribute to delays and increased costs. At the same time, interventions in the energy sector entail heightened corruption risks, given the sector's vulnerability and the serious corruption cases that have affected it. Some interventions are delayed or reprioritised due to funding constraints and the security situation, and, in several cases, comprehensive impact data remains limited. This means that results are largely achieved gradually and that implementation risks remain high.

Overall, the results show that Norwegian support contributes both to maintaining critical energy services in the short term and to the gradual modernisation of the energy systems in Ukraine and Moldova over the longer term. At the same time, this is an area in which progress is not linear. Efforts span emergency crisis response, winter preparedness, reconstruction, reform and the green transition, with new attacks and changing needs continually shaping priorities.

Since the full-scale invasion, the balance of energy support has largely been shaped by developments in the war and the needs identified as most urgent by the Ukrainian authorities. A significant share of the support has therefore been directed towards measures that can rapidly help maintain energy supplies and critical public services, such as support for gas purchases, repairs, reconstruction and investments in decentralised power generation. At the same time, where circumstances have allowed, efforts have sought to place greater emphasis on measures that can improve energy efficiency, advance reforms and mobilise the private sector. This reflects a gradual adjustment in the balance between short-term needs and long-term objectives, with emergency energy preparedness combined with measures that can lay the foundations for a more resilient, efficient and modern energy system.

In the event of a ceasefire or an end to the war, it would be natural for energy support to shift increasingly towards long-term reconstruction and modernisation, in line with Ukraine's goal of EU integration. At the same time, reconstruction and economic growth will increase the need for an adequate and reliable power supply. Such a shift could entail greater emphasis on energy efficiency, energy sector reforms, infrastructure modernisation, the further development of a flexible and decentralised energy system and measures to mobilise private capital. At the same time, experience to date shows that the challenge is not primarily to choose between short-term response and long-term transformation, but to link the two as effectively as possible. The value of these efforts must also be assessed against the alternative: further system failures, more severe humanitarian consequences and weakened national resistance.

> Ukrainian energy workers are doing everything they can to keep power and heat available to homes, hospitals and businesses despite Russia's continued attacks on our energy system. Norway's support contributes to that effort and helps us respond as needs rapidly change.

ANATOLII KUTSEVOL – DEPUTY MINISTER OF ENERGY OF UKRAINE



Employees repair sections of the Darnytska combined heat and power plant damaged by Russian air strikes in Kyiv, on February 4, 2026,. During winter, Russian strikes on Ukraine's power infrastructure disrupted light, heating and water supplies to millions across the country as temperatures plummet well below freezing, leaving the war-battered country facing a humanitarian crisis. | Photo: Roman Pilipey, AFP/NTB

What this support has helped achieve

3.5 million
had their electricity restored

Emergency repairs to the electricity grid following attacks, supported through the World Bank's fund, restored electricity to around 3.5 million people.

150 small businesses
invested in their own energy supply

Ukrainian micro and small businesses invested in their own energy solutions. All 116 businesses followed up were still operating when the projects ended.

13 million
received salaries or benefits

Norwegian support through the World Bank helped ensure that Ukrainians continued to receive public sector salaries, pensions or social benefits.

Over 3,000 hectares
of land released

Norwegian-supported mine action organisations released land through clearance and surveys. Combined with agricultural support, these efforts formed part of a programme in which around 15,000 hectares were in production.

Over 1 million
readers reached through investigative journalism

With Norwegian support, 18 Ukrainian media outlets produced 105 investigative reports. Such journalism promotes public awareness, anti-corruption efforts and public scrutiny during the war.

13 per cent
of Ukraine's gas import needs

Norwegian support helped finance gas imports during the winters of 2022–2025. In 2025, Norwegian-financed gas accounted for 13 per cent of the country's total import needs.

At least 17,400
families received answers

With support from Norway and other donors, the International Committee of the Red Cross helped thousands of families learn the fate of missing family members.

18,000 children
received free school transport

Through the World Bank, children in remote areas received school transport so they could continue their education.

1.1 million
received food and cash assistance

The World Food Programme provided food and cash assistance to 1.1 million people in Ukraine in 2025.



5. Result area: Fiscal stability and critical societal functions have been maintained


← Ukranian flag in Sarny, Ukraine. | Photo: Henriette Bjørge, Norad

Fiscal stability and critical societal functions have been maintained

Ukraine largely maintained fiscal stability and critical public services in 2023-2025, despite the considerable strain that the war placed on the economy and the state budget. Inflation fell sharply in 2023, rose again in 2024 and declined in 2025, but remained well below the 2022 level throughout the period. At the same time, government revenue excluding budget support grants increased as a share of GDP, particularly in 2025. [34]

The government continued to finance defence, public services, pensions and social benefits. This was possible despite a significant weakening of the revenue base as a result of destruction, occupation and population displacement. Stability should therefore be understood as the state having avoided a severe financial and institutional breakdown, rather than as an indication that public finances were robust or self-sustaining.

Several of the largest financing mechanisms linked all or part of their disbursements to documented expenditure, implemented reforms or the achievement of agreed milestones. The financing therefore not only provided liquidity, but also supported continued reform efforts. At the same time, Ukrainian institutions were required to demonstrate results and meet their commitments during the war. The continued provision of financing therefore reflects both the international community's commitment to supporting Ukraine and the Ukrainian authorities' continued capacity to administer large-scale financing mechanisms.



↑ Rescuers work at a residential building partially destroyed following Russian drone and missile strikes in Kyiv in the morning of May 14, 2026. | Photo: Roman Pilipey, AFP/NTB

Ukraine also reinstated medium-term budget planning and established a more integrated system for public investment management in 2024-2025. These changes could provide a stronger basis for prioritising scarce resources and monitoring investments more transparently. However, it is too early to determine whether they have led to more efficient use of resources or strengthened the long-term sustainability of public finances. Results related to public investment management, including the use of the DREAM system, are discussed in greater detail under the result area on strengthened capacity in public institutions.

Access to basic services was largely maintained

The continued provision of health, education, energy, water and social services demonstrates that essential public functions were maintained under severe pressure. These services depend on a combination of adequate financing, functioning energy supplies and public institutions with the capacity to make payments and deliver services.

Available evidence indicates that essential services were largely maintained at national level. Population surveys indicate that overall people's ability to meet their basic needs and access support services was relatively high and that public perceptions of government services remained at approximately the same level from 2023 to 2024. At the same time, external assessments indicate that pressure on public services remained significantly higher than before the full-scale invasion. Access to certain services, such as electricity and water supply, was significantly disrupted following extensive attacks on energy infrastructure in 2024.[35] Destroyed infrastructure, staff shortages, population displacement, air attacks and repeated energy disruption undermined both the regularity and quality of service delivery. The strain was particularly severe in areas close to the front line and in areas subjected to extensive attacks.

Access has also been unevenly distributed. Internally displaced people, people without the necessary documentation, people in hard-to-reach areas and those with specific protection needs may have been partly or entirely excluded from regular public services and support schemes. Humanitarian organisations and civil society have therefore been essential in meeting urgent needs and reaching groups not fully covered by state systems.

The result should not be assessed against normal levels of service delivery during peacetime. The difference between pre-war levels of service delivery and the current situation says little in itself about what the support has achieved. The relevant comparison is between the situation today and how it might have developed in the absence of the support. The war has created a real risk of more widespread disruptions to salaries, social benefit payments and the operation of schools, healthcare facilities and municipal services. This counterfactual outcome cannot be observed, making it impossible to quantify the extent of service disruption that international support has averted. The analysis can, however, examine whether the mechanisms necessary for continual service delivery – financing, energy, infrastructure and institutional capacity – were in fact maintained and whether Norwegian support contributed to sustaining them.

Several result areas have contributed to maintaining service delivery. Financing of the state budget has made it possible to maintain civilian payments and cover ongoing operating costs. Energy supplies, repairs and backup power have been essential to keeping hospitals, schools, water utilities and municipal services operational. At the same time, the capacity of public institutions has influenced the extent to which available resources have been translated into service delivery. Civil society and humanitarian organisations have also helped reach people and areas not fully covered by regular public systems.

These relationships are examined in greater detail in the relevant result chapters. The section below assesses the financing of civilian public functions through the World Bank, which represents one of the most direct links between Norwegian support and the maintenance of government payments and public services.

> The combination of direct budget support and financing of critical infrastructure is what makes Norway's partnership so valuable to Ukraine - helping us sustain essential public services today while strengthening the foundations for recovery and resilience.
>
> OLGA ZYKOVA – DEPUTY FINANCE MINISTER OF UKRAINE

State budget financing secured

As highlighted in the Report to the Storting on the Nansen Programme,[36] operational support to the Ukrainian state, repairs to critical infrastructure and early reconstruction are essential to the state's ability to withstand Russian aggression and to the resilience of the population. The World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)[37] were identified as particularly relevant multilateral partners.

By the end of 2025, Norway had contributed a total of NOK 10.6 billion to financing Ukraine's state budget through the World Bank. The support was distributed across the Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), the Special Program for Ukraine Response (SPUR) and early crisis budget support. Of the total contribution, NOK 9.3 billion was channelled through the URTF.

URTF is a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank. By the end of 2025, 19 donors were participating in the fund, with Norway as the largest contributor. Norway accounted for around 35 per cent of contributions to the fund from sovereign donors.

Most URTF support is implemented through Ukrainian government programmes and systems, but not all of the financing can be considered general budget support. The support has enabled the Ukrainian authorities to maintain government operations and essential services, including salaries, pensions and social benefits, health and education services, repairs and investments in energy, infrastructure, agriculture and housing and conditions for private investment (see Figure 1).[38]

At the same time, the URTF serves as a catalytic financing platform. By the end of 2025, the fund had helped mobilise an additional USD 7.3 billion in development and private financing. This included USD 3.35 billion from IDA and IBRD operations and USD 3.95 billion from private and other public financing sources. The significance of the fund therefore lies both in the grants channelled through the URTF and in their role within larger co-financed funding packages.

↓ Doctors perform ultrasound diagnostics in the renovated trauma building of the municipal emergency hospital in Zaporizhzhia on 11 February 2026. | Photo: Dmytro Smolienko, Ukrinform/NTB



FIGURE 3
Breakdown of URTF grants across the 11 Nansen-supported programmes, totalling approximately USD 2.02 billion.[39]

Sector	Programme	Percentage of USD 2.017 billion
Operational and budget support	PEACE	24.0%
Agriculture	ARISE	20.6%
Energy	REPOWER	20.0%
Transport	RELINC	14.4%
Housing repairs	HOPE	11.2%
Health	HEAL + THRIVE	5.4%
Education	LEARN	3.0%
Road network	DRIVE	0.5%
Private sector	RISE	0.5%
Public sector reforms and governance	SURGE / STRONG	0.5%

An important aspect of the URTF's added value is that the interventions are managed as a coherent and coordinated portfolio rather than as standalone projects. Coordinated financing, flexible programme frameworks and implementation support have made it possible to scale up and adapt interventions as needs and operating conditions have changed. This has been particularly important in a context of severe pressure on Ukrainian institutions and a risk of fragmented donor efforts.[40]

The URTF is also coordinated with other World Bank support, including loans backed by bilateral guarantees. SPUR supports some of the same programmes as the URTF, but through loans rather than grants. Norwegian financing has therefore contributed to the results described in table 1.

TABLE 1
Selected results for URTF (and IDA-SPUR where the programmes overlap) up to 31 December 2025[41]

Together with other financing, the URTF has helped deliver 40 million individual services to Ukrainians, reaching more than 20 million people overall. This includes, among other things:

Energy	Equipment for emergency repairs to the electricity grid helped restore power to 3.5 million households, while the reconstruction of district heating systems restored district heating to 1.5 million residents.
Education	779,000 pupils have benefited from improved schooling through upgrades and reforms in the education sector, while 18,000 children in remote regions have received free school transport, enabling them to continue their education. In addition, 240,000 teachers have received training in the new EU-aligned curriculum for years 7-8.
Housing	130,000 people have received support for the reconstruction and repair of their homes. Preparatory work for repairs to 200 apartment blocks is under way.
Health	7 million children have received vaccinations, 11.7 million people have gained access to primary health services, 655,000 have gained access to mental health services and 772,000 have participated in rehabilitation programmes. In addition, more than 5.7 million people received subsidised medicines.
Agriculture	69,883 farmers have gained access to financing, nearly half of them women. USD 3.2 billion in private capital has been mobilised for the sector, twice the target.
Roads, rivers and railways	Infrastructure such as bridges, railway rolling stock and tugboats supports the transport sector. Design and preparatory work for major road projects has begun, while the construction work itself is financed through other mechanisms.
Operational support	13 million people have continued to receive social benefits, pensions or salaries in the civilian public sector, including nurses and teachers.



6. Result area: Lives have been saved and people have received essential protection in accordance with humanitarian principles

← People line up to enter a train during an exercise conducted by Ukrainian Railways, Ukrzaliznytsia, simulating passenger evacuation following repeated Russian drone attacks on the rail system, in Kyiv, Ukraine, April 9, 2026. | Photo: Thomas Peter, Reuters/NTB

Lives have been saved and people have received essential protection in accordance with humanitarian principles

Humanitarian efforts in Ukraine contributed to saving lives, reducing suffering and protecting people affected by the consequences of the war in 2023-2025. Food, water, shelter, cash assistance, healthcare, evacuation and other emergency measures reduced the immediate risk of death and serious harm. At the same time, legal assistance, psychosocial support, protection from violence and measures to ensure access to rights and public support schemes contributed to physical safety, legal protection and human dignity.

Humanitarian needs remain extensive, particularly in areas close to the front line and among internally displaced people. In 2025, 12.7 million people in Ukraine were in need of humanitarian aid. Of these, six million were prioritised, but this figure was subsequently reduced to 4.8 million due to insufficient funding. Overall, 65.1 per cent of the humanitarian response plan was funded.[42] Evacuations, expanding combat zones and increased long-range drone capabilities, together with an increasingly protracted situation for internally displaced people, have highlighted the need for an approach that both addresses immediate needs and lays the foundations for sustainable solutions. In 2025, 3.7 million people were internally displaced.[43] The need for humanitarian stakeholders is particularly acute in areas where the authorities lack the capacity to provide services. This is particularly important in occupied territories and in areas where the state orders mandatory evacuations. In areas subject to mandatory evacuation, the authorities will no longer provide services.[44]

The humanitarian situation in Ukraine differs from many other crises in its scale, the extensive destruction of civilian infrastructure and attacks in urban areas, particularly on electricity supplies and facilities essential to basic service provision. Combined with extremely cold winters and increasingly frequent attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers, this makes the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine particularly challenging. Norway's humanitarian partners have adapted their efforts in close cooperation with a strong civil society and government institutions to support existing national and local responses.

Norwegian support formed part of the broader humanitarian response led by Ukrainian authorities and local communities, the UN, the International Red Cross Movement and national and international organisations. Norway provided funding that enabled the delivery of emergency assistance and protection and the adaptation of the response as needs changed.

Several Norwegian partners contribute both to service delivery in these areas and to the evacuation of the population. At the same time, public services in areas receiving displaced people are often inadequate. Humanitarian organisations therefore provide important support from the point of evacuation and

throughout the displacement process, until displaced people are integrated into new local communities and have access to essential public services. The efforts of humanitarian partners are essential to filling gaps in government service delivery throughout this process.[45]

The overall picture must also take into account those who were not reached. Limited access, security risks, funding gaps and a lack of documentation or registration mean that some groups have less access to assistance. This includes people in areas close to the front line and in occupied territories, people with reduced mobility and those not covered by regular government or humanitarian support schemes. The fact that many people have received assistance and protection does not therefore mean that needs have been met overall.



