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A review of Norwegian support to Development Workshop's programme for civic and electoral education among state and civil society actors

Aslak Orre, CMI, (team leader) and Christian Larssen,
with input from Manolo Sánchez, Scanteam

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June 2008

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Cover photo:

From a civic education event in Bailundo, Huambo

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From the civic education session in Seles, Kwanza Sul.

Abbreviations and acronyms

Abbrev./ Acronym	Meaning in English	In Portuguese
ADRA	Action for Rural Development and Environment	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente
AEA	Evangelical Alliance of Angola	Aliança Evangelica de Angola
CACS	Councils for auscultation and social cooperation	Conselhos de Auscultação e Concertação Social
CEAST	Catholic Church of Angola and São Tomé	Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé
CICA	Council of Christian Churches of Angola	Conselho das Igrejas Cristãs de Angola
CIPE	Interministerial Comittee for the Electoral Process	Commissão Interministerial para o Processo Eleitoral
CMI	Christian Michelsen Institute	
CNE	The National Election Commission	Comissão Nacional Eleitoral
CPE	The Provincial Election Commission	Comissão Provincial Eleitoral
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	
DW	Development Workshop	
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa	
EU	European Union	União Europeia
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola	Frente Nacional para Libertação de Angola
FONGA	Forum for Angolan NGO's	Forum de ONGs de Angola
GRN	The National Reconstruction Office	Gabinete Reconstrução Nacional
GURN	The United Government for National Reconciliation	Governo Unido pelo Reconciliação Nacional
IECA	Angolan Evangelical Congregational Church	Igreja Evangélica Congregacional em Angola
INIDE	Institute for Investigation and Development in Education	Instituto Nacional de Investigação e Desenvolvimento da Educação
IRSEM	Institute of ex-Military reintegration	Instituto de Ressentimento Social dos Ex-Militares
MAT	Ministry of Territorial Administration	Ministério de Administração Territorial
MINARS	Ministry for Social Reintegration	Ministério de Apoio à Reinserção Social
MINED	Ministry for Education	Ministério de Educação
MINFAMU	Ministry for Family and Women	Ministério de Família e Mulher
MOSAIKO	Angolan NGO	
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola	Movimento Popular para Libertação de Angola
NDI	National Democratic Institute	
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation	Organização Não Governamental
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation	
PCP	Programme for Citizenry and Peace	Programa de Cidadania e Paz
PECE	Programme for Electoral Civic Education	Programa de Educação Cívica Eleitoral
ToR	Terms of Reference	
UN	United Nations	Nações Unidas
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola	União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola
UTCAH	Technical Unit for Humanitarian Coord. (MINARS)	Unidade Técnica para Coordenação Humanitária (MINARS)

Thanks

The review team would like to express its gratefulness to all the people in Development Workshop (and partners) who contributed with so much to a very memorable journey through several provinces, as well as in Luanda. In particular, our thanks go to João Gil, Eunice Inácio and to Batalha, as well as all the people in the provincial nuclei of Cabinda, Kwanza Sul and Benguela. We also thank Estévão for taking us safely around Luanda.

The consultancy mission had a troublesome start and last-minute changes had to be made to the team and to the interpretation of the Terms of Reference, due to some unfortunate events: two (!) passports which went astray, an airport strike in Norway and a railway breakdown – which made us suspect that some *feitiçaria* was involved to impede the mission. Manolo Sánchez of Scanteam was indeed prevented from coming to Angola by these events, but the remaining team could fortunately enjoy his contributions in terms of quality assurance in the write-up process.

The team would like to thank Norad (Eli Moen), and in particular Vibeke Skauerud as the responsible officer at the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda for showing great flexibility, and for the outstandingly friendly reception at the Embassy when we eventually arrived in Luanda. We are also grateful to Aled Williams for proof-reading the manuscripts.

Executive summary

- Development Workshop's Programme for Civic and Electoral Education under review (PECE 1, *Programa de Educação Cívica e Eleitoral*) has lasted since 2005, though its precursor, the "peace building programme", has since 1999 been built around the partnership with several nation-wide church organisations and with ADRA, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and the Ministry of Education.

- The main programme goal is to "contribute to the consolidation of the ongoing peace process and secure successful elections."

- The programme's goals are sought to be accomplished through carrying out civic education sessions in churches, schools and in villages and *bairros* (urban neighbourhoods); through maintaining a presence in mass-media (Radio Ecclesia) and conferences; through development of "mini-libraries"; and through strengthening of civil society's partnership with government with regard to civic education. In addition, some promoters claim to have actively engaged in the display of "civicness" through local conflict resolution. The programme has activities in 10 provinces.

- The purpose of the end review is to assess the results achieved and provide advice for the Norwegian embassy on the issues of civic education and democracy support in Angola.

- A team of two consultants carried out the review, after having meetings with the national coordinators of PECE 1, as well as with other key figures in the DW and its partner organisations. In addition, travels to the provinces of Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Huambo and Cabinda strongly informed the report.

- The context in which civic education took place in 2008 could be characterised in terms of the generally low knowledge about civic rights and the political system. Three dynamics also influence civic education: The considerable *enthusiasm* for peace and democratisation, the *fear* of a backlash after the elections similar to the 1992 elections and the *authoritarianism* of political life.

- The PECE 1 programme is of *very high relevance* to the Angolan situation.

- PECE 1 has seen some organisational changes, including reorganisation and re-recruitment of its *promotores* (that is, the "field workers" carrying out civic education sessions)*,* as well as several changes to its national coordination. The provincial *nuclei* constituted by a few individuals have remained the backbone of the organisation. No staff members in the provinces are working full-time on the programme. Reflecting this, the programme has

encountered some challenges identifying the right timing and size of remuneration of staff members and promoters.

- The reviewers' *overall assessment* of the programme is that it has provided highly relevant outputs to people who have received its communications. DW has successfully utilised its network and contacts throughout the country to set up and maintain the delivering organisation throughout a good number of years. There have been organisational challenges, and there is good room for improvement with regard to financial and reporting routines in order to maintain a high level of motivation both among the promoters and among potential donors. Nevertheless, the organisation appears to be efficient in its delivery of civic education services compared to its available financial and human resources.

- The impact of the programme has its principal limitation in the numerical outreach: little more than 1 per cent of the registered voters had been reached by its civic education sessions since 2005. As discussed below – some messages were communicated very efficiently (the peace message, as the prime example). Other, more subtle messages of civic education linked to political development were harder to deliver through the most preferred communication method – the *palestras*. Future programmes should seek to vary and experiment with innovative methods of participative meetings.

- The question of "who is the prioritised target group(s)" for the programme's efforts appears not to have been properly dealt with.

- DW appears to be in a strong position, with its credibility as a knowledge-based NGO, to play an important role in the network. DW appears to well integrate its thinking of contributing to a national network of civil society organisations and a corollary network with a geographic coverage.

1. Introduction

In March 2005 Development Workshop (DW) presented its project proposal for civil and electoral education, envisaging a network organisation of activists, promoters (*promotores)* and trainers (*formadores*) which would cover all 18 provinces of Angola. Eventually, funding for the programme was only obtained from the Norwegian Embassy, whose grant document bears out that support to the forthcoming electoral process was a principal motive behind the support. The shortage of financial support to implement the entire project led to a revision of ambitions to cover only 10 provinces: Cabinda, Benguela, Bengo, Bié, Huambo, Kuando Kubango, Malange, Moxico, Kwanza Sul, and Uíge.

ABOUT DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP (DW): Development Workshop-Angola is a non-profit organisation with links to other international chapters of DW. The NGO has worked in Angola since 1981, for many years as the only NGO in the country, initially at the national government's request to assist with self-help housing. It has since participated with local government and community based partners in the first integrated squatter-upgrading program in the *musseques* of Luanda, and had a vital part in building the capacity of Angolan civil society partners after 1991.

DW is currently among the biggest non-governmental "development organisations", with major offices in both Luanda and Huambo. In the latter city it runs a large scale urban planning programme in cooperation with the government. It has also run a pioneering micro-finance programme, and is one of the few organizations carrying out independent research on issues such as: land rights, water and sanitation, communities and reconstruction, household survival and coping mechanisms, demobilisation and resettlement.

The organisation's main funders are the United Kingdom Government (DFID), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Norwegian Cooperation (NORAD) and the Dutch Government. DW also receives a core grant from NORAD via the Norwegian Embassy in Angola.

THE CIVIC AND ELECTORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME: This programme represents the continuation of a partnership between Development Workshop and key Angolan governmental institutions (INIDE[1] and IRSEM[2]) and four church umbrella organisations (AEA, CICA, CEAST, MOSAIKO, IECA)[3] and two secular CSOs (FONGA and ADRA).[4] It also enjoys an

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[1] Institute within the MINED responsible for the teaching of Moral and Civic Education in Angolan schools.