↑ UNHCR's partner organisation Angels of Salvation helps residents near the front line in the Donetsk region repair their war-damaged homes. | Photo: Oleksii Hutnyk, Angels of Salvation

HNRP 2025 and RRP 2025-2026

The 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) is the joint UN-coordinated plan for the humanitarian response in Ukraine. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) prepares the plan on behalf of humanitarian partners, in cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities. The plan is based on needs assessments and is intended to ensure a principled, coordinated and needs-based response. More than 600 organisations are involved in its implementation. The humanitarian plan is structured around different thematic areas or clusters and covers emergency assistance, protection, health, food security, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, cash assistance and mine clearance, among other areas.[46]

The 2025-2026 Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) covers refugees from Ukraine in European host countries, including Moldova. The plan is coordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and builds on the leadership of host governments, with the participation of UN agencies, national and international organisations and civil society. It emphasises protection and legal rights, inclusion in national services, employment, social cohesion and locally led responses.[47]

From emergency aid to more sustainable solutions

Norway's partners in the humanitarian portfolio have combined life-saving assistance with measures that strengthen stability, reduce vulnerability and contribute to more sustainable solutions. This is particularly evident in the combination of cash assistance, winter assistance in the form of cash and fuel, essential goods and infrastructure and support for local services. In practice, the aid has therefore not only helped people through the immediate crisis, but has also contributed to maintaining essential services and reducing the need for negative coping strategies.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Caritas Norway and Norwegian Church Aid have combined winter assistance, cash assistance, hygiene items, vouchers and food security support with longer-term solutions such as housing repairs, investments in water infrastructure, rehabilitation of water systems and heating solutions. In 2025, the World Food Programme provided food and cash assistance to 1.1 million people in Ukraine. In 2025, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees combined cash assistance and shelter with the rehabilitation of social infrastructure and expanded housing repair programmes in Ukraine. Around 200,000 people received cash assistance and support for solid fuel

In the Mykolaiv region, the Norwegian Church Aid repaired water towers in two communities (Kobleve and Inhulka) and rehabilitated the water supply network in another (Pisky). | Photo: Håvard Hovdhaugen, HEKS/EPER

during the winter, including 25,000 persons with disabilities, while more than 157,000 people received support for emergency housing and shelter. Through Caritas Norway, more than 49,200 people in Ukraine gained access to safe water, while 96 per cent of those who received housing repairs reported that their homes were weatherproof and adequate. Norwegian Church Aid reached around 322,200 people in Ukraine with water, sanitation and heating interventions, including more than 131,000 people through rehabilitated water systems, and provided 5,000 hygiene vouchers to more than 4,300 households in 2025. In 2025, the Norwegian Refugee Council supported more than 14,200 people with cash assistance for heating and fuel, while 97 per cent of evacuees and returnees in Ukraine were able to meet all or most of their basic needs within four to six weeks. In addition, the organisation provided shelter and hygiene kits to more than 41,000 people. Taken together, this shows how emergency aid in 2025 was combined with measures that strengthen households' security, dignity and capacity to cope over time. Different stakeholders may play different roles in the response, including through their geographical presence, access to specific target groups, sector-specific expertise, cooperation with local organisations and ability to adapt their efforts rapidly to local needs. At the same time, UN agencies contribute capacity and systems that make it possible to reach very large numbers of people.[48]

The World Health Organization has played a key role in ensuring access to life-saving health services in Ukraine through the provision of medicines, medical equipment and emergency supplies, support for mobile health services, medical evacuations and coordination. In 2025, the response was increasingly linked to early recovery, preparedness and strengthening of systems through support to the Ministry of Health, healthcare institutions and regional health authorities. In frontline areas, healthcare workers have operated under extreme pressure, while healthcare facilities have faced limited access to electricity, water, medicines and transport. This has made both emergency response and routine healthcare more challenging. In 2025, the World Health Organization delivered medicines and equipment worth more than USD 24 million, while more than 100,000 people in frontline areas gained access to mobile primary health services.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) maintained a large-scale humanitarian response for 16.8 million children and families in Ukraine in 2024 and 2025 through health services, psychosocial support, education, water and sanitation services and cash assistance. Save the Children supported more than 18,400 children through education initiatives in 2025. Through a combination of digital learning centres for children and teachers, children were able to continue their education despite disruption caused by the war, displacement and damage to infrastructure.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Humanitarian Fund is an important

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

The International Committee of the Red Cross helped improve access to water, electricity, heating and other critical infrastructure for around 9.9 million people in Ukraine between 2023 and 2025, comprising 4.9 million in 2023, 2.9 million in 2024 and 2.1 million in 2025.


The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies helped more than six million people in Ukraine in 2023 and 2024 through logistics, emergency preparedness, the distribution of emergency aid and cash assistance.

The Norwegian Red Cross helped provide more than 300,000 people in Ukraine with primary health services through mobile health units between 2022 and 2025.



example of flexible, needs-based funding. In 2024, the fund disbursed more than USD 164 million and reached approximately 1.4 million people in Ukraine. In 2025, USD 202 million was disbursed, contributing to the provision of services for around 660,000 people. A large share of the funding went directly to national and local organisations – nearly 60 per cent in 2024 and 70 per cent in 2025. This has strengthened local coordination, local decision-making and the ability to adapt the humanitarian response in areas close to the front line. Locally rooted Ukrainian organisations enjoy high levels of trust within local communities, have a strong understanding of local needs and play a key role in identifying vulnerable people and linking humanitarian support with public services.[49]





→ The Red Cross provides healthcare in Maryivka, transports medical equipment to hospitals near the front line and assists with rescue efforts following a Russian attack in Kyiv. | Photo: Roar Dalmo Moltubak, Norwegian Red Cross (top and bottom left), and Red Cross

From humanitarian aid to sustainable solutions in Moldova

Developments in Moldova are particularly relevant to understanding how the humanitarian response within the portfolio has shifted towards longer-term and more sustainable solutions. According to an external review of Norway's portfolio in Moldova, the support has gradually evolved from emergency aid to encompass more sustainable solutions, refugee inclusion and stronger government ownership. This is a trend observed over the period 2022-2025 rather than a set of results from a single year. Across sectors, stakeholders reported a shared emphasis on strengthening Moldova's long-term resilience. In the humanitarian portfolio, this has been reflected, among other things, in greater emphasis on refugee self-reliance, inclusion in national systems and the use of public schemes where possible.[50]

Norway was described by partners and government authorities as a flexible, trust-based and pragmatic partner. This flexibility was particularly important during the initial phase of the refugee crisis in 2022-2023. It also proved crucial as needs shifted from emergency aid towards protection and longer-term integration in the period up to 2025. Given the scale of the refugee crisis in a country with a population of just over 2.3 million and high levels of poverty, it was also important that humanitarian support was extended to vulnerable Moldovan households. This helped reduce pressure on social cohesion and strengthened the legitimacy of the response.[51]

At the same time, experience from Moldova shows that the transition from emergency aid to more sustainable solutions is not without challenges. This was particularly evident towards the end of the period in 2024-2025, when humanitarian funding declined while needs became more protracted. The transition continues to be constrained by declining humanitarian funding, limited fiscal space and institutional capacity in Moldova, as well as a persistent divide between humanitarian and development financing.[52] This highlights the need for time, flexibility and close cooperation with national authorities and systems in order to achieve more sustainable solutions.



→ Anna fled Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine and arrived in Moldova with her family in 2022. In 2023, she took part in an entrepreneurship programme for Ukrainian women run by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). With technical support from NRC and its local partner organisation AFAM, combined with her own savings, she was able to open her own flower shop in Chișinău. | Photo: Sandra Mørkestøl, Norad

Flexibility provides choice and wider benefits

A clear feature of partners' results is that flexibility has been important both for the implementation of the response and for aid recipients. This is a recurring pattern throughout the period. For partners, flexibility has made it possible to reallocate funding, adapt activities and change delivery methods as the security situation, displacement patterns or funding levels have changed. For aid recipients, flexible forms of support, particularly cash assistance and vouchers, have provided greater choice in meeting their own needs in ways suited to their circumstances. This appears to have improved the relevance and targeting of aid, while respecting the dignity of recipients.[53]

One example of this type of flexible support is the cash assistance used by several partners throughout the period. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is one of the partners providing cash assistance. Since 2022, the organisation has disbursed USD 721 million to around 2.4 million people. Recipients of this cash assistance have included particularly vulnerable families, who used the funds to cover increased costs during the winter and families who were evacuated from the front line or lost their homes and belongings following attacks.

Several results also point to wider benefits arising from this flexibility. Cash and voucher assistance enabled households to prioritise what they needed most. At the same time, some interventions appear to have strengthened people's capacity to cope, reduced the use of negative coping strategies and, in some cases, stimulated local markets. Norwegian Church Aid reports that voucher assistance was very well received in 2025: 99 per cent of recipients reported being satisfied and 90 per cent said they preferred this form of support. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Norwegian Refugee Council have shown how cash assistance enabled families to meet basic needs quickly in difficult circumstances. Cash assistance from the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and humanitarian support from Caritas in Moldova helped ease pressure and tensions in vulnerable local communities by including both refugees and host communities in the response.

At the same time, the results point to some recurring challenges across the portfolio. Throughout 2023-2025, the persistent and changing security situation in Ukraine restricted access, delayed activities and made it difficult to reach the most vulnerable. Attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure have had significant knock-on effects on water, electricity, heating, health, education and essential services. Limited access, destroyed infrastructure, mine and explosive ordnance contamination, administrative barriers and staff shortages recur as key challenges, particularly in areas close to the front line. Access in occupied territories is also extremely challenging. Several partners also report that funding gaps, rising costs and declining humanitarian support, particularly in 2024-2025, have forced them to prioritise the most vulnerable more strictly, reducing coverage elsewhere. This is a result of the Humanitarian Response Plan being hyper-prioritised following cuts to aid for Ukraine. This trend is also evident in Moldova, where the transition towards more system-oriented solutions is taking place at the same time as humanitarian funding is declining and the government's fiscal space remains limited. Furthermore, the sustainability of reforms and services is not yet assured, partly due to limited public funding and a lack of clear long-term solutions for particularly vulnerable refugees.

For almost 5 years of war, Norway has been a consistent donor supporting humanitarian response in Ukraine. As a result, local and international partners and the United Nations continue to bring lifesaving assistance and protection to people forced to flee their homes and those living in frontline communities. Norway's sustained commitment has made a real difference for people in coping with the daily hardships of war.

MATTHIAS SCHMALE – UNITED NATIONS RESIDENT AND HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR IN UKRAINE

Kakhovka: The value of acting in a timely manner

The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on 6 June 2023 triggered flooding that severely affected southern Ukraine. The flooding claimed lives, destroyed homes and left nearly one million people without access to clean water. This required a rapid response across several areas. In the first hours and days, evacuations and assistance to those affected by the flooding were the highest priorities. At the same time, damage to the water supply increased the risk of waterborne diseases and long-term problems for local communities that depended on the reservoir.

Three days after the destruction of the dam, Norway announced NOK 150 million in humanitarian aid through the UN and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The fact that partners were already operational made it possible to provide support quickly without first having to establish new mechanisms. The response could therefore build on existing knowledge, partnerships and capacity. The UN and humanitarian partners were active from the first day of the disaster and worked simultaneously to gain access to all affected areas, including areas outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities.

During June, the UN delivered around 20 convoys of emergency aid and approximately 20 million litres of drinking water, as well as providing support to nearly 70 local water utilities. Nearly 40,000 people received cash assistance, more than 200,000 food rations were distributed and medical equipment and mobile healthcare teams helped provide assistance to nearly 38,000 people. Nearly 65,000 repair and household products were also distributed to people whose homes had been damaged.

The Kakhovka response illustrates the importance of a timely response in a humanitarian crisis. In this case, flexible funding through established partners made it possible to meet urgent needs quickly. Assistance can have a far greater impact when it reaches people when they are at their most vulnerable soon after a disaster.



→ Rescue workers from Ukraine's State Emergency Service evacuate a resident from the flooded area of Kherson. | Photo: Mykola Tymchenko, UNDP

Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights

Through its portfolio of partners, Norway has helped vulnerable people in Ukraine and Moldova gain access to protection measures that strengthen their ability to exercise their rights. Protection is both an integral part of humanitarian aid and a core humanitarian principle. The war in Ukraine has been described as a protection crisis.[54] Protection encompasses measures to prevent and reduce violence, abuse and exploitation and to help ensure safe and equitable access to assistance and services for vulnerable groups. Vulnerability must be understood as multidimensional and context-dependent and is often greatest where several risk factors intersect. Vulnerable groups include older people, children, persons with disabilities, internally displaced people and people living close to the front line.

Norway works on protection at three different levels.

1. **Integrating protection considerations across the humanitarian response to ensure that all humanitarian assistance is provided safely and without causing harm.** This involves identifying who is particularly vulnerable, understanding the circumstances that put them at risk and ensuring equitable access to assistance and services. We do this to reduce the risk of violence, abuse, discrimination and exclusion.
2. **Specialised services for vulnerable people.** Specialised services include measures for and the establishment of safe spaces for children, legal aid and advice, evacuation of vulnerable people living close to the front line, accommodation, psychosocial support and mental health care, prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence and work relating to missing persons and prisoners of war.
3. **Advocacy and strengthening of national systems, including through legislative changes and improvements to public service provision.** This involves strengthening the capacity of authorities and institutions to protect rights, including through measures to improve soldiers' understanding of international humanitarian law.[55]

A recent evaluation of this portfolio highlights several important results. A key finding is that the most robust and sustainable results are achieved when services and interventions are closely integrated with Ukrainian government systems. Cooperation with local organisations is essential because they enjoy high levels of trust within local communities, have a strong understanding of local needs and play a key role in identifying vulnerable people and linking humanitarian support with public services. The humanitarian protection response often serves as a bridge between vulnerable people and government support schemes, while also filling gaps in public service delivery where capacity is limited.[56]

Partners consistently demonstrate a strong understanding of needs and several have specific mandates to assist particularly vulnerable groups. UNICEF, SOS Children's Villages and Save the Children work specifically with children. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) supports internally displaced people, while the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) provides support to women and girls affected by sexual and gender-based violence. Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid work with, among other areas, survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, while the Norwegian Helsinki Committee focuses on LGBT+ groups and women's rights groups. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) and Geneva Call work with armed actors and non-state armed actors, as well as prisoners of war, missing persons and their families.[57]

The need for specialised services is increasing as a result of the war, protracted displacement, demographic pressures, attacks on civilian infrastructure, lack of documentation among internally displaced people and refugees, overstretched institutions, reduced humanitarian funding and growing social needs. At the same time, many specialised services remain heavily dependent on international funding.

Specialised services

Specialised protection services include individual case management, legal advice, psychosocial support



Children in class in Arbuzynka, Ukraine's Mykolaiv region, April 2026. | Photo: Norwegian Refugee Council

and mental health care, as well as the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence. Several of Norway's partners provide individual case management. This is a structured approach to supporting individuals with complex protection needs. The approach involves identifying risks and vulnerabilities, assessing needs, developing an individual support plan, referring individuals to relevant services and following up to ensure they actually receive the support they need. Individual case management is therefore not a single service, but an approach designed to ensure comprehensive and coordinated support.