[2] Institute with MINARS responsible for overseeing the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

[3] IRSEM and MOSAIKO only had minor roles in the civic education programme.

agreement with the government institutions of INIDE (the department of the education ministry responsible for the civic and moral education curriculum in schools) and MAT (the responsible ministry for the electoral process). This precursory partnership was established and carried out activities under the context of the period immediately before and after peace "broke out" in 2002, under the acronym PCP – *Programa de Construção de Paz*.

PROGRAMME ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE: The partnership initially developed its activities on the back of conferences and workshop, principally involving the provincial nuclei, where the direction and the focus of the programme's activities have been hammered out. Despite some initial murmuring of the partners of DW (noted in the mid-term review) it appears that DW has duly adjusted the organisation to accommodate the views and interests of the partners. There are no full-time employees on the programme in the provinces, although the regional coordinators are full time in DW (but working on other projects simultaneously). The programme/project is organised as follows:

-   The programme, called PECE 1, is organised under DW´s "*sector for peace and citizenship*", directed and managed by Eunice Inácio. It is one of two projects in the field (the other, PECE 2, carries out similar activities in the remaining provinces).

-   The project itself has a *national coordinator*, currently João Gil who has recently taken up the post after three previous coordinators (Amândio Mavela, Adelina Vandombemua, José Broa).

-   The *provincial nuclei* constitute the backbone of the organisation, with a staff of three: A provincial coordinator, a vice-coordinator (*adjunto*) and a finance officer. The nuclei organises the activities locally (with significant local autonomy), recruits promoters and have the responsibility to secure the flow of funds for the activities, as well as reporting on the activities. They also organise the continuous training of the promoters.

-   The nuclei are backed by three DW-employed "*regional technical coordinators*" who have the principal responsibility to oversee and secure the activities, as well as carry out administrative routines and due reporting in the provinces. They also have a principal role in the training of promoters, in the cooperation with the national programme unit.

-   The provincial nuclei are also supposed to be backed by "*coordination units*" which involve both government entities and partner organisations, but the coordination units appear not to have taken a significant role in all provinces.

-   Each provincial nucleus has recruited a team of promoters (*promotores*). The original intention was that each province would recruit 40 promoters, principally drawn from the organisations involved in the partnership (although the church organisations and teachers appear to be the

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4 DW has supporting peacebuilding since 1999. It then brought together all of the major church organisations and national NGOs to advocate for peace.

most important deliverers of staff). In practice, the number of promoters in each province varies greatly, with some promoters having left and new ones recruited. The large distances proved a significant challenge, contributing to the disengagement of some promoters. As an example, 40 promoters were originally trained in Cabinda, but as of June 2008, only 8 were on the list of remunerated promoters.

The project document idiosyncratically defines civic and electoral education as activities that:

'support ongoing process of democratic consolidation and preparation for holding elections; that further citizen awareness; promote national reconciliation and consolidation of peace; facilitate greater approximation between the Angolan state and its citizens'.

The *goal* or "*general objective*" of the programme is stated as such in the log-frame:

"To prepare and educate Angolan citizens for future legislative, presidential and municipal elections through a national process of civic and electoral education".

This goal has been sought by pursuing the following activities:

- Promoters carrying out a civic education campaign in face-to-face meetings with people in villages and *bairros (*mostly with the techniques of lectures (*palestras*) and on-the-spot theatre performances.

- Influencing the population and government authorities through mass media (principally, through radio shows).

- The setting up of "public mini-libraries" for civic and electoral education in the provinces (linked to the ministry of education).

- Setting up and strengthening civil society – government partnership for civic and electoral education through influence at meetings and conferences.

- Some advocacy activities where the promoters/nuclei have intervened to facilitate the resolution of local challenges (examples: problems of "political intolerance" and to the "verification" of the electoral register).

The programme carried out an initial "needs assessment survey" although its report arrived too late to determine the choice of activities and messages. The programme appears to have produced some (though little) curriculum/literature for itself, though it has mainly relied on civic and electoral education materials produced by some churches, ADRA, EISA, NDI and the government/CNE.

On the whole, the "curriculum" of the programme has covered a lot of ground under the heading of civil and electoral education since 2005, including: democracy and multi-partyism; electoral education; gender awareness and equality of rights; peaceful conflict resolution; basic health, sanitation and HIV/aids awareness; domestic violence awareness; juvenile delinquency. Three pamphlets were produced, one in collaboration with ADRA ("*Manual sobre desarmamento das mentes*", used as a base for

the radio talks at Radio Ecclesia), and two with the education sector. Since the beginning of 2007 when the electoral agenda was concretised, the programme appears to have responded and has increasingly focussed on electoral education.

PURPOSE OF END-REVIEW: The purpose of this study has been to '*carry out an end-review and to assess the results achieved assessing the plan, budget / resources and methodology used to reach the planned outputs, purpose and goal.*' Also, the review set out to consider the context of the programme, with its opportunities and constraining features so as to '*provide the embassy with conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations that can be used by the embassy in its discussion of possible continued support of the programme and of future support of democracy development in Angola in general.*' It should therefore be noted that the team interpreted its role as *primarily* providing the *embassy* with conclusions and *secondarily* to other stakeholders.

REPORT STRUCTURE: The remainder of this report is organised as follows: *Part 2* sets out the review mission's method, scope and delimitations. *Part 3* aims to interpret and describe the political, institutional and social environment in which civic and electoral education takes place - a background for reflections on the future of civic education in Angola. Part 4 is an assessment of the programme's achievements as compared to its objectives and the readjustments agreed upon after the mid-term review in 2006. *Part 4* also includes an assessment of the monitoring system applied by DW. *Part 5* aims to fulfil the review mission's purpose to discuss overall strategic issues of choice for future programmes. The final *part 6* sums up key findings and lessons learned.

2. Method and scope of review mission

This report originates from a mission where a team of two consultants *simultaneously* carried out the reviews of the UNDP Trust Fund for civic education and Development Workshop's programme on civic and electoral education. In the space of two weeks, the DW-supported provincial nuclei were visited in four provinces: Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Cabinda and Huambo. The following DW-supported activities of civic and electoral education were observed by the team (in addition, ten similar UNDP-supported activities were observed in close-by locations):

Date	Organisation/group	Location	Participants	Communication form
22.05	Radio Ecclesia, *Desarmamento das mentes*	Luanda	Listeners	Radio theatre
23.05	DW promoters / COIEPA promoters & community activists	Mun. of Seles, Bº Aluwaio	Local residents	Theatre performance and speeches held for the visitors
25.05	DW Núcleo provincial	Benguela, Igreja Evangelica, Bº da Graça	Mixed church congregation (200+)	Palestra
28.05	DW promoters	Kikongo, Aldeia Tenda	Local residents (30 W, 15 M)	Tree shadow meeting
31.05	DW Núcleo Huambo + promoters	Bailundo, Bº Kalueyo	Local residents (40 W, 5 M)	Palestra

This "double mission" created some methodological *advantages*, allowing the team to:

- *Observe* education sessions and assess the meetings in terms of organisation, ambience, and communication style, as well as its pedagogic approach, and not least, the message conveyed.
- *Interview* the local promoters before and after the sessions, and learn from local challenges.
- Appreciate the civic education promoters' working environment *in loci*.
- Draw comparisons, which usefully illustrated differences in tackling the challenges of civic and electoral education in Angola.

The "double mission" had some methodological *drawbacks*:

- Time spent on travelling to see numerous "sessions", reduced time to meet with and explore relationships with national and local stakeholders outside of the DW-nuclei and UNDP-supported groups.[5]
- Switching attention between two programmes/organisations impacted to some degree on the level of detail that could be considered.

3. The context

Angola has enjoyed effective peace since 2002 – with the exception of the low-intensity conflict-situation in Cabinda. As peace settled, few would have predicted that it would actually take another six and a half years to realize the first elections since 1992, and the second elections ever.

The civic education programmes in Angola intervenes in a context where citizenship and citizenship rights appears to be an alien concept for large parts of the Angolan population (Marques Guedes 2005). The ties linking many peoples of Angola to "the nation" are weak, a consequence of the particular trajectory of state-building which Angola has gone through. The nationalist movements consisted of mutually hostile leaderships not only displaying competing political agendas but also differing definitions of "the nation" and its key identifying characters (Messiant 1998; Newitt 2007). The tumultuous post-independence period of almost incessant war has hardly been conducive to the integration of the country under one "nation-state" with one "citizenry". It cannot simply be taken as given that "Western" ideals regarding relations between governments and populations have intrinsic meaning to all peoples throughout the territory of Angola, such as "the common fate of Angolans"; that Angolans share rights and duties as citizens; that government should be accountable to and serve its citizenry. This fundamental challenge underlies all others meeting the promoters and activists of civic education: the extremely low average level of (civic) education,[6] as well as a remarkable lack of access to (varied) information about national and international politics and society.