A large number of people in Ukraine received support through measures relating to safe identification, referral and follow-up. For children, this included individual case management for more than 65,710 children through UNICEF in 2025, while approximately 910 children received support from Save the Children. Several partners also worked on prevention, risk reduction and response relating to gender-based violence. Norwegian People's Aid and Norwegian Church Aid provided individual case management to more than 6,200 women, girls and non-binary people.[58]

In 2025, the OHCHR reported more than 740 verified cases of conflict-related sexual violence since the full-scale invasion. In 2025, UN Action supported survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, prevention and capacity-building. The project reached more than 10,500 people directly and approximately 2,900 government service providers in the health sector, police, prosecution services and social services received training in survivor-centred support, trauma-informed investigation and case management. In addition, broader capacity-building activities reached more than 5,000 stakeholders. Integrated support centres provided medical, psychosocial and legal assistance in high-risk areas, while psychologists supported more than 150 survivors and family members during legal proceedings. More than 200 survivors also participated in consultations on reparations mechanisms and a total of nine support groups were established for male survivors of conflict-related sexual violence.

The war has exacerbated a range of gender-based violence in Ukraine, including intimate partner violence and sexual violence.[59] In 2025, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) supported 25,642 people through measures addressing gender-based violence, including by strengthening psychosocial support provided by mobile healthcare teams, sharing information on available health services and distributing hygiene supplies. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) also helps strengthen the capacity of regional public services and supports the operation of a national digital service for survivors of violence. Additionally, the organisation has reached 108,607 people with sexual and reproductive health services in Ukraine. This includes the operation of two mobile maternity units in Kherson and Donetsk, where public services have been severely reduced as a result of the war. Other key partners in this area include the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which supported approximately 339,100 people in Ukraine in 2025. Norwegian People's Aid supported more than 3,700 survivors of gender-based violence in Ukraine, while Norwegian Church Aid supported nearly 5,400 women and girls in Ukraine and Moldova in 2025. In addition, at least 603,500 people received psychosocial support and mental health care in 2025 through the efforts of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Norwegian Church Aid and Save the Children.[60]

At least 147,000 people received legal advice in 2025 through the efforts of Norwegian partners, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Norwegian Church Aid and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee.[61] Partners provide legal advice to help vulnerable people access social security benefits, social assistance and public services. The limited digitisation of official documents in many of the occupied territories has resulted in legal documents being lost as a consequence of the occupation.[62] This poses a challenge for internally displaced people from these areas, who require legal assistance to reintegrate into the public service system and, among other things, have their social security benefits or pensions reinstated. Partners also work with internally displaced people to help them apply for compensation for damaged or destroyed homes. However, this support is not available to people who have fled their homes in

occupied territories. Vulnerable people who have fled occupied territories are therefore offered temporary accommodation or support in reception centres. Partners also provide legal services to help internally displaced people obtain the documentation necessary for access to services. Where documentation is unavailable, they work closely with the authorities to ensure that particularly vulnerable people can access public services. Many partners provide information on available services, including temporary shelter and healthcare services. This information is essential to helping vulnerable people feel more secure when evacuating their homes.[63]



↑ A UNHCR staff member comforts two internally displaced boys who have found refuge at the "Your Camp" reception centre in a village in the Chernivtsi region of western Ukraine. UNHCR has provided bedding for the centre, which accommodates 200 internally displaced people each day. | Photo:: Anton Fedorovn, UNCHR

Advocacy and strengthening national systems

Before the full-scale invasion, reforms to social services were under way. These have partly stalled as a result of the war, while needs have increased sharply. Challenges include low standards of institutional care for children and older people, high levels of institutionalisation and limited access to foster care and adoption. In addition, there is an ongoing need for better protection within the justice system, in services for survivors of gender-based violence and of the rights of LGBT+ people.[64] Norway's partners therefore work on both advocacy and the strengthening of systems in close cooperation with Ukrainian authorities, public institutions and civil society. Ukrainian authorities are demonstrating the political will to fulfil their obligations and are open to advice and support on how to safeguard human rights and ensure protection.

Human rights are central to these efforts. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) monitors Ukraine's compliance with human rights obligations, reports on developments and advises the state, including the military, on how these obligations can be upheld. Cooperation with the Ombudsperson and civil society organisations also helps ensure that the rights of vulnerable groups are better protected. The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) at the University of Oslo supports reforms in the justice sector, while the Norwegian Helsinki Committee supports LGBT+ groups, women's organisations and stakeholders working with survivors of gender-based violence. Geneva Call is another important example through its work to strengthen non-state armed actors' knowledge of and compliance with international humanitarian law.[65] The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) has also contributed to concrete legislative and regulatory changes in Ukraine, including Law no. 4502-IX on the protection of Ukrainian citizenship for residents of occupied territories and Cabinet of Ministers Decree no. 871 on the recognition of education obtained in occupied territories. Furthermore. HRMMU's analysis, recommendations and advocacy contributed significantly to the adoption of the National Strategy for the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts 2023-2030 and to the development of the National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, particularly with regard to the investigation of conflict-related sexual violence in accordance with international standards.

Reform efforts are particularly important because they link humanitarian action to longer-term systemic change. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) are among the organisations that have helped maintain momentum in reform efforts, including in the areas of gender-based violence and children in institutional care. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also contributed to a new national strategy to safeguard internally displaced people's and asylum seekers' access to social benefits and education in Ukraine.

Working with missing persons and persons deprived of their liberty

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has played a particular role in efforts concerning prisoners of war, missing persons and their families. The organisation's work with Ukrainian associations of families of missing persons has strengthened their capacity to advocate for their rights. During the period 2023-2025, at least 17,400 families received clarification regarding the fate of their family members.[66] In addition, more than 1,720 prisoners of war received individual assistance in 2025, while more than 4,030 people with specific vulnerabilities received individual support in connection with detention. Furthermore, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has visited more than 8,090 prisoners of war since 2022. The organisation also supports the Ukrainian authorities in their efforts to facilitate the exchange of prisoners of war with Russia.

The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) has strengthened civil society's capacity to engage in efforts concerning missing persons, particularly through support to family associations and women-led organisations. This has been achieved through training, information activities, small grants and forums for dialogue between families, civil society and the authorities. Families have also gained improved access to information, legal aid, appeals mechanisms and compensation schemes.

Protection measures in Moldova

Ukrainian refugees in Moldova face significant challenges. Many refugees face increased uncertainty as a result of reduced humanitarian support and it remains unclear how people with temporary protection will be integrated into regular government systems. Those who are unable to enter the labour market, such as older people and persons with disabilities, are particularly vulnerable. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) estimates that 6,000 particularly vulnerable Ukrainians need to be transitioned to national social services. Norwegian and international partners are therefore working to ensure that Ukrainian refugees in Moldova receive adequate protection and, in the longer term, can access regular government services. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has led efforts to promote the inclusion of refugees in national systems, while the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has worked with the child protection system to ensure more sustainable outcomes for children and greater alignment with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[67] In 2025, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) provided gender-based violence response measures for 130,000 women and children in Moldova. Overall, partners have placed strong emphasis on protection, gender and inclusion and are helping to transition more services to the state through budgetary and legislative measures. Nevertheless, services remain underfunded and several of the results remain fragile as long as government systems lack the capacity and funding to assume full responsibility.

Several factors constrained the achievement of results relating to saving lives and ensuring that people in Ukraine receive the protection they need. The ongoing security situation, access constraints, damaged infrastructure, administrative barriers and staff shortages made it difficult to reach the most vulnerable people, particularly in frontline areas and occupied territories. In both Ukraine and Moldova, funding gaps, rising costs and declining humanitarian aid led to more difficult prioritisation decisions and reduced coverage. Protection, particularly efforts to address gender-based violence, is often among the areas deprioritised when funding is reduced. This increases the risk that specialist services for particularly vulnerable groups will be reduced or discontinued.

The transition from emergency humanitarian aid to more sustainable solutions was also challenging. Many interventions have strengthened links with local services and government systems, but their sustainability remains uncertain where public funding, institutional capacity and long-term solutions are not yet in place. This applies in particular to people with complex and long-term needs.

Results in the area of protection are methodologically challenging to measure and attribute. Variations in reporting and limited data disaggregation make it more difficult to assess how effectively aid has reached particularly vulnerable groups. Overall, this shows that flexible funding, local capacity and strong links to national systems remain essential for sustaining and embedding the results.

What this support has helped achieve

Ukraine

Over 300,000

received primary healthcare

The Norwegian Red Cross helped provide primary healthcare through mobile teams to more than 300,000 people in Ukraine in 2022–2025.

Over 25,600

received support related to gender-based violence

In 2025, the United Nations Population Fund supported people in Ukraine with psychosocial support, information about health services and hygiene supplies, among other assistance.

Nearly 10 million

gained better access to essential services

The International Committee of the Red Cross helped improve access to water, electricity, heating and other critical infrastructure for 9.9 million people in 2023–2025.

Moldova

Nearly 150,000

households received support to stay warm

During the energy crisis in winter 2025, Moldovan households received Norwegian support to pay for heating.

Elections and independent media

supported during a critical period

Norwegian support helped counter disinformation, illicit political financing, cyber threats and Russian influence operations.

73 per cent

of Moldova's gas needs covered

In 2024, Norwegian support and an EBRD loan helped cover 73 per cent of Moldova's gas needs. The support came as the country reduced its dependence on Russian gas and increased imports from the EU.



Anzhela (24) holds her little niece Liliya (4) during a distribution of warm clothing and blankets to vulnerable, war-affected families in Sloviansk in the Donetsk region. The distribution is organised by UNHCR's partner organisation Humanitarian Mission Proliska. Anzhela and Liliya are internally displaced from the village of Krasnopillia near Kramatorsk in the Donetsk region. | Photo: Artur Ulianytskyi, Humanitarian Mission Proliska/UNHCR



7. Result area: Lasting, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full employment and decent work for all have been promoted

← Steel retail shelving is manufactured at MARKQUEN Company outside Lviv and exported to Europe. | Photo: Henriette Bjørge, Norad

Lasting, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full employment and decent work for all have been promoted

Ukraine's economy continued to function and grew during 2023-2025, despite the war, extensive destruction and repeated disruptions to energy and transport infrastructure. Real GDP growth was 5.5 per cent in 2023, 3.2 per cent in 2024 and 1.8 per cent in 2025. The growth should be viewed in the context of the sharp contraction in 2022 and does not mean that output, investment or employment have returned to pre-full-scale invasion levels.

At the same time, the scale of damage continues to increase. Direct physical damage was estimated at USD 195.1 billion by the end of 2025, while reconstruction and recovery needs over the next decade were estimated at USD 587.7 billion.[68] The private sector could potentially meet a significant share of these needs, but this depends, among other factors, on security, reforms, access to finance and an investment climate conducive to mobilising capital. Reconstruction needs are too extensive to be met by public financing alone. It is estimated that, with continued reform implementation and an improved investment climate, private capital could finance up to 40 per cent of reconstruction needs.




→ Steel shop fittings are manufactured with precision and craftsmanship at MARKQUEN Company outside Lviv. | Photo: Henriette Bjørge, Norad

RDNA (Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment)

The RDNA is an ongoing assessment of war damage, economic losses and reconstruction needs in Ukraine, prepared by the Ukrainian authorities in cooperation with the World Bank, the European Commission and the United Nations. The methodology distinguishes between direct damage to physical infrastructure and assets, economic losses resulting from the war and reconstruction and rehabilitation needs.

The latest assessment, RDNA5, covers the situation as of 31 December 2025. It estimates direct war damage at USD 195 billion, while total economic losses amount to approximately USD 667 billion. Reconstruction and rehabilitation needs are estimated at USD 588 billion over the next ten years, equivalent to nearly three times Ukraine's GDP in 2025.

FIGURE 4
Total damage by sector (US$ billion)



Source: The World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union, United Nations (2026). Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDN5). Link



Fire and rescue crews respond quickly – here following the attack on Okhmatdyt Hospital, Ukraine's largest children's hospital, in Kyiv on 8 July 2024. | Photo: Oleksii Filii, UNICEF

The economy's resilience was primarily due to the adaptations made by Ukrainian businesses, workers, public authorities and local communities. Businesses relocated production, adapted supply chains and invested in backup power, while the authorities maintained essential economic and public functions. At the same time, international support, including Norwegian support, helped reduce some financial, energy-related, institutional and physical barriers.

Evidence shows economic adaptation and the restoration or maintenance of activity in some areas, but does not provide a basis for concluding that growth is lasting and sustainable, that full employment has been achieved or that decent work is available to all. War-related risks remained a fundamental constraint and evidence on working conditions, wages, safety and the inclusion of vulnerable groups, among other issues, remains limited.

Growth in private sector employment and economic activity

Increased private sector activity and employment are key intermediate results on the path towards sustained economic growth. At the same time, this result must be interpreted in light of the sharp contraction following the full-scale invasion. Increased activity from a low level may reflect businesses and jobs being maintained or restored and does not necessarily indicate new and sustained growth. Developments also varied considerably across sectors and regions and war-driven activity cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence of a broadly strengthened private sector.

Through the World Bank's co-financed ARISE programme, part of the URTF, more than 69,800 farmers gained access to finance and the programme reported USD 3.2 billion in private capital mobilised for the agricultural sector. Nearly half of the beneficiaries were women. This demonstrates significant access to finance and capital mobilisation. However, this does not in itself demonstrate the extent to which the financing increased production or employment and cannot be attributed to Norway alone.

Norwegian support through GIZ provides more direct evidence that supported businesses have continued to operate. All companies that received support were still operational at the end of the project. Through Norwegian support, businesses received grants, often combined with loans from local banks, to invest in their own energy security. The businesses invested in decentralised energy solutions and follow-up data showed fewer power outages during working hours than among a comparison group. The results indicate that the support improved conditions for maintaining operations and helped preserve approximately 1,000 jobs.

Mine action combined with agricultural support financed through funds allocated to humanitarian aid has also enabled production to resume. At the broader programme level, with contributions from the Ukrainian authorities and several donors, more than 15,000 hectares had been returned to agricultural production through interventions that included Norwegian support. At the same time, an evaluation of

TABLE 2 Estimated agricultural production and gross value from released land, by stakeholder, 2024-2025[70]

Stake-holder	2024			2025			Gross value 2024-2025 (USD)
	Area (hectares)	Production (metric tonnes)	Gross value (USD)	Area (hectares)	Production (metric tonnes)	Gross value (USD)	
HALO	284.0	870.7	225,029	372.3	1,110.3	286,550	511,579
Norwegian People's Aid	662.3	1,838.0	466,685	1,025.2	2,590.1	651,821	1,118,506
FAO/WFP	246.5	731.0	168,524	445.0	1,287.6	321,387	489,911
Totalt	**1,192.8**	**3,439.7**	**860,238**	**1,842.5**	**4,988.0**	**1,259,758**	**2,119,996**

Norwegian-supported interventions found increasing agricultural production on released land from 2024 to 2025 and estimated a total modelled gross value of approximately USD 2.12 million over the two years.[69]

Several result areas under the Nansen Programme contributed to maintaining private sector activity or creating conditions for its resumption. Financing of the state budget contributed indirectly through macroeconomic stability, public payments and the continued provision of services. Energy security had a more direct impact by reducing production disruptions and making business operations more predictable. At the same time, the capacity of public institutions affected businesses' access to permits, registries, customs and tax services and other essential services.

Other effects were more indirect. Civil society, trade unions and business organisations have contributed to a more transparent and predictable business environment, while legal aid and documentation have reduced barriers to employment, ownership and business activity. In the short term, humanitarian cash assistance has sustained household demand and thereby supported local markets, but does not in itself provide a basis for concluding that it has led to sustained private sector development or job creation.

These relationships are examined in greater detail in the relevant result chapters. The following sections assess improvements in the business environment and access to productive land, which represent two of the most direct ways in which Norwegian support is linked to documented results in private sector activity, investment and production.



← Combine harvesters gather wheat in fields in Ukraine's Kharkiv region on 3 August 2026. | Photo: Ukrinform/ Shutterstock/NTB

Improved framework conditions for the private sector

The private sector is essential for sustaining economic activity, employment, tax revenues and functioning markets during the war and will play a central role in long-term reconstruction. At the same time, normal market conditions did not prevail in Ukraine during 2023-2025. War-related risks, attacks on infrastructure, power outages, logistical challenges, labour shortages and uncertainty regarding future operating conditions constrained both business operations and investment.

Norwegian support has aimed to improve certain framework conditions for the private sector within this challenging environment. The support has not created a normal investment climate, but has enabled more economic activity and trade and helped prepare more investments than would otherwise have been possible. The support has focused in particular on:

- reducing war-related and political risk
- improving access to insurance, guarantees and credit
- increasing businesses' resilience to energy disruptions
- maintaining trade, transport and commercial relationships
- developing projects that can attract private financing over time

The assessment of results covers Norad's support. Norfund, Eksfin and other parts of Norway's public financing and support institutions have mandates and financial instruments that complement this support, but their results are not included in the analysis below.

Since 2023, Norad has supported private sector development in Ukraine through three main areas: developing investment-ready projects, mobilising risk capital and supporting Ukrainian businesses in maintaining operations and competitiveness. Total support since 2022 is reported at approximately NOK 900 million.

Risk mitigation, insurance and guarantees

Limited access to war-risk insurance and guarantees was among the most significant barriers to private investment. The risk of physical damage, business interruptions and political uncertainty limited access to conventional insurance and credit markets. This particularly affected investments in physical assets in the energy, industry, logistics and transport sectors.

Norway has helped develop the market for risk mitigation through support to the World Bank Group's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the EBRD's Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Guarantee Facility (URGF). The two mechanisms have distinct but complementary functions. MIGA provides guarantees against war-related and political risk to investors and financial institutions. URGF aims to strengthen capacity in the insurance market, including by insuring mobile assets such as goods in transit against war-related damage and encouraging private insurers to re-enter the market.

As of June 2025, MIGA had issued USD 453 million in guarantees for projects in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion. Donor contributions of USD 103 million were included in the facility. This means that for every dollar in donor funding, MIGA issued USD 4.4 in guarantees. The ratio therefore indicates the scale of guarantees supported by donor contributions. However, it does not in itself indicate the wider socio-economic returns generated by the facility or the scale of investment actually mobilised as a result of the guarantees.

The guarantees enabled financial institutions to increase their lending capacity. MIGA reported that approximately 35,000 small and medium-sized enterprises had benefited from the increased lending capacity. This is a result of an international facility supported by Norway, rather than the number of businesses financed by Norway alone. A distinction must also be made between businesses that gained access to financing, businesses that actually took out loans and any resulting effects on investment and employment.

The URGF was established as a different type of risk mitigation mechanism and, during the reporting period, began building insurance capacity for assets, including goods in transit, vehicles and railway rolling stock. By March 2026, assets with a total value of EUR 361 million had been insured, primarily mobile assets such as goods

in transit, vehicles, locomotives and other rolling stock. The facility has achieved a multiplier effect of 4.5 on donor contributions,[71] partly because the insurance policies are often short-term, allowing the funds to be reused. An important objective of the facility has been to encourage international private reinsurers to re-enter the market and private insurers currently assume 10 per cent of the risk. This is an important, but still limited, step towards building a more functional insurance market for businesses operating in Ukraine.

An important objective of the URGF is for private insurers to gradually assume a larger share of the risk. Such private sector participation may be an early indication of market development, but, by the end of the period, capacity remained limited relative to investment needs. This must also be viewed in light of the fact that private reinsurers largely ceased covering risks in Ukraine following the full-scale invasion in 2022. The mechanisms also depended on a combination of donor contributions, public capital and private reinsurance.

The result therefore does not mean that the war-risk insurance market was functioning normally or that barriers to investment had been removed. The support reduced some barriers and enabled specific loans, investments and trade activities. The main remaining challenge was to scale up the facilities to support larger and more complex investments without public capital assuming risks that commercial stakeholders could eventually bear themselves.

Improved conditions for businesses to maintain operations

Small and medium-sized enterprises account for more than 70 per cent of private sector employment.[72] For many Ukrainian businesses, the most immediate challenge was maintaining day-to-day operations in the face of power outages, rising costs and shortages of labour and equipment. Small and medium-sized enterprises are particularly vulnerable because they often have less access to capital and fewer opportunities to diversify risk.

Norwegian support through GIZ focused on strengthening energy resilience among micro and small enterprises. The businesses received grants and subsidised loans for measures including local energy generation, energy storage and energy efficiency. The measures were intended to reduce business disruptions and enable businesses to maintain production and employment during repeated attacks on the energy system.

A total of 150 businesses have received support through Norwegian funding. Of these, 118 received grants, while 32 received a combination of grants and subsidised loans. All 116 businesses included in the assessment of continued operations were still operating when the projects ended. This demonstrates a high survival rate among the supported businesses and indicates that the support may have helped strengthen their ability to maintain operations under challenging conditions.[73] By comparison, approximately 64 per cent of Ukrainian businesses have temporarily suspended operations or closed down since 2022. Around 84-85 per cent of these businesses subsequently resumed operations, a share that remained stable in 2025.[74]

The project generated reported investments of EUR 2.5 million in energy solutions and contributed to the installation of 6,820 kW of energy generation and storage capacity, approximately 3.4 times the project target of 2,000 kW. In total, the businesses installed solar power capacity equivalent to that which could be installed on the roofs of around 800 Norwegian detached houses. This demonstrates that the businesses made investments and increased their energy capacity.

Follow-up data showed that the supported businesses experienced 20 per cent fewer power outages during working hours than a comparison group. This provides stronger evidence linking the support to more stable operations, but the robustness of the result depends on how the comparison group was selected, whether the businesses were comparable before receiving support and how power outages were measured. The businesses also reported an average reduction in energy consumption of 49 per cent.

Overall, the results provide relatively strong evidence that the supported businesses gained better access to energy, and developed more resilient operating conditions. The evidence is weaker regarding the

number of jobs maintained or created, changes in production and profitability and the extent to which the results will be sustained after the support ends.

Business matchmaking and investment dialogue

The business environment also encompasses access to information, networks, markets and business partners. This is particularly important in a wartime context, when physical presence and regular market engagement are more difficult.

Through support to the Norwegian-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce, more than 224 business connections were established and 82 business networking events were held between Norwegian and Ukrainian stakeholders during 2024-2025. The Norwegian-Ukrainian Business Hub opened in Kyiv in April 2025 under the Team Norway initiative, in collaboration with Innovation Norway. In 2025, the Hub engaged more than 50 companies and organisations across sectors including energy, infrastructure, security, IT, seafood, agriculture and reconstruction.

In addition, 111 representatives of Ukrainian small and medium-sized enterprises and professional communities participated in regional capacity-building activities in Ukraine in 2025. The activities covered areas including corporate governance, transparency, sustainability and responsible business conduct.

Development of investment-ready projects

Another barrier is the lack of projects that are sufficiently developed and quality-assured to attract financing. This applies in particular to technically complex and capital-intensive investments in energy, infrastructure, logistics and food production. Even when investor risk is reduced, capital cannot be mobilised without projects for which the technology, location, security, costs, regulatory requirements and future operations have been clarified.

Through the business support scheme for Ukraine, seven projects received support in 2024 and 2025 for project preparation and feasibility studies. The projects included wind power, rehabilitation of hydropower plants, energy storage, a logistics terminal and infrastructure for pharmaceutical supply.

The projects were still under way and the feasibility studies had not been completed by the end of the



→ The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Ukraine's state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia have jointly launched the country's first child-friendly train carriage, designed to provide a safe and comfortable journey for its youngest passengers. Nadiya (33) holds her son Matvii in the carriage, Ukraine, 8 August 2024. | Photo: Oleksii Fili, UNICEF

reporting period. Support had therefore contributed to project preparation and the development of a potential future investment pipeline, but not yet to realised investments. The results can only be assessed once it is known whether the feasibility studies lead to financing decisions, construction and operation. At this stage, the support should be described as a necessary precondition for future investment, rather than as mobilised capital.

Overall assessment of framework conditions

Norwegian-supported interventions have reduced some specific barriers to private sector activity. The strongest evidence relates to guarantees that have increased the lending capacity of financial institutions and energy measures that have provided supported businesses with more stable operating conditions. The evidence is more preliminary regarding the insurance market, the outcomes of business matchmaking and the development of investment-ready projects.

The objective has therefore been partially achieved in the segments of the market reached by the support. Against a backdrop of persistently high war-related risk, the support has helped maintain certain market functions, reduce risks associated with specific investments and strengthen the resilience of a limited number of businesses. Whether this leads to sustained investment and employment depends on the security situation, further reforms, access to capital and the ability to scale up the risk mitigation mechanisms.

People have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines

Russia's full-scale invasion has rendered large areas of land and water inaccessible or unsafe due to mines and other explosive ordnance. By the end of 2025, approximately 133,000 km² of land and 14,000 km² of water were potentially contaminated by unexploded ordnance.[75] The land area corresponds to approximately 22 per cent of Ukraine's total territory. "Potentially contaminated" does not mean that the entire area contains mines or requires physical clearance. An important part of the work is to survey and release areas so that suspected contamination can be ruled out.

Explosive ordnance contamination constrains agricultural production, investment and income opportunities, undermines livelihoods and delays returns and economic recovery. Results in this area are therefore not limited to the number of hectares cleared. The land must also be brought back into use and its productive use must generate production, income or other economic activity that would otherwise not have occurred, or would have occurred later, had the land not been made safely accessible.

The documented agricultural production and the modelled gross value generated from released land are results linked to actual economic activity. However, this is not necessarily the same as economic activity attributable to land release, as some of the land was already in production before it was formally released. This section assesses partners' contributions to making land safe and accessible and the conditions needed for this access to translate into productive use.

Complementary support from land survey to production

Through the Nansen Programme, Norway supports several stages of this process. The HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid survey, release and clear areas that are or may be contaminated by explosive ordnance. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) help identify and prioritise affected agricultural land and support farmers, households and local communities so that they can maintain or resume production. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports, among other areas, coordination, information management and national mine action capacity.

Partners' activities are complementary, but not necessarily sequential. Support to farmers and households may be provided while they await confirmation that the land is safe or after the land has been made accessible. WFP's broader support can also reach households economically affected by explosive ordnance contamination, even if they themselves do not use land registered as contaminated. The results therefore cannot always be linked to the same area of land or beneficiary.

The assessment of results consists of three parts:

1. Land has been released, cleared or otherwise made safely accessible.

2. Released land has been brought into productive use.

3. Its use has contributed to production, income or improved livelihoods.

Agricultural land data has been made available

It is estimated that approximately 15,000 hectares were under agricultural production in areas or among beneficiaries covered by Norwegian-supported mine action and related agricultural support. This figure is not directly comparable with the area of land released by the HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid. The first figure covers a broader combination of land release and agricultural support and relates in part to different areas of land and beneficiaries. With Norwegian support, the HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid released more than 1,500 hectares through clearance and technical surveys. In addition, more than 1,490 hectares were cancelled as suspected hazardous areas following non-technical surveys. In total, more than 3,000 hectares were therefore released through clearance, reduction and cancellation.[76]

It is important to distinguish between these categories. Physical clearance removes confirmed explosive ordnance contamination. Technical surveys delineate or reduce suspected hazardous areas, while non-technical surveys can provide a basis for cancelling suspected hazardous areas without physical clearance. All these approaches can make land accessible, but they differ in terms of cost, time required and documentation.

Norad commissioned an evaluation to examine this in greater detail. The evaluation examined the proportion of released land that was under agricultural production in samples assessed in 2024 and 2025. The proportion was higher in the 2025 samples than in the 2024 samples.

TABLE 3 Share of released land under agricultural production in the evaluation samples, 2024-2025[77]

	Share of released land in agricultural production in 2024	Share of released land in agricultural production in 2025	Difference (percentage points)
Land released by HALO	21%	27%	+6
Land released by Norwegian People's Aid	41%	63%	+22
Land released combined with support from FAO/WFP	34%	85%	+51



↑ Near Kramatorsk, on July 7, 2022, a farmer is harvesting wheat as he drives a combine harvester near a crater suspected to be caused by an air strike. | Photo: Miguel Medina, AFP/NTB

In 2025, approximately 1,390 hectares of agricultural land released by the HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid were under production. Production on this land was estimated to have a gross value of just under USD 1 million that year. The figures show that released land is being used for actual economic activity, but the full value of this production cannot be attributed to mine action.

The proportion was particularly high for land supported by FAO and WFP. This is consistent with the assumption that support for agricultural inputs, financing or other conditions for production can make it easier to bring accessible land into productive use. However, the differences alone do not demonstrate an effect of the agricultural support. Samples may differ in terms of land type, ownership, security situation and market access, among other factors.[78]

The difference between land released by the HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid must also be viewed in light of differences in the types of activities undertaken and in the areas in which the organisations operate. The HALO Trust carries out physical clearance to a greater extent, while Norwegian People's Aid releases more land through surveys and the cancellation of suspected hazardous areas. The available data alone does not provide a basis for determining how much of the difference in subsequent agricultural use is attributable to these factors.

How much new production can be attributed to land release?

To estimate additional production, the analysis must take into account that some land was cultivated before it was formally released, while other land is not brought into production until some time after release.

The analysis estimates the annual additional income associated with the transition from uncultivated to cultivated land at approximately USD 158 per hectare released by Norwegian People's Aid and USD 47 per hectare released by the HALO Trust. For land supported by FAO/WFP, the corresponding estimated additional income was USD 395 per hectare. The figures are substantially lower than the gross value of all production on released land because the analysis seeks to capture only the additional economic activity generated when previously uncultivated land is brought into production.[79]

Partners' post-release surveys provide additional information on the effects on affected people. In the HALO Trust's surveys conducted six to twelve months after clearance, 77 per cent of respondents reported improved access to land, 68 per cent reported improved livelihoods and 92 per cent reported feeling safer. In the Norwegian People's Aid surveys, 70 per cent of respondents reported that mine action had contributed to safe return, while 67 per cent reported that the interventions had helped restore livelihoods or create new economic opportunities.[80]

Collaboration and information sharing improve prioritisation


The most important synergy between partners lies in combining information on explosive ordnance contamination, knowledge of agricultural land use and the operational prioritisation of mine action. Information from FAO and other agricultural stakeholders can help ensure that areas important for production and livelihoods are prioritised, while the HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid provide technical assessments of safety and feasibility.

FAO can support farms in maintaining production while they wait for land to be released and in expanding production once land becomes accessible. WFP's broader support to households and markets can help sustain local demand and reduce the need for negative coping strategies. However, the link between such support and specific areas of released land is less direct.

UNDP's support for coordination and information management is intended to strengthen coordination among government authorities, UN agencies, operational mine action organisations, donors and civil society. This can facilitate better prioritisation and more consistent use of information. The result should be assessed on the basis of whether data is actually shared and used in planning and the allocation of tasks, rather than simply whether platforms and forums have been established.













→ Norad representatives meet with deminers from HALO Trust, who demonstrate remotely operated machines used to clear mines and explosives, during a visit to Ukraine in November 2025. | Photo: Oleksandr Techynskyi, Norwegian Embassy in Kyiv

Resource use and economic value

Comparisons of the cost per hectare of land released and cost-effectiveness among the organisations supported by Norway must be interpreted with caution. Costs are influenced by factors including the types of activities undertaken and the proportion of land released through physical clearance, technical surveys or cancellation following non-technical surveys. Terrain, the extent and type of explosive ordnance contamination, the security situation and the scale and complexity of operations can also affect resource use. Differences in cost per hectare therefore do not, on their own, provide a basis for drawing conclusions regarding the relative cost-effectiveness of the organisations.