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[5] In particular, it is regrettable that we did not have time to visit with representatives of CNE. At the time of our appointed meeting with the CNE on Thursday May 29, the key person fell seriously ill.

[6] Statistics on literacy levels in Angola, regarded to be among the lowest in Southern Africa, are not very reliable.

There is a general lack of knowledge on basic features of democratic governance, citizenship and rights, particularly in rural areas. That's why the programmes for civic and electoral education are highly relevant – if one believes that informing people of their rights is conducive to securing them.

The particular importance of the elections to the promotion of citizen participation and "empowerment" in Angola is that there are in fact no other significant formal and institutionalised channels of state-citizen consultation – although some local governance experiments are taking place.

Observation and talking to promoters and participants in the civic education inspired the reviewers to sum up central aspects of the context for the campaigns as *enthusiasm, fear and authoritarianism.*

ENTHUSIASM: The civic and electoral education campaigns in Angola take place in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections on Sept. 5, 2008. In all the events the team observed, 20-100 people turned up; old and young, women and men, local authorities and village traditional authorities – to learn or hear the message the promoters conveyed. The sessions were carried out with apparent good spirits among all, and people would listen attentively despite various communication difficulties.

FEAR: The level of popular worry that elections would again precede a period of instability, similar to the 1992 events,[7] became evident during the events. Participants often raised questions about the association of elections and the eruption of war as first issue. The promoters responded valiantly with patience, historical comparison and encouraging appeal that this time around things will be different. People still appear to have a certain fear of talking in public about political parties.

AUTHORITARIAN ENVIRONMENT: By any measure, Angola is still a *de facto* one party state under the MPLA party, combined with a high degree of centralisation under the personal power of the President of the Republic (Hodges 2002; Messiant 2007; Vidal 2007). He also appoints, in practice, the government. It is also widely asserted that having the "right connections" in the party and government structures is a prerequisite for carrying out successful business in the country and even to get a job in the civil service. Civil power appears to be centred on the MPLA party and the local government structure, in Angola called the "local organs of the state". The below organigram illustrates the unfailing central control[8] of the appointment of local administration leaders.[9]

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[7] The 1992 debacle was catastrophic to democratic development in Angola. The war reached unprecedented levels of intensity, destruction and killing, and for a while, political liberalisation came to an abrupt end.

[8] Unita and a few other opposition parties do have some cadres in appointed positions in the central and local government structures as a result of the GURN agreement after 1997. However, they are widely seen to be bereft of real power and influence, and serve merely as token concessions to the opposition from the MPLA.

[9] The organigram is adaption to the provisions embedded in the "constitutional law" and the Law-Decree 2/07 on the Local Organs of the State.

The local organs of the state

→ Administrative hierarchy
┈┈▶ Appointment

Diagram boxes:
- President of the Republic
- Provincial Governors (18)
- Minister of territorial admin.
- *Municipio* Administrators (164)
- *Comuna* Administrators (557)
- Traditional authority
- New CACS

Local communities

Finally, the conception that many *sobas* ("traditional authorities") are working for the benefit of the MPLA is also widespread. Many *sobas* openly parades their membership of the ruling party, accepting and using its gifts (motorbikes with MPLA-stickers, TVs and cars) or ostentatiously exhibit symbols of MPLA, like its banner outside the *soba*'s house.

Politicians of the opposition and independent media voices have argued that the governing party has set up the game board so as to create advantages for the ruling party, and impede opposition parties.

The degree of multipartyism in present day Angola must be seen in this context. There is so much at stake for today's powerholders (which are intimately linked to the MPLA-party) that losing power in elections is certainly not contemplated easily. This is not to argue that the party-state is a "monolith" unable or unwilling to reform and work for multiparty democracy – and certainly we met many government officials along the way who sincerely supported the civic education campaign and the message of realising the liberties enshrined in the liberal constitution. However, there are conflicting agendas at play – and there are forces in the state apparatus which act in ways that disallow a level playing field for the opposition and the incumbent – and the presence of these forces have created an, at times, intimidating atmosphere for the promoters of civic and electoral education.

One example is that the *formadores* of one provincial team of DWs programme appears to have felt intimidated by the presence of an element of UTCAH which ostensibly had no other role than to "coordinate" the NGO activity – but which had the additional effect of being interpreted by the *formadores* as surveillance which led them to exercise self censorship. Other promoters complained that their work in many *comunas* was difficult since they were viewed with suspicion by local

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authorities and by *sobas*. They were often threateningly accused of "working for the opposition". Some also had a hard time getting permission to carry out civic education, and some complained that no one would accept that photographs were taken during the session. Mistrustful people were also said to refuse to sign the forms proving their participation. This picture should be modified by the verification that most promoters claim to enjoy a good relationship with the local authorities.

Local violence is also an issue, and promoters in various *municípios* said that they had actually intervened in the local society to help settle local conflicts, many of which were linked to inter-party struggles such as the battle of the hoisting of party banners.

4. Findings of the end review

In the project document and agreements with the Norwegian Embassy (donor agency), the **goal** of the programme is to: *'contribute to the consolidation of the ongoing peace process and secure successful elections'*.

Accordingly, the **purpose** is stated as to *'prepare and educate Angolan citizens for future legislative, presidential and municipal elections through a national process of civic and electoral education.'* The purpose, in essence, reads like a rephrasing of the goal.

Note: The reviewers would have preferred that the various important project-related documents (contract/prodoc, translations in Portuguese and English, proposals and progress reports) was dealing with a consistent logical framework providing logical links between purpose, general objectives/outcome, outputs and activities (and that the latter were targeted and measurable).

The short answer to the review question of whether or not the goal has been reached is "yes". DW's programme of civic and electoral education has contributed to the peace process, not least due to its institutional history, but also because the peace and reconciliation message appears to have been central throughout its work. Peace has held, and it can only be reckoned that the DW programme has contributed positively in this respect. On the other hand, only the post-electoral period will reveal to which extent the elections have been successful. Again, it is difficult to imagine, however, that the programme could have contributed anything else than positively to the stability of elections.

To what extent were the resource inputs, the applied methodology and organisation established by DW conducive to achieving the results anticipated in the purpose and goal formulation?

This question touches upon *the impact* of the programme. It should be noted that an *impact study* (in the broad sense) is not part of the scope of the current mission – yet we have chosen to deal with some

issues in the means-end spectrum in order to highlight some issues of importance for future programmes of civic and electoral education, as we believe that there are lessons to be learned from, at least, thinking through the possible impacts of the programme. Some of these issues are dealt with in chapter five. We will first start by assessing the outreach of the education effort.

DW reports on its goal according to two "specific objectives":

- To train Angolan citizens to improve their understanding of the democratic and electoral processes.
- Collaborate with state structures and civil society in the process of civic and electoral education.

The focus of this end-review report leans towards the first of these specific objectives, as the methodology agreed did not permit an in-depth assessment of the second specific objective.

Outreach of organisation

For a start, the following figures summing up achievements in numbers were provided in an untitled document sent to the promoters.

Province	DW-supported activities/CSOs	DW beneficiaries
Huambo	CEAST and Vozes de Paz	11474 (f: 45 %)
Bié	CEAST, AEA	22715 (f: 64 %)
Kuando Kubango	CEAST, IECA, e ANDA	1035 (f: 47 %)
Cabinda		650 (f: ca. 70 %)
Benguela	CICA	1888 (f: 54 %)
Moxico	CEAST	3558 (f: ca. 75 %)
Kwanza Sul	CEAST, MED	14530 (f: 48 %)
Bengo	Rede Mulher and MINED	50422 (f: 47 %)
Malange	CICA, CEAST e MINED	1657 (f: 35 %)
Luanda	MINFAMU and RADIO ECCLESIA	?
Sum		107929

OUTREACH: The figures in the table above report how many people have been reached through the "sessions" of civic and electoral education under the PECE1 programme (in addition, similar activities are carried out in six other provinces under the PECE2 facility). To the hundred thousand people reported above should be added the tens of thousands who are likely to have heard the radio programmes of Radio Ecclesia which also fall under the cooperation around PECE1. The radio programme *Desarmamento das Mentes* (meaning "the disarming of minds"), is on the air for one hour every Friday. The listeners are, however, geographically restricted to the provinces of Luanda and Bengo. Taken together, the numbers are not high and constitute, for instance, only 1,2 per cent of the registered electorate (8,26 million people). As such, the outreach is therefore so small that only a minority can be said to have been directly affected by the training. As we went to community meetings, many villagers eagerly attended – many more chose not to attend.