When physical clearance is assessed against the number of explosive items removed, the HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid cleared approximately 640 and 690 m^2 per explosive item respectively. The ratio of cleared land to the number of explosive items removed was therefore relatively similar across the data analysed. However, this measure alone does not provide a basis for comparing the organisations' efficiency, as factors such as the density of explosive items, terrain, type of contamination and the nature of the operations may vary.

Costs reported by some alternative operators in Ukraine, including commercial operators, are substantially lower. The figures are not directly comparable. Among other factors, it is unclear whether the alternative cost estimates include administrative and other indirect costs, whether commercial operators tend to work in less challenging areas and whether the same quality assurance requirements apply. The cost data therefore provides a basis for further analysis, but not for concluding that humanitarian operators are less cost-effective.

Overall, the results show that increased agricultural income alone does not provide a sufficient measure of the value of mine action. A broader assessment must also take into account safety and social benefits, opportunities for safe return and long-term economic effects. At the same time, economic results and costs should be assessed with a clear distinction between physical clearance, other forms of land release and support that enabled released land to be brought into productive use.

Results and remaining challenges

During the period, Ukraine strengthened national governance of mine action through a national strategy and increasingly government-led coordination. At the same time, the large number of stakeholders and fragmented responsibilities made coordination challenging. Limited quality control capacity and differences in regulations, definitions and data systems could delay land release and make it more difficult to compare results.

Land release does not automatically lead to productive use. Farmers may lack financing, agricultural inputs, labour or equipment. Infrastructure and market access may have been disrupted, while the local security situation may make production unsafe. Air strikes, drones and military activity have also caused delays and temporary suspensions of mine action operations.

At the same time, surveys can provide significant value even when physical clearance is not required. When areas are released as uncontaminated, land can be brought into use more quickly and at lower cost. On the other hand, if land release takes a long time, economic pressure may lead people to undertake dangerous clearance themselves or use informal operators.

With support from Norway through the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, we at Norwegian People's Aid have cleared landmines and helped create a safer environment, enabling many children to return to school, strengthening local economic development and helping the agricultural sector get back on its feet. This support has also helped improve protection for women and other particularly vulnerable groups.

RAYMOND JOHANSEN – SECRETARY GENERAL OF NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID

The targeting of agricultural support also involves trade-offs. Registration requirements in agricultural registries can strengthen oversight and traceability, but may also exclude some small-scale or informal producers. Broader household support can reach more affected people, but makes the link to specific areas of released land less direct. Differences in definitions, samples and follow-up periods also limit the extent to which partners' results can be aggregated without risking double counting.

Norwegian support has demonstrably contributed to land being surveyed, assessed and cleared and to parts of the released land being brought back into production. The main added value is that the portfolio addresses several of the barriers between suspected contamination and productive use: technical assessment, physical clearance, agricultural support, information and coordination.

The results are most robustly documented for land release and assessment. The evaluation also indicates that combining land release with agricultural support increases the likelihood of productive use. The evidence is weaker regarding lasting effects on net income, food security, employment and the local economy. The available data also does not provide a basis for isolating the effects of Norwegian support from the contributions of the Ukrainian authorities, other donors and the farmers themselves.

Relative to the scale of potential explosive ordnance contamination, the area covered by Norwegian-supported interventions is limited. At the local level, however, the results may be significant for affected farmers and local communities. At the same time, the interventions serve several functions: They reduce the risk of death and injury, facilitate safe return and improved livelihoods and enable production, income generation and economic activity.



→ A minefield in Ukraine's Mykolaiv region. | Photo: Ida Kroksæter, Norwegian People's Aid



8. Result area: Governance has improved, in line with the requirements for EU candidate countries

← Relatives of prisoners of war and missing servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine carry a huge Ukrainian flag and the flag of Hope along Deribasovskaya Street. On the occasion of the National Flag Day of Ukraine, which is annually celebrated on August 23, relatives of the fallen defenders of Ukraine, those missing and those in Russian captivity marched through the center of Odessa with two huge 100-meter banners. | Photo: Viacheslav Onyshchenko, SOPA Images/NTB

Governance has improved, in line with the requirements for EU candidate countries

Ukraine's efforts towards EU integration are anchored in the country's own political objective of EU membership. Norwegian support has contributed to reforms implemented by Ukrainian authorities as part of the EU accession process and dialogue with the EU.

Overall developments in Ukraine point to a gradual strengthening of governance and increased alignment with the requirements associated with EU candidate status. This is taking place under extremely challenging conditions. The full-scale war, martial law and pressure on public institutions constrain normal democratic processes and the capacity to implement reforms. There have also been setbacks and persistent challenges, including in anti-corruption efforts, institutional independence and the implementation of adopted reforms.

This complex picture is also reflected in external governance indicators. In Ukraine, the operating environment for civil society has remained relatively stable, while external measures of democracy remain at a low level, largely reflecting the full-scale war and martial law. At the same time, external indicators show some improvement in state legitimacy and the capacity to maintain public services, while challenges relating to human rights, the rule of law and societal vulnerability remain significant.[81]

In Moldova, the picture is somewhat more positive in terms of state fragility. External indicators show improvements in state legitimacy and public services, while the operating environment for civil society has remained stable. At the same time, external measures of liberal democracy show a less positive trend.[82] Here too, the picture is therefore complex, with progress in some areas alongside persistent challenges relating to democratic institutions.

The EU accession process has provided an increasingly clear framework and direction for reform efforts. Ukraine opened accession negotiations in June 2024, completed the bilateral screening of its alignment with the EU acquis in September 2025 and opened the first negotiating cluster, 'Fundamentals', in June 2026. This cluster covers, among other areas, the rule of law, fundamental rights, democratic institutions and public administration reform and, under the EU's negotiating methodology, progress in these areas is intended to determine the pace of the accession negotiations. This does not mean that the reforms have been completed, but shows that reform efforts are increasingly structured around specific requirements and milestones linked to potential EU membership.

The European Commission's assessments of the five negotiating chapters in the Fundamentals cluster provide a more direct picture of developments in areas relevant to governance than an overall average across the entire EU acquis. The table below therefore presents the Commission's qualitative assessments of progress in 2023 and 2025.

Early results from targeted anti-corruption efforts

Ukraine has made significant progress in tackling corruption at the systemic level and in interactions with public services, supported in part by increased digitalisation and strong anti-corruption institutions. Nevertheless, Ukraine remains vulnerable to corruption and other forms of financial misconduct. In 2025-2026, the Nansen Programme therefore entered into a number of agreements to support Ukraine's own anti-corruption efforts. The hypothesis is that if partners strengthen the capacity of relevant public institutions and other key stakeholders to prevent, detect and address corruption, this will lead to concrete results, including a stronger evidence base, improved working methods and more targeted measures. These results are in turn expected to enable institutions and stakeholders to work more systematically and in a more coordinated manner and to be better equipped to identify, mitigate and follow up on corruption risks and cases of corruption.

Among the partners working on anti-corruption, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) aims to strengthen Ukraine's reconstruction efforts in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Its implementation partner, the Open Contracting Partnership (OCP), promotes transparency in public procurement through the digital platform DREAM (Digital Reconstruction Ecosystem for Accountable Management). The Basel Institute on Governance prioritises the prevention of corruption relating to natural resources ("green corruption") and in the defence and energy sectors. Norad's agreements with Transparency International Ukraine (TIU) and the Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC) are intended to enable Ukrainian civil society to closely scrutinise private and state-owned enterprises handling large sums of money.

Although targeted support for this type of anti-corruption work is a relatively new component of the Nansen Programme, some initial results have already been achieved. Partners such as Automaidan mobilised in the summer of 2025 against proposed legislation that threatened the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions, while systematic monitoring of the anti-corruption court strengthened public oversight and transparency. Investigative media outlets such as Bihus.Info reached more than 25 million views with reporting and explanatory content on corruption and accountability. Such support for civil society contributes to greater public accountability and resilience against democratic backsliding. Furthermore, the OECD's Country Programme for Ukraine has conducted a comprehensive corruption analysis that provides recommendations based on international standards and has supported new anti-corruption legislation. More than 390 civil servants have received OECD training on targeted approaches to preventing corruption.

When results of this kind are achieved over time, they are expected to contribute to stronger institutional integrity, more effective enforcement, reduced scope for corruption and greater trust in public processes and institutions. However, this depends on sufficient political will, institutional capacity and collaboration among relevant stakeholders and on external factors not significantly constraining the implementation of the measures.

↓ Ukraine's biggest national flag flies in Kyiv on February 26, 2022. | Photo: Genya Savilov, AFP/NTB




TABLE 4 The European Commission's assessment of progress in the five negotiation chapters in Cluster 1 (Fundamentals)[83]

Ch.	Chapter	2023	2025
23	Judiciary and fundamental rights	Good progress	Some progress
24	Justice, freedom and security	Limited progress	Some progress
5	Public procurement	Limited progress	Limited progress
18	Statistics	Limited progress	Some progress
32	Financial control	Limited progress	Good progress

Examples of reforms and milestones relating to Ukraine's EU accession process

There are several documented changes in legislation, institutional arrangements or implementation that can be linked to requirements under the EU accession process. They represent important steps in the reform processes.

The reforms cover, among other areas, the regulation of lobbying, public consultations, administrative procedures, the civil service pay system and corporate governance of state-owned enterprises. Several of these reforms have been developed through collaboration between the Ukrainian authorities, civil society and international partners. For some reforms, there are also traceable contributions from stakeholders supported through the Nansen Programme, for example through technical advice and analysis, input into the development of laws and regulations, dialogue with the authorities and civil society advocacy.

For example, the OECD's Country Programme for Ukraine contributed to the reform of state-owned enterprises by providing input to Law no. 3587-IX, adopted in 2024. The OECD has also supported implementation of the reform by providing input to policy documents and the development of a state ownership policy, helping to strengthen governance, accountability and alignment with IMF and EU requirements.

The Law on Lobbying (Law no. 3606-IX) also illustrates how different stakeholders contributed to varying degrees, based on their respective roles and strengths. The Council of Europe and the OECD contributed standards and expert advice, while Ukrainian civil society organisations contributed through consultations, analysis and advocacy.

An important condition for successful reforms – and a result in its own right – is that they are not only adopted and implemented, but also have public support. When reforms are firmly embedded in society, they are better adapted to local needs and circumstances. They gain greater legitimacy and support from stakeholders who can help ensure that they are implemented, followed up and complied with.[84] Such broad-based support reduces the risk of reforms becoming merely formal changes or favouring particular interests. This is particularly important under martial law, when regular elections cannot be held.


To support Ukraine and Moldova in their reform efforts, the Nansen Programme strengthens capacity in both the public sector and civil society. Below, we explain why this is important and summarise key results achieved through the support.

Public institutions have strengthened their capacity

The capacity of public institutions is an important prerequisite for reforms to be designed, implemented and firmly embedded. At the same time, professionalism, transparency, the use of evidence and meaningful civil society engagement can strengthen the credibility of reforms and public ownership of them.

Well-functioning public institutions are essential for the state to maintain its core functions, deliver services to the population and implement reforms in line with requirements for EU membership. When such institutions are weakened, the state becomes less able to meet the needs of its citizens and safeguard their rights and security. This is particularly evident in Ukraine, where the authorities must simultaneously manage the war, maintain essential societal functions and lay the foundations for future reconstruction. The continued functioning of the state is important both for the population living with the consequences of the war today and for ensuring that, after the war, Ukraine has institutions capable of delivering essential services and pursuing further reforms. In Moldova, the support has helped strengthen the capacity of public institutions to address the consequences of the war in neighbouring Ukraine, while also advancing reform efforts.

Norwegian support for strengthening public institutions is based on Ukraine and Moldova's own priorities. The support addresses both immediate needs and the longer-term strengthening of systems, regulatory frameworks and public administration practices. This is necessary if the countries are to achieve their goal of closer integration with the EU. Even during wartime, reforms must continue and public institutions must become more resilient, effective and accountable. Norwegian support has therefore contributed both to strengthening the state's capacity to function in the short term and to longer-term institution-building.



↑ A woman hugs a boy in the schoolyard at Prylymansk School in Ukraine on 1 September 2023. The boy is wearing a blue backpack provided by UNICEF for the start of the school year. | Photo: Oleksandr Va, UNICEF

Ukraine: Public institutions during wartime

In Ukraine, the support has helped strengthen the capacity of public institutions to maintain the state's core functions during the war, while continuing reforms in line with the requirements for closer integration with the EU. This is an extremely demanding dual task. National and local authorities must address the immediate consequences of the war, maintain essential services and, at the same time, further develop the systems, regulatory frameworks and institutions needed for long-term reform and reconstruction.



↑ Journalists from the Ukrainian news outlet Kordon report from the rubble following a Russian attack in Ukraine's Sumy region. | Photo: Kordon.Media

Norwegian support has helped strengthen reform capacity and alignment with European standards in key areas. Through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Norway has supported reform efforts and provided input to new legislation on anti-corruption, public administration, tax administration and the governance of state-owned enterprises. Through its support for the Council of Europe, Norway has contributed to the development of reforms in the areas of employment, decentralisation, local governance, social dialogue and the rights of vulnerable groups. In 2025, the Council of Europe trained more than 110,000 representatives of national and local institutions through more than 600 programmes in Ukraine.

Several partners have provided more targeted support to specific sectors and key institutions. The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo has supported the development and formalisation of an international standard for investigative interviewing, with the aim of promoting human rights-based and rapport-based interviewing methods to replace coercion and pressure. To date, 445 participants from institutions including the prosecution service, the security service, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), investigative bodies and academia have received training. The methodology has now also been endorsed by the leadership of key institutions, including NABU, the war crimes unit and the security service. The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) is an international organisation that supports the Ukrainian authorities in accounting for persons missing as a result of the war and identifying unidentified human remains. With Norwegian support, ICMP has strengthened Ukraine's institutional capacity by establishing standards, collaboration agreements and digital systems for managing missing persons cases and forensic identification. ICMP has also supported the development of new digital solutions to improve the processing of DNA data and has helped ensure that forensic identification work follows standardised procedures. This work is highly significant for Ukrainian authorities' efforts to identify missing persons, for families awaiting answers regarding their missing relatives and for accountability and justice.

Norwegian support has also helped strengthen the administrative capacity of public institutions and their ability to work more systematically, effectively and on the basis of evidence. Statistics Norway (SSB) has strengthened the State Statistics Service through modernised quality management, improved risk management, a new organisational structure, sustainable internal training programmes and enhanced digital preparedness. Here too, the OECD has contributed to capacity development in data modelling and international standards for official statistics,

including training for around 50 participants from the National Bank of Ukraine and the State Statistics Service. With Norwegian funding, International IDEA has worked with Ukraine's Central Election Commission to strengthen its capacity in strategic communication and organisational preparedness. This work led the Central Election Commission to adopt a strategic communications plan for elections. Eighty-five per cent of the Commission's members reported increased knowledge of communication.

A key result of Norwegian support is that public institutions are better equipped to maintain services during the war. The Council of Europe has helped strengthen the authorities' capacity to provide services to internally displaced people, veterans and other groups affected by the war. This includes approaches that take into account how experiences of war and trauma can affect individuals' needs and interactions with public services. The work included the certification of 42 local government professionals and the accreditation of 19 trainers in trauma-informed service delivery. An important lesson from this work was that strengthening the capacity of Ukrainian authorities must also include trauma-informed approaches, rather than technical training alone.