That should not necessarily be taken as a judgement of the programme´s achievements. Setting up an organisation to reach so many people in the very difficult working context of Angola is rather to be seen as quite an accomplishment – when taking into account the number of challenges that central and local promoters have to go through to actually reach people in the villages and *bairros*. This can be summed up, albeit in extreme form, by the statement of one promoter in Cabinda: "We have to confront all sorts of constraints and dangers: If we go bicycling to one of the *comunas* we might even run into a gorilla on the road!" Human hindrances are usually more of a challenge.

DW, and partners, appears to have made skilled and appropriate adjustments to its organisational structures at an early stage so as to facilitate outreach (though some ambitions to cover many distant areas had to be sacrificed). Whereas in the early phase, the intention was to send promoters from the provincial capitals to the *municípios,* an adjustment was made so as to recruit and train promoters who lives in the *municípios*. This measure was taken to ease the logistical difficulties (and probably to reduce costs) and also since the "locals" moved with greater facility in their respective environments.

CIVIC EDUCATION & WOMEN: The figures in parenthesis indicate that there was a fairly good gender balance among the participants. The sessions the end-review team observed in fact had a majority of women participants. It appears that the promoters made a good and conscious effort to convince women to participate through their announcement in the communities. We would like to point out that "gender sensitivity" needs to be viewed in more sophisticated terms than percentages.

The information gap is not only a female problem. Shortage of information and formal education is only part of the complex of problems which constitute women's oppression. Women and men share the same rights as citizens before the Angolan constitution and before international norms related to human rights. Yet two factors restrict the application of constitutional law in Angola: Firstly, the legal and judicial apparatus is poorly developed, something people are well aware of. Consequently, knowledge about citizens' rights according to national law is made more relevant if discussed in relation to *how* they can be exercised. Secondly, civic and electoral education in Angola also takes place in a context of legal pluralism, where local customary notions of social regulation often provides an additional layer of legality to the Angolan positive law. Hence, how the rights bequeathed by the constitution play out in the hearts and minds of local people can only be untangled in a local context.

It is highly recommendable for the civic education campaigners to see women's particular information and education needs in their local context of power relations and legal pluralism. Without attempting to provide a "recipe" for action, we believe that the approached must be truly interactive to cater for the problems and local concerns of women involved. Such interactivity (participatory

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learning, or learning by applying new knowledge to a well-known context) is key to securing the relevance of civic and electoral education to women in particular and the citizenry in general.

Motivating the promoters

Providing the promoters with authority and motivation must be seen as key to a successful campaign of any programme of civic and electoral education which is based on direct communication with people in *bairros* and villages.

REMUNERATION/SUBSIDY: The mid-term review identified some issues of concern regarding the remuneration of the promoters. Tardy arrival of funds and/or unclear arrangements regarding remuneration/subsidy seemed to go hand in hand, something which in some instances has led to worry, uncertainty or irritation on the part of the promoters and some members of the provincial nuclei. At one point we observed a discussion between the financial manager of a nuclei and a promoter about whether the subsidy paid was intended as a monthly remuneration or as a subsidy paid per activity. This message was heard several times during the field visits – and related problems were also reported from several provinces in the internal annual report of 2008 – hence, significant enough to make the clear recommendation that the question of subsidies for the respective categories of people involved should be discussed (apparently not for the first time) and then agreed. The ensuing decisions should be clearly communicated and possibly also stated in contracts. It is of some concern that this issue, which was identified in the mid-term review, reappears two years later.[10]

TRANSPORT ISSUES: In addition, there seems to be confusion among some promoters about the covering of transport costs. Should they be covered from the subsidy? Or should there be an extra-subsidy for transport? Some promoters lamented that they were not able to reach the more distant communities of the *municipios* which are often located tens of kilometres away. In order to reach them the promoters would have to pay expensive transportation, or walk – which some promoters insisted were detrimental to their image: "How can we speak with authority if we are arrive in the village after having slept in the bush, have a ragged appearance and are forced to beg for something to eat?" There are local variations to how the transport difficulties are solved – some have even arranged bicycles for the promoters.

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[10] Further on the issue of the promoters, it is worth noting that the initial issues of discussion (identified in the mid-term review) relating to promoters who are also members of political parties appear to have been clarified and solved. It does not appear from any observation in the end-review that the "loyalty" of the promoters has been questioned, and insofar as party-members are present in the squad of promoters, it is reckoned that each knows how to carry out their role as promoters of civic education as opposed to their role as party militants.

The end-review team does not endeavour in suggesting a solution – as the provincial nuclei are in a much better position to find well-adapted arrangements. We would instead insist that the question of transport should be subordinated to general issues of strategy with regard to target groups discussed in part 5 – as it appears that some of the strategic choices on the outreach of the programme have not been made or clearly communicated. However, whichever transport solutions are chosen locally (based on a central strategic decision), they need to be agreed and communicated to a larger extent than as observed during the review.

KITS AND MATERIALS: At the beginning of 2008, 500 t-shirts and bonnets with PECE messages were distributed among the 10 provincial nuclei. We found that many of the promoters were wearing them both casually and as "uniforms" during the civic education sessions. The promoters expressed their appreciation of the t-shirts as it helped provide the identification and status they feel they need to carry out their work. On the same note, several promoters also expressed that a proper credential or an identification card would assist them in their mission.

The libraries

The project document envisages the establishment of 'civic education libraries set up in all eighteen provinces and accessed regularly by citizens'. According to DW´s own reports, the experience with the libraries has not been entirely successful – a point corroborated by the lack of emphasis the stakeholders themselves gave to this aspect during the field visits. The project coordination comments that there appears to be "little culture for reading" in the target group. For the 2008 annual report, only a few of the provinces actually reported on the functioning and use of the libraries and the few reports indicate a quite limited impact. The administration and maintenance costs of running well-functioning public mini-libraries are very high compared to simple distribution of written materials. It is hard not to conclude that the project should have considered the context and the likely usefulness of the mini-libraries before taking the decision to include this feature in the project.

Financial routines and reporting

The consultants did not give priority to a review of financial and administrative routines, yet it is noted that the financial routines were wanting in two respects. The relation to the provincial nuclei has been noted above, and the Norwegian Embassy iterated that the financial reports could be significantly clarified. Hence, there seems to be scope for DW to reinforce its efforts to professionalise its flow of funds to the provinces and reports to the donor agency, a point which was also clearly made during the mid-term review in 2006.

Style and methods of communication

The DW and UNDP programmes invited the review team to a total of 15 sessions of civic and electoral education. Among these, nine could be characterised as *palestras* (lectures) whereas two were "under the shadow of a tree conversations" and one included a theatre performance.

DW has argued that the *palestra* is a form of communication appropriate both for the promoters as well as for the audience. The review team would encourage rethinking the choice of *palestras* as the preferred communication/dissemination channel or, perhaps more appropriately, to redouble efforts of training the promoters in alternative pedagogical methods.

The *palestras* do have their advantage in that they provide a sense of "predictability" – and therefore security – for the promoter. However, they had the visible effect of creating a distance between the "audience" and the promoter, which was sometimes inappropriately underscored with a table and physical distance between the promoter and the audience. Other promoters had a more relaxed and oral style, efficiently and convincingly mastering the switch between Portuguese and local languages. The latter group, though authoritative and reassuring, tended to lecture in a way that reduced scope for actual dialogue by heightening the threshold of inputs, comments and questions from the participants. Many *palestras* were followed by "question rounds" which received fairly minimal responses before the meeting was rounded off.

The principles of interactivity and participatory learning seem to be amply present in the materials DW uses in its *formação de formadores*. However, the methods observed during the sessions indicated that there is some way still to go. We insist that the method of participation is not only a cosmetic and humanistic nicety – it is more fundamentally a tool to ensure that the message conveyed is the most relevant and best targeted, and that the learning is internalised as people feel the knowledge they acquire is of the kind they can use.[11]

There are many standard tools for interactivity available which do not appear to be used by the promoters of DW and partners: Group discussions, flip-chart summaries, problem- and solution oriented brainstorming and discussions – and among students and youth: role acting. Some

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[11] We dare link this question to the issue of giving sessions in local languages. During a UNDP regional "exchange of experience" meeting between promoters, the question of local language was raised – implying that translation difficulties were a serious challenge. Obviously without having the linguistic knowledge to delve into the "world" of, say, the Umbundu language, one might question if it was the "technical and law-text prone" approach taken by some promoters that created (obvious) translation difficulties. If the method had started more interactively, by letting local people express in their own languages what the meaning of the terms actually might mean, and what they point of learning them might be – then surely a common linguistic platform should be possible to find. The word "accountability" might not have a direct translation in Umbundu, but its content – that people in government must answer for their actions to the people who have elected them – should not be impossible to discuss. The discussions could start with local examples, and be extrapolated to the national level.

techniques, like dancing and singing, are mainly ice-breakers to facilitate discussion. In several DW sessions – singing and dancing which really animated the people and brought forward their smiles – took place *after* the sessions when they clearly would have been well utilised before!

5. Overall issues for concern

THE "PUBLIC SPHERE", ROOM FOR DEBATE AND CIVIC EDUCATION: One of the strong achievements of Development Workshop is that it has maintained a position in a network of church and civil society organisations which is/has been a significant factor in the public sphere. This network has a history of at least 10 years and has played an important role in increasing the scope for public debate and critical thought in Angola. An expression of the capability of this network is that in February, a weeklong conference on various peace and civic education issues took place, where the churches' civic branches participated along with NGOs and high-level representatives of the most well-known political parties. Training *in cascade* followed in the provinces during the subsequent weeks. The fact that political parties attended the debates is significant, since in Angola a schism of communication has divided "party politics" from the "rational debates" of "civil society". As such, the conference was an important step towards the normalisation of democratic debates on social and political issues. The weekly debate programmes on issues of peace and citizenship at Radio Ecclesia are an expression of good practice where the national heavyweights in the church communities use their influence to expand the public space for debate.

DW appears to be in a strong position, with credibility as a knowledge-based NGO, to play an important role in the civil society – in particular as a bridge between the CSO/church networks and the various parties. DW appears to integrate well its thinking of contributing to a central network of civil society organisations and a corollary network with nationwide coverage.

Who is the target group?

Setting-up an organisation of civic and electoral education in Angola implies that one has to make some tough choices on who should benefit from the training. Who should be targeted for training, and who should not? Who should receive little/quick training and who should receive intensive training? Should work on "high levels" with strategic partners (government entities, church organisations, etc.) be privileged in relation to direct communication in the communities?

The contract between the Norwegian MFA and DW states that the target group is: "Individuals and local communities across Angola, particularly in the rural areas, as well as state institutions and other

civil society actors and organisations." Evidently, the statement is so general that it cannot really be treated as a priority of target groups. It is elsewhere stated that the programme should work for "gender equality" which furthermore dilutes a sense of priority.

With DW´s (or anyone's) point of departure, the "need" is simply too vast to allow for comprehensive coverage. Then one has to make strategic choices, or choices based on some clear and agreed criteria which are deemed to amplify the impact of the programme and increase the likelihood of achieving its goals.

Neither the documentation available nor impressions from the field made it clear to the review team which was the strategy and prioritised target groups. On the other hand, we got the impression that there was a certain *laissez-faire* attitude that the provincial nuclei would pragmatically make the right choices. The promoters complained that "many more could be reached with training" if only they had the means and the transport because distances were so great, while at the same time urban coverage was far from exhausted. This indicated to us that strategic guidance was not forthcoming: Why was it necessary to reach the remote areas/populations?

If one abandons the unrealistic goal of reaching "all" citizens in Angola, one needs to strategically focus on particular groups. A few suggestions might help to structure discussions on the strategy:

- ◦ *Rights based approach:* The most needy of civic education (gender, province, etc.), or the most vulnerable (most poor, handicapped, etc.)

- ◦ *Strategic intervention:* Focus on groups deemed more likely to contribute and create pressure toward a culture of openness and a democratic public sphere (urban youth, school teachers, *sobas*, etc).

A further criterion is the choice of intensity of training vs. numbers that can be reached. Should one "spread it thin" or concentrate on a few? Both have advantages, and both have associated costs. Usually, giving a lot to many is the most expensive (and unrealistic), though skilled use of channels of mass communication (for instance, interactive radio broadcasting or church sermons) could at least theoretically provide high intensity training to many – though we are fully aware of the many challenges of carrying out such mass communication in the context of Angola. Hence, the discussion of numbers versus intensity of training raises the question of choice of channels of communication. The PECE1 organisation appears to have been geared towards carrying out various versions of "community meetings" which is only one of many possible dissemination channels. This choice should be continuously reconsidered (though we hasten to add that the impressive network and organisation of promoters should not easily be given up).

The below figure is an illustration of the trade-offs between intensity of training versus numeric outreach when disseminating through a selection of channels. More channels could be considered and placed in the chart. Intensity of training could be read as "the amount of time and effort" spent on each individual receiving the messages of civic education.

However, the above diagram is but one of many strategic discussions that can be raised. Any ambitious programme of civic and electoral education must combine various target groups and more than one channel of dissemination. Yet when all cannot be given priority, clear guidance is needed and the involved stakeholders should be duly informed about the strategy. One important strategic choice is whether or not to focus more on the *content* of the civic education programme.

The message

The observations the review team made during field visits and the interviews with the nuclei and the promoters implied that more attention could be given to the *content* and the *message* conveyed.

THE INFORMATION MUST BE CORRECT: Some cases of confusing or outright misinformation were overheard! In several instances, promoters said that elections are about choosing our government – which is not entirely precise information in the run-up to Angolan (legislative) elections.

THE INFORMATION MUST BE RELEVANT: In another instance, the promoters entertained a lengthy discussion about the constitutional requirement that a candidate for president need be an Angolan citizen. This, for one, does not appear to be the most relevant of issues for a lengthy plenary debate.[12] More importantly, it could create confusion between legislative and presidential elections.

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[12] To be fair to this specific case, the promoters eventually duly clarified this point.

Relevant information is more than a selection of laws to be presented to the audience. The information should satisfy the *information needs* of the audience, thus contributing to real empowerment: to enable people to exercise rights more efficiently. Informing illiterate people on the roles, rights and duties of the various entities of the electoral apparatus might be less relevant than explaining the underlying meaning of legally bound roles: That each entity contributes to a whole which should ensure a level playing field so that no party can rig elections to its own advantage.

Whereas many promoters read from laws and explained technicalities of the process, the questions which were raised by the audience often focussed on the fear of repetition of the 1992 debacle, why soldiers are on the road if there is peace (Cabinda) or simple but fundamental questions like: "What can the elections do to help us with the agriculture or put children in school"? Civic education implies explaining and convincing people that democratic principles of government are somehow better at addressing the real needs of people (oriented around physical, social and economic security) than governments under guidance of other ideals. Once given the motivation to vote and to embrace the message of democracy, then its technicalities (the various steps of the voting process, other civic rights, etc.) will be much more easily grasped by people.

Some promoters were good at explaining that voters should vote according to trustworthiness and what the party programmes of each respective party indicated. Other promoters tended to treat the elections simply as an end in itself – which begs the question why anyone should bother to vote? Some reverted to a very typical "African" way of transmitting a message: that of packaging it in parables and anecdotes. The parables often tend to be linked to family matters (parents and children, husband and wife), or to nature (such as sowing seeds to harvest at a later point). The most skilled and charismatic promoters masterfully used parables and jokes to convey their message, others were less successful. Parables aren't always suitable to explain or discuss concrete challenges, and could even dilute a message. To use one example: Reducing the question of peace building between two former warring enemies to a question of "peace in the house" between husband and wife (to "keep the children from suffering") is to make the complexities of the Angolan history appear banal. Some parables also seemed to have been quite "improvised" by the promoter. Promoters' lessons learned sessions could well be used to discuss which parables work to explain particular points and discuss the "value added" of conveying particular messages in allegories.

INCREASE OPENNESS: The generalised association of political parties with danger and fear appear to lead most promoters to speak of political parties in the abstract, or by using pseudonyms such as "*partido Banana*" and "*partido Laranja*". The review team would argue that in the long run, such "mystification" of the parties (that is, MPLA, Unita, PRS, FNLA, PRD, PDL, etc.) rather contributes

to fear instead of reducing it: Is mentioning the name of the party somehow dangerous? Being open about the existence of several parties and that they carry names should be part and parcel of a civic and electoral education campaign. Being concrete is also to educate. If the well-informed and confident people promoting civic education do not dare speak the names of parties and open up frank dialogue which touches on the content of their programmes and the real options available to citizens, then who can?

One could imagine that the civic education sessions could provide opportunities for taking up questions of the role of political parties in a democracy, of which there is a rich and growing literature with African examples (Lipset 2000; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Lindberg 2006; Catón 2007; Rakner and van de Walle 2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007).

TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CULTURE AND PUBLIC SPHERE: It is easy to understand the focus on elections as a pacifying mechanism is the Angolan context, and the challenge of communicating this given the 1992 experience. However, it should be a future challenge for the well-placed and "heavy-weight" partners in the DW programme to ensure that the public space is open for frank and civic debate on all aspects of society, politics and government and that pressure is made on the government to guarantee this openness throughout the country.