With Norwegian support, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (NIPH) have strengthened the capacity of Ukraine's health system in infection prevention and control, antimicrobial resistance, rehabilitation, mental health, emergency medicine and preparedness. In 2025, WHO provided training to more than 3,000 healthcare workers, while around 8,700 primary health service employees received training in mental health and psychosocial support. At the same time, more than 30 million patients had access to mental health services through the integration of such services into the primary health services, delivered by more than 23,000 Ukrainian general practitioners. Among the healthcare facilities working with NIPH, the proportion meeting minimum infection prevention and control requirements increased from 31 per cent in 2023 to 45 per cent in 2025.

The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) contributed to revisions to national action plans, new legal provisions on gender-based violence and measures to protect survivors of violence. The organisation also helped introduce a standardised reporting tool that has strengthened monitoring and resource allocation.
In collaboration with the Ukrainian Women's Fund, a Ukrainian women's fund that provides financial and technical support to women's organisations and local women's groups, UN Women began mobilising and supporting women's self-help groups following Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. Over the course of the project, a total of 83 women's groups were mobilised across four regions. This work strengthened women's participation in local reconstruction processes and helped build trust between citizens and the authorities. Sixteen of these women's groups were subsequently formally registered as civil society organisations.

In several cases, efforts to strengthen public institutions in Ukraine have been carried out in close collaboration with civil society. The Ukrainian organisation ISAR Ednannia has supported civil society organisations that work directly with public authorities and contribute evidence-based and practical solutions to decision-making processes. This has helped local and national institutions adopt new working methods, plans, protocols and coordination mechanisms.
The Ukrainian civil society organisations supported through ISAR Ednannia have collectively contributed to 24 documented changes in policy, legislation or institutional frameworks. For example, the NGO Volyn Institute of Law contributed to the establishment of a formal working group under the Volyn Regional State Administration, thereby creating a more structured channel for civil society participation in regional policymaking. The Association of Relatives of Kremlin Political Prisoners, for its part, helped advance state support for formerly detained civilians.

Similarly, the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) has funded civil society initiatives that support local authorities in planning for reconstruction. The examples from the Odessa region and Bereznehuvate (see text box) show how two of IRF's grant recipients have linked local participation and technical assessments to municipal plans and investment proposals.

Civil society's contribution to strengthened local governance – examples from the Odessa region and Bereznehuvate

Organised forms of local participation can provide municipal authorities with a broader evidence base for planning and link locally defined priorities to public investment processes. Through the Impulse programme. the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) has funded civil society organisations that support local authorities in planning for reconstruction and long-term development.

In the Odessa region, a regional civil society organisation supported two rural municipalities in developing strategies and sector plans covering areas including economic development, social issues, institutional development and the organisation of reconstruction efforts. The organisation provided technical and process support for municipal planning and helped establish mechanisms for local participation, follow-up and public oversight.

According to IRF's reporting, the work resulted in 15 strategic documents aligned with regional and national planning frameworks. Two strategic environmental assessments based on field studies were also carried out. The recommendations from these assessments were incorporated into the municipalities' strategies and informed the development of local environmental policies.

In Bereznehuvate, another IRF-funded civil society organisation supported the municipality in developing a comprehensive reconstruction programme in collaboration with residents and other local stakeholders. A network of 20 local dialogue facilitators, 18 of whom were women, received training and facilitated dialogues to gather proposals and priorities from the local community. The input was incorporated into the work of the municipality's reconstruction office. The final programme includes 24 locally defined priorities across seven areas of intervention. Four public investment proposals for reconstruction were subsequently registered in the national DREAM system.

The Republic of Moldova and Norway share a commitment to safeguarding the integrity of elections and strengthening citizens' trust in democratic processes. Norway's support has contributed to strengthening our country's electoral integrity under particularly challenging circumstances.

ANGELICA CARAMAN – PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Moldova: Institutional development, reform and crisis management

In Moldova, Norwegian support has helped strengthen the capacity of public institutions to manage crises arising from the war in neighbouring Ukraine, while also advancing reforms in line with the country's closer integration with the EU. An external review of Norwegian support to Moldova concludes that support for good governance has produced solid results in institutional reform.[85] The review further concludes that the support has helped strengthen the policy frameworks, systems and capacities needed to advance public sector modernisation and Moldova's preparations for EU accession.[86] Norwegian support has focused primarily on the rule of law, public administration, social protection, electoral administration, migration, local governance and climate adaptation.

In 2024-2025, Moldova was subjected to extensive Russian influence operations aimed at influencing voters, weakening institutions and undermining trust in democratic processes. Norwegian electoral support through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped strengthen both institutional preparedness and the legal framework for the elections. This left the country better equipped to address a challenging threat environment characterised by disinformation, illicit political financing, cyber threats and Russian influence operations. Ninety-one per cent of political parties submitted financial reports through an upgraded

oversight system, while enforcement increased significantly, with eleven times as many administrative cases and four times as many sanctions as in 2023. More than 1,500 police officers received training in detecting vote buying, illegal political advertising and the use of virtual currencies in election-related offences. In addition, the Council of Europe has contributed to improvements in electoral legislation and secondary legislation in line with international standards. The Central Election Commission adopted around 40 regulations under the new electoral law, nine of which were developed with support from the Council of Europe. In 2025, 7,764 people were certified as election officials, with a pass rate of 82.3 per cent. Overall, Norwegian support in 2024-2025 helped enable Moldova to hold two elections and a referendum on EU membership that international observers assessed as legitimate, despite a highly challenging threat environment.

The Council of Europe, which receives Norwegian support, has contributed to progress in Moldova's rule of law reforms. This has been achieved through support for the pre-vetting of candidates for key judicial and prosecutorial councils, the development of a new legal framework for the Supreme Court in line with European recommendations and reforms to systems for the oversight and appointment of judges and the governance of the prosecution service. The Council of Europe has also supported Moldova in drafting legislative amendments to bring rules on pre-trial detention and criminal sanctions more closely into line with European standards. At the same time, the Council of Europe provided technical support for Moldova's reform efforts to strengthen measures against money laundering and terrorist financing. The work aimed to bring Moldova closer to international standards on combating money laundering and terrorist financing and to align its framework with the relevant EU acquis. This work points to a gradual strengthening of the institutional structures needed to ensure that key rule of law reforms have a lasting impact.

Through collaboration with the World Bank in Moldova under the M-GROW fund, Norway has supported the implementation of EU-related reforms to strengthen private sector competitiveness, make higher education more relevant to labour market needs and improve young people's employment prospects, as well as promoting energy security and climate-smart agriculture. The World Bank also works closely with the Moldovan authorities on capacity-building and institutional development, including macroeconomic modelling in collaboration with the Moldovan Ministry of Finance and living standards surveys in line with EU standards in collaboration with Moldova's National Bureau of Statistics.

Through NORCAP, the Norwegian Refugee Council's global provider of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding expertise, Norway has seconded experts to the Moldovan authorities. The experts have supported efforts to align migration and asylum legislation with EU requirements and to develop digital solutions for migration management and the processing of asylum applications.

Through UNDP, Norway has supported education reforms aligned with Moldova's National Education

↓ Mobile teams informed around 20,000 people across Moldova about the presidential election and referendum in autumn 2024 as part of the "Vote with Confidence!" information campaign, organised by the Central Electoral Commission with support from Norway and UNDP. | Photo: UNDP



Strategy 2030 and the country's closer integration with the EU. In line with the EU Growth Plan, the mathematics curriculum has undergone a comprehensive revision and a new national methodology for curriculum evaluation has been developed. More than 120 experts have received training, nearly 1,500 teaching resources have been developed, and, with support from UNDP, Moldova has established its first national association for newly qualified teachers. In addition, new data tools have been developed and introduced, including the School Barometer, Moldova's first national school survey measuring well-being, the quality of education and resources in schools. Although it is still too early to assess effects on learning outcomes, the results show early signs of change in school leadership, teaching practices and more evidence-based education governance. This strengthens both administrative capacity and the ability to implement reforms with broader impact.

As noted earlier, Norwegian support through UNDP was channelled through Moldova's Energy Vulnerability Fund. In this context, the institutional result is particularly relevant: The scheme was built on existing public systems for social support, oversight and payments. The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection was responsible for verifying information and calculating the level of support each household was entitled to receive. The Ministry of Finance was responsible for transferring the funds, while the National Social Insurance Office and the government's electronic payment service handled the payments. At the same time, UNDP supported further development of the digital platform used to apply for support, process applications, verify information and calculate compensation. This has made the scheme more efficient, transparent and verifiable, while strengthening Moldova's capacity to use its own public systems to provide support during a crisis.

Norwegian support through UNDP has also helped advance Moldova's comprehensive local public administration reform and strengthen the capacity of public institutions at the local level. Moldova currently has nearly 900 local authorities across an area roughly the size of the Norwegian county of Vestland, the vast majority of which have weak finances and very limited capacity to manage infrastructure, schools and other public services. The reform aims to reduce the number of local authorities to less than 300 and strengthen their capacity. An important result is the establishment of four local public service centres (CUPS), which are intended to ensure that people continue to have access to public services in their local communities. UNDP has also developed pilots for renewable energy communities as a new model for local energy sharing. In 2025, agreements were signed with three civil society organisations and four pilot municipalities were selected. At the same time, the Ministry of Energy received support to develop a dedicated legal framework for such energy communities. This has strengthened the authorities' capacity to regulate, facilitate and oversee new EU-relevant approaches to local energy management. The results to date relate primarily to institutional development and preparatory work, and it is still too early to assess the ultimate effects. These will depend on whether the pilots are successful and can be scaled up.

Long-term effects and institutionalisation

Overall, the results show that the support has contributed to stronger public sector capacity, but also that implementation is taking place under challenging conditions. In Ukraine, the work is characterised by war, security challenges, heavy workloads and staff shortages. In Moldova, the challenges relate to limited administrative capacity and staff availability, low public sector salaries and an import-dependent economy that is vulnerable to geopolitical tensions. At the same time, the country is dealing with significant spillover effects from the war in neighbouring Ukraine.

Several interventions have produced clear and measurable results in the form of new systems, strategies, training programmes and institutional arrangements. At the same time, in several cases, it is too early to determine how lasting the effects will be and to what extent the results will become institutionalised. Overall, however, the results point towards stronger institutions that are better equipped to meet the requirements of European integration while maintaining the state's core functions under pressure.

Civil society has strengthened its capacity

In addition to the public sector, civil society is an important channel for support for socially grounded reforms and improved governance. Civil society plays a particularly important role in Ukraine during the war. Civil society organisations help maintain essential services, support vulnerable groups, monitor public authorities and ensure that citizens' interests and rights continue to be heard and protected. A strong and sustainable civil society is important for maintaining democratic governance and accountability during the war and will play a central role in the country's long-term reconstruction. This importance is also reflected in the consistently high level of public trust in civil society. Public trust in civil society is higher than trust in most public institutions and the media and is comparable to trust in the military.[87] Civil society organisations can also convey the experiences and needs of groups that would otherwise have limited influence. Such participation increases the likelihood that reforms will reflect society's needs and that the authorities will be held accountable for their implementation.

Norwegian support has helped civil society organisations, watchdog organisations, family associations, stakeholders in the education sector and independent media maintain and, in several cases, strengthen their contributions to democratic governance, accountability



Journalists from Ukrainian news outlet Kordon.Media report from the rubble following a Russian attack in Ukraine's Sumy region. The outlet covers news from areas bordering Russia, where the war affects the daily life for local communities. | Photo: Kordon.Media

and societal resilience. The most notable results relate to organisational resilience, the practical application of training, improved coordination and media content aimed at vulnerable and particularly at-risk groups.

Independent media were strengthened as part of the democratic infrastructure. Through WAN-IFRA and its partners, local and regional media outlets were strengthened through organisational development, mentoring programmes and support for investigative journalism. In total, 18 media outlets produced 105 investigative reports that reached more than one million readers, while media partners reported increased digital reach and strong confidence in their ability to continue operating under wartime conditions. The programme also contributed to greater gender equality and stronger leadership, including through leadership development for female media leaders and measures to create safer and more inclusive working and editorial environments. In Moldova, support for independent media and civil society through International Media Support (IMS) and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) helped ensure access to fact-based information, counter disinformation and document influence operations. An external review concluded that the support had been effective and that Norway's contribution had largely played a catalytic role by broadening the scope, accelerating the pace and strengthening the systemic impact of the changes.[88]

Capacity-building support has helped strengthen partners' resilience, governance and accountability. Ednannia reported that 96.4 per cent of recipients who completed the capacity-building support strengthened their organisational resilience and management capacity. Furthermore, 99.1 per cent remained operational, while 35 per cent expanded their activities. IRF reported that grant recipients followed up on recommendations from audits and capacity assessments, helping to strengthen internal governance and controls. A mid-term evaluation also found that the intervention addressed the needs of civil society organisations to a large extent. Satisfaction was 85 per cent in frontline areas and all recipients reported that the support package met their needs.

These results are consistent with broader trends among active Ukrainian civil society organisations: In a sector study, the proportion that considered themselves fully adapted to operating under wartime conditions increased from 46 per cent in 2023 to 55 per cent in 2025. At the same time, the proportions reporting success in project implementation and in maintaining or expanding partnerships increased from 72 to 83 per cent and from 74 to 80 per cent respectively between 2022 and 2025.[89]

The support has also contributed to results that benefit the wider public. Organisations supported by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee helped mobilise opposition to draft law no. 4555, which posed a threat

> Norway's support has given Ukrainian regional journalists something that is difficult to put a price on during war: the space to move from survival to development and to protect their independence. Through the 'Stronger Together' programme, we are helping media organisations develop financial sustainability, investigative capacity, leadership and resilience they need to serve their communities with trusted information, at a time when strong local journalism is needed more than ever.
>
> OKSANA BROVKO – CEO OF ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT REGIONAL PUBLISHERS OF UKRAINE

to the anti-corruption institutions and was subsequently withdrawn. The Basel Institute contributed to the adoption of five regulatory and compliance documents in collaboration with government partners. Through their accountability work, IWPR's partners contributed to an estimated saving for the state of UAH 6.7 billion, approximately NOK 1.6 billion.


The support strengthens not only individual organisations, but also platforms for coordination. FOKUS established three reconstruction hubs and laid the groundwork for nine coalitions. The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) strengthened platforms for dialogue between families, civil society and the authorities. This helped improve affected families' access to information, legal remedies and compensation schemes.

Support for Ukrainian civil society through the Askold and Dir Fund

In 2024, a funding scheme for Ukrainian civil society was established, with total Norwegian funding of NOK 437 million for the period 2024-2027. The scheme supports small and medium-sized organisations in Ukraine. By the end of 2025, the Nansen Programme had supported around 300 Ukrainian civil society organisations in their work on democratic participation, human rights, anti-corruption, investigative journalism and women's participation in reconstruction. The support had broad geographical coverage: Organisations are represented in at least 17 regions (oblasts), from Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia in the east to Lviv, Volyn and Zakarpattia in the west, as well as in regions in central and northern Ukraine. Through the Askold and Dir Fund, Ednannia combines grants with organisational development, mentoring, networking and engagement with public authorities and donors.

FIGURE 5

What do local civil society organisations work on? Thematic breakdown of grants disbursed to 215 projects through the Askold and Dir Fund, with support from Norway and Sweden, 2024-2025. (An organisation may work across several thematic areas.)



Use of training and new tools

Available evidence indicates that the training is being put into practice to a large extent. IWPR reported that 91 per cent of participants applied the skills they had acquired after five capacity-building courses. For three courses on public oversight, all participants reported having applied new methods, tools or skills. Following webinars on networking and community-building, 95 per cent reported that they had incorporated practical tools and examples into their organisations' work.

IRF provides similar evidence at the organisational level. The mid-term evaluation found that 88 per cent of partner organisations strengthened their ability to use open data and digital tools to monitor reconstruction processes. Furthermore, 48 per cent adopted gender-responsive planning and budgeting tools. Qualitative examples, including from Sumy, Chernihiv and Lviv, also suggest that the support had wider effects beyond the individual organisations. Through training, mentoring, platforms for exchange and collaboration with local authorities and academic institutions, recipients shared knowledge and methods with other local stakeholders.

ICMP reports improved skills in strategic planning, communication, resource mobilisation, cybersecurity, the use of AI tools and advocacy among organisations representing families of missing persons.

The results are clearest in Moldova. IMS reported that all seven media partners in the Rapid Response Group demonstrated behavioural change and strengthened capacity. This included the use of AI-based real-time alerts, audience analysis, preventive measures against disinformation and more targeted content production. The programme also tailored content to vulnerable and marginalised groups and effectively reached Russian-speaking audiences and audiences in Transnistria.

IWPR in Moldova reported that 85 per cent of its 13 local partner organisations strengthened their organisational capacity, including their ability to counter disinformation. Partners also made use of Russian-language content, regional collaboration and youth-oriented formats. This helped reach older, rural and Russian-speaking groups with more reliable information.

In Ukraine, WAN-IFRA reported that 75 per cent of its 40 media partners adopted new methods or approaches. Furthermore, 35 per cent implemented editorial or organisational changes relating to gender equality, diversity and inclusion. At the same time, reporting indicates that many organisations in Ukraine have limited capacity to translate journalistic content and investigative work into broader advocacy efforts. Martial law and the associated restrictions also make it more difficult to influence government decision-making.

Across the portfolio, the evidence suggests that results are driven in particular by a combination of flexible funding and organisational development, local ownership, engagement with decision-makers and sustained support for collaboration. Grants appear to provide the greatest organisational value when combined with tailored guidance, mentoring and support for internal systems and when they take into account organisations' level of maturity, geographical context and area of work. Research, monitoring and journalism are more likely to prompt an institutional response when the evidence is followed up through measures including coalition-building and structured dialogue with the authorities. Similarly, platforms for exchange facilitate connections, but networks become more sustainable only when stakeholders have specific tasks, incentives and resources to work together over time.

At the same time, the extent to which these mechanisms lead to lasting results depends on factors that are largely beyond the influence of individual organisations or the support alone. The greatest long-term risk is financial sustainability. The war also affects organisations' human and operational capacity through attacks, power outages, displacement, military mobilisation, staff shortages and psychological exhaustion. At the same time, extensive requirements for training, audits, reporting and participation in programme activities can place additional demands on already limited capacity. Civil society's ability to translate capacity into influence also depends on the available political and institutional space. Martial law, limited access to information and varying responsiveness from the authorities mean that stronger capacity does not automatically translate into policy influence or institutionalised change.



9. The way forward

← Nine-year-old Mykhailo (Misha) sits in a classroom at the school he attends in Chernihiv, Ukraine, on 26 September 2022. His usual school was damaged and rendered unusable after an explosion destroyed almost all its windows. | Photo: Diego Ibarra, UNICEF

The way forward

Russia's war affects both Ukrainian society today and the foundations for the country's future. A protracted war means that losses, injuries, trauma, displacement and destruction accumulate, while people and institutions must withstand sustained and extreme pressure. Emergency aid must therefore be combined with interventions that maintain essential societal functions, reduce vulnerability and enable reconstruction even during the war.

Ukraine's future will be shaped by people in the country and Ukrainians living abroad. Whether people stay, return or build their lives elsewhere will depend, among other factors, on security, housing, employment, services, educational opportunities, family ties and confidence in the future. At the same time, Ukrainian society must accommodate people with very different experiences of the war: soldiers and civilians, those who stayed and those who were forced to flee, people in occupied and formerly occupied territories, veterans and bereaved families. Such differences may affect trust, political expectations and views on rights, responsibilities and the distribution of resources. Social cohesion must be built and sustained; it cannot be taken for granted. This trust is also challenged by corruption. Despite significant improvements, corruption is still perceived as one of the country's greatest challenges. This highlights the importance of strong anti-corruption institutions, civil society oversight and greater transparency.

Employment and economic transformation will be crucial for enabling people to participate in society and the labour market, financing welfare and reconstruction and fostering confidence in the future. Population loss, military mobilisation, injuries and disabilities, changing care responsibilities and new skills needs will shape the labour market for many years to come. At the same time, the energy transition, digitalisation, new technologies and new forms of production can create employment and income opportunities. Women, veterans, young people, returnees and persons with disabilities have skills and experience that will be essential in shaping this transformation.

Reconstruction is about more than physical infrastructure and investment. It also encompasses justice, trust and democratic institutions. Accountability for abuses, the rights of victims and open public debate will be important for public trust in rule-of-law and democratic institutions. The same applies to political participation, independent media, an active civil society and local participation, all of which must function in a society shaped by war, security restrictions and significant differences in people's experiences and the burdens they face. At the same time, Ukraine's progress towards EU integration is a strong driver of reform, institutional development and democratic development.

This points to an overarching need to safeguard Ukraine's operational flexibility: its capacity to maintain

services and economic activity during the war, respond to new pressures and, at the same time, make its own choices about the country's future development. The different dimensions of this operational flexibility are closely interconnected. Setbacks in one area can quickly constrain opportunities in others, while positive results in one area can reinforce results elsewhere.

The results documented in this report show how Ukrainian authorities, institutions, local communities, businesses, organisations and individuals have driven these efforts, supported by Norway as part of a much broader international effort. Norwegian support has helped protect people and maintain services, institutions and economic activity. The significance of these results lies both in what has been achieved and in their contribution to preserving the conditions that enable Ukrainians to continue shaping their own future.

What would likely have happened without the support, if it had been provided earlier or later or if the resources had been used differently? Such questions cannot be answered with certainty, but they are essential when deciding how to prioritise support. In a wartime context, the value of an intervention may lie in maintaining a critical function, preventing further losses or preserving the possibility of achieving results in other areas.

There will rarely be a complete knowledge platform before decisions have to be made. The level of risk tolerance established by the Storting for the Nansen Programme also means that support must be provided even when the knowledge platform is incomplete and outcomes are uncertain. Good governance cannot eliminate uncertainty, but it can make assumptions, alternatives and trade-offs explicit, monitor whether they remain valid and adjust the approach as needs, risks or available evidence change.

A key lesson running throughout the report is therefore that results must be viewed in context. The value of one intervention may depend on developments in other areas and certain functions may be critical to sustaining many other results. This points to the need for prioritisation across sectors and interventions, continuous learning and assessment of where support as a whole can make the greatest contribution to Ukraine's operational flexibility.

↓ People hold up a Ukrainian flag as they watch a broadcast of the international charity concert "Save Ukraine – Stop War" from Warsaw in Prague's Old Town Square on 27 March 2022. | Photo: Michal Cizek, AFP/NTB





Annexes

← A young couple kisses with the Dnipro River and the city skyline in the background in Kyiv, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on December 19, 2025. | Photo: Roman Pilipey, AFP/NTB

1. Overview of Support

FIGURE 6
Total support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries (2022–2026)
All figures in NOK million

		2022	2023	2024	2025	Totalt 2022-2025	2026	Totalt 2022-2026
	Total support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries (the Nansen Support Programme)	**10,830**	**18,951**	**27,657**	**85,133**	**142,571**	**77,037**	**219,608**
	Military	**4,657**	**10,224**	**17,710**	**72,633**	**105,224**	**62,037**	**167,261**
	Civilian	**6,173**	**8,727**	**9,947**	**12,500**	**37,347**	**15,000**	**52,347**
	Humanitarian Assistance	2,458	2,525	2,840	2,848	10,671	3,379	14,065
	Energy support	2,067	1,873	2,250	5,500	11,690	4,800	16,490
	Operational and budget support	1,350	3,142	3,625	2,810	10,927	4,000	14,927
	Human rights, reforms and governance	11	78	180	441	710	925	1,635
	Private sector support		314	503	341	1,158	800	1,958
	Civilian support to Moldova	287	795	549	500	2,131	471	2,587
	Administration of the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine				60	60	117	147
	Allocated funds not yet committed to specific interventions						508	508

2. Partners (overview)

Partner	Effect on the target group	Period of Norad support	Disbursed by Norad in 2023-2025 (MNOK)
Basel Institute on Governance	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2025	7
Caritas Norway	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	188
Contact Center	Civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2025	2
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; improved framework conditions for the private sector; Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2023-2025	4,625
International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience; vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights	2023-2025	77
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2024	175
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	People have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines; vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	640
Norwegian Helsinki Committee	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	28
The European Wergeland Centre (EWC)	Civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	19
International Finance Corporation (IFC) – a member of the World Bank Group	Improved framework conditions for the private sector	2024	250
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	People have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines; public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2023-2025	115
International Development Association (IDA) – a member of the World Bank Group	State budget financing secured	2023	1,000
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) – a member of the World Bank Group	Improved framework conditions for the private sector	2023	240

Partner	Effect on the target group	Period of Norad support	Disbursed by Norad in 2023-2025 (MNOK)
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO)	Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2023-2025	300
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; improved framework conditions for the private sector; Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2024-2025	183
DTEK Poltavska Wind Farm Ltd.	Improved framework conditions for the private sector	2025	3
East Europe Foundation (EEF)	Civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2025	7
Emergy AS	Improved framework conditions for the private sector; Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2024-2025	27
Energy Community Secretariat	Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2024-2025	920
Council of Europe	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	42
EU's Ukraine Investment Framework	Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2025	1,500
Farmasoft LLC	Improved framework conditions for the private sector	2025	5
Fenix Repower AS	Improved framework conditions for the private sector; Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2025	6
Norwegian Refugee Council	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	740
Norwegian Refugee Council – NORCAP	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2023-2025	122
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	617
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	209
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	1,402
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)	Civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience; vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights	2024-2025	17
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	565
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	People have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines	2023-2025	107
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security; public institutions have strengthened their capacity; people have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines	2023-2025	2,488
Norwegian Institute of Public Health (NIPH)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2024-2025	18
Forum for Women and Development (FOKUS)	Civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2025	12

Partner	Effect on the target group	Period of Norad support	Disbursed by Norad in 2023-2025 (MNOK)
Geneva Call	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2023-2025	16
HALO Trust	People have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines; public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2023-2025	136
Initiative Center to Support Social Action "Ednannia" (ISAR Ednannia)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	50
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	47
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2025	30
International Media Support (IMS)	Civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	16
International Renaissance Foundation (IRF)	Civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	33
Norwegian Church Aid	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	208
Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2025	5
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO)	Civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2025	14
Malthe Winje AS	Improved framework conditions for the private sector; Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2025	5
Norwegian Red Cross	Vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	428
NORSAR	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights	2025	3
Norwegian People's Aid	People have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines; vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights	2023-2025	357
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights	2024-2025	7
Norwegian-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce (NUCC)	Improved framework conditions for the private sector	2023-2025	35
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)		2024	5
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience; improved framework conditions for the private sector	2023-2025	52

Partner	Effect on the target group	Period of Norad support	Disbursed by Norad in 2023-2025 (MNOK)
Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU) – administered by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	105
Save the Children Norway	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights	2023-2025	114
Scatec Solar AS	Improved framework conditions for the private sector; Ukraine and Moldova have control over their own energy security	2025	1
SOS Children's Villages	Vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met; vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights	2024-2025	30
Statistics Norway (SSB)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2024-2025	7
Tallinn Mechanism through the Estonian Centre for International Development (ESTDEV)	Improved framework conditions for the private sector; public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2025	5
Tschudi Logistics Holding AS	Improved framework conditions for the private sector	2024-2025	8
UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action)	Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures to help safeguard their rights	2023-2024	52
UN Women	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2024-2025	18
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2025	27
World Health Organization (WHO)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity	2023-2025	235
World Food Programme (WFP)	People have access to productive land, including land previously contaminated by mines; vulnerable people have had their urgent humanitarian needs met	2023-2025	979
World Customs Organization (WCO)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2025	4
World Bank (URTF and M-GROW multi-donor trust funds)	State budget financing secured; public institutions have strengthened their capacity; improved framework conditions for the private sector	2023-2025	6,480
World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA)	Public institutions have strengthened their capacity; civil society has strengthened its capacity to contribute to democratic governance and resilience	2025	23

3. Glossary

The report uses some terms that may be unfamiliar. The glossary provides working definitions of how these terms should be understood in the report, without constituting formal definitions beyond this context.

Term	Explanation
Budget support	Funds transferred to the recipient country's state budget and administered through the country's budgetary systems.
Disaggregated data	Data broken down into subgroups, for example by gender, age, disability or other underrepresented groups. Such disaggregation makes it easier to identify who is reached by the support and who is left out.
Distributed or decentralised energy generation	Power generation distributed across many smaller facilities closer to users, rather than a few large, centralised facilities. This can make the energy supply less vulnerable to attacks and disruptions.
Theory of change	A reasoned description of how an intervention is expected to produce results at different levels and contribute to longer-term societal change. It also makes explicit the assumptions and risks underlying this results chain.
Energy poverty	Energy poverty means that people do not have access to sufficient energy to meet their basic everyday needs.
Multi-donor trust fund	A fund in which multiple donors pool their funding under common administration and rules. The purpose is often to improve coordination, achieve greater scale and reduce the administrative burden on the recipient country.
Negotiation cluster	A group of chapters of the EU acquis that are addressed together in accession negotiations.
Released land	Land that, following a survey, cancellation or physical clearance, has been declared safe and made available for use. The term does not necessarily mean that the entire area of land has been physically cleared of mines.
Humanitarian aid	Aid designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and protect people in times of crisis. It is provided on the basis of need and may include food, water, healthcare, shelter, cash assistance and protection.
Humanitarian principles	The principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. They are intended to ensure that humanitarian aid is provided on the basis of need and is not driven by political, military or economic interests.
Hyper-prioritisation	Hyper-prioritisation in humanitarian aid means that, as a result of large and sudden funding cuts in 2025, aid was sharply reduced and concentrated on the most vulnerable people and the most urgent, life-threatening needs. These priorities were coordinated within each sector/cluster at country level.
Catalytic financing	Public or donor-funded resources that help mobilise additional financing or enable larger-scale interventions. The term does not automatically imply that all subsequent financing is attributable to the donor contribution.


Term	Explanation
Combined heat and power plant	Facility that produces both electricity and heat, often for district heating. Combined heat and power is particularly widespread in former Soviet countries, where such facilities have historically been a key part of large, centralised district heating systems.
Cash-assistance	What would likely have happened in the absence of the intervention or support. The comparison is used to assess contribution or effect, but is often uncertain in a wartime context.
Cost-effectiveness – “value for money”	The relationship between the resources used and the results achieved. The assessment is not only about the lowest cost, but also about relevance, quality, sustainability, risk and who is reached.
Multilateral partner	An international organisation owned or governed by several countries, such as UN agencies, the World Bank or EBRD.
Negative coping strategies	Actions people resort to in order to meet urgent needs but which may harm them in the longer term, such as skipping meals, selling essential equipment, foregoing healthcare, taking children out of school, engaging in prostitution or taking on unsustainable debt.
Reinsurance	Also known as reinsurance. Insurance for insurance companies. Reassurance makes it possible to spread large or unusual risks, such as war-related risks, across multiple stakeholders.
Results chain	The sequence from resources and activities through outputs and direct results to longer-term effects. The chain is used to explain how an intervention is expected to contribute to change.
Triangulation	To verify or shed light on information by comparing multiple data sources, methods or perspectives. This can strengthen the credibility of the assessment.
Ukraine Donor Platform	A high-level forum for coordination between Ukraine, the EU, G7 countries and other major donors. The platform is intended to improve coordination of support, reforms, reconstruction and financing needs.