In a rather cautious way, the current programmes have combined the peace message with gravitation towards individual enlightenment – to preach the gospel or rights, so to say. The question is if future civic education should move a step forward to set its aim on the next challenges of consolidating democracy: to put across that democracy is more than a set of procedures (or 'a methodology' as one promoter had it) to *elect* a legitimate government. That would imply providing people with tools for collective action, and to explaining the meaning of democracy in terms which are controversial in today's Angola, for instance principles which involve that:

- a people could recall a poorly performing government through elections
- the law is above the executive (the rule of law, as opposed to arbitrary government)
- people have the right to organise to fight for their interests
- all citizens are equal before the law, and that no one is above the law
- government is accountable to its citizenry
- transparency is a precondition for accountability
- the state has committed to the duty to ensure provision of public services for citizens

These principles need not read like a political science curriculum. Brought down to a local level, and discussed as part and parcel of the quest for resolving the difficulties experienced by ordinary people throughout Angola, they should give intrinsic and immediate meaning. Building these principles and

terms into discussions about the local governance – which provide the immediate governance context of all people – could actually be an efficient pedagogic move.

DW has indicated that its plans for civic and electoral education efforts should be closely linked to its many activities promoting participatory local governance and decentralisation. Such a move could provide an excellent platform for learning through civic education linking local practice with abstract theories of democratic governance – and give them real practical applicability in a local context where the idea of transparency and accountability in a *município* administration seems much more of a possibility than the same applied to the military-petroleum complex wielding power in Luanda.

Pictures above are from various civic education sessions. Pictures 1 & 2: Joint DW and COIEPA session in Seles, Kwanza Sul, MPLA flag towering over the civic education premises. Pictures 3 & 4: Pastor in Catumbela preaching of the virtues of peace and reconciliation, spellbinding the packed church.

6. Summary of lessons learned and recommendations

Development Workshop's programme for civic and electoral education has *high relevance* for the development of a democratic public space and to inform a citizenry with a large need for civic and electoral information and education.

DW appears to be in a strong position, with credibility as a knowledge-based NGO, to play an important role in civil society. DW appears to integrate well its thinking of contributing to a central network of civil society organisations and a corollary network nationwide coverage.

The programme has *proven merits* and deserves further funding. The programme has delivered a *very satisfactory* amount of activities and outputs, fulfilling what could be realistically expected. (The only exception is the low performance of the mini-libraries. The library feature was ill-conceived, but has not appeared to hamper the development of other activities noticeably). The most important output was "to train Angolan citizens to improve their understanding of the democratic and electoral processes." A very satisfactory number of people were reached. Since the number of people reached is still low, however, its targeting and the message conveyed must be even more focussed to enhance impact.

The question of who is the prioritised target group was unsatisfactorily dealt with in the project documents, and should be the objective of serious debate for a next phase.

Lessons and recommendations are summarised below:

- ✓ DW should consider restricting the use of libraries to the people who are more directly involved in the programme as *formadores* and promoters, and create a clearer link between the libraries and their contents and the curriculum of the promoters.

- ✓ The priorities with regard to target groups must be duly communicated. Future donors should ensure that this priority has been addressed.

- ✓ DW should make efforts to continuously develop and sharpen the message of civic and electoral education so as to increase relevance for citizens/population groups in their varying local "life-worlds".

- ✓ Interactivity is key to securing the relevance of civic and electoral education to women in particular and the citizenry in general.

- ✓ It should carefully consider moving from focussing the message on "individual enlightenment" to "collective empowerment" in order to ensure that civic education does not merely teach how to avoid the elections going *puiti-puiti* (a mess), but that it also provides

ordinary people with new tools and self-confidence to claim their rights before the state and other citizens.

✓ Adjustments and increased efforts are needed in the organisation and the Luanda-nuclei transactions.

✓ DW must dedicate necessary human resources to ensure a steady and correct stream of funds from the project offices to the nuclei, and from the project offices to the donors. Insofar as the lack of reporting from the nuclei prevents the transfer of funds to promoters in the provinces, then DW must ensure that enough human resources are dedicated to the training of the nuclei's financial officers.

Future and even better programmes of civic and electoral education – that is, with higher impact – could be made through further development of the partnership with other CSOs and the state authorities, in particular local authorities.

✓ The latter necessitates *increased* demands on the follow-up capacity of the central project coordination – most likely meaning that DW would need *more* full-time staff.

✓ The programme could well be linked to other strong activities in the DW programme, such as programmes around decentralisation and the strengthening of participation in local governance - to ease the transition referred to above.

The reports with the narrative on project outputs and activities were often confusing: They were not of the same format, and were poorly edited, making it difficult for DW as well as for the donor (and the reviewers) to assess real programme output.

✓ DW needs to place more effort on producing proper reports. This should *not* be seen as pure "bureaucracy" to satisfy donors, but is a necessary ingredient for institutional memory and continuous learning and is a steering tool for the programme itself.

✓ A general and useful note to donor(s) (and DW) on the logical framework: It should always be ensured that the statements of goals, outputs and activities referred to in the donor's grant documents ("bevilgningsdokument") and the contract document are the same as that in the implementing agency's project document (prodoc) – or else agree on which document takes precedence.

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(*At the time of this review's write-up, the programme's final report had not yet been produced).*

People interviewed and consulted

(All meetings for both the UNDP and DW supported teams and organizations are listed, as in many respects "both missions" informed each other).

Date	Organisation/group	Location	Participants
21.05	Representatives of UNDP-supported organisations: • FAPED • Plataforma Eleitoral • Lawuleno • Search for common ground, Moxico • Rede Eleitoral, Bengo • AASAA, Lunda Norte • Igreja Metodista, Uíge • AJUDECA, Zaire • OADEC, Zaire	UNDP offices, Luanda	Round table discussions
22.05	Meetings with representatives of DW's partners: • CEASTE • CICA • FONGA	DW offices	Round table discussion

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Date	Name	Role, organisation	Where
31.5	Florinda Sambambi	Promotor, coordenadora provincial do núcleo	Bailundo
31.5	Pedro Satchitota	Promotor, Coordenador prov. adjunto	Bailundo
31.5	Magazini Kambozo	Promotora de Bailundo	Bailundo
31.5	Cesar Katimba	Promotor e assitente de finanças do núcleo	Bailundo
31.5	Afonso Kangingi	Soba, Bairro Kalueyo	Bailundo
25.5	Aurélio Kissombe	Promotor, DW	Benguela
25.5	Simão Ezequiel	Promotor, DW	Benguela
25.5	Domingos Santos	Promotor, DW, município de Balombo	Benguela
25.5	Joaquim Vitor	Promotor, DW, município de Lobito	Benguela
25.5	João da Silva	Promotor, DW	Benguela
25.5	Dona Adriana	Formador, DW	Benguela
25.5	Benedito Sayendo	Pastor CICA, formador do Núcleo, DW	Benguela
25.5	Leonardo Pinto Engerio	Promotor, Solcicampo	Benguela
26.5	Palmira Diogo	Promotora, DW & Plataforma Eleitoral	Cabinda
26.5	Onesimo Setucula	Coordenador nacional, Plataforma Eleitoral	Cabinda
26.5	Ivo Mabiala	Coordenador do núcleo provincial, DW	Cabinda
26.5	Próspero Ngaia	Coordenador adjunto do núcleo	Cabinda
26.5	Antónia Rodrigues da Costa	Formadora, Plataforma Eleitoral	Cabinda
27.5	Mateus Nhaca	Presidente, Plataforma Eleitoral	Cabinda
28.5	Simão Madeka	Coordenator of civic education, Mãos Livres	Cabinda
28.5	Sr da Silva	Presidente, Mãos Livres	Cabinda
31.5	Julio Quintas	Coordenador técnico, centre region, DW	Huambo
1.6	Jonas Chilimo	Coordenador da educação cívica, INACAD	Huambo
1.6	Altina Violeta Vapor Vitor	Activist, INACAD	Huambo
1.6	4 promoters and representatives	FAPED	Huambo
24.5	Dickyamini Bocolo	Formador, Círculo Rastafari de Benguela	Lobito
24.5	Carla	Activista, Círculo Rastafari de Benguela	Lobito
	Fritz Affolter	Senior Civic Education Expert, civic education programme leader, UNDP	Luanda
	Eunice Inácio	Gestora, Sector da Paz e Cidadania, DW	Luanda
	João Gil	National coordinator, PECE1, DW	Luanda
	Henriques Freitas Cabula	National coordinator, UNDP trust fund	Luanda
	Vibeke Skauerud	Programme officer, Norwegian Embassy	Luanda
	Lise Stensrud	Minister councillor, Norwegian Embassy	Luanda
21.5	João Castro "Freedom"	Secretário geral, LIDDHA e FONGA	Luanda

26.5	Paula Cristina Fernandes	European Commission	Luanda
26.5	Áurea Machado Pereira	Project manager, European Commission	Luanda
26.5	Isabel Emerson	Country director, NDI	Luanda
26.5	Clarisse Kaputu	Vice-min. De MINARS, Spokeswoman of UNITA	Luanda
26.5	Azevedo Kanganje	Secretário para assuntos eleitorais, UNITA	Luanda
26.5	Filomeno Vieira Lopes	Spokesman, FpD	Luanda
29.5	Maria Cramér	First secretary, Swedish Embassy	Luanda
29.5	Mervyn Farroe	Oficial de supervisão de programas, USAID	Luanda
29.5	Ranca Tuba	Democracy and governance team leader, USAID	Luanda
29.5	Allan Cain	Director, Development Workshop	Luanda
2.6	Fabrice Beutler	Gestor de programas, DW	Luanda
4.6	Ana Graça	Assistant resident representative, Governance unit, UNDP	Luanda
4.6	Gita Welch	Resident representative, UNDP Angola	Luanda
23.5	Vieira Chitunga	Reporter da ACCIDANA	Seles
23.5	Baptista André	Soba de Aluwaio	Seles
23.5	Domingos Aguiar	Soba adjunto de Aluwaio	Seles
23.5	Ricardo Kalei	Coordenador provincial, COPOLO (NGO)	Seles
23.5	Ngunza Fernando	Regedor geral do município	Seles
23.5	Simão Gando	Promotor, DW	Seles
23.5	Fernando Domingos	Coordenador DW, município Gabela	Seles
24.5	Silva João	Promotor de DW e dir. prov. ACCIDANA	Seles
24.5	Edvânio, Ana Gasolina & Lauriana	Civic education activists, COIEPA	Sumbe
24.5	5 sobas	Listeners to a civic education session	Sumbe

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Annexes

Agreed project summary

1. Identification of the Project
- Project Title/Name: National Civic and Electoral Education Programme among State and Civil Society Actors.
- Implementing institution: Development Workshop.
- Norwegian and/or other Partner institution: None.

2. Description of the Project

2.1 Goal

Contribute to the consolidation of the ongoing peace process and secure successful elections.

2.3 Purpose

To prepare and educate Angolan citizens for future legislative, presidential and municipal elections through a national process of civic and electoral education.

2.3 Outputs
- A national partnership has been established between the Ministry of Education (INIDE), the Ministry of Justice (Human Rights Dep.), the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT), IRSEM and a range of Angolan civic actors, both religious and secular, with representation in all 18 provinces.
- Civic education libraries set up in 18 provinces and accessed regularly by citizens.
- Civic and electoral education carried out in all 18 provinces.
- Monitoring and evaluation visits to all provincial nuclei undertaken.

2.4 Inputs
- 10,5 NOK over three years
- Various equipment, logistical support and facilities
- Technical assistance

2.5 Main indicators

For the Goal: Degree and number of acts of violence during and after the election process, successful elections concluded, social and political stability.

For the Purpose: Percentage of participation in the various elections, greater engagement with state institutions and demands for accountability.

For the Outputs:
- State ministries and institutions and civil society actors actively engaged in the programme.
- Number of civic education libraries established and functioning in different provinces.
- Record of number of visitors and of books consulted.
- Timely submission of ToRs and work plans from each provincial nuclei.
- Carrying out of civic and electoral education activities in all 18 provinces.
- Reports from project personnel of activities carried out by provincial nuclei.
- Examples of increased citizen awareness.
- Example of increased engagement between local communities and state actors.

Target groups: Individuals and local communities across Angola, particularly in the rural areas, as well as state institutions and other civil society actors and organisations.

2.6   Major risk factors (internal and external)
- Shortened time for implementation of the project, in case of delays in the process.
- Lack of co-ordination among CSOs and election stakeholders in general.
- Increase of political tension could lead to limited transparency on the part of the authorities.
- Interruption of dialogue and collaboration with authorities and partner ministries.

3.   Overall Budget

There are to date no other confirmed donors to the project. However, both CIDA, the Swiss and SIDA have indicated support. In addition, the Irish NGO Trocaire has signalled support in-kind as their new director will participate in the organisation of the project. Trocaire's new country director for Angola was the previous project co-ordinator of DW's civic education project and was instrumental in the planning phase.

Total budget for the 3 years: USD 3 557 324

Break down per year: USD 1 339 921   Year 1 (2005)

USD 1 141 746   Year 2 (2006)
USD 1 075 657   Year 3 (2007)

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Sub-total
National prog. co-ord. – human res.	284 042	278 218	276 100	USD 838 360
Prov. nuclei co-ord. + animation, 18 prov.	507 200	464 200	464 200	USD 1 435 600
Educational material	107 000	75 000	45 000	USD 227 000
Proj. monitoring, accomp., ongoing train.	52 500	50 000	45 000	USD 147 500
Advocacy, research and communications	50 000	50 000	30 000	USD 130 000
Communications	25 000	25 000	25 000	USD 75 000
Operational, office and vehicle costs	238 334	134 701	129 471	USD 502 506
Sub-Total	1 264 076	1 077 119	1 014 771	USD 3 355 966
NGO overhead 6%	75 845	64 627	60 886	USD 201 358

TOTAL PROGRAMME COST: USD 3 557 324

Results Oriented Logical Framework

Country/ Region	Angola/ Southern Africa	Project No.		
Project Title	Civic and Electoral Education	Project Budget		
Partner Organization	Development Workshop	Programme Manager		
Project Purpose	**Outcomes**	**Performance Indicators**	**Beneficiaries**	**Assumptions**
To prepare and educate Angolan citizens for future legislative, presidential and municipal elections through a national process of civic and electoral education	Greater citizen understanding of democratic and electoral procedures leading to informed voter participation and civic engagement with state institutions and structures.	- Significant participation in electoral processes. - Greater citizen confidence and lack of fear in the pre-election period. - Greater engagement with state institutions and demands for accountability.	- Individuals and local communities across Angola, particularly in provincial and rural areas. - State institutions strengthened as a result of programme activity. - Partner civil society actors strengthened as a result of programme activity	That is it possible to overcome a weak sense of citizenship and a lack of civic and electoral education through a systematic approach
Outputs	**Outcomes**	**Performance Indicators**	**Beneficiaries**	**Assumptions**
1. Establish a national state and civil society partnership.	The creation of a national partnership between the Ministry of Education (INIDE), the Ministry of Justice (Human Rights Department), IRSEM, and a range of Angolan civic actors both religious and secular, with representation in all 18 provinces.	State ministries and institutions and civil society actors actively engaged in the programme.	- Angolan citizens and local communities. - State institutions, especially the Ministries of Education and Justice and IRSEM. - Angolan civil society actors.	That state and civil society are willing to work together in pursuit of a common objective in the area or civic and electoral education.
2. Develop and Disseminate Civic and Electoral Education Materials nationally and create mini-libraries.	Civic education libraries set up in all 18 provinces and accessed regularly by citizens.	- Number of civic education libraries established and functioning in different provinces. - Record of number of visitors and of books consulted.	- Provincial nuclei members involved in the programme - Number of Angolan citizens accessing local libraries.	- That appropriate civic and electoral education material can be identified. - That it will be possible to create local libraries in all provinces. - That local communities will access these local libraries.
3. Carry out civic and electoral education activities in all 18 Angolan provinces.	- Elaboration of ToRs and work plans for all 18 provinces - Provincial nuclei engaged systematically in electoral and civic education across Angola.	- Timely submission of ToRs and work plans from each provincial nuclei. - Carrying out of civic and electoral	- Angolan citizens and local communities. - State institutions, such as the Ministries of Education and Justice, and IRSEM. - Angolan civil society actors.	That present levels of security and access to rural and provincial areas continue prior to legislative, presidential and municipal elections.

		education activities in all 18 provinces.		
4. Ongoing support of provincial nuclei including monitoring and evaluation visits.	Reports from systematic monitoring and evaluation visits.	- Reports from project personnel of activities carried out by provincial nuclei. - Examples of increased citizen awareness. - Examples of increased engagement between local communities and state actors.	- Provincial nuclei for civic and electoral education. - State institutions, such as the Ministries of Education and Justice, and IRSEM.	That the programme will have sufficient staffing levels to conduct M&E, and that present access to all provinces continues.