4. Theory of change

The Nansen Programme is intended to contribute to achieving the objectives set by the Storting through a broad portfolio of partners with different mandates, expertise and instruments. The programme is based on the principle that interventions complement and, where possible, reinforce one another. This is reflected in the programme's theory of change, which describes plausible pathways from interventions and outputs to immediate results and longer-term societal change, as well as the assumptions underpinning these relationships. The report is based on this theory of change.

The administration of Norwegian support through the Nansen Programme is underpinned by a theory of change centred on enabling Ukraine to determine its own future. The theory of change framework shows how the different components of civilian support, through results at multiple levels, are intended to contribute collectively to this objective. It links specific interventions to broader results: maintaining critical societal functions, improving governance in line with the requirements for EU candidate countries and saving lives, alleviating suffering and safeguarding human dignity. Support for fiscal stability, energy and public institutions helps ensure that the state and essential services can continue to function. At the same time, humanitarian aid, mine clearance, legal aid and support for civil society and business contribute to the protection of civilians, reforms and economic activity. These connections are based on available evidence, implementation experience and ongoing assessments of developments and needs in Ukraine. When these efforts work towards the same objectives, they strengthen Ukraine's ability to keep society functioning, build resilience and determine its own future.

FIGURE 7
Theory of change for the civilian aid under the Nansen Programme administered by Norad



Endnotes

1 Report to the Storting no. 8 The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine.
2 In 2026, civilian support to Ukraine will exceed NOK 50 billion. This report examines results from the 2023-2025 period.
3 Beneficiary figures across organisations cannot be aggregated without the risk of double counting. The figures may overlap and cannot be aggregated or attributed to Norwegian funding alone.
4 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024), Report to the Storting no. 8 (2023-2024), the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, 2 February 2024.
5 NIRAS og Kyiv School of Economics (2026), Evaluation of the result area People have access to productive land, including previously mine-contaminated land; NIRAS (2026), Meta-study of results and the knowledge platform for the Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund: Itad (2026), Evaluation of the result area Vulnerable people have gained access to protection measures, enabling them to exercise their rights, 2026; NIRAS (2026), Review of Norwegian humanitarian and long-term aid to the Republic of Moldova, 2023-2026.
6 Norad would like to thank Arne Strand, Senior Researcher at Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI); Natalia Moen-Larsen, Senior Researcher and Morten Bøås, Research Professor, at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI); Oleksandra Deineko, Senior Researcher at OsloMet and researcher in the Ukraine Programme at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS); and DiXi Group for comments on parts of an early draft of the report. The comments were advisory in nature.
7 ACAPS (2025), Ukraine. Scenarios for the Cold Season 2025-2026, 28 August 2025. The figure covers the period from January to July 2025.
8 OHCHR (2026), UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict – Annual Report 2025, 12 January 2026.
9 United Nations Office at Geneva (2026), "UN Geneva Press Briefing," 16 January 2026.
10 World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission and United Nations (2024), Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3), 31 December 2023; World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission and United Nations (2025), Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4), 1 March 2025; World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission and United Nations (2026), Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), 28 February 2026.
11 RDNA3, RDNA4 and RDNA5.
12 RDNA5.
13 OHCHR (2026), Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict - Annual Report 2025, 12 January 2026.
14 WHO (2026), Attacks on Ukraine's Health Care Increased by 20% in 2025 (Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care), 23 February 2026.
15 OCHA (2025), Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 16 January 2025; OCHA (2026), Ukraine: Humanitarian Situation, Response and Funding Snapshot (January - December 2025), 27 January 2026; UNHCR (2026). Europe Situations: Data and Trends - Arrivals and Displaced Populations - October 2025, 2 January 2026.
16 UNFPA (2026), Population Matters: Building Demographic Resilience and Modern Statistical System.
17 National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) (2026), NBU Comment on Change in Real GDP in 2025, 19 March 2026; National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) (2025), NBU Comment on Change in Real GDP in 2024, 4 April 2025.
18 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2026), Assessment of the Impact of the War on Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises in Ukraine, 12 March 2026.
19 ISAR Ednannia (2025), Civil Society in Ukraine During Wartime 2022-2025, 29 October 2025.
20 European Commission (2025), Ukraine successfully completes its screening process, 30 September 2025.
21 Kiel Institute for the World Economy (2026), Ukraine Support Tracker, data update and Kiel Policy Brief February 2026; Trebesch, C. and Nishikawa, T. (2026), "Europe Steps Up: Ukraine Support After Four Years of War", 11 February 2026. The data covers the period up to and including December 2025. The figures refer to allocated aid from 41 donor countries, as well as the European Commission and the European Investment Bank, rather than disbursements, and do not include the IMF or other international organisations.
22 Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (2025), "In 2025 Ukraine's Ministry of Finance secured $52.4 billion in external financing, more than 70% of which came from revenues generated by frozen Russian assets", 30 December 2025; Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (2024), " The Ministry of Finance of Ukraine attracted $41.7 billion in external financing, including 30% in the form of grants", 30 December 2024; Government Portal, " "In 2023 State Budget of Ukraine raised USD 42.6 billion in external financing", 29 December 2023.
23 U.S. Government Accountability Office (2025), GAO-25-107535, 29 July 2025.
24 For this report, the growing gap between needs and available funding, together with these changes in the volume, composition and predictability of funding, are particularly relevant as external conditions shaping the operating environment for Ukrainian authorities, civil society and other stakeholders.
25 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2025), Ukraine Humanitarian Response Plan 2025, 14 January 2025.
26 UNHCR (2026), Ukraine Situation: Moldova. Operational Update, June 2026.
27 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (2025), Republic of Moldova: Parliamentary Elections, 28 September 2025; ODIHR (2026), ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, 18 February 2026.
28 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024), Report to the Storting no. 8 (2023–2024) The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine. See annex "Political Agreement on Support for Ukraine and Developing Countries Affected by the Global Repercussions of the War," 16 February 2023. All parties represented in the Storting endorsed the agreement.
29 Palestine, Syria, Ethiopia and Afghanistan were the largest recipients of Norwegian aid after Ukraine during the period 2020-2025. Source: Norad, https://www.aidresults.no
30 Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER) (2026), Ukrainian Business in Wartime, 18 August 2026. (http://www.ier.com.ua/ua/institute/news?pid=8007). This is supported by the National Bank of Ukraine, which assessed in July 2026 that economic growth had picked up in the second quarter, partly due to improvements in the energy system (National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) (2026), Inflation Report, July 2026, 6. august 2026 (https://bank.gov.ua/en/monetary/report)..
31 See, for example, DiXi Group (2024), Energy Transparency Index of Ukraine (https://indexua.dixigroup.org/en/).
32 https://www.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/8780.html
33 In Ukraine, seven E5P projects have been completed since the full-scale invasion, achieving combined annual energy savings of 52,962 MWh, annual natural gas savings of around 36.1 million m^3 and improved services for approximately 826,000 people.
34 IMF (2026), Ukraine: 2026 Article IV Consultation and First Review Under the Extended Fund Facility, 21 July 2026. Year-end consumer price inflation was 26.6 per cent in 2022, 5.1 per cent in 2023, 12.0 per cent in 2024 and 8.0 per cent in 2025. Government revenue, excluding budget support grants, is calculated as total government revenue less budgeted support grants and amounted to 47.7 per cent of GDP in 2023, 48.1 per cent in 2024 and 50.7 per cent in 2025.
35 SeeD/UNDP (2025), Gendered socio-economic challenges in Ukraine. Analysis of gendered disparities and insecurities among men and women using data from reSCORE Ukraine 2024 May 2025; Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, P2 Public Services, 2022-2024
36 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024), Report to the Storting no. 8 (2023–2024) The Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine, 2 February 2024.
37 The efforts of the EBRD and other partners are described in the chapters on energy and the economy.
38 The eleven programmes included in the URTF portfolio are Restoration Project of Winterization and Energy Resources (REPOWER), Repairing Essential Logistics Infrastructure and Network Connectivity (RELINC), Resilient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Enterprise (RISE), Housing Repair for People's Empowerment (HOPE), Delivering Resilient Infrastructure in Vulnerable Environments in Ukraine (DRIVE), Agriculture Recovery Inclusive Support Emergency (ARISE), Lifting Education Access and Resilience in Times of Need (LEARN), Health Enhancement and Lifesaving Ukraine (HEAL), Transforming Healthcare through Reform and Investments in Efficiency (THRIVE), Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) and Supporting Reconstruction through Smart Fiscal Governance / Strengthening Government Capacity for Fiscal Reform Implementation (SURGE/STRONG).
39 Source of calculations: NIRAS (2026), Meta-study of results and the knowledge platform for the Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund, Annex 1.

40 NIRAS (2026), Meta-analysis of URTF Results and Evidence Base; PEMConsult (2025) Joint Nordic Evaluation of Contributions to Trust Funds – Annex to the Final Evaluation Report, 23 June 2026.
41 The results are best documented in terms of payments, physical outputs, beneficiaries and other verifiable intermediate results. The evidence base is considered relatively strong where results can be linked to physical inspections, financial controls or independent verification. The evidence is weaker when it comes to longer-term effects and whether the outputs have led to lasting changes for institutions, households and businesses. The results above should therefore be understood primarily as documented outputs and intermediate results, while long-term effects should be interpreted with greater caution.
42 OCHA (2025), Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 16 January 2025.
43 OCHA (2025), Ukraine: Humanitarian Situation, Response and Funding Snapshot, 27 January 2026.
44 Itad (2026), Final Report: Evaluation of Nansen Protection Direct Outcomes.
45 Ibid.
46 OCHA (2025), Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 16 January 2025, p. 1, 14 and 36.
47 UNHCR (2025), Ukraine Situation: Regional Refugee Response Plan 2025-2026, p. 7-10 and 119-122.
48 The difference in scale between Norwegian organisations and UN agencies can be striking. This must be viewed in light of significant differences, particularly in reporting requirements, as Norway supports the UN's country-level humanitarian plans without requiring results from Norwegian funding to be reported separately from the contributions of other donors. In addition, the difference can be explained by differences in budget size and operational capacity. UN agencies often receive larger allocations and have more staff and greater logistical and storage capacity, enabling a broader presence on the ground and closer cooperation with regional authorities. This enables them to respond more quickly and reach more people with humanitarian aid.
49 Itad (2026), Final Report: Evaluation of Nansen Protection Direct Outcomes.
50 NIRAS (2026), Review of Norwegian development and humanitarian support to the Republic of Moldova under the Nansen Support Programme.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 OCHA (2026), Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, 13 January 2026.
55 Itad (2026), Final Report: Evaluation of Nansen Protection Direct Outcomes.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Approximately 70 per cent of these individuals received support through Norwegian Church Aid.
59 UNFPA (2025), Voices from Ukraine: An Overview of Gender-Based Violence in Ukraine, 19/03/2025
60 Of these, Norwegian Church Aid accounted for about 1.7 per cent in Moldova and Ukraine, while Save the Children accounted for about 0.7 per cent.
61 Itad (2026), Evaluation of Nansen Protection Direct Outcomes.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 NIRAS (2026), Review of Norwegian development and humanitarian support to the Republic of Moldova under the Nansen Support Programme.
68 World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission and United Nations (2026), Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), 23 February 2026.
69 NIRAS (2026), Evaluation of Access to Productive Land in the Nansen Programme for Ukraine.
70 The estimates are based on GIS data on the crops cultivated, combined with prices and expected yields. The estimates assume yields equivalent to 80 per cent of the average for the relevant oblast, as productivity is often lower during the first few years after war-affected land is brought back into production. Differences in geography, the timing of land release, farm structure, security and access to capital and agricultural inputs may also affect the results. The evaluation therefore finds an association, but does not yet provide a basis for establishing causality.
71 The URGF reporting period runs from March to March and some figures presented here are therefore from 2026.
72 Engage UA (2026), «Количество предприятий в Украине 2026: статистика ФЛП и юрлиц, тенденции» ["Number of Businesses in Ukraine in 2026: Statistics on Sole Proprietorships and Legal Entities and Trends"], 29 July 2026. Based on data from Ukraine's statistical authorities and OpenDataBot.
73 However, the result cannot be used to establish a direct causal relationship between the support and continued operations.
74 UNDP (2024), Assessment of the War Impact on Micro-, Small-, and Medium-sized Enterprises in Ukraine, 20 February 2024; VoxUkraine (EBRD/UNDP-data) (2025), Resilience of Ukraine's Small and Medium Businesses Amid the War: Challenges, Policy, and the Future, 29 October 2025.
75 World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission and United Nations (2026), Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), 28 February 2026.
76 NIRAS and Kyiv School of Economics (2026), Evaluation of the Result Area:People Have Access to Productive Land, Including Land Previously Contaminated by Mines.
77 The percentages show the proportion of the surveyed released land that had been returned to agricultural production. The samples cover different areas and are not directly comparable.
78 NIRAS and Kyiv School of Economics (2026), Evaluation of the Result Area:People Have Access to Productive Land, Including Land Previously Contaminated by Mines.
79 These estimates should be interpreted as lower-bound estimates. The post-release observation period is short and it may take several years before accessible land is brought into use. Lack of capital, regulatory barriers and other constraints may delay the transition to production.
80 These are relevant results for affected people, but they are self-reported and are not necessarily based on representative samples or comparison groups. They should therefore be used as evidence of respondents' experiences, rather than as precise estimates for all those who have gained access to released land.
81 CSO Meter, Ukraine and Moldova Country Reports 2023-2025; V-Dem (2026), Dataset v16, Liberal Democracy Index (v2x_libdem), 2023-2025, March 2026; Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2023 og 2024.
82 CSO Meter, Ukraine and Moldova Country Reports 2023-2025; V-Dem (2026), Dataset v16, Liberal Democracy Index (v2x_libdem), 2023-2025, March 2026; Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2023 og 2024.
83 European Commission (2023), Ukraine Report 2023, SWD (2023) 699; European Commission (2025), Ukraine Report 2025, SWD (2025) 759. The assessments in the table are the European Commission's qualitative assessments of progress during the relevant reporting period, not the overall level of preparedness. The Commission uses the scale 'backsliding', 'no progress', 'limited progress', 'some progress', 'good progress' and 'very good progress', with intermediate categories where relevant.
84 OECD (2020), Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave, 10 June 2020; OECD (2020), Building Capacity for Evidence-Informed Policy-Making, 8 September 2020; Zia ud din, M., Yuan yuan, X., Khan, N.U. et al. (2023), Linking local collaborative governance and public service delivery: mediating role of institutional capacity building, 5 December 2023; Kovalchuk, M. (2024), Factors Influencing the Institutional Capacity of the State: A Comparative Analysis of Ukraine and the USA, 30 October 2024; Farazmand, A. (2009), Building Administrative Capacity for the Age of Rapid Globalization: A Modest Prescription for the Twenty-First Century, 12 October 2009; OECD (2018), The Role of Media and Investigative Journalism in Combating Corruption, 27 March 2018; Transparency International (2019), Media and Corruption, 20 June 2019.
85 NIRAS (2026), Review of Norwegian development and humanitarian support to the Republic of Moldova under the Nansen Support Programme.
86 Ibid.
87 Ednannia (2025), Civil Society in Ukraine During Wartime, 2022-2025: Report on a Comprehensive Sociological Study, 29 October 2025.
88 NIRAS (2026), Review of Norwegian development and humanitarian support to the Republic of Moldova under the Nansen Support Programme.
89 Ednannia (2025), Civil Society in Ukraine During Wartime, 2022-2025: Report on a Comprehensive Sociological Study, publication date 29 October 2025.