Terms of reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE for A review of Norwegian support to Development Workshop (DW): NATIONAL CIVIC AND ELECTORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME AMONG STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS - ANGOLA

(hereafter called the "study")

BACKGROUND

Following more than 10 years of anti-colonial liberation struggle and 27 years of brutal civil war, Angola has enjoyed an effective peace since a peace agreement was signed on the 4th of April, 2002.

First time elections were held in 1992, but were cut short after the first round of presidential elections, when the opposition party UNITA pulled out after accusing the ruling party MPLA of fraud. War started again, and lasted until the peace agreement in 2002.

New elections have been anticipated in Angola since the signing of the 2002 peace agreement. However, real preparations only started in 2006, with the creation of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the interministerial committee (CIPE) in charge of ensuring the logistics in connection with the registration and election process, and with the start of the actual voter registration in November 2006. In his new-year speech, the president announced elections on the 5th and 6th of September 2008. However, the dates are not yet formally approved, and elections still need to be officially announced.

Wanting to contribute to the election process, but without any official dates announced for the elections, Norway (together with a few other bilateral donors) early on decided to support Angolan civil society through civic education projects. The rationale behind the decision was that civic education would be useful, regardless of an election date, and it allowed the embassy to contribute to the election process without depending on an official invitation from the Angolan authorities.

Despite a booming economy, Angola still faces a series of problems. The most serious challenges continue to be poverty, a limited peace dividend for the majority of its population in the context of massive and increasing financial incomes and economic growth, and a resource distribution gap which fails to produce progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. Literacy rate for adults (over 15 years old) is 67,4%, and for youth between 15 and 24 years old it is 72,2%.[13] When it comes to media, only the state owned radio and television channels broadcast nationally. There is only one daily newspaper, the Jornal de Angola, also controlled by the authorities. The few privately owned provincial radio stations are in most cases owned and controlled by members of the ruling MPLA party. There is a high degree of self-censorship by the media in the provinces. In Luanda, the situation is better. There are two main radio stations in addition to the state controlled media, namely Radio Ecclesia, owned by the Catholic Church, and Radio Despertar, owned by the opposition party UNITA. In addition, there are a number of weekly, private newspapers voicing rather strong criticism towards the government. However, the quality of the articles is often poor, and the price too high for the general population.

Furthermore, Angola is a country where donors in general and the UN system in particular have limited political leverage. The country's fortunate financial situation and new relationship with China makes it difficult to achieve an

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[13] UNDP Human Development report 2007 / 2008.

open political dialogue, including over human rights problems. In addition, Angola's experience with the UN has been rather mixed, in particular during the period of the Security Council mandates in the country.

DW was one of the first international NGOs to establish themselves in Angola in the early 1980's. The organisations overall goal is poverty reduction through different type of community work and programmes. The embassy has collaborated with DW for a number of years and supported a variety of programmes. The current civic and electoral education programme builds on the network established as a result of DW's Peace Building Initiative from 2000 to 2004, which yielded many positive results (ref. review report from November 2003). While other NGOs have substantially scaled down or closed their programmes after the end of the war and the humanitarian phase, DW has maintained a similar rate of growth to previous years, adapting to more long-term development goals.

1.1   Programme description

An initial agreement with DW was signed on the 10th of October 2005, for NOK 10,5 million. An extension of the programme was signed on the 28th of November 2007, for NOK 1,7 million. Due to a lack of funding, it was decided to reduce the initial number of target provinces from 18 to 10. There are no other donors to the programme. However, DW receives support from the EU for similar activities in 5 additional provinces. A mid-term review was carried out in the fall of 2006, by independent consultant Nelia Taimo from Mozambique.

- Goal

Contribute to the consolidation of the ongoing peace process and secure successful elections.

- Purpose

To prepare and educate Angolan citizens for future legislative, presidential and municipal elections through a national process of civic and electoral education.

- Outcome

Angolan citizens have greater understanding of democratic and electoral procedures leading to informed voter participation and civic engagement with state institutions and structures.

- Outputs

- A national partnership has been established between the Ministry of Education (INIDE), the Ministry of Justice (Human Rights Dep.), the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT), IRSEM (Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Combatants.) and a range of Angolan civic actors, both religious and secular, with representation in all 18 provinces.

- Civic education libraries set up in 18 provinces and accessed regularly by citizens.

- Civic and electoral education carried out in all 18 provinces.

- Monitoring and evaluation visits to all provincial nuclei undertaken.

- Inputs

- 10,5 NOK over three years

- Various equipment, logistical support and facilities

- Technical assistance

- Target groups:

- Individuals and local communities across Angola, particularly in the rural areas, as well as state institutions and other civil society actors and organisations. The Norwegian funds are used in ten of the 18 provinces of Angola, namely: Benguela, Bié, Bengo, Cabinda, Huambo, Malanje, Moxico, Kwanza Sul, Kuando Kubango and Uige.

MAIN PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is to carry out an end-review and to assess the results achieved assessing the plan, budget / resources and methodology used to reach the planned outputs, purpose and goal.

The assessment should take into consideration political, economic, social and/or cultural opportunities and obstacles in the environment that are affecting democratic development and citizens' access to information and education in that respect. Opportunities and obstacles may refer to actors, groups and organisations in the public sphere and civil society including informal institutions as well as the relations between the civil society organisations/groups and the state, and the underlying structures of political, economic and social power. Thus, by the environment is meant the public space where the organisations of the state interact with societal actors/organisations on issues of democratic development.

The assessment shall, in particular, pay attention to factors of influence on outputs, outcome and purpose arising from the post-conflict situation of present days' Angola.

The study shall provide the embassy with conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations that can be used by the embassy in its discussion of possible continued support of the programme and of future support of democracy development in Angola in general.

SCOPE OF WORK

The work shall be guided by the NORAD Development Cooperation Manual and comprise, but not necessarily be limited to, the following tasks:

1. Assessing the results achieved in comparison with the planned outputs, outcome and purpose, and the efficiency of the methodology used to reach the planned outputs, outcome and purpose, furthermore to assess the realism of the programme and the relevance of the objectives.

2. Assessing how DW coordinates its activities with other civil society organisations and other actors active in the field of civic education on democratic development as well as its collaboration and interaction with government institutions and parliament/political parties.

3. Reviewing the monitoring system of the programme.

4. Assessing DW's follow-up of recommendations from the mid-term review carried out in 2006.

5. Assessing the gender dimension and the inclusion of issues of particular concern to gender and minority groups in the programme.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STUDY

4.1   The team

The study should be carried out by a team of two consultants, both with experience from and knowledge of Angola and / or the region and with proficiency in Portuguese and English. In addition, the team should have a thorough

knowledge of the governance situation in Angola and have a good knowledge of democratic development in an African context, preferably from post-conflict situations.

The consultants should familiarise themselves with MFA's strategy for its development co-operation with Angola over the next planning period.

Consultants will be hired by Norad. Responsible Norad adviser can be consulted throughout.

4.2   Sources of Documentation, respondents and methodology

The study will be based on secondary data (including relevant files in the Embassy), interviews and field visits. Interviews should be undertaken with the Embassy, DW, other civil society organisations operating in the same area, media, government and political parties, the donor community, and academia, as relevant. Interviews may be undertaken one-on-one or in groups.

4.3   Time frame and financing

The time frame of the study is estimated to be 5 weeks for the team leader, who will be responsible for the report and 4 weeks for the other team member. Both will spend approx. 15 days in Angola. The assignment will be undertaken alongside a similar review of the UNDP Trust Fund for Support to Civic Education Angola. The stipulated time shall cover both reviews.

- The review, including the field work is expected to take place during the period 20 May to 10 June 2008.

- The Embassy and DW will assist the team in making arrangements for their stay in Luanda and the provinces/ communities to be visited outside of Luanda. To the extent possible, the Embassy and DW will assist the team in preparing a mission programme of meetings/ interviews with relevant stakeholders, etc. Local transportation in Luanda will be the responsibility of the team.

- The study will be financed over and above the Norwegian contribution to the DW Civic and Electoral Education programme and Norad will be responsible for the costs related to the study.

REPORTING

- The consultants shall, before leaving Luanda, debrief the Norwegian Embassy, DW, other donors and other relevant partners on the main findings and conclusions of the study at a meeting in the Embassy.

- A draft report shall be presented in electronic form no later than one week after the consultants have left Angola, for feedback from the Embassy, DW, and Norad. These shall be given two weeks to comment on the draft report. The final report shall reflect these comments and acknowledge any substantive disagreements. The final report shall be ready by end of July 2008.

- The report shall be written in English and should not exceed 20 pages (excluding the annexes). The report shall consist of an executive summary, methodology used, major findings, conclusions and recommendations. TOR shall be attached.

- The executive summary, including main conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations shall be translated into Portuguese.

- The final report shall be delivered both in electronic and paper form (2 copies).